Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


[RFC Home] [TEXT|PDF|HTML] [Tracker] [IPR] [Info page]

INFORMATIONAL
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)                             J. NobreRequest for Comments: 8316           University of Vale do Rio dos SinosCategory: Informational                                     L. GranvilleISSN: 2070-1721                  Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul                                                                A. Clemm                                                                  Huawei                                                      A. Gonzalez Prieto                                                                  VMware                                                           February 2018Autonomic Networking Use Case for Distributed Detection ofService Level Agreement (SLA) ViolationsAbstract   This document describes an experimental use case that employs   autonomic networking for the monitoring of Service Level Agreements   (SLAs).  The use case is for detecting violations of SLAs in a   distributed fashion.  It strives to optimize and dynamically adapt   the autonomic deployment of active measurement probes in a way that   maximizes the likelihood of detecting service-level violations with a   given resource budget to perform active measurements.  This   optimization and adaptation should be done without any outside   guidance or intervention.   This document is a product of the IRTF Network Management Research   Group (NMRG).  It is published for informational purposes.Status of This Memo   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is   published for informational purposes.   This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force   (IRTF).  The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research   and development activities.  These results might not be suitable for   deployment.  This RFC represents the consensus of the Network   Management Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF).   Documents approved for publication by the IRSG are not candidates for   any level of Internet Standard; seeSection 2 of RFC 7841.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8316.Nobre, et al.                 Informational                     [Page 1]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.Table of Contents1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32.  Definitions and Acronyms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53.  Current Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64.  Use Case Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75.  A Distributed Autonomic Solution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86.  Intended User Experience  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117.1.  Device-Based Self-Knowledge and Decisions . . . . . . . .117.2.  Interaction with Other Devices  . . . . . . . . . . . . .118.  Comparison with Current Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129.  Related IETF Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1210. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1311. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1312. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16Nobre, et al.                 Informational                     [Page 2]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 20181.  Introduction   The Internet has been growing dramatically in terms of size,   capacity, and accessibility in recent years.  Communication   requirements of distributed services and applications running on top   of the Internet have become increasingly demanding.  Some examples   are real-time interactive video or financial trading.  Providing such   services involves stringent requirements in terms of acceptable   latency, loss, and jitter.   Performance requirements lead to the articulation of Service Level   Objectives (SLOs) that must be met.  Those SLOs are part of Service   Level Agreements (SLAs) that define a contract between the provider   and the consumer of a service.  SLOs, in effect, constitute a   service-level guarantee that the consumer of the service can expect   to receive (and often has to pay for).  Likewise, the provider of a   service needs to ensure that the service-level guarantee and   associated SLOs are met.  Some examples of clauses that relate to   SLOs can be found in [RFC7297].   Violations of SLOs can be associated with significant financial loss,   which can by divided into two categories.  First, there is the loss   that can be incurred by the user of a service when the agreed service   levels are not provided.  For example, a financial brokerage's stock   orders might suffer losses when it is unable to execute stock   transactions in a timely manner.  An electronic retailer may lose   customers when its online presence is perceived by customers as   sluggish.  An online gaming provider may not be able to provide fair   access to online players, resulting in frustrated players who are   lost as customers.  In each case, the failure of a service provider   to meet promised service-level guarantees can have a substantial   financial impact on users of the service.  Second, there is the loss   that is incurred by the provider of a service who is unable to meet   promised SLOs.  