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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       M. PritikinRequest for Comments: 7894                           Cisco Systems, Inc.Category: Standards Track                                     C. WallaceISSN: 2070-1721                                 Red Hound Software, Inc.                                                               June 2016Alternative Challenge Password Attributesfor Enrollment over Secure TransportAbstract   This document defines a set of new Certificate Signing Request   attributes for use with the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST)   protocol.  These attributes provide disambiguation of the existing   overloaded uses for the challengePassword attribute defined in "PKCS   #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0" (RFC2985).  Uses include the original certificate revocation password,   common authentication password uses, and EST-defined linking of   transport security identity.Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 7841.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7894.Pritikin & Wallace           Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 7894      EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes    June 2016Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents1. Introduction ....................................................32. Terminology .....................................................43. Alternative Challenge Password Attributes .......................43.1. OTP Challenge Attribute ....................................43.2. Revocation Challenge Attribute .............................53.3. EST Identity Linking Attribute .............................54. Indicating Support for the Alternative Challenge Attributes .....65. Security Considerations .........................................66. IANA Considerations .............................................77. References ......................................................77.1. Normative References .......................................77.2. Informative References .....................................8Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module ..........................................9   Acknowledgements ..................................................10   Authors' Addresses ................................................10Pritikin & Wallace           Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 7894      EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes    June 20161.  Introduction   "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0"   [RFC2985] defined a challengePassword attribute that has been   overloaded by modern protocol usage with the appropriate   interpretation being provided by context rather than OID definition.   PKCS #9 defines the challengePassword attribute as "a password by   which an entity may request certificate revocation".  The parsing and   embedding of this attribute within Certificate Signing Requests is   well supported by common PKI toolsets, but many workflows leverage   this supported field as a one-time password for authentication.  For   example, this is codified in many Simple Certificate Enrollment   Protocol (SCEP) implementations as indicated by [SCEP].  Continuing   this trend, Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] defines   an additional semantic for the challengePassword attribute inSection 3.5, in order to provide a linking of the Certificate Signing   Request (CSR) to the secure transport.   Where the context of the protocol operation fully defined the proper   semantic, and when only one use was required at a time, the   overloading of this field did not cause difficulties.  Implementation   experience with EST has shown this to be a limitation though.  There   are plausible use cases where it is valuable to use either of the   existing methods separately or in concert.  For example, an EST   server might require the client to authenticate itself using the   existing client X.509 certificate as well as the user's username and   password, and to include a one-time password within the CSR, all   while maintaining identity linking to bind the CSR to the secure   transport.  The overloading of a single attribute type should not be   the limiting factor for administrators attempting to meet their   security requirements.   This document defines the otpChallenge attribute for use when a one-   time password (OTP) value within the CSR is a requirement.  The   revocationChallenge attribute is defined to allow disambiguated usage   of the original challenge password attribute semantics for   certificate revocation.  The estIdentityLinking attribute is defined   to reference existing EST challenge password semantics with no   potential for confusion with legacy challenge password practices.   The attributes defined in this specification supplement existing EST   mechanisms and are not intended to displace current usage of any   existing EST authentication mechanisms.  Conveying the authentication   value itself as an attribute may be preferable to using an HTTP or   Transport Layer Security (TLS) password or other TLS authentication   mechanism in environments where the certificate request processing   component is removed from the HTTP/TLS termination point, for   example, when a web application firewall is used.Pritikin & Wallace           Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 7894      EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes    June 20162.  Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].3.  Alternative Challenge Password Attributes   The following sections describe three alternative challenge password   attributes for use with EST [RFC7030].Appendix A provides an ASN.1   module containing the new definitions.   Each attribute described below is defined as a DirectoryString with a   maximum length of 255, which features several possible encoding   options.  Attribute values generated in accordance this document   SHOULD use the PrintableString encoding whenever possible.  If   internationalization issues make this impossible, the UTF8String   alternative SHOULD be used.  Attribute processing systems MUST be   able to recognize and process the PrintableString and UTF8String   string types in DirectoryString values.  Support for other string   types is OPTIONAL.3.1.  OTP Challenge Attribute   The otpChallenge attribute is defined as a DirectoryString with a   maximum length of 255.  This is consistent with the challengePassword   attribute as originally defined in PKCS #9 [RFC2985].  The   otpChallenge attribute is identified by the id-aa-otpChallenge object   identifier.  This facilitates reuse of the existing challengePassword   code by associating the new object identifiers with the existing   parsing and generation code.  This attribute provides a means of   conveying a one-time password value as part of a CSR request.   Generation, verification, storage, etc., of the value is not   addressed by this specification.  [RFC4226] and [RFC6238] define one-   time password mechanisms that MAY be used with this attribute.      ub-aa-otpChallenge INTEGER ::= 255      id-aa-otpChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {          id-smime 56      }      otpChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {          WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-otpChallenge}          EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch          SINGLE VALUE TRUE          ID id-aa-otpChallenge      }Pritikin & Wallace           Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 7894      EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes    June 20163.2.  Revocation Challenge Attribute   The original PKCS #9 challengePassword field has been overloaded, and   the common use is unclear.  The revocationChallenge attribute defined   here provides an unambiguous method of indicating the original PKCS   #9 intent for this attribute type.  The revocationChallenge attribute   is identified by the id-aa-revocationChallenge object identifier.   [RFC2985] discusses the original semantics for the PKCS #9 challenge   password attribute.      ub-aa-revocationChallenge INTEGER ::= 255      id-aa-revocationChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {          id-smime 57      }      revocationChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {          WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-revocationChallenge}          EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch          SINGLE VALUE TRUE          ID id-aa-revocationChallenge      }3.3.  EST Identity Linking Attribute   EST defines a mechanism for associating identity information from an   authenticated TLS session with proof-of-possession information in a   certificate request.  The mechanism was labeled using the pkcs-9-at-   challengePassword identifier from [RFC2985].  To avoid any confusion   with the semantics described in [RFC2985] or any other specifications   that similarly defined use of the PKCS #9 challenge password   attribute for their own purposes, a new object identifier is defined   here and associated with the semantics described inSection 3.5 of   [RFC7030].      ub-aa-est-identity-linking INTEGER ::= 255      id-aa-estIdentityLinking OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {          id-smime 58      }      estIdentityLinking ATTRIBUTE ::= {          WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-est-identity-linking}          EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch          SINGLE VALUE TRUE          ID id-aa-estIdentityLinking      }Pritikin & Wallace           Standards Track                    [Page 5]

