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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        J. SolinasRequest for Comments: 5759                                    L. ZieglarCategory: Informational                                              NSAISSN: 2070-1721                                             January 2010Suite B Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) ProfileAbstract   This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and   X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use with the United   States National Security Agency's Suite B Cryptography.  The reader   is assumed to have familiarity withRFC 5280, "Internet X.509 Public   Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)   Profile".Status of This Memo   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is   published for informational purposes.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet   Standard; seeSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5759.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Solinas & Zieglar             Informational                     [Page 1]

RFC 5759           Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile      January 2010Table of Contents1. Introduction ....................................................22. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................33. Requirements and Assumptions ....................................33.1. Implementing Suite B .......................................33.2. Suite B Object Identifiers .................................44. Suite B Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile ..........44.1. signatureAlgorithm .........................................44.2. signatureValue .............................................54.3. Version ....................................................64.4. SubjectPublicKeyInfo .......................................6      4.5. Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of           Certificates ...............................................74.5.1. Suite B Self-Signed CA Certificates .................74.5.2. Suite B Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates .............8           4.5.3. Suite B End Entity Signature and Key                  Establishment Certificates ..........................85. Suite B CRL and CRL Extensions Profile ..........................96. Security Considerations .........................................97. IANA Considerations .............................................98. References .....................................................108.1. Normative References ......................................108.2. Informative References ....................................101.  Introduction   This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and   X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use by applications   that support the United States National Security Agency's Suite B   Cryptography.   The reader is assumed to have familiarity with [RFC5280].  This Suite   B Certificate and CRL Profile is a profile ofRFC 5280.  All MUST-   level requirements ofRFC 5280 apply throughout this profile and are   generally not repeated here.  In cases where a MUST-level requirement   is repeated for emphasis, the text notes the requirement is "in   adherence with [RFC5280]".  This profile contains changes that   elevate some MAY-level options inRFC 5280 to SHOULD-level and MUST-   level in this profile; this profile also contains changes that   elevate some SHOULD-level options inRFC 5280 to MUST-level for this   profile.  All options fromRFC 5280 that are not listed in this   profile remain at the requirement level ofRFC 5280.Solinas & Zieglar             Informational                     [Page 2]

RFC 5759           Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile      January 2010   The reader is also assumed to have familiarity with [RFC5480], which   specifies the syntax and semantics for the Subject Public Key   Information field in certificates that support Elliptic Curve   Cryptography and [RFC5758], which specifies algorithm identifiers for   Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).2.  Conventions Used in This Document   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].3.  Requirements and Assumptions   The goal of this document is to define a base set of certificate and   CRL formats to support interoperability among Suite B solutions.   Specific communities, such as the US National Security Systems, may   define community profiles that further restrict certificate and CRL   formats by mandating the presence of extensions that are optional in   this base profile, defining new optional or critical extension types,   or restricting the values and/or presence of fields within existing   extensions.  However, communications between distinct communities   MUST use the formats specified in this document when interoperability   is desired.  (Applications may add additional non-critical extensions   to these formats but they MUST NOT assume that a remote peer will be   able to process them.)3.1.  Implementing Suite B   Every Suite B certificate MUST use the X.509 v3 format, and contain   either:      * An ECDSA-capable signing key, using curve P-256 or P-384; or      * An ECDH-capable (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) key        establishment key, using curve P-256 or P-384.   Every Suite B certificate and CRL MUST be signed using ECDSA.  The   signing Certification Authority's  (CA's) key MUST be on the curve   P-256 or P-384 if the certificate contains a key on the curve P-256.   If the certificate contains a key on the curve P-384, the signing   CA's key MUST be on the curve P-384.  Any certificate and CRL MUST be   hashed using SHA-256 or SHA-384, matched to the size of the signing   CA's key.Solinas & Zieglar             Informational                     [Page 3]

RFC 5759           Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile      January 20103.2.  Suite B Object Identifiers   The primary OID structure for Suite B is as follows per [X9.62],   [SEC2], [RFC5480], and [RFC5758].      ansi-X9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {         iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }      certicom-arc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {         iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) }      id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {         ansi-X9-62 keyType(2) 1 }      secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {         ansi-X9-62 curves(3) prime(1) 7 }      secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {         certicom-arc curve(0) 34 }      id-ecSigType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {         ansi-X9-62 signatures(4) }      ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {         id-ecSigType ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }      ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {         id-ecSigType ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }4.  Suite B Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile   This Suite B certificate profile is a profile of [RFC5280].  The   changes in the requirements fromRFC 5280 are listed here.  Note thatRFC 5280 has varying mandates for marking extensions as critical or   non-critical.  This profile changes some of those mandates for   extensions that are included in Suite B certificates.4.1.  signatureAlgorithm   The two algorithm identifiers used by Suite B are:   1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 for ecdsa-with-SHA256 and 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 for   ecdsa-with-SHA384, as described in [RFC5758] AND [X9.62].   The parameters MUST be absent as per [RFC5758].Solinas & Zieglar             Informational                     [Page 4]