Those losses can take several forms, such as   penalties for violating the service level agreement and even loss of   future revenue due to reduced customer satisfaction (which, in many   cases, is more serious).  Hence, SLOs are a key concern for the   service provider.  In order to ensure that SLOs are not being   violated, service levels need to be continuously monitored at the   network infrastructure layer in order to know, for example, when   mitigating actions need to be taken.  To that end, service-level   measurements must take place.   Network measurements can be performed using active or passive   measurement techniques.  In passive measurements, production traffic   is observed, and no monitoring traffic is created by the measurement   process itself.  That is, network conditions are checked in a   non-intrusive way.  In the context of IP Flow Information ExportNobre, et al.                 Informational                     [Page 3]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   (IPFIX), several documents were produced that define how to export   data associated with flow records, i.e., data that is collected as   part of passive measurement mechanisms, generally applied against   flows of production traffic (e.g., [RFC7011]).  In addition, it is   possible to collect real data traffic (not just summarized flow   records) with time-stamped packets, possibly sampled (e.g., per   [RFC5474]), as a means of measuring and inferring service levels.   Active measurements, on the other hand, are more intrusive to the   network in the sense that they involve injecting synthetic test   traffic into the network to measure network service levels, as   opposed to simply observing production traffic.  The IP Performance   Metrics (IPPM) Working Group produced documents that describe active   measurement mechanisms such as the One-Way Active Measurement   Protocol (OWAMP) [RFC4656], the Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol   (TWAMP) [RFC5357], and the Cisco Service-Level Assurance Protocol   [RFC6812].  In addition, there are some mechanisms that do not   cleanly fit into either active or passive categories, such as   Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination Option   techniques [RFC8250].   Active measurement mechanisms offer a high level of control over what   and how to measure.  They do not require inspecting production   traffic.  Because of this, active measurements usually offer better   accuracy and privacy than passive measurement mechanisms.  Traffic   encryption and regulations that limit the amount of payload   inspection that can occur are non-issues.  Furthermore, active   measurement mechanisms are able to detect end-to-end network   performance problems in a fine-grained way (e.g., simulating the   traffic that must be handled considering specific SLOs).  As a   result, active measurements are often preferred over passive   measurement for SLA monitoring.  Measurement probes must be hosted in   network devices and measurement sessions must be activated to compute   the current network metrics (for example, metrics such as the ones   described in [RFC4148], although note that [RFC4148] was obsoleted by   [RFC6248]).  This activation should be dynamic in order to follow   changes in network conditions, such as those related to routes being   added or new customer demands.   While offering many advantages, active measurements are expensive in   terms of network resource consumption.  Active measurements generally   involve measurement probes that generate synthetic test traffic that   is directed at a responder.  The responder needs to timestamp test   traffic it receives and reflect it back to the originating   measurement probe.  The measurement probe subsequently processes the   returned packets along with time-stamping information in order to   compute service levels.  Accordingly, active measurements consume   substantial CPU cycles as well as memory of network devices toNobre, et al.                 Informational                     [Page 4]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   generate and process test traffic.  In addition, synthetic traffic   increases network load.  Thus, active measurements compete for   resources with other functions, including routing and switching.   The resources required and traffic generated by the active   measurement sessions are, in a large part, a function of the number   of measured network destinations.  (In addition, the amount of   traffic generated for each measurement plays a role that, in turn,   influences the accuracy of the measurement.)  When more destinations   are measured, a greater number of resources are consumed and more   traffic is needed to perform the measurements.  Thus, to have better   monitoring coverage, it is necessary to deploy more sessions, which   consequently increases consumed resources.  Otherwise, enabling the   observation of just a small subset of all network flows can lead to   insufficient coverage.   Furthermore, while some end-to-end service levels can be determined   by adding up the service levels observed across different path   segments, the same is not true for all service levels.  For example,   the end-to-end delay or packet loss from a node A to a node C routed   via a node B can often be computed simply by adding delays (or loss)   from A to B and from B to C.  This allows the decomposition of a   large set of end-to-end measurements into a much smaller set of   segment measurements.  