Wang Yangming (1472–1529) was a Chinese statesman, general, andNeo–Confucian philosopher. He was one of the leading critics ofthe orthodox Neo–Confucianism of Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Wangis perhaps best known for his doctrine of the “unity of knowingand acting,” which can be interpreted as a denial of thepossibility of weakness of will.

• 1. Life
• 2. Intellectual Context
• 3. Unity of Knowing and Acting
• 4. Interpretation of theGreat Learning
• 5. Metaphysics
• 6. Influence
• Bibliography
  • Works by and about Wang Yangming
  • Other Works Cited
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life

This philosopher’s family name was “Wang,” hispersonal name was “Shouren,” and his “courtesyname” was “Bo–an.”^[1] However, he is normally known today as “Wang Yangming,”based on a nickname he adopted when he was living in the YangmingGrotto of Kuaiji Mountain. Born in 1472 near Hangzhou in what is nowZhejiang Province, Wang was the son of a successful official. As such,he would have received a fairly conventional education, with a focuson the Four Books of the Confucian tradition: theAnalects(the sayings of Confucius and his immediate disciples), theGreatLearning (believed to consist of an opening statement byConfucius with a commentary on it by his leading disciple, Zengzi),theMean (attributed to Zisi, the grandson of Confucius, whowas also a student of Zengzi), and theMengzi (the sayingsand dialogues of Mencius, a student of Zisi). The young Wang wouldhave literally committed these classics to memory, along with thecommentaries on them by the master of orthodox Confucianism, Zhu Xi(1130–1200). The study of theseclassics–cum–commentary was thought to be morallyedifying; however, people also studied them in order to pass the civilservice examinations, which were the primary route to governmentpower, and with it wealth and prestige. At the age of seventeen(1489), Wang had a conversation with a Daoist priest that left himdeeply intrigued with this alternative philosophical system and way oflife. Wang was also attracted to Buddhism, and remained torn betweenDaoism, Buddhism and Confucianism for much of his early life. WhereasConfucianism emphasizes our ethical obligations to others, especiallyfamily members, and public service in government, the Daoism andBuddhism of Wang’s era encouraged people to overcome theirattachment to the physical world. Wang continued the serious study ofZhu Xi’s interpretation of Confucianism, but was disillusionedby an experience in which he and a friend made a determined effort toapply what they took to be Zhu Xi’s method for achievingsagehood:

…my friend Qian and I discussed the idea that to become a sageor a worthy one must investigate all the things in the world. But howcan a person have such tremendous energy? I therefore pointed to thebamboos in front of the pavilion and told him to investigate them andsee. Day and night Qian went ahead trying to investigate to the utmostthe Pattern of the bamboos. He exhausted his mind and thoughts, and onthe third day he was tired out and took sick. At first I said that itwas because his energy and strength were insufficient. Therefore Imyself went to try to investigate to the utmost. From morning tillnight, I was unable to find the Pattern of the bamboos. On the seventhday I also became sick because I thought too hard. In consequence wesighed to each other and said that it was impossible to be a sage or aworthy, for we do not have the tremendous energy to investigate thingsthat they have. (Translation modified from Chan 1963, 249)

As we shall see (Section 2, below), it is unclear whether Wang and hisfriend were correctly applying what Zhu Xi meant by “theinvestigation of things.” However, Wang’s experience offinding it impractical to seek for the Pattern of the universe inexternal things left a deep impression on him, and influenced thelater course of his philosophy.

Wang continued to study Daoism as well as Buddhism, but also showed akeen interest in military techniques and the craft of writing elegantcompositions. Meanwhile, he progressed through the various levels ofthe civil service examinations, finally passing the highest level in1499. After this, Wang had a meteoric rise in the government,including distinguished service in offices overseeing public works,criminal prosecution, and the examination system. During this period,Wang began to express disdain for overly refined literary compositionslike those he had produced in his earlier years. Wang would latercriticize those who “waste their time competing with one anotherwriting flowery compositions in order to win acclaim in their age,and…no longer comprehend conduct that honors what isfundamental, esteems what is real, reverts to simplicity, and returnsto purity” (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 275).

In addition, Wang started to turn his back on Daoism and Buddhism,which he came to regard as socially irresponsible:“…simply because they did not understand what it is torest in the ultimate good and instead exerted their selfish mindstoward the achievement of excessively lofty goals, [Buddhists andDaoists] were lost in vagaries, illusions, emptiness, and stillnessand had nothing to do with the family, state or world” (Tiwaldand Van Norden 2014, 244, gloss mine). Nonetheless, Wang continued toshow an intimate familiarity with Daoist and Buddhist literature andconcepts throughout his career.

A life–changing event for Wang occurred in 1506. A eunuch whohad assumed illegitimate influence at court had several able officialsimprisoned for opposing him. Wang wrote a “memorial” tothe emperor in protest. The eunuch responded by having Wang publiclybeaten and exiled to an insignificant position in asemi–civilized part of what is now Guizhou Province. Wang had toface considerable physical and psychological hardship in this post,but through these challenges he achieved a deep philosophicalawakening (1508), which he later expressed in a poem he wrote for hisstudents:

Everyone has within an unerring compass;
The root and source of the myriad transformations lies in the mind.
I laugh when I think that, earlier, I saw things the other way around;
Following branches and leaves, I searched outside! (Ivanhoe 2009, 181)

In other words, looking outside oneself for moral truth, as he and hisfriend Qian had tried to do when studying the bamboos, was ignoringthe root of moral insight, which is one’s own innateunderstanding.

