The classical Indian philosophy of Advaita Vedānta articulates aphilosophical position of radical nondualism, a revisionary worldviewwhich it derives from the ancient Upaniṣadic texts. According toAdvaita Vedāntins, the Upaniṣads reveal a fundamentalprinciple of nonduality termed “brahman,” whichis the reality of all things. Advaitins understandbrahman astranscending individuality and empirical plurality. They seek toestablish that the essential core of one’s self(ātman) isbrahman. The fundamental thrust ofAdvaita Vedānta is that theātman is purenon-intentional consciousness. It is one without a second, nondual,infinite existence, and numerically identical withbrahman.This effort entails tying a metaphysics ofbrahman to aphilosophy of consciousness.

This philosophical tradition finds its most sustained earlyarticulation in the works of the preeminent Advaita Vedāntin,Śaṅkarācārya (hereafter Śaṅkara), whoflourished during the eighth century CE. Śaṅkara endeavoredto communicate nonduality through systematized theories ofmetaphysics, language, and epistemology. He also incorporated specificmethods of philosophical teaching, along with learning methods oflistening, reflection, and contemplation. His philosophy and methodscomprise a teaching tradition intended to culminate in a directliberating recognition of nonduality that is synonymous withliberation or freedom (mokṣa). Śaṅkara isone of the most widely known and influential Indian philosophers fromthe classical period, and the most authoritative philosopher ofAdvaita Vedānta. He is revered by Advaita Vedānta’steaching tradition and monastic lineages, and continues to influencevirtually all contemporary lineages today. For comprehensive accountsof Śaṅkara’s philosophy readers may consult Potter1981; Mayeda 1992; Comans 2000; Suthren Hirst 2005; Ram-Prasad 2002;Isayeva 1992; Rambachan 2006; and Deutsch 1969.

• 1. Life and Works
• 2. Metaphysics
  • 2.1 Existence, Reality, and Causation
  • 2.2 The Appearance of the Universe
  • 2.3 Two-Tiered Reality
  • 2.4 Īśvara (God)
• 3. Consciousness, Mind, and Personal Identity
  • 3.1 Witnessing Consciousness
  • 3.2 Self-Illumination of Consciousness
  • 3.3 Reflection: Consciousness, Mind, and Personal Identity
  • 3.4 Superimposition: The Fundamental Problem of Ignorance
• 4. Contemplative Philosophical Methods
  • 4.1 Action and Meditation
  • 4.2 The Triple Process and the Means of Nondual Knowledge
  • 4.3 Self-Knowledge and Living While Liberated
• Bibliography
  • Abbreviations
  • Śaṅkara’s Texts in English Translation
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life and Works

There are several different dates ascribed to Śaṅkara.Early scholars placed him from 788–820 CE. Nakamura (1983:48–88) argues for an earlier date of 700–750 CE, anddiscusses the various dating theories at length. Potter (1981:14–15, 116–119) places him from the late seventh to earlyeighth centuries CE due to the dating of a contemporaneous Advaitinnamed Maṇḍanamiśra (see Thrasher 1979 onMaṇḍanamiśra’s dating). There are no dependablehistorical records of Śaṅkara’s life beyond hiswritten works which provide few biographical clues. Scholars are alsonot clear about his religious identity. According to the AdvaitaVedānta tradition itself, he was Śaiva (a devotee of thedeity Śiva); but several scholars believe he wasVaiṣṇava, a devotee of the deity Viṣṇu (seeClark 2006: 159–170 for an overview of these theories).Hagiographical accounts of his life, theŚaṅkaravijayas (Conquests ofŚaṅkara), were composed several centuries after hisdeath. They describe him as being born in Kalāḍi, locatedin modern day Kerala. He became a renouncer at a young age, left hisfamily to pursue liberation, and spent his life travelling around thesub-continent while teaching his pupils, engaging in philosophicaldebate, and composing his works. He supposedly died at the young ageof thirty-two. (See Bader 2000 for a discussion ofŚaṅkara’s life according to his hagiographies).

Śaṅkara was a systematizer of Advaita Vedānta, not afounder. He viewed himself as part of a long lineage of teachers.Śaṅkara’s teacher was named Govinda; and according totradition, Govinda’s teacher was Gauḍapāda (sixthcentury CE), who composed theGauḍapādakārikās (Verses ofGauḍapāda) on theMāṇḍūkyaUpaniṣad. The historical record of Advaita Vedānta isobscure prior to Gauḍapāda (see Nakamura 2004 for hisextensive work on pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntins). AdvaitaVedāntins trace their lineage back throughBādarāyaṇa (ca. first century BCE), who authored theBrahmasūtras (The Aphorisms on Brahman), to theindividuals in Upaniṣadic narratives, and ultimately toīśvara (roughly “God”) asViṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa or the teaching form ofŚiva known as Dakṣināmūrti. By this lineage theyclaim the authority of Upaniṣadic teachers,Kṛṣṇa, and Bādarāyana as their own. Thecorresponding texts of the Upaniṣads,Bhagavadgītā, andBrahmasūtrasconstitute Advaita Vedānta’s triple canon(prasthānatrayī).

From a historical standpoint, Śaṅkara’s textual worksdefine his identity. He composed our earliest complete extantcommentaries on theBrahmasūtras,Bhagavadgītā, and the ten principal Upaniṣadsconsisting of theĪṣā,Kena,Kaṭha,Praṣna,Muṇḍaka,Māṇḍūkya,Aitareya,Taittirīya,Chāndogya,andBṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisads.Śaṅkara’s commentary on theMāṇḍukya is part of his extensive commentaryon theGauḍapādakārikās’explanation of theMāṇḍūkya.Śaṅkara also composed an independent work titled theUpadeśasāhasrī (A ThousandTeachings). There are hundreds of other texts attributed toŚaṅkara, but their authorship is questionable and most werelikely composed in later centuries by monastic heads who held a“Śaṅkarācārya” title. (See Potter1981: 115–117; Hacker 1995; and Mayeda 1965a, 1965b, and 1967for discussions of Śaṅkara’s likely works, as well asHacker’s criteria for determining their authenticity. SeeSundaresan 2002 for some critiques and expansion of Hacker’scriteria).

Śaṅkara was an exegete, philosopher, and teacher. Hisprimary commitment was to establish his philosophy of nondualbrahman as the subject matter of the Upaniṣads, and tosystematize Advaita exegesis by harmonizing the diverse andpotentially contradictory passages between Upaniṣadic texts. Onemust note however, that Śaṅkara does not attempt to provenonduality solely through independent reasoning. Such an endeavor isnot possible in his opinion because nonduality is not subject tological proofs (see Murty 1959 on the role of reason forŚaṅkara). He accepts nonduality based on theUpaniṣad’s authority alone. Nonetheless, he was anoriginal philosopher who constructed novel arguments to make sense ofthe Upaniṣads, defend his positions, and critique hisphilosophical adversaries. Śaṅkara also shaped apedagogical method to approach texts as a means of knowledge. At thesame time, he left several open questions and ambiguities in hiswriting, in part due to the different source texts of his commentariesand the voluminous amount of his work. This has led to differentinterpretations and several intra-Advaitin philosophical disputes inthe post-Śaṅkara tradition (see Potter 2012).

Śaṅkara purportedly established the earliest monasticsystem in Brahmanical religion, including the Daśanāmī(Ten Names) renouncer orders (see Clark 2006 on these orders) as wellas four or five principle monasteries (maṭhas) acrossthe subcontinent (see Cenkner 1983 onmaṭhas). ManyŚaṅkara-identifying lineages, along with the principlemonasteries, and several smaller monasteries, hermitages, and learninginstitutions continue to flourish today in the living AdvaitaVedānta tradition. An unbroken lineage beginning withŚaṅkara’s direct disciples, such as Padmapādaand Sureśvara, continued to develop, defend, and expand upon hisphilosophy into the modern period. At present,Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta extends far beyond itsorthodox cultural and geographical confines. Its streams of thoughtcontinue to evolve due to the encounter with different philosophical,theological, and socio-political contexts; yet the tradition as awhole demonstrates a significant degree of philosophical continuityfrom past to present.