RFC 5759           Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile      January 20104.2.  signatureValue   ECDSA digital signature generation is described in [FIPS186-3].  An   ECDSA signature value is comprised of two unsigned integers, denoted   as r and s.  r and s MUST be represented as ASN.1 INTEGERs.  If the   high order bit of the unsigned integer is a 1, an octet with the   value 0x00 MUST be prepended to the binary representation before   encoding it as an ASN.1 INTEGER.  Unsigned integers for the P-256 and   P-384 curves can be a maximum of 32 and 48 bytes, respectively.   Therefore, converting each r and s to an ASN.1 INTEGER will result in   a maximum of 33 bytes for the P-256 curve and 49 bytes for the P-384   curve.   The ECDSA signatureValue in an X.509 certificate is encoded as a BIT   STRING value of a DER-encoded SEQUENCE of the two INTEGERS.  As per   [RFC5480], the structure, included for convenience, is as follows:      ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {          r  INTEGER,          s  INTEGER        }   For example, in a signature using P-256 and hex notation:      r=  52e3f7b7 27fba9e8 eddb1d08 3b75c188          2517e6dc 63ded9c0 524f8f9a 45dc8661      s=  b8930438 de8d33bd ab12c3a2 bdad9795          92a1fd65 76d1734c 3eb0af34 0456aef4      r represented as a DER-encoded INTEGER:         022052e3 f7b727fb a9e8eddb 1d083b75         c1882517 e6dc63de d9c0524f 8f9a45dc         8661      s represented as a DER-encoded INTEGER:         022100b8 930438de 8d33bdab 12c3a2bd         ad979592 a1fd6576 d1734c3e b0af3404         56aef4      Representation of SEQUENCE of r and s:         30450220 52e3f7b7 27fba9e8 eddb1d08         3b75c188 2517e6dc 63ded9c0 524f8f9a         45dc8661 022100b8 930438de 8d33bdab         12c3a2bd ad979592 a1fd6576 d1734c3e         b0af3404 56aef4Solinas & Zieglar             Informational                     [Page 5]

RFC 5759           Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile      January 2010      Representation of resulting signatureValue:         03480030 45022052 e3f7b727 fba9e8ed         db1d083b 75c18825 17e6dc63 ded9c052         4f8f9a45 dc866102 2100b893 0438de8d         33bdab12 c3a2bdad 979592a1 fd6576d1         734c3eb0 af340456 aef44.3.  Version   For this profile, Version MUST be 3, which means the value MUST be   set to 2.4.4.  SubjectPublicKeyInfo   For ECDSA signing keys and ECDH key agreement keys, the algorithm ID,   id-ecPublicKey, MUST be used.   The parameters of the AlgorithmIdentifier in this field MUST use the   namedCurve option.  The specifiedCurve and implicitCurve options   described in [RFC5480] MUST NOT be used.  The namedCurve MUST be   either the OID for secp256r1 (curve P-256) or secp384r1 (curve P-384)   [RFC5480].   The elliptic curve public key, ECPoint, SHALL be the OCTET STRING   representation of an elliptic curve point following the conversion   routine insection 2.2 of [RFC5480] and sections2.3.1 and2.3.2 of   [SEC1].   Suite B implementations MAY use either the uncompressed form or the   compressed form of the elliptic curve point [RFC5480].  For   interoperability purposes, all relying parties MUST be prepared to   process the uncompressed form.   The elliptic curve public key (an ECPoint that is an OCTET STRING) is   mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a BIT STRING) as follows:  the most   significant bit of the OCTET STRING becomes the most significant bit   of the BIT STRING and the least significant bit of the OCTET STRING   becomes the least significant bit of the BIT STRING [RFC5480].Solinas & Zieglar             Informational                     [Page 6]

RFC 5759           Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile      January 2010   An octet string representation of a P-256 uncompressed elliptic curve   point:      046cc93a 2cdb0308 47fa0734 2bc8e130      4c77f04f 63557372 43f3a5d7 f51baa82      23d21ebf b87d9944 f7ec170d 64f9924e      9ce20e4d 361c2db5 f1d52257 4259edad      5e   A DER-encoded bit string representation of the subject public key:      03420004 6cc93a2c db030847 fa07342b      c8e1304c 77f04f63 55737243 f3a5d7f5      1baa8223 d21ebfb8 7d9944f7 ec170d64      f9924e9c e20e4d36 1c2db5f1 d5225742      59edad5e   A DER-encoded representation of the AlgorithmIdentifier:      30130607 2a8648ce 3d020106 082a8648      ce3d0301 07   A DER-encoded representation of the subjectPublicKeyInfo using the   P-256 curve:      30593013 06072a86 48ce3d02 0106082a      8648ce3d 03010703 4200046c c93a2cdb      030847fa 07342bc8 e1304c77 f04f6355      737243f3 a5d7f51b aa8223d2 1ebfb87d      9944f7ec 170d64f9 924e9ce2 0e4d361c      2db5f1d5 22574259 edad5e4.5.  Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of Certificates   Different types of certificates in this profile have different   required and recommended extensions.  Those are listed in this   section.  Those extensions fromRFC 5280 not explicitly listed in   this profile remain at the requirement levels ofRFC 5280.4.5.1.  Suite B Self-Signed CA Certificates   In adherence with [RFC5280], self-signed CA certificates in this   profile MUST contain the subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, and   basicConstraints extensions.   The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical.  The keyCertSign   and cRLSign bits MUST be set.  The digitalSignature and   nonRepudiation bits MAY be set.  All other bits MUST NOT be set.Solinas & Zieglar             Informational                     [Page 7]

