The debate between methodological holists and methodologicalindividualists concerns the proper focus of explanations in the socialsciences: to what extent should social scientific explanations revolvearound social phenomena and individuals, respectively? The discussiontakes two main forms.

The most enduring debate surrounds the issue of dispensability.Methodological holists engaged in this debate defend the view thatexplanations that invoke social phenomena (e.g., institutions, socialstructures or cultures) should be offered within the social sciences:their use is indispensable. Explanations of this sort are variouslyreferred to as holist, collectivist, social (-level), or macro(-level) explanations. They are exemplified by claims such as“the unions protested because the government wanted to lower thenational minimum wage”, or “the rise in unemployment ledto a higher crime rate”. Holist explanations may be contrastedwith explanations that are expressed in terms of individuals, theiractions, beliefs, desires, and the like. The latter are variouslytermed individualist, individual (-level), or micro (-level)explanations. They are illustrated by claims such as “Anna bakeda cake because Susan wanted it”, or

as a result of individualsa,b,c, etc.losing their jobs, and feeling very frustrated about having littlemoney and no job opportunities, the crime rate went up.

Methodological holists may or may not hold that individualistexplanations should be offered in addition to holist explanations.Whatever methodological holists’ stand on this issue, they areopposed by methodological individualists who insist that individualistexplanations alone should be provided within the social sciences, andthus, that holist explanations should be dispensed with.

The other, more recent dispute between methodological holists andindividualists is concerned with the issue of microfoundations.Methodological holists involved in this debate defend the view that insome cases, purely holist explanations (i.e., explanations statedsolely in terms of social phenomena) may stand on their own: they donot invariably need individual-level microfoundations. A purely holistexplanation might be “the economic depression was the mainreason why the war broke out”. Methodological holists maymaintain that this explanation is fine as it stands; it need not besupplemented with further details specifying how the economicdepression incited individuals to adopt certain beliefs, act incertain ways, etc., that in turn led to the outbreak of the war.Methodological individualists disagree, insisting that such additionalaccounts must always be provided.

Within philosophy and the social sciences, whether in the context ofthe dispensability or the microfoundations debate, proponents ofmethodological holism do not necessarily describe their position insuch terms. In fact, this is seldom so within the social sciences. Incertain cases, some alternative label is used, for example, when“explanatory holism” and “collectivism” areemployed to denote the view that holist explanations areindispensable. In other cases, no label at all is attributed to one orboth of the views that are here described as methodologically holist.In this entry, differences of terminology will be disregarded: theterm “methodological holism” is used to describe both thethesis that holist explanations are indispensable, as well as thethesis that purely holist explanations do not always needindividual-level microfoundations.

The methodological individualism-holism debate that concerns theproper focus of social scientific explanations is just one amongseveral individualism-holism disputes. Most notably, there areindividualism-holism debates about ontology, confirmation, andmorality. Within these discussions, holism is the view that socialphenomena existsui generis, or in their own right (theontological debate); that social scientific explanations need notalways be confirmed by looking at what happens at the level ofindividuals (the debate on confirmation); and that moralresponsibility may sometimes be ascribed to social entities such asgroups (one version of the moral debate). It is perfectly possible,and in fact quite common, to subscribe to methodological holism in thesense defined in this entry without endorsing these other forms ofholism. Though interesting, these debates will not be directlyaddressed here.

The following discussion of methodological holism consists of twoparts. Sections 1 and 2 examine the dispensability debate, andSections 3 and 4 consider the microfoundations debate. Both partsfocus on methodological holists’ views—andarguments—in these disputes. For a characterization ofmethodological individualism, see the entry onmethodological individualism.

• 1. The Dispensability Debate
• 2. Why Holist Explanations are Indispensable
  • 2.1 The Argument from Social Phenomena as Causes
  • 2.2 The Argument from the Impossibility of Translation
  • 2.3 The Argument from the Impossibility of Intertheoretic Reduction
  • 2.4 The Argument from Explanatory Regress
  • 2.5 The Argument from Differing Explanatory Interests
  • 2.6 The Argument from Pragmatic Concerns
• 3. The Microfoundations Debate
• 4. Why Purely Holist Explanations Can Sometimes Stand on Their Own
  • 4.1 The Argument from Underlying Social-Level Mechanisms
  • 4.2 The Argument from Mechanism Regress
  • 4.3 The Argument from Explanatory Practices
  • 4.4 The Argument from Non-Mechanistic Explanatory Considerations
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Dispensability Debate

The defense of methodological holism dates back to at least the turnof the nineteenth century. Around this time, Emile Durkheim advocatedthe indispensability of holist explanations in a number of writings(see e.g., Durkheim 1938[1895], 1951[1897]). He famously stated thatthe

determining cause of a social fact should be sought among thesocial facts preceding it and not among the states of the individualconsciousness. (Durkheim 1938 [1895]: 110—italics in theoriginal)

His work is typically juxtaposed to that of Max Weber, who is regardedas the main proponent of methodological individualism during thisperiod. In the subsequent history of the debate, there are two phasesthat particularly stand out. The first began around the 1950s, whenFriedrich Hayek, Karl Popper, and J.W.N. Watkins argued ardently insupport of methodological individualism. In response, Ernest Gellner,Leon G. Goldstein, Maurice Mandelbaum, and others maintained thatthere were alternative ways of cashing out, and defending,methodological holism that were left unscathed by Hayek’s,Popper’s and Watkins’ objections (see Gellner 1973 [1956];Goldstein 1973a [1956], 1973b [1958]; Mandelbaum 1955, 1973 [1957].They all appear in O’Neill 1973, which also contains otherimportant contributions from this period).

The second significant period stretches from around the 1980s up untiltoday. From the perspective of methodological holism, this phase ismarked by the appearance of a number of new, or new versions of,arguments in support of the indispensability of holist explanations.In this phase, seminal contributions to the dispensability debate weremade by Roy Bhaskar, Alan Garfinkel, Harold Kincaid, Frank Jackson andPhilip Pettit to mention just a few (see Bhaskar 1979; Garfinkel 1981;Kincaid 1996, 1997; Jackson and Pettit 1992a, 1992b). The followingsection focuses on the most important arguments advanced during thislast—and still unfolding—period. (See Zahle and Collin2014a for a collection of papers from this period.) The remainder ofthe present section is concerned with the further introduction of thepositions at play within the dispensability debate. As noted above,special attention will be paid to the methodological holiststance.

