Pantheism is a metaphysical and religious position. Broadly defined itis the view that (1) "God is everything and everything is God … theworld is either identical with God or in some way a self-expression ofhis nature" (Owen 1971: 74). Similarly, it is the view that (2)everything that exists constitutes a "unity" and this all-inclusiveunity is in some sense divine (MacIntyre 1967: 34). A slightly morespecific definition is given by Owen (1971: 65) who says (3)"‘Pantheism’ … signifies the belief that every existingentity is, only one Being; and that all other forms of reality areeither modes (or appearances) of it or identical with it." Even withthese definitions there is dispute as to just how pantheism is to beunderstood and who is and is not a pantheist. Aside from Spinoza, otherpossible pantheists include some of the Presocratics; Plato; Lao Tzu;Plotinus; Schelling; Hegel; Bruno, Eriugena and Tillich. Possiblepantheists among literary figures include Emerson, Walt Whitman, D.H.Lawrence, and Robinson Jeffers. Beethoven (Crabbe 1982) and MarthaGraham (Kisselgoff 1987) have also been thought to be pantheistic insome of their work — if not pantheists.
The book recognized as containing the most complete attempt atexplaining and defending pantheism from a philosophical perspective isSpinoza'sEthics, finished in 1675 two years before his death.In 1720 John Toland wrote thePantheisticon: or The Form ofCelebrating the Socratic-Society in Latin. He (possibly) coinedthe term "pantheist" and used it as a synonym for "Spinozist." However,aside from some interesting pantheistic sounding slogans (like "EveryThing is to All, as All is to Every Thing"), and despite promising "Ashort Dissertation upon a Two-fold philosophy of the Pantheists"Toland's work has little to do with pantheism.
Not all of the problems generated by the theistic notion of God arealso problems for pantheism. But given a suitable reformulation, someof them will be. And, as expected, pantheism will also generate somedifficulties peculiar to itself. Thus, although evil and creation donot present identical problems for pantheism and theism, and mayeven be inherent to theism; itmay also be possible toreformulate them in a way that makes them applicable to pantheism.There may be pantheistic counterparts to the problem of evil and otherclassical theistic problems, and perhaps they can be resolved bypantheism.
There are probably more (grass-root) pantheists than Protestants, ortheists in general, and pantheism continues to be the traditionalreligious alternative to theism for those who reject the classicaltheistic notion of God. Not only is pantheism not antithetical toreligion, but certain religions are better understood as pantheisticrather than theistic when their doctrines are examined. PhilosophicalTaoism is the most pantheistic, but Advaita Vedanta, certain forms ofBuddhism and some mystical strands in monotheistic traditions are alsopantheistic. But even apart from any religious tradition many peopleprofess pantheistic beliefs — though somewhat obscurely. Pantheismremains a much neglected topic of inquiry. Given their prevalence,non-theistic notions of deity have not received the kind of carefulphilosophical attention they deserve. Certainly the central claims ofpantheism areprima facie no more "fantastic" than the centralclaims of theism — and probably a great deal less so.
In his non-pantheistic phase, Coleridge claimed that "every thingGod, and no God, are identical positions" (McFarland 1969: 228). Owen(1971: 69-70) says, "if ‘God’ (theos) is identical with theUniverse (to pan) it is merely another name for the Universe. It istherefore bereft of any distinctive meaning; so that pantheism isequivalent to atheism." Similarly, Schopenhauer (1951: 40) said that"to call the world ‘God’ is not to explain it; it is onlyto enrich our language with a superfluous synonym for the word‘world’." The charge that pantheism is atheistic is as oldas pantheism itself. Christopher Rowe (1980: 54-5) says, "When Cicero'sVelleius describes Speusippus' pantheism as an attempt to ‘rootout the notion of gods from our minds’, he is echoing a chargewhich was commonly made against the pantheism of the earlier Greeknatural philosophers … like Anaximander or Heraclitus. These tendedto be identified as atheists in the popular mind; and indeed Platohimself implies a similar view … the opponents who classify them asatheists are in reality attacking them for undermining traditionalbeliefs about the gods — or, to borrow a phrase from the indictmentagainst Socrates, ‘for not believing in the gods the citybelieves in’."
At most, what Schopenhauer, Coleridge, Owen etc. can show, andprobably all they intend, is that the pantheistic Unity can beexplained in terms that would either eliminate the notion of deity frompantheism altogether, or that it is incoherent. They want to show thatbelieving in a pantheistic God is a convoluted and confused way ofbelieving in something that can adequately be described apart from anynotion of deity — and in this they are mistaken.
For the pantheist, however Unity is interpreted, the world is notsimply an all-inclusive Unity in the sense that the world, understoodto be everything, is the "unity" composed of everything. This would beto interpret it as asserting that everything that exists simply iseverything that exists; or to put it another way, everything is (ofcourse) all-inclusively everything. This is true but vacuous, and ittrivialises pantheism at the outset.
Attributing Unity simply on the basis of all-inclusiveness isirrelevant to pantheism. Formal unity can always be attributed to theworld on this basis alone. To understand the world as "everything" isto attribute a sense of unity to the world, but there is no reason tosuppose this sense of all-inclusiveness is the pantheistically relevantUnity. Similarly, unity as mere numerical, class or categorical unityis irrelevant, since just about anything (and everything) can be "one"or a "unity" in these senses. Suppose "formal unity" to be "the sensein which things are one in virtue of the fact that they are members ofone and the same class … the same universal" (Demos 1945-6: 538).Then clearly formal unity is not pantheistic Unity. Furthermore, formalunity neither entails or is entailed by types of unity (e.g.substantial unity) sometimes taken to be Unity. Hegel'sGeist,Lao Tzu'sTao, Plotinus' "One," and arguably Spinoza's"substance," are independent of this kind of formal unity.
Unity is explained in various ways that are often interrelated. Theseconnections range from mutual entailment, to different types of causaland contingent relations. Roughly, Unity is interpreted 1)ontologically; 2) naturalistically — in terms of orderingprinciple(s), force(s) or plans; 3) substantively — where thisis distinguished from "ontologically"; and 4) genealogically —in terms of origin. Christopher Rowe (1980: 57) calls 4 a"genealogical model of explanation" of unity. "Thales, Anaximander,and Anaximenes, the Milesian monists appear to have claimed that whatunifies the world is that it sprang from a single undifferentiatedsubstance.
Unity may have to be explained partly in terms of divinity. Theall-inclusive whole may be a Unity because it is divine — eitherin itself (Spinoza's substance), or because of a divine powerinforming the whole — as with the Presocratics. The Presocraticsgive an account of why they think the unifying principle is divine. Itis immortal and indestructible. But this does not satisfactorilyexplain the relation between Unity and divinity, or why divinity mightbe seen as a basis of Unity. Similarly, though less naturally, thequestion arises as to whether the all-inclusive whole is divinebecause it is a Unity. Can Unity be a basis for attributing divinityto the whole? If divinity is the basis for Unity, as it may be for thePresocratics; or alternatively if Unity is the basis for divinity;then there is something of a redundancy in the definition of pantheismas the belief that everything that exists constitutes a divineUnity. A simpler non-redundant definition would be that pantheismholds that "everything is divine".
Why do pantheists ascribe divinity to the Unity? The reason issimilar to why theists describe God as holy. They experience it assuch. In Otto's (1950) experiential account, what is divine is whatevokes the numinous experience. This can be a theistic god, but it canalso be a pantheistic Unity. And, when looked at from socio-scientificperspectives in terms of how the concept of divinity functionsintellectually and affectively (e.g., its ethical, soteriological andexplanatory roles), its application in theism and pantheism is much thesame.
There is no reason to suppose the idea of "divinity" relevant topantheism should be modelled after a specific tradition's concept ofdivinity-like Christianity. At best, this tradition-dependent conceptwould be relevant to Christian/pantheist and other theist/pantheisthybrids (e.g. panentheism). It is too specific for any generalanalysis of pantheism, and it refers to the theistic variants ofpantheism which are most inconsequential for pantheistic practice.
From a pantheistic perspective, panentheism is just a variety oftheism. It involves both the belief that God is a person (has a mind,is conscious etc) and the belief that God is partially, or in somerespect, transcendent. Like deism and pantheism, it too is best seen,from a Western perspective, as a response to theism — a way ofovercoming allegedly unacceptable aspects.