Fortunately for Wang, in the year when his term of service in Guizhouwas over (1510), the eunuch who had Wang beaten and banished washimself executed. Wang’s official career quickly returned to itsstratospheric level of achievement, with high–ranking posts andexceptional achievements in both civil and military positions. Thisinevitably led to opposition from the faction–ridden court. Wangwas even accused of conspiring with the leader of a rebellion thatWang had himself put down.

Wang had begun to attract devoted disciples even before his exile toGuizhou, and they gradually compiled theRecord for Practice(the anthology of his sayings, correspondence, and dialogues that isone of our primary sources for Wang’s philosophy). It isreflective of Wang’s philosophy that the discussions recorded inthis work occurred in the midst of his active life in public affairs.Near the end of his life, Wang was called upon to suppress yet anotherrebellion (1527). The night before he left, one of his disciplesrecorded the “Inquiry on theGreat Learning,”which was intended as a primer of Wang’s philosophy for newdisciples. Wang put down the rebellion, but his health had beendeclining for several years, and he died soon afterward (1529).

On his deathbed, Wang said, “ ‘This mind’ isluminous and bright. What more is there to say?”^[2]

2. Intellectual Context

During Wang’s lifetime, the dominant intellectual movement wasNeo–Confucianism (in Chinese,Dàoxué, orthe Learning of the Way). Neo–Confucianism traces its origins toHan Yu and Li Ao in the late Tang dynasty (618–906), but it onlycame to intellectual maturity in the Song and Southern Song dynasties(960–1279), with the theorizing of Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, ChengYi, his brother Cheng Hao, and Zhu Xi. Neo–Confucianismoriginally developed as a Confucian reaction against Buddhism.Ironically, though, the Neo–Confucians were deeply influenced byBuddhism and adopted many key Buddhists concepts, including thenotions that the diverse phenomena of the universe are manifestationsof some underlying unity, and that selfishness is the fundamentalvice.

Zhu Xi synthesized the thought of earlier Neo–Confucians, andhis interpretation of the Four Books became the basis of the civilservice examinations (see Section 1, above). Zhu held that everythingin existence has two aspects, Pattern andqì. Pattern(lǐ, also translated “principle”) is theunderlying structure of the universe.Qi is thespatio–temporal stuff that constitutes concrete objects. Thecomplete Pattern is fully present in each entity in the universe;however, entities are individuated by having distinct allotments ofqi (variously translated as “ether,”“psychophysical stuff,” “vital fluid,”“material force,” and others). In addition to havingspatio–temporal location,qi has qualitativedistinctions, described metaphorically in terms of degrees of“clarity” and “turbidity.” The more“clear” theqi, the greater the extent to whichthe Pattern manifests. This explains how speciation is possible. Forexample, plants have more “clear”qi than dorocks, which is reflected in the more complex repertoire ofinteractions plants have with their environments.

Neo–Confucian metaphysics, ethics, and philosophical psychologyare systematically connected. Humans have the most clearqiof any being. However, some humans have especially clearqi,and as a result manifest the virtues, while others have comparativelyturbidqi, and therefore are prone to vice. The state ofone’sqi is not fixed, though. Through ethicalcultivation, any human can clarify hisqi, and thereby becomemore virtuous. Similarly, through laxness, one can allow one’sqi to morally deteriorate. Because the Pattern is fullypresent in each human, everyone has complete innate ethical knowledge.However, due to the obscurations ofqi, the manifestations ofthis knowledge are sporadic and inconsistent. Thus, a king who showsbenevolence when he takes pity on an ox being led to slaughter andspares it may fail to show benevolence in his treatment of his ownsubjects (Mengzi 1A7). Similarly, a person might manifestrighteousness when he disdains to even consider an illicit sexualrelationship; however, the same person might see nothing shamefulabout flattering the worst traits and most foolish policies of a rulerwhom he serves (Mengzi 3B3). Because humans all share thesame Pattern, we are parts of a potentially harmonious whole. In somesense, we form “one body” with other humans and the restof the universe. Consequently, the fundamental human virtue isbenevolence, which involves recognition of our shared nature with others.^[3] Correspondingly, the fundamental vice is selfishness. Cheng Hao usesa medical metaphor to explain the relationship between ethics andpersonal identity:

A medical text describes numbness of the hands and feet as being“unfeeling.” This expression describes it perfectly.Benevolent people regard Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things as oneSubstance. Nothing is not oneself. If you recognize something asyourself, there are no limits to how far [your compassion] will go.But if you do not identify something as part of yourself, you willhave nothing to do with it. This is like how, when hands and feet are“unfeeling,” theqi does not flow and one doesnot identify them as part of oneself. (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014,201)

Just as those whose hands and feet are “unfeeling” are notbothered by injuries to their own limbs, so do those who are ethically“unfeeling” fail to show concern for other humans. In bothcases, one fails to act appropriately because one fails to recognizethat something is a part of oneself.