There are three basic views within the debate:

Strong methodological holism: Holist explanations aloneshould be offered within the social sciences; they are indispensable.Individualist explanations may, and should, be dispensed with.

Moderate methodological holism: In certain cases, holistexplanations should be advanced; in other cases individualistexplanations should be advanced; both holist and individualistexplanations are indispensable within the social sciences.

Methodological individualism: Individualist explanationsalone should be put forward within the social sciences; they areindispensable. Holist explanations may, and should, be dispensedwith.

Among these positions, the thesis of strong methodological holism hasenjoyed relatively little support and today it has few, if any,proponents. The vast majority of methodological holists are of themoderate variety. Accordingly, the debate has mainly played itself outbetween the moderate holist view and the individualist position.Because both parties agree that individualist explanations should beadvanced, their efforts have first and foremost been directed towardthe question of whether holist explanations are indispensable ornot.

The three basic positions may be further characterized in three ways.First, each relies on a distinction between holist and individualistexplanations. This raises the issue of exactly how to differentiatebetween these two categories of explanation. The answer to thisquestion is a matter of dispute among participants in the debate. Onepossible formulation of the distinction is that holist explanationsappeal to social phenomena, whereas individualist explanations invokeindividuals, their actions, beliefs, etc. To elaborate further on thissuggestion, it may be specified that holist explanations containsocial terms, descriptions, or predicates set apart by their referenceto, and focus on, social phenomena. By contrast, individualistexplanations contain individualist terms, descriptions, or predicatesdistinguished by their reference to, and focus on, individuals, theiractions, beliefs, desires, etc.

One issue still left open by this supplementary characterization ishow to understand the notion of a social phenomenon. Methodologicalholists commonly take the following list of items to exemplify socialphenomena: (a) Organizations—like universities, firms, andchurches; (b) social processes—like revolutions and economicgrowth; (c) statistical properties—like the literacy rate or thesuicide rate within a group; (d) cultures and traditions—likethe Mayan culture or a democratic tradition; (e) beliefs, desires, andother mental properties ascribed to groups—like thegovernment’s desire to stay in power; (f) norms andrules—like the proscription of sex with family members and therule requiring cars to drive on the right-hand side of the road; (g)properties of social networks—like their density or cohesion;(h) social structures, typically identified with one or more of theitems already listed; and (i) social roles—like being a busdriver or a nurse. The list includes social phenomena in the form ofsocial entities, social processes, and social properties. The latterare first and foremost properties ascribed to social groups orconstellations of individuals. Yet social properties also includecertain features ascribed to individuals, such as anindividual’s social role. These properties are socialproperties, it is sometimes suggested, because they presuppose thesocial organization of individuals, or the existence of socialentities. (For a discussion of different kinds of social properties,see also Ylikoski 2012, 2014.)

Methodological individualists typically disagree that all the itemslisted above constitute social phenomena. They contend that someexemplify individualist properties because they are properties ofindividuals. For instance, some methodological individualists maintainthat norms and rules are individualist properties since they expressindividuals’ beliefs as to how they should—or shouldnot—act. Likewise, many hold that social roles are individualistproperties because they are ascribed to individuals. (For holistdefenses of the view that social roles should be classified as socialproperties, see e.g., Kincaid 1997; Lukes 1968; Elder-Vass 2010;Hodgson 2007.) In this fashion, the dispute about how to distinguishbetween holist and individualist explanations translates into adifference in opinion concerning what constitutes social phenomena.Methodological holists consider more phenomena to be social and hencethey classify more explanations as holist, whereas methodologicalindividualists view fewer phenomena as social, the result being thatthey categorize fewer explanations as holist and more asindividualist. Due to such disagreements, methodological holists andindividualists often talk past one another: each offers argumentspresupposing a distinction between holist and individualistexplanations that is at odds with that relied upon by their opponent(see Zahle 2003, 2014).

The question of how to differentiate between holist and individualistexplanations may also be approached by drawing on the analysis ofexplanations as consisting of an explanans, i.e., what does theexplaining, and an explanandum, i.e., what is in need of explanation.Consider the following options: (a) both the explanans and theexplanandum are expressed in terms of social phenomena (e.g., thegovernment’s decision to lower the national minimum wage led toprotests from the unions); (b) the explanans is stated in terms ofsocial phenomena while the explanandum is described in terms ofindividuals, their actions, etc. (e.g., the government’sdecision to lower the national minimum wage resulted in severalindividuals writing public letters of protest); (c) both the explanansand the explanandum are expressed in terms of individuals, theiractions, etc. (e.g., because the small children started crying, anumber of people came over to help out); (d) the explanans is statedin terms of individuals, their actions, etc. while the explanandum isdescribed in terms of social phenomena (e.g., the fact that manyindividuals withdrew their money at once had the result that the bankexhausted its cash reserves). With these options in mind, threedifferent ways of circumscribing holist and individualist explanationsmay be registered:

(1)

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Holist explanations: The explanans is stated in terms ofsocial phenomena; the explanandum is expressed either in terms ofsocial phenomena, or in terms of individuals, their actions, etc.

–

Individualist explanations: The explanans is stated interms of individuals; the explanandum is expressed either in terms ofsocial phenomena, or in terms of individuals, their actions, etc.

(2)

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Holist explanations: The explanans is stated in terms ofsocial phenomena; the explanandum is described in terms of socialphenomena.

–

Individualist explanations: The explanans is stated interms of individuals, their actions, etc.; the explanandum isdescribed in terms of social phenomena.

(3)

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Holist explanations: The explanans is stated in terms ofsocial phenomena; the explanandum is expressed in terms of socialphenomena.

–

Individualist explanations: The explanans is stated interms of individuals, their actions, etc.; the explanandum isexpressed in terms of individuals, their actions, etc.

All three conceptions have been advocated in the dispensabilitydebate. Among them, the first position is the most inclusive, whilealso being the most widespread.

