Fechner’s philosophy is characterized by a clash between hismetaphysical interests and his positivist proclivities. Hismetaphysical interests led him toward panpsychism: the doctrine thatthe universe is created and governed by mind or the soul; hispositivist leanings led him to uphold an early version ofverificationism and phenomenalism. Fechner insisted that there was nodisparity between these tendencies, that the best scientific evidencesupported the view that the universe is psychic. His philosophy ofmind is an early form of neutral monism.

• 1. A Divided Soul
• 2. Early Years
• 3. The Breakdown
• 4. The Soul of Plants
• 5. The Soul of the Universe
• 6. The Existence of Atoms
• 7. Theory of Mind
• Bibliography
  • Works by Fechner
  • Other Primary Sources
  • Secondary Sources
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. A Divided Soul

Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887) is one of the most enigmaticthinkers of nineteenth century German philosophy. His intellectualsoul was fractured, torn into two deeply divided halves, each of whichclaimed dominance over the other. His entire career was an attempt tounite these warring sides. But, despite his best efforts, he neversucceeded.

What were these halves? On the one hand, Fechner had deep positivistproclivities, which made him advocate the strictest standards ofobservation and measurement in science, and which led him to adoptearly versions of phenomenalism and verificationism in philosophy. Onthe other hand, Fechner also had a desperate longing for metaphysics,for a complete vision of the entire cosmos, which his piecemealscientific work could never satisfy. The problem facing him wasdaunting: How to be both a cautious and sober scientist and a daringand imaginative metaphysician?

These two sides of Fechner represent conflicting currents of his age.Growing up in the early nineteenth century, Fechner was exposed to therise of romanticism and the growth of the empirical sciences. He wasan early student of romanticNaturphilosophie, the writingsof Schelling, Oken and Steffans, which were Faustian attempts to graspnature as a whole. But he was also a student of physics and physiologyat the University of Leipzig, where his mentors, Alfred Volkmann andErnst Weber, were at the forefront of experimental work on thepsychology of perception. Fechner learned early that the speculativemethods ofNaturphilosophie were insufficient to yieldcareful and substantive results in science; despite that, he neverlost the longing for unity, the desire for a complete vision ofthings, which is characteristic ofNaturphilosophie.

Each side of Fechner’s personality bore its characteristicfruit. The product of his positivist side was his early scientificwork on the psychology of perception, and his massive two volume workElemente der Psychophysik (1860), which attempts to describein precise laws the relationship between the psychic and physical.Because it stressed the dependence of the mental on its physicalexpression and embodiment, Fechner’s philosophy of mind has beendescribed as a form of materialism. The product of his metaphysicalside is his so-called “panpsychism”, the doctrine thatthe cosmos is psychic, that it is an embodiment of the psychic (for amore precise definition of this term,see below, section 4). Fechner put forward this doctrine in his two most famous works:Nanna oder über das Seelenleben der Pflanzen (1848a) andZend-Avesta oder über die Dinge des Himmels und desJenseits (1851).

Fechner’s effort to harmonize the two sides of his nature camewith hisinductive metaphysics, i.e., the attempt to reachgeneral metaphysical conclusions on the basis of the methods andresults of the empirical sciences. Like other philosophers of hisgeneration, viz., Lotze, Trendelenburg and Hartmann, Fechner rejectedthe synthetic methods of the German idealists (Fichte, Schelling,Hegel), who attempted to derive their conclusions bya priorimethods. In his view, metaphysics should follow, not lead theempirical sciences, which are autonomous and stand on their ownfoundation independent of philosophy. The crucial question was whethergeneral metaphysical principles really could be based on the empiricalsciences, whose results are always piecemeal and tentative.

Any attempt to understand Fechner must come to terms with both sidesof his personality. We must do justice to his panpsychism as well ashis positivism. We can dismiss the panpsychism on positivist grounds,as many have done; but if we do that, we beg questions againstFechner. He insisted that his conclusions are based on well-groundedinferences from facts of experience, and he pointed out (rightly) thatresistance to his views was often based on little more than prejudice.Far from a reckless metaphysician, Fechner himself applied positiviststandards to his own metaphysics. We can dispute whether he met thosestandards; but we can can do so only after a careful examination ofhis argument. Even where his conclusions extend beyond the empiricalevidence for them, they at least raise interesting questions andpossibilities. Fechner’s panpsychism raises the importantquestion of the limits of consciousness: Is consciousness limited tohuman beings and animals? Or should we extend it to plants and indeedall organic beings?

Many studies of Fechner are one-sided, emphasizing one side of him atthe expense of the other. Older scholarship tended to focus on hismetaphysical side, especially his panpsychism (see, for example,Adolph 1923; Bruchmann 1887; Pastor 1901a,b; Wille 1905; and Wentscher1924: 18–72). In reaction to such work, a more recent book byMichael Heidelberger finds “the heart of Fechner’sphilosophy” in his non-metaphysical side, and it stresses his“non-reductive materialism” as the main achievement of hisphilosophy (2004: 73–74). While Heidelberger’s work is animportant corrective to older scholarship, it still makes the samemistake: it too is one-sided. It is unconvincing because itdrastically underplays Fechner’s panpsychism, which it simplydismisses as “one of his most notorious ideas” (2004: 3).Though odd by contemporary standards, panpsychism was Fechner’sgeneral worldview, and its exposition and defense would preoccupy himfor much of his life. It is also deeply misleading to describe theheart of Fechner’s philosophy as any form of materialism, evenif it is a “non-reductive” kind. Fechner not only had adeep aversion to materialism, but he also insisted that belief in theexistence of matter is only the reification of an abstraction. Thereare indeed passages, which Heidelberger duly cites, where Fechnerdescribes his philosophy as “very materialist”; but inthose very same passages he also describes his philosophy as“very idealist”.^[1]

The chief purpose of this introductory article is to provide a briefsurvey of Fechner’s most importantphilosophicalwritings. No attempt is made to consider his writings on physics andpsychology, which is the task for another article. The most importantphilosophical writings are, in my opinion,Nanna,Zend-Avesta andUeber die physikalische undphilosophische Atomlehre.^[2] These writings represent the two sides of Fechner’s philosophy,the metaphysical and positivist. There is also no attempt to providean account of Fechner’sElemente derPsychophysik—even though some contemporaries regarded it ashis most important work—since its results are essentiallyempirical and have, on Fechner’s own reading (see Fechner 1860:I, 6), little philosophical relevance. Because Fechner’sphilosophy is incomprehensible without knowing about his life, thisarticle also includes two biographical sections, one on his early lifeand another on his mental breakdown. The latter section, thoughseemingly superfluous, is crucial because it is the source andmotivation for Fechner’s mature philosophy. The articleconcludes with a short analysis of Fechner’s theory of mind,which is probably that aspect of his philosophy of most contemporaryinterest. Finally,a supplement: “Dr. Mises’ Merry Pranks” contains a survey of Fechner’s early pseudonymous writings,which should shed light on his philosophical development.

2. Early Years

Gustav Theodor Fechner was born on April 19, 1801, in the then Saxonvillage of Großsärchen. His father, Samuel Traugott Fischer(1765–1806), and indeed grandfather, were pastors in thevillage; and his mother, Dorothea Fechner (1744–1806), was alsofrom a pastoral family. This religious background had a profoundeffect on Fechner, who would attempt to rationalize it in hisphilosophy.

Gustav was the second of five children. He had an older brother,Eduard Clemens (1799–1861), who was an artist, and who moved toParis in 1825; he had three younger sisters, Emilie, Clementine, andMathilde. Though only a village pastor, Samuel Fechner was a man ofthe Enlightenment: he was the first in his village to inoculate hischildren; he put a lightning rod on the village church; and he was thefirst to give sermons without wearing a wig. By all accounts he was acherished father; but he died when Gustav was only five. His deathleft the family destitute.