RFC 7894      EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes    June 20164.  Indicating Support for the Alternative Challenge Attributes   The EST server MUST indicate these attributes, as the particular use   case requires, in every CSR Attributes Response.  An EST server MAY   send both the estIdentityLinking attribute and the challengePassword   attribute [RFC7030] in a CSR Attributes Response to ensure support   for legacy clients.   The client MUST include every indicated attribute for which it has   values in the subsequent CSR.  If a client sees an estIdentityLinking   attribute in a CSR Attributes Response, it SHOULD prefer that and not   include a challengePassword attribute [RFC7030] in the resulting CSR.   EST clients that include an unsolicited estIdentityLinking attribute   MAY also include the challengePassword attribute [RFC7030] to ensure   support for legacy servers.   EST servers MUST evaluate each challenge attribute independently.   All challenge attributes included by an EST client MUST be   successfully processed by an EST server for a request to be   considered valid.  The EST server MAY ignore challenge attributes   according to local policy, for example, if the EST client is an   authenticated Registration Authority, the EST server may ignore the   estIdentityLinking attribute within a CSR (seeSection 3.7 of   [RFC7030]).  The EST server MAY refuse enrollment requests that are   not encoded according to the policy of the Certification Authority   (CA).5.  Security Considerations   In addition to the security considerations expressed in the EST   specification [RFC7030], additional security considerations may be   associated with the mechanism used to generate and verify the   otpChallenge value.  Where a one-time password is used, the security   considerations expressed in "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password   Algorithm" [RFC4226] or "TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password   Algorithm" [RFC6238] may be relevant.  Similarly, the security   considerations from [RFC2985] that apply to the challenge attribute   are relevant as well.Pritikin & Wallace           Standards Track                    [Page 6]