Second, the basic positions of strong methodological holism, moderatemethodological holism and methodological individualism can be furthercharacterized by noting that holist and individualist explanations maybe categorized into different types. For instance, both holist andindividualist explanations may be classified according to whether theyare functional, intentional, or straightforward causal explanations.This point may be illustrated in relation to holist explanations.Holist explanations of the functional variety state that the continuedexistence of a social phenomenon is explained by its function oreffect. For instance, it may be suggested that “the statecontinues to exist because it furthers the interests of the rulingclass”. In the past, but no longer today, methodological holismhas often been associated with the advancement of holist explanationsof this type. (On the use of functional holist explanations, see e.g.,Macdonald and Pettit 1981: 131ff.) Intentional holist explanationspurport to explain an action ascribed to a group by reference to thegroup’s reasons for performing it. For example, it may beaffirmed that “the government decided to call a general electionin May because it believed this would increase its chances of beingreelected”. (On the use of intentional holist explanations, seee.g., Tollefsen 2002; List and Pettit 2011.) Nowadays, both functionaland intentional explanations are often regarded as special kinds ofcausal explanation to be distinguished from more straightforwardcausal explanations. This latter kind of causal explanation isillustrated by assertions such as “the rise in unemployment ledto an increase in crime”, or “the government’slowering of the taxes led to an increase in the consumption of luxurygoods”.

Alternatively, to note an additional example, holist and individualistexplanations may be categorized by reference to their focus. In thisspirit, holist explanations may be classified according to whetherthey focus on, say, the statistical properties of social groups, onsocial organizations and their actions, and so on. Likewise,individualist explanations may be categorized according to whether,say, their descriptions of individuals are informed by rational choicemodels, by accounts that stress how actions are largely habitual andbased on various forms of tacit knowledge, etc. The advocacy of abasic position may go together with the favoring of certain types ofholist or individualist explanations over others.

Third, the positions of strong methodological holism, moderatemethodological holism and methodological individualism can be furtherexplicated by observing that each stance may either be formulated as aclaim about explanations in general, that is, all explanationsadvanced within the social sciences, or as pertaining to finalexplanations only, that is, explanations that are satisfactory ratherthan being merely tolerable in the absence of better ones. Sometimesmethodological individualists tend to regard the discussion asrevolving solely around final explanations. Accordingly, they maintainthat though holist explanations may be advanced, they are onlytolerable as stopping points that are temporarily acceptable inanticipation of individualist explanations that, alone, will qualifyas final explanations. Among both strong and moderate methodologicalholists, it is less commonly maintained that the debate concerns finalexplanations only.

There are additional dimensions along which the three basic positionswithin the dispensability debate may be clarified. For instance, eachstance is compatible with different views of what constitutes anexplanation, different notions of causation, and so on. Occasionally,the divergence of opinion with respect to these issues will surface inthe discussion that follows.

2. Why Holist Explanations are Indispensable

This section examines some of the most important arguments offered insupport of the claim that holist explanations are indispensable withinthe social sciences. All the arguments have been advocated by moderatemethodological holists. Only the first version of the first argumenthas also, and perhaps mainly, been propounded by strong methodologicalholists. The arguments should all be read as defenses of theindispensability of holist explanations understood as finalexplanations.

2.1 The Argument from Social Phenomena as Causes

The argument from social phenomena as causes takes it that holistexplanations are indispensable if social phenomena are causallyeffective. The basic structure of the argument is as follows. First, acharacterization of social phenomena as causally effective ispresented. Next, it is maintained that in order to explain the eventsgenerated by the causally effective social phenomena, holistexplanations must be offered: holist explanations alone state howsocial phenomena bring about certain events. Lastly, it is concludedthat since the events brought about by social phenomena should not beleft unexplained, holist explanations are indispensable. The argumentcomes in various versions set apart by the way in which theycharacterize social phenomena as causally effective.

According to one line of reasoning, social entities like nations andsocieties have causal powers that are independent of, and override,the causal powers of the individuals who comprise these entities. Forinstance, it is held that nations develop in such a way so as torealize some goal, yet without the implicated individuals having anyinfluence on this development. Alternatively, it is contended thatsocietal structures may ensure that individuals perform certainfunctions in society; the individuals have no choice in this matter.However specified, social phenomena that have these independent andoverriding causal powers produce effects that cannot be accounted forby offering individualist explanations; individuals are simply notcausally responsible for these effects. The explanation of such socialphenomena is only possible by way of holist explanations that lay outhow the phenomena brought about the effects in question.

The contention that social entities have independent and overridingcausal powers is often ascribed to Comte, Hegel, Marx, and theirfollowers. Today the claim enjoys very few adherents. One importantreason for this is that the claim is regarded as incompatible with thewidely held view that social phenomena are noncausally determined byindividuals and their properties, and sometimes by material artifactstoo. Particularly since the 1980s, the notions of supervenience,realization, and emergence have received a lot of attention as ways ofspelling out this non-causal dependency relation between socialphenomena, on the one hand, and individuals and their properties, onthe other. These notions have served as the basis for alternativeversions of the argument from social phenomena as causes.

Consider first the notions of supervenience and realization.Supervenience is a relationship between properties, kinds, or facts.Roughly speaking, social properties supervene upon individualistproperties if and only if there can be no change at the level ofsocial properties unless there is also a change at the level ofindividualist properties. Otherwise put, the individualist propertiesfix the social properties. Too see how this works, assume that afootball club supervenes on a constellation of individuals withcertain beliefs, bearing certain relations to each other, and so on.This being the case, the football club cannot transform into a golfclub, say, unless the individuals change some of their beliefs, therelations they stand in, or the like. The individuals’ beliefs,relations, etc. fix the property of their being a football club. Thenotion of supervenience is often used interchangeably with the notionof realization. Thus, it is said that a constellation of individualswith certain beliefs, relationships, etc. realizes the property ofbeing a football club. Several moderate methodological holists have,in varying ways, expanded on the account of social properties assupervenient properties by presenting considerations in support ofsupervenient social properties being, in certain cases, causallyeffective properties (see e.g., Kincaid 1997, 2009; List andSpiekermann 2013; Sawyer 2003, 2005). Their reflections are a responseto the so-called exclusion argument, which states that supervenientproperties are epiphenomenal because all the causal work is done bythe properties that they supervene upon (on this argument, see e.g.,Kim 2005). Here is how Christian List and Kai Spiekermann purport toestablish that some supervenient social properties are causallyeffective (List and Spiekermann 2013).