Neo–Confucians regarded the ancient philosopher Mencius (4thcentury BCE) as having presented an especially incisive interpretationof Confucianism. They referred to him as the “SecondSage,” second in importance only to Confucius himself, and oftenappealed to his vocabulary, arguments, and examples.^[4] In particular, Neo–Confucians adopted Mencius’s view thathuman nature is good, and that wrongdoing is the result of humansignoring the promptings of their innate virtues. Physical desires areone of the primary causes for the failure to heed one’s innatemoral sense. There is nothing intrinsically immoral about desires forfine food, sex, wealth, etc., but we will be led to wrongdoing if wepursue them without giving thought to the well–being of others(Mengzi 6A15). Neo–Confucians also adoptedMencius’s list of four cardinal virtues: benevolence,righteousness, wisdom, and propriety. Benevolence is manifested in theemotion of compassion, which involves sympathizing with the sufferingof others and acting appropriately on that sympathy. For instance, abenevolent ruler could never be indifferent to the well–being ofhis subjects, and would work tirelessly to alleviate their suffering.Righteousness is manifested in the emotion of disdain or shame at thethought of doing what is dishonorable, especially in the face oftemptations of wealth or physical desire. For example, a righteousperson would not cheat at a game, or accept a bribe. Wisdom ismanifested in approval or disapproval that reflects sound judgmentabout means–end deliberation and about the character of others.Thus, a wise official would know which policies to support and whichto oppose, and would be inventive in devising solutions to complexproblems. Propriety is manifested in respect or deference towardelders and legitimate authorities, particularly as expressed inceremonies or etiquette. For instance, a person with propriety wouldwillingly defer to elder family members most of the time, but would bemotivated to serve a guest before his elder brother.

The preceding views are shared, in broad outline, by allNeo–Confucian philosophers. The primary issue they debated wasthe proper method of ethical cultivation. In other words, how is itpossible for us to consistently and reliably access and act on ourinnate ethical knowledge? Other disagreements among them (on seeminglyrecondite issues of metaphysics and the interpretation of theConfucian classics) can often be traced to more fundamentaldisagreements over ethical cultivation. For Zhu Xi, almost all humansare born withqi that is so turbid that it is impossible forthem to consistently know what is virtuous and act accordingly withoutexternal assistance. The remedy is carefully studying the classicswritten by the ancient sages, ideally under the guidance of a wiseteacher. Although the classics were written in response to concretehistorical situations, their words allow us to grasp the Pattern at acertain level of abstraction from its instantiations. However, Zhu Xistates that merely understanding the Pattern is insufficient for theexercise of virtue. One must achieve Sincerity(chéng), a continual awareness of moral knowledge inthe face of temptations.^[5]

In his own lifetime, Zhu Xi’s leading critic was Lu Xiangshan(1139–1193). Lu argued that, because the Pattern is fullypresent in the mind of each human, it is not necessary to engage in anintellectually demanding process of study in order to recoverone’s moral knowledge:

Righteousness and Pattern are in the minds of human beings. As amatter of fact, these are what Heaven has endowed us with, and theycan never be effaced or eliminated [from our minds]. If one becomesobsessed with [desires for] things and reaches the point where oneviolates Pattern and transgresses righteousness, usually this issimply because one fails to reflect upon these things [i.e., therighteousness and Pattern that lie within one]. If one truly is ableto turn back and reflect upon these things, then what is right andwrong and what one should cleave to and what one should subtly rejectwill begin to stir, separate, become clear, and leave one resolute andwithout doubts. (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 251–52, glosses inoriginal translation)

In emphasizing the innate human capacity for moral judgment, Luadopted the phrase “pure knowing” fromMengzi7A15. In its original context, Mencius writes that “Among babesin arms there are none that do not know to love their parents,”and describes this as an instance of “pure knowing,” whichhumans “know without pondering” (Tiwald and Van Norden2014, 218). Lu explains:

Pure knowing lies within human beings; although some people becomemired in dissolution, pure knowing still remains undiminished andenduring [within them]. … Truly, if they can turn back and seekafter it, then, without needing to make a concerted effort, what isright and wrong, what is fine and foul, will become exceedingly clear,and they will decide for themselves what to like and dislike, what topursue and what to abandon. (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 252)

Although there were always Confucians like Lu who disagreed with ZhuXi, the latter’s interpretation became dominant after thegovernment sponsored it as the official interpretation for the civilservice examinations. By the time of Wang Yangming, Zhu Xi’sapproach had ossified into a stale orthodoxy that careeristsmindlessly parroted in an effort to pass the examinations.

3. Unity of Knowing and Acting

Some aspects of Wang’s philosophy can be understood as refiningor drawing out the full implications of Lu Xiangshan’s critiqueof Zhu Xi. Like Lu, Wang stressed that the Pattern is fully present inthe mind of every person: “The mindis Pattern. Isthere any affair outside the mind? Is there any Pattern outside themind?” (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 264)^[6] As a result, the theoretical study of ethics is unnecessary. All amoral agent needs to do is exercise “pure knowing.” Thisview may seem naive at first glance. However, this is partially due tothe different foci of Chinese and Western ethics. Metaethics andnormative ethical theory are substantial parts of Western ethics, butless central to Chinese ethics. In addition, recent Western ethicsmanifests an interest in abstract ethical dilemmas that is perhapsdisproportionate to the relevance of these quandaries in practice. Incontrast, the focus of much Chinese ethics, particularly Confucianism,is applied ethical cultivation. Consequently, Lu and Wang wereprimarily interested in having a genuine positive effect on theethical lives of their followers. There is some plausibility to theclaim that (even in our own complex, multicultural intellectualcontext) most of us know what our basic ethical obligations are. Forexample, as a teacher, I have an obligation to grade assignmentspromptly and fairly. As a colleague, I have an obligation to take myturn serving as chair. As a parent, I have an obligation to make timeto share my children’s interests. Due to selfish desires, it istempting to procrastinate in grading essays, or try to evadedepartmental service, or ignore the emotional needs of one’schildren. However, it is not as if it is genuinely difficult to figureout that these are our obligations.

