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.2023 Dec;41(Suppl 1):66-81.
doi: 10.1007/s40592-023-00180-0. Epub 2023 Sep 9.

Efficiency and the futures market in organs

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Efficiency and the futures market in organs

Andreas Albertsen. Monash Bioeth Rev.2023 Dec.

Abstract

There has been considerable debate over regulated organ markets. Especially current markets, where people sell one of their kidneys while still alive, have received increased attention. Futures markets remain an interesting and under-discussed alternative specification of a market-based solution to the organ shortage. Futures markets pertain to the sale of the right to procure people's organs after they die. There is a wide range of possible specifications of the futures market. There are, however, some major unaddressed efficiency concerns. This article presents this class of concerns and discusses the implication for organ futures markets. It identifies a number of inefficiency sources pertaining to crowding out, bad organs, costs and missed opportunities, family refusals, moral hazard and strength of the provided incentive. However, a complete assessment of futures market requires better knowledge regarding the potential reaction from donors, families and health professionals.

Keywords: Controversial markets; Moral limits of markets; Organ donation; Organ futures markets; Organ markets.

© 2023. The Author(s) under exclusive licence to Monash University.

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References

    1. Albertsen, Andreas. 2017. Priority to organ donors: Personal responsibility, equal access and the priority rule in organ procurement. Diamitros 51 (March): 137–152.
    1. Albertsen, Andreas. 2020. Against the family veto in organ procurement: Why the wishes of the dead should prevail when the living and the deceased disagree on organ donation. Bioethics 34 (3): 272–280.https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12661 . - DOI
    1. Albertsen, Andreas. 2020. If the price is right: The ethics and efficiency of market solutions to the organ shortage. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 17 (3): 357–367.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-020-09981-y . - DOI
    1. Albertsen, Andreas. 2023a. Organ Markets. In The Rowman & Littlefield Handbook of Bioethics, ed. Ezio Di Nucci, Ji-Young. Lee, and Isaac Eagner, 170–84. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
    1. Albertsen, Andreas. 2023b. Priority for organ donors in the allocation of organs: Priority rules from the perspective of equality of opportunity. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 48: 359–372. - DOI

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