Fechner showed great promise from an early age. He could speak Latineven as a boy. He learned quickly and studied avidly. When he was onlyfifteen, the Rektor of his Gymnasium said to him: “Fechner, youare still very young; you must leave because there is nothing morethat we can teach you” (Kuntze 1892: 5). But, simply because hewas too young for the university, he had to stay an extra year in theGymnasium. When he was only sixteen, he went to the University ofLeipzig. Since he could receive little help from his family, he had torely on stipends and to give tutorials. Later Fechner would supporthimself through translations and literary work. This reliance on hackliterary work, as we shall soon see, would prove fateful.

Fechner was, in the truest sense of the word, “einLeipziger”. Though he spent his childhood inGroßsärchen and Dresden, he lived almost his entire life inLeipzig, from 1817 to 1887. He travelled outside it only forvacations, and only once for a short sojourn, a three month stay inParis in 1827. Leipzig was not intellectually restricting, however,since, in the first half of the nineteenth century, it was in manyrespects the cultural center of Germany. It was famous for its musicallife, for its book trade, and for its literary salons. It was called“the Paris of Germany”. Fechner enjoyed this cultural lifeand was fully integrated into it.

Fechner first studied medicine, taking his Baccalaureate and doctoralexams in 1822. But he quickly became dissatisfied with the subject.Although he had the right to practice medicine, he confessed that hedid not have the least idea how to bleed an artery, to deliverchildren, or to apply a bandage (Kuntze 1892: 38). Medicine also didnot satisfy him as an intellectual discipline because its theorieswere based more on authority and tradition rather than observation andexperiment. Because of his intellectual interests, Fechner soongravitated toward physics, which applied higher standards and morerigorous methods than medicine. He gave up most of his lectures onmedicine and attended only the lectures of the physiologist ErnstHeinrich Weber (1795–1878) and the mathematician Karl Mollweide(1774–1825). For a while Fechner became Mollweide’sassistant, but he confessed that he had little talent for mathematics(Kuntze 1892: 37). Weber’s and Mollweide’s work onperception would prove to be a profound influence on Fechner’slater psychophysics.

A crucial event in Fechner’s intellectual development came in1820 with his reading of Lorenz Oken’sLehrbuch zurNaturphilosophie (1809). Oken was an admirer of Schelling’sNaturphilosophie, and in hisLehrbuch he set out toprovide a systematic exposition of its basic ideas and to reconcileits many opponents (in his “Vorrede” [1809: v–vi]).^[3] Fechner was excited by Oken’s breathtaking speculations aboutthe whole of nature. From his study of medicine he had becomeaccustomed to see nature as a mechanism; but Oken gave him an excitingnew way of conceiving nature as an organic whole. Fechner later saidof his first reading of Oken’s book: “A new light seemedto me to illuminate the whole world and the sciences of the world; Iwas dazzled by it” (Kuntze 1892: 39).

For the next four years, Fechner devoted himself toNaturphilosophie. Although he said that he little understoodOken’s book, of which he read only the first chapter, he went onto read otherNaturphilosophen, especially Schelling andSteffens. He was indeed so involved inNaturphilosophie thatin 1823 he wrote his PhD dissertation on it,Praemissae adtheoriam organismi generalem (a summary is provided by MarilynMarshall 1974b), which was a general theory of organisms. In 1824, ina collection of essays,Stapelia mixta, he made his ownproposals for the method ofNaturphilosophie (1824).^[4]

In the midst of his fascination withNaturphilosophie,Fechner started writing satires under the pseudonym “Dr.Mises”. His first two publications were spoofs of thepretensions and practices of the medicine of his day:Beweis,daß der Mond aus Jodine bestehe (1821) andPanegyrikusder jezigen Medicin und Naturgeschichte (1822). These satiresalso contain a critique of the methods ofNaturphilosophie,which Dr. Mises chastened for its hasty analogies and its lack ofcareful experimentation. Despite his awareness of its flaws, Fechnerdid not lose his enthusiasm forNaturphilosophie. He believedthat its problems could be overcome by finding and employing theproper methodology. Hence the proposals inStapelia mixta,which were designed to putNaturphilosophie on a soundermethodological footing.

However, in 1824, the very year in whichStapelia mixtaappeared, Fechner seemed to have lost further confidence inNaturphilosophie. In that year he had begun to translate theFrench physicists Louis Jacques Thénard (1777–1857) andJena Baptiste Biot (1774–1862), whose work deeply impressed him(Thénard 1813–16 [trans. 1825–28] and Biot 1817[trans. 1828–29]). By following careful methods ofexperimentation and observation, the French physicists seemed toproduce definite results. Fechner asked himself if Oken and Schellingcould ever have produced the precise laws of optics found inBiot’s work? (Kuntze 1892: 39–40).

Despite such disillusionment,Naturphilosophie would remain aprofound influence on Fechner. There are two fundamental ideals ofNaturphilosophie which would have an enduring effect on him:first, its ideal of a unified worldview; and, second, its organicconcept of nature. However much Fechner rejected the methods ofNaturphilosophie, he was still excited by these ideals, whichhe would never renounce. Already by 1824, then, there is a basictension in Fechner’s intellectual life: the hankering forspeculativeNaturphilosophie and the demand for exactscience.

In the Winter Semester 1823–24, at the tender age of twenty-two,Fechner began his academic career by lecturing on physiology for thefaculty of medicine. After the death of Ludwig Gilbert(1769–1824), the Leipzig professor of physics, in 1824, Fechnerserved as his temporary substitute. Because he was still so young, theposition could not be made permanent. It was only in 1834 that Fechnerfinally became professor of physics in Leipzig.

During the 1820s, Fechner began his first experimental work, taking ashis subject the new and exciting field of electricity. He conductedexperiments to test, and to perfect the measurements for, Ohm’s law,^[5] which had been discovered in 1826, but which was at first verycontroversial. Fechner’s exact observations and experiments werehighly praised and contributed to the general acceptance ofOhm’s law. The experiments were collected under the titleMaßbestimmungen über die galvanische Kette(Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1831).

In 1827 Fechner took a long journey through Bavaria, Salzburg, Tirol,and Switzerland, which finally ended with his three month stay inParis. There he finally met Biot and Thénard as well asAndré Marie Ampère (1775–1836); their exactingexperimental work served as a model for him. Fechner’stranslations of Biot and Thénard played an important role indisseminating French mathematical science in Germany.

From 1838 to 1840 Fechner undertook experiments on the psychology ofsense perception. In doing so he became part of a Leipzig tradition:in the 1830s Alfred Volkmann (1801–1877), and Ernst HeinrichWeber (1795–1878) and Eduard Friedrich Weber (1806–1871)had conducted experiments on the psychology and physiology of senseperception. Fechner continued in that tradition by conductingexperiments on color perception. He wanted to investigate theconnection between the objective phenomenon of light and itssubjective perception. He discovered that the appearance of many colorphenomena is due more to retinal fatigue rather than any property oflight itself. Fechner’s results proved fruitful and were latertaken up by Helmholtz.^[6]

Although Fechner was making a name for himself, he was still nearlydestitute. His lecturing posts were either poorly paid or not paid atall, so he somehow had to make up for the lack of income. To keep thewolf from the door, he engaged in various translation and writingprojects. The most questionable of these projects was his editingBreitkopf and Härtel’sHauslexikon, a householdguide (1834). This work consisted in eight volumes, each containingeight to nine hundred pages; a third of the articles had to be writtenby Fechner himself. So our philosopher found himself writing on thebest way to set the table and how to cut meat. Fechner’s motivefor undertaking this work was totally financial: previous editions oftheHauslexikon had been very profitable. But, as fortunewould have it, this edition proved to be a bust. Fechner’smighty labors were for very little gain. It was working on suchprojects that so exhausted him, leading to his breakdown in 1840.

3. The Breakdown

The most dramatic and fateful event in Fechner’s life was hismental breakdown, which lasted for nearly four years, beginning inDecember 1839 and ending in October 1843. The breakdown was extremelysevere, leading to near death and loss of sanity. His mental andphysical collapse was the talk of Leipzig. No one expected Fechner tocome out of it. But, remarkably, he did. That he survived it at all,and then continued in a productive career, is astonishing. Fechnerhimself regarded it as “a miracle”.