List and Spiekermann begin by appealing to the difference-making orcounterfactual conception of causation, which asserts that “apropertyC (within a system of interest) is the cause ofanother propertyE if and only ifC systematicallymakes a difference toE” (2013: 636). By implication, asupervenient social property,S, qualifies as a cause ofE, whenS makes a systematic difference toE. This means that, other things being equal, ifSoccurredE would do so too, and that ifS did notoccur, then neither wouldE. Now assume thatS ismicrorealization-robust:S would also have brought aboutE if it had been realized by a compound of individualistproperties other than the one that actually realizes it. In situationsof this sort, the compound of individualist properties that realizesS does not make a systematic difference toE. Whileit is the case that if the particular compound occurred then so wouldE, it is not the case that if the compound did not occur,E would not occur either. Hence it isS, rather thanthe compound of individualist properties realizingS, thatqualifies as the cause ofE. List and Spiekermann underlinethat in these circumstances, a holist explanation—that is, anexplanation describing how a given supervenient social propertybrought about some effect—is needed.

As an anecdotal illustration of these points, they refer to the failedclimate summit in Copenhagen in 2010 (2013: 637). They suggest thatthe summit failed at least in part because there were so many parties,and no common interest. Moreover, they note that these—andother—social properties of the situation aremicrorealization-robust: even had they been realized by individualswith somewhat different individualist properties, the socialproperties would have still resulted in a failed summit. The socialproperties of the meeting should thus be regarded as the cause of thefailure; that is, a holist explanation must be offered in order toexplain why the summit was unsuccessful.

Turn now to the notion of emergence. While emergent properties aresometimes regarded as identical to, or as a special class of,supervenient properties, emergent properties may also be differentlycharacterized. These alternative specifications of social propertiesas emergent properties have similarly served as the basis forinsisting that holist explanations are indispensable. Currently, thisline of reasoning is often associated with the social scientificschool of Critical Realism, founded by Roy Bhaskar and furtherdeveloped by many others (see e.g., Archer 1995, 2000; Bhaskar 1979,1982; Elder-Vass 2007, 2010, 2014). Main representatives of themovement have offered a variety of specifications of the notion ofemergence. Among these, Dave Elder-Vass’ account will be brieflydiscussed.

According to Elder-Vass, social entities like firms and universitiesare composed of individuals (and sometimes material things as well)that stand in certain relations to one another (Elder-Vass 2007: 31).In virtue of being composed, at a given moment in time, ofinterrelated individuals, social entities have various causallyeffective social properties. Most notably, they have emergent socialproperties, of which there are two kinds. The first is constituted byemergent social properties that are ascribed to social entities aswholes. These are exemplified by a government’s power tointroduce a new tax, or a quartet’s ability to deliver aharmonized performance. The second kind consists in emergent socialproperties that are ascribed to individuals. These are illustrated bya boss’s power to hire or fire employees. Individuals have theseproperties in virtue of being interrelated so as to form a socialentity, and that’s why they constitute emergentsocialproperties (Elder-Vass 2010: 74). Individuals who form part of socialentities have non-emergent properties too. These are the causallyeffective properties, like the ability to read or talk, whichindividuals have independently of being, at a given moment in time,part of a social entity. From these reflections, Elder-Vass contends,it follows that holist explanations cannot be dispensed with. Theeffects of emergent social properties should be explained. To thisend, it is necessary to offer holist explanations—that is,explanations that state how a social property partially brought aboutsome effect. Individualist explanations are not up to this taskinasmuch as they are confined to describing how individuals, in virtueof their non-emergent properties, partially brought about some effect.Simply pointing to the properties that individuals have independentlyof being, at a given moment in time, part of social entities, does notadd up to an explanation of the effects of emergent social properties(see 2010: 66).

Contemporary moderate methodological holists largely agree that socialphenomena are non-causally determined by individuals and theirproperties, and occasionally by material artifacts too. As illustratedin the foregoing, some defend the claim that thus conceived, socialphenomena are causally effective, while such defenses often dependheavily on the particular notion of causation espoused. Many moderatemethodological holists, however, see no need for arguments in supportof social phenomena being causally effective. They simply assume thisto be the case while pursuing alternative strategies in the attempt toestablish that holist explanations are indispensable.

2.2 The Argument from the Impossibility of Translation

The argument from the impossibility of translation takes it that theindispensability of holist explanations is a matter of theseexplanations being untranslatable into individualist explanations. Theargument begins by observing that holist explanations contain socialdescriptions or concepts, and goes on to note that the meaning ofsocial descriptions cannot be captured by specifications that containdescriptions of individuals alone. Or, put otherwise, social conceptsare not reductively definable solely in terms of individualistconcepts. As a result, it is impossible to translate holistexplanations into individualist ones: holist explanations cannot bereplaced by individualist explanations through translation. Finally,the argument concludes that since the events accounted for by holistexplanations should not go unexplained holist explanations areindispensable.

The argument from the impossibility of translation is famouslypresented by Maurice Mandelbaum in a paper from 1955 (Mandelbaum1955). Here Mandelbaum defines social concepts as concepts that referto forms of organization within a society. He remarks that concepts ofthis sort “cannot be translated into psychological [i.e.,individualist] conceptswithout remainder” (1955:310—italics in the original). In order to drive this point home,Mandelbaum considers the social concept of a bank teller. In order tospecify what a bank teller is, it is necessary to invoke the socialconcept of a bank. The definition of a “bank”, in turn,must contain social concepts such as “legal tender” and“contract”. And these social concepts, too, can only bedefined in ways that involve yet other social concepts, such that thedefinition of a social concept inevitably contains other socialconcepts. Given that the distinctive feature of holist explanations istheir very containment of social concepts, these explanations can thusnot be translated into, and as such replaced by, individualistexplanations.