However, end-to-end jitter and mean opinion   scores cannot be decomposed as easily and, for higher accuracy, must   be measured end-to-end.   Hence, the decision about how to place measurement probes becomes an   important management activity.  The goal is to obtain the maximum   benefits of service-level monitoring with a limited amount of   measurement overhead.  Specifically, the goal is to maximize the   number of service-level violations that are detected with a limited   number of resources.   The use case and the solution approach described in this document   address an important practical issue.  They are intended to provide a   basis for further experimentation to lead to solutions for wider   deployment.  This document represents the consensus of the IRTF's   Network Management Research Group (NMRG).  It was discussed   extensively and received three separate in-depth reviews.2.  Definitions and Acronyms   Active Measurements: Techniques to measure service levels that      involve generating and observing synthetic test traffic   Passive Measurements: Techniques used to measure service levels based      on observation of production trafficNobre, et al.                 Informational                     [Page 5]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   Autonomic Network: A network containing exclusively autonomic nodes,      requiring no configuration, and deriving all required information      through self-knowledge, discovery, or intent.   Autonomic Service Agent (ASA): An agent implemented on an autonomic      node that implements an autonomic function, either in part (in the      case of a distributed function, as in the context of this      document) or whole   Measurement Session: A communications association between a probe and      a responder used to send and reflect synthetic test traffic for      active measurements   Probe: The source of synthetic test traffic in an active measurement   Responder: The destination for synthetic test traffic in an active      measurement   SLA: Service Level Agreement   SLO: Service Level Objective   P2P: Peer-to-Peer   (Note: The definitions for "Autonomic Network" and "Autonomic Service   Agent" are borrowed from [RFC7575]).3.  Current Approaches   For feasible deployments of active measurement solutions to   distribute the available measurement sessions along the network, the   current best practice consists of relying entirely on the human   administrator's expertise to infer the best location to activate such   sessions.  This is done through several steps.  First, it is   necessary to collect traffic information in order to grasp the   traffic matrix.  Then, the administrator uses this information to   infer the best destinations for measurement sessions.  After that,   the administrator activates sessions on the chosen subset of   destinations, taking the available resources into account.  This   practice, however, does not scale well because it is still labor   intensive and error-prone for the administrator to determine which   sessions should be activated given the set of critical flows that   needs to be measured.  Even worse, this practice completely fails in   networks where the most critical flows change rapidly, resulting in   dynamic changes to what would be the most important destinations.   For example, this can be the case in modern cloud environments.  This   is because fast reactions are necessary to reconfigure the sessions,   and administrators are just not quick enough in computing andNobre, et al.                 Informational                     [Page 6]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   activating the new set of required sessions every time the network   traffic pattern changes.  Finally, the current practice for active   measurements usually covers only a fraction of the network flows that   should be observed, which invariably leads to the damaging   consequence of undetected SLA violations.4.  Use Case Description   The use case involves a service-level provider that needs to monitor   the network to detect service-level violations using active service-   level measurements and wants to be able to do so with minimal human   intervention.  The goal is to conduct the measurements in an   effective manner to maximize the percentage of detected service-level   violations.  The service-level provider has a bounded resource budget   with regard to measurements that can be performed, specifically the   number of measurements that can be conducted concurrently from any   one network device and possibly the total amount of measurement   traffic on the network.  However, while at any one point in time the   number of measurements conducted is limited, it is possible for a   device to change which destinations to measure over time.  This can   be exploited to achieve a balance of eventually covering all possible   destinations using a reasonable amount of "sampling" where   measurement coverage of a destination cannot be continuous.  The   solution needs to be dynamic and able to cope with network conditions   that may change over time.  The solution should also be embeddable   inside network devices that control the deployment of active   measurement mechanisms.   The goal is to conduct the measurements in a smart manner that   ensures that the network is broadly covered and that the likelihood   of detecting service-level violations is maximized.  