Whatever criteria are decided upon as necessary for attributingdivinity to something, one cannot decidea priori that thepossession of divinity requires personhood without ruling out thepossibility of the most typical types of pantheism (i.e. non-personaltypes). After all, theism is what pantheism is most of all trying todistance itself from. I am not sure the reverse is true-but theism doesordinarily strongly oppose itself to pantheism. In any case, Spinoza'sGod and Lao Tzu'sTao, for example, are distinctlynon-personal, as are the governing principles of the Presocratics. Itseems unwarranted, therefore, to suppose that a necessary condition ofsomething's being divine is that it be personal on the grounds that "Ofall the modes of creaturely existence, personality is the highest andso the fittest to serve as an analogy of divine being" (Macquarrie1984: 42). At least to do so begs the question against Spinoza, some ofthe Presocratics, Lao Tzu, probably Plotinus, as well as againstexperiential and socio-scientific accounts of divinity.
Whether or not substance monism is ontologically necessary forUnity, an explanation of its relevance requires somethingextra-ontological to be cited. The same is true of any factual groundfor Unity. Delineating metaphysical or modal properties of a substance,or anything else, does not make their relevance to Unity obvious. Sowhat if everything is made from one self-subsistent immutablesubstance? So what if everything is really a single organism whenconsidered macrocosmically? Why would this be pantheistically, ratherthan merely metaphysically significant? What is the evaluative orreligious significance of natural features of the totality thatpantheism claims is central to Unity? Because value must be partlyconstitutive of Unity, it must be explained in partly evaluative terms.This is a necessary condition for an adequate criterion of Unity.Without it one is left only with this or that fact as a basis forpositing Unity, but no adequate account of the relevance of the basis,and so no account of Unity itself.
There may be ways of conceiving of the monistic "One" such that it istaken both as a unity and as "divine" — yet still not as apantheistic Unity. The monistic unity (the "One") may not be regardedas a "Unity" (i.e. unity in some relevant pantheistic sense). Not justany monistic unity (e.g. mere substance monism) suffices forpantheism, whether or not it is also regarded as divine. Thus,although Hegel conceived of Reality as unified and rational in termsof the Absolute (Geist), and in a manner that I take it would qualifyGeist as divine, he denies he was a pantheist. Similarly, Sankara'sBrahman is ontologically all-inclusive and is part of a metaphysicalaccount of the nature of Reality that is religiously significant(i.e. "Reality" is divine in some sense). However, it may be deniedthat advaita Vedanta, although monistic, is pantheistic. "Unity" isseen as absent from, or even antithetical to, essential aspects ofadvaita Vedanta such as its monism.
Monists, like pantheists, believe that Reality, or an aspect of it,is "One" or unified. Of course they also deny it is "One" or a "unity"in most other senses. Whatever similarities there are in this regard,there is insufficient reason for attributing pantheism to monists,because the oneness of Reality is neither a necessary nor sufficientcondition of pantheism. It is at most a necessary condition if monistic"oneness" is construed in a unitive sense that is constitutive of someparticular pantheistic account of the divine Unity. An allegedentailment between pantheism and monism is even less likely sincepantheists, like everyone else, are generally pluralistic. Anyappearance to the contrary has been fostered by simply conflating Unitywith monism, or by considering the few pantheists who were also monistsand taking them as the norm. The connection between Spinoza's monismand his pantheism, does not rest on an identification of the twopositions, but is instead the result of the wider metaphysical positionconstructed in hisEthics.
Substance monism need not have any implications concerning God or anAbsolute in either a theistic or pantheistic sense. Differences amongsubstance monists may be greater than differences between monists whodeny and theists who affirm that God and creation are substantiallydistinct. For example, a substance monist (e.g. Sankara —interpreted atheistically) need not identify substance with God, orrecognize any God, at all. In this case it is plausible to hold thatthe difference between such an atheistic monist and a theistic orpantheistic monist is far greater than that between the theisticmonist who perhaps holds that creatures and creator are co-substantial(though the theistic monist need not hold this view), and the theisticnon-monist who believes that all creatures are substantially distinctfrom the creator. The latter two have their theism in common, whilethe former two have their monism in common. The latter two are"closer" in kind than the former, if (and so far as) one assumes thattheism is a more significant common denominator than monism.
Many of the difficulties associated with theistic transcendence arenot dissipated for the pantheist when relevantly adjusted. Forexample, theistic transcendence presentsprima faciedifficulties concerning knowledge of and relations with God. Thepantheist is part of the Unity, but both the nature of Unity, and itspractical implications must be determined. In theMeditationsof Marcus Aurelius this appears as much a problem for pantheists, ifAurelius is one, as knowing and relating to God is for theists.
In a sense, the Unity in pantheism is wholly immanent, but this isbare ontological immanence that follows from the Unity'sall-inclusiveness (i.e. there is nothing else). Yet even thisoverstates the pantheistic commitment to immanence. Aspects of theUnity or the unifying principle often have a transcendent aspect tothem. Unity is "all-inclusive" but with the possible exception ofSpinoza, pantheists generally deny complete immanence. Thus, themetaphysicalTao informs everything and is part of theall-inclusive Unity, but it does have a transcendent aspect to it. Itdoes transcend the phenomenal world of "myriad things." The same istrue of Hegel'sGeist, the Plotinian "One," and Presocraticunifying principles as well. So the claim that pantheists deny "God's"transcendence is altogether misleading on several counts unless takento mean what it usually does mean when asserted by theists —which is that pantheists deny the transcendence of a theistic God.
If pantheism is seen as the quintessential expression of divineimmanence, then it is not difficult to see why it might be combinedwith panpsychism or animism. Like pantheism, both of these express akind of pervasive immanence — "mind" in the former case and "livingsoul," "spirit," or "animal life" in the latter. But however consonantor combined with pantheism these may be, they should be distinguishedfrom both from each other and from pantheism. None of these three viewsentail one another, and the suggestion that pantheism and panpsychismnaturally go together is vague apart from specific accounts of the twopositions.
What immediately sets panpsychism apart from pantheism is its beliefthat mental activity, usually of a kind we can only at times be mildlyaware of, is all-pervasive. Although such a supposition is notnecessarily inconsistent with pantheism, it is not part of pantheism.Pantheism does not imply that the material/immaterial, ororganic/inorganic dichotomies must be rejected. It does not rejectthese distinctions, but implies that Unity ranges over such divisions.There are other major differences between the two positions as well.Pantheism is a much broader theory. It has implications beyond thescope of panpsychism where the latter is seen as an account of theorigin of mind and the relation between mind and matter.
Animism, panpsychism, and especially the doctrine of a world-soul asembodied in the macrocosm/microcosm distinction, have at times beenequated with pantheism. These positions may be intrinsic to particularversions of pantheism, but pantheism as such is broader than these anddistinct from them.
Assuming pantheism does require a doctrine or view about creation,what can be said positively about it? Pantheism has a range of optionsunavailable to theism since the theistic doctrine is extrapolated fromscripture. A pantheist might be a kind of existentialist with regardto questions like "Why is there anything at all?" They could believeexistence is a brute fact, with no explanation possible. This might beseen as a refusal to deal with the issue of creation — asrejecting the idea that pantheism requires a theory of creation suitedto the notion of a divine Unity. But this is not necessarily so. Forall its seeming negativity, this is a positive position and not onethat simply denies other views. It is a theory of origin or creationthat could be acceptable to some pantheists.
One reason any account of origin, including the view of existence asa brute fact, might be rejected as being especially relevant topantheism, is that the account is not thought to be intrinsicallyconnected to the notion of Unity. Indeed, pantheists might reject theidea that they require an account of creation intrinsic to their ideaof Unity. Instead,any account that does not conflict with theway in which Unity is conceived of might be accepted.
In distinguishing between creationex nihilo and emanationismas he does, Macquarrie (1984: 34-5) makes it easy to see whyemanationism is often closely associated with pantheism. Emanationismis the view that "creation" is not a "making," but in some sense a"flowing forth" from God or its origin, as Macquarrie puts it. And,what "flows forth" "maintains a closer relation to [its] origin. Itparticipates in the origin, and the origin participates in it." Hesays, "…emanationism does not necessarily lead to pantheism,but it does imply that in some sense God is in the world and the worldis in God."
