In many, if not most, areas of thought, significant differences ofopinion exist among individuals who seem to be equally knowledgeableand sincere. Such diversity of opinion, though, is nowhere moreevident than in the area of religious thought. On almost everyreligious issue, individuals who seem to have equal access to therelevant information and be equally truth-seeking hold significantlydiverse, often incompatible beliefs.

Religious diversity of this sort can be fruitfully explored in manyways —for instance, from psychological, anthropological, orhistorical perspectives. The current discussion, however, will concernitself primarily some key issues surrounding religious diversity withwhich philosophers are most concerned at present. Specifically, ourdiscussion will focus primarily on the following questions: Howpervasive is religious diversity? Does the reality of such diversityrequire a response? Can a person who acknowledges religious diversityremain justified in claiming just one perspective to be correct? Canacknowledged religious diversity lead to religious tolerance? Can itjustifiably be claimed that only one religion offers a path into theeternal presence of God? How should religious diversity be approachedin public education? The answers to such questions are not simplyacademic; they have an increasingly practical impact on how we treatothers, both personally and corporately.

The main goal of this discussion, it is important to note, is not tosupport a given stance on these issues. It is to clarify the issuesand explore differing perspectives.

• 1. The Focus and Scope of the Discussion
• 2. Responses to Religious Diversity
• 3. Religious Diversity and Epistemic Obligation
• 4. Religious Diversity and Justified Belief
• 5. Religious Diversity and Religious Tolerance
• 6. Religious Diversity and the Eternal Destiny of Humankind
• 7. Religious Diversity in Public Education
• 8. Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Focus and Scope of the Discussion

Some prominent philosophers of religion are critical of the fact thatthe main focus of most philosophical discussions of religion,including discussions of religious diversity, is on theistic ratherthan non-theistic religions. John Schellenberg, for instance, hasrecently argued that “philosophy of religion should incorporatenontheistic conceptions of God in the context of themuch largerset of topics that philosophers of religion should beinvestigating” (Schellenberg 2024, 34). While I’msensitive to this concern, the focus of this discussion will remain,as it currently does for the majority of analytic philosophers ofreligion, on theistic religions. Monotheistic religions such asJudaism, Christianity, and Islam agree that there is a sole God, whilepolytheistic religions such as Taoism, Japanese Shinto, and Chinesefolk religion hold that there are multiple deities (gods). Much ofwhat follows applies to any theistic religion. The main focus,however, will be on the diversity issues that arise predominately inthose religions that believe in a sole personal Supreme Being(God).

Even in relation to theistic religions, Schellenberg and others areconcerned with the continuing prominence and influence of classicalChristianity. To counter