Philosophers connect sentences with various different items, such asthoughts, facts and states of affairs.Thoughts are eithertrue or false in an absolute sense, never both or neither. A sentencesuch as “Socrates is wise” is true (false) in virtue ofexpressing the true (false) thought that Socrates is wise. Thoughtsare also the contents of propositional attitudes like belief anddesire. For example, John’s belief that Vulcan is a planet is arelation between him and the thought that Vulcan is a planet. Sincethere is no such planet, the thought that Vulcan is a planet cannot becomposed of Vulcan and the property ofbeing a planet. It iscomposed, among other things, of a way of thinking that purports tolatch on to a planet. This so-called mode of presentation may beexpressed by a definite description like “the planet between theSun and Mercury”.

Some philosophers take it to be obvious that if something is true,there must be something that makes it true, a truth-maker.Facts are truth-makers. Like sentences and thoughts, factsare taken to be complex objects. The constituents of (atomic) factsare not words or modes of presentation, but particulars and properties(see, for instance, Armstrong 1986: 85). The fact that Socrates iswise exists if, and only if Socratesis wise.

Facts may be required in the theory of truth-making. States ofaffairs, by contrast, are supposed to pull their weight in themetaphysics of modality. According to Wittgenstein’sTractatus Logico-Philosophicus,the totality of states ofaffairs exhausts the space of possibilities; the totality of states ofaffairs that obtain are the (actual) world. More recently, AlvinPlantinga (1974, 44) and Pollock (1984, 52) have posited in theirmetaphysics of possible worlds states of affairs that exists whetherthey obtain or not.

Before pressing on, a note about terminology: many philosophers followArmstrong’s (1993: 429) terminology who uses “states ofaffairs” to refer to facts. (Armstrong’s bookA Worldof States of Affairs is solely concerned with facts.) Thisarticle isnot devoted to “Armstrongian” statesof affairs, but to states of affairs in the sense that is prominent inthe work of such philosophers as Husserl, Reinach, Russell (at onetime), the early Wittgenstein and Plantinga.^[1] Hereafter, “states of affairs” is used only for states ofaffairs that exist whether they obtain or not.

States of affairs are similar to thoughts. Thoughts are true or false;states of affairs obtain or not. There are also similarities betweenfacts and states of affairs. Both facts and states of affairs aresupposed to be complexes that contain (in a sense to be explainedfurther) objects and properties.

Does one need states of affairs in addition to facts and thoughts? Inorder to answer this question we need to know what states of affairsare and how they contrast and compare with thoughts and facts. Wetherefore begin by outlining the theoretical role states of affairsare supposed to play.

• 1. Introducing States of Affairs
  • 1.1 Talking about States of Affairs
  • 1.2 A Theoretical Role for States of Affairs
• 2. Thoughts and States of Affairs
  • 2.1 Individuation and Existence Conditions
  • 2.2 States of Affairs and Probabilities
  • 2.3 States of Affairs and Possible Worlds
  • 2.4 States of Affairs and Propositional Attitudes
• 3. Facts and States of Affairs
  • 3.1 Facts as Truth-Makers and Regress-Stoppers
  • 3.2 Are Facts Just Obtaining States of Affairs?
  • 3.3 Are States of Affairs Just Recombinations of Fact Constituents?
• 4. States of Affairs in the Metaphysics of Perception and Value
  • 4.1 States of Affairs as the Primary Objects of Perception
  • 4.2 States of Affairs in the Metaphysics of Value
• 5. States of Affairs as Complexes
  • 5.1 States of Affairs as N-Tuples and Wholes
  • 5.2 Non-Mereological Composition to the Rescue?
  • 5.3 Are States of Affairs Ontologically Dependent?
• 6. The Unity of a State of Affairs
  • 6.1 The Unity-Problem
  • 6.2 External Unification
  • 6.3 Internal Unification
• 7. Conclusion
• Appendix: Historical Background
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Introducing States of Affairs

1.1 Talking about States of Affairs

Can one base our understanding of what states of affairs are onfeatures of how we talk about them?

Pollock holds that we normally refer to states of affairs by gerundclauses such asKareem Abdul-Jabbar’s being more than sevenfeet tall orSpiro Agnew’s being President of YaleUniversity (see Pollock 1984b: 121). However, while the referentsof such gerund clauses seem not to bepropositions—“Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s being morethan seven feet tall is true” does not soundright—these clauses are referentially flexible. For the gerundclauses in the following sentences seem to refer to facts or events,the relata of causal relations and objects of knowledge (the first twoexamples are from Pollock 1984b: 122):

• Charlie’s eloping with Ginger was surprising.
• Mary’s divorcing Charlie causedCharlie’sdemise.
• Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s being more than seven feettall is well-known.

Now facts may be nothing but states of affairs that obtain and eventsstates of affairs that obtain at some times and not at others. If thiswere right, the gerund clauses above would refer to states of affairs.But we need to get an independent grip on the notion of states ofaffairs before settling the question whether facts and events are akind of state of affairs. For this purpose we can neither pick outstates of affairs as the things that obtain or nor say that they arethe referents of gerund clauses of the kind considered above.

Are there predicates that we apply to states of affairs and that aredistinctive of them? States of affairs are said toobtain ornot, while Fregean thoughts aretrue orfalse. In contrast, facts exist; a fact cannot be qualifiedas obtaining or not obtaining (see Betti 2015: 35). However, it seemsdifficult to get a grip on the difference betweenobtainingandnon-obtaining on the one hand, andtruth andfalsity on the other.Prima facie, the state ofaffairsSocrates’s being wise obtains if, and only if,it is true that Socrates is wise (see Plantinga 1974: 45–6; seealso Betti 2015: 35). Pollock (1984a: 53) correctly observes that“obtaining and not-obtaining are truth-like properties”.But why are they just truth-like and not just truth andfalsity under a different label; why can the obtaining of a state ofaffairs not be identified with the truth of a thought orproposition?

Betti proposes that the distinction between obtaining andnon-obtaining states of affairs is an ontological one:

nonobtaining states of affairs have no mode of being (so they neithersubsist nor exist) but they are still objects in their ownright—that is, they are part of the catalogue of the world intheir own right. (2015: 35–6)

If this were right, states of affairs would be more even puzzling thanMeinongian objects that at least subsist. However, false propositionsseem equally to have only a “shadowy” existence:

Time was when I thought there were propositions, but it does not seemto me very plausible to say that in addition to facts there are alsothese curious shadowy things going about such as “That today isWednesday” when in fact it is Tuesday. (Russell 1918: 223)

In conclusion: the difference between “is true (false)”and “obtains (does not obtain)”, does not help us todistinguish states of affairs from other things. Is there atheoretical role that states of affairs can, but thoughts(propositions) and facts can’t fill?

1.2 A Theoretical Role for States of Affairs

In order to answer this question, consider a school exercise inprobability (see Kripke 1980: 16). Take two ordinary dice, \(D_{1}\)and \(D_{2}\), with six sides each. For each die, there are sixpossible outcomes of a throw. \(D_{1}\) and \(D_{2}\) are thrown and,on landing, display two numbers. Hence, there are thirty-six possibleoutcomes of throwing the dice. Let us now calculate the probabilitythat the outcome of throwing the two dice is 11. There are only twooutcomes of throwing the two dice in which they show together 11:either (i) \(D_{1}\) shows 5 and \(D_{2}\) 6 or (ii) \(D_{1}\) shows 6and \(D_{2}\) 5. The probability of the outcome of \(D_{1}\)’sand \(D_{2}\)’s jointly showing 11 is the ratio between allpossible outcomes of \(D_{1}\)’s and \(D_{2}\)’s jointlyshowing 11 and the totality of possible outcomes of throwing the twodice: 2/36 = 1/18.

In the calculations we assumed (1):

(1)

There are bearers of probabilities: things that are probable orimprobable to a certain degree.

We also assumed that there is a space of possible states of the dice;ways the two dice might fall. A way the dice might fall exists even ifit is not true that the dice have fallen that way:

(2)

The possible states (outcomes) of \(D_{1}\)’s and\(D_{2}\)’s showing jointly certain numbers exist whether it istrue that they show this number or false that they do.

The possible states are possible states of objects. \(D_{1}\)’sand \(D_{2}\)’sShowing 5 is a possible state of thedice, however we describe them or ascribe the property. This suggests(3):

(3)

Possible states are different if they are states of differentobjects or constituted by different ways an object can be.

The possible states involved in our exercise have the propertiesphilosophers take states of affairs to have. States of affairs areprobable to a degree or possible, as stressed by Reinach (1911:339–40; Künne 1987: 185ff and Forbes 1989: 131 followReinach). They are supposed to exist without obtaining (2) and to haveobjects and properties as constituents (3).

(2) distinguishes states of affairs from facts. The fact that Socratesis wise exists, if, and only if, Socrates is wise. If Socrates is notwise, there is no fact of him being wise. Hence, the fact thatSocrates is wise cannot be a mere possibility for Socrates; it can, soto speak, only be an actuality. In contrast, the state of affairs thatSocrates is foolish exists, even if Socrates is not foolish (seeReinach 1911; Wittgenstein 1918: 2.04, 2.05; Plantinga 1974: 44;Pollock 1984a: 52).

(3) distinguishes states of affairs from thoughts:

[States of affairs] are “about” objects but not in termsof some mode of representation. States of affairs, in some sense,contain objects as direct constituents. (Pollock 1984a: 53)

The state of affairsMarilyn Monroe’s being an actressand the state of affairsNorma Jean Baker’s being anactress, contain, in some sense, the same objects and propertiesas constituents in the same order. They are the same state of affairsunder different names. However, I can believe that Marilyn Monroe isan actress while doubting that Norma Jean Baker is an actress. Hence,if there are states of affairs, they are not the content ofpropositional attitudes like belief; thoughts are. This point leavesopen the possibility that a state of affairs is a set of thoughts thatare equivalent in some respect (seesection 2.2).