2. Metaphysics

Śaṅkara’s metaphysical arguments defendUpaniṣadic propositions claiming that existence is “oneonly, without a second” (ChU 6.2.1). He follows the generalUpaniṣadic model that all known objects are compoundedpermutations of a set of primary elements. This is modeled asthreefold, consisting of fire, water, and earth (ChU 6.2.3); or asfive-fold, consisting of space, air, fire, water, and earth (TaiU2.1.1; see BrSūBh 2.3.1–12 for reconciling these twodifferent models). The elements emerge successively fromundifferentiated existence, at first in subtle (i.e., non-perceptible)form. They then undergo a process of division and recombination, sothat each element includes portions of the others, to evolve into thecoarse (i.e., perceptible) “great elements”(mahābhūtas). Perceptual objects are in factderivative products that lack existence independent of these primaryelements. These elements, however, do not constitute an elementalfoundationalism, nor do they bottom out in an atomic foundationalism,because they are ultimately ontologically dependent on something else,namely pure existence (brahman) (BrSūBh2.2.15–17).Brahman is the nondual ground underlyingall objects, the single foundation (adhiṣṭhana)on which the entire universe depends. All objects point back to thisindependent ground and possess no existence apart from it.Śaṅkara argues that this foundational existence has nodependence on a second thing. It is self-established, irreducible,immutable, and free of space, time, and causation.

According to Śaṅkara, a corollary of his position onnondual existence is that the world we perceive is less-than-real orillusory in some way in comparison to its ground. Though objects existwithin existence, their forms are merely concepts that we representwith names (see BrSūBh 2.1.14 and ChUBh 6.1.4). They arecognitive constructions; however, in Śaṅkara’s viewthis construction is an epistemic error of attributing independentreality to objects, not an ontological subjective idealism ofindividuals mentally projecting the world. His commentary on BrSū2.2.28–31, for example, affirms that we must assume perceptualrealism and rejects Buddhist Yogācāra idealism. By knowingnondual existence, one knows the reality of all things in theuniverse, and recognizes their forms as merely names. The immediateepistemic recognition of one’s consciousness as numericallyidentical with this ground of nondual existence isŚaṅkara’s philosophical goal. This recognition issynonymous with liberation (mokṣa), and entails anabsolute metaphysical wholeness by which the individual’s mindis freed from psychological suffering.

2.1 Existence, Reality, and Causation

Throughout his commentaries Śaṅkara employs two relatedcriteria, dependence and persistence, to determine what is real. Hedefines the real as that which does not change its nature, whereaswhat is unreal does change (see, e.g., GKBh 2.6; TaiUBh 2.1.1). Theprimary distinction here is change. Something which persists is morereal than what is transient because what is transient is subject tonegation. His canonical illustration is a clay pot. One may shape asubstantial cause such as clay into new names and forms, from a lumpto a pot to a plate. With each new form, the former is destroyed, yetthe clay continues through each. This example illustrates hisfoundational discriminative reasoning of continuity and discontinuity,which determines the relationship of what persists and what does notpersist between two things (see§4.3 below). Accordingly, the clay persisting through causation isrelatively more real than the non-persisting lump, pot, and plateforms, because clay is not negatable. In this illustration, clay isanalogous tobrahman, the underlying existence of theuniverse, and the pot is analogous to objects.

Śaṅkara also incorporates the persistence argument to showthat one term (clay) is independent of another (pot)—clay ismore real based on independence in causation. The pot form arises outof the clay cause, is sustained by clay, and resolves back into clayupon its destruction. The pot depends on clay for its being. Its formand mass possess no objective existence apart from its clay substance.Therefore, the clay is more real based on a hierarchy of dependency.This hierarchical relationship reveals an asymmetricaldependence—pot form depends upon clay substance for its being,but clay substance does not depend on the particular pot form.Śaṅkara draws several important conclusions from this:

1. the metaphysical ground possesses more reality than the groundedeffect;
2. the effect is wholly reducible to its causal ground; and
3. therefore the effect is not different than its ground.

(See ChUBh ch. 6 and BrSūBh 2.1.15–20 forŚaṅkara’s understanding of cause and effect; seePotter 1981: 65–7 for a summary of his views on causality).

Everything in the universe undergoes constant change; however,according to Śaṅkara, objects cannot simply come into beingand go out of being. They must depend on something else, some existentcause, for their being. Śaṅkara argues that prior touniverse emergence, when all objects, time, and space, are unmanifest,only primordial undifferentiated existence exists (see ChUBh6.2.1–2 for example). This existence is a single potential causefree of form; but even after the universe emerges, there is still justthat single cause. It persists through all objects and causation, likethe clay persists through its changing forms. He concludes that everyobject, including the universe itself, is a temporal artifact, simplya name (nāma) and form (rūpa). The entireuniverse is not different frombrahman, and its form is lessreal thanbrahman. All forms are less real than existenceitself. Foundational existence is transitive, lending existence toobjects, like the clay to each of its forms. Furthermore, therelationship is asymmetrical—pure undifferentiated existencedoes not depend on objects, but objects depend on existence. Objectsborrow their existence from this metaphysical ground and lack anyindependent being apart from it. They are not different than theircause, and therefore their names and forms are only provisionally realappearances.

In considering Śaṅkara’s position, it is questionablewhere to locate the given existence possessed by objects in everydaypropositions like, “this pot exists”, “this seedis”, or “the shirt is”. How would one isolate theobject’s existence within its particular form? ForŚaṅkara, this question is misguided and unanswerablebecause form does not delimit existence. When one encounters a formand seeks its existence in the locus of its substantial cause, oneencounters another form that decomposes into further forms. Forexample, the existence of a shirt depends on its causal clothsubstance; however, cloth existence depends on threads, threadexistence depends on fibers, and fibers are composed of further subtlecauses,ad infinitum. Similarly, we may view the pot beyondthe boundaries of an illustration—clay is the material cause ofthe pot, but has further causes, like minerals and water, whichthemselves depend on a descending chain of subtler causes.

Reductions of wholes to aggregates of parts, forms to further forms,properties to other properties, effects to causes, or names to furthernames are infinite. They never bottom out in a metaphysicalfoundation. The proposition that an object’s form delimitsexistence crumbles because the regress defers an object’sexistence to the next ontological level, an unending descent intosubtler causes or further mereological parts. Therefore, attempting toisolate stable independent existence as delimited by a given form is areceding horizon. The form’s existence is self-evident at eachpoint, but forever out of objective reach. Śaṅkara arguesthat this non-finding of existence in a form or as a form should notlead to positing the emergence of objects (e.g., properties, forms,wholes, etc.) from non-existence somewhere in the chain of dependency(a position he interprets as Vaiśeṣika philosophy). Norshould one conclude that if no unchanging ultimate essence can beobjectified, then everything must be empty of essential existence, andtherefore no metaphysical foundation ultimately exists (see ChUbh6.2.1–2). He considers this latter position, which he construesas the Madhyamika Buddhist, to be counter-intuitively nihilistic. Italso conflicts with his premises that existence is self-evident andthat it persists even as something evolves or devolves. Decompositionchains do not reveal any disruption of existence, only disruption offorms.

The philosophical upshot of Śaṅkara’s metaphysic isthat no form or object constitutes the fundamental ground ofexistence. This explains why one cannot isolate existence itselfthrough hierarchical descension or ascension in the realm of causationand objects. If this very effort is misguided, then the non-finding ofexistence in an object does not entail an absolute absence ofexistence, nor the object’s emergence from non-existence. Herejects the presupposition that objects possess a property ofexistence, or that the object delimits existence in spatial-temporalways. Existence is formless and nondual in reality. Therefore, inlight of Śaṅkara’s theory of causation, one cannotattribute independent reality to an object. Objects are divisible,derivative, dependent, and transient. They are merely names,nominalist wholes that lack any independent being. By negating thereality of their name and form one discovers that objects are in factnumerically identical to formless existence. If this existence is notbound by space or time, which are also forms, it must be nondual. (SeeŚaṅkara on BrSū 2.1.15, ChU 6.2.2, and BhG 2.16 forfurther discussion of these points).