Fechner’s breakdown was a watershed in his intellectualdevelopment. It forced him to reevaluate the orientation of his work.From now on, he would write on only what was important to him. No morehackwork. More importantly, during his recovery Fechner had a mysticalexperience which it became his mission to spell out in philosophicalprose. Some of Fechner’s iconic works are the direct result ofthis experience.

The story of the breakdown was told by Fechner himself in a memoir,entitled ‘Krankheitsgeschichte’, written in 1845(reproduced in Kuntze 1892: 106–126). What follows are thehighlights of his story.

In the Autumn of 1839 the strain of overwork was beginning to take itstoll on Fechner. There were acute physical symptoms of mental stress.He was suffering from headaches, insomnia and lethargy. But there werealso symptoms of neurosis. His thought was obsessive and compulsive.He complained that his thinking was leading nowhere, that he wouldconstantly come back to the same point, that in doing so he wasexhausting himself. It was impossible for him to stop thinking; hecould not relax or distract himself. Rather than he controlling histhinking, it was as if his thinking were controlling him.

The worst physical symptom of Fechner’s growing illness was nearblindness. He had strained his eyes doing his experimental work. Hehad to look through colored glasses at the sun, so that images ofbright objects would remain in his eyes. He also had to stare for longperiods at very fine measurement scales, which taxed his vision. Hissight received “its final blow” in 1840. His eyes becameso sensitive to light that he could not open them. He had to live in acompletely darkened room and to wear a blindfold. Because of thedeterioration of his sight, he had to abandon reading and writing; andbecause he could not read or write, he could not work. His great enemybecame boredom. All could have been bearable to him if he could onlysleep; but his insomnia was relentless.

Though Fechner could not read himself, someone could still read tohim. For a while, this was his only source of stimulation. His wifewould often read to him; so would a friend, who would visit him daily.That friend was no less than the young Hermann Lotze, who was justthen beginning his writing career. But, eventually, even his visitshad to stop. Fechner could not bear the strain of listening. Therecould be only complete silence in that darkened room.

Anything that involved mental effort was now unbearable to Fechner.Because even conversation was impossible for him, he avoided allcontact with others, even his wife. And so Fechner became completelyisolated, from the world and others. He was utterly alone in thatblack and silent room.

Desperate, Fechner finally made the fateful decision to listen to hisdoctors. They would attempt an experimental remedy from traditionalChinese medicine. They would apply to his back moxa—a down ofdried leaves from the plantArtemisia moxa. The immediateeffect was to create swellings, which left scars on his back; but thelong-term effect was much worse: digestion became impossible. NowFechner could not eat or drink; he quickly became emaciated. He was onthe brink of starvation.

Fechner was rescued from starvation by a woman who was acquainted withhis family. She had read of his illness, and dreamed of a remedy forit. She sent him pieces of dried ham, cleaned of all fat. To hissurprise, Fechner enjoyed eating it, and he gradually recovered hisstrength through it.

Some of the symptoms Fechner describes in the depths of his illnesssound like schizophrenia. He complained that his thoughts were beyondhis control. They would arise from very incidental reasons and hecould not stop them. As he wrote of his state of mind: “My innerbeing divided itself into two parts: in my self and in mythoughts.” (114)

Fechner later wrote that only two things prevented him from sinkinginto complete oblivion: the care of his wife and his religious faith.He was especially strengthened and comforted by the thought that therewas compensation in another life for the sorrows endured in this life.These eschatological themes will later play a central role in histheory of religion.

The worst month of his illness, Fechner later wrote, was August 1843.It seemed he could not sink any further into depression, and thatthere could be neither rescue nor redemption from all his suffering.But, slowly and gradually, a process of recovery began in October. Hefound that he could now speak without having unpleasant sensations,and that the more he spoke, the more he liked speaking. Withself-confidence and prudence, his powers gradually strengthened. For afew seconds, he could open his eyes without feeling any pain; he laterfound that he could do this for longer moments. Fechner told himselfthat he was not merely passive, that he had the power to exercise hiseyes, and that he could make them stronger. Eventually, he wrote, theyfelt “a real hunger for light”.

Thus Fechner cured himself. It was as if it were all a question ofwill power. He found a source of strength within himself, a power togo out and meet the world. He now believed that he had allowed himselfto sink into nothingness; if he was the source of hisself-annihilation, he reasoned, he could also be the source of hisself-affirmation. And so by Christmas of 1843, full of hope andconfidence, Fechner walked out of his dark night, a new man. He wouldbe a productive writer for the next forty four years.

4. The Soul of Plants

Fechner has gone down in history as “the father ofpanpsychism”. But that phrase is problematic. We should drop theclaim to paternity since the doctrine is very old and has had a wealthof followers, both in ancient and modern times. The more importantquestion is whether it is accurate to describe Fechner’sphilosophy as “panpsychism”. The label is correct if itmeans the following: the doctrine that all living beings are psychic,i.e., have the power of consciousness.^[7]

We should distinguish panpsychism from organicism. The panpsychistholds that all living beings are psychic where the psyche involves thepower of consciousness; the organicists holds that living beings arenot necessarily psychic, that their living powers might not beconscious but only be subconscious drives. Organicism is ambiguous: itcan mean

1. the doctrine that everything in the universe is alive; or
2. the doctrine that the universe is organic in structure, i.e.,forms a whole where the whole precedes the parts and makes thempossible.

It is possible to hold (a) and (b); but it is also possible to hold(b) and not (a) if one thinks that there are inorganic parts withinthe organic whole. Organicists are not necessarily panpsychistsbecause they might hold that there are living creatures who are notconscious; panpsychists are organicists at least in sense (b) but notnecessarily in sense (a). Fechner was an organicist in sense (b) butnot (a) because he held that there is such a thing as inorganic nature(Fechner 1879: 37).

Fechner’s first exposition of panpsychism is hisNanna oderüber das Seelenleben der Pflanzen, which he first publishedin 1848.Nanna took the first step toward panpsychism byarguing that plants are conscious beings, having a life of feeling andvolition. In hisZend-Avesta, which first appeared in 1851,Fechner took his panpsychism a giant step further by contending thatplanets, and indeed the cosmos as a whole, are also psychic or mental.Fechner defended and elaborated his panpsychism in two works of theearly 1860s:Ueber die Seelenfrage (1861) andDie DreiMotive and Gründe des Glaubens (1863). His final expositionof his doctrine appears in hisDie Tagesansicht gegenüber derNachtansicht (1879).

Fechner’s panpsychism originated from a mystical experiencewhich came at the end of his mental breakdown.^[8] The day he began to see again, 5 October 1843, he walked into thegarden of his house to look at the plants and flowers. Now the wholeworld appeared alive to him; it seemed for the first time to revealitself to him. The flowers were all illuminated, as if from within.The light they shed seemed to come from their very souls.

The whole garden seemed to me transformed, as if not I but all ofnature were arisen anew; and I thought, it is only a matter of openingmy eyes again to allow a nature grown old to become young again.(Nanna: 65)

From that day onward, Fechner made it his mission to be true to thatexperience, to capture its meaning in philosophical prose. Theultimate results of his efforts wereNanna andZend-Avesta.

Though Fechner’s panpsychism arose from a mystical experience,it is not based upon it; that experience was the origin of his view,not the rationale for it. Fechner insisted in bothNanna andZend-Avesta that his doctrine was based upon the best naturalscience. While he did not claim certainty or finality for hisdoctrine, he still maintained that it was the most “likelystory” given the latest findings of empirical research.

Fechner explains the title of his work in his forward (Nanna:xi). He wanted a short and catchy name for his book. He firstconsidered “Flora” and “Hamadryas”; but thenhe found the first too botanical and the second too archaic. Just theright name came from Uhland’s work on Nordic mythology (1836:147–148). Nanna was the goddess of flowers, the wife of Baldur,the god of light.