The model of a space of possible outcomes of a throw of a die gives usan initial idea of what the distinctive properties of state of affairsare and why it is plausible to assume that there are any states ofaffairs. It leaves questions about the precise nature of states ofaffairs open. For example, Wittgenstein (1918: 4.26) argued that onlyelementary sentences “picture” states of affairs. Anelementary sentence in Wittgenstein’s sense is a concatenationof simple proper names each of which refers to a simple object. Thenames in the elementary proposition are arranged in a way that can bemapped onto an arrangement of the simple objects named. Thisarrangement of objects is the state of affairs pictured by theelementary sentence. Nothing said so far rules out that states ofaffairs that involve some objects and properties (relations) combineto form further complex states of affairs that have states of affairsas constituents. (Pollock 1984a: 55–6) defines negation,conjunction etc. for states of affairs. For example, if there is astate of affairs \(S_1\) and a state of affairs \(S_2\), theirconjunction is the state of affairs that obtains if, and only if, both\(S_1\) and \(S_2\) obtain. If one wants to restrict the space ofpossible states to combinations of simple objects, one needs tomarshal arguments that show that this and similar conceptions ofcomplex states of affairs is flawed. (This entry is mainly concernedwith simple states of affairs.)

Similarly, the model of states of affairs as possible outcomes doesnot rule out that there are impossible state of affairs. If there is aspace of possible states of the dice, there seems to be a space ofimpossible states of them as well. For example, it isimpossible for the dice to show 17 or no number at all (see Rumfitt2015: 187f for a brief discussion of impossible states ofaffairs).

2. Thoughts and States of Affairs

2.1 Individuation and Existence Conditions

Thoughts can be the contents of propositional attitudes. When one says“There are three things that everyone who works on elementaryphysics believes”, one quantifies over things that everyoneworking in elementary physics believes: thoughts (see Chisholm 1970:19). Thoughts are also truth-value bearers (“There are threetruths that everyone who works in elementary physicsbelieves”). How are thoughts related to states of affairs? Forinstance, how is the thought that Socrates is wise related to thestate of affairsSocrates’ being wise?

Prima facie, thoughts are one thing, states of affairsanother. Thoughts and states of affairs differ in their individuationand existence conditions.

Individuation-conditions: Thoughts are supposed to be thecontents of propositional attitudes like belief and desire. Let“j” be shorthand for a propositional attitude verb(“desire”, “believe” etc). If one canjthatp withouteo ipsoj-ing thatq (andvice versa), the contents thatp and thatq aredifferent. Now I can believe, for instance, that Hesperus shineswithout believing that Phosphorus shines. Hence, if thoughts are thecontents of propositional attitudes, the thought that Hesperus shinesis different from the thought that Phosphorus shines. If the thoughtthat Hesperus shines is different from the thought that Phosphorusshines, thoughts cannot be logical complexes whose constituents areparticulars and properties. Following Frege, many philosopherstherefore take thoughts to be complexes that are built up out of modesof presentation. Here “thoughts” only refers to suchcomplexes. Since there are different modes of presentation of the sameparticular (property), there can be different thoughts that concern orare about the same particulars and properties. In contrast,Hesperus’s shining andPhosphorus’sshining are the same state of affairs, namely the complex thatcontains only the planet Venus and the property of shining. We willsee insection 2.4 that not all philosophers follow Frege’s lead. If one hasarguments for a coarse-grained individuation of the objects of belief,states of affairs may serve as contents of propositionalattitudes.

Existence-conditions: A thought is a complex whoseconstituents are modes of presentation that purport to representobjects. Standard accounts of modes of presentation allow for theexistence of modes of presentation that are empty. Hence, theexistence of a thought does not depend on the existence of the objectsit purports to represent. For example, the thought that Pegasus is ahorse exists, although there is no such horse (for defense andelaboration see Sainsbury 2005: 86–9). This is different forstates of affairs. If a state of affairs is a complex that containsobjects and properties as constituents, it cannot exist if itsconstituents don’t exist. So while it is true that Pegasus doesnot exist, there is no such state of affairs. This is unproblematicfor we have not been given any reason to think that such a state ofaffairs obtains or does not obtain. For the same reason states ofaffairs that contain contingently existing objects are themselvescontingent existents.

Philosophers often use the notion of a singular proposition. Asingular proposition is supposed to be (i) “directlyabout” an object and (ii) evaluable as true or false. Directaboutness requires that what the proposition is directly about existsif the proposition exists. If one combines (i) and (ii) with theplausible assumption that the proposition that Superman does not existis singular and true, one arrives at the conclusion that Supermanexists. Similar problems arise for negative modal existential singularpropositions such as the proposition that Socrates might not haveexisted. Williamson 2002 argues on the basis of these problems thateverything exists necessarily. Williamson’smodusponens is Plantinga’s (1983) and Merricks’s 2015(chapt. 5)modus tollens: singular propositions can existalthough the object they are directly about doesn’t.

If one sides with Plantinga and Merricks, one can drive a wedgebetween truth and obtaining. We are not compelled to hold that thereis a state of affairsSuperman’s non-existing becausewe have no reason to say that such a state of affairs obtains or evenpossibly obtains, while we have a reason to say that it is true thatSuperman does not exist. Hence, the (singular) proposition thatSuperman does not exist can be true without the state of affairsSuperman’s non-existing obtaining. Obtaining is indeedonly truth-like.

Chisholm held that propositions are those states of affairs such thateither the state of affairs or its negation always occurs (onChisholm’s notion of state of affairs, see Kim 1979). But, as wehave seen, the truth that Superman does not exist cannot be the stateof affairs Superman’s non-existing occurring or obtaining.

2.2 States of Affairs and Probabilities

Reinach (1911: 339) claimed that “states of affairs, and onlystates of affairs, can adopt such modalities” as probability andpossibility. He had in mind that an object such as a die cannot bepossible or probable. This seems plausible enough. It is equallyplausible that facts are not probable or possible. However, whycan’t thoughts be probable or possible?

Forbes (1989: 130–131) refines Reinach’s idea in takingstates of affairs as thefundamental bearers of modalproperties likebeing possible,necessary etc. FromReinach we learn that particulars can’t be the bearers ofmodality. Fregean truth-values are also unsuited. According toFrege’s semantics for assertoric sentences, every true (false)sentence, whether necessary or contingently true (false), refers tothe True (the False). Forbes appeals to our modal intuitions to arguefor a better candidate for the modal value bearer role,

a category of entity not so finely discriminated as thoughts but morefinely discriminated than truth-values, such that sentences with thesame entity in the category as their references are guaranteed to havethe same modal status. (1989: 130)

Let us consider a pair of sentences to illustrate Forbes’sargument for an entity less discriminating than thoughts and morediscriminating than truth-values. Consider the sentence pairs:

(1)

a.

Hesperus shines.

b.

Phosphorus shines.

(2)

a.

Hesperus is Hesperus.

b.

Hesperus is Phosphorus.

(1a) to (2b) are all true. Hence, in Fregean terms, they all refer tothe True. Each of these sentences expresses a thought different fromall others. However, the members of each pair have the same modalstatus that differs from the modal status of the members of the otherpair. (1a) and (1b) are contingently true; (2a) and (2b) necessarilytrue. If one lets sentences stand for or describe states of affairswhose constituents are the referents of the semantically relevantsentence parts, one can capture this similarity: (1a) and (1b) ((2a)and (2b)) have the same modal status because these sentences stand forthe same state of affairs (Forbes 1989: 131). In general, sentencesthat stand for the same state of affairs have the same modal value. Itis then a short step to take states of affairs to be the primary orfundamental bearers of modal status (1989: 131–2). A sentence iscontingently (necessarily) true if, and only if, it stands for a stateof affairs that contingently (necessarily) obtains.^[2]

Can’t facts be the basic bearers of modal status? Take a furthersentence pair:

(3)

a.

Hesperus has an orbital period of 226 days.

b.

Phosphorus has an orbital period of 226 days.

(3a) and (3b) are false, they express different thoughts, yet have thesame modal status: they might have been true. This similarity cannotbe explained by taking them to refer to the same fact; we need statesof affairs.

We can now answer our initial question:Yes, we need statesof affairs as well as thoughts. States of affairs and thoughts havedistinct individuation and existence conditions. Therefore, states ofaffairs can be thefundamental bearers of modalproperties.

We can strengthen the conclusion by considering ways to dispute it.Consider all thoughts that represent the same particulars andpredicate the same properties of them. Let us call these thoughtsreferentially equivalent. Vendler proposed that a fact is“an abstract entity which indiscriminately contains a set ofreferentially equivalenttrue propositions” (Vendler1967: 711; my emphasis). If we drop the restriction to truepropositions and simplify Vendler’s idea, we can propose that astate of affairs is a set of referentially equivalent thoughts,whether they are true or not. The state of affairsHesperus’s shining is the set of all thoughts that areabout Hesperus and predicate the property of shining to it.

However, such an approach to states of affairs makes themexplanatorily uninteresting. If we want to explain why (1a) and (1b)((2a)–(2b)/(3a)–(3b)) have the same modal profile,appealing to states of affairs in Vendler’s sense does not allowus to make progress. For instance, saying that (1a) and (1b) have thesame modal profile because they belong to the set of thoughts that areabout Hesperus and predicate the property of shining to it is at besta partial explanation. For it raises such questions as “What hasbelonging to this set to do with possibility?” and “Invirtue of which property has a set of thoughts modalproperties”? In contrast, the assumption that there are statesof affairs that are not just a particular kind of set and that haveproperties likebeing possible orbeing probable canbe independently motivated and is explanatory progress.

2.3 States of Affairs and Possible Worlds

Insection 2.2 we used the modal properties of states of affairs to distinguish themfrom thoughts. Some philosophers have proposed to use the connectionbetween states of affairs and modality constructively to explain whata possible world is.

Lewis (1973: 84) points out that we talk about ways things might havebeen. He goes on to label ways every thing might have been“possible worlds”. If it is possible that something is thecase, there is a possible world in which it is the case. What are,then, possible worlds?