Even though doctrines of creationex nihilo do notnecessarily conflict with that central pantheistic claim, they areusually seen as doing do — partly because they are associatedwith other incompatible theistic elements (e.g. the creator is aperson). On the other hand, emanationism appears to provide a doctrinewhich — if not an explicit ground on which to base pantheism— is at least one that is seen as congenial. As a doctrine ofcreation, it may even provide a partial basis for pantheism — asit has (arguably) for Plotinus, Eriugena, and even for Spinoza where"God" is the immanent cause of all things. The view that God is the"immanent cause" of things is a kind of creation doctrine for Spinozaand a basis for Unity. So far as Lao Tzu has a doctrine of creation ittoo is emanationist. "The Tao engenders one, One engenders two, Twoengenders three, And three engenders the myriad things" (Tao TeChing, XLII) (Ku-ying 1981: 49). TheTao is "theprimordial natural force, possessing an infinite supply of power andcreativity" (Ku-ying 1981: 6). Not only does theTao createthings — it is responsible for, or makes possible, theirgrowth. "It nourishes them and develops them … provides forthem and shelters them"(Tao Te Ching, LI).
Emanationism tends to affirm rather than deny a common ontological,substantial, and evaluative base among everything that exists (e.g.,whatever it is which creatively emanates, it is "Good"). It istherefore seen as in keeping with the central tenets of pantheism, andwhere pantheists adhere to a doctrine of creation it tends to beemanationist. Since Unity must partly be explained evaluatively, thefact that emanationism is often linked to the "Good" provides furtherreason for supposing it consonant with pantheism. Thus, althoughMacquarrie is right in claiming that the emanationist view of creation"does not necessarily lead to pantheism," the implication is that itoften does.
It is not the case that pantheism need not address the existence ofevil and associated moral issues. It offers both its ownformulation(s) of a "problem of evil" and its own responses. However,the very idea of evil may be something the pantheist wishes toeschew. "Evil" is essentially a metaphysical rather than a moralconcept; or it is moral concept with a particular theisticmetaphysical commitment. The pantheist may prefer, as mostcontemporary ethical theorists do, to talk of what is morally orethically right and wrong. The term "evil" could be retained andapplied to particular (usually extreme) instances of moral wrongness,but it would be understood in a sense that divorces it from itsoriginal theological and metaphysical context.
Given the classical argument from evil in either its logical orempirical versions it is surprising that anyone should think evilpresents any problem whatsoever for the pantheist; for example, thatevil counts against the existence of the pantheistic Unity in a waysimilar to the way in which it counts against the existence of thetheistic God. Evil might be taken to be indicative of a lack ofpantheistic Unity, as evidence of some kind of chaos instead. But itcannot count against the existence of a pantheistic Unity in the wayit can count against the existence of a theistic God. The argumentfrom evil states that given the following propositions it is eitherimpossible that God exists, or it improbable that God exists. 1) Godis omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. 2) God would preventall preventable evil. 3) The world contains preventable evil. Thepantheist rejects the proposition needed to generate the problem tobegin with. The pantheist accepts (3) "The world contains preventableevil." The pantheist also accepts that if there was a theistic God,which for the pantheistex hypothesi there is not, then (2)"God would prevent preventable evil." But the pantheist rejects (1)"God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good." Undeniably thereis evil in the world that could be prevented, and supposing there wasa theistic God one would assume that he would prevent it. But sincethere is no such God why suppose that proposition (3) requires somekind of special explanation or is cause for any "unease" on the partof the pantheist? The existence of preventable evil, for all that hasbeen, does not even constitute aprima facie reason forrejecting the coherence of a pantheistic notion of Unity, or theprobability of the existence of Unity. (3) is not incompatible withanything the pantheist believes to be true. Certainly it is notincompatible with (1) since the pantheist denies the truth of (1), andit is not incompatible with (2) which is only hypothetically true forthe pantheist. The pantheist has no need to explain evil, or toexplain evil away — at least not in any way resembling theism'sneed to do so.
Evil may be a problem for the pantheist, but it is not the kind ofproblem that it is for the theist. It does not even conflict,prima facie with the existence of a divine Unity. Pantheismdoes not claim that its divine Unity is a "perfect being" or being atall (generally), or that it is omniscient etc. Surely it is mistakento interpret Spinoza's "God" as "perfect" and "omniscient" etc. inanything like the way these predicates are interpreted theistically asapplying to God. It might be supposed that the existence of evil isinconsistent or incongruous with the "divinity" of the Unity. But thiswould have to argued. In theism it is assumed that what is divinecannot also be (in part) evil. But why assume this is the case withpantheism? Even in Otto's account of the "holy" the holy has a demonicaspect. There seems little reason to suppose that what is divinecannot also, in part, be evil. At any rate, there is little reason forthe pantheist to argue that what is divine can also be evil, sincethey can deny that evil falls within the purview of the divineUnity. To say that everything that exists constitutes a divine Unity(i.e. pantheism's essential claim) need not be interpreted in such away so that it entails that all parts and every aspect of the Unity isdivine or good. There can be a Unity and it can be divine withouteverything about it always, or even sometimes, being divine.
"Natural properties" are properties such as being a certain colour,shape, temperature or height, causing pain, "producing the greatestgood for the greatest number" etc. They are properties that one can,in principle, verify that an object or action has or lacks. Someethical "naturalists" (e.g., some Utilitarians) claim that moralproperties are identical with natural properties. For example, amorally right action is sometimes equated with the action which"produces the greatest good for the greatest number." Others claimthat moral properties are entailed by natural properties. Pantheists,however, generally believe that moral properties are both distinctfrom natural properties and are not entailed by them. Thus, they areusually "nonnaturalists.
Despite their nonnaturalism, pantheists, like theists, reject G.E.Moore's contention that these properties (i.e. goodness and badness)are ultimate and irreducible. For the theist the fact that "X is wrong"will be explained, and partially analysed, in terms of (even if notreducible to) nonnatural facts about God's will and nature. And, forthe pantheist the fact that "X is wrong" will be explained, andpartially analysed, in terms of (even if not reducible to) nonnaturalfacts about the divine Unity. Nonnaturalism is the position mostcongenial to pantheism, but a pantheist could make a case for being anethical naturalist just as one could argue for a naturalistic theisticethics.
Pantheism leaves the option between ethical naturalism and ethicalnonnaturalism open. For the pantheist, though perhaps not for thetheist, value-properties and predicates may be empirical or natural, orsupervene upon natural properties, even if they are not entailed bysuch properties. So pantheists may be ethical naturalists. This may bethe case even if assertions containing value predicates are not takento be empirically verifiable in any straightforward way as they oftenare for naturalism. Such value-predicates are not "empirical" in anarrow sense in which facts in the physical or even psychologicalsciences are empirical; but neither are they facts about sometranscendent reality. Pantheism may, in a sense, deny the existence ofany properties that are not "natural." It depends on how much one iswilling to broaden one's notion of "natural." Of course,classifications such as "objectivist" and "nonnaturalist," are only apartial explanation of pantheists' ethical views.
A pantheistic ecological ethic will not be anthropocentric. Thisrules out the notion of man as a "steward of nature," whether his ownor God's, who is responsible for nature. It also rules out utilitarian,contractarian, and Kantian approaches as providing an ultimate basissince they are anthropocentric. It does not, however, rule outcontractarian etc. principles as useful guides to making and justifyingenvironmental decisions. Applying anthropocentrically conceivedprinciples to environmental issues would suffice in many cases, but notall, to sound reasoning about the environment. (The practical problemenvironmentally speaking has been that almost no principles have beenapplied until recently. Selfish economic "forces," i.e. people, haveruled without restraint.) The situation here is no different than withrespect to theism. For the theist, ultimate justification of ethicsresides in a view about the nature of God. But the theist is notprevented,qua theist, from invoking less ultimate ethicalprinciples.