RFC 5759           Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile      January 2010   In adherence with [RFC5280], the basicConstraints extension MUST be   marked as critical.  The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the   subject is a CA and the pathLenConstraint MUST NOT be present.4.5.2.  Suite B Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates   Non-self-signed CA Certificates in this profile MUST contain the   authorityKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, and basicConstraints extensions. If   there is a policy to be asserted, then the certificatePolicies   extension MUST be included.   The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical.  The keyCertSign   and CRLSign bits MUST be set.  The digitalSignature and   nonRepudiation bits MAY be set.  All other bits MUST NOT be set.   In adherence with [RFC5280], the basicConstraints extension MUST be   marked as critical.  The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the   subject is a CA and the pathLenConstraint subfield is OPTIONAL.   If a policy is asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST be   marked as non-critical, MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable   certificate policies and SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option.   If a policy is not asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST   be omitted.   Relying party applications conforming to this profile MUST be   prepared to process the policyMappings, policyConstraints, and   inhibitAnyPolicy extensions, regardless of criticality, following the   guidance in [RFC5280] when they appear in non-self-signed CA   certificates.4.5.3.  Suite B End Entity Signature and Key Establishment Certificates   In adherence with [RFC5280], end entity certificates in this profile   MUST contain the authorityKeyIdentifier and keyUsage extensions.  If   there is a policy to be asserted, then the certificatePolicies   extension MUST be included.  End entity certificates SHOULD contain   the subjectKeyIdentifier extension.   The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical.   For end entity digital signature certificates, the keyUsage extension   MUST be set for digitalSignature.  The nonRepudiation bit MAY be set.   All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be set.Solinas & Zieglar             Informational                     [Page 8]

RFC 5759           Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile      January 2010   For end entity key establishment certificates, the keyUsage extension   MUST BE set for keyAgreement.  The encipherOnly or decipherOnly bit   MAY be set.  All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be   set.   If a policy is asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST be   marked as non-critical, MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable   certificate policies and SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option.   If a policy is not asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST   be omitted.5.  Suite B CRL and CRL Extensions Profile   This Suite B CRL profile is a profile of [RFC5280].  There are   changes in the requirements from [RFC5280] for the signatures on CRLs   of this profile.   The signatures on CRLs in this profile MUST follow the same rules   from this profile that apply to signatures in the certificates, seesection 4.6.  Security Considerations   The security considerations in [RFC5280], [RFC5480], and [RFC5758]   apply.   A single key pair SHOULD NOT be used for both signature and key   establishment per [SP-800-57].   The Suite B algorithms provide significantly improved performance   when compared to equivalent-strength cryptography that does not   employ elliptic curve cryptography.  Where performance has previously   been an impediment, use of Suite B may permit employment of PKI-based   cryptographic security mechanisms.7.  IANA Considerations   This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register   public key types, elliptic curves, and algorithms.  Most of them are   registered in the ANSI X9.62 arc with the exception of some of the   curves, which are in the Certicom, Inc. arc (these curves have been   adopted by ANSI and NIST).  Extensions in certificates and CRLs are   identified using the object identifiers defined in an arc delegated   by IANA to the PKIX working group.  No further action by IANA is   necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.Solinas & Zieglar             Informational                     [Page 9]

RFC 5759           Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile      January 20108.  References8.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate                Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [RFC5280]    Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,                Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key                Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation                List (CRL) Profile",RFC 5280, May 2008.   [RFC5480]    Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T.                Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key                Information",RFC 5480, March 2009.   [RFC5758]    Dang, Q., Santesson, S., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., and T.                Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:                Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and                ECDSA",RFC 5758, January 2010.8.2.   Informative References   [FIPS186-3]  "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", June 2009.   [SEC1]       Standards for Efficient Cryptography, "SEC1: Elliptic                Curve Cryptography", September 2000.   [SEC2]       Standards for Efficient Cryptography, "SEC 2:                Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", September                2000.   [SP-800-57]  Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W. Smid, M.,                "NIST SP-800-57:Recommendation for Key Management-Part                1: General", March 2007.   [X9.62]      ANS X9.62, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial                Services Industry; The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature                Algorithm (ECDSA)", December 2005.   [X9.63]      ANS X9.63, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial                Services Industry; Key Agreement and Key Transport Using                Elliptic Curve Cryptography", December 2001.Solinas & Zieglar             Informational                    [Page 10]

RFC 5759           Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile      January 2010Authors' Addresses   Jerome Solinas   National Information Assurance Research Laboratory   National Security Agency   EMail: jasolin@orion.ncsc.mil   Lydia Zieglar   National Information Assurance Research Laboratory   National Security Agency   EMail: llziegl@tycho.ncsc.milSolinas & Zieglar             Informational                    [Page 11]