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1. The common formulation of the Identity ofIndiscernibles—\(\forall F(Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \rightarrowx=y\)—seems to assume identity as such a default position. Thus,if both \(x\) and \(y\) were to have no properties at all, theabove formulation of the Identity of Indiscernibles would deem themidentical.

2. Yet, see Garber 2015 for a critique of the ascription of thePrinciple to Spinoza, and Della Rocca 2015 for a defense of suchascription.

3. Notice that in this text, non-existence does not require areason. Unless otherwise marked, all quotes from Spinoza’s worksand letters rely on Curley’s translation. We have relied onGebhardt’s critical edition for the Latin text of Spinoza. Weuse the following standard abbreviations for Spinoza’s works:TIE—Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect[Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione],TTP—Theological-Political Treatise [TractatusTheologico-Politicus], Ep.—Letters. Passages intheEthics will be referred to by means of the followingabbreviations: a(-xiom), c(-orollary), p(-roposition), s(-cholium) andapp(-endix); ‘d’ stands for either‘definition’ (when it appears immediately to the right ofthe part of the book), or ‘demonstration’ (in all othercases). Hence, E1d3 is the third definition of part 1 and E1p16d isthe demonstration of proposition 16 of part 1.

4. In §97 of the TIE, Spinoza discusses the requirements for aproper definition of an “uncreated thing [resincreata]”. The first requirement states that thedefinition “should exclude every cause, i.e., that the objectshould require nothing except its own being [esse] for itsexplanation”. Thus, it seems that in this early period Spinozaallowed for anuncaused being, though not for one that isunexplained.

5. Along the same lines, E1a3 can be read as stating that everythingmust have a sufficient cause (see Lin 2011).

6. See, however, Newlands (2010) for an intriguing attempt to explainconceivability and intelligibility in Spinoza as not bound to theattribute of thought. While this is an original and enticing reading,it is not well supported by Spinoza’s text.

7. Notice that on Spinoza’s view, things that are not necessitatedby their nature, are still necessitated by their cause.

8. This is not Leibniz’s only account of contingency but the onethat is most suited for dealing with the challenge that hiscontainment theory of truth leads to necessitarianism.