The pantheist's ethic, her environmental ethic and her ethics moregenerally, will be metaphysically based in terms of the divine Unity.It will be based on the Unifying principle which accounts for animportant commonality, and it will be the grounds for extending one'snotion of the moral community to other living and non-living things.Everything that is part of the divine Unity (as everything is) is alsopart of the moral community. Aldo Leopold (1949: 219, 240) says, "Theland ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to includesoils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land …A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability,and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tendsotherwise." Looking towards pantheism as a metaphysical justificationof, for example, Leopold's "land ethic" is not unreasonable — orno more unreasonable than pantheism itself is.
An anthropocentric view of morality can at best make the non-human andnon-living world an object of moral consideration. But it cannot,according to some, provide a basis for regarding those things ashaving a "good" of their own or as being non-human members of a moralcommunity. Pantheists (and theists) will generally reject anyenvironmental ethic as unsound if it fails to regard the non-humanworld as a full-fledged member of the moral community. In their view,to do otherwise is ultimately to rest the prospects of environmentalwell-being on the good will of the only members of the moral communitythere are — humans. This is seen like resting the welfare ofcolonies on the goodwill of the colonisers. In order to enlarge ourunderstanding of the moral community in the appropriate ways ametaphysical basis for an environmental ethic is needed which limitsthe significance of the anthropocentric view.
Furthermore, it is clear that those, like deep ecologists, who arguethat our notion of the moral community must be enlarged to include the"good" of the non-human and non-living, and that it is metaphysicallycorrect to do so, also claim that practical consequencesareinvolved. The issue is not merely one of providing a rational basisfor an environmental ethic.
It may seem that pantheists can claim that ethics and an approach toecology should be kept separate from, or that they are separate from,the more general pantheistic view that asserts the existence of adivine Unity. A kind of "separation between church and environment"might be proposed. But I doubt that such a separation is possible. Thepantheist, like the theist or atheist takes the nature of reality asdeterminative of ethical requirements. Since Unity is predicated uponsome evaluative consideration (e.g. the divine Unity being constitutedon the basis of "goodness"), value is a focal point for the pantheistand a principle concern. This situation in regard to pantheism is nottoo different than the one for theism. For the theist, ethicalrequirements and evaluative concerns of all sorts are connected toGod's alleged goodness, and overall nature.
Pantheistic ethics are, in some ways, Aristotelian. For pantheism thenotion of "the good life" as a regulative ideal — atelos or end to be strived for — is an aspect ofsalvation. This can be explained by examining some similaritiesbetween pantheistic ethics and Aristotelianism. The pantheist has whatPaul Taylor (1975: 132) calls "an essentialist conception ofhappiness." Like the Aristotelian; Platonist; and theist — thepantheist's conception of happiness "presupposes that there is such athing as an essential human nature." They all disagree as to whatthat essential nature is. The pantheist's conception of human nature,her philosophical anthropology, is generally broader and less specificthan the others. When goals are stipulated that manqua manshould achieve this indicates an essentialist conception of humannature.
Furthermore, in an essentialist conception of happiness (one whichpresupposes that there is such a thing as an essential human nature),"happiness" is largely a function of how well one fulfils one'sessential nature. Pantheism's wide conception of human nature allowsfor a broad range of ways for people to achieve happiness. There arefewer ways for the Aristotelian or theist to achieve happiness thanthere are for the pantheist. To the extent that a human being is ableto achieve "happiness" by actualising the properties that "define thegood of man as such" — they will be leading an intrinsicallygood life. "Happiness" is then the standard by which to judge thenon-derivative (intrinsic) value of a person's life.
Pantheism has a nonanthropocentric conception of human well-being.The human good is characterised partly in terms of relationalproperties. One must have a certain kind of relation to the Unity inorder to live "properly." The set of properties common and unique tohumans, which also define the good for humans as such, includerelational properties. When a person exemplifies their essential humannature in this way — and it can only be exemplified in thisrelational way — they are living the "Good" life and can therebyachieve well-being and happiness. This nonanthropocentric conceptionof human well-being constitutes pantheism's standard of humanperfection and virtue. It is a standard of intrinsic value.
As in the case of Aristotle's essentialist conception of the natureof things, the Human Good (defined as it is in terms of human nature)will be different from an animal's good or a plant's good. For thepantheist, the Good of these other things must also be understoodpartly in terms of their relation to the Unity. Furthermore, the Goodassociated with various things (humans, plants, etc.) isincommensurable. There is no standard external to each kind of thing bywhich all things can be measured in terms of perfection, or virtue, orintrinsic value. There is no such thing as intrinsic valueperse given an essentialist account of the nature's of things whichincludes essentialist standards of perfection. It is not just wrong tosay that a human being is intrinsically more valuable than a tree. Itis also nonsense. Of course this does not mean trees should not be usedby people.
Taylor (1975) claims that according to the essentialist conception ofhuman nature, the value achieved in human life by fulfilling thestandard of intrinsic value is independent its consequences in thelives of others. If this is right then the pantheist will reject anyunqualified account of the essentialist's standard of human perfectionand virtue. (Indeed, an Aristotelian need not hold such an absolutenon-consequentialist account either.) Intrinsic value is, of course,value that is non-derivative. But, what determines the intrinsicgoodness in a person's life will, for the pantheist, rely on thatperson's relationship to the Unity. A person's "good" is partiallyconstituted by the divine Unity of which everything is a part. Inpantheistic terms it makes little sense to speak of the intrinsicvalue of a human life as measured against a standard independent ofhow that life affects others, since for the pantheist all such value,even so-called "intrinsic value," is partly derivative. The standardof intrinsic value and perfection cannot be determined withoutreference to the divine Unity. The essential nature and well-being ofa person, or anything else, cannot be analysed apart from its contextin relation to the Unity and everything it includes.
Although both theism and pantheism have essentialist conceptions ofhuman nature, well-being on either of those accounts cannot beachieved apart from one's relation to others, or the consequences ofone's actions for others. And, the pantheist and theist are not theonly kind of essentialists for whom consequences and relationsmatter. For the Aristotelian, in order to achieve well-being it isnecessary to develop a certain kind of character. This requires, inpart, certain virtues (e.g. courage, temperance etc.). Since thedevelopment and display of character and virtue is connected insignificant ways with the consequences of an individual's actions inrelation to other people — the concept of one life having"intrinsic value" apart from how it affects any other life isvacuous. Aristotle's account of the virtues makes a practicalimpossibility of living a "good life" that is fundamentally bad forothers. Plato too claims that the virtuous life has its rewards forall. Thus, essentialist conceptions of human nature and the Good neednot preclude, and may even entail, an account of persons in relationto other things. For the pantheist, "realising the good for man asman" must be interpreted in terms of the Unity. For pantheism, anessentialist account of human nature does not suggest that there isnecessarily only one kind of ideal person or way to achievehappiness.
An essentialist conception of human nature may recognise a range ofhuman natures compatible with "Human Nature" as such. Just as variousplants are constituted in such a way that their different requirementsmust be met if they are to thrive and flourish (i.e. what constitutestheir well-being varies), so too will conditions for a person's"well-being" vary from person to person. The pantheist maintains thatthere is no such thing as an (i.e. one) essential human nature —although some properties are shared. Yet given various human natures,well-being can only be achieved to the extent that the individualsatisfies their own nature — achieve their own potential —in their particular circumstances in relation to the Unity. Pantheistseschew hierarchies that have as a criterion for the "good life" anyparticular intrinsic feature that certain human beings may have whichothers lack. A good mind used in a good way may help one lead a betterlife, but so will good looks and a good job.
Pantheists deny personal immortality. There is no life after deathin the sense that it is "they" who survive. Historically, the denial ofpersonal immortality is one of pantheism's most distinctive features.This is partly because it is in clear opposition to the theistic view.But, it is primarily significant because it is constitutive of thepantheist's world-view and ethos, and so has implications forpantheistic practice. Believing that one is not going to live againafter one dies, just as believing one will live again, has implicationsfor one's choices in this life. There, is of course, nothing like adirect correlation in terms of what one believes concerning immortalityand how they choose to live. But for some people, seeing death as thepermanent end of one's existence, or alternatively as a prolegomenon toanother life, will be a constitutive factor of the ultimate context inwhich to live. The goals they choose to pursue, the relationships theyhave, their vocations, may to varying degrees be affected by theirbelief that death is or is not the permanent end of the individual. Thepantheist need not believe that it would be tedious to live forever.They just claim that no one does. This fact is not so much something tobe lived with — as to be lived in terms of. The denial of personalimmortality is as determinative of how the pantheist lives as thebelief in an afterlife is for the theist.