2.2 The Appearance of the Universe

Śaṅkara’s philosophy is perhaps most infamous forundermining the reality of the universe and its ultimate value. Hisphilosophical adversaries pejoratively labeled him amāyāvādin—“one who argues theworld is illusory (māyā)”. While this epithetis not exactly incorrect, it misrepresents his intention as centeredon world negation, and ignores the fact that he infrequently uses theterm “māyā” (see Hacker 1995 on his useof this term). Śaṅkara places great emphasis on moralvirtues and acting for the good of the world (see BhGBh ch.3 forexample and§4.1 below). Furthermore, the world is a pedagogical necessity as theinstrumental means to discover nonduality (on this, see Suthren Hirst2005). His goal is not to negate the axiological value of the worldand intersubjective life (see Rambachan 2006 for a development of thispoint). Rather, his focus is simplybrahman. The world is adependent effect ofbrahman and therefore not other thanbrahman, andbrahman is not a cosmogonicconstruction. This metaphysical view possesses epistemic value forliberation, along with is positive psychological byproducts such ascessation of suffering and the deepest happiness.

Given Śaṅkara’s absolute nonduality, how can heexplain the world’s emergence in the first place? LaterAdvaitins developed cosmogonic defenses to neutralize philosophicalrivals, including theories ofmāyā as a creativematerial cause equated with beginningless ignorance. Whether or not wecan accurately read such theories into Śaṅkara is contestedby academic and traditional scholars (see Comans 2000: 263–7;Doherty 2005; and Satchidanandendra 1964 [1989]). The more pertinentpoint though is that Śaṅkara does not require a definitivecosmogonic story of world causation for his philosophical goal ofknowingbrahman. He employs cosmologies as models that mapthe empirical order in order to point back obliquely to nonduality asalready present as one’s most primitive self-existence. Thesemodels may be dropped after serving their purpose (see, e.g., GKBh4.4.2; BrSūBh 3.2.21, 2.1.27, and 4.3.14). Furthermore, anairtight philosophical causal account for a less-than-real world isnot possible. One strength of his position is a remarkable flexibilityin accommodating contemporary scientific cosmologies. It is moreaccurate to read Śaṅkara as ambivalent towards the world.His approach is analogous to a dream character attempting to discoverthe waking ground of their dreamscape. Analyzing the dream’scausation and illusoriness may be part of a method, but is not thegoal. The dream’s illusoriness is only seen upon awakening andrecognizing the dream’s waking foundation.

Still, the empirical universe presents an ontological difficulty forŚaṅkara because he is an epistemic realist. He accepts thatexternal objects are not individual subjective illusions because weperceive these effects with intersubjective agreement. The world isthus independent of mind and not wholly unreal. One may thereforeargue that he contradicts himself or falls into an excluded middle(see Fost 1998). The universe either exists or does not exist, is realor unreal, and cannot be both simultaneously. His solution is to arguefor a third ontological space—that the universe is an objectivebut less-than-real appearance. This appearance, akin to a magic trick,ismāyā. All objects are unreal in that they aretransient and dependent; yet are not non-existent like the horn of ahare or self-contradictory like a square circle. His understanding ofwhat is unreal as a less-than-real appearance does not contradict whatis real. The universe of names and forms holds a unique ontologicalposition as indeterminable (anirvacanīya) asbrahman or something else other thanbrahman(BrSūBh 2.1.14, 2.1.17; GK 2.34; see Comans 2000: 239–246on indeterminability). It is not identical tobrahman (eventhough reducible tobrahman), but is not differenteither—it does not constitute a second reality. One may thusviewmāyā as a postulate by elimination to accountfor the world’s ontological inexplicability, intended to directone toward the unity of reality. In Śaṅkara’s finalphilosophical position, there is onlybrahman without parts,attributes, or causation.

2.3 Two-Tiered Reality

For Śaṅkara, the existence of the phenomenal empiricalworld alongside that of nondualbrahman is in fact anillusory false reality. They are one, not two. Yet the world’sindeterminable appearance sets up a two-tiered (or two truths or twoorders) approach to reality: (1) The conventional intersubjectiveempirical reality (vyāvahārikasattā) thatcomprises the universe; and (2) the ultimate reality(pāramārthikasattā) of nondual existence thatisbrahman. This hierarchy of two orders and theirasymmetrical relationship avoids their mutual contradiction. Aconscientious reader must understand this distinction and be mindfulthat Śaṅkara toggles his perspective between the two. Thisdistinction is also foundational for comprehending his views onconsciousness and his philosophical methods intended to culminate inmokṣa, more on which below.

The empirical order is a provisional ontology, whereas the ultimatereality is a final ontology. From the provisional empiricalperspective, our universe is well founded like the pot is founded inclay. No object depends on itself, and its dependence is transitivelydescending to the foundation of nondual existence. Theuniverse’s relationship with this ground is dependent andasymmetrical. This relationship collapses however at the ultimateorder of nondual reality. For example, Śaṅkara canprovisionally speak of the relationship of pot and clay (akin to theempirical standpoint); but from the perspective of cause and effectidentity, there is only clay (i.e., the absolute standpoint). The potform is a mere property, not a substantive. Despite its name andfunction, Śaṅkara does not ultimately attribute pot form toclay because it possesses no being apart from the clay substantive andis less real. Similarly, the order of ultimate reality is nondualexistence alone, with no second things like properties.

One cannot count two things, existence and object or existence andproperty, as equally existing across two orders of reality. Nor doescausation cross between two orders. In fact, from the ultimateperspective, the world (including the individual) is never truly bornbecause nonduality is not subject to causation. It has no parts, isnot bound by time or space, and is changeless (BrSūBh 2.1.14).Similarly, the pot-space which appears to be delimited by the walls ofthe pot does not delimit space itself—it is never truly bornfrom infinite space (GKBh 3.3–9). Therefore, the ultimatereality perspective excludes any dependence relations to make sense ofmetaphysical grounding. (See GKBh 2.32–33, 3.3–9 fordiscussions of brahman as that which has no birth(ajāti) as the universe).

The clay-pot example falls short of adequately illustrating the twoorders of reality. Śaṅkara’s more apt illustration isour phenomenal worlds of waking and dreaming, by which he can pump theintuition that there is no objective causation between the two states.For example, the dreamscape or an object like a dream clay-pot, iswell founded in the dreamer’s cognition born of wakingperceptual memory. This ontological dependence is asymmetrical. Thedream pot depends on the memory of a waking pot cognition, but notvice versa; however, the dreamer cannot discover that causation solelyfrom within the dream’s objective reality no matter how hardthey reductively squeeze the dream pot. The dream pot’s groundis in the waking state, and discovering that waking realitysimultaneously falsifies the dream world. After awakening, there is nodream to speak of, no level playing field for causation across the twoorders. Similarly, discovering the metaphysical ground of theempirical universe transitions to the ultimate reality of nondualexistence, in which there is no world of forms to question and nolevels of hierarchy remaining. (See Ram-Prasad 2002 onŚaṅkara’s use of the dream analogy).

In this way, even though Śaṅkara assumes realism at theempirical level in terms of veridical cognition, he negates itmetaphysically from the absolute level. This leads him to a positionof non-realism (Ram-Prasad 2002). From the empirical standpoint, thesetwo orders seem to exist simultaneously and possess an asymmetricalrelationship—the world is dependent uponbrahman forits existence, yetbrahman has no dependence on the worldeven though immanent in it. Only from the absolute standpoint doesempirical reality collapse intobrahman. The ultimate realityperspective metaphysically devours the world, all of its causation,and even its status as an appearance. From the nondual standpointthere is onlybrahman.Brahman never undergoesgenuine transformation (pariṇāma) into the world,just as a rope mistaken to be a snake does not actually transform intoa snake. Nor is the snake separate from the rope.