Wang’s most distinctive and well-known doctrine is the unity ofknowing and acting (zhī xíng hé yī).In order to grasp the significance of this doctrine, consider astudent who is being questioned by a college honor code panel afterbeing caught plagiarizing an essay. If the honor code panel asked thestudent whether he knew that plagiarism was wrong, it would not besurprising for the student to reply, “Yes, I knew it was wrongto plagiarize my essay, but I wanted so much to get an easy A that Igave in to temptation.” Western philosophers would describe thisas a case ofakrasia, or weakness of will. Zhu Xi, along withmany Western philosophers like Aristotle, would acknowledge that thestudent had correctly described his psychological state. However, WangYangming would deny that the student actually knew that plagiarism waswrong: “There never have been people who know but do not act.Those who ‘know’ but do not act simply do not yetknow” (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 267). One of Wang’sprimary claims is that merely verbal assent is inadequate todemonstrate actual knowledge: “One cannot say he knows filialpiety or brotherly respect simply because he knows how tosaysomething filial or brotherly. Knowing pain offers another goodexample. One must have experienced pain oneself in order to knowpain.” Wang also adduces cold and hunger as things that one mustexperience in order to know. We might object that Wang’s exampleshows, at most, that someone must have had an experience of goodnessor evilat some point in his life in order to know what itmeans for something to be good or evil. This falls short of theconclusion that Wang needs, though, for just as I can know what youmean when you say “I am hungry” even if I am not currentlymotivated to eat, so might I know that “plagiarism iswrong,” even if I am not motivated to avoid plagiarism myself inthis circumstance.

A more promising line of argument for Wang is his appropriation of anexample from theGreat Learning (Commentary 6), whichsuggests that loving the good is “like loving a lovelysight,” while hating evil is “like hating a hatefulodor” (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 191). To recognize an odor asdisgusting (a kind of knowing) is to be repulsed by it (a motivation),which leads to avoiding the odor or eliminating its source (actions).The Chinese phrase rendered “loving a lovely sight”(hào hǎo sè) has connotations of findingsomeone sexually attractive.^[7] To regard someone as sexually attractive (a kind of cognition) is tobe drawn toward them (a kind of motivation that can lead to action).To this, one might object that Wang’s examples show, at most,that knowing something is good or bad requires that one havesome level of appropriate motivation. Even if we grant therelevance of Wang’s examples, it is possible to have anintrinsic motivation that does not result in action. Recognizing thatsomeone is sexually attractive certainly does not always result inpursuing an assignation, for example.

Perhaps Wang’s most compelling line of argument is a pragmaticone about the aim or purpose behind discussing knowing and acting. Heallows that it may be useful and legitimate to discuss knowingseparately from acting or acting separately from knowing, but only inorder to address the failings of specific kinds of individuals. On theone hand, “there is a type of person in the world who foolishlyacts upon impulse without engaging in the slightest thought orreflection. Because they always act blindly and recklessly, it isnecessary to talk to them about knowing…,” withoutemphasizing acting. On the other hand, “[t]here is also a typeof person who is vague and irresolute; they engage in speculationwhile suspended in a vacuum and are unwilling to apply themselves toany concrete actions” (268). These latter people benefit fromadvice that emphasizes action, without necessarily discussingknowledge. However, those in Wang’s era who distinguishknowledge and action (and here he has in mind those who follow theorthodox philosophy of Zhu Xi) “separate knowing and acting intotwo distinct tasks to perform and think that one must first know andonly then can one act.” As a result, they become nothing morethan pedantic bookworms, who study ethics without ever living up toits ideals or trying to achieve positive change in the world aroundthem. Wang concludes, “My current teaching regarding the unityof knowing and acting is a medicine directed precisely at thisdisease.”

4. Interpretation of theGreat Learning

In the standard Confucian curriculum of Wang’s era, theGreat Learning was the first of the Four Books that studentswere assigned, and Zhu Xi’s commentary on it often made alasting impression on them. In the opening of theGreatLearning, Confucius describes the steps inself–cultivation:

The ancients who desired to enlighten the enlightened Virtue of theworld would first put their states in order. Those who desired to puttheir states in order would first regulate their families. Those whodesired to regulate their families would first cultivate their selves.Those who desired to cultivate their selves would first correct theirminds. Those who desired to correct their minds would first make theirthoughts have Sincerity. Those who desired to make their thoughts haveSincerity would first extend their knowledge. Extending knowledge liesingé wù. (Translation slightly modified fromTiwald and Van Norden 2014, 188–189)

Ge wu is left unexplained in theGreat Learning.However, Zhu Xi, following the interpretation of Cheng Yi, claimsthat

…what is meant by “extending knowledge lies ingewu” is that desiring to extend my knowledge lies inencountering things and exhaustively investigating their Pattern. Ingeneral, the human mind is sentient and never fails to have knowledge,while the things of the world never fail to have the Pattern. It isonly because the Pattern is not yet exhaustively investigated thatknowledge is not fully fathomed. Consequently, at the beginning ofeducation in the Great Learning, the learner must be made to encounterthe things of the world, and never fail to follow the Pattern that onealready knows and further exhaust it, seeking to arrive at thefarthest points. When one has exerted effort for a long time, one day,like something suddenly cracking open, one will know in a manner thatbinds it all together. (Translation slightly modified from Tiwald andVan Norden 2014, 191)

Following Zhu Xi’s interpretations, most translators todayrenderge wu as “investigating things.” Wang andhis friend Qian were trying to “investigate things” inthis manner when they stared attentively at the bamboos, struggling tograsp their underlying Pattern. It is questionable, though, whetherthis is what Zhu Xi had in mind. Zhu certainly thought the Pattern waspresent in everything, and could potentially be investigated in eventhe most mundane of objects. However, he emphasized that the bestmethod to learn about the Pattern was through studying the classicstexts of Confucianism, particularly the Four Books.

