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1. That something is widely acknowledged to be true certainly does notmean that no philosopher has denied it. For a denial thatpropositional knowledge requires belief, see Radford 1966.

2. See the previous footnote.

3. For more on suspension of judgment, see Friedman (2013, 2017).

4. Notice that a universal form of Cartesian Skepticism is inconsistent,for reasons related to our discussion of whether Pyrrhonian Skepticismis self-refuting. A universal form of Cartesian Skepticism would haveto hold, for some proposition of the form “Suspension ofjudgment is the only justified attitude regardingp”,both that suspension of judgment and belief are each the onlyjustified attitude to hold towards it. For arguments that Cartesianskepticism is self-refuting, see Wilson (2012) and Rinard (2018).

5. See, for example, DeRose and Warfield 1999. In that volume most ofthe authors take the CP-style argument to be the primary one. There isa good discussion of Cartesian Skepticism in the Introduction to thatvolume. Frances (2005) argues that special kinds of skepticalhypotheses generate limited but insidious forms of skepticism.

6. Alternatively, CP might be further patched by adding the requirementthat the subject in question performs the requisite deduction andbelievesq on this basis. This version of CP brings it closerto so-called “Transmission Principles”—see the entryontransmission of justification and warrant.

7. For another, similar, proposed counterexample, see Audi 1988: 77.

8. In other words, Dretske-style cases seem to be, at best,counterexample to Transmission Principles rather than CP. See footnote5.

9. The possibility of our having foundational justification forbelievingp can still work as an alternative toDretske’s construction of CP.

10. Nozick’s account is in direct conflict with a knowledge versionof CP, but we are assuming that if the knowledge version fails, thenso does the justification version. See section 1 for more on this.

11. For a full discussion of Nozick’s account of knowledge, seeLuper-Foy 1987.

12. It is crucial to note that the truth of CP does not depend upon theantecedent being fulfilled. It is also important to note that Nozickhimself thought that his analysis entailed that although we do notknow that we are not the victims in a skeptical scenario, we do knowordinary propositions.

13. Our discussion of safety is taken from Comesaña 2007.

14. Williamson 2000 also proposes what he calls a “safety”condition on knowledge, and he cites Sosa approvingly. However,Williamson is not averse to understanding safety in terms ofknowledge, which goes against Sosa’s project.

15. Notice that, for similar reasons, Nozick’s third condition alsocannot be understood in terms of the standard semantics forsubjunctives.

16. It is interesting to note in this regard that Hobbes 1651 had alreadyappealed to the asymmetry of indiscriminability with regard to thedreaming hypothesis.

17. This section borrows from Comesaña 2005a.

18. We are ignoring here disjunctivism about perceptual experience (seeentry onthe disjunctive theory of perception).

19. Inferentially justified beliefs can aid in justifying yet furtherbeliefs, but they themselves must be justified at least in part on thebasis of basic beliefs. This recursive structure for justification isrelated to our discussion above regarding whether Closure by itselfhas untoward consequences.

20. Primitivists are usually classified as internalists too.

21. We already encountered Positism in our discussion of CartesianSkepticism, there in the guise of the view that no evidence justifiesus in believing the negation of skeptical hypotheses. The name“Positism” is from Van Cleve 2005.