2.4 Īśvara (God)

Though Śaṅkara dismisses empirical reality from themetaphysical standpoint of nonduality, the universe still possessesvalue in its identification withīśvara (usuallytranslated as “God” or “Lord” for lack of amore suitable English term). Śaṅkara is ambiguous at timesin differentiatingīśvara frombrahman,and uses several terms synonymously for both such as the“highest lord” (parameśvara); but hegenerally distinguishesīsvara as the lower(apara)brahman qualified with attributes (i.e., theuniverse), from the higher (apara)brahman that isabsolute nonduality (BrSūBh 4.3.14). Following his readings ofthe Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara identifiesīśvara as both the material and intelligent causesof the universe (BrSūBh 1.1.2).Īśvaraemanates the universe through a cosmic causal power(māyāṣakti), and is the very process ofbecoming itself, a beginningless cycle of universe manifestation,sustenance, and dissolution. This process is an auto-cosmogony, makingīśvara the material of the universe. As nothing butīśvara, the whole universe is sentient andself-aware. (See Ram-Prasad 2013; Comans 2000; Hacker 1995; andWarrier 1977 for further discussions ofīśvara).

Following his reading of theMāṇḍūkyaUpaniṣad, Śaṅkara likens the universe’sunmanifest state toīśvara in a cosmic state ofdeep dreamless sleep. Manifestation occurs whenīśvara, as the intelligent cause, visualizes theuniverse through memory of past universes. This projective ontologicalcapacity ofīśvara is analogous to anindividual’s process of dreaming. Dreaming utilizes memory toproject a dream world that is not separate from one’s mind(BṛUBh 4.3.10). The universe is similarly an effortlessmanifestation ofīśvara’s knowledge, andpossesses no existence apart fromīśvara. Theuniverse’s ongoing manifestation is concurrent withīśvara’s perception of it like the dreamscapeis concurrent with the dreamer’s perception. Theuniverse’s very existence depends onīśvaraknowing it, forīśvara’s knowing is its veryprojection into objective existence.

As the material cause,īśvara takes form as theuniverse through a processual cosmogony of subtle elements thatundergo a process of grossification, first into elements and then intoobjects. On the level of subtle elements,īśvarafunctions as a cosmic mind named Hiraṇyagarbha, whoseunrestricted intelligence pervades the universe. This cosmic mind isenlivened by its fundamental ground of consciousness-existence(brahman). On the level of coarse element composition, theperceptible universe is akin toīśvara’sphysical body or brain. In this formīśvara isnamed Virāt. Śaṅkara’s view of the universe atthe empirical level, with its universal mind and fundamental nature asconsciousness, parallels some contemporary iterations of panentheismand panpsychism, particularly top-down cosmopsychism; however, hisultimate view of nondualbrahman collapses any questionsabout the individual derivation or instantiation of nondualconsciousness. (See Gasparri 2019; Vaidya 2020; and Albahari 2019 forcomparisons of Advaita Vedānta and cosmopsychism).

Individuals are microcosms homologous to theīśvaramacrocosm; however, they are part and parcel of the universe. They areontologically dependent onīśvara and lack anyobjective ontological power of projection beyond subjectiveprojections like dreaming and imagination. While the individual has apart to whole relationship withīśvara from themind-body standpoint, ultimately there is only numerical identitybetween the individual andīśvara from thestandpoint of existence identified as pure consciousness.Īśvara is the “knower of the field”(kṣetrajña)—the core of subjectivitypresent in all living beings and identified withbrahman aspure consciousness (BhGBh 13.2).

3. Consciousness, Mind, and Personal Identity

Śaṅkara does not intend his position that existence existswithout objective location to be a paradox or a kind of obscurantistmysticism (see§2.1 above). He believes the world is mysterious in that it isindeterminable, but not so existence itself. His crucial point is thatthe singular place to discover existence without objectifying it iswithin the foundation of our own phenomenal experience—asconsciousness itself. Śaṅkara analyzes consciousness(cit orcaitanyam) through both perspectives of histwo orders of reality. From the provisional empirical order,consciousness is a witnessing presence (sākṣin) bywhich all mental cognition is revealed as known. The absoluteperspective strips consciousness of all relational properties,including intentionality and its status as a witness, leaving only theintrinsic self-illuminating nature of consciousness remaining. Heidentifies this pure non-intentional consciousness as numericallyidentical with nondual existence, which isbrahman.

3.1 Witnessing Consciousness

From the standpoint of individual experience, witnessing consciousnessis the locus of one’s subjective being, the basic sense ofself-existence, and the foundation of self-identity. It is the gluethat unifies disparate forms of experience like waking, dreaming, anddifferent modes of perception, and it accounts for memory anddiachronic personal identity (BrSūBh 2.3.31; BṛUBh 4.3.7).This consciousness is distinct from an autobiographical sense of selfconstructed through recollective memory traces. Śaṅkaradistinguishes witnessing consciousness from the mind, mentalqualities, and cognitive modes. Consciousness is not composed ofphysical materials, structures, or processes, whereas the mind iscomposed of inert subtle matter. Consciousness is not an emergentproperty of the brain and body, which are composed of inert coarsematter, because that which is inert cannot give rise to sentiency.(See Ram-Prasad 2001a on Advaita’s consciousness andcontemporary physicalism).

Witnessing consciousness always accompanies cognition (see, e.g.,BṛUBh 1.4.10; KeUBh 1.2, 2.4). When one’s mind assumes theform of intentional objects, the cognition is immediately manifestedas known in the presence of witnessing consciousness. Consciousnessillumines cognitions directly with infallible access and without themediation of another mental mode. It reveals first order states ofcognition, including sense perception and internal states such asaffect and imagination; as well as second order states such asintrospection and meta-cognitive monitoring. Yet the witness is notitself a meta-function of the mind, such as an inner sense, a higherorder cognition, or an introspective awareness that deliberatelyrecognizes the fact of one’s experience. The witness is not aseparate substantial entity at all according to Śaṅkara,nor does it possess agency in revealing cognition as a knower. It isintransitive and receptive, simply the passive witnessing itself(BṛUBh 1.4.10; TaiUBh 2.1.1; KeUBh 2.4). Only the mind possessesobject directed intentionality, not witnessing consciousness. (SeeGupta 1998 and Fort 1984 on witnessing consciousness. See Albahari2009; and Fasching 2011 and 2012 for contextualizing witnessingconsciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind).

Śaṅkara understands consciousness as immediately evident,yet outside the scope of any means of knowledge. As the illuminatingbackground of all phenomenal states, witnessing consciousness is thepresupposition of all epistemological knowing. It is intrinsicallyfirst-personal. Consciousness is therefore not objectifiable (KeUBh2.1). This conclusion further entails that it is unaffected by what itillumines and remains untouched by mental states. Consciousness doesnot undergo any causation whatsoever because causation must presupposeits object-hood status.

Śaṅkara views witnessing consciousness as invariabledespite the fluctuations of mental modes. One foundational argumentfor this is his analysis of waking, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleepstates based on theBṛhadāraṇyaka andMāṇḍūkya Upaniṣads. He considersthese three mental states as exhaustive of human experience, andclaims that consciousness persists constantly through all threedespite their mutual exclusivity. When awakening from a dream state,though the dream world and dream body discontinue, there is no ruptureto the continuity of one’s consciousness. Consciousnesscontinues seamlessly even in deep dreamless sleep where ego and agencyresolve into an unmanifest state and subject-object distinctionscollapse.