Mandelbaum’s argument, including his example of the bank teller,is widely cited in subsequent contributions to the debate betweenmoderate methodological holists and individualists (see e.g., Bhargava1992; Danto 1973 [1962]; Epstein 2015; Gellner 1973 [1956]; Goldstein1973b [1958]; James 1984; Kincaid 1986, 1997; Zahle 2003). However,few moderate methodological holists have followed Mandelbaum inholding that holist explanations are indispensable if they indeedcannot be translated into individualist explanations.

2.3 The Argument from the Impossibility of Intertheoretic Reduction

The argument from the impossibility of intertheoretic reductionpresumes that holist explanations cannot be dispensed with if holisttheories are irreducible to individualist ones. The argument rests onthe view that holist explanations draw on social theories, whereasindividualist explanations involve individualist theories. From withinthis context, it is argued that social theories are oftentimesirreducible to, and hence irreplaceable by, individualist theories.Accordingly, when holist explanations make use of irreducible socialtheories, they cannot be substituted by individualist explanationsthat appeal to individualist theories. Since the events that areexplained by appeal to irreducible social theories should not gounexplained, holist explanations are therefore indispensable.

Typically, discussions of the argument rely on some version of theNagelian model of intertheoretic reduction. The model conceives oftheories as statements issued mainly in the form of laws. Adapted tothe present focus, it requires that two conditions be fulfilled inorder to reduce a social theory to an individualist one. The firstrequirement is the condition of connectability, which must be metbecause it is assumed that holist theories are distinguished by theiruse of social predicates or descriptions, whereas individualisttheories are characterized by containing individualist predicates ordescriptions only. Following one common interpretation, the conditionstates that the social predicates in the social theory to-be-reducedmust be linked, on a one-to-one basis, to individualist descriptionsin the reducing individualist theory. The resulting bridge laws, asthey are called, express that the linked descriptions areco-extensive, that is, that they have the same reference, in alaw-like manner. (Note that this is a weaker condition than the demandconsidered in2.2, requiring that the meaning of social terms must be captured byspecifications that contain descriptions of individuals only.) Thecondition of connectability implies that if, say, the social term“church” occurs in the social theory to-be-reduced, thenit must be demonstrated that this term is co-extensive, in a law-likemanner, with a single individualist description of individuals andtheir properties as realizing a church. Once this condition has beenmet, the second requirement, the condition of derivability, should befulfilled. It states that the social theory to-be-reduced must bededuced from, and in that sense explained by, the reducingindividualist theory, plus the bridge laws.

Moderate methodological holists have primarily focused ondemonstrating that social theories cannot be reduced to individualisttheories because of difficulties that relate to meeting therequirement of connectability. The most prominent argument to thiseffect is the argument from multiple realization (other argumentsinclude, e.g., Kincaid 1996, Wahlberg 2019). The argument frommultiple realization originates from within philosophy of mind, fromwhence it was developed into a generalizable argument againstintertheoretic reduction (see Putnam 1967 and Fodor 1974). In the1980s, it began to appear as an argument against the possibility ofreducing social to individualist theories (see e.g., Kincaid 1986,1996, 1997; Little 1991; Rios 2005; Sawyer 2002, 2005, Wright et al.1992; Tollefsen 2002, 2015).

The argument begins by noting that social properties supervene on, orare realized by, individualist properties. It is then pointed out thatthis relationship between social and individualist properties iscompatible with social properties being realizable not only by asingle compound of individualist properties, but by different—infact indefinitely many—compounds of individualist properties. Anempirical claim is made next, asserting that many social propertiesare indeed multiply realizable. This point is typically supported byway of example. For instance, Kincaid lists several social predicatessuch as “revolution”, “bureaucracy”, and“peer group”, and remarks that “any number ofdifferent relations between individuals, individual psychologicalstates, beliefs, etc. could realize the referent of these terms”(Kincaid 1986: 497). In a similar vein, Keith Sawyer states that“‘being a church’ could be realized in disjunctive[and hence multiple] ways in different cultures and socialgroups” (Sawyer 2002: 550). Finally, it is observed that thecondition of connectability cannot be met whenever social theoriescontain social predicates that refer to social properties that havemultiple and highly different, or indefinitely many, realizations. Inthese cases, the social predicates cannot be linked via bridge laws tosingle individualist descriptions. Instead, they will have to belinked to a disjunction of individualist descriptions. To see this,return to the example of the social property of being a church.Insofar as a church is multiply realizable, the term“church” will have to be linked up with a disjunction ofindividualist descriptions, each characterizing a possible compound ofindividualist properties that may realize a church. The upshot is thatsocial theories that refer to multiply realizable social propertiescannot be reduced to individualist theories. Thus, holist explanationsthat appeal to these theories cannot be substituted by individualistexplanations.

Within recent discussions in the philosophy of science, the Nagelianmodel of intertheoretic reduction has been criticized on a number ofgrounds that likewise challenge its suitability as a model ofreduction in the context of the dispensability debate. Insofar as themodel is deemed inadequate, arguments in favor of the indispensabilityof holist explanations that rest on this model lose theirsignificance.

2.4 The Argument from Explanatory Regress

The argument from explanatory regress focuses on the tenability of astandard reason for holding that holist explanations should bedispensed with. The standard reason in question is the following.Given that holist explanations focus on larger units in the form ofsocial entities and processes, they are less preferable thanindividualist explanations that zero in on the components of theselarger units, viz. individuals, their actions, etc. The argument fromexplanatory regress states that this claim may likewise be used tojustify the contention that individualist explanations are lesspreferable than explanations that focus on the biological componentsof individuals. The claim may be further used to motivate theassertion that these explanations, too, should be dismissed in favorof explanations that concentrate on the chemical components ofindividuals’ biological units, and so on. To avoid thisundesirable consequence, the argument continues, the standard reasonfor holding that holist explanations are always less preferable thanindividualist ones should be dismissed. Accordingly, since explanatorypractices should not be changed unless there are good reasons to doso, the existing practice of offering holist explanations should notbe discontinued. From the perspective of carrying on existingexplanatory practices, holist explanations are indispensable.