Fechner writes that it is the purpose of his work to show how plantsare part of a world ensouled by God (Nanna: xiii). It thenseems as if panpsychism can be proven simply from the omnipresence ofGod. But Fechner explicitly rejects this strategy because it wouldmake the question of the soul of plants depend on general metaphysicalquestions, such as the relationships between God and nature or mindand body (Nanna: 7). Furthermore, even if we could prove theomnipresence of the divine mind, Fechner adds, it still would notprove that each individual thing is conscious. It would still bepossible for the divine mind to be omnipresent in nature even thoughno individual thing is conscious (Nanna: 3). For thesereasons, Fechner will investigate the question of the soul of plantson its own, apart from any general metaphysics; he asks: What evidencedo we have for the common view that only humans and animals but notplants have souls?

All belief in the existence of other minds, Fechner reminds us, isbased on analogy. We assume that other humans have minds because theirspeech and actions are like our own; and we infer that animals haveminds because, in crucial respects, their actions are like our own.But we must be careful with analogy, Fechner warns, because we cannotdemand that other creatures be exactly like ourselves in all respects.The very nature of analogy means that they are like us in somerespects but unlike us in others. We are permitted to infer, becauseanalogies do not exactly hold, that other creatures have mindssimilar to our own; but similarity does not mean identical oralike in all respects. Their minds could still be, in other respects,very different from our own. Though we assume that worms have souls,we recognize that they are very different ones from our own(Nanna: 6). Why cannot we then say that plants too havesouls, though very different ones from us?

Fechner makes it his business to argue that all the reasons forascribing souls to animals also hold for plants (Nanna: 7).Plants and animals have very similar structures and functions. Theyshare a similar pattern of development (birth, maturity, death); bothhave similar cellular structures; both require nutrition, both engagein digestion, excretion, respiration. All that we can infer from thedifferences in their organic structure, function and development isthat plants havedifferent souls than our own, not that theyhave no souls at all (Nanna: 9).

The most common reason for denying souls to plants, Fechner notes, isthat they do not have a central nervous system. If one destroys thenerves of a human or animal, they show no signs of life. It thereforeseems that plants cannot a have a soul because they have no nervoussystem. But here Fechner raises an interesting question: Are nervesthe only possible organs to produce sensation? Nature has many meansto the same end, and we should not assume that there is only one wayto produce sensation. If we cut all the strings of a violin, itproduces no sound; but not all instruments are stringed. We canproduce sound from wind instruments. Similarly, nature might have manymeans of creating sensations apart from a nervous system(Nanna: 28). The fibers of plants could perform the samefunction as nerves.

Another common reason for denying souls to plants is that they are notcapable of locomotion, of changing their position, as humans andanimals are (Nanna: 41, 71). But why should motion todifferent places be necessary for life?, Fechner asks. Plants movetoo, its just that they move vertically rather than horizontally. Onemaintains that the movements of plants are not voluntary, like that ofhumans and animals, because they are subject to physical necessity.But Fechner replies that the actions of animals too can be shown to bephysically necessary. The mere necessity of an action—itsexplicability according to mechanical causes—does not show thatit cannot be also accompanied by internal or mental events(Nanna: 79).

A weak point of Fechner’s argument is that he never sufficientlyclarifies what he means by the soul or mind. His argument is cast inthe language of having “a soul”, which makes it seem as ifhe means a special kind of substance. He tells us that by a soul(Seele) he means the same thing as mind (Geist); butthis only kicks the can down the road: What are the criteria of amind? The crucial consideration for Fechner seems to be sentience,consciousness or awareness, or at least the possibility of it. Eventhe most primitive plants, he argues, have consciousness or feeling;though it might not be on the level of humans and animals, it is stillat least as lively and intense (Nanna: 188). This isinteresting because Fechner seems to exclude the possibility of thesubconscious; he does not allow, as Leibniz famously did, theexistence of subconscious living creatures. In some places, Fechnerseems to hold that having feelings and desires are sufficient for thepresence of a mind; but he also writes that there can be sensation anddesire without consciousness (Nanna: 53). In other places, hemakes purposive activity a necessary condition of having a mind. Onlya being with a soul has a purpose, he says (Nanna: 152). Thecrucial consideration for an organism, he also contends, is that itsorganization allows it to effectively achieve its ends(Nanna: 191). But this too becomes troubled because Fechnerconcedes that there can be purposive or organic development withoutany awareness of it (Nanna: 87).

One of the most important differences between Fechner’spanpsychism and Schelling’s and Hegel’s idealism is that,for Schelling and Hegel, the ideal does not necessarily imply thepresence of consciousness. What makes a creature living is itspurposive activity, which need not imply that its activity is directedby consciousness. These differences with the idealist traditioneventually became public in Fechner’s sharp criticism of Eduardvon Hartmann’sDie Philosophie des Unbewussten, whichput forward a strong case for the presence of subconscious lifethroughout nature (see Fechner 1879: 22).^[9]

5. The Soul of the Universe

Zend-Avesta is Fechner’s most personal work, thestatement of his fundamental beliefs. It is nineteenth centurymetaphysics in the grand style, on a par with Schopenhauer’sDie Welt als Wille und Vorstellung and Lotze’sMikrokosmus. It is a much more ambitious work thanNanna. WhereasNanna would deal strictly with therealm of botany,Zend-Avesta would consider the cosmos as awhole. WhileNanna would prove only that plants have souls,Zend-Avesta would attempt to show that the entireorganic universe has a soul.^[10] Although this panpsychic doctrine was the inspiration forNanna, Fechner, as we have seen, refused to make it the basisof his argument. Now, inZend-Avesta, it will be his purposeto prove this doctrine.

Zend-Avesta is unapologetically religious. Fechner conceivesit as a defense of ancient natural religion. In his preface he writesthat its purpose is to restore an old belief: “that all ofnature is living and divinely ensouled” (ZA: vi).Zend-Avesta, which means “living word” in ancientPersian, was the sacred text of Zoroastrianism. Fechner hopes that hiswork will be a newZend-Avesta (ZA: vii).

Although it has a religious agenda,Zend-Avesta was nodefense of the Christian faith. Fechner’s natural religion wasdecidedly not Christianity. His denial of a transcendent dimensionbeyond nature, his insistence that the mental be embodied in thephysical, and his affirmation of a God of nature, all departdrastically from Christian dogma. Still, Fechner was sympathetic toChristianity—the faith of his family and fathers—andattempted to interpret many of its beliefs in terms of his philosophy.^[11] He conceived his own religion as a synthesis of Christianity andpaganism (Fechner 1879: 71).

Despite his religious agenda, Fechner insists that he intends to basehis faith upon the best science. This work follows a different coursefrom mostNaturphilosophie, he writes, because it does notbegin from universal principles and descend to matter of fact; rather,it begins from an examination of the particulars of experience andascends to the universal. “The whole tendency of thiswriting”, he says in the preface, “is that the universalrests on the particular rather than the particular on theuniversal.” (ZA: xiii) It will show that the realm ofthe soul is much wider than usually thought, and then proceed todemonstrate that it extends to the universe as a whole.

There was some equivocation on Fechner’s part on the basis forhis natural religion. Although he insisted that it had to be based onscience, he had to admit that it could not be based on “exactresearch” (ZA: vii, xiv). The very nature of thesubject matter did not permit “empirical confirmation andmathematical calculation”. Furthermore, he vacillates concerninghow it is based on empirical fact. He insists that he will allow onlyinferences based on experience; but then he says that his theory is inorder as long as it does not contradict the results of science(ZA: xiv). He then went on to admit that to believe in thesoul of the stars would be always “a matter of faith”(Glaubenssache;ZA: 7).

We should contrast Fechner’s attitude toward religion andscience with the materialists of his day (Feuerbach, Vogt,Büchner, Moleschott). It was a major advantage of his philosophy,Fechner claimed, that it could reconcile science with religion. Thematerialists saw this as no advantage at all; they insisted thatmodern science was moving in the direction of materialism, which madeit necessary to reject all the religious dogmas of the past. Fechnerwas well aware of the threat of materialism and did his best tocounter it. His constant appeal to science was an attempt to meet thematerialists on their own ground.