One might object that persistence of consciousness in deep sleep isnot possible given the mainstream premise of identifying consciousnessas intentional experience. Śaṅkara disagrees with thepremise that consciousness is intrinsically intentional. (This was amatter of great debate between Advaita Vedānta and rivalphilosophies like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). He counters thatthe absence of intentional experience in deep sleep does not entailthe lack of consciousness insofar as consciousness is notintrinsically intentional. It exists even in the absence of cognitionrepresenting an object. Rejecting his position is difficult becauseone cannot claim direct perception of unconsciousness in deep sleep,and in that case cannot inductively infer unconsciousness either.Rather than viewing deep sleep as the absence of consciousness,Śaṅkara claims there is simply an absence of objects.Consciousness of the absence of objects is not the absence ofconsciousness. This is akin to having one’s eyes wide open andseeing but in a pitch-black room. Consciousness simply has nothing toillumine, therefore no intentional experience occurs nor any awarenessof one’s self as a knower. This presence of consciousness indeep sleep is possible because it is self-illuminating and existsindependently from objects or knowing agents. (SeeŚaṅkara’s discussions of deep sleep in BṛUBh4.3, GKBh ch.1, and BrSūBh 3.2.7–10. For further studiessee Thompson 2015; Comans 1990; and Sharma 2004).

3.2 Self-Illumination of Consciousness

Witnessing consciousness is elusive because it is unobjectifiable. Itescapes our attention because it stands behind cognitiveintentionality and cannot attend to itself. One cannot isolate thewitness by pulling it to one side and objects to another, for indrawing a line between the two, both become objects of consciousness.Consciousness cannot become an objective content of consciousness. Ifone infers that this non-finding of consciousness is evidence of itsnon-existence, Śaṅkara counters that one cannot deny theirown consciousness (BrSūBh 2.3.7). Consciousness is self-evident.It cannot admit its own absence or antecedent negation, for anydismissal of consciousness presupposes its very existence.Consciousness thus falls outside the scope of negation.

Śaṅkara defines the intrinsic nature of consciousness asuniquely self-illuminating (svaprakāśa) because itdoes not require a second awareness for it to be known. Consciousnessis intrinsically reflexive, immediate, and self-revealing in allcognition, while simultaneously remaining the non-object of knowledge.It is self-established in that it does not require a means ofknowledge to be known, nor any proof or justification for itsexistence. It is self-disclosing. No second thing mediates its accessto itself (see Śaṅkara on BṛUBh 4.3, TaiUBh2.1.1).

Śaṅkara repudiates rival philosophies such as theNyāya school which rejects witnessing consciousness andself-illumination in favor of other-illumination(paraprakāśa)—a thesis more akin tocontemporary higher order theories. Nyāya argues that a secondcognition is required to illumine the first.Śaṅkara’s basic counter-critique is that if a primarycognition requires a second apperceptive cognition to be known, thenthe second would require a third, etc., leading to a vicious infiniteregression fallacy. In that case no perception could ever be known.The self-illumination of witnessing consciousness accounts for theimmediacy of cognition without falling into an infinite regress ofmental modes (BrSūBh 2.2.28; BṛUBh 4.3.7). There is no needto apprehend the witness because it is self-established. Ifconsciousness cannot become its own object, yet does not require asecond, subsequent, or higher order cognition to reveal itself, thanan infinite regression fallacy does not arise.

Śaṅkara also critiques the view of some MahāyānaBuddhist philosophers, Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti for example,who argue that a given cognition or mental state can simultaneouslyreveal itself and its object. Their self-illumination thesis is quitesimilar to Advaita Vedānta but endeavors to be more parsimoniousby eliding the witnessing consciousness. Śaṅkara countersthat a self-illuminating cognition is incoherent because it is subjectto the reflexivity fallacy (BrSūBh 2.2.28). Just as a knifecannot cut itself, so too is cognition unable to objectify itself. Acognition requires a different source of illumination to be known.This is also a matter of direct experience, for we are aware of acognition’s changes such as its origination and destruction andthe arising of a new cognition. A source of illumination distinct fromthe cognition itself is required to know such changes.Śaṅkara contends that the self-illumination of witnessingconsciousness does not similarly fall to a reflexivity fallacy (KeUBh1.3). Even though consciousness is immediately known, it does notobjectify itself. Self-illuminating consciousness does not come into arelationship with itself. It does not entail being subject and objectsimultaneously, which would be incoherent, for there is no distinctionto be made between itself and consciousness of itself. (See Mackenzie2012; Ram-Prasad 2007; Timalsina 2009; Indich 1980; and Fasching 2021for further discussions of self-illumination).

3.3 Reflection: Consciousness, Mind, and Personal Identity

As the foundation of experience and presupposition of knowledge,Śaṅkara’s witnessing consciousness precedes hisepistemology. The difficulty he faces, however, is how to bridgeself-illuminating consciousness, which is unchanging andnon-relational, to cognition and intentional experience within theindividual knower. He develops a reflection or semblance(pratibimba orābhāsa) theory ofconsciousness to address such issues. The deeper purpose of thistheory however is to develop an account for individuals superimposingfalse identities on consciousness (see US ch.18 forŚaṅkara’s most detailed discussion of reflection, aswell as BṛUBh 4.3.7 and ChUBh 6.3.2).

For Śaṅkara,īśvara’s emanationinto the universe not only indicates that the universe is sentient,but also how living beings come to possess phenomenal consciousnessand identify themselves as individuals. Even though the entireuniverse is sentient, individual sentiency is only expressed under thecondition of having a mind. He employs the analogy of reflection toexplain the relationship of mind and consciousness, and toprovisionally wed intrinsic reflexivity with cognitive intentionality.His theory of reflection is also a novel way of addressing thedecombination problem in cosmopsychism—the explanatory gapbetween universal and individual organism consciousness. (See Albahari2019 on the decombination problem).

Śaṅkara’s common term for the mind is the“inner instrument” (antaḥkaraṇa). Hecategorizes the mind in different ways in accordance with his sourcetexts (see BrSūBh 2.3.32 for example), yet consistentlydistinguishes between two functions:

1. the intellect (buddhi) which is the mental function ofdetermination and definitive knowing; and
2. themanas, which includes sensory, affective, andconative functions as well as indecision.

He also includes two additional functions:

3. the I-notion (ahaṃkāra–literally the“I-maker”,) which is one’s sense of self; and
4. the power of recollection (citta)

(see, e.g., his commentary onMāṇḍūkya2. The later Advaita tradition standardized the mind as having thisfour-fold function). Śaṅkara maintains an Upaniṣadicview that minds are materially constituted bysattva, thesubtlest aspect of each primary element.Sattva has aqualitative predominance of lucidity and transparency. It makes themind akin to the reflective surface of a mirror capable of reflectinglight, or like a transparent glass that allows light to pass throughwhile illuminating variations on its surface. Unlike minds, mediumslike rocks are inert because of their opacity. They lack enoughsattva constitution to be reflective even though they arealso fundamentally grounded in consciousness.

Śaṅkara identifies the reflective medium specifically asthebuddhi (BṛUBh 4.3.7). Just as light is pervasivebut only becomes visible through a reflective medium (because spacedoes not reveal light), so too is consciousness expressedexperientially only in the reflective medium of the intellect. Theintellect takes on the semblance of consciousness. Consciousness thusappears to be located in one’s mind even though all-pervasive.The mind depends on reflected consciousness for its experience ofitself, like we use a mirror reflection to see ourselves. The mindalso depends on consciousness to cognize objects, like using themirror reflection of light to illumine things in darkness. Thereflection enables intentionality even though the prototype witnessingconsciousness is non-intentional and remains untouched in theappearance of causation.

Reflection is the seed of individuation and the I-notion because mindappears to be the locus of consciousness. Mind becomes the reflexivecenter of self-identification, manifesting as knower-ship, doer-ship,and enjoyer-ship. The reflection further extends through the senseorgans, which are also predominantlysattva, to encompassesthe body’s periphery through the sense of touch. This extensionforms a constellation of experiential points of reference thatcircumscribes self-identity as the complex of mind, body, and senseorgans (see BṛUBh 4.3.7; ChUBh 8.8.1–2; BrSūBh2.3.28–30).