The fact that pantheists (e.g. Spinoza) deny personal immortality isat times given as reason why pantheism is atheistic. The doctrine ofimmortality is so central to classical Christian theism, that rejectingthe former is taken as entailing the denial of the latter. Yet, denyingpersonal immortality can hardly be regarded as grounds for atheismunless theism, with its insistence on personal immortality, is taken tobe the only position asserting the existence of a "God" that is notatheistic. The doctrine of personal immortality is not even essentialto all forms of theism. Since many theists, e.g. many Jewish theists,deny immortality, it would seem this denial is neither a necessary norsufficient condition of atheism.
People who are interested in personal immortality, like people whoare not interested (perhaps because they do not believe people survivedeath) may nevertheless be concerned with their continued existence inan impersonal sense. Impersonal forms of "immortality," or survivingdeath, can include "surviving" in people's memories, being rememberedfor one's work, a bone in a reliquary, or becoming another part of thematter/energy cycle once again. One may want to be remembered for what onehas accomplished, or for the person one was. Impersonal "immortality"may seem to pale next to the theists' insistence on personalimmortality and the meeting again of people known in this life.Nevertheless, people's notions of impersonal immortality may beimportant in various ways. Whether or not they believe in personalimmortality, it matters to some people how they will be thought of. Nodoubt, people who believe in personal immortality are also generallyconcerned with the impersonal forms. Some may even value beingremembered for something they produced as more important than personalsurvival after death. But typically, the person who believes inpersonal immortality regards it with a concern that they do not havefor various impersonal types of survival.
Some pantheists believe in various types of non-personal immortality(e.g. Spinoza and Robinson Jeffers), and they regard this assignificant for reasons other than, or in addition to, the reasonsnon-pantheists give. They reject the view that personal immortality ismore valuable than impersonal immortality. This is not to say that ifpantheists believed there was personal immortality they could notregard it as desirable. Perhaps the could even though the idea isanthropocentric and uncongenial to pantheism. But pantheists do notbelieve in personal immortality, and they regard some types ofimpersonal immortality as important on distinctively pantheisticgrounds.
Robinson Jeffers suggests that what may be important to the pantheist,and regarded as "a kind of salvation," is neither the realisation ofthe theist's hope for personal immortality, nor the atheists' (ortheists') desire to be remembered in certain ways — although thepantheist can desire this as well. Instead, what is distinctivelysignificant is the recognition of the individual as a part of theUnity — what Jeffers calls the "one organic whole … thisone God." The "parts change and pass, or die, people and races androcks and stars," but the whole remains. He says, "… all itsparts are different expressions of the same energy, and they are allin communication with each other, influencing each other, [and are]therefore parts of one organic whole." (See, George Sessions 1977:481-528). Part of what Jeffers is suggesting is that "salvation" (orimmortality) it is not so much a matter of the fact of one's survivalin some form; rather, "salvation" consists in the recognition of the"oneness" or Unity of everything. "[T]his whole alone is worthy of thedeeper sort of love; and that there is peace, freedom, I might say akind of salvation, in turning one's affections outward toward this oneGod, rather than inwards on one's self, or on humanity." This isimpersonal rather than personal immortality or salvation, but it isdifferent from the kinds of impersonal survival discussed above. Itmay even be regarded as a kind of personal salvation, since Jefferssuggests that salvation can be experienced for oneself while alive— and only when alive. Such salvation resembles neitherimpersonal forms of immortality, nor theists' personal life afterdeath.
Even if we are not at all clear about what pantheists should do, itmay seem we are relatively clear about what they believe. However, iftheorists who claim that action sometimes explains belief, or thataction and belief must be understood together are right, then itfollows that we do not yet know what pantheists believe. Insofar aspantheists lack a distinctive practice, they may be taken not tobelieve anything (pantheistically) at all. Such theorists claim thatsystems of belief and practice, if not individual beliefs andpractices, are intrinsically related so as to define one another— and they develop together. Therefore, it may not be possibleto keep the question of what pantheists believe distinct from thequestion of what they do. One need not accept such theories tobelieve, as a matter of commonsense, that belief and practice areconnected in such a way that they cannot be adequately understoodapart from one another.
In attempting to construct an account of what the contemporarypantheist should do, it would be useful to examine practices thatpantheists have traditionally undertaken. But it makes no sense tosuppose contemporary pantheists could replicate the representation ofsocial relations that pantheistic rituals might be analysed as havingby a symbolist account. If a pantheistic ritual symbolicallyrepresents social relations, it represents those of its ownsociety. At any rate, the point is largely moot since the practice ofpantheism has never been associated with ritual practice but with away of life. Thus, Lao Tzu, explicitly eschewed ritual, and Spinozathought that while ordinary religious practice, ritual etc., was agood idea for the common people since it inculcated valuable ideals,it was beside the point for him. The fact that pantheistic practicehas never been associated with ritual may partly explain why pantheismhas not been practiced communally in a church.
In literalist or Geertzian terms it makes sense to ask what to do,given certain beliefs, in a way it does not for a symbolist. The kindsof practice suitable to pantheism are explicable in terms of beliefsliterally and symbolically understood; and especially (in Geertz'saccount) in terms of a world view (e.g. belief in a divine Unity) andcorresponding ethos. Thus, Lao Tzu describes theTao as ametaphysical reality; as natural law or system of self-regulatedprinciples; and also as a principle, pattern and standard for humanconduct. One emulates theTao after discerning its manifestcharacteristics in the phenomenal world, and to emulate theTao is to practiceTaoism. In "Song of Myself"Whitman articulates a world view, and evokes the connected ethos heenvisages. For Spinoza, examining the nature and implications of Unity(substance) in theEthics, and trying to live in accord withthat account, was itself a form of pantheistic practice. Similarly, inwriting and living as depicted in "Song of Myself," Whitman practicedthe pantheism he preached. The relationship between the thought andpractice of Hegel, Plotinus, Bruno etc. is less apparent, but should beof interest to pantheists. If pantheists find any of the various worldviews and ‘ethos’ described as consonant with their own,they may pattern their practices after those associated with suchviews. In having a particular pantheistic view of the nature of things,certain practices and a way of life must, to an extent, follow.
The idea of looking to religions with pantheistic practices forexamples of what to do may seem promising in a literalist or Geertzianapproach. Similar kinds of practice should follow similar beliefs. Thedifficulty is that there seem to be no pantheistic traditions toexamine — not evenTaoism, since as practiced, it isnot pantheistic. In traditional religions, practices that might beidentifiable as pantheistic are always seen in the context of widerreligious (e.g. theistic) practice. In traditions that are partlypantheistic like some native American Indian religions, it isdifficult to discern how practices relating to pantheistic beliefs canbe distinguished from various kinds of god and spirit worship. Sincepantheism has largely been non-communal, individual pantheists, nottraditions, must examined.
Religious practice is usually prescribed by teachings and doctrine,and informed by other beliefs widely held among the community ofbelievers. Since there is no widely recognised body of scriptural orother religious teaching in pantheism and never has been (there islittle doctrine and no church), there should be little in the way ofprescribed practice. As already noted, the philosophicalTaoism of theTao Te Ching is pantheistic, but ithas never been widely practiced and there is no body of ritualassociated with it.
The kind of activity undertaken by a believer ideally reflects (i.e.is explainable in terms of) the way in which the religious object, andone's relation to it, is conceived. Differences in practice are theproducts of varying views on the nature of God and the world-set in thecontext of a more comprehensive world view. Since pantheistic andtheistic accounts of God and the world are best regarded as mutuallyexclusive, it is likely that the practices of each would be dissimilar.Theistic practice, the intent and so forth, is inappropriate for thepantheist, andvice versa. Pantheists will not want topractice in a way that reflects beliefs they do not hold.
