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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         S. TurnerRequest for Comments: 5756                                          IECAUpdates:4055                                                   D. BrownCategory: Standards Track                                       CerticomISSN: 2070-1721                                                   K. Yiu                                                               Microsoft                                                              R. Housley                                                          Vigil Security                                                                 T. Polk                                                                    NIST                                                            January 2010Updates for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS Algorithm ParametersAbstract   This document updatesRFC 4055.  It updates the conventions for using   the RSA Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding   (RSAES-OAEP) key transport algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key   Infrastructure (PKI).  Specifically, it updates the conventions for   algorithm parameters in an X.509 certificate's subjectPublicKeyInfo   field.Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5756.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respectTurner, et al.              Standards Track                     [Page 1]

RFC 5756RFC 4055 Update                 January 2010   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF   Contributions published or made publicly available before November   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other   than English.1.  IntroductionRFC 4055 specifies conventions for using the RSA Encryption Scheme -   Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport   algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  It   provides algorithm identifiers and parameters for RSAES-OAEP.   This document updates the conventions for RSAES-OAEP parameters in   the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of an X.509 certificate.  The PKIX WG   Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) design team recommended that Key   Derivation Functions (KDFs) should not be constrained within a   certificate; rather, KDF constraints should be negotiated in   protocols that need to employ certificates.   Only two paragraphs in [RFC4055] discuss RSAES-OAEP parameters in   X.509 certificates: the second paragraph ofSection 4 and the first   paragraph ofSection 4.1.  This document only updates these two   paragraphs.Section 3 updates the second paragraph inSection 4 of   [RFC4055], whileSection 4 updates the second paragraph inSection4.1 of [RFC4055].  "Old:" prefaces the text to be replaced and "New:"   prefaces the replacement text.   This document also replaces incorrect references to the   publicKeyAlgorithms field inSection 3 with references to the   parameters field in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field.Section 3 also rewords the second and third paragraphs for clarity.Turner, et al.              Standards Track                     [Page 2]

RFC 5756RFC 4055 Update                 January 20101.1.  Conventions Used in This Document   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].2.  Changes toSection 3 (Second and Third Paragraphs)   This change clarifies the placement of RSASSA-PSS-params in the   signature, signatureAlgorithm, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields for   certification authority (CA) and end-entity (EE) certificates.  It   also clarifies the placement of RSASSA-PSS-params in the   signatureAlgorithm field in certificate revocation lists (CRLs).   Old:   CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSASSA-PSS algorithm   identifier SHOULD require the presence of parameters in the   publicKeyAlgorithms field if the cA boolean flag is set in the basic   constraints certificate extension.  CAs MAY require that the   parameters be present in the publicKeyAlgorithms field for end-entity   certificates.   CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS algorithm for signing certificates SHOULD   include RSASSA-PSS-params in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm   parameters in their own certificates.  CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS   algorithm for signing certificates or CRLs MUST include RSASSA-PSS-   params in the signatureAlgorithm parameters in the TBSCertificate or   TBSCertList structures.   New:   When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the   TBSCertificate or TBSCertList signature algorithm field, then the   RSASSA-PSS-params structure MUST be included in the TBSCertificate or   TBSCertList signature parameters field.   When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the   TBSCertificate subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of CA   certificates, then the parameters field SHOULD include the RSASSA-   PSS-params structure.  When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier   appears in the TBSCertificate subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of   EE certificates, then the parameters field MAY include the RSASSA-   PSS-params structure.Turner, et al.              Standards Track                     [Page 3]

RFC 5756RFC 4055 Update                 January 2010   All certificates and CRLs signed by a CA that supports the id-RSASSA-   PSS algorithm MUST include the RSASSA-PSS-params in the   signatureAlgorithm parameters in Certificate and CertList structures,   respectively.3.  Changes toSection 4 (Second Paragraph)   This change prohibits the inclusion of RSAES-OAEP-params in the   subjectPublicKeyInfo field.  This was done because a) it does not   affect interoperability and b) it aligns with PKIX practice to not   include limitations on how the public key can be used in   subjectPublicKeyInfo.  A poll of implementers was taken and there   were no objections to this change as it did not affect current   implementations.   Old:   CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm   identifier SHOULD require the presence of parameters in the   publicKeyAlgorithms field for all certificates.  Entities that use a   certificate with a publicKeyAlgorithm value of id-RSA-OAEP where the   parameters are absent SHOULD use the default set of parameters for   RSAES-OAEP-params.  Entities that use a certificate with a   publicKeyAlgorithm value of rsaEncryption SHOULD use the default set   of parameters for RSAES-OAEP-params.   New:   CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm   identifier MUST NOT include parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo   algorithm field.4.  Changes toSection 4.1 (First Paragraph)   This change prohibits the inclusion of parameters in the   subjectPublicKeyInfo field.  This was done because a) it does not   affect interoperability and b) it aligns with PKIX practice to not   include limitations on how the public key can be used in   subjectPublicKeyInfo.  A poll of implementers was taken and there   were no objections to this change as it did not affect current   implementations.   Old:   When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters   MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax.  The parameters may be   either absent or present when used as subject public key information.Turner, et al.              Standards Track                     [Page 4]

RFC 5756RFC 4055 Update                 January 2010   The parameters MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier   associated with an encrypted value.   New:   When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters   MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax.  The parameters MUST be   absent when used in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field.  The parameters   MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier associated with   an encrypted value.5.  Security Considerations   The security considerations from [RFC4055] apply.   If the RSAES-OAEP-params are negotiated, then the negotiation   mechanism needs to provide integrity for these parameters.  For   example, an S/MIME Agent can advertise their capabilities in the   SMIMECapabilities attribute, which is either a signed attribute   [RFC5751] or a certificate extension [RFC4262].6.  References6.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate                 Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [RFC4055]     Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional                 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use                 in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure                 Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)                 Profile",RFC 4055, June 2005.6.2.  Informative References   [RFC4262]     Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for                 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)                 Capabilities",RFC 4262, December 2005.   [RFC5751]     Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose                 Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message                 Specification",RFC 5751, January 2010.Turner, et al.              Standards Track                     [Page 5]

RFC 5756RFC 4055 Update                 January 2010Authors' Addresses   Sean Turner   IECA, Inc.   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106   Fairfax, VA 22031   USA   EMail: turners@ieca.com   Kelvin Yiu   Microsoft   One Microsoft Way   Redmond, WA 98052-6399   USA   EMail: kelviny@microsoft.com   Daniel R. L. Brown   Certicom Corp   5520 Explorer Drive #400   Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1   CANADA   EMail: dbrown@certicom.com   Russ Housley   Vigil Security, LLC   918 Spring Knoll Drive   Herndon, VA 20170   USA   EMail: housley@vigilsec.com   Tim Polk   NIST   Building 820, Room 426   Gaithersburg, MD 20899   USA   EMail: wpolk@nist.govTurner, et al.              Standards Track                     [Page 6]