To prove that the universe has a soul, Fechner again follows theguiding thread of analogy, just as he did inNanna. He beginsby considering the body closest to us: the earth. He finds manysimilarities between the earth and our body: both are self-enclosedpurposive wholes; both consist in solid, fluid, gaseous materials inmanifold connections; both go through cycles of changes; both gothrough processes of development whereby they become differentiatedand more finely organized (ZA: 29–31). Furthermore, theearth has a circulatory system like that of our body (ZA:73–74). Because of these many similarities, we are justified inconcluding, Fechner argues, that the earth is an individual organism(ZA: 35). Of course, because it is a much greater organism,there is much in the earth that one does not find in man; but there isnothing in man that one does not already find in the earth(ZA: 37). The main difference between the human body and theearth is that the earth is a higher organism than the body; this isbecause it is more independent, self-sufficient, massive and powerful(ZA: 31). All the characteristics of the humanorganism—unity, multiplicity, organization and development fromwithin—the earth has to a greater degree (ZA:35–6).

Having demonstrated that the earth is an organism, Fechner proceeds toargue that it also has a soul. Because the earth has a body much likeour own, we are justified, on the basis of analogy, to assume that ithas a soul much like our own (ZA: 110–111). If weregard freedom as a necessary characteristic of the soul, we shouldalso attribute it to the earth, which is an even more self-sufficientand independent being (ZA: 113). All the respects in whichthe earth is unlike us are only reasons to attribute to it a highersoul (ZA: 115). To the objection that the earth does not havea nervous system and other organic functions like ours, Fechnerreplies that, though the presence of these functions proves a soul,their absence does not disprove the soul either but only the lack ofananimal orhuman soul (ZA: 130). It iseasier to prove that the earth has a soul than plants do, Fechnerclaims, for the simple reason that we have souls and are part of theearth (ZA: 120). We are all parts of the earth, Fechnerargues at length, and just for that reason the earth must have also asoul, because a soul cannot arise from matter but only another soul(ZA: 140–1).

Fechner conceives the soul of the earth as present within allindividual souls, much like Averroës famous doctrine of theuniversal intellect. All the different representations in one mindpresuppose a single general consciousness; but the same is the casefor the different representations in different minds: they toopresuppose a general consciousness (ZA: 160–1). What weperceive or think as an individual mind we perceive or think throughthe general mind (ZA: 164). This single common consciousnessin all individual consciousness explains, Fechner believes, how mutualunderstanding and communication are possible. Although we areindependent and self-sufficient with respect to one another, that isnot with respect to the higher mind. That I know myself and onlymyself, and that you know yourself and only yourself, does not preventthe higher spirit from knowing both of us. What is separation(Scheidung) for us is only a distinction(Unterscheidung) for it.

The earth is only one planet in the cosmos, and as such only oneorganism within an infinite one, one mind within an infinite one. Theuniversal organism is nothing less than God, who is the tree of life,from which everything grows and upon which everything depends(ZA: 23). God is notabove space and time, Fechnerinsists, but he iswithin them. He not onlydoeseverything in all things, but heis everything in all things(ZA: 200). “God is the one and all” (ZA:223), Fechner says, endorsing thehen kai pan of theGoethezeit. The external world of appearances is not opposedto God, but it is simply his external side (ZA: 201).God’s spirit does not stand outside the material world butexpresses itself in and through it. Fechner distinguishes between anarrower and broader concept of God: the narrow concept is God asspirit alone; the broader concept is spiritand itsembodiment in the world (ZA: 200–1). In the same way,he says, we talk about a person as a personality but also as a wholebeing involving its body. But it is noteworthy that Fechner says thatGod in the narrow sense, i.e., God as a pure spirit, is only anabstraction (ZA: 204). The concept of the world in a broadsense, in which it includes spiritual and physical existence,coincides with the concept of God (ZA: 204). Fechner admitsthat, in this sense, his view is pantheistic, but he insists that itis not so in the Hegelian sense in which the spirit existsonly in its individual manifestations.

6. The Existence of Atoms

In 1855 Fechner published a book much less famous thanNannaandZend-Avesta but one just as important for the expositionof his philosophy:Über die physikalische und philosophischeAtomlehre. WhileNanna andZend-Avesta make upthe speculative or metaphysical side of Fechner’s philosophy,theAtomlehre represents its positivist side. It is in thiswork that Fechner puts forward his phenomenalism and verificationism.All that exists, and all that we can meaningfully talk about, it nowturns out, is an object of possible experience. It is as if the soulof the universe were swept away with a positivist broom

TheAtomlehre was Fechner’s contribution to a majorcontroversy in the mid nineteenth century: the existence of the atom.Fechner argued that, by the best standards of observation andexperiment then current in physics, the most probable view is thatatoms really do exist; they are not only a convenient fiction or afallacious hypostasis. The simplest and most consistent interpretationof the data of observation and experiment is that there are atomsbehind the laws of experience.

The question of the existence of the atom had divided philosophy andnatural science against one another. The philosophers held that atomsare only a fiction or hypostasis, while the physicists claimed thatthey are a reality, the best inference from observation andexperiment, even though they are unobservable themselves. Thisdisagreement among philosophers and scientists reflected their widerdisagreements about the nature of matter and scientific method. Theywere opposed on three fronts. First, the philosophers held that matteris infinitely divisible and continuous, while the scientistsmaintained that it is indivisible and discrete. Second, thephilosophers made forces fundamental, analyzing matter into powers ofattraction and repulsion; the scientists, however, made matter thebasis of force, claiming that forces inhere in matter and that theyare only a way of accounting for its law-like regularities. Third, thephilosophers stated that the fundamental questions about nature cannotbe settled by observation and experiment and have to be determineda priori; the physicists insisted that every question ofnatural science has to be determined by observation and experiment andthat questions about its very possibility are not the concern ofnatural science. The chief philosophers, who were all Germans, wereSchelling, Hegel and Herbart; their philosophy of nature was in thetradition of Kant’sMetaphysische Anfangsgründe derNaturwissenschaften. The main scientists, who were French, wereone and all experimental physicists, men like AndréAmpère (1775–1836), Augustin Cauchy (1858–1898) andAugustin Fresnel (1788–1827).

Atomism had become such a controversial issue in the mid nineteenthcentury partly because of the rise of materialism, and partly becauseof the traditional reputation of atomism. Materialism had become arising force in German philosophy in the early 1850s; and by1855—the very year Fechner published his work—Karl Vogt,Heinrich Czolbe, and Ludwig Büchner published their manifestos ofmaterialism (Vogt 1855; Büchner 1855; Czolbe 1855). The Germanmaterialists were not unqualified champions of atomism. Though Czolbehad explicitly defended it (1855: 105 and 1875: 95), Büchner wasmore cautious, stating only that the atom was still a workinghypothesis (1855 [1904: 39–40]). Nevertheless, the reputation ofatomism as a materialist doctrine had been formed since antiquity.Atomism, whose chief exposition was Lucretius’De rerumnaturae, stood for a completely naturalistic worldview.

As one could surmise from the author ofNanna andZend-Avesta, Fechner was not sympathetic to materialism andlamented its rising power in German life and letters. It was one ofthe most interesting features of his book that it would attempt tobreak the traditional association of atomism with materialism. Fechnerargued that atomism does not necessarily support materialism, and thatit is indeed ultimately a better support for the beliefs in theexistence of God and immortality than the opposing view of thephilosophers. Part I ofAtomlehre lays out the experimentalevidence forphysical atomism; but Part II states the casefor aphilosophical atomism which supports a metaphysicsavowing the existence of God and immortality. The battle betweenphilosophy and physics about the existence of the atom should not beseen, at least in Fechner’s view, as a struggle between faithand science.