If specific pantheistic practices could be identified, these might beadapted to modern pantheism. Yet, to talk of adapting practices inthis way is artificial. As a whole, practice neither precedes norfollows the body of beliefs formulated and codified by a religiouscommunity. It develops along with them. Even where religious beliefsare taken (e.g. Durkheim) to be rationalisations of practices thatprecede them, practice occurs in a context of shared conceptions,beliefs and concerns, and are — whether literally orsymbolically — expressions of these. Ritual, and religiouspractice generally, is a product of conscious and unconscious, literaland symbolic, communal religious reflection. Given (and one wonderswhy) that there has been little structured pantheistic communalreflection, despite the fact that there are many pantheists, there isno identifiable pantheistic practice. There are only identifiablepantheistic world views and beliefs. This does not explain whyindividual pantheists have not developed recognisable rituals, unlessa community of believers (i.e. a church) is necessary for suchpractices. The practice of pantheism seems confined to individualsacting in ways they see as according with the nature of things.
If contemporary pantheistic ritual exists, it is scarce. (Is thesolstice gathering at Stonehenge pantheistic?) The extent to which onecan self-consciously set out to construct a ritual is, for reasonsalready given, suspect. But, given that one can consciously constructsymbols that address a community's concerns, there seems no reason whypantheistic rituals cannot be formulated. Indeed, various theisticrituals are self-consciously created. Furthermore, ritual is only oneaspect of religious practice, and pantheists may develop other ways toexpress their beliefs in action. Since belief and practice areinterdependent and evolve together, if some future pantheisticcommunal reflection results in doctrines, then it is likely to resultin practices of various sorts as well. Other than the fact they havelacked what seems to be requisite in terms of a community ofpantheists, there may be additional or alternative explanations of whypantheists have not developed rituals. Maybe the lack of community canjust as easily be explained by the lack of a developed mode ofpractice asvice versa.
Pantheists basically lack scripture and an established body ofdoctrine and discourse that could help establish the nature ofpantheistic practice. However, it this is not entirely true. Thepantheist can, to some extent, rely on traditional religious scripturethat is recognisably pantheistic; for example, sometaoisttexts, and some Western and non-Western theistic scripture. Pantheistsalso have recourse to numerous philosophical sources — Spinozaetc. But, the pantheist is not without alternatives to the scriptureand discourse theists have at their disposal. To some extent, thepantheist too will know what to do to practice pantheism. Art, music,literature and poetry, fulfil the same kinds of roles in pantheism asthey do in theism. As representations of cultural patterns theyreflect and sustain a world view and ethos. In Geertz's (1973: 93)terms they symbolically function as both a modelof realityand a modelfor reality. "Culture patterns are‘models’ … they are sets of symbols whose relationsto one another ‘model’ relations among entities, processesor what-have-you … they give meaning, that is objectiveconceptual form, to social and psychological reality both by shapingthemselves to it and by shaping it to themselves." Pantheistsrecognise cultural patterns and symbolic representations that "model"their beliefs. Given such beliefs, and the efficacy of symbolicrepresentations of those beliefs; certain other beliefs, actions, andattitudes will be regarded, cognitively and affectively, asappropriate and correct.
In theistic traditions, prayer — which is a type of worship— and sometimes meditation, are the principle forms of religiouspractice. They are often set in the context of ritual. Theism gives avariety of reasons why prayer and worship are appropriate andnecessary forms of theistic practice. But, what about for thepantheist? In principle, pantheists will not do things that literallyconflict with the beliefs they express. They will not worship ifworship implies the recognition of an independent and superior god,since this theistic belief is antithetical to a central tenet ofpantheism. Are prayer and worship appropriate kinds of practice forthe pantheist? Given that the pantheist should not pray to or worshipa theistic God, can she worship the pantheistic Unity?
Pantheistic worship might naively be thought to be a kind ofself-worship; worshipping something of which one is a part oridentified with. This too is a mistake. As we have seen, pantheism isnot the view that "everything that exists," including oneself, is god;and it is not the view that every particular thing or person isequally god. If worship is not acceptable religious practice forpantheists, it is for reasons other than that such practice involvesadoring and venerating (i.e. worshipping) oneself. Worship and prayerare not consonant with pantheism. Like "evil" and "salvation," theyare connected to the theistic world-view that pantheistsreject. Therefore, except in a highly derivative sense (i.e.,derivative from theism) worship and prayer are types of practice thatare not acceptable to pantheists. Devotion to the universe, artisticexpression, nature observation, etc., are not types of worship astheistically understood — though they may be ways of respecting,honouring, and revering.
What makes worship and prayer inappropriate for the pantheist is notthe lack of ontological separation from the Unity that theism claimsGod has from the world. If there is a sense in which pantheists areontologically, or in other ways, distinct from the divine Unity,worship and prayer are still inappropriate. If a necessary conditionof worship is that it has to be in some significant sense "otherregarding," then worship would not on that account be inappropriate topantheism. What makes it unsuitable is that worship, and especiallyprayer, are basically directed at "persons" — or at a being withpersonal characteristics separate and superior to oneself. Whetherone's reasons for worship are petitionary or devotional is irrelevant;and so is one's motivation — whether a Freudian way of copingwith guilt, or a rationally-based sense of duty. Objects of worshipare not oneself, and perhaps not even ontologically distinct fromoneself as theism claims, but they are generally taken to beconscious, personal and superior.
Given the nature and goal of worship objects of worship must have apersonal character. It might be thought that showing the pantheisticUnity should not, on conceptual grounds, be worshipped is ratheruninteresting. That may be right. The implications of this result,however, are anything but insignificant. For the pantheist, thepractical consequences of worship and prayer being unavailable as formsof religious practice are enormous.
In the theistic view, worship and prayer are practically synonymouswith religious practice. And, even in (theoretically) non-theisticreligious traditions such as Buddhism and Taoism, worship and prayerare frequent if not prevalent. Yet, the pantheist is faced with theproblem of finding a way to practice pantheism that is consistent withthe finding that worship and prayer make sense only in a theisticcontext. As a result, one of the defining and most noticeablecharacteristics of pantheism will be the type of practice it takes up.The practices involved, whatever they are, will be different not onlyfrom those in theistic traditions, but also from those in non-theisticones in which theistic practice is so much a part.
In pantheistic systems such as Spinoza's or philosophical Taoism, theobjective is best described as a state rather than a relation.However, just as theism correctly claims that although the principlegoal of theistic practice is a relation to God, this also involves a"state of the individual"; so the pantheist claims that althoughpantheistic practice is principally concerned with a "state of anindividual," a crucial and intrinsic aspect of this state is one'srelation to the divine Unity. However, granted that a dichotomybetween the objective as "relationship" or "state" is not firm; theprincipal form of practice — contemplative and meditative on theone hand, or worship on the other — follows from the objectiveemphasised. In theism it is on a personal relationship to God. Inpantheism, the emphasis is on an individual state resulting from anunderstanding of, and a right relation to, the Unity. Practice will becontemplative and meditative rather than devotional. As in the case oftheism, pantheistic practices — like the beliefs they arerelated to — are meant to have practical consequences both interms of what one does, and more generally, the way one lives.
The question, of course, is how the pantheist is to arrive at "theright relation" to the Unity thereby achieving their objective.Answering this is the principal focus of both Spinoza'sEthics, theTao Te Ching and most other pantheisticliterature (e.g. Whitman's "Song of Myself"). What one actually doesdepends partly on the individual (i.e. Spinoza is no Whitman), andalso on the particulars of the state sought. Since the pantheisticconception(s) of reality is ultimately very different from, forexample, that of the Theravada Buddhist, there is no reason to supposethe pantheistic objective to be likenirvana. The pantheist'srelation to the divine Unity does not entail the obliteration of selfor liberation that a Buddhist's identification with Brahman does; noris it like the theistic mystic's union with God. There may be aspectsof the state pantheists seek that are similar to Buddhist goals, andeven to theistic ones — though to a far lesser extent. But, evenif the pantheist's objective is as different from what the Buddhistseeks as it is from what the theist seeks, the means for achieving itremain contemplative or meditative, rather than devotional.