In order to   maximize that likelihood, it is reasonable to focus measurement   resources on destinations that are more likely to incur a violation,   while spending fewer resources on destinations that are more likely   to be in compliance.  In order to do this, there are various aspects   that can be exploited, including past measurements (destinations   close to a service-level threshold requiring more focus than   destinations farther from it), complementation with passive   measurements such as flow data (to identify network destinations that   are currently popular and critical), and observations from other   parts of the network.  In addition, measurements can be coordinated   among different network devices to avoid hitting the same destination   at the same time and to share results that may be useful in future   probe placement.   Clearly, static solutions will have severe limitations.  At the same   time, human administrators cannot be in the loop for continuous   dynamic reconfigurations of measurement probes.  Thus, an automatedNobre, et al.                 Informational                     [Page 7]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   solution, or ideally an autonomic solution, is needed so that network   measurements are automatically orchestrated and dynamically   reconfigured from within the network.  This can be accomplished using   an autonomic solution that is distributed, using ASAs that are   implemented on nodes in the network.5.  A Distributed Autonomic Solution   The use of Autonomic Networking (AN) [RFC7575] can help such   detection through an efficient activation of measurement sessions.   Such an approach, along with a detailed assessment confirming its   viability, is described in [P2PBNM-Nobre-2012].  The problem to be   solved by AN in the present use case is how to steer the process of   measurement session activation by a complete solution that sets all   necessary parameters for this activation to operate efficiently,   reliably, and securely, with no required human intervention other   than setting overall policy.   When a node first comes online, it has no information about which   measurements are more critical than others.  In the absence of   information about past measurements and information from measurement   peers, it may start with an initial set of measurement sessions,   possibly randomly seeding a set of starter measurements and perhaps   taking a round-robin approach for subsequent measurement rounds.   However, as measurements are collected, a node will gain an   increasing amount of information that it can utilize to refine its   strategy of selecting measurement targets going forward.  For one, it   may take note of which targets returned measurement results very   close to service-level thresholds; these targets may require closer   scrutiny compared to others.  Second, it may utilize observations   that are made by its measurement peers in order to conclude which   measurement targets may be more critical than others and to ensure   that proper overall measurement coverage is obtained (so that not   every node incidentally measures the same targets, while other   targets are not measured at all).   We advocate for embedding P2P technology in network devices in order   to use autonomic control loops to make decisions about measurement   sessions.   Specifically, we advocate for network devices to implement an   autonomic function that monitors service levels for violations of   SLOs and that determines which measurement sessions to set up at any   given point in time based on current and past observations of the   node and of other peer nodes.   By performing these functions locally and autonomically on the device   itself, which measurements to conduct can be modified quickly basedNobre, et al.                 Informational                     [Page 8]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   on local observations while taking local resource availability into   account.  This allows a solution to be more robust and react more   dynamically to rapidly changing service levels than a solution that   has to rely on central coordination.  However, in order to optimize   decisions about which measurements to conduct, a node will need to   communicate with other nodes.  This allows a node to take into   account other nodes' observations in addition to its own in its   decisions.   For example, remote destinations whose observed service levels are on   the verge of violating stated objectives may require closer   monitoring than remote destinations that are comfortably within a   range of tolerance.  A distributed autonomic solution also allows   nodes to coordinate their probing decisions to collectively achieve   the best possible measurement coverage.  Because the number of   resources available for monitoring, exchanging measurement data, and   coordinating with other nodes is limited, a node may be interested in   identifying other nodes whose observations are similar to and   correlated with its own.  This helps a node prioritize and decide   which other nodes to coordinate and exchange data with.  All of this   requires the use of a P2P overlay.   A P2P overlay is essential for several reasons:   o  It makes it possible for nodes (or more specifically, the ASAs      that are deployed on those nodes) in the network to autonomically      set up measurement sessions without having to rely on a central      management system or controller to perform configuration      operations associated with configuring measurement probes and      responders.   