The most remarkable feature of Fechner’s book is that it is adefense of atomism at all. InNanna andZend-AvestaFechner had expounded the organic vision of the universe socharacteristic of romanticism. The support for that organic vision, asset forth by theNaturphilosophen (Schelling, Hegel, andHerbart), had been the dynamic theory of matter, according to whichmatter consists essentially in living force. If matter consists inforce, theNaturphilosophen argued, then there is nofundamental difference in kind between mind and matter, because theyare only different degrees of development and organization of force.It was just this view of matter, however, that Fechner had rejected inhisAtomlehre. He was very explicit that force presupposesthe existence of matter, that trying to analyze matter into theseforces was like trying to analyze sounds into the intervals betweenthem (Atom: 112, 113). But this repudiation of dynamicisminevitably poses the question: Did Fechner’s atomism notundermine his organicism?^[12]

The chief reason that Fechner advocates atomism is because he thinksthat it better explains the facts than its rival, dynamicism. Atomismis not simply a good model of explanation but the correct ontology,i.e., the right account of what exists in the world. That is to say,atomism does not work simply on a hypothetical basis:ifatoms exist, then we can account for the phenomena; rather, itpostulates that atoms do exist, and that only as such do they explainphenomena. The atomist knows that the existence of atoms cannot beconfirmed by experience; but he still insists that the only way toexplain what we do know about experience is to assume the existence ofatoms (Atom: 25, 30). Here again the natural scientistfollows the guide of analogy. He assumes that the same laws that holdfor the macroscopic world also hold for the microscopic, an assumptionwhich brings consistency into his general worldview (Atom:33, 35–6, 88). Fechner concedes that many phenomena explicableaccording to atomism are also explicable according to dynamicism; buthe insists that there always comes a point where phenomena revealthemselves that dynamicism cannot explain (Atom: 13, 21, 24).When we examine mass macroscopic phenomena in greaterdetail—taking them apart into their microscopicconstituents—we find that the facts we then discover areexplicable according to atomism alone.

Fechner cites the following experiments and phenomena in favor ofatomism.

1. The refraction of a ray of light into different colors was oftenregarded as a difficulty of the wave theory of light. Why should asingle transparent ray suddenly transform itself into a multitude ofcolors? The investigations of Cauchy have shown, however, thatrefraction into different colorsfollows from, and is notonlyconsistent with, wave theory if one supposes that thereare discrete particles in the aether (Atom: 18).^[13]
2. A heat ray (Wärmestralung) and heat conduction(Wärmefortpfanzung) seem to be very different phenomena.But Fourier has demonstrated that conduction follows under the samelaws that hold for rays provided that one assumes rays consist indiscrete particles (Atom: 22).
3. The phenomena of isomery—objects having the same mass andchemical constitution but producing different experimentalresults—are explicable only according to atomism. The atomistassumes that there is something more to atoms beside their mass andchemical constitution: namely, their direction or positions. Thedifferent results are then ascribed to the different directions orpositions of the atoms (Atom: 37). The dynamicist, however,can refer to only mass and chemical constitution.
4. Two crystal formations can be exactly alike in their parts andstructure even though they are incongruous with one another. Theatomist explains their incongruity from the different directions oftheir constituent atoms (Atom: 43)
5. A rubber band, when stretched, eventually breaks in one place. Thedynamicist cannot explain this break in a single place; his adherenceto the principle of continuity forces him to claim that the rubberband stretchesad infinitum or breaks in all places. Theatomist explains the break from the growing distance between particlesinside the band; the attraction between the particles lessens as theband stretches and the distance between the particles grows(Atom: 54–55)
6. When a body expands because of heat, its density diminishes as itsvolume increases (Atom: 45). The atomist can easily explainthis: the particles spread further apart from one another as the bodyis heated.
7. The atomist can explain organic development—thedifferentiation of a primal mass into a multitude of organs andfunctions—better than the dynamicist, because he claims that theoriginal apparently undifferentiated mass in fact consists in manydifferent kinds of particles with their different structures(Atom: 60–62). The dynamicist, who chastens the atomistfor speculation beyond experience, can refer to only the small visibledifferences between primal masses, which are not sufficient to explaindifferentiation or the differences between individuals.

As case 1 demonstrates, Fechner still holds an aether theory. He evenincludes the aether into his summary of his doctrine, according towhich ponderable matter consists in spatially discrete parts, inbetween which there is an imponderable substance or aether(Atom: 79). Fechner admits, however, that there is muchuncertainty about the relation of ponderable to imponderable matter.He knew that the aether theory was problematic, though this did notstop him from referring to Cauchy’s experiments. In theintroduction to Part I ofAtomlehre, he is explicit thatatomism does not depend on the theory of aether (Atom:14–15). The question whether light or heat are atomisticallyexplicable is independent of the existence of the aether, he insists.

It was a crucial aspect of Fechner’s defense of atomism that itmade no philosophical claims about the nature of matter itself. Itsfoundation lies simply with its explanation of empirical phenomena; itdoes not attempt to answer deeper philosophical questions about thepossibility of matter and experience. As Fechner put it: the physicistdoes not worry about a philosophical analysis of matter anymore than abuilder troubles himself about the chemical analysis of his brick andmortar (Atom: 72). The philosopher always claimed that theatomist did not go far enough in his analysis of matter, that he didnot try to answer ultimate questions. What he fails to see, however,is that the physicist does not attempt to answer such questions; he isonly trying to explain the data given in experience. From this modestempirical point of view, Fechner was willing to make significantconcessions to the dynamicist: perhaps matter did ultimately consistin forces of attraction and repulsion (Atom: 72); perhaps thespaces between matter were ultimately filled, so that everything iscontinuous after all (Atom: 76).

But this modest empiricist defense of atomism was disingenuous. It wasonly half the story. For Fechner had a more aggressive philosophicaldefense of atomism, a positivist-style counterattack which claimedthat the questions posed by the philosopher are meaningless. Unlikethe physicist, the philosopher does not intend to stay within thelimits of experience; he attempts to go beyond these limits to findthe conditions of their possibility. What makes experience possiblefor him is the unconditioned, the thing-in-itself; and hisspeculations therefore are so many attempts to know thething-in-itself. But the thing-in-itself, Fechner insists, is anillusion, something which does not really exist (Atom: 94,98). The world does not consist in the appearances of athing-in-itself but in nothing more than appearances (Atom:94). Matter is only what appears, or what would appear under certaincircumstances (Atom: 95). The idea that there is somethingbehind the appearances, something that makes them all one thing, issimply an hypostasis, the reification of a concept that unites allthese appearances into one (Atom: 96). As part of thiscounterattack, Fechner went on to argue that the dynamicist’sconcept of force or power is only a reification of the concept of alaw (Atom: 106). It did not even make sense to analyze a bodyinto its powers because power is only a relational concept betweenbodies; to attempt to construct matter from powers would be likeconstructing sound from tone intervals (Atom: 112).

Also in the spirit of this counterattack, Fechner sets out adefinition of matter which spurns any philosophical account of it.Matter is defined as what resists the sense of touch; it is nothingmore nor less than “tangibility”(Handgreiflichkeit) (Atom: 90). In response to thephilosopher, who asks what is it that is so tangible, Fechner repliesthat it is nothing more than what he feels and what he infers fromthat feeling (Atom: 92). Fechner does not then allow thephilosopher to speculate about the sources or conditions of thatfeeling. Rather, he claims the very idea that there is somethingbehind this feeling, that there is a reality that that makes itpossible, is an illusion (Atom: 94).

Hence Fechner’s defense of atomism is not what it first appearsto be, or at least not what he pretends it to be. It does not carveout a realm of experience in which atomism holds, then leaving aside atranscendent realm which is the proper domain of metaphysics. Instead,Fechner argues that there is no such transcendent realm and thatmetaphysics deludes itself when it speculates about it. In thisrespect, Fechner’s attack on metaphysics anticipates exactlywhat Otto Liebmann would write ten years later in his famousKantund die Epigonen (1865).

Though he was very aggressive in his attack on the philosophers,Fechner insisted that he had nothing against philosophyperse; his target was onlycontemporary philosophy,specifically the metaphysics of Schelling, Hegel, and Herbart(Atom: xiii). The second part of his book was indeed devotedto his own philosophy, his own metaphysics of matter. It would give upthe empirical limits onphysical atomism, and then attempt toprovide aphilosophical atomism, which would give “theultimate construction of matter itself” (Atom: viii).Fechner reassured his readers that he was not sacrificing theirdemands for a worldview and that he would sketch one of his own. Heexpressed his complete agreement with the philosophers about the needto investigate “the most universal, the highest and theultimate”; he said that he differed from them only inhow he wanted to conduct such an investigation. WhileSchelling, Hegel and Herbart had followed ana priorimethodology, which preceded natural science, Fechner insisted on ana posteriori methodology which would be based upon thenatural sciences. His metaphysics would comeafter, notprior to orbefore, physics (Atom: 126).The foundation for his metaphysics would be nothing less than thewhole of natural science (Atom: 127).