For Spinoza, acquiring the happiness described in theEthicsis largely an intellectual achievement. It is difficult to see how onecan attain the understanding and identification with "God" thatSpinoza claims leads to peace of mind and "blessedness" (i.e., thehighest achievement of the individual) without addressing the problemdiscursively rather than affectively by intuition and meditation— although discursive thinking and these other methods are by nomeans inconsistent. But even though Spinoza's approach involves littlethat is not discursive; it is contemplative, and the objective remainsprimarily a state rather than relation. Worship is not a mode ofpractice conducive to achieving the state Spinoza seeks. Granted thatSpinoza's method is intellectualistic; other approaches are possible— especially where the objective itself is conceived ofdifferently (i.e. less intellectualistic). Spinoza of courserecognises that his own method is not suited to most people andacknowledges that ordinary practice such as worship and prayer may attimes engender ends he describes. Just as theists use various methodsto pursue their objective — some more intellectualistic thanothers — so in pantheism certain kinds of practices are suitedto certain kinds of people. As in other religions, the means by whichpantheists pursue their objectives are generally not overtly or overlyintellectualised. To do so can undermine practice by upsetting thebalance between the affective and intellectual aspects of their beliefsystem.
The pantheist is likely to view the kinds of goals that most religioustraditions envision as excessive and grandiose — as neitherbelievable nor desirable. What is more, although they are nothumanists, like humanists pantheists are likely to view thoseobjectives and related beliefs much as theistic traditions viewedthose of "primitive religions" and of each other: as superstitiouslyanthropocentric and so capable of being naturalisticallyexplained. The state sought by the pantheist supervenes (as in Taoism)on establishing the right relation with the Unity by means ofcultivating a life suited to the nature of the Unity and ofoneself. But for the pantheist this is a goal in itself, athis-worldly happiness. The pantheist eschews a notion of their beingfurther goals; for example, the theist's beatific vision; personalimmortality;nirvana; and even Spinoza's "blessedness,"interpreted as something other-worldly.
The pantheist's happiness is nevertheless a special "state" that isdifficult to achieve. Being a kind of utopian ideal it too is perhapsgrandiose. Ordinary happiness is part of it but should not beconflated with the kind of thoroughgoing happiness the pantheistthinks it is possible to attain now and again. Much as Kierkegaarddenied that "truth," "subjectivity" and even "immortality" areattainable once and for all, the pantheists denies their objective isa once and for all achievement. It is a state of well-being thatinvolves a sustained peace of mind and the kind of happiness thatcomes from, or is identical with, such a state of mind. Since one'sown state of mind and relation to the all-inclusive Unity are partlydependent upon other people and things, the state the pantheist seeksis not something achievable in isolation. Pantheism involves athis-worldly utopian vision based on individual's relations to, andidentification with, the Unity.
"Nature" — which appears to be equated with the "Great Outdoors"— has pride of place in a pantheistic world view and ethos. Itis assumed that pantheists are nature lovers, if not naturemystics. This view of pantheists as naturalists and rural outdoorpeople as opposed to city dwellers, is common. A reason for thepantheist's stress on Nature is that anthropocentricism is seen asincompatible with a proper recognition of Unity. It is seen asundermining the cosmocentric perspective required by pantheisticethics, and a pantheistic way of life; as antithetical to thepantheist world view and ethos. Involvement in nature de-emphasisesthe anthropocentrism pantheism believes endemic to theism anddetrimental to well-being and Unity.
This characterisation of pantheists as loving nature and as having toestablish a relationship to things natural is what principally informsvague views as to how pantheism is to be practiced — especiallyamong contemporary pantheists. Practice becomes an expression of alove of nature — usually by "communing" with it. It is no wonderpantheism is often regarded as little more than a type of naturemysticism. But for the pantheist, "love" of nature is expressedprimarily in ethical rather than in mystical or quasi-mysticalterms. Pantheistic ethics focuses on how to live and on theindividual's relation to the natural order — an order of whichothers are a part. One's own well-being and that of others depends onit. Since nature is taken as intrinsically valuable, and becauserelating appropriately to nature presupposes its preservation andprotection; nature in general and environmental issues in particular,are important to the pantheist. Like many others, pantheists see theirwell-being as intrinsically connected to the wider environment as wellas to things more immediate (e.g. employment).
Is the urban person at areligious disadvantage from apantheistic perspective? Without denying the significance Nature hasfor the pantheist (e.g., as a standard of behaviour, and as an objectof meditation conducive to a "right" state of mind), is there reasonto believe a pantheist who prefers an urban to a pastoral setting, andwho likes technology, is risking spiritual depravity? Does thepantheist have a duty to spend time in natural settings if they preferthe city? Technology is associated with the Urban, and the pantheistmay see much of it, or too much of it, as inimical to Unity andwell-being. Technology is devalued when it is taken as underminingthe kinds of value pantheism seeks to promote. Technology (peopleusing it) despoils the environment. At any rate, since the world isincreasingly urban, for pantheism to be viable it will have to bepossible to practice it in cities.
A person who prefers city street life may claim there is a biastowards the non-human in a pantheist's exclusive insistence on Nature.Why cannot cities — themselves "natural" in a way — alsobe conducive to the practice of pantheism? Perhaps cities could be ifthey and many of their people were not as neglected and abused as muchas some wilderness areas (if the comparison makes any sense). "God'scountry" for the pantheist denotes urban as well as pastoral settings— indeed it extends to the suburbs. Given the existence of adivine Unity one should not regard all personal preferences (e.g., fora garden), as cosmically endorsed. If the goal of pantheism is a wayof life and a kind of "state," then any locale that is generallyconducive to promoting those goals is acceptable. This may have moreto do with the kind of urban or rural setting one lives in rather thanjust whether the setting is urban or rural.
In terms of its practice, one of the striking things about pantheismis that it has not produced a church or any kind of organisationengaged in overseeing its practice. Apparently a community ofpantheists is not necessary for the practice of pantheism. Either thisis an historical accident, or it has to do with structural features ofpantheism. Pantheists, like many theists, tend to regard Churches andreligious leaders with suspicion. The kind of orientation that thepantheist seeks vis a vis the Unity is not taken to be something achurch can facilitate. The mediation churches provide is seen assuperfluous or harmful — just as it has been by manymystics. Organised religions are seen as divisive and exclusivist, andchurches perhaps are seen as essentially anthropocentric. It is forthese kinds of reasons that there never has been a pantheistic churchand probably never will be.
Pantheism remains a fertile subject for natural theology. Naturaltheologians have hardly approached it. Pantheism should be of interestto those in the philosophy of religion who seek a way out of theconstrictions (often institutional ones) put upon them by workingwithin the confines of classical theism; especially as the issuesrelating to classical theism have been taken up by the contemporarychristian conservative analytic philosophers of religion. Perhapspantheism will be of most interest to those who do not believe in atheistic God, yet are concerned with many of the traditional questionsthat natural theologians have always asked, and that religioustraditions necessarily address.
Pantheism's lack of "success" in worldly terms on the religion marketmay have to do with the fact that it is antithetical to any powerstructure; the kind, for example, found in the Catholic church. Ifso, then even though pantheism may be more profoundly religious thaninstitutionalised religions, it may be doomed to ineffectivenessbecause it cannot manipulate power — it cannot "play the game."Wielding various kinds of power has been a feature of religion fromits most "primitive" to its most sophisticated levels — afeature churches can generally not control. Pantheism negates thepower struggle through its emphasis on Unity. It refuses to seereligion in political and hierarchical terms. Pantheism is thereligion that tries most completely to escape the limitations createdby anthropocentric models of religion that create god in man'simage.
As stated, the definition of pantheism in this entry maintains thatpantheism involves, if not entails, the denial of the two key claimsof theism: (i) that god is a "person," and (ii) that god isontologically distinct from, and transcendent to all else that exists.As such, critics (Baltzly 2003) may seek to show that there areversions of pantheism or something like it (panentheism perhaps), inwhich one or both of these two conditions are not met. Thisdefinition, however, is not meant to be an analytical truth, but tocapture what is crucial to pantheism if it is to be a genuinereligious alternative to theism (Levine, 1994:1-143) — one thatmakes a practical difference and a difference in practice. That is whypantheism is and historically has been of interest; because it offersthe possibility or promise of a genuine religious alternative totheism. Where the two significant aspects of theism are present thatpantheism allegedly denies, religious practice (worship, prayer etc)will be dictated by these theistic components rather than by anypantheistic ones. Thus, it is wrong to suggest that this definition— even if it is mistaken — is analytic or merelystipulative. Instead, it is meant to capture what is crucial topantheism as an alternative to theism. Pantheism is to bedistinguished from panentheism in much the same way and for the samebasic reason.