Van Inwagen distinguished between Abstractionist and Concretistconceptions of possible worlds (see van Inwagen 1986: 185–6; seealso Stalnaker 1986: 121). According to a Concretist conception ofpossible worlds such as David Lewis’s, a possible world is themaximal mereological sum of individuals that are spatio-temporallyrelated and each such sum is spatio-temporally isolated from allothers (see Lewis 1986: 69–70). There are no impossible worlds.The actual world is the world in which we are located.

According to Abstractionists, possible worlds are abstract objects ofsome sort. The exercise in probability calculation fromsection 1.2 motivates an Abstractionist proposal in which states of affairs arethe basic building blocks. States of affairs are possible outcomes.Kripke called possible outcomes “miniature possibleworlds”. This suggests an idea of what a possible world is: itis amaximal state of affairs. Pollock (1984a: 57) definespossible world therefore as follows:

(PW)

w is a possible world if, and only if,w is anontransient possible state of affairs and for any nontransient stateof affairsS if it is possible thatw andS bothobtain,w includesS. (see also Plantinga 1974:44–6)

A state of affairsw includes a state of affairsS if,and only if, necessarily ifw obtains,S obtains. Theactual world is the possible maximal nontransient state of affairsthat obtains.

A state of affairs is transient if, and only if, it obtains at onetime and not another. For instance, the state of affairsSocrates’s not drinking hemlock obtains at some times,but not at others. Transient states of affairs are only possible,actual etc. relative to a time. Before 399 BC it was possible thatSocrates does not drink hemlock, but this is no longer possible after399 BC. A state of affairs is nontransient if, and only, if it is suchthat necessarily if it obtains at one time it obtains at all times.For example, the state of affairsSocrates’s being hungry onthe 15^th of April 400 BC at 16:15 is nontransient.

(PW) makes use of modal concepts to define possible world: it must bepossible forS andw to both obtain etc. Hence,this particular Abstractionist conception of possible worlds does notallow one to explain modality away; it presupposes it. In contrast,the Concretist conception promises a definitional reduction of modalconcepts. When we talk about possibility and necessity we quantifyover mereological sums of things. The concept of modality is notrequired to distinguish between possible and impossible worlds: thereare no impossible ones. Why is (PW), then, attractive?

First, Forbes (1987: 139ff) argues that the identification ofpossible worlds with constructions out of compossible states ofaffairs solves the problem of accidental intrinsics (Lewis 1986:199–201). Let us consider an intrinsic property of a humanbeing, say me, such ashaving two hands. I might have existedwithout having had two hands. On the concretist account this impliesthat there is a possible world in which I have a different number ofhands. But how can one and the same individual have two as well asfewer/more hands “in different worlds”? If the worlds aremereological sums that have me as a common part, this seems notpossible. Lewis concludes that the same object cannot be part ofdifferent possible worlds. An object can only be in different possibleworlds by having counterparts in them.

According to counterpart theory, I might have had three hands only inthe derived sense by having counter-parts that have three hands (seeKripke 1980: 45). This does not sit well with the intuition thatI strictly and literally speaking might have had three hands.The identification of possible worlds with constructions out ofcompossible states of affairs is faithful to this intuition. I havedifferent properties in different possible worlds, if the possibleworlds contain different states of affairs that involve me. Onepossible world contains the state of affairsMT’s havingthree hands; the possible world that is actual contains the stateof affairsMT’s having two hands. The differentpossible worlds under discussion don’t overlap, yet thepossibilities involve me (see Forbes 1987: 141).

Second, the semantics of counterfactuals. The so-called“Stalnaker-Lewis semantics” for counterfactuals assumesthat a counterfactual such as “If it were rainy today, I wouldtake an umbrella” is true if, and only if, all of the closestpossible worlds in which the antecedent is true are possible worlds inwhich the consequent is true. This semantics for counterfactualsallows the substitution of logically equivalent sentences in theantecedent of a counterfactual. For example, if the counterfactual“If it were rainy today, I would take an umbrella” istrue, so is “If it were rainy and windy today or rainy and notwindy today, I would take an umbrella” because “It israiny today” and “If it is rainy and windy today or rainyand not windy today” are true in the same possible worlds. Fine(1975: 453f; 2012: 230f) argues that the substitution principle shouldbe given up in the light of puzzling consequences. But certainly onecan substitute some sentences in the antecedent of a counterfactual.Which ones? Fine suggests replacing Stalnaker-Lewis semantics forcounterfactuals with a semantics in which possible states take prideof place. Instead of a plurality of possible worlds there is a spaceof possible states that involve particulars and ways they can be.Assertoric sentences refer to states of affairs and only thosesentences that refer to the same state of affairs can be substitutedin the antecedent of a counter-factual (Fine 1975: 454).

Fine assumes that “It is rainy”, “It is rainy andwindy” and “It is rainy and not windy” etc. refer todifferent states of affairs (1975: 454). How can this assumption bejustified? If we take the idea that states of affairs are complexesseriously, we can answer this question. Just like other complexes theycan (at least in part) be individuated in terms of their constituents.The states of affairs \(S_1\) and \(S_2\) can therefore only be thesame state of affairs if they have the same constituents. Thisconception allows for states of affairs that necessarily co-obtain,but differ. For example, necessarily, the state of affairs thattriangleA is equilateral obtains if the state of affairs thattriangleA is equiangular andvice versa. Similarly,the state of affairsP necessarily obtains if, and only if, thestate of affairs \(P \mathbin{\&} (Q \lor \neg Q)\) obtains. Yet,these are different states of affairs: they have differentconstituents.

This conception of states of affairs as complexes makes them usefulfor semantics. If sentences refer to such states of affairs, logicallyequivalent sentences can refer to different states of affairs andtherefore have different semantic properties. All tautologies are truein all possible worlds, yet they can refer to different states ofaffairs. A number of semantic theories assume that sentences refer tostates of affairs. These theories provide principles that determinethe reference of complex sentences on the basis of their parts (seeFine 2012: 234; see also Rumfitt 2015: 160–7).

However, if states of affairs are individuated in terms of theircomponents and their mode of combination, there are for every possibleworld many different maximal nontransient states of affairs (for thefollowing see Zalta 1993: 393–4). If the state of affairsP is a possible world, so is \(P \mathbin{\&} (Q\lor \negQ)\) for an arbitrarily chosen possible state of affairsQ.P and \(P \mathbin{\&} (Q\lor \neg Q)\) are necessarilyequivalent, but, according to our individuation method, differentstates of affairs. Hence, there are many different maximal states ofaffairs that correspond to the same possible world and, in particular,to the actual world.

Zalta (1993) tackles this problem on the basis of his axiomatic theoryof abstract objects. According to him, abstract objects like numbersexemplify but also encode properties. For example, 1 encodes theproperties that are essential to its identity; to its being the objectit is. In contrast, 1 exemplifies, but does not encode, the propertyof being the number of inhabited planets of the solar system. In thissystem, situations are those abstract objects that encode state ofaffairs properties such asbeing such that John is to the left ofHarry. If a situation is the case, the state of affairsproperties it encodes obtain; the situation makes the encoded state ofaffairs property factual. A situationS is a possible world if,and only if, it is possible thatS makes all and only theobtaining states of affairs properties factual. On the basis of theaxioms of his system Zalta can show that there is a unique actualworld.

If one is unwilling to make a distinction between encoding andexemplifying, but one wants to maintain the identification of possibleworlds with maximal possible states of affairs, one either has toaccept that necessarily equivalent states of affairs are the same orone must identify possible worlds with sets of necessarily equivalentpossible states of affairs. We already rejected the first option asunfruitful for semantics. The second option seems to result in aset-theoretic modeling or replacement of possible worlds, not in aconception of possible worlds (see Zalta 1993: 394).

2.4 States of Affairs and Propositional Attitudes

Thoughts can’t fulfill the role of states of affairs as thefundamental bearers of modal properties. Can states of affairs be thecontents of propositional attitudes?Prima facie, the answerisNo. We have already seen that states of affairs are toocoarse-grained to be the contents of propositional attitudes. I canbelieve that Hesperus is a planet, without believing that Phosphorusis a planet (and vice versa). Hence, the contents of the attitudesdiffer. But the state of affairsHesperus’s being aplanet is just the state of affairsPhosphorus’s beinga planet. Propositional attitudes are, at best, mediatedrelations to states of affairs. For example, a belief represents astate of affairs if, and only if, the believer assents to a thoughtthat describes a state of affairs.

Barcan Marcus has challenged this view. She argued that belief is“a relation between a subject or agent and a state of affairsthat is not necessarily actual but that has actual objects as itsconstituents” (Barcan Marcus 1993 [1990]: 240). Herobject-centered account of belief identifies belief with adifferential disposition to a state of affairs:

x believes thatS just in case, under certainagent-centered circumstances includingx’sdesires and needs as well asexternal circumstances,xis disposed to act as ifS, that actual or nonactual state ofaffairs, obtains. (Barcan Marcus 1993 [1990]: 241)

Believing that so-and-so does not require concept possession. Forexample, believing that the sun is shining is a differentialdisposition to the state of affairsthe sun’s shining,however described or presented.

The object-centered account of belief contrasts withmode-of-presentation-centered or language-centered accounts. Theobject-centered theory allows us to take belief-ascriptions tonon-linguistic creatures to be literally true. However, it runs intoproblems when it comes to assertoric utterances of sentencescontaining empty singular terms. According to the object-centred view,these don’t express beliefs (see Barcan Marcus 1993 [1990]:247). While the state of affairsa’s beingF can exist, althougha is notF; it cannotexist, if eithera orbeingF doesn’texist. Now take the belief that Napoleon was French. I satisfy allintuitive criteria for the possession of this belief. Imagine that wefind out that, after all, there was never such a person as Napoleon.It was all a very elaborate hoax. Then there is no state of affairscomposed of Napoleon andbeing French. Hence, although allintuitive criteria may have told us that I believed that Napoleon wasFrench, we now find out that I never had that belief. This iscounter-intuitive and artificial.

To sum up: Thoughts and states of affairs are different things.Thoughts cannot be reduced to states of affairs and the reduction ofstates of affairs to sets of referentially equivalent thoughts isunwarranted. We need both thoughts and states of affairs in order tofulfill different roles.