The great hope of Fechner, like many other philosophers of his age(Trendelenburg, Lotze, Hartmann), was that the natural sciences couldprovide a worldview more reliable than thea priori methodsof the old metaphysics. The old metaphysics here was not simply therationalism of Leibniz and Wolff but the metaphysics of naturalscience of Kant, Schelling, Hegel and Herbart, which was stillindebted to the old rationalism in its faith in pure reason. This newworldview would still be able to satisfy the interests of morality andreligion; and it would disarm the threat of materialism, whichregarded the old morality and religion as little more thansuperstition.

The distinguishing feature of Fechner’s new metaphysics is hisinsistence that it is based upon experience alone rather than thea priori reasoning of the oldNaturphilosophie.Accordingly, the basic principle of his philosophical atomism is thatatoms are “limiting concepts” in the analysis ofexperience. This means that they represent the ultimate units ofanalysishitherto, so that they involve no claim that theanalysis is complete. Atoms must be defined strictly in relation tothe empirically given; they are not points behind or beyond space andtime but within it; but there is always the stipulation that howeversmall they are represented to be is never enough (Atom: 132).They appear to our representation as the smallest visible and tangiblepoints; yet they are are smaller than the smallest we can see andtouch (Atom: 156).

Fechner’s new metaphysics did not avoid the problems or theconcepts of the old metaphysics; it simply cast them in aquasi-empirical dress. Though Fechner adamantly insists that his atomsbe defined empirically, he goes on to attribute to them the classicproperties of the monad, all of which transcend the empirically given.Thus he writes that his atoms are utterly simple beings, having nocharacteristics (Atom: 133); that they are extensionlesspoints (Atom: 120); and that they are completely independentof one another, so that they cannot be connected to one another(Atom: 142). Now Fechner confronts the old conundrum whichcaused so much trouble for Leibniz: How do unextended points give riseto the extended entities of experience? Fechner breezily dismisses theproblem. Extension does not arise from the atoms themselves but therelationships between them; it is their aggregation which gives riseto their spatial appearance (Atom: 156–157). But thisquick solution still did not explain how spatial relationships couldarise from spaceless beings.

7. Theory of Mind

Beginning inZend-Avesta Fechner set forth a theory ofmind-body relations, which he then expounded in greater detail in hisUeber die Seelenfrage andElemente der Psychophysik.This theory has been explained in great detail by Michael Heidelberger(2004: 73–115), who regards it as Fechner’s most importantcontribution to philosophy. There is no necessary connection betweenthis theory and Fechner’s panpsychism: the theory could be trueeven if human minds where the only minds in the universe; panpsychismis more about the extent rather than the nature of mind.

Fechner’s theory begins with a distinction between twostandpoints, two ways of observing or knowing a human being. There isan internal and external standpoint, corresponding to which there aretwo kinds of appearances of a human being, internal and externalappearances. An internal appearance is how I appear to myself orself-appearance; an external appearance is how I appear toothers. There are two kinds of knowledge corresponding to each kind ofappearance. We know ourselves as minds immediately, i.e., intuitivelyor directly and without the need to make an inference; but we knowothers mediately, i.e., intellectually or indirectly, throughinferences we make from certain signs, viz., actions or words.

The main point that Fechner makes about these standpoints is thattheir appearances belong to one and the same thing. There are not twodistinct entities, a mind corresponding to internal appearances and abody corresponding to external appearances; rather, there is one andthe same thing that appears inwardly to myself and outwardly toothers. “Inwardly it appears to itself thus; and outwardly itappears thus; but what appears is one and the same”(ZA: 253). Hence Fechner’s theory has been described asa “two aspect theory” of the self.

This is the simplest formulation of the theory. It becomes morecomplicated, however, when Fechner adds other claims to it. The moststriking of these claims is that the mind and body are nothing buttheir appearances. The mind is nothing but its (actual and possible)appearances to itself; and the body is nothing but its (actual andpossible) appearances to others. There is no mind in itself beyond howit appears to itself; and there is no body in itself, apart from andprior to how it appears to others. The theory then is a form of“neutral monism”, according to which there is one and thesame kind of thing which has two aspects or attributes depending onhow it is viewed.^[14] This thing consists in only its appearances, whether internal orexternal.

Another claim that Fechner adds to his theory is that the twoappearances are connected to one another in a causal or law-like way(see 1861: 211 andZA: 253). Hence he says explicitly thatthey are in a relation of interchange (Wechselbedingheit),that they are intimately connected with one another (solidarischzusammenhangen) (1861: 211). This is notable because some dualaspect theories exclude the possibility of any interaction between themental and physical appearances precisely because they are suchdifferent kinds of attribute. Spinoza, for example, forbade any causalinteraction between the mental and physical because they were suchdifferent kinds of attribute of substance (Spinoza 1677: Pars Prima,Propositio VI & X). Fechner saw the interaction as problematic, asdifficult to explain, but he did not forbid its possibility. Despiteall the differences between mental and physical characteristics, heassumed that they referred to distinct events which, somehow, couldinteract. The whole purpose of hisPsychophysik was toexplain the interaction between them.

Still another puzzling claim added to Fechner’s theory is whathe calls “the most universal law of psychophysics”: thatnothing exists, originates or acts in the mind without somethingexisting, originating or acting in the body; in other words,everything mental has its expression in the physical (1861: 211). Thisprinciple seems to bias the connection between mind and body, so thatthe mind appears as the body but not conversely; but the theoryoriginally called for areciprocal connection or interactionbetween mind and body (as we have just seen above).

It is on the basis of this universal law that Fechner’s theoryhas been described as “materialist” (Heidelberger 2004:98, 107). This is an odd description, though, because the law seems topostulate that the mind has an efficacy on the body rather than theconversely. Materialist theories are often epiphenomenal, allowing thecausal direction to move only from the body to the mind. ButFechner’s law seems to say the opposite.

We will leave aside, for reasons of space, further complications inFechner’s theory. To avoid serious confusion, though, it isnecessary to consider, if only briefly, the origins of the theory.^[15] Fechner himself stated that his theory had its roots inSchelling’sNaturphilosophie (Atom: xiv).There is a certain plausibility to Fechner’s genealogy. In theearly 1800s Schelling had developed his own dual aspect theory of themind and body, according to which the mental and physical, the idealand the real, are two equal and independent appearances of theabsolute. We need not cast doubt on Fechner’s genealogy. Theinitial impetus for his dual aspect theory might indeed havebeen Schelling; perhaps, if he had not read Schelling, he would neverhave suggested a dual aspect theory. Still, it is important to seethat Fechner developed his theory along lines completely differentfrom Schelling’s. It was a fundamental principle ofSchelling’s theory that the mental and physical are one and thesame because they are different manifestations or appearances ofliving force; the mental is the highest organization and developmentof that force, the physical is its lowest organization anddevelopment. His theory therefore rested upon the dynamic theory ofmatter central to hisNaturphilosophie. But Fechner, as wehave seen, rejected this theory, which was in conflict with hisatomism. Furthermore, Schelling, like Spinoza, forbade the possibilityof interaction between the mental and physical, the very possibilitythat Fechner wanted to investigate (Schelling 1859: I/4, 344).

Bibliography

All translations are by the author of this entry, unless otherwisenoted.