o  It facilitates the exchange of data between different nodes to      share measurement results so that each node can refine its      measurement strategy based not just on its own observations, but      also on observations from its peers.   o  It allows nodes to coordinate their measurements to obtain the      best possible test coverage and avoid measurements that have a      very low likelihood of detecting service-level violations.   The provisioning of the P2P overlay should be transparent for the   network administrator.  An Autonomic Control Plane such as defined in   [ACP] provides an ideal candidate for the P2P overlay to run on.   An autonomic solution for the distributed detection of SLA violations   provides several benefits.  First, it provides efficiency; this   solution should optimize the resource consumption and avoid resource   starvation on the network devices.  A device that is "self-aware" ofNobre, et al.                 Informational                     [Page 9]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   its available resources will be able to adjust measurement activities   rapidly as needed, without requiring a separate control loop   involving resource monitoring by an external system.  Second, placing   logic about where to conduct measurements into the node enables rapid   control loops that allow devices to react instantly to observations   and adjust their measurement strategy.  For example, a device could   decide to adjust the amount of synthetic test traffic being sent   during the measurement itself depending on results observed so far on   this and other concurrent measurement sessions.  As a result, the   solution could decrease the time necessary to detect SLA violations.   Adaptivity features of an autonomic loop could capture the network   dynamics faster than a human administrator or even a central   controller.  Finally, the solution could help to reduce the workload   of human administrators.   In practice, these factors combine to maximize the likelihood of SLA   violations being detected while operating within a given resource   budget, allowing a continuous measurement strategy that takes into   account past measurement results to be conducted, observations of   other measures such as link utilization or flow data, measurement   results shared between network devices, and future measurement   activities coordinated among nodes.  Combined, this can result in   efficient measurement decisions that achieve a golden balance between   offering broad network coverage and honing in on service-level "hot   spots".6.  Intended User Experience   The autonomic solution should not require any human intervention in   the distributed detection of SLA violations.  By virtue of the   solution being autonomic, human users will not have to plan which   measurements to conduct in a network, which is often a very labor-   intensive task that requires detailed analysis of traffic matrices   and network topologies and is not prone to easy dynamic adjustment.   Likewise, they will not have to configure measurement probes and   responders.   There are some ways in which a human administrator may still interact   with the solution.  First, the human administrator will, of course,   be notified and obtain reports about service-level violations that   are observed.  Second, a human administrator may set policies   regarding how closely to monitor the network for service-level   violations and how many resources to spend.  For example, an   administrator may set a resource budget that is assigned to network   devices for measurement operations.  With that given budget, the   number of SLO violations that are detected will be maximized.   Alternatively, an administrator may set a target for the percentage   of SLO violations that must be detected, i.e., a target for the ratioNobre, et al.                 Informational                    [Page 10]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   between the number of detected SLO violations and the number of total   SLO violations that are actually occurring (some of which might go   undetected).  In that case, the solution will aim to minimize the   resources spent (i.e., the amount of test traffic and number of   measurement sessions) that are required to achieve that target.7.  Implementation Considerations   The active measurement model assumes that a typical infrastructure   will have multiple network segments, multiple Autonomous Systems   (ASes), and a reasonably large number of routers.  It also considers   that multiple SLOs can be in place at a given time.  Since   interoperability in a heterogeneous network is a goal, features found   on different active measurement mechanisms (e.g., OWAMP, TWAMP, and   Cisco Service Level Assurance Protocol) and device programmability   interfaces (such as Juniper's Junos API or Cisco's Embedded Event   Manager) could be used for the implementation.  The autonomic   solution should include and/or reference specific algorithms,   protocols, metrics, and technologies for the implementation of   distributed detection of SLA violations as a whole.   Finally, it should be noted that there are multiple deployment   scenarios, including deployment scenarios that involve physical   devices hosting autonomic functions or virtualized infrastructure   hosting the same.  