3. Facts and States of Affairs

3.1 Facts as Truth-Makers and Regress-Stoppers

What are facts and how may they be distinguished from states ofaffairs?

The Truthmaker-Argument is the main argument for the introduction offacts (see Armstrong 1997: 115ff). It also yields an understanding ofthe main features of facts. The argument can be summed up asfollows:

(P1)

Every truth must have a truth-maker.

(P2)

The best candidates to occupy the truth-maker role are facts.

(C)

There are facts.

Armstrong takes (P1) to articulate the following intuitive asymmetry:It is true that Socrates is wisebecause Socrates is wise;but Socrates is not wisebecause it is true that Socrates iswise (see Armstrong 2004: 4). In Armstrong’s terminology atruth-bearer istrue in virtue of (made true by) theexistence of another entity, a truth-maker. A truth-maker ensures orguarantees the truth of a truth-bearer. Some authors take thisguarantee to be a form of necessitation:x makes it true thatp if, and only if, necessarily, ifx exists, it is truethatp.

This brings us to the second premise of the Truthmaker-Argument. Whyare facts the best candidates for the truth-maker role? Let us workthrough some alternatives. Take the thought that Socrates is wise. Theexistence of which object necessitates its truth? Socrates can existwithout being wise. Hence,Socrates is not the truth-maker weare looking for.

The last point suggests that only a complex entity that“contains” Socrates as well as the property ofbeingwise is a candidate for the truth-maker role. The mereologicalsum of Socrates andbeing wise, that is, the whole that hasonly Socrates and wisdom as parts, satisfies this condition, yet itcannot fulfill the truth-maker role. If Socrates and wisdom exist,their mereological sum exists. Hence, the sum exists whether it istrue that Socrates is wise or not. For similar reasons the set thatcontains only Socrates andbeing wise cannot be thetruth-maker of the thought that Socrates is wise. Armstrong concludesthat only the fact that Socrates is wise that “ties”Socrates andbeing wise makes it true that Socrates is wise(see Armstrong 1997: 118).

Armstrong’s conception of truthmaking is controversial (see, forinstance, Restall 1996). I will set its problems aside here and focuson clarifying the relation between facts and states of affairs. Facts“tie” particulars and universals. This brings them closeto states of affairs that also involve particulars and universals.What distinguishes them is that the existence of a fact is supposed toguarantee the truth of a truth-bearer. The existence of the fact thata isF can only guarantee the truth of the thought thata isF if one cannot distinguish facts into those thatobtain and those that do not obtain. Saying of the fact that Socratesis wise that it obtains is redundant, while it is not redundant to sayso of the state of affairsSocrates’ being wise.

Facts are also introduced in order to stop a regress of instantiation.Take the particulara and the property ofbeingF and assume that they can exist independently of each other.Given this assumption, there must be a relation that“ties” them together toa’s beingF. If the required “tie” is a genuinerelation, a regress, usually calledBradley’s regress,ensues: we need to introduce another relation that ties the firstrelation toa and beingF, and so on. Facts are supposedto prevent Bradley’s regress (see Armstrong 1997: 115 and 118;Hossack 2007: 33). How? Relations that tie particulars and propertiestogether are “explained away” in terms of facts thatcontain particulars and properties: ifa instantiatesF-ness, it does sobecause the fact thata isF exists. The existence of this fact guarantees thataisF. Facts are just instantiations of universals byparticulars (see Armstrong 1997: 119). Hence, we arrive again at theresult that the obtaining/non-obtaining distinction does not apply tofacts.

In contrast to facts the obtaining/non-obtaining distinction dividesstates of affairs into those that obtain and those that do not obtain(seesection 1). For this reason states of affairs cannot be truthmakers: theirexistence does not necessitate the truth of a truth-bearer. The stateof affairsSocrates’ being foolish exists in somepossible worlds in which Socrates is foolish, but it also exists inpossible worlds in which Socrates is not foolish. Vallicellareinforces this point:

[Facts] are not to be confused with abstract states of affairs whicheither obtain or do not obtain depending on how the world is. Thelatter are themselves in need of something in the world that explainswhy they obtain. (Vallicella 2000: 237)

3.2 Are Facts Just Obtaining States of Affairs?

States of affairs contain particulars and properties; facts tie them.This similarity encourages the question whether a fact is nothing buta state of affairsthat obtains (see Horwich 1990: 113 whotakes true Russellian propositions to be facts). On this view thereason why it is redundant to say that a fact obtains is that a factis just an obtaining state of affairs. However, the identification offacts with obtaining states of affairs creates problems for the theoryof truthmaking. Assume that the fact that Socrates is wise is just theobtaining state of affairsSocrates’ being wise. Thefact is supposed to make it true that Socrates is wise. But if thefact is just the obtaining state of affairsSocrates’ beingwise, we need in turn something that explains why the state ofaffairs obtains. For it seems correct to say “The state ofaffairsSocrates’ being wise obtains because Socratesis wise”, but not “Socrates is wise because the state ofaffairsSocrates’ being wise obtains”. Hence,obtaining states of affairs cannot play the same role as facts. Theycannot be truth-makers. The question “Why is it true thatSocrates is wise?” cannot beconclusively answered bysaying “BecauseSocrates’ being wiseobtains”. This answer is in need of a further explanation of thesame type as the one we were originally after.

3.3 Are States of Affairs Just Recombinations of Fact Constituents?

A non-obtaining state of affairs cannot be a fact. But can every stateof affairs be a recombination of particulars and properties that arecombined in some facts? Combinatorialists answer Yes (see, forexample, Skyrms 1981; Armstrong 1989: 45ff; Bigelow 1988; Forbes 1989:137). This idea has two main varieties:

Representationalism raises the question: what distinguishes a(possible) state of affairs from a mere representation of it? Why isthe state of affairsa’s beingG notsimply the ordered pair ofa andbeingG? Wewill come back to this question insection 5.

4. States of Affairs in the Metaphysics of Perception and Value

So far states of affairs may seem to be useful theoretical constructsof philosophical semantics and modal theory. For example, Taylor(1976: 263) introduced a notion of states of affairs that is languagerelative: different languages posit different totalities of state ofaffairs. Are there reasons to introduce states of affairsindependently of theorizing about language and modality?

4.1 States of Affairs as the Primary Objects of Perception

One answer to this question takes states of affairs to be the thingswe directly perceive. Here is an argument from the recent literaturethat will get us started in thinking about this view:

While we often speak of perceivingobjects alone (a bird, abush, a cloud, a star) orproperties alone—depending on thepurpose of our attention or the purpose of our reporting—it does notseem possible to perceive objects without at least some of theirproperties, or to perceive properties without perceiving at least someinstantiations of these properties. (Church 2013: 11)

Church concludes that “perception is always perception of astate of affairs” (ibid. See also Levinson 2006: 576)

According to this Argument from Perception, perceptual reports such as“I saw a robin yesterday” are incomplete. What I saw wasthe state of affairs of the robin’s being a certain way. Ireport that I saw a robin because my attention was focused on thebird.

Some champions of states of affairs want to resist the Argument fromPerception. Husserl (1901: § 28) and Reinach (1911: 341f]) deniedthat states of affairs can be perceived. They argued that onlyparticulars, birds, bushes etc., can be the direct objects ofperception. Wesay“NN saw that a robin sat on atwig.” But these utterances are supposed to be reports ofjudgements that depend on perceptions of particulars. Hence,the existence of such reports is supposed to be compatible with theclaim that states of affairs can only be the correlates ofjudgements.

The Argument from Perception indeed needs strengthening. The movefrom:

Necessarily, if one perceivesx, one perceives a property ofx.

to

Necessarily, one perceives (the state of affairs of)x’s havinga property

is not valid. If one sees the robin, it appears distinct from itsenvironment. The robin can only appear distinct from its environmentif one perceives at least one property of it. But that one perceivesan object in virtue of perceiving some of its properties does not yetimply that one perceives the object’s having the property.Consider an analogy: I can only touch an object if I touch a part ofit. But that does not mean that I really touch a different object: theobject’s having the part.

Even if the argument above can be strengthened, the strengthenedversion seems only to show that the primary objects of perception areproperty instantiations or facts (see Church 2013: 12). Seeing is afactive mental state. Hence, if I see the robin perching on the twig,and things are as they visually seem to me, it is a fact that therobin is perching on the twig. At best the Argument from Perceptiongives us a reason to believe in facts, but not in states ofaffairs.

However, there is an argument in the vicinity of the Argument fromPerception that speaks to the existence of states of affairs. McDowellused the thesis that we perceive the referents of‘that’-clauses as a basis for direct realism:

In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one takesin isthat things are thus and so.That things are thusand sois the content of the experience, and it can also be thecontent of the judgement if the subject decides to take the experienceat face value […]. But,that things are thus and so isalso, if one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the world: itis how things are. (McDowell 1994: 26)

If a particular experience, McDowell argues,does not misleadus, it discloses the fact that things are thus and so. This veryfact can be judged and will be among the facts that make up the world.So much about veridical perception. What aboutnon-veridicalperception?

If we assume that veridical and non-veridical perception have a commonfactor, states of affairs start to pull their weight in the theory ofperception. Consider two different kinds of non-veridical perception:hallucination and illusion.

Hallucination: if you visually hallucinate an oasis, you arenot mistaken about something you see:prima facie, there isnothing to see. But even hallucinations seem to be perceptualawareness of something. Johnston (2004: 134f) therefore describesvisual hallucinations as perceptual awareness of a complex property(he calls it a “profile”), a way some things might be,that is not instantiated (at the time).

Illusion: if the stick that is straight looks bent to you,there is something you see, the stick, but it is not the way itvisually seems to you: you see the stick, but it is not bent. How canone conceptualise such illusions? Johnston takes his cue from thehallucination case. An illusion is an improved hallucination: we areaware of a complex property that is in part instantiated:

Illusion is seeing a particular combined with non-veridical seeing ofthe particularas thus and so. When theseeing asisprimary in this way, one is aware of a particular and one is aware ofa complex profile, only part of which is instantiated by theparticular. One also sees the particular as instantiating parts of theprofile, parts that it does not instantiate. (Johnston 2004: 174)

If you experience the straight stick as bent, there is something yourexperience is of. This is not only the stick, but something whichcombines the stick and being bent: the state of affairs of thestick’s being bent (at a time). This state of affairs exists,but does not obtain. Your visual experience has an object, but becausethe object does not obtain, you suffer an illusion.