Considerations of this sort have been presented by a number oftheorists (see e.g., Hodgson 2007; Jackson and Pettit 1992a; Jones1996; Tannsjö 1990). It should be noted that the regress argumentmakes a purely negative point in that it offers no guidance as towhen—and why—holist explanations are indispensable in thesocial sciences as they are currently practiced. In this respect, theargument differs from the others considered in this section.

2.5 The Argument from Differing Explanatory Interests

The argument from differing explanatory interests asserts that holistexplanations are indispensable insofar as they are capable ofsatisfying explanatory interests that are distinct from the intereststhat individualist explanations are able to satisfy. The argument hasthe following basic structure. First, it is made clear that a certainnotion of explanation is adopted. By appeal to this notion, it is thenargued that some holist explanations may serve explanatory intereststhat cannot be satisfied by individualist explanations. It isconcluded that since the social sciences should satisfy theseexplanatory interests, holist explanations are indispensable.

The argument has mainly been advanced since the early 1980s. Onecommon version of it relies on the erothetic model of explanation,according to which an explanation is an answer to a why-question. Ithas been presented by Alan Garfinkel, and subsequently by othertheorists as well (see e.g., Garfinkel 1981; Haslanger 2016, 2018;Kincaid 1996, 1997; Risjord 2000; Weber and Van Bouwel 2002). Theprincipal point made is that some why-questions can only be adequatelyanswered by offering holist explanations. Consequently, since aninterest in answers to these why-questions should be met, holistexplanations are indispensable. Another well-known version of theargument from differing explanatory interests relies on the causalinformation view of explanation. It states that an explanationprovides information about the causal process leading to the event inneed of explanation. The key idea is that some information can only beprovided via holist explanations. Since an interest in thisinformation should be satisfied, holist explanations are thusindispensable. This version of the argument has been presented byFrank Jackson and Philip Pettit (see Jackson and Pettit 1992a, 1992b;for a comparison of the erothetic and the causal information view ofexplanation, see Marchionni 2007). Their influential account will beexamined in more detail.

Equipped with the causal information view of explanation, Jackson andPettit consider the explaining of particular events (Jackson andPettit 1992a). A holist explanation provides information about themanner in which the instantiation of a social property,S,resulted in a certain event. Now, due to social properties beingsupervenient on individualist ones, it is always possible to offer acorresponding individualist explanation of the same event: theindividualist explanation offers information as to how the individualswho realizedS produced the event in question. For example,assume that the particular event in need of explanation is a rise incrime. Here, the holist explanation might be that the rise in crimewas the result of a rise in unemployment, whereas the individualistexplanation might state that the crime rate went up because individuala,b,c, etc. lost their jobs, and feltfrustrated about having little money and no job opportunities.

The key claim made by Jackson and Pettit is that these twoexplanations provide different information. The holist explanationconveys that given the rise in unemployment, an increase in crime wasalmost bound to occur. The reason is that

had the motivations and opportunities of those particular individualsnot changed, the motivations of others would have done so. (1992a:11)

Thus the holist explanation provides modally comparative information,that is, information that brings out that what happened in the actualworld would also have taken place in a variety of possible worlds. Bycontrast, the individualist explanation confines itself to pointingout that these particular individuals, with their changed jobsituations and altered motivations, were responsible for the rise incrime. As such, it offers modally contrastive information, that is,information that sets the actual world apart from other possibleworlds. Because of this divergence in the information provided,Jackson and Pettit conclude that holist explanations areindispensable. Unlike individualist explanations, holist explanationsmay satisfy an explanatory interest in modally comparativeinformation, and an interest in this sort of information should bemet.

Jackson and Pettit’s version of the argument from differingexplanatory interests has been criticized for not taking into accountthat pragmatic considerations may determine whether the informationprovided by a holist explanation is considered to be of more—orless—interest than that offered by an individualist explanation(see Weber and Van Bouwel 2002). The idea that pragmaticconsiderations have a role to play is given center stage in theargument from pragmatic concerns.

2.6 The Argument from Pragmatic Concerns

The argument from pragmatic concerns states that whether holistexplanations are indispensable is a matter of whether they arepragmatically preferable to individualist explanations. The argumentrests on the assumption that whenever a holist explanation of an eventis possible, an individualist explanation of that same event islikewise feasible. It is claimed that the choice between these twoexplanations should be made by appeal to pragmatic considerations. Itis maintained, moreover, that it is sometimes preferable from apragmatic perspective to offer a holist, rather than an individualistexplanation. On this basis, it is concluded that holist explanationsare indispensable.

An argument along these lines has been offered by Jones (1996). Henotes that it is sometimes less costly to establish a holist ratherthan an individualist explanation of some event (1996: 126). What helikely has in mind is that gathering evidence about individuals, theirdoings, intentions, etc. with the aim of offering an individualistexplanation may take more time, and hence come with a higher monetarycost, than producing the evidence needed to advance a holistexplanation. Jones additionally asserts that a holist explanation issometimes easier to teach: because holist explanations tend to besimpler in that they do not include an abundance of detail aboutindividuals, their doings, beliefs, etc. (1996), they may be easierfor individuals to grasp. In these sorts of situations, Jones contendsthat holist explanations are preferable to individualist ones: in viewof pragmatic concerns like those outlined above, holist explanationsare indispensable.

3. The Microfoundations Debate

The microfoundations debate gained prominence around the beginning ofthe 1980s when a number of philosophers and social scientists began todefend the view that purely holist explanations, as they may betermed, should be supplemented by an account of the underlyingindividual-level mechanisms. Jon Elster and Daniel Little, amongothers, argued in favor of this view in the context of Marxist socialtheorizing (Elster 1983, 1985, 1989; Little 1986, 1991, 1998). RaymondBoudon was also an early and important proponent (Boudon 1976, 1979).Their contention that social theorists must pay attention toindividual-level microfoundations was soon met by opposition frommethodological holists, and a debate developed. Within currentphilosophical discussions, the advocacy of the methodologicalindividualist stance is often associated with the approach ofanalytical sociology or with key representatives thereof(Hedström 2005; Hedström and Swedberg 1996; Demeulenaere2011). Yet the view is also defended by others, both from within andoutside sociology. Arguments in support of the opposing holist stanceare not tied to any specific approach within the social sciences orphilosophy.

