Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9430.¶

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Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶

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Table of Contents

1.Introduction

The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework[RFC9200] defines an architecture for lightweight authentication between the Client, Resource Server (RS), and Authorization Server (AS), where the Client and RS may be constrained. "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)"[RFC9202] only specifies the use of DTLS[RFC9147] for transport layer security between the nodes in the ACE architecture but works equally well for Transport Layer Security (TLS)[RFC8446]. For many constrained implementations, the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) over UDP[RFC7252] is the first choice, but when deploying ACE in networks controlled by other entities (such as the Internet), UDP might be blocked on the path between the Client and the ResourceServer, and the Client might have to fall back to CoAP over TCP[RFC8323] for NAT or firewall traversal. This dual support for security over TCP as well as UDP is already supported by the Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) profile[RFC9203].¶

This document updates[RFC9202] by specifying that the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS. It only impacts the transport layer security channel between the Client and Resource Server. The same access rights are valid in case transport layer security is provided by either DTLS or TLS. The same access token can be used by either DTLS or TLS between a given (Client, RS) pair. Therefore, the valuecoap_dtls in theace_profile parameter of an Authorization Server to Client (AS-to-Client) response or in theace_profile claim of an access token indicates that either DTLS or TLS can be used for transport layer security.¶

2.Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14[RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and conceptsdescribed in[RFC9200] and[RFC9202].¶

3.Specific Changes to RFC 9202

The main changes to[RFC9202] specified in this document are limitedto replacing "DTLS" with "DTLS/TLS" throughout the document. Thisessentially impacts the use of secure transport, as described inSections3.2.2,3.3.2,4, and5.¶

In addition to this, the Client and Resource Server behavior isupdated to describe the case where either or both DTLS and TLS may beavailable, as described in the following section.¶

4.Connection Establishment

Following the procedures defined in[RFC9202], aClient can retrieve an access token from an Authorization Server inorder to establish a security association with a specific ResourceServer. Theace_profile parameter in the Client-to-AS request andAS-to-Client response is used to determine the ACE profile that theClient uses towards the Resource Server.¶

Theace_profile parameter indicates the use of the DTLSprofile for ACE, as defined in[RFC9202]. Therefore, the Client typicallyfirst tries using DTLS to connect to the Resource Server. If this fails, theClientMAY try to connect to the Resource Server via TLS.¶

As resource-constrained devices are not expected to support bothtransport layer security mechanisms, Clients and Resource ServersSHOULD support DTLS andMAY support TLS. A Client that implements eitherTLS or DTLS but not both might fail in establishing a securecommunication channel with the Resource Server altogether. NonconstrainedClients and Resource ServersSHOULD support both TLS and DTLS.¶

Note that a communication setup with an a priori unknown ResourceServer typically employs an initial unauthorized resource request, asillustrated inSection 2 of [RFC9202]. If thismessage exchange succeeds, the ClientSHOULD first use the sameunderlying transport protocol for the establishment of the securityassociation to the Resource Server (i.e., DTLS for UDP, and TLS for TCP).¶

As a consequence, the selection of the transport protocol used for theinitial unauthorized resource request also depends on the transportlayer security mechanism supported by the Client. Clients thatsupport either DTLS or TLS but not bothSHOULD use the transportprotocol underlying the supported transport layer security mechanismfor an initial unauthorized resource request to the ResourceServer, as inSection 2 of [RFC9202].¶

5.IANA Considerations

In the "ACE Profiles" registry, the Description and Reference fields have been updated as follows for coap_dtls:¶

Name:

coap_dtls¶

Description:

Profile for delegating client Authentication andAuthorization for Constrained Environments by establishing a DatagramTransport Layer Security (DTLS) or Transport Layer Security (TLS)channel between resource-constrained nodes.¶

CBOR Value:

1¶

Reference:

[RFC9202], RFC 9430¶

6.Security Considerations

The security consideration and requirements in[RFC9202], TLS 1.3[RFC8446], and BCP 195[RFC8996][RFC9325] also apply to this document.¶

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thankMarco Tiloca for reviewing thisspecification.¶

Authors' Addresses