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1. For example, it has been argued that all moral theories can bedescribed in consequentialist terms, and so consequentialism istrivial, and it has been argued that virtue ethics is not astructurally distinct theory from consequentialism or deontology. Seethe entries onconsequentialism andvirtue ethics. However, it is certainly the case that deontologists andconsequentialists tend to talk about value in a different way. Herethe entry remains neutral on whether or not these different ways oftalking really reflect different views about the nature of value.

2. We will return to the complicated question of what kind of pluralistRoss is.

3. Ruth Chang makes this distinction in slightly different terminology,referring to reductive value pluralism, or metaphysical valuepluralism (what is called here foundational pluralism) andnonreductive value pluralism (what is called here non-foundationalpluralism.) (Chang, 2015). Chris Heathwood talks about substantivepluralism and substantive monism. (Heathwood, 2015). Miles Tuckertalks in terms of strong and weak value pluralism: strong valuepluralism claims that there are plural values that are not reducibleto each other or to some other value. Tucker usefully stresses thatirreducibility is not the same as is not the same as unanalysibility(Tucker, 2016). The crucial point is that we cannot analyse afundamental value in terms of some other value.

4. This is the famous open question argument. Moore establishes hispreliminary conclusion that when we say ‘x isgood’ we do not mean anything naturalistic like‘x is pleasure’ by pointing out that there isalways an open question of the form, ‘but is pleasuregood?’. So according to Moore, the naturalistic fallacy consistsin thinking that there is a naturalistic account of goodness. See theentry on Moore’s moral philosophy.

5. There is still an ambiguity here: in order for the theory to befoundationally monist we must assume that the judgment of the expertjudges is univocal—it would be less ambiguous if we thought interms of one expert judge. I return to preference satisfactionaccounts below.

6. The distinction was introduced by Bales (1971). For more on its usein consequentialism see the entries on consequentialism and on ruleconsequentialism. In recent discussions of consequentialist theories,the strategy has often been used to argue that a consequentialistagent need not be motivated purely by the (monist) good, but can alsobe motivated by such things as her friends, her relationships, and herpersonal projects. This is an example of decision proceduralpluralism.

7. There are too many such discussions to cite here: see entries onfriendship,pleasure,hedonism, and onKant's moral philosophy.

8. Griffin’s account of value is complex and subtle. His view is afoundational monist one on my classification: he thinks that the basicvalue is informed desire fulfillment, and he is a normative pluralistbecause he thinks that we desire irreducibly plural things, and sofrom our point of view there are plural values. Furthermore, thethings we desire are values in a deep sense—Griffin’s viewis discussed in detail in the section on preference satisfactionviews.

9. Of course, Mill himself may have intended his higher and lowerpleasures as foundational plural values—but that debate can beleft aside.

10. Griffin presents a similar view in his later book,ValueJudgment. In that book Griffin’s view is more identifiableas foundational pluralism.