In sum: states of affairs offer themselves up to systematize therelations between seeing, visual hallucination and illusion. Forinstance, one might suggest the following explications: S’s experience as of a’s being F is S’s seeing a tobe F, if, and only if, the state of affairs of a’s being Fobtains and causes the experience in the right way; S’sexperience is an illusion if, and only if, the state of affairs doesnot obtain; and the experience is a hallucination if, and only if,only the state of affairs of a’s being F does not exist, but itsproperty-part does.

This systematization is based on the assumption that there is a commonfactor in seeing and suffering from a visual illusion: both areexperiences of a state of affairs, the only difference is that thestates of affairs does not obtain in the second case. McDowell (seehis 1982) and other philosophers argue that it is a mistake to holdthat veridical perception and illusion involve a common factor. Theplausibility of an argument for states of affairs as the primaryobjects of perception depends on the defensibility of the commonfactor assumption.

4.2 States of Affairs in the Metaphysics of Value

Which things are good for their own sake and without qualification?Particulars like the Taj Mahal? Properties like Beauty or Justice? Orsomething else?

The British philosopher William David Ross was one of the first whoargued that one could make progress with these questions about valueby bringing in the referents of ‘that’-clauses:

Consideration of the question is aided if we adopt the view […] thatwhat is good or bad is always something properly expressed by athat-clause, i.e. an objective, or as I should prefer to call it, afact. (Ross 1930: 137)

According to Ross, Justice is not intrinsically good. What isintrinsically good isthat someone or other is just.Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000 argue against Ross’sthesis: sometimesthat a is F is good becausea isgood. If their arguments are convincing, objectives are not the onlykind of thing that is good/bad for its own sake.

If ‘that’ clauses introduce bearers of intrinsic value,what do these clauses refer to in ascriptions of value? It seemsintuitively implausible to holds thatthoughtsareintrinsically good (bad). Thoughts represent how things might be ornot. A representation might have value but its value depends, at leastin part, on what it represents. Hence, thoughts seem not to be bearersof intrinsic value. Neither facts nor states of affairs represent howthings might be or not. Hence, both are candidates for the role ofbeing bearers of intrinsic value.

Ross (see above) opted for facts as the bearers of intrinsic value.This view is defended, among others, by Lemos (1994: 23–5) andZimmerman (2001: 51ff) although Zimmerman rejects the“fact” terminology and prefers to talk aboutproperty-exemplifications. Chisholm and Sosa (1966: 244) assumed thatstates of affairs are bearers of intrinsic value. But they warned thereader:

Ordinarily, one would not say of any unexemplified state of affairs(say, that everyone is happy) that it is good, or bad, or better thansome other state of affairs. One might say, instead, that the state ofaffairs would be good, or bad, or better than some state of affairs ifonly it were exemplified. (ibid.)

This warning is the cue for Zimmerman’s (2001: 47) argument forthe conclusion that property-exemplifications (facts) and not state ofaffairs are value-bearers. If something has an intrinsic value, it hasit in all circumstances. Hence, a state of affairs cannot have finalvalue if it obtained (were exemplified) and be without value if doesnot obtain (is not exemplified). If the value of the state of affairsdepended on the state of affairs’s obtaining, the state ofaffairs itself would not be the true bearer of value. The true bearerof value is the object that exists in all and only those situations inwhich the state of affairs obtains. The true bearer of intrinsic valueis fact that exists in all and only those situation in which the stateof affairs obtains.

If non-obtaining states of affairs can have intrinsic value, thisargument does not get off the ground. Rabinowicz andRønnow-Rasmussen (2000, 401f) outline considerations thatsupport the view that some non-obtaining states of affairs areintrinsically good (bad). We value (love/like) the state of affairs ofeveryone’s being happy. For example, although you know that thisstate of affairs does not and probably will never obtain, you like itand like it more than the obtaining states of affairs. The question atissue between the fact and the state of affairs view of intrinsicvalue is whether a state of affairs is good (bad) because worlds inwhich it obtains are good (bad) or whether worlds in which the stateof affairs obtains are good (bad) because the state of affairs is good(bad).

5. States of Affairs as Complexes

In the previous sections we have seen that states of affairs can onlyplay important explanatory roles if the necessarily co-obtainingstates of affairs are distinct. This gives us a reason to rejectChisholm’s (1976: 118) thesis that necessarily co-obtainingstates of affairs are identical. At the same time it puts weight onthe characterization of states of affairs as “involving”objects and properties or as composed out of objects and properties.It seems intuitively plausible that the state of affairsSocrates’s being wise involves Socrates and theproperty of being wise. But in what way do states of affairs involveparticulars and properties?

5.1 States of Affairs as N-Tuples and Wholes

Ordered n-tuples have members. Are states of affairs n-tuples thathave objects and properties as members? Is, for example, the state ofaffairsSocrates’s being wise nothing but the orderedpair \(\langle\)Socrates, being wise\(\rangle\)? Plantinga answersNO:

Clearly there are many set-theoretical models of our talk about statesof affairs and individuals. Why pick any of them as more revealingthan the others? (Plantinga 1984: 327)

We can model states of affairs as ordered n-tuples in many differentways. But there seems no way to decide between \(\langle\)Socrates,being wise\(\rangle\) and \(\langle\)being wise, Socrates\(\rangle\)as the right model for the state of affairs. Hence, the state ofaffairs is not identical with either ordered pair (see Pollock 1984b:138).

Some philosophers spell out “involvement” as containment:A state of affairs is a complex that contains properties andparticulars asparts. In order to assess this proposal, letus first sharpen our understanding of the part-of relation. It iscontroversial weather the relation we aim to pick out with“part-of” is reflexive (everything is part of itself) ornot. But it is not controversial that the relation is transitive (ifx is a part ofy, andy is a part ofz,x is a part ofz) and antisymmetrical (ifx is part ofy, andy is a part ofx,x is identical toy) (see the entry onmereology, sect. 2 and 3). A further plausible principle governing our part-ofrelation is the supplementation principle: ifx is a part ofy, there is an objectz that is part ofy andz does overlap, that is, have a part in common, withx. The supplementation principle implies the intuitivelyplausible view that nothing can have a single proper part. Thesupplementation principle together with the uncontroversial axioms forthe (proper) part-of relation also implies the more controversialthesis that complex objects with the same parts are identical (seeentry onmereology, 3.2).

The transitivity of part-of immediately gives rise to problems. Forinstance, Frege wrote to Wittgenstein:

[If Vesuvius is part of a state of affairs,] it seems that parts ofVesuvius must also be parts of this fact; the fact will hence alsoconsist of solidified lava. This does not seem right to me. (Frege1919: 20; my translation)

If Vesuvius is part of the obtaining state of affairsVesuvius’s being a volcano, the state of affairs mustby the transitivity of part-of contain the parts of solidified lavathat are parts of Vesuvius. But if the state of affairs contains thesolidified lava as parts, it must have a weight and an extension etc.However, the state of affairsVesuvius’s being avolcano is not a thing that has weight etc.

There are further problems for the view that states of affairs arecomplexes. If the state of affairsa’s beingF has onlya andbeingF as itsparts (in any plausible sense of “part”), it can onlyexist at a time at whicha andbeingF exist(the sum of all my body parts exists only at the time when all my bodyparts exist). Hence, the state of affairsa’sceasing to exist beforeb’s starting to exist cannot bea complex containinga andb. For there is no time whenits constituents both exist (see Künne 2003: 122).

The principles for the (proper) part-of relation imply that complexeswith the same parts are identical. But take the state of affairs thatRomeo loves Juliet. If it has Romeo, Love and Juliet as its parts, itis the same as the state of affairs that Juliet loves Romeo. Butintuitively, the state of affairsJuliet’s loving Romeois different from the state of affairsRomeo’s lovingJuliet. On the standard mereological conception of part,particulars and universals are not parts of states of affairs.

5.2 Non-Mereological Composition to the Rescue?

The last point cuts both ways. Why not say that different complexobjects can have the same parts? Armstrong (1997: 118) answered thisquestion positively and argued that facts are non-mereologicalcomposites. Lewis has denied that there is room for non-mereologicalcomposition (see Lewis 1992: 213; for discussion McDaniel 2009).However, independently of considerations about states of affairs weallow for different wholes that share all their parts. For instance,the sentences “John loves Mary” and “Mary lovesJohn” both consist of the same words “John”,“Mary” and “loves”, yet they are clearlydifferent sentences.

But our intuitive notion of part does not allow for wholes with onlyone part: if somethingx is part of a wholeW, there isa remainder ofW that is not identical withx. Toillustrate: If you tell me that this slice is part of your cake, butthere is no distinct, further part of your cake, I will take you tomake joke or to be confused. The remainder principle is implied by thesupplementation principle of mereology, but not the other way around(seemereology entry, sect. 3.2) Hence, we can draw on the remainder principlewithout endorsing the stronger supplementation principle. Now thereseem to be states of affairs that “contain” only oneproperty (see Bynoe 2011 who argues the following point in detail).Bradley’s Regress which was discussed insection 3.1 seems to show that the state of affairsSocrates’ beingwise consists only of Socrates andbeing wise. There isno relation that ties them to a state of affairs. Otherwise thequestion would arise what relates this relation to Socrates andbeing wise. Now some properties instantiate themselves:identity is self-identical. Hence, the state of affairsidentity’s being self-identical obtains. But this stateof affairs contains only the property of identity. There seems to beno intuitively acceptable sense of “part” in which suchstates of affairs have parts.

We are back then to the problem of how to make sense of how a state ofaffairs involves properties and particulars. In order to solve it, weneed to find a relation between the state of affairsa’s beingF anda andbeingF that (i) does not makea andbeingFparts of the state of affairs, (ii) allows one to distinguishbetween necessarily co-obtaining states of affairs, and (iii)distinguishes the state of affairsa’s beingF from other objects that, intuitively speaking, involvea andbeingF.