Works by Fechner

• 1821 [1832], as Dr. Mises,Beweis, daß der Mond ausJodine bestehe,Germanien: Penig. Zweite Auflage: Leipzig: Voß, 1832. Reprintedalso in Fechner 1875: 1–20.
• 1822, as Dr. Mises,Panegyrikus der jezigen Medicin undNaturgeschichte, Leipzig: C.H.F. Hartmann. Reprinted in Fechner1875: 21–68.
• 1823,Praemissae ad theoriam organismi generalem,Leipzig: Staritz.
• 1824, as Dr. Mises,Stapelia Mixta, Leipzig: LeopoldVoß. Essays include:
  • “Ueber Definitionen des Lebens”, 65–73.
  • “Verkehrte Welt”, 83–86
  • “Ueber Schematismus und Symbolik”, 119–128
  • “Ueber das Verhältniß von Kunst, Wissenschaft undReligion”, 129–157.
  • “Extreme sese tangent”,172–179
  • “Versuch einer Entwicklung des Organisationsgesetzes aus demräumlichen Symbol”,180–205
  [Stapelia available online]
• 1825, as Dr. Mises,Vergleichende Anatomie der Engel. EineSkizze, Leipzig:Industrie-Comptoir.
• 1831,Maßbestimmungen über die galvanischeKette, Leipzig: Brockhaus.
• 1832, as Dr. Mises,Schutzmittel für die Cholera,Leipzig: Voß.
• 1834,Das Hauslexikon. Vollständiges Handbuch praktischerLenbenskenntnizze für alle Stände, 8 volumes, Leipzig:Breitkopf und Härtel.
• 1836, as Dr. Mises,Das Büchlein vom Leben nach demTode, Dresden: C.F. Grimmersche Buchhandlung.
• 1846a,Ueber das höchste Gut, Leipzig: Breitkopf undHärtel.
• 1846b, as Dr. Mises,Vier Paradoxa,Leipzig: Leopold Voß.
• [Nanna] 1848a [1908],Nanna oder über dasSeelenleben der Pflanzen, Leipzig: Leopold Voß. Fourthedition (Vierte Auflage), 1908. Page references are to the fourthedition.
• 1848b, “Ueber das Lustprincip des Handeln”,Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik,19: 1–30, 163–94.
• 1849, “Über das Causalgesetze”,Berichteüber die Verhandlungen der Königlich SächsischenGesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Jahrgang 1849:98–120.
• 1851a, “Zur Kritik der Grundlagen von HerbartsMetaphysik”,Zeitschrift für Philosophie undphilosophische Kritik 21: 193–209.
• [ZA] 1851b [1901],Zend-Avesta oder über dieDinge des Himmels und des Jenseits. Vom Standpunkt derNaturbetrachtung, Leipzig: Leopold Voß. Second edition,Kurd Laßwitz (ed.), 1901. Page references are to the secondedition.
• [Atom] 1855,Über die physikalische undphilosophische Atomlehre, Leipzig: Hermann Mendelssohn. A secondexpanded edition appeared in 1864. All page references are to thefirst edition.
• 1856,Professor Schleiden und der Mond, Leipzig: AdolfGumprecht.
• 1860,Elemente der Psychophysik, 2 volumes, Leipzig:Breitkopf und Härtel.
• 1861,Ueber die Seelenfrage. Ein Gang durch die sichtbareWelt, um die unsichtbare zu Finden, Leipzig: Amelang.
• 1863,Die drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens,Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel.
• 1873,Einige Ideen zur SchöpfungsundEntwickelungsgeschichte der Organismen, Leipzig: Breitkopf undHärtel.
• 1875,Kleine Schriften, Leipzig: Breitkopf undHärtel.
• 1876,Vorschule der Aesthetik, Leipzig: Breitkopf undHärtel.
• 1877,In Sachen der Psychophysik, Leipzig: Breitkopf undHärtel.
• 1879,Die Tagesansicht gegenüber die Nachtansicht,Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel.
• 1946,Religion of a Scientist: Selections from Gustav TheodorFechner, Walter Lowrie (ed./trans.), New York: PantheonBooks.

Other Primary Sources

• Biot, Jean Baptiste, 1817 [1828–29],Précisélémentaire de physique expérimentale, 2volumes, Paris: Déterville. Translated by Fechner into GermanasLehrbuch der Experimental-Physik oderErfahrungs-Naturlehre, 5 volumes, Lepzig: Voß,1828–29.
• Büchner, Ludwig, 1855 [1904],Kraft und Stoff,Frankfurt: Meidinger. 21^st edition, Leipzig: Thomas,1904.
• Czolbe, Heinrich, 1855,Neue Darstellung desSensualismus, Leipzig: Costenoble.
• –––, 1875,Grundzüge einer ExtensionaleErkenntnistheorie, Plauen, Hohmann.
• Hartmann, Eduard, 1869,Philosophie des Unbewußten,Berlin: Duncker.
• Helmholtz, Hermann, 1867,Handbuch der physiologischenOptik, Leipzig: Voß.
• James, William, 1904 [1912], “Does‘Consciousness’ Exist?”,The Journal ofPhilosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1(18):477–491. Reprinted in hisEssays in Radical Empiricism,New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912, pp. 1–38.doi:10.2307/2011942
• Lange, Friedrich, 1875,Geschichte des Materialismus undKritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart, 2 volumes, Iserlohn: J.Baedeker.
• Liebmann, Otto, 1865,Kant und die Epigonen: Eine kritischeAbhandlung, Stuttgart: Carl Schober.
• Oken, Lorenz, 1809,Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie, Jena:Friedrich Frommann.
• Schelling, F.W.J., 1859,Fernere Darstellungen aus dem Systemder Philosophie, inSämtliche Werke, K.F.A.Schelling (ed.), Stuttgart: Cotta, 14 vols.
• Spinoza, Baruch de, 1677 [1967],Ethica, inOpera/Werke, Günter Gawlick, Friedrich Niewöhnerand Konrad Blumenstock (eds), Darmstadt: WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft.
• Thénard, Louis Jacques, 1813–16 [1825–28],Traité de chimie élémentaire,théorique et pratique, 4 volumes, Paris: Crochand.Translated by Fechner into German asLehrbuch der theoretischenund praktischen Chemie, 6 volumes, Leipzig: Leopold Voß,1825–28.
• Uhland, Ludwig, 1836,Sagenforschungen, Stuttgart:Cotta.
• Vogt, Karl, 1855,Köhlergluabe und Wissenschaft,Gießen: Ricker.

Secondary Sources

• Adolph, Heinrich, 1923,Die Weltanschauung Gustav TheodorFechners, Stuttgart: Strecker und Schröder.
• Audi, Robert, 1995,Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Bruchmann, Kurt, 1887, “Gustav Theodor Fechner, eindeutscher Metaphysiker”,PreußischeJahrbücher, 58: 293–309.
• Heidelberger, Michael, 2004,Nature from Within: GustavTheodor Fechner and his Psychophysical Worldview, Pittsburgh, PA:University of Pittsburgh Press.
• Kuntze, Johannes Emil, 1892,Gustav Theodor Fechner: Eindeutsches Gelehrtenleben, Leipzig: Breitkopf undHärtel.
• Lasswitz, Kurd, 1902,Gustav Theodor Fechner, Zweitevermehrte Auflage. Stuttgart: Frommanns Verlag.
• Marshall, Marilyn E., 1974a, “William James, Gustav Fechner,and the Question of Dogs and Cats in the Library”,Journalof the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 10(3):304–312.
• –––, 1974b, “G. T. Fechner: Premisestoward a General Theory of Organisms (1823)”,Journal of theHistory of the Behavioral Sciences, 10(4): 438–447.
• Pastor, Willy, 1901a,Im Geiste Fechners, Fünfnaturwissenschaftliche Essays, Leipzig: G.H. Meyer.
• –––, 1901b,Gustav Theodor Fechner und diedurch ihn erschlossene Weltanschauung, Leipzig: G.H. Meyer.
• Wentscher, Max, 1924,Fechner und Lotze, Munich: ErnstReinhardt.
• Wille, Bruno, 1905,Idealistische Weltanschauung aufnaturwissenschaftliche Grundlage im Sinne Fechners, Hamburg:Leopold Voß.

Academic Tools

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at theFriends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
	Enhanced bibliography for this entryatPhilPapers, with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

Related Entries

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich |Herbart, Johann Friedrich |Lotze, Hermann |measurement: in science |neutral monism |panpsychism |Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von