Śaṅkara employs another theory, the limitation theory(avaccheda), to help explain the individuation ofconsciousness. This theory counters potential problems arising fromthe reflection theory, such as assuming a genuine duality of mind andconsciousness, or that consciousness undergoes causation and entry, orthat it actually resides locatively in the mind. The limitation theoryexplains that just as we mistakenly perceive nondual space asdelimited by an object—for example, a pot delimiting a potspace—so too do we misunderstand non-dual consciousness asdelimited by the mind (see GKBh 3.3–9). The pot space is not agenuine limiting property of space because space is not divisible bythe pot form. The pot space is an appearance. It is merely an asthough limiting property, a conditioning adjunct(upādhi) that we superimpose on to space to account forparticular functions (e.g., containing a liquid). So too, do peoplemistakenly assume the mind-body-sense complex possesses consciousnessand that consciousness is intrinsically intentional. In reality, themind-body-sense complex is merely anupādhi that doesnot possess or limit nondual consciousness.

For Śaṅkara, the reflection of consciousness is an asthough appearance because all-pervasive consciousness is not subjectto movement or change. Consciousness is not like a substance thatundergoes modification or entry within time and space. It remainsuntouched and unaffected, like the prototype image is untouched by itsreflection or universal space is unaffected by the pot (BrSūBh2.3.46). Furthermore, literal entry is also not possible because thereflection is less real than its prototype. Śaṅkara arguesthat a real thing (consciousness) cannot enter into a less real one(mind) because they are of two different orders of reality. My limitedsense of self-identity, what I take to be me, is merely a reflection.It only appears to be my self like a reflected facial image appears tobe my face. My actual face, the prototype, is more real than thereflection and does not literally enter the mirror (US 18.85–6).Furthermore, my facial reflection possesses no existence apart from myface. Self-identity with the mind-body-sense organs is similarlyvirtual, not fully real; yet people remain unaware of this factbecause they are mired in self-ignorance and enamored with theirreflections.

The intention of the reflection analogy is not to establish adefinitive metaphysical process of how one becomes conscious; butrather to reveal consciousness as untouched, and to point out thefundamental epistemological problem of falsely buying into constructedself-identities as if they are fundamental features of reality. Thisintention parallels his use of cosmogonies to undermine our assumedreality of the world and point back towards the metaphysical ground ofexistence (see§2.2 above). Similarly, the reflection theory obliquely points backtowards the prototype, the witness, which is the ground of pureconsciousness underlying the reflection. Recognizing that ground cutsthrough mistaken self-identities. The reflection analogy thus providesa conceptual framework to discriminate consciousness from all pointsof reflected identity from within the starting point of ourphenomenology. This project is difficult however because consciousnessis unobjectifiable, situated elusively behind cognition so to speak,and is transparent to cognition. Consciousness and intellect cannot beseparated like a blade of grass from its sheath (BṛUBh 4.3.7).Cognition is also subtly embedded in bodily identity and invariablyaccompanied by a sense of knower-ship/I-ness andownership/for-me-ness; however, Śaṅkara claims thatembodiment, knower-ship and ownership are all objectifiablecognitions. They are known and therefore not intrinsic to witnessingconsciousness.

The distinction of witnessing consciousness from mind and objectsappears dualistic from the empirical order perspective but transitionsto nonduality from the absolute perspective. Witnessing consciousnessis the bridge between the two orders, an ontological primitive that isfundamental to one’s self as well as all reality. Pureconsciousness matches the nature of nondual existence as free of nameand form. Consciousness is “pure”, in that it is free fromany relation, predication, or intentionality. Consciousness is unlikeany object because it is unobjectifiable. It is ultimately not evensubject to time or space, which are themselves objects of the witness.Like pure existence, consciousness is self-established. It has noparts, is irreducible, and stands outside of causation and dependencerelations. Consciousness is a constant unchanging presence, the onlycontinuity of existence persisting through the process of infiniteobject reductions in searching for an object’s metaphysicalground. It resists qualification, eliminative reduction, or dependenceon a second thing.

Śaṅkara’s philosophical conclusion is thatnon-reducible existence is numerically identical to purenon-intentional consciousness. Consciousness is nondual. It is theintrinsic nature ofbrahman itself. Consciousness is notsimply the witness of one’s experience. It is the ultimateground comprising an individual’s self-existence, the singleself (ātman) of all sentient beings from a blade ofgrass toīśvara, and the metaphysical foundation ofthe entire universe.

3.4 Superimposition: The Fundamental Problem of Ignorance

The reflection and limitation theories above point to a fundamentalerror shared by all beings. If individuation is the apparentdelimitation of nondual consciousness, then assuming personal identityis real is actually an error, a manifestation of ignorance.Śaṅkara explains that we falsely identify with“I”, construct the possessiveness of “mine”,and then cling to them. We mutually superimpose consciousness on toour mind-body, and the mind-body on to consciousness (i.e., I am themind-body, and the mind-body is I). Superimposition is possible eventhough consciousness is not an object because it is the content of“I” and always immediate in one’s experience. Weassume the mind intrinsically possesses consciousness, and thatconsciousness is subject to the mind-body’s limitations, likeone may mistake a scratch in the mirror as actually marringone’s face. Similarly, one may mistake a clear crystal as reddue to a red flower placed behind it. Like the crystal or mirror, themind-body is a conditioning adjunct (upādhi) thatprovides a locus of individuation. This error conceals one’sfundamental nondual nature, the ground of superimposition, likemistaking a rope for a snake conceals its rope nature. (SeeŚaṅkara’s seminal discussion of superimposition inhis introduction to the BrSū titled, the “Commentary onSuperimposition” [Adhyāsabhāṣya]).

The epistemic failure of mutual superimposition is caused by ignorance(avidyā). Śaṅkara identifiesavidyā as the root cause of all existential suffering.It produces a baseline of fear and anxiety due to assuming one’sself as a limited being subject to sorrow, sickness, and death. Basedon this error, individuals seek wholeness, happiness, andlimitlessness through known ends like material gains, social status,hedonic pleasures, or reaching heavenly worlds; however, suchendeavors are perpetually bound to fail because results of finiteactions are limited, transient, and dependent. They may providetemporary reprieves or happy mental states, but do not provide thelimitless wholeness of liberation. Only the direct understanding ofone’s self as nondualbrahman negates the error ofsuperimposition, and frees one from the beginninglesskarmiccycle of death, rebirth, and suffering. One’s cluster ofmistaken self-identities and the whole psychological scaffolding thatperpetuates suffering collapses only by removing the kingpin ofignorance. Then only nondual consciousness remains standing. Uponrecognizing this reality, the mind rests in its own intrinsic beingwith absolute fullness, peacefulness, and tranquility.Śaṅkara’s soteriological project is thus primarilyepistemological with several positive psychological repercussions.

Several questions about Śaṅkara’s position onignorance became contentious in post-Śaṅkara Advaita: Isthe locus of ignorance in the individual orbrahman? Isignorance simply misapprehension or does it have a two-fold power ofcovering and projection? Does it hold both epistemological andontological powers? Is there a distinction of cosmic root ignoranceand secondary individual ignorance? And what is its relationship withmāyā? Such questions have caused severalintra-Advaita debates as well as philosophical critiques from rivaltraditions such as Rāmānuja’sViśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta andMādhva’s Dvaita Vedānta. (For further discussions ofthese issues see Potter 1981: 78–80; Ingalls 1953; Comans 2000:263–7; Doherty 2005; and Grimes 1990).

4. Contemplative Philosophical Methods

According to Śaṅkara, because the individual is nondualbrahman in reality, they already are what they seek tobe—unlimited, whole, and complete. The difficulty, however, isthat one’s felt sense of finite identity contradicts nondualityand engenders a seeming distance between the person andbrahman.Mokṣa thus appears to be a futureattainment rather than a recognition of present reality. This falsepremise entices one into action with the intent to gain or becomebrahman, but one cannot attain anew what is already attained.Action is superfluous to accomplish an already accomplished fact. Infact, the more one attempts to gain, reach, or experience liberationwhile mistakenly presupposing its distance, the further it recedeslike the horizon. This quagmire of action is not intractable thoughbecause both bondage and liberation are just figurative—nochange occurs in reality. The solution is purely self-knowledge, aradical epistemic shift in perspective by which one simultaneouslysheds limited self-identities and recognizes their existence asnondual consciousness. Only this direct immediate recognition ofnonduality defeats the error of superimposition. One becomesbrahman simply by knowingbrahman (MuU 3.2.9).Śaṅkara illustrates this concept of accomplishing theaccomplished with the “tenth man story” (TaiUBh 2.1.1).Ten children cross a river and then regroup to count each other. Eachchild counts only nine, and they sorrowfully conclude that the missingtenth child must have drowned. A passerby sees their plight andstates, “you are the tenth!” They then realize they simplyforgot to count themselves. The tenth child was never truly lost orgained. (See Comans 2000; Suthren Hirst 2005; and Rambachan 1991 forfurther discussions of Śaṅkara’s method).

