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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          J. ArkkoRequest for Comments: 5872                                      EricssonUpdates:5191                                                   A. YeginCategory: Standards Track                                        SamsungISSN: 2070-1721                                                 May 2010IANA Rules for theProtocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)Abstract   This document relaxes the IANA rules for the Protocol for Carrying   Authentication for Network Access (PANA).Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5872.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Arkko & Yegin                Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 5872                     PANA IANA Rules                    May 20101.  Introduction   This document relaxes the IANA rules for the Protocol for Carrying   Authentication for Network Access (PANA) [RFC5191].  Rules for the   following protocol fields, all defined in [RFC5191], are affected:   o  Message Types   o  Message Flags   o  Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) Flags   o  Result-Code AVP Values   o  Termination-Cause AVP Values   The rationale for this update is that there can be situations in   which it makes sense to grant an allocation under special   circumstances.  At the time of this writing, the IETF is in the   process of approving one such allocation.  By changing the current   IANA rules to allow for IESG Approval [RFC5226] as well, it has   become possible for the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) to   consider an allocation request, even if it does not fulfill the   default rule.  For instance, an experimental protocol extension could   perhaps deserve an allocation from a field of reserved bits, as long   as a sufficient number of bits still remain for other purposes, and   the PANA community is happy with such allocation.2.  IANA Considerations   IANA has updated the registries related to PANA Message Types,   Message Flags, AVP Flags, Result-Code AVP Values, and Termination-   Cause AVP Values, as specified below.  All other PANA IANA registries   are to remain unchanged.2.1.  Message Types   The Message Types namespace is used to identify PANA messages.  Value   0 is not used and is not assigned by IANA.  The range of values from   1 - 65,519 are for permanent, standard Message Types, allocated by   IETF Review or IESG Approval [RFC5226].  Previously, the rule for   this range was allocation by IETF Review only.  [RFC5191] defined the   range of values from 1 - 4.  The same Message Type is used for both   the request and the answer messages, except for type 1.  The Request   bit distinguishes requests from answers.Arkko & Yegin                Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 5872                     PANA IANA Rules                    May 2010   The range of values from 65,520 - 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfff0 -   0xffff) is reserved for experimental messages.  As these codes are   only for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for   interoperability between the communicating PANA Client (PaC) and PANA   Authentication Agent (PAA) using experimental commands, as outlined   in [RFC3692].2.2.  Message Flags   There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA message header.Section 6.2 of [RFC5191] assigned bit 0 ('R'), 1 ('S'), 2 ('C'), 3   ('A'), 4 ('P'), and 5 ('I').  Allocations from the remaining free   bits in the PANA header Flag field are made via Standards Action or   IESG Approval [RFC5226].  Previously, the rule for these bits was   allocation by Standards Action only.2.3.  AVP Flags   There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined   inSection 6.3 of [RFC5191].  That RFC also assigned bit 0 ('V').   The remaining bits are assigned via Standards Action or IESG Approval   [RFC5226].  Previously, the rule for these bits was allocation by   Standards Action only.2.4.  Result-Code AVP Values   As defined inSection 8.7 of [RFC5191], the Result-Code AVP (AVP   Code 7) defines the values from 0 - 2.   All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Review or   IESG Approval [RFC5226].  Previously, the rule for these values was   allocation by IETF Review only.2.5.  Termination-Cause AVP Values   As defined inSection 8.9 of [RFC5191], the Termination-Cause AVP   (AVP Code 9) defines the values 1, 4, and 8.   All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Review or   IESG Approval [RFC5226].  Previously, the rule for these values was   allocation by IETF Review only.Arkko & Yegin                Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 5872                     PANA IANA Rules                    May 20103.  Security Considerations   This specification does not change the security properties of PANA.   However, a few words are necessary about the use of the experimental   code points defined inSection 2.1.  Potentially harmful side effects   from the use of the experimental values need to be carefully   evaluated before deploying any experiment across networks that the   owner of the experiment does not entirely control.  Guidance given in   [RFC3692] about the use of experimental values needs to be followed.4.  References4.1.  Normative References   [RFC5191]  Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A.              Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network              Access (PANA)",RFC 5191, May 2008.   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs",BCP 26,RFC 5226,              May 2008.4.2.  Informative References   [RFC3692]  Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers              Considered Useful",BCP 82,RFC 3692, January 2004.Arkko & Yegin                Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 5872                     PANA IANA Rules                    May 2010Appendix A.  Changes fromRFC 5191   This document changes the IANA rules for: Message Types, Message   Flags, AVP Flags, Result-Code AVP Values, and Termination-Cause AVP   Values.Appendix B.  Acknowledgments   The authors would like to thank Yoshihiro Ohba, Ralph Droms,   Magnus Westerlund, and Alfred Hoenes for reviews and comments on this   topic.Authors' Addresses   Jari Arkko   Ericsson   Jorvas  02420   Finland   EMail: jari.arkko@piuha.net   Alper Yegin   Samsung   Istanbul   Turkey   EMail: alper.yegin@yegin.orgArkko & Yegin                Standards Track                    [Page 5]