Based on default assessment until relevant scores are available.
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSSdocumentation for more details.
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libeddsa-java
to version 0.3.0-2.1 or higher.
Note:Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstreamlibeddsa-java
package and not thelibeddsa-java
package as distributed byDebian
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forDebian:unstable
relevant fixed versions and status.
The implementation of EdDSA in EdDSA-Java (aka ed25519-java) through 0.3.0 exhibits signature malleability and does not satisfy the SUF-CMA (Strong Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attacks) property. This allows attackers to create new valid signatures different from previous signatures for a known message.
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitableat the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.
The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.