4.1 Action and Meditation

Śaṅkara is ambivalent about actions such as yogicmeditation, ritual practice, or ethical duties within his method. Onthe one hand he strives to undermine the importance of mental orphysical action as an independent methodology for liberation. Actionis a cause for bondage, not a means of liberation, because it alwayspresupposes the reality of individual agency and contributes to acycle of further desire and action. Furthermore, any product of actionis finite and transient (Potter 1981: 38–41). Śaṅkaraviews action as having no epistemic fruitfulness independent of ameans of knowledge. He draws a critical distinction based on contentdependence. Physical actions such as ritual performance or mentalactions like imagination or meditation are dependent on anindividual’s will. They arise independently of the nature of thething concerned. Veridical cognition, however, is ultimately dependenton the nature of the object. It is determined by the object through aproper means of knowledge, with no options or alternatives in terms ofan agent’s choice. Action is therefore incapable of providingveridical knowledge whatsoever, let alone knowledge of non-duality(BrSūBh 1.1.4). This critique of action collapses anymethodological dichotomy of theory and practice, which is intrinsic toboth ritual practice and yogic meditation methods. Liberatingself-knowledge is not subject to any kind of ritual injunctions. It isnot procedural knowledge, nor the result of procedural knowledge. (SeeRam-Prasad 2000 on Śaṅkara’s distinction of knowledgeand action. See Bader 1990 and Dalal 2016 on his approach tomeditation).

On the other hand, Śaṅkara accepts the secondary importanceof yogic practices that involve a variety of meditation methods,devotional practices, ascetic austerities, moral psychology, and thedevelopment of ethical virtues and action ethics (see Sundaresan 2003on Yoga in Śaṅkara’s method). They may function asindirect means to liberation. Śaṅkara’s ambivalencetowards action is not a contradiction. He recognizes a voluntaryelement in any knowledge to some degree. One must create the properconditions to align a means of knowledge. For example, to visuallyperceive an object one may have to open their eyes and turn theirhead. Then visual knowledge automatically takes place. Similarly, theAdvaitin must possess a prepared mind to recognizebrahman.Śaṅkara provides a fourfold set of prerequisite conditionscharacterizing this qualified student: (1) discrimination between whatis transient and eternal; (2) dispassion towards objects of enjoyment;(3) perfecting practices such as the control of the mind and senses;and (4) the desire for liberation (BrSūBh 1.1.1).

Yogic and ethical practices, as well as analyses of the limitations ofgoals like pleasure, wealth, status, and heaven provide the conditionsfor self-knowledge by cultivating mental purity(antaḥkaraṇaśuddhi). Mental purity is theremoval of epistemic obstructions to knowingbrahman, such asgreed, anger, selfishness, violence, jealousy, and distraction. Italso includes developing positive qualifications such as ethicalattitudinal values of equanimity, acceptance, truthfulness,compassion, and benevolence. Mediation practices provide mentalstability and focus. These qualifications hone the mind’scapacity to be a proper container for text-sparked knowledge; though,in theory, if a student is already sufficiently qualified, they neednot undergo any such practices.

Śaṅkara’s commentary on theBhagavadgītā provides a rich resource for his yogicmethods and ethical virtues. For example, following BhG ch. 2–4,he endorses a yoga of action (karmayoga).Karmayogais a yogic process that employs a philosophy of action to cultivateemotional growth and world participation. It extends Vedic ritualframeworks of sacrificial contribution and consumption to all actions.All action becomes analogous to devotionally placing ritual oblationsinto the sacrificial fire as offerings to deities. The Advaitinyogin offers actions altruistically toīṣvara for the benefit of all beings(lokasaṅgraḥ) and the harmonious functioning ofthe world. Just as the sacrificer equanimously consumes the remnantsof sacrificial food offerings as a blessing, sans gustatory pleasureor aversion, so too does theyogin learn to accept theresults of their actions with equanimity.Karmayoga intendsto free one from the binding attachment of desires caused by themistaken belief that desired objects possess one’s happiness. Itdevelops internal renunciation, equipoise, gratitude, and benevolence,while releasing one from the anger, sadness, and inner turmoil thatarise from thwarted desire. This yogic attitude extends not onlyexternally to society, beings, and world, but also internally toone’s physiology and psychology.

4.2 The Triple Process and the Means of Nondual Knowledge

Śaṅkara embraces particular verbal methods to understandpropositions affirming nonduality crystallized in pithyUpaniṣadic sentences. (Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins focusedon four such “great sentences”[mahāvākyas]). These methods include continuity anddiscontinuity (anvaya andvyatireka), secondaryindication (lakṣaṇā), and negative language(neti neti). Śaṅkara does not clearly codify theseseparately, but it may be most accurate to describe his primary methodas continuity and discontinuity (see, e.g., GKBh 13.13).Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins often discuss his method aslakṣaṇā instead; however, Śaṅkaraappears to view all three as varying iterations of a singlemethod.

Anvaya andvyatireka is a method of discriminativereasoning to determine the relationship of what persists and what doesnot persist between two things. It reveals whether one term isindependent of another. For example, in the analogy of the clay andits forms (see§2.1 above), when a particular form of clay (such as a pot) occurs, thenclay occurs (continuity). And when that particular form (pot) isabsent (discontinuity) after being shaped into a plate, then claystill occurs. One may apply this method, for example, to consciousnessand mental states. Consciousness is continuous through thediscontinuous states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep and neversubject to its negative instance of discontinuity. Consciousnessitself can never be absent. One cannot escape from one’s ownconsciousness, nor can one directly separate a particular mental statefrom consciousness because consciousness itself is not mutuallyexclusive of anything and not subject to the negative instance ofvyatireka. However, separating consciousness and a particularmental state is possible throughanvaya andvyatireka because the states themselves are mutuallyexclusive. For example, dream reality and waking reality are mutuallyexclusive, pointing to the fact that consciousness is independent ofthem even as it persists through both. (See Cardona 1981;Satchidanandendra 1964 [1989]; Halbfass 1991: 162–77; Comans1996: 59–63; and Mayeda 1992: 51–58 onanvaya andvyatireka).

Mahāvākyas like “I am Brahman”(BṛU 1.4.10:ahaṃ brahmāsmi) or “Youare that” (ChU 6.8.7:tat tvam asi) are identitystatements that form an equation consisting of two or moreco-referential terms in grammatical apposition. The equation’slack of logical congruence—identifying the limited individual(aham) with nondualbrahman, or you (tvam)with that (tat) universe for example—contradictsyntactical expectancy. This prods the reader to use theanvaya andvyatireka method to resolve the equation.In the case of “You are that”,tvam negates themediacy oftat as existence external to one’s Self. Andtat negates any subjective limitations to the consciousnessreferred to intvam. The apposition thus restricts what doesnot persist between the two terms to reveal what is continuous andnumerically identical—namely pure consciousness andundifferentiated existence. The identity statement reveals that you(tvam), the pure consciousness which is the underlyingexistence of the individual, is that (tat) pure existencewhich is the metaphysical ground of all objects. Existence andconsciousness are one, not two. There is no distinction between theam-ness of one’s self and the is-ness of objects. (See ChUBhch.6 and US ch.18 for Śaṅkara’s interpretation of“You are that”).