There are two basic positions within the microfoundations debate:

Methodological holism: Purely holist explanations maysometimes stand on their own; they need not always be supplemented byaccounts of the underlying individual-level microfoundations.

Methodological individualism: Purely holist explanations maynever stand on their own; they should always be supplemented byaccounts of the underlying individual-level microfoundations.

The debate may be further characterized by considering its keynotions, possible qualifications of the individualist stance, and thestandard motivation behind the demand for microfoundations.

To begin, purely holist explanations are ones in which both theexplanans and the explanandum are expressed in terms of socialphenomena. They are exemplified by claims such as “theprotestant ethic caused the rise of capitalism in WesternEurope”, or “the country’s high economic growth waspartly due to its stable political environment”. Drawing on thediscussion of holist explanations in connection with thedispensability debate, the explanans and explanandum may be said to bein terms of social phenomena when they contain social terms,descriptions, or predicates set apart by their reference to, and focuson, social phenomena. In turn, social phenomena may then be specifiedas social entities, social processes and social properties asexemplified by universities, revolutions, the literacy rate, and soon. Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between different types ofpurely holist explanation. For instance, purely holist explanationsmay be classified according to whether they are of the functional,intentional, or straightforward causal type, as introduced above. Or,purely holist explanations may be individuated according to theirfocus on, say, organizations, the statistical properties of groups,etc.

Turn now to the accounts of the individual-level microfoundations.These are specifications of the underlying individual-level mechanismsunderstood as causal chains of events, that occur at the level ofindividuals, and that link some cause in the form of a socialphenomenon to its effect in the form of another social phenomenon.Very often, accounts of this sort are taken to consist of three parts.Part I lays out how a social phenomenon resulted in individualsforming various beliefs and desires, and having certain opportunities.Part II states how these beliefs, desires, and opportunities gave riseto individuals acting and interacting in a certain manner. Part IIIoutlines how these actions and interactions, intentionally orunintentionally, brought about a certain social phenomenon. As anillustration of an account along these lines, consider the example ofthe purely holist explanation that “the protestant ethic causedthe rise of capitalism in the West”. A very rough three-partaccount of the underlying individual-level mechanisms might go asfollows. The protestant ethic compelled individuals to adopt certainvalues. These, in turn, induced them to engage in certain new forms ofeconomic behavior. Those, finally, caused the rise of capitalism inthe West. Frequently, Coleman’s well-known boat model is used todepict how purely holist explanations must include such three-partaccounts of the underlying individual-level mechanisms (Coleman 1986,1990). The model uses a boat form to illustrate the move from onesocial phenomenon down to individual-level events and up again toanother social phenomenon.

As may already be clear, the accounts of the underlying mechanisms areindividual-level accounts in the sense that they invariably containdescriptions of what happens to, and what is made to happen by,individuals. It is standard to invoke descriptions of individuals byreference to their roles and other properties they possess as a resultof being part of social organizations. In this sense, a permissivenotion as to what counts as individual-level descriptions is endorsed.The accounts of individuals may draw on different theories of theactor. In earlier phases of the debate, there was a clear tendency tobase the accounts on rational-choice models. Today, other models areused as well.

The claim that purely holist explanations are in need ofmicrofoundations may be qualified in various ways. Sometimes, it ismade clear that purely holist explanations should always beaccompanied by accounts of the underlying individual-level mechanisms.Very often, this position is motivated by appeal to the“mechanism model” of explanation. It states that toexplain is to show how one phenomenon, via underlying mechanisms,brought about another phenomenon; to borrow Elster’s words, toexplain is “to provide a mechanism, to open up the black box andshow the nuts and bolts, the cogs and wheels” (Elster 1985: 5).Accordingly, purely holist explanations do not actually constituteexplanations unless they are supplemented by accounts of theunderlying individual-level mechanisms. In other instances, it is onlyheld that purely holist explanations must be supplemented by accountsof the underlying individual-level mechanisms in order to qualify assatisfying orcomplete explanations. This view iscommonly motivated by a weaker version of the mechanism model ofexplanation, according to which a satisfactory or completeexplanation, rather than an explanation as such, must describe how onephenomenon, via underlying mechanisms, brought about another.

However qualified, the assertion that purely holist explanations arealways in need of microfoundations is a weaker form of methodologicalindividualism than the one defended within the indispensabilitydispute. Methodological individualists who are engaged in themicrofoundations debate do not insist that holist explanations shouldbe dispensed with. The target is only purely holist explanations,i.e., ones in which both the explanans and the explanandum areexpressed in terms of social phenomena, and it is simply held thatthese explanations are in need of supplementation by accounts ofindividual-level mechanisms. Also, there is no objection to the use ofholist explanations in which the explanans is stated in terms ofsocial phenomena and the explanandum is described in terms ofindividuals, their actions, etc. In fact, explanations along theselines are offered as part of the accounts of the individual-levelmechanisms when it is specified how a social phenomenon resulted inindividuals forming various beliefs and desires, and having certainopportunities. Even though the demand for microfoundations is a weakerform of methodological individualism, the position has nonetheless metwith opposition. As noted, methodological holists who are engaged inthe microfoundations debate insist that purely holist explanations maysometimes stand on their own in that they need not be supplemented byaccounts of the individual-level mechanisms; purely holistexplanations qualify as explanations, or as satisfying or completeexplanations.

4. Why Purely Holist Explanations Can Sometimes Stand on Their Own

Methodological holists have offered a number of arguments in supportof the claim that purely holist explanations can sometimes stand ontheir own. In the following, some of their main arguments areexamined.

4.1 The Argument from Underlying Social-Level Mechanisms

The argument from underlying social-level mechanisms purports toestablish that purely holist explanations may sometimes be accompaniedby underlying social-level rather than individual-level mechanisms(see e.g., Kaidesoja 2013; Kincaid 1997: 111; Mayntz 2004; Vromen2010; Wan 2012; Ylikoski 2012).