5.3 Are States of Affairs Ontologically Dependent?

Fine (1982: 51–2) has suggested an answer that invokes theindependently motivated idea that the identity of some objects isexplained in terms of the identity of other objects (see also Fine1995; Bynoe 2011: 99–100; and Keller 2013: 669). ConsiderFine’s example of the singleton of 1. The singleton of 1 is theset whose sole member is 1. The singleton of 1 is ontologicallydependent on 1 because its identity depends on the identity of 1. Weexplain what the singleton is by appealing to 1, but not the other wayaround. Similarly, the identity of (atomic) states of affairs isexplained in terms of objects and properties. Fine (1982: 52) takesbasic states of affairs—propositions in histerminology—to be the results of the application of theoperation of predication to particulars and properties. We say whatthe state of affairsa’s beingF is bysaying that it is the result of predicatingbeingF toa. Hence, the state of affairsa’s beingF depends on predicatingbeingF toa. Complex states of affairs are the result of theapplication of such operations as conjunction and disjunction to basicstates of affairs (on Operationalism as a general approach see Fine2010: 564ff). The notion of predication gives rise to severalquestions and we will come back to it in the next section.

If states of affairs are ontologically dependent on particulars andproperties, we can satisfy the desiderata (i) to (iii):

(i) An object can ontologically depend on other objects without beinga complex that contains these objects as parts. The axis of the earthontologically depends on the Earth, but it does not contain the Earthas a constituent. The assumption that the state of affairsa’s beingF ontologically depends ona andF can therefore solve the problems that arise forthe assumption that it containsa andF. Take forexample Frege’s intuitive argument against the view that statesof affairs contain physical objects like Vesuvius. The state ofaffairsVesuvius’s being a volcano ontologicallydepends on Vesuvius, but it does not contain it as a part. Hence, itdoes not contain the lava parts that are the parts of Vesuvius. Thereis no need to ascribe weight etc. to the state of affairs.

Ontological dependence helps us to get around the temporal problemsraised by the logical complex view of states of affairs. While acomplex cannot exist at a time at which some of its parts don’texist, an object can ontologically depend on objects that no longerexist. (I ontologically depend on a particular event, thefertilization of a particular egg by a particular sperm, although thisevent is long past.)

(ii) Fine’s proposal suggests that states of affairs areindividuated in terms of the objects and relations in virtue of whichthey exist:

• (Same2) If \(S_1\) and\(S_2\) are states of affairs, \(S_1 = S_2\) if, and only if, \(S_1\)and \(S_2\) exist in virtue of the same properties predicated of thesame particulars.

This criterion of identity for states of affairs distinguishes betweenthe necessarily co-obtaining states of affairsHesperus’sbeing self-identical andSocrates’ beingself-identical because they ontologically depend on differentthings. Hence, they come out as different. In turn,Hesperus’s being a planet andPhosphorus’sbeing a planet come out, as it is desirable, as the same state ofaffairs.

(iii) If the state of affairsHesperus’s being a planetontologically depends on Hesperus, it can only exist if Hesperusexists at some time. In contrast, a thought can exist whether or notthe objects it purports to be about ever existed or will exist. Thethought that Pegasus is a horse exists, whether there is such a horseor not.

The notion of ontological dependence sheds light on the sense in whichstates of affairs “involve” particulars and properties: astate of affairs involves those objects on which it ontologicallydepends. Consider as a representative example Richard’s 2013view of propositions as states of affairs. He identifies states ofaffairs with ways for things to be. A way for things to be is, inturn, identified by the things and the way these things need to be forthe way for things to be to be how things are. A way for things to beis a property the world might have. The existence of this propertydepends on the existence of the properties and particulars we need torefer to in identifying it. If there is no Eiffel Tower, for example,there is no way for the Eiffel Tower to be. Hence, states of affairsontologically depend on particulars and properties. Richard (2013:704) goes a step further by saying that ontological dependence is“a mark of mereological relations”. Hence, states ofaffairs should have constituent structure. But the additional claimthat states of affairs are (in some sense) wholes with parts does notexplain more than the ontological dependence claim. Rather theopposite: it leads to the problems discussed above.

The notion of ontological dependence helps to articulate how states ofaffairs are related to particulars and properties. But the ontologicaldependence of states of affairs on properties and particulars is notbrute. It is because some properties are predicated of some objectsthat (i) they form a state of affairs (ii) such that this state ofaffairs depends on them and can be said to involve them. A fundamentalquestion about states of affairs concerns then the conditions ofpredicability. We will come back to this question in section 6.3.

6. The Unity of a State of Affairs

6.1 The Unity-Problem

If one conceives of a state of affairs as complexes that“contain” particulars and properties, one needs to answerthe unity-question “What unifies some particulars and propertiesinto one state of affairs?” An answer to this question shoulddistinguish states of affairs from other complexes. Frege pressed thispoint in his letters to Wittgenstein:

Is every connection of objects a state of affairs? Does it not alsodepend on how the connection is produced? What is the tie? Can thisperhaps be gravitation, as with the system of planets? Is it [thesystem of planets] a state of affairs? (Frege 1919: 20, mytranslation)

The solar system consists of the sun and the planets pulled into orbitaround it by gravity. If this does not qualify as a state of affairsthen there must be some relation independent of gravitation thatunites the things involved in a state of affairs. What distinguishesthis complex physical object from the state of affairsthesun’s pulling the planets into orbit by gravity? If thelatter contains the sun and the planets and the pulling-by gravityrelation, the distinction between the states of affairs and solarsystem must lie in what unites their elements.

Russell argued that there is no plausible answer to the unity-questionfor states of affairs (he called them “propositions”). Heexplains his main worry about states of affairs as follows:

Our disbelief in their [propositions’] reality may be reinforcedby asking ourselves what kind of entity a false proposition could be.Let us take some very simple false proposition, say “AprecedesB”, when in factA comes afterB.It seems as though nothing were involved here beyondA andB and “preceding” and the general form of dualcomplexes. But sinceA does not precedeB, these objectsare not put together in the way indicated in the proposition. Itseems, therefore, that nothing which is actually composed of theseobjects is the proposition; and it is not credible that anythingfurther enters the proposition. (Russell 1913: 109–10; for adetailed discussion of this argument see Wetzel 1998)

What unifiesA,B and the relation ofPrecedingto the fact thatA precedesB?A’s actuallyprecedingB. What unifiesA,B and the relationofPreceding to the state of affairsA’sprecedingB? IfA does not precedeB, theunity of the state of affairs cannot consist inA beingactually related by the preceding relation toB.

So far Russell has only shown that the unity of a state of affairsA’s standing inR toB does notconsist inA’s standing inR toB.In addition, he has imposed a constraint on answers to theunity-question. He says that it is not credible that there is aunifying element that is not a constituent of the state of affairs.Russell himself couldn’t find an answer to the unity-questionthat met his constraint. Hence, he tried to eliminate states ofaffairs.

6.2 External Unification

While Russell does not refute the view that there are states ofaffairs, he asks philosophers who believe in them a difficultquestion. To see the force of the constraint he imposes on answers tothe unity-question consider a proposal that violates it. Externaltheories develop the following general idea (I take the“external/internal” terminology from Vallicella 2000):

The state of affairsa’s beingF exists if, andonly if, there is something distinct froma,beingF anda’s beingF & it unifiesa andbeingF to forma’s beingF.

Roughly speaking, the external unifier can bring the constituents ofstates of affairs together even if they don’t constitute a fact.A psychological version of the External Theory is proposed inValicella 2000. According to him, the external ground of unity is thejudging consciousness that brings about the unity of a state ofaffairs (Valicella 2000: 252).

Russell, in turn, argued that a mental act cannot unify some things toform a state of affairs:

Suppose we wish to understand “A andB aresimilar”. It is essential that our thought should, as is said,“unite” or “synthesize” the two terms and therelation; but we cannotactually “unite” them,since eitherA andB are similar, in which case they arealready united, or they are dissimilar, in which case no amount ofthinking can force them to be united. (Russell 1913: 116)

Any mental activity seems simply to be unable to create unity wherenone obtains already. If I think ofa andbeingF, why should a new complex object consisting of them comeinto existence? Russell himself goes on to suppose that the mind isable to uniteA,B and similarity with a logical form.How the mind can have that ability goes unexplained.

The linguistic version of the External Theory takes states of affairsto be descripta of sentences that owe their unity to the sentencesthat describe them:

The state of affairsa’s beingF existsif, and only if, there is a sentence of a language L (or an extensionof L) that concatenates a singular term referring toa and ageneral term referring toF. (see Taylor 1985: 29ff; King 2009:263)

The linguistic version gives up on the view that states of affairs arelanguage independent (see King 2009: 259 who concedes this). There isnothing in our intuitive notion of states of affairs that justifiesthe assumption that states of affairs depend for their unity on theexistence of a language in which they are described. For example,there will be a space of probable outcomes of an event whether thereare descriptions of them or not.

The criticism of the External Theory makes Russell’s constrainton an answer to the unity-question plausible. States of affairs areconceived of assui generis entities that do not owe theirunity and hence their identity to anything else.

6.3 Internal Unification

This brings us to Internal Theories that explain the unity of a stateof affairs merely by appealing to its constituents.

The state of affairsa’s beingF existsif, and only if,a orbeingF or both unify thestate of affairs.

Ramsey describes (but does not endorse) the core of this view when hesays:

[I]n every atomic fact there must be one constituent which is in itsown nature incomplete or connective and, as it were, holds the otherconstituents together. (Ramsey 1925: 408)

For Wittgenstein in hisTractatus Logico-Philosophicus thereis no designated connector in a state of affairs. All constituents areincomplete and mutually complete each other:

In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links in achain. (Wittgenstein 1918: 2.03; Pears/McGuinness translation)

So far we have only been given a necessary condition for the existenceof a state of affairs. Among the things that enter into a state ofaffairs there must be at least one incomplete one. Wittgenstein willrequire incompleteness or connectivity of all things that enter astate of affairs.