Thus, in his challenging and provocative essay Dirk Baltzly (2003:4)may be missing the context and hence the point of the above definitionwhen he says:
The way the Stoics regard god is inconsistent with, say,Spinoza's treatment of god. But to suppose that this means the Stoicsare not pantheists is to make Spinoza not merely a highly visiblerepresentative of pantheism. but ratherparadigmaticof pantheism. Everyone is entitled to use terms like‘pantheism’ as he sees fit, but I think that being toonarrow about what counts as a pantheist view probably invests theconcept with more precision than it has historically had. If, however,you consult your intuitions about the necessary and sufficientconditions for ‘x is a pantheist view’ and findthat these intuitions rule out candidates that involve providence or apersonal god, then read this paper as an essay on somethinga bitlike pantheism in Stoic philosophy. Perhaps you would prefer tolabel it 'panentheistic'. I won't mind: I'll just envy you your finelyarticulated intuitions on what counts as pantheism.
The issue of definition, of course, is not meant to deny that"Everyone is entitled to use terms like ‘pantheism" as he seesfit," nor does it concern the preciseness of one's "intuitions" as towhat pantheism is. It is meant to capture something of the essentialdifference between pantheism on the one hand, and panentheism ortheism on the other — when viewed as a religious/philosophicalalternative to theism.
The definition is normative to a degree, but in way that that is meantto do justice, conceptually and historically, to various versions ofpantheism. It is meant to be indicative of why Spinoza's view is,religiously and philosophically speaking, paradigmatic of pantheismper se in important ways, while also being representative ofit. (It is probably not paradigmatic in denying freewill.) Argumentsthat there are undeniably elements of pantheism in Stoic philosophyalongside theistic ones need not deny any of this. Note too thatelements of the Stoic philosophy (founded by Zeno of Citium c.300 BC)that Baltzly (2003) argues are pantheistic or imply pantheism, as wellas those that imply theism, are themselves contested — by theStoics themselves as well as by interpreters. They may not be asproblematic or opaque as some the earliest pre-Socratics like Thales(c.585 BC) or Anaximander (c.610–after 546 BC), but interpretingthe metaphysics in these texts is not straightforward. There is noreceived view of some of the elements requisite to regarding Stoics asboth pantheists and theists.
Baltzly's (2003) interpretation of the Stoics as both pantheists andtheists arguably runs into less difficulty in terms of the claim thatthe Stoics see all that exists as a divine Unity, than it does withthe claim that they also see it theistically, as a personal god— and associated with, for example, notions of divineprovidence, agency, immutability, intelligence and rationality.Baltzly's general strategy here is to claim that such issues are nomore problematic for Stoic theism than for theism generally. Theyare, however, no less problematic either. If, for example, anyacceptable — let alone plausible — theism must deny God'simpassibility or immutability, as arguably it must, then the fact thatStoic theism is committed to such a view about the nature of Godrenders it problematic. And if the Stoic view of God is unacceptablyproblematic or no part of the theist's understanding of God, then itmay be preferable to deny that they are theists — whereordinarily a theistic god is not taken to be impassable or immutable.Since the Stoics were also polytheists, and theism as contrasted withpantheism generally maintains a single god ontologically distinct fromthe world, the idea that the Stoics were theistic in the relevantsense may be further questioned. Polytheism may not be compatiblewith theism as used in the context of distinguishing pantheism fromtheism. Additionally, to assert (Baltzly 2003:15) that "far frombeing congenial to a deep ecology ethic that locates divinity and thusvalue in nature, Stoic pantheism is breath-takingly anthropocentric"seemingly on the basis of a single quotation (Cicero) isproblematic. Seeing moral virtue as the only good (Baltzly 2003: 15)and as residing in persons may or may not be antithetical to a deepecology that sees living in accordance with nature as necessary forwell-being and happiness (cf. Baltzly 2003: 17). More significantlyhowever, it is not uncongenial with the pantheistic identificationwith, and attitudes towards, nature, and with seeing one's ownwell-being as irreducibly bound with nature. What it is incompatiblewith is an anthropocentrism that ignores or deprecates the connectionbetween nature and human flourishing.
Additionally, it is important when discussing pantheism in relation totheism, to re-examine but not to reinvent a well worn wheel. CharlesHartshorne (1953), as a proponent of dipolar theism or panentheismmade it a good part of his life's work to show that theism haspantheistic elements in it and that philosophical systems that areprimarily pantheistic also have theistic elements in them — andhe discusses the Stoics in various places. Consider, for example,Anselm who says "For nothing contains thee, but thou containestall" (cf.Proslogion, chapter XIX XX). Paul says"we live and move and have our being" in God (Acts 17:28).Cf., Jeremiah (23:24) "Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith theLord." Aquinas says "… spiritual things contain the things inwhich they are; as the soul contains the body. So, too, God is inthings as containing them. Nevertheless … it is said that allthings are in God inasmuch as they are contained by Him" (SummaTheologiae, Vol. I, q. 8, a.1, reply objection 2). It seemsundeniable, though it usually is denied, that pantheism is intimatedin these quotations.
Analogies can be misleading but may nevertheless be useful inconsidering the definition of pantheism. Buddhism (as well asphilosophical Taosim) is generally and rightly considered to benon-theistic and/or atheistic. (Taoism is arguably pantheistic.)However, in terms of religious practice — in certain sects andtypes of Buddhism (and Taoism), not only are certain deitiesworshipped, invoked, etc as well as mediated upon, but theisticpractices may be present in other ways as well. Does this makeBuddhism or philosophical Taoism theistic or polytheistic? Perhaps,the easiest way to answer this question is to draw the distinctionbetween philosophy and practice, and to deny and even consider itunreasonable or naive, to expect that they would or should completelycoincide or accurately reflect one another. Buddhism is properlyregarded as non-theistic because of its basic philosophical, religioustenets — it fundamental understanding of reality — andvarious theistically oriented religious practices need not betaken asundermining Buddhism's non-theistic (atheistic) stance.
Blatzly's (2003) advances the discussion on pantheism, but it is arare exception. (See also Steinhart (2004) for a discussion of"sophisticated contemporary pantheisms" in terms of contemporaryontology.) The principal reason there has been relatively littleadvance in examining pantheism philosophically is at least twofold.First, contemporary analytic philosophy of religion remains dominatednot merely by theism but by peculiarly fundamentalist Christianapproaches to theism. Plantinga's and Wolterstorff's (1983) ("basicbelief"); Wolterstorff's (1995) (divine discourse); and Alston's(1991) epistemology of religious belief are examples, but so too arethe creationist doctrines of Haldane (Smart and Haldane, 1996) and VanInwagen (1995). While there is currently debate about whethercreationism should be taught alongside evolution in public schools,the fact that creationist doctrine is argued for by mainstreamChristian analytic philosophers of religion (as above) goes largelyunnoticed or remarked upon (cf. Levine: 1998; 1999; 2000). There islittle room or interest in non-fundamentalist, theologicallyprogressive, notions of deity in this milieu — let alonepantheism. There are only two twentieth century bibliographicalreferences in the entry on pantheism in theRoutledge Encyclopediaof Philosophy, Version 1.0 (Yandell 1998), where the primaryfocus is an exposition of Spinoza's pantheism.
Secondly, while non-western and comparative approaches to philosophyof religion — the other arena in which pantheism is likely to bediscussed, is no longer as concerned with an rapprochement to westerntheism as it once was (itsraison d'etre since the 1950s),its agenda remains largely religious. Philosophers working in Buddhistand other traditions are engaged in first-order philosophicalspeculation, analytic expositions, and philosophical/religiousreconstructions of their own. As with the case of Christiancontemporary analytic philosophy of religion, much of this isreligiously motivated for religious ends — to prove for example,that aspects of Buddhist doctrine are true and correct. If thephilosophical investigation of pantheism as the denial of theism— that is, as the denial of a personal and ontologicallytranscendent deity — is to advance, it will have totheoretically and practically distance itself from the philosophy ofreligion, Western and Eastern, in which revealed religion, rather thannatural theology (Human natural theology), informs the structure andnature of enquiry.
The author and editors would like to thank Paul Oppenheimer forspotting a misquotation in Section 3, which has now beencorrected.