RFC 7894      EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes    June 20166.  IANA ConsiderationsSection 3 defines three attributes that have been assigned object   identifiers in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Attributes   (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2)" registry [RFC7107]:        Value     Description                        Reference        --------  ---------------------------------  ----------        56        id-aa-otpChallengeRFC 7894        57        id-aa-revocationChallengeRFC 7894        58        id-aa-estIdentityLinkingRFC 7894   Appendix A contains an ASN.1 module.  A module identifier has been   assigned in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry   [RFC7299].        Value     Description                        Reference        --------  ---------------------------------  ----------        87        id-mod-EST-Alt-ChallengeRFC 78947.  References7.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.   [RFC2985]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0",RFC 2985,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.   [RFC5272]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS              (CMC)",RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List              (CRL) Profile",RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)",RFC 5912,              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.Pritikin & Wallace           Standards Track                    [Page 7]

RFC 7894      EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes    June 2016   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,              "Enrollment over Secure Transport",RFC 7030,              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.7.2.  Informative References   [RFC4226]  M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and              O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password              Algorithm",RFC 4226, DOI 10.17487/RFC4226, December 2005,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4226>.   [RFC6238]  M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP:              Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm",RFC 6238,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6238, May 2011,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6238>.   [RFC7107]  Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the S/MIME              Mail Security Working Group",RFC 7107,              DOI 10.17487/RFC7107, January 2014,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7107>.   [RFC7299]  Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX              Working Group",RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.   [SCEP]     Gutmann, P. and M. Pritikin, "Simple Certificate Enrolment              Protocol", Work in Progress,draft-gutmann-scep-02, March              2016.Pritikin & Wallace           Standards Track                    [Page 8]

RFC 7894      EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes    June 2016Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module   The following ASN.1 module includes the definitions to support usage   of the attributes defined in this specification.  Modules from   [RFC5912] are imported (the original Standards Track source for the   imported structures is [RFC5280] and [RFC5272]).   Mod-EST-Alt-Challenge {      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)         mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 87   }   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=   BEGIN   IMPORTS   DirectoryString{}   FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)   }   ATTRIBUTE   FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)   };   ub-aa-otpChallenge INTEGER ::= 255   id-aa-otpChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {      iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)      smime(16) aa(2) 56   }   otpChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {      TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-otpChallenge}      COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1      IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-otpChallenge   }   ub-aa-revocationChallenge INTEGER ::= 255   id-aa-revocationChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {      iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)      smime(16) aa(2) 57   }   revocationChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {      TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-revocationChallenge}      COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1      IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-revocationChallenge   }Pritikin & Wallace           Standards Track                    [Page 9]

RFC 7894      EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes    June 2016   ub-aa-est-identity-linking INTEGER ::= 255   id-aa-estIdentityLinking OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {      iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)      smime(16) aa(2) 58   }   estIdentityLinking ATTRIBUTE ::= {      TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-est-identity-linking}      COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1      IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-estIdentityLinking   }   ENDAcknowledgements   Thanks to Jim Schaad, Dan Harkins, Phil Scheffler, Geoff Beier, Mike   Jenkins, and Deb Cooley for their feedback.Authors' Addresses   Max Pritikin   Cisco Systems, Inc.   510 McCarthy Drive   Milpitas, CA  95035   United States   Email: pritikin@cisco.com   Carl Wallace   Red Hound Software, Inc.   Email: carl@redhoundsoftware.comPritikin & Wallace           Standards Track                   [Page 10]

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