The argument begins by noting that social phenomena are at a higherlevel of organization than individuals. Note that this is why accountsof individual-level mechanisms qualify as specifications of theunderlying mechanisms. What is sometimes overlooked, theargument continues, is that social phenomena may themselves be athigher or lower levels of organization. For instance, a nation or astate is typically at a higher level of organization than a small firmor a school. This observation paves the way for the contention that apurely holist explanation should sometimes be accompanied by anaccount of the underlying mechanisms involving lower-level socialphenomena. These explanations are still holist explanations.Accordingly, it is concluded, holist explanations may sometimes standon their own in that they do not needindividual-levelmicrofoundations.

The argument from underlying social-level mechanisms makes it plainthat the adoption of the mechanism model of explanation does not lendsupport to the view that purely holist explanations need always beaccompanied by accounts of individual-level microfoundations. Themodel states that an explanation, or a satisfactory or completeexplanation, describes how one phenomenon, via underlying mechanisms,brought about another phenomenon, and this is perfectly compatiblewith accounts of the underlying mechanisms consisting in descriptionsof mechanisms at the level of other (though lower-level) socialphenomena. Thus the argument from underlying social-level mechanismsdoes not challenge the mechanism model of explanation. Other argumentsoffered by methodological holists, however, aim to do exactlythis.

4.2 The Argument from Mechanism Regress

The argument from mechanism regress is directed at the mechanism modelof explanation. The endorsement of this model is taken to support theinsistence that purely holist explanations must always be accompaniedby accounts of the underlying individual-level mechanisms (see e.g.,Van Bouwel 2006; Norkus 2005; Kincaid 1997: 26; Opp 2005).

The starting point of the argument involves the observation that whentwo social phenomena are linked by a causal chain of events at thelevel of individuals, then these events are themselves connected byunderlying mechanisms involving events that are, in turn, linked byunderlying mechanisms, and so on. In this fashion, it is mechanismsall the way down until some physical bottom-level mechanisms areprobably reached. According to the argument from mechanism regress,this point brings into view a problem faced by the mechanism model ofexplanation. The model requires that the underlying mechanisms thatcausally link two phenomena must be specified. Consequently, due tosocial phenomena being connected by underlying mechanisms that extendall the way down to some bottom physical level, the model seems torequire that all such mechanisms be specified each time a purelyholist explanation is offered. But, of course, this is an absurdrequirement, and so the mechanism view of explanation should berejected. Without it, there is no longer any basis for holding thatpurely holist explanations can never stand on their own.

4.3 The Argument from Explanatory Practices

The argument from explanatory practices likewise targets the mechanismview of explanation that is taken to underwrite the claim that purelyholist explanations must be complemented by accounts of the underlyingindividual-level mechanisms. The argument has been presented byKincaid, who observes that both in everyday and scientific contexts,we offer explanations that lack specifications of the underlyingmechanisms while still regarding these explanations as being perfectlyacceptable (Kincaid 1997: 28). For instance, that a flying ball hitthe window is typically regarded as a successful explanation as to whythe window broke, even though no account of the underlying mechanismsis offered. This shows that our standard explanatory practicesconflict with the mechanism model of explanation and, on this ground,the model should be dismissed. If this is so, there is no longer anyreason for holding that purely holist explanations must always beaccompanied by accounts of the underlying individual-levelmicrofoundations.

The argument from explanatory practices and the earlier argument frommechanism regress intend to reject the mechanism model of explanation,so that it cannot serve as justification for the claim that purelyholist explanations can never stand on their own. This makes itnatural to wonder whether the demand for accounts of individual-levelmicrofoundations may be upheld without appeal to this model ofexplanation. This issue has also been addressed in the debate.

4.4 The Argument from Non-Mechanistic Explanatory Considerations

The argument from non-mechanistic explanation purports to show that ifnon-mechanistic considerations as to what constitutes an explanation(or at least a satisfactory or complete explanation) are adopted, thenpurely holist explanations may sometimes stand on their own.

One version of the argument takes as its starting point the erotheticmodel of explanation, according to which explanations are, roughlyspeaking, answers to why-questions. Equipped with this model ofexplanation, Jeroen Van Bouwel considers the contrastive question asto why the French Revolution broke out in 1789, and not in 1750 (VanBouwel 2006). Following Theda Skocpol’s work, he suggests thatcertain structural conditions made the revolution possible in 1789,and that these conditions were not present in 1750. In 1789, but notin 1750, the French state was economically weak because of thesubstantial resources that had gone into the American War ofIndependence, and because of the growing economic competition withEngland. This contrastive explanation is expressed in purely holistterms. Moreover, Van Bouwel contends that it constitutes a perfectlysatisfactory—and complete—answer to the contrastivequestion. Adding an account of how the state’s weakness ledvarious individuals to adopt certain beliefs and desires, and to actin ways that ultimately led to the French Revolution, would not renderthe explanation any better. Elaborating on this point, Van Bouwelconcludes that in response to contrastive questions, purely holistexplanations do not invariably need to be complemented by accounts ofthe underlying individual-level mechanisms.

Another version of the argument has been offered by Julian Reiss, whodraws attention to the fact that two types of social phenomena may becausally linked by many different types of underlying individual-levelmechanisms (Reiss 2013: 111). As an illustration of this point, henotes that an increase in the supply of currency tends to make pricesgo up, and that this may happen via multiple types of underlyingindividual-level mechanisms. Consequently, when faced with the task ofexplaining a particular case of prices having gone up, there are twooptions. One option is to appeal to the tendency of an increase in themoney supply to make the prices go up; the other is to refer to thistendency while supplementing this with an account of the underlyingindividual-level mechanisms. The point is that we may sometimes preferexplanations that are applicable to a large number of individualcases, in which case we should opt for the purely holist explanation.If an account of the underlying individual-level mechanisms isincluded, the explanation will not hold for all the cases in which themechanisms are of a different type (2013: 114). Therefore, Reissargues, it is not correct that purely holist explanations shouldalways be accompanied by accounts of the individual-levelmicrofoundations; sometimes purely holist explanations may stand ontheir own.

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Acknowledgments

This entry draws, and expands, on Zahle (2007, 2013) and Zahle andCollin (2014b). Thanks to Harold Kincaid and Petri Ylikoski for theirvery helpful comments.