As important as learning was for Zhu Xi, he stressed that it waspossible to know what is right and wrong yet not act on it:“Knowledge and action always need each other. It’s likehow eyes cannot walk without feet, but feet cannot see without eyes.If we discuss them in terms of their sequence, knowledge comes first.But if we discuss them in terms of importance, action is what isimportant” (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 180–81). Whatconnects knowledge and action, on Zhu Xi’s account, isSincerity. Sincerity (chéng) is a subtle andmultifaceted notion in Neo–Confucian thought. However, theGreat Learning focuses on one key aspect of it: “Whatis meant by ‘making thoughts have Sincerity’ is to letthere be no self–deception. It is like hating a hateful odor, orloving a lovely sight. The is called not being conflicted”(Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 191). In other words, humans engage inwrongdoing through a sort of self–deception in which they allowthemselves to ignore the promptings of their moral sense, and becomemotivated solely by their physical desires for sex, food, wealth, etc.Once one knows what is right and wrong, one must then make an effortto keep that knowledge present to one’s consciousness, so thatit becomes motivationally efficacious. As Zhu Xi explains,“…those who desire to cultivate themselves, when theyknow to do good in order to avoid the bad, must then genuinely make aneffort and forbid self–deception, making their hatred of the[ethically] hateful be like their hating a hateful odor, and theirloving what is good like their loving a lovely sight” (Tiwaldand Van Norden 2014, 192).

Wang challenged almost every aspect of Zhu Xi’s interpretationof theGreat Learning. He regarded Zhu Xi’s account asnot just theoretically mistaken but dangerously misleading for thoseseeking to improve themselves ethically. However, Wang recognized thatstudents who had memorized Zhu Xi’s interpretation to preparefor the civil service examinations would have difficulty understandingthe text any other way. Consequently, when he accepted a new disciple,Wang often began by explaining his alternative interpretation of theGreat Learning, and invited students to ask questions.Wang’s approach is preserved in a brief but densely argued work,“Questions on theGreat Learning.” Let’sbegin at the apparent foundation of theGreatLearning’s program:ge wu. Whereas Zhu Xi arguesthatge wu is literally “reaching things,”meaning to intellectually grasp the Pattern in things and situations,Wang argues thatge wu means “rectifying things,”including both one’s own thoughts and the objects of thosethoughts. For Zhu Xi,ge wu is primarily about gainingknowledge, while for Wang it is about motivation and action.^[8]

The fact that theGreat Learning explicatesge wu interms of “extending knowledge” might seem to support ZhuXi’s interpretation. However, Wang offers a plausiblealternative explanation: “To fully extend one’s knowledgeis not like the so–called ‘filling out’ of what oneknows that later scholars [like Zhu Xi] talk about. It is simply toextend fully the ‘pure knowing’ of my own mind. Pureknowing is what [Mencius] was talking about when he said that allhumans have ‘the mind of approval and disapproval.’ Themind of approval and disapproval ‘knows without pondering’and is ‘capable without learning’ ” (Tiwaldand Van Norden 2014, 248, glosses mine).^[9] Wang is suggesting that “extending knowledge” referssimply to exercising our innate faculty of moral awareness, whichMencius refers to as “pure knowing.” As David S. Nivisonexplains, “We might say that Wang’s‘extending’ of knowledge is more like extendingone’s arm than, say, extending one’s vocabulary”(Nivison 1996a, 225).

According to Zhu Xi, the opening of theGreat Learning listsa series of steps that are, at least to some extent, temporallydistinct. Wang demurs:

While one can say that there is an ordering of first and last in thissequence of spiritual training, the training itself is a unified wholethat cannot be divided into any ordering of first and last. While thissequence of spiritual training cannot be divided into any ordering offirst and last, only when every aspect of its practice is highlyrefined can one be sure that it will not be deficient in the slightestdegree. (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 250)

Wang’s argument here is similar to the one he made about theverbal distinction between knowing and acting (Section 3, above). Heclaimed that the ancient sages recognized that knowing and acting wereultimately one thing, but sometimes discussed them separately forpedagogic purposes, to help those who underemphasized one aspect ofthis unity. Similarly, Wang suggests, theGreat Learning usesmultiple terms to describe various aspects of the unified exercise ofmoral agency, but does not mean to suggest that these are actuallydistinct temporal stages:

…we can say that “self,” “mind,”“thoughts,” “knowledge,” and“things” describe the sequence of spiritual training.While each has its own place, in reality they are but a single thing.We can say that “ge wu,” “extending,”“making Sincere,” “correcting,” and“cultivating” describe the spiritual training used in thecourse of this sequence. While each has its own name, in reality theyare but a single affair. What do we mean by “self”? It isthe way we refer to the physical operations of the mind. What do wemean by “mind”? It is the way we refer to the luminous andintelligent master of the person. (Translation slightly modified fromTiwald and Van Norden 2014, 247)