Co-deployment in conjunction with Virtual Network   Functions (VNFs) is a possibility for further study.7.1.  Device-Based Self-Knowledge and Decisions   Each device has self-knowledge about the local SLA monitoring.  This   could be in the form of historical measurement data and SLOs.   Besides that, the devices would have algorithms that could decide   which probes should be activated at a given time.  The choice of   which algorithm is better for a specific situation would be also   autonomic.7.2.  Interaction with Other Devices   Network devices should share information about service-level   measurement results.  This information can speed up the detection of   SLA violations and increase the number of detected SLA violations.   For example, if one device detects that a remote destination is in   danger of violating an SLO, other devices may conduct additional   measurements to the same destination or other destinations in its   proximity.  For any given network device, the exchange of data may be   more important with some devices (for example, devices in the same   network neighborhood or devices that are "correlated" by some other   means) than with others.  Defining the network devices that exchangeNobre, et al.                 Informational                    [Page 11]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   measurement data (i.e., management peers) creates a new topology.   Different approaches could be used to define this topology (e.g.,   correlated peers [P2PBNM-Nobre-2012]).  To bootstrap peer selection,   each device should use its known neighbors (e.g., FIB and RIB tables)   as initial seeds to identify possible peers.  It should be noted that   a solution will benefit if topology information and network discovery   functions are provided by the underlying autonomic framework.  A   solution will need to be able to discover measurement peers as well   as measurement targets, specifically measurement targets that support   active measurement responders and that will be able to respond to   measurement requests and reflect measurement traffic as needed.8.  Comparison with Current Solutions   There is no standardized solution for distributed autonomic detection   of SLA violations.  Current solutions are restricted to ad hoc   scripts running on a per-node fashion to automate some administrator   actions.  There are some proposals for passive probe activation   (e.g., DECON [DECON] and CSAMP [CSAMP]), but these do not focus on   autonomic features.9.  Related IETF Work   This section discusses related IETF work and is provided for   reference.  This section is not exhaustive; rather, it provides an   overview of the various initiatives and how they relate to autonomic   distributed detection of SLA violations.   1.  LMAP: The Large-Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance       Working Group standardizes the LMAP measurement system for       performance management of broadband access devices.  The       autonomic solution could be relevant to LMAP because it deploys       measurement probes and could be used for screening for SLA       violations.  Besides that, a solution to decrease the workload of       human administrators in service providers is probably highly       desirable.   2.  IPFIX: IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Working Group (now       concluded) aimed to standardize IP flows (i.e., netflows).  IPFIX       uses measurement probes (i.e., metering exporters) to gather flow       data.  In this context, the autonomic solution for the activation       of active measurement probes could possibly be extended to also       address passive measurement probes.  Besides that, flow       information could be used in making decisions regarding probe       activation.Nobre, et al.                 Informational                    [Page 12]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   3.  ALTO: The Application-Layer Traffic Optimization Working Group       aims to provide topological information at a higher abstraction       layer, which can be based upon network policy, and with       application-relevant service functions located in it.  Their work       could be leveraged to define the topology for network devices       that exchange measurement data.10.  IANA Considerations   This document has no IANA actions.11.  Security Considerations   The security of this solution hinges on the security of the network   underlay, i.e., the Autonomic Control Plane.  If the Autonomic   Control Plane were to be compromised, an attacker could undermine the   effectiveness of measurement coordination by reporting fraudulent   measurement results to peers.  This would cause measurement probes to   be deployed in an ineffective manner that would increase the   likelihood that violations of SLOs go undetected.   Likewise, the security of the solution hinges on the security of the   deployment mechanism for autonomic functions (in this case, the   autonomic function that conducts the service-level measurements).  If   an attacker were able to hijack an autonomic function, it could try   to exhaust or exceed the resources that should be spent on autonomic   measurements in order to deplete network resources, including network   bandwidth due to higher-than-necessary volumes of synthetic test   traffic generated by measurement probes.  