Lakṣaṇā’s indirect implication employsa theory of metonymy which distinguishes between literal denotativemeanings and implied connotative meanings. The contradictoryjuxtaposition of an identity statement such as “You arethat” triggers a particular form of secondary implication inwhich a portion of the primary meaning is rejected while another partis retained. The canonical Advaita example is, “This (personthat you see now) is that Devadatta (whom you knew in thepast)”. Here, the primary referents of “this” and“that” cannot be identical because “this” and“that” refer to different locations and times, Devadattain the past somewhere else and Devadatta here and now. The twoDevadattas are not completely identical because of their relationshipsto time and place, nor are they completely separate. The import of thesentence creates a cognition of a single Devadatta substantive that isnot connected to a specific time or place. (See Lipner 1997; Bartley2002: 111–23; Suthren Hirst 2005: 145–51; Kunjunni Raja1969: 251–54, and the entry on theliteral-nonliteral distinction for further discussions of indirect implication).

Neti neti (negative language) literally means “not(this), not (this)”. Its negation targets the discontinuityaspect by stripping away all qualifications to personal identity andthe external world. This process removes false superimpositions ofbody, senses, and mind previously attributed tobrahman.Negative language attempts to avoid defining absolute reality as athing in the world. It denies any nameability ofbrahman, itsgrammatical object. This is directly tied tobrahman’sunobjectifiable status, for the hermeneutical premise ofŚaṅkara’s negative language is the inability ofpredicates to apply to absolute reality. To give positive predicateswould reify the absolute to a finite entity (on this see BṛUBh2.3.6).

Neti neti negates all properties, conceptions, limitations,and identities attributed tobrahman; however, it cannot loseall reference. Passages using negative language may push their objectaway, allowing the unobjectifiable object to continually slip back andbeyond; however, the purpose is not open ended. Negation strips awayall false conceptions, including one’s tendency to grasp afterthe absolute, without lapsing into nihilism or an infinite regression(BrSūBh 3.2.22). What appears to be an illogical infinite regressof negation is harnessed as a semantic force for understanding theabsolute. Negative language turns onto itself as well, negating itsprior negation and its own referential delimitations. When allconceptions of “I” as “this” or“that” are negated, then one’s self is understood tobe nondual consciousness.

Negative language usually constitutes half of a paradox that affirmspositive and negative propositions at the same time. Textual instancesof negation usually follow positive statements aboutbrahmanwhich provide an explicit positive proposition of continuity. There isa positive assertion of an entity but the negative language stripsthat entity of any limitations or finite objectivity. This methodologythreads the needle of indicatingbrahman’s presencewithout objectifying it. It ensures that the reader neither grasps atan object nor falls into nihilism. The negative assertions ofnetineti, which follow or imply a positive assertion, parallel theother two methods.Lakṣaṇā andanvaya-vyatireka similarly depend on negationthrough mutual restriction, while simultaneously indicating theintrinsic nature ofbrahman without falling intonihilism.

4.3 Self-Knowledge and Living While Liberated

How to exactly define liberation in Śaṅkara’s thoughtis inherently problematic. He does not provide a preciseepistemological account of how knowledge ofbrahman takesplace. Śaṅkara’s conception of liberation removesitself from the boundaries of ordinary discourse, debate, and causalepistemology (See TaiUBh 2.9.1 for example). There is a metaphysicaluncertainty about it, for on the one hand a liberating cognition maybe able to remove self-ignorance, but on the other it is problematicto reduce ever-present liberation to a cognition which is a productand a temporal event. From the empirical perspective liberation may beinexplicable and indeterminable due to its transition to ultimatenondual reality.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty is describing what Śaṅkarathought about the transition from what appears to be descriptiveknowledge to direct knowledge, or from a type of modal knowledge to aknowledge of intrinsic being that is pure consciousness. In his view,understanding the Upaniṣadic identity statement generates aunique cognition revealing the veridical knowledge, “I ambrahman”—that one is indiscernible from nondualconsciousness, numerically identical withbrahman, and thereality of everything. This knowledge removes root ignorance to negatesuperimposition veiling one’s true nature. It strips allqualifications and relationships from consciousness, deconstructs theI-sense and knower-ship as unreal, and deindividuates the individualfrom all conditioning adjuncts (see Ram-Prasad 2001b: ch. 4). Thensuffering,karma, and rebirth have no locus in which to clingbecause only nondual consciousness remains.

Nondual knowledge does not entail subject-object distinction likeobject cognitions because its content is identical to theconsciousness illuminating the cognition. Its content isbrahman itself (see, e.g., TaiUBh 2.1.1; MuUBh 3.1.2, 4; andBrSūBh 2.1.14). There is no call to apperceive this knowledge forthe sake of a truth certifying inference. Extrinsic certificationcannot determine its veridicality because intrinsic consciousness(svarūpajñānam) is self-illuminating andcannot be known by a second cognition. Its self-illumination entailsits self-certification when directly known. The cognition’smodal form (vrttijñānam), however, is analogousto a self-immolating match. By recognizing its content, itcannibalizes its own modal form. It reveals its own modal appearanceas an appearance, which is only brahman. In this process it loses itsstatus as a means of knowledge, akin to a means of knowledge in adream (BhGBh 2.69).

Śaṅkara uses the analogy of waking up from dreaming toillustrate understanding nonduality and the non-realism of the world(BrSūBh 2.1.14). He does not characterize this as a mysticalstate of union, an extraordinary oceanic experience, or a state of nomind. In fact, one cannot describe this knowledge as an experientialstate because states are objectifiable cognitions. Furthermore, thisknowledge ostensibly negates experiential agency. His liberation is apurely epistemic shift that removes false conceptual constructions.From an epistemic perspective, Śaṅkara sees the liberatedperson as having no more dealings concerned with actions, instruments,and results. They have no more perception of duality, and possess nomore self-identity with the mind and body (BṛUBh 2.4.14,4.5.15); however, from a phenomenal perspective, liberation does notentail an annihilation of one’s experience of the world(BrSūBh 3.2.21). This is like a magician who remains unconfuseddespite perceiving their own magical illusions. The liberated personrecognizes nonduality but continues living as an embodied individualexperiencing the world. This lasts according to the ongoingfructification ofkarma in their present birth (ChUbh6.14.2). One who is “living while liberated”(jīvanmukti) seamlessly inhabits the apparent paradoxesof being disembodied in the midst of embodiment, of acting whilerecognizing their non-agency, and of perceiving the world despitedeindividuation. (See Fort 1998 onjīvanmukti).

A lucid dream experience is an ideal illustration ofŚaṅkara’s liberation, though not found in his work.For experienced lucid dreamers, the recognition that one is dreamingpossesses a conviction that completely cuts through the appearance ofthe dream fabric, but does so without eliminating perceptual dreamexperience. They are epistemically aware of two orders of reality,waking and dreaming, while phenomenally remaining in the less realdreaming order. The lucid dreamer is deindividuated from the dreambody, yet remains embodied within the dream experience. They recognizethat the dream is not separate from themselves, that it cannot touchthem, and that there is nothing to fear or gain from it. InŚaṅkara’s metaphysical view however, the empiricalorder is analogous toīśvara’s dream, notone’s own. This view accommodates the universe’s identitywithīśvara, along with intersubjective agreementand veridical cognition, without falling into solipsism. Theindividual is not creating empirical reality, but rather making amistake about it. Like the dream, empirical reality is not illusoryfrom within its own order of reality. It is known as a virtualappearance only from the more foundational perspective of knowingbrahman, analogous to awakening to the reality of the dream.The liberated person is like a finite dream being withinīśvara’s cosmic dream who has awakened withinthe dream. They recognize that the immediate presence of consciousnessis the single foundation grounding all objects, the single self of allbeings, and the self ofīśvara.

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Abbreviations

Note that ‘Bh’ is appended to the other abbreviations toindicate Śaṅkara’s commentary on that work (e.g.,‘TaiUBh’). The numbers following an abbreviation (e.g.,"TaiU 2.1.1") indicate the chapter, section, and verse.

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