Wang even interprets the key metaphor of theGreat Learningin a very different way from Zhu Xi. For Zhu Xi, hating evil“like hating a hateful odor,” and loving good “likeloving a lovely sight” are goals that we must aspire to, but canonly achieve after an arduous process of ethical cultivation. For WangYangming, these phrases describe what our attitudes toward good andevil can and should be at the very inception of ethicalcultivation:

…theGreat Learning gives us examples of true knowingand acting, saying it is “like loving a lovely sight” or“hating a hateful odor.” Seeing a lovely sight is a caseof knowing, while loving a lovely sight is a case of acting. As soonas one sees that lovely sight, one naturally loves it. It is not as ifyou first see it and only then, intentionally, you decide to love it.Smelling a hateful odor is a case of knowing, while hating a hatefulodor is a case of acting. As soon as one smells that hateful odor, onenaturally hates it. It is not as if you first smell it and only then,intentionally, you decide to hate it. Consider the case of a personwith a stuffed–up nose. Even if he sees a malodorous objectright in front of him, the smell does not reach him, and so he doesnot hate it. This is simply not to know the hateful odor. (Tiwald andVan Norden 2014, 267)

In summary, Zhu Xi and Wang agree that theGreat Learning isan authoritative statement on ethical cultivation, expressing thewisdom of the ancient sages. However, for Zhu Xi, it is analogous to arecipe, with distinct steps that must be performed in order. For Wang,theGreat Learning is analogous to a description of apainting, in which shading, coloring, composition, perspective andother factors are aspects of a unified effect.

5. Metaphysics

Wang was not primarily interested in theoretical issues. However, someof his comments suggest a subtle metaphysical view that supports hisconception of ethics. This metaphysics is phrased in terms of thePattern/qi framework (see Section 2, above), and also makesuse of the Substance/Function distinction. Substance(tǐ), literally body, is an entity in itself, whileFunction is its characteristic or appropriate activity ormanifestation: a lamp is Substance, its light is function; an eye isSubstance, seeing is its Function; water is Substance, waves are itsFunction. The Substance/Function distinction goes back to the Daoistsof the Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE) and became central amongChinese Buddhists before being picked up by Neo–Confucians. Partof the attraction of this vocabulary is that it gives philosophersdrawn to a sort of monism the ability to distinguish between twoaspects of what they regard as ultimately a unity.

Wang argues that the human mind is identical with the Pattern of theuniverse, and as such it forms “one body” (yìtǐ, one Substance) with “Heaven, Earth, and the myriadcreatures” of the world. The difference between the virtuous andthe vicious is that the former recognize that their minds form onebody with everything else, while the latter, “because of thespace between their own physical form and those of others, regardthemselves as separate” (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 241). Asevidence for the claim that the minds of all humans form one body withthe rest of the universe, Wang appeals to a thought experiment firstformulated by Mencius: “when they see a child [about to] fallinto a well, [humans] cannot avoid having a mind of alarm andcompassion for the child” (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014,241–242;Mengzi 2A6). Wang then anticipates a series ofobjections, and offers further thought experiments to motivate theconclusion that only some underlying metaphysical identity betweenhumans and other things can account for the broad range of ourreactions to them:

Someone might object that this response is because the child belongsto the same species. But when they hear the anguished cries or see thefrightened appearance of birds or beasts, they cannot avoid a sense ofbeing unable to bear it. … Someone might object that thisresponse is because birds and beasts are sentient creatures. But whenthey see grass or trees uprooted and torn apart, they cannot avoidfeeling a sense of sympathy and distress. … Someone mightobject that this response is because grass and trees have life andvitality. But when they see tiles and stones broken and destroyed,they cannot avoid feeling a sense of concern and regret. … Thisshows that the benevolence that forms one body [with Heaven, Earth,and the myriad creatures] is something that even the minds of pettypeople possess. (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 242)

Wang’s first three thought experiments seem fairly compelling atfirst glance. Almost all humans would, at least as a first instinct,have “alarm and compassion” if suddenly confronted withthe sight of a child about to fall into a well. In addition, humansoften do show pity for the suffering of non–human animals.Finally, the fact that humans maintain public parks and personalgardens shows some kind of concern for plants.

It is not a decisive objection to Wang’s view that humans oftenfail to manifest benevolence to other humans, non–human animals,or plants. Wang is arguing that all humans manifest these responsessometimes (and that this is best explained by his favoredmetaphysics). Like all Neo–Confucians, Wang readily acknowledgesthat selfish desires frequently block the manifestation of our sharednature. However, there are three lines of objection to Wang’sview that are harder to dismiss. (1) There is considerable empiricalevidence that some humans never manifestany compassion forthe suffering of others. In the technical literature of psychology,these people are a subset of those identified as having“Antisocial Personality Disorder” as defined in DSM–V.^[10] (2) Wang asserts that when humans “see tiles and stones brokenand destroyed, they cannot avoid feeling a sense of concern andregret.” This claim is important for Wang’s argument,because he takes this reaction to be evidence for the conclusion thatour minds are ultimately “one Substance” witheverything in the universe, not merely with members of ourspecies, or other sentient creatures, or other living things. We canperhaps motivate Wang’s intuition by considering how we mightreact if we saw that someone had spray painted graffiti on Half Domein Yosemite National Park. The defacement of this scenic beauty wouldprobably provoke sadness in those of us with an eye for naturalbeauty. However, it is certainly not obvious that everyone manifestseven sporadic concern for “tiles and stones,” which iswhat he needs for his conclusion. (3) Even if we grant Wang hisintuitions, it is not clear that the particular metaphysics he appealsto is the best explanation of those intuitions. As Darwin himselfsuggested, our compassion for other humans can be explained inevolutionary terms. In addition, the “biophiliahypothesis” (Wilson [1984]) provides an evolutionary explanationfor the human fondness for other animals and plants. There is not anobvious evolutionary explanation for why humans seem engaged bynon–living natural beauty, like mountain peaks, but as we haveseen it seems questionable how common this trait is.