Again, it could also lead   to reporting of misleading results; among other things, this could   result in non-optimal selection of measurement targets and, in turn,   an increase in the likelihood that service-level violations go   undetected.12.  Informative References   [ACP]      Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An              Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", Work in Progress,draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-13, December              2017.   [CSAMP]    Sekar, V., Reiter, M., Willinger, W., Zhang, H., Kompella,              R., and D. Andersen, "CSAMP: A System for Network-Wide              Flow Monitoring", NSDI USENIX Symposium Networked Systems              Design and Implementation, April 2008.Nobre, et al.                 Informational                    [Page 13]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   [DECON]    di Pietro, A., Huici, F., Costantini, D., and S.              Niccolini, "DECON: Decentralized Coordination for Large-              Scale Flow Monitoring", IEEE INFOCOM Workshops,              DOI 10.1109/INFCOMW.2010.5466642, March 2010.   [P2PBNM-Nobre-2012]              Nobre, J., Granville, L., Clemm, A., and A. Gonzalez              Prieto, "Decentralized Detection of SLA Violations Using              P2P Technology, 8th International Conference Network and              Service Management (CNSM)", 8th International Conference              on Network and Service Management (CNSM), 2012,              <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6379997>.   [RFC4148]  Stephan, E., "IP Performance Metrics (IPPM) Metrics              Registry",BCP 108,RFC 4148, DOI 10.17487/RFC4148, August              2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4148>.   [RFC4656]  Shalunov, S., Teitelbaum, B., Karp, A., Boote, J., and M.              Zekauskas, "A One-way Active Measurement Protocol              (OWAMP)",RFC 4656, DOI 10.17487/RFC4656, September 2006,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4656>.   [RFC5357]  Hedayat, K., Krzanowski, R., Morton, A., Yum, K., and J.              Babiarz, "A Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)",RFC 5357, DOI 10.17487/RFC5357, October 2008,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5357>.   [RFC5474]  Duffield, N., Ed., Chiou, D., Claise, B., Greenberg, A.,              Grossglauser, M., and J. Rexford, "A Framework for Packet              Selection and Reporting",RFC 5474, DOI 10.17487/RFC5474,              March 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5474>.   [RFC6248]  Morton, A., "RFC 4148 and the IP Performance Metrics              (IPPM) Registry of Metrics Are Obsolete",RFC 6248,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6248, April 2011,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6248>.   [RFC6812]  Chiba, M., Clemm, A., Medley, S., Salowey, J., Thombare,              S., and E. Yedavalli, "Cisco Service-Level Assurance              Protocol",RFC 6812, DOI 10.17487/RFC6812, January 2013,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6812>.   [RFC7011]  Claise, B., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and P. Aitken,              "Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)              Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information", STD 77,RFC 7011, DOI 10.17487/RFC7011, September 2013,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7011>.Nobre, et al.                 Informational                    [Page 14]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018   [RFC7297]  Boucadair, M., Jacquenet, C., and N. Wang, "IP              Connectivity Provisioning Profile (CPP)",RFC 7297,              DOI 10.17487/RFC7297, July 2014,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7297>.   [RFC7575]  Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,              Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic              Networking: Definitions and Design Goals",RFC 7575,              DOI 10.17487/RFC7575, June 2015,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575>.   [RFC8250]  Elkins, N., Hamilton, R., and M. Ackermann, "IPv6              Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination              Option",RFC 8250, DOI 10.17487/RFC8250, September 2017,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8250>.Nobre, et al.                 Informational                    [Page 15]

RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018Acknowledgements   We wish to acknowledge the helpful contributions, comments, and   suggestions that were received from Mohamed Boucadair, Brian   Carpenter, Hanlin Fang, Bruno Klauser, Diego Lopez, Vincent Roca, and   Eric Voit.  In addition, we thank Diego Lopez, Vincent Roca, and   Brian Carpenter for their detailed reviews.Authors' Addresses   Jeferson Campos Nobre   University of Vale do Rio dos Sinos   Porto Alegre   Brazil   Email: jcnobre@unisinos.br   Lisandro Zambenedetti Granvile   Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul   Porto Alegre   Brazil   Email: granville@inf.ufrgs.br   Alexander Clemm   Huawei USA - Futurewei Technologies Inc.   Santa Clara, California   United States of America   Email: ludwig@clemm.org, alexander.clemm@huawei.com   Alberto Gonzalez Prieto   VMware   Palo Alto, California   United States of America   Email: agonzalezpri@vmware.comNobre, et al.                 Informational                    [Page 16]

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2026 Movatter.jp