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.2020 Jan 10;36(4):711-733.
doi: 10.1007/s10680-019-09547-8. eCollection 2020 Sep.

The Gender Cliff in the Relative Contribution to the Household Income: Insights from Modelling Marriage Markets in 27 European Countries

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The Gender Cliff in the Relative Contribution to the Household Income: Insights from Modelling Marriage Markets in 27 European Countries

André Grow et al. Eur J Popul..

Abstract

In Western countries, the distribution of relative incomes within marriages tends to be skewed in a remarkable way. Husbands usually do not only earn more than their female partners, but there is also a striking discontinuity in their relative contributions to the household income at the 50/50 point: many wives contribute just a bit less than or as much as their husbands, but few contribute more. This 'cliff' has been interpreted as evidence that men and women avoid situations where a wife would earn more than her husband, since this would go against traditional gender norms. In this paper, we use a simulation approach to model marriage markets and demonstrate that a cliff in the relative income distribution can also emerge without such avoidance. We feed our simulations with income data from 27 European countries. Results show that a cliff can emerge from inequalities in men's and women's average incomes, even if they do not attach special meaning to a situation in which a wife earns more than her husband.

Keywords: Gender inequality; Gender norms; Income; Marriage markets; Simulation modelling.

© The Author(s) 2020.

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Conflict of interest statement

Conflict of interestThe authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Figures

Fig. 1
Fig. 1
Shares that women contribute to household income in 27 countries.Note: The grey vertical line indicates the point where the share of the household income that the woman provides is .5. The number in the upper left/right corner of each panel shows the share of couples in which the woman contributes nothing to the household income.Source: Pooled data from the 2007 and 2011 waves of the cross-sectional versions of EU-SILC
Fig. 2
Fig. 2
Baseline probability that individuali is willing to settle for his/her partnerj, contingent on how much the share of the household income thatj would contribute deviates from .5 (sj − .5) at different levels ofα
Fig. 3
Fig. 3
Comparison of women’s and men’s incomes across 27 countries.Note: Income is measured in national currencies. The vertical lines show the average incomes of men and women.Source: Pooled data from the 2007 and 2011 waves of the cross-sectional versions of EU-SILC
Fig. 4
Fig. 4
Comparison of the relative income distributions observed in the EU-SILC data with those generated by the simulation model.Note: The grey vertical line indicates the point where the share of the household income that the woman provides is .5. The numbers in the upper left/right corner of each panel show the shares of couples in which the woman contributes nothing to the household income.Source: The simulation results are based on the main simulation experiment. The empirical data are the same as for Fig. 1
Fig. 5
Fig. 5
Comparison of the relative income distributions that the simulation model generates, contingent on the parameterα.Note: The grey vertical line indicates the point where the share of the household income that the woman provides is .5.Source: The simulation results are based on the sensitivity simulation experiment
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References

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    1. Bailey MJ, DiPrete TA. Five decades of remarkable but slowing change in U.S. women’s economic and social status and poplitical participation. Russel Sage Foundation Journal of Sociology. 2016;2(4):1–32. - PMC - PubMed
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    1. Bertrand M, Kamenica E, Pan J. Gender identity and relative income within households. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2015;130(2):571–614.

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