6. Influence

Wang is regarded, along with Lu Xiangshan, as one of the founders ofthe Lu–Wang School of Neo–Confucianism, or the School ofMind. This is one of the two major wings of Neo–Confucianism,along with the Cheng–Zhu School (named after Cheng Yi and ZhuXi), or School of Pattern. He has frequently been an inspiration forcritics of the orthodox Cheng–Zhu School, not just in China butalso in Japan. In Japan, his philosophy is referred to asŌyōmeigaku, and its major adherents included NakaeTōju (1608–1648) and Kumazawa Banzan (1619–1691).Wang’s thought was also an inspiration for some of the leadersof the Meiji Restoration (1868), which began Japan’s rapid modernization.^[11]

In China, Confucianism underwent a significant shift during the Qingdynasty (1644–1911) with the development of the EvidentialResearch movement. Evidential Research emphasized carefully documentedand tightly argued work on concrete issues of philology, history, andeven mathematics and civil engineering. Such scholars generally lookedwith disdain on “the Song–Ming Confucians”(including both Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming), whom they accused ofproducing “empty words” that could not be substantiated.^[12] One of the few Evidential Research scholars with a serious interestin ethics was Dai Zhen (1724–1777). However, he too was criticalof both the Cheng–Zhu and the Lu–Wang schools. The threemajor prongs of Dai’s critique of Neo–Confucians like Wangwere that they (1) encouraged people to treat their subjectiveopinions as the deliverances of some infallible moral sense, (2)projected Buddhist–inspired concepts back onto the ancientConfucian classics, and (3) ignored the ethical value of ordinaryphysical desires.

One of the major trends in contemporary Chinese philosophy is“New Confucianism.” New Confucianism is a movement toadapt Confucianism to modern thought, showing how it is consistentwith democracy and modern science. New Confucianism is distinct fromwhat we in the West call Neo–Confucianism, but it adopts manyNeo–Confucian concepts, in particular the view that humans sharea trans–personal nature which is constituted by the universalPattern. Many New Confucians agree with Mou Zongsan (1909–1995)that Wang had a deeper and more orthodox understanding of Confucianismthan did Zhu Xi.^[13]

Wang’s philosophy is of considerable intrinsic interest, becauseof the ingenuity of his arguments, the systematicity of his views, andthe precision of his textual exegesis. Beyond that, Wang’s workhas the potential to inform contemporary ethics. Although hisparticular metaphysics may not be appealing, many of his ideas can benaturalized. It may be hard to believe that everything is unified by ashared, underlying Pattern, but it does seem plausible that we aredeeply dependent upon one another and upon our natural environment forour survival and our identities. I am a husband, a father, a teacher,and a researcher, but only because I have a wife, children, students,and colleagues. In some sense, we do form “one body” withothers, and Wang provides provocative ideas about how we shouldrespond to this insight. In addition, Wang’s fundamentalcriticism of Zhu Xi’s approach, that it produces pedants whoonly study and talk about ethics, rather than people who strive toactuallybe ethical, has considerable contemporary relevance,particularly given the empirical evidence that our current practicesof ethical education have little positive effect on ethical behavior(Schwitzgebel and Rust 2014; and cf. Schwitzgebel 2013 (Other InternetResources)).