The notion of incompleteness at work here is difficult to explain. Butone way to develop it is to propose that the incomplete and connectingelements are functions. For example, the propertybeingF is conceived of as a function that takes a particulara as argument and maps it to the state of affairsa’s beingF (see Oliver 1992: 91). Theproblems of the functional model of states of affairs are manifest inthe development of Frege’s work. Frege 1879 held that sentencesstand for what he called “judgeable contents”, complexescomposed of functions and objects. For Frege predication is theapplication of a function to an object. Judgeable contents seem to benothing other than states of affairs. However, the idea that states ofaffairs are complex does not sit happily with Frege’s furtheridea that the judgeable contenta’s beingF is the value of the functionF fora asargument.

Now different functions have the same value for different arguments.For example, 3 is the value of the functionSquare root ofx for 9 and the value of the function \(x+1\) for 2. Whichof these arguments and functions is contained in the value 3? Sincethere is no principle that singles out one argument and function asconstituting the value, we should abandon either the functional modelof incompleteness or the idea that states of affairs haveconstituents. Later Frege takes the second option:

The references of the parts of a sentence are not parts of thereference of the sentence. (Frege 1910–14: 87)

Since different functions can have the same value for differentarguments, Frege arrived at the view that a sentence that is eithertrue or false refers to its truth-value, the True or the False. Everytrue (false) sentence has the same referent: the True (the False).States of affairs have no place in the Fregean theory of reference.The “case study” of Frege shows that the functional modelof incompleteness undermines the very idea that states of affairs arecomplexes (for a reply to this argument see Gaskin 2008: 100).

The strategy to explain the unity of a state of affairs by using thenotion of incompleteness either only labels the problem or, ifincomplete elements are taken to be functions, threatens the very ideaof states of affairs. Can one dispense with the notion ofincompleteness in an answer to the unity-question?

The unity-question arises on a conception that takes states of affairsto be ontologically dependent entities. Take the state of affairsAristotle’s being wise. It ontologically depends onAristotle andbeing wise. So do the ordered pair\(\langle\)Aristotle,being wise\(\rangle\) and themereological sum of Aristotle andbeing wise. Whatdistinguishes them? If we follow Fine, the answer will invoke anoperation that “generates” the entities in question.States of affairs are generated by predication, ordered pairs byanother operation.

Now saying that something is predicated of something else sounds as ifthe existence of a state of affairs depends on performing an act. Butthis is a misunderstanding. Johnston explains:

[P]redicability guarantees predication. WheneverF-ness ispredicable ofa, there will be something that is thepredication ofF-ness toa. (Johnston 2006: 684)

All the interesting work is done by the notion of predicability:

The state of affairsa’s beingF existsif, and only if,beingF is predicable ofa.

When a property (relation) is predicable of some objects will bedetermined by a number of principles (or axioms) (Johnston 2006: 685).For example, particulars are not predicable of other particulars,n-place properties are only predicable ofn particulars.It is part of the nature of the objects and properties on which astate of affairs ontologically depends that the properties arepredicable of the objects. This brings us to a key thought ofWittgenstein’s theory of states of affairs. He wrote in theTractatus Logico-Philosophicus:

2.0123

If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences instates of affairs. (Every one of these possibilities must be part ofthe nature of the object.)

2.0214

If all objects are given, then at the same time all possiblestates of affairs are also given.

The nature of particulars and properties determines whether the secondare predicable of the first or not. Wetzel (1998: 57) fills thissuggestion out in an informative way. An object may be in a range ofpossible states due to its capacities. Given that the computer I amwriting on belongs to a particular kind there is a range ofpossibilities for it to be: it might be broken, functioning well, beturned off etc. Its capacities and, broadly speaking, its nature isthe “ontological ground of ranges of possible states of affairsin which [it is a constituent]” (1998: 57). One should add thatthe nature and capacities of an object also determine a range ofimpossibilities such as the impossibility of my computer’sbecoming a sentient being.

However, consider my computer’s being to the left of my lamp.This is a possibility for my computer, but it is a brute possibilitynot grounded in its causal powers. Hence, the range of states ofaffairs which contain a particular seems to be broader than the rangeof states of affairs determined by its capacities.

If the propertybeingF is predicable of the objecta, the state of affairsa’s beingF exists. Hence, states of affairs exist in virtue of thenature of objects and properties. No unifying relation or operation inaddition toa andbeingF is required. Whatdistinguishes states of affairs from other entities whichontologically depend on the same properties and particulars is thatstates of affairs exist because the properties are predicable of theparticulars.

This account assumes that ifbeingF is predicable ofa, there is a state of affairsa’s beingF that ontologically depends on them. This move carriesthe problem posed by states of affairs to the right place: what arethe restrictions on predicability? If one has answered this question,one has solved the unity problem for states of affairs.

7. Conclusion

Does one need states of affairs in addition to facts and thoughts?Yes, there seem to be good reasons to posit states of affairs as asui generis category of object. If states of affairs are tobe useful (i) they must exist even if they do not obtain and (ii) mustinvolve objects and properties (relations) directly. (i) is the basicfeature that distinguishes states of affairs from facts; (ii) thebasic feature that distinguishes them from thoughts. Therefore atheory of states of affairs must answer the question how a state ofaffairs can “involve” objects and properties (relations)and combine them, if the objects don’t exemplify the properties(stand in the relations). Although there are promising proposals toanswer it, this question is still open.

Appendix: Some Historical Background

Smith (1992: 1103–4) traces state affairs like entities back toAristotle and medieval philosophers. Important contributions to thetheory of states of affairs were made in particular in Austro-GermanPhilosophy. Stumpf (1907: 29–30) claimed that the notion ofstates of affairs was introduced in Franz Brentano’s lectures onlogic (1870–1885). Brentano distinguished between a mental act,its content and its object. When I think of Hesperus, my thinking, theact, has a particularcontent in virtue of which itis directed on the planet, theobject. In his logic lecturesBrentano extended this distinction to judgements (Brentano1870ff:13.020 [6]): when I judge that Hesperus is a planet, my judginghas a content and an object: the object is what is judged (“dasGeurteilte”). Stumpf (1907: 30) called thecontent of ajudgement “Sachverhalt”. This term is now translated as“state of affairs”.  However, Stumpf’s statesof affairs are rather close to thoughts or propositions (see alsoSmith 1992, 1105). For example, Stumpf (1907: 30) likened states ofaffairs to Bolzano’s sentences-in-themselves. Sentences-inthemselves are supposed to be either true or false. This suggests thatstates of affairs were also conceived as truth-value bearers byStumpf.

According to Adolf Reinach (1911: 374, Fn.),  Edmund Husserl, astudent of Brentano, was the first to clarify the significance anddistinctive nature of states of affairs. Husserl (1901: V §17,§ 18) took the object and not the content of a judgement to be astate of affairs. Every judgement has a content, in Husserlterminology “matter” (Materie) in virtue of whichit is directed on a state of affairs, its object. Different kinds ofmental act can be directed on the same state of affairs.  Forinstance, when I wonder whether Rome was built in a day and when Ijudge that Rome was built in a day, I am directed on the same state ofaffairs, but once in the questioning, once in the assertoric mode. Canjudgements that differ in their matter be directed on the same stateof affairs? An answer to this question would help us to fix thedistinction between matter and content for judgements. ButHusserl’s answer to this question is difficult to reconstruct.Husserl 1900 connected states of affairs further to correct judgement,probability and the laws of logic. For instance, a judgement issupposed to be correct if, and only if, the state of affairs it isdirected on obtains (Husserl 1900: 13).

Reinach 1911 followed Husserl: states of affairs are the“correlates” of judgement and assertion (See Meinertsen2020 for a comparison between Reinach and Armstrongian states ofaffairs). If, for instance, a particular rose exists, a range ofstates of affairs exists that depend on the rose, whether they obtainor not (see Reinach 1911: 340). If I judge that the rose is blue, Ijudge incorrectly, because the judged state of affairs exists, butdoes not obtain. The property of states of affairs to obtain or failto obtain distinguishes them from facts. As we have seen in section 2,the “space” of states of affairs helps Reinach to clarifythe notions of modality and probability (see Reinach 1911:339–40).  Reinach (1911: 338f) proposed, but did not arguein detail, that states of affairs are the relata of theground-consequence relation. If an eventa causes an eventb, the state of affairs thata occurs is the groundof the state of affairs thatb occurs. States of affairsfigure prominently in Wittgenstein’sTractatusLogico-Philosophicus. Potter (2011, 106) speculates about theinfluence of Austrian philosophers on Wittgenstein in thisrespect.

Bibliography

• Aquila, Richard E., 1971, “Intentionality and PossibleFacts”,Noûs, 5(4): 411–417.doi:10.2307/2214387
• Armstrong D.M., 1986, “In Defence of StructuralUniversals”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(1):85–88. doi:10.1080/00048408612342261
• –––, 1989,A Combinatorial Theory ofPossibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1993, “A World of States ofAffairs”,Philosophical Perspectives, 7:429–440.
• –––, 1997,A World of States ofAffairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2004,Truth and Truthmakers,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Barcan Marcus, Ruth, 1990 [1993], “Some RevisionaryProposals about Belief and Believing”,Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 50: 133–153. doi:10.2307/2108036Reprinted in herModalities, Oxford: Oxford University Press1993: 233–255. doi:10.1093/0195096576.003.0015
• Barwise, Jon, 1989,The Situation in Logic, CSLI LectureNotes, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
• Barwise, Jon & John Perry, 1983,Situations andAttitudes, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Betti, Arianna, 2015,Against Facts, Cambridge, MA: MITPress.
• Bigelow, John, 1988, “Real Possibilities”,Philosophical Studies, 53: 37–64.
• Brentano, Franz, 1870ff,Logik (EL 80), online:http://gams.uni-graz.at/archive/objects/o:bag.el.80-html-norm/methods/sdef:HTML/get
• Bynoe, William, 2011, “Against the Compositional View ofFacts”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(1):91–100. doi:10.1080/00048400903521025
• Chisholm, Roderick, 1970, “Events and Propositions”,Nous, 4(1): 15–24. doi:10.2307/2214288
• –––, 1976,Person and Object: A MetaphysicalStudy, London: George Allen & Unwin.
• Chisholm, Roderick, Sosa, Ernest, 1966. “On the Logic of‘Intrinsically Better’”, AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly, 3(3): 244–49.
• Church, Jennifer, 2013,Possibilities of Perception,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• David, Marian, 2009, “Defending Existentialism?” inReicher 2009: 167–209.
• Ducasse, Curt J., 1940, “Propositions, Opinions, Sentencesand Facts”,Journal of Philosophy, 37(26):701–711. doi:10.2307/2018525
• Fine, Kit, 1975, “Critical Notice of David LewisCounterfactuals”,Mind, 84(335):451–458. doi:10.1093/mind/LXXXIV.1.451
• –––, 1982, “First-Order Modal TheoriesIII: Facts”,Synthese, 53(1): 43–122. doi:10.1007/BF00500112
• –––, 1995, “Ontological Dependence”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95:269–290.
• –––, 2010, “Towards a Theory ofPart”,Journal of Philosophy, 107(11): 559–589.doi:10.5840/jphil20101071139
• –––, 2012, “Counterfactuals withoutPossible Worlds”,Journal of Philosophy, 109(3):221–246. doi:10.5840/jphil201210938
• Forbes, Graeme, 1987, “Is there a Problem about Persistence?II”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,Supplementary Volume, 61: 136–155.
• –––, 1989,Languages of Possibility,Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• –––, 1992, “Worlds and States of Affairs:How Similar Can They Be?” in Kevin Mulligan (ed.)Language,Truth and Ontology, Dordrecht: Springer, 118–132.
• Frege, Gottlob, 1879,Conceptual Notation and RelatedArticles, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972.
• –––, 1910–14,Frege’s Lectureson Logic: Carnap’s Jena Notes, 1910–1914, edited bySteve Awodey, Erich Reck, Gottfried Gabriel. Open Court: LaSalle2004.
• –––, 1919, “Letter to Wittgenstein28.6.1919”, reprinted inGrazer Philosophische Studien,33/34 (1989), 19–20.
• Gaskin, Richard, 2008,The Unity of the Proposition,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Gilmore, Cody, 2014, “Parts of Propositions”, inShieva Kleinschmidt (ed.)Mereology and Location, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 156–208.
• Horwich, Paul, 1990,Truth, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• Hossack, Keith, 2007,The Metaphysics of Knowledge,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Humberstone, I. Lloyd, 1981, “From Worlds toPossibilities”,Journal of Philosophical Logic, 10:313–339.
• Husserl, Edmund, 1900,Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band:Prolegomena zur Reinen Logik, First Edition 1900, Reprint of thesecond (1913) edition, Tübingen: Niemeyer.
• –––, 1901,Logische Untersuchungen. ZweiterBand I: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie derErkenntnis,First Edition 1901,  Reprint of the second(1913) edition, Tübingen: Niemeyer.
• Johnston, Mark, 2004. “The Obscure Object ofHallucination”,Philosophical Studies,120 (1/3):113–83. doi/org/10.1023/B:Phil.0000033753.64202.21
• –––, 2006, “Hylomorphism”,Journal of Philosophy, 103(12): 653–698.doi:10.5840/jphil2006103125
• Keller, Lorraine, 2013, “The Metaphysics of PropositionalConstituency”,Canadian Journal of Philosophy,43(5–6): 655–678. doi:10.1080/00455091.2013.870735
• Kim, Jaegwon, 1979, “States of Affairs, Events, andPropositions”, in E. Sosa (ed.)Essays on the Philosophy ofRoderick M. Chisholm,Grazer Philosophische Studien,7–8: 147–162. doi:10.5840/gps19797/821
• King, Jeffrey C., 2009, “Questions of Unity”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109: 257–277.doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00267.x
• Kripke, Saul, 1980,Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.
• Künne, Wolfgang, 1987, “The intentionality of thinking:the difference between State of Affairs and PropositionalMatter”, in Kevin Mulligan (ed.),Speech Act andSachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realistphenomenology, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,175–187
• –––, 2003,Conceptions of Truth,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lemos, Noah M., 1994.Intrinsic Value: Concept andWarrant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Levinson, Jerrold, 2006. “Why there are no tropes”,Philosophy 81 (318): 563–79.
• Lewis, David, 1973,Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.
• –––, 1986,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• –––, 1992, “Critical notice of DavidArmstrong,A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224.
• McDaniel, Kris, 2009, “Structure-Making”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87: 251–274.doi:10.1080/00048400802587374
• McDowell, John, 1982, “Criteria, Defeasibility andKnowledge”,Proceedings of the British Academy, 68:455–79.
• –––, 1994, Mind and World,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Meinertsen, Bo, 2020,  “Reinach and Armstrongian Stateof Affairs Ontology”,Axiomathes, Online first.
• Merricks, Trenton, 2015,Propositions, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Moore, George E., 1910,Some Main Problems of Philosophy,London: Allen and Unwin 1953.
• Neale, Stephen, 2001,Facing Facts, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Oliver, Alex, 1992, “Could there be conjunctiveuniversals?”Analysis, 52(2): 88–97.doi:10.2307/3328277
• Plantinga, Alvin, 1974,The Nature of Necessity, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
• –––, 1983, “On Existentialism”,Philosophical Studies, 44(1): 1–21.doi:10.1007/BF00353411
• –––, 1984, “Reply to John L.Pollock”, in J.E. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (eds.)AlvinPlantinga, Princeton: Princeton University Press,313–329.
• Pollock, John, 1982, “The logic of logical necessity”,Logique et Analyse, 10: 307–323.
• –––, 1984a,The Foundations of PhilosophicalSemantics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 1984b, “Plantinga on PossibleWorlds”, in J.E. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (eds.)AlvinPlantinga, Princeton: Princeton University Press,121–144.
• Potter, Michael, 2011, Wittgenstein’s Notes onLogic.Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni, 2000,“A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:33–49.
• –––, 2003, “Tropic of Value”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research66(2):389–403.
• Ramsey, Frank P., 1925, “Universals”,Mind,34(136): 401–17. doi:10.1093/mind/XXXIV.136.401
• Reicher, Maria Elisabeth (ed.), 2009,States of Affairs,Frankfurt A.M.: Ontos Verlag.
• Reinach, Adolf, 1911, “Beiträge zur Theorie desNegativen Urteils”, in hisGesammelte Schriften, Halle:Max Niemeyer 1921. Transl. asOn the Theory of NegativeJudgement, by Barry Smith inParts and Moments: Studies inLogic and Formal Ontology, Barry Smith (ed.), Munich: Philosophia1982, 315–376.
• Restall, Greg, 1996, “Truthmakers, Entailment andNecessity”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74:221–340. doi:10.1080/00048409612347331
• Richard, Mark, 2013,  “What are Propositions?”,Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5/6): 702–19.
• Ross, William D., 1930,The Right and the Good, ed. by.Philip Stratton-Lake, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
• Rumfitt, Ian, 2015,The Boundary Stones of Thought,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Russell, Bertrand, 1904, “Letter to Frege”, in GottlobFrege,Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, Oxford:Blackwell, 1980, 38–41.
• –––, 1912,The Problems of Philosophy,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
• –––, 1913,Theory of Knowledge: The 1913Manuscript, London: Routledge 1992.
• –––, 1918, “The Philosophy of LogicalAtomism”, in hisLogic and Knowledge, London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin, 1968.
• Sainsbury, R. M., 2005,Reference without Referents,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Skyrms, Brian, 1981, “Tractarian nominalism”,Philosophical Studies, 40: 199–206.
• Smith, Barry, 1989, “Logic and theSachverhalt”,The Monist, 72:52–69.
• –––, 1992. “Sachverhalt”, inHistorisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Volume 8,Basel: Schwabe, 1102–113.
• Stalnaker, Robert, 1986, “Counterparts and Identity”,Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11(1): 121–140. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1986.tb00490.x
• Stumpf, Carl, 1907,Erscheinungen und Ihre PsychischenFunktionen, Berlin: Verlag der Königlichen Akademie derWissenschaften.
• Taylor, Barry, 1976, “States of Affairs”, in G. Evansand J. McDowell (eds.)Truth and Meaning, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• –––, 1985,Modes of Occurrence. Verbs,Adverbs and Events, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• Vallicella, William F., 2000, “Three Conceptions of Statesof Affairs”,Noûs, 34: 237–259.doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00209
• van Inwagen, Peter, 1986, “Two Concepts of PossibleWorlds”,Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11(1):185–213.
• Vendler, Zeno, 1967, “Causal Relations”,Journalof Philosophy, 64(21): 704–713. doi:10.2307/2023854
• Wetzel, Thomas, 1998, “Possible States of Affairs”,Philosophical Studies, 91: 43–60.
• Williamson, Timothy, 2002, “Necessary Existents”, inA. O’Hear (ed.)Logic, Thought and Language, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 233–251.
• Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1918,TractatusLogico-Philosophicus, Trans. by D. Pears and B. McGuinness,London: Routledge, 1961.
• Zalta, Edward N., 1993, “Twenty-Five Basic Theorems inSituation and World Theory”,Journal of PhilosophicalLogic, 22(4): 385–428. doi:10.1007/BF01052533
• Zimmerman, Michael J., 2001,The Nature of IntrinsicValue, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford: Rowman &Littlefield.

Academic Tools

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at theFriends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
	Enhanced bibliography for this entryatPhilPapers, with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

• Wetzel, Thomas, “States of Affairs”,StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.) URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/states-of-affairs/>. [This was the previous entry on states of affairs in theStanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy – see theversion history.]

Related Entries

facts |fictionalism: modal |logical atomism: Russell’s |mereology |possible worlds |probability, interpretations of |Russell, Bertrand |truthmakers |Wittgenstein, Ludwig

Acknowledgments

I want to thank Arianna Betti, Will Bynoe, Chris Hughes, FabriceCorreia, Keith Hossack, Nick Jones and Jessica Leech, Dolf Rami andfour anonymous referees for discussion and comments.