Bibliography

Works by and about Wang Yangming

• Angle, Stephen C. and Justin Tiwald, 2017,Neo-Confucianism: APhilosophical Introduction, Polity Press.
• Chan, Wing–tsit, 1962, “How Buddhistic Is WangYang–ming?”Philosophy East and West, 12:203–16.
• Chan, Wing–tsit (trans.), 1963,Instructions forPractical Living and Other Neo–Confucian Writings by WangYang–ming, New York: Columbia University Press.
• Chang Yü–ch’üan, 1939, “WangShou–jen as a Statesman,”Chinese Social and PoliticalScience Review, 23:1 (April–June): 473–517.
• Chang, Carsun, 1962, Wang Yang-Ming, Idealist Philosopherof Sixteenth-Century China, Jamaica, NY: St. John’sUniversity Press.
• Chang, Carsun, 1955, “Wang Yang–ming’sPhilosophy,”Philosophy East and West, 5:3–18.
• Ching, Julia (trans.), 1973,The Philosophical Letters of WangYang–ming, Columbia, SC: University of South CarolinaPress.
• Ching, Julia, 1976,To Acquire Wisdom: The Way of WangYang–ming, New York: Columbia University Press.
• Henke, Frederick Goodrich (trans.), 1964,The Philosophy ofWang Yang–ming, reprint, New York: Paragon Books.
• Iki, Hiroyuki, 1961–62, “Wang Yang–ming’sDoctrine of Innate Knowledge,”Philosophy East andWest, 11: 27–44.
• Israel, George L., 2014,Doing Good and Ridding Evil in MingChina: The Political Career of Wang Yangming, Leiden and Boston:Brill.
• Ivanhoe, Philip J., 2002,Ethics in the Confucian Tradition:The Thought of Mengzi and Wang Yangming, rev. 2nd edition,Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
• Ivanhoe, Philip J. (trans.), 2009,Readings from theLu–Wang School of Neo–Confucianism, Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing.
• Li Shenglong, 2004,Chuanxilu xinyi, Taibei: SanminShuju.
• Nivison, David S., 1967, “The Problem of‘Knowledge’ and ‘Action’ in Chinese Thoughtsince Wang Yang–ming,” in Arthur F. Wright, ed.,Studies in Chinese Thought, Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, pp. 112–45.
• –––, 1996a, “The Philosophy of WangYangming,” inThe Ways of Confucianism, Chicago: OpenCourt Press, pp. 217–231
• –––, 1996b, “The Philosophy of ZhangXuecheng,” inThe Ways of Confucianism, Chicago: OpenCourt Press, pp. 249–60.
• Sarkissian, Hagop, 2018, “Neo-Confucianism, ExperimentalPhilosophy and the Trouble with Intuitive Methods,”BritishJournal for the History of Philosophy, 26(5): 812–828.
• Shun, Kwong-loi, 2011, “Wang Yang-ming on Self-Cultivationin theDaxue,”Journal of Chinese Philosophy,38 (Supplement): 96–113.
• Stanchina, Gabriella, 2015, “Zhi 知 as UnceasingDynamism and Practical Effort: The Common Root of Knowledge and Actionin Wang Yangming and Peter Sloterdijk,”学问：思勉青年学术期刊1: 280–307.
• T’ang Chun-i, 1988, “The Development of the Concept ofMoral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang Chi,” in idem,Essayson Chinese Philosophy and Culture, Taipei, Taiwan: Student BookCompany, pp. 180–205.
• Tiwald, Justin and Bryan W. Van Norden (eds.), 2014,Readingsin Later Chinese Philosophy: Han to the Twentieth Century,Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
• Tu, Wei–ming, 1976,Neo–Confucian Thought inAction: Wang Yang–ming’s Youth (1472–1509),Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Wang Yangming, 1572,Wang Wencheng Gong Quanshu, XieTingjie, ed., in theSibu congkan.

Other Works Cited

• American Psychiatric Association, 2013,Diagnostic andStatistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed., Arlington, VA:American Psychiatric Publishing.
• de Bary, William Theodore et al. (eds.), 2005,Sources ofJapanese Tradition, vol. 2,1600–2000, New York:Columbia University Press.
• Elman, Benjamin, 2001,From Philosophy to Philology:Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China,Los Angeles: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series.
• Fallon, James, 2013,The Psychopath Inside, New York:Current Publishing.
• Gardner, Daniel K. (trans.), 1990,Chu Hsi: Learning to Be aSage: Selections from the Conversations of Master Chu, ArrangedTopically, Los Angeles: University of California Press.
• Kim, Yung Sik, 2000,The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi(1130–1200), Philadelphia: American PhilosophicalSociety.
• Makeham, John (ed.), 2003,New Confucianism: A CriticalExamination, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Schwitzgebel, Eric and Joshua Rust, 2014, “The Self-ReportedMoral Behavior of Ethics Professors,”PhilosophicalPsychology 27: 293–327.
• Shun, Kwong-loi, 2010, “Zhu Xi on the ‘Internal’and the ‘External,’ ”Journal of ChinesePhilosophy, 37 (4): 639–54.
• Slingerland, Edward (trans.), 2003,Confucius: Analects: WithSelections from Traditional Commentaries, Indianapolis: HackettPublishing.
• Van Norden, Bryan W., 2004, “What Is Living and What Is Deadin the Confucianism of Zhu Xi?” in Robing R. Wang, ed.,Chinese Philosophy in an Age of Globalization, Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press, pp. 99–120.
• Van Norden, Bryan W. (trans.), 2008,Mengzi: With Selectionsfrom Traditional Commentaries, Indianapolis: HackettPublishing.
• Van Norden, Bryan W., 2013, “ ‘Few Are Able toAppreciate the Flavors’: Translating theDaxue andZhongyong,”Journal of Chinese Studies, 56(January): 295–314.
• Wilson, Edward O., 1984,Biophilia, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.

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Other Internet Resources

• Schwitzgebel, Eric, 2013, “Do Ethics Classes Influence Student Behavior?,” unpublished manuscript.
• The Chinese text of theChuanxilu by Wang Yangming (at the Hong Kong Society of Humanities).
• The Chinese text of theDaxue wen by Wang Yangming (at the Hong Kong Society of Humanities).
• The Chinese text of theChuanxilu by Wang Yangming (in various formats, at Project Gutenberg).
• The Chinese text of theWang Yangming quanji (in various formats, at Project Gutenberg).
• Selections from the writings of Wang Yangming, translated by Frederick Henke (public domain text at Fordham University East Asian HistorySourcebook)

Related Entries

Chinese Philosophy: ethics |Chinese Philosophy: Song-Ming Confucianism |Confucius |Daoism |Japanese Philosophy: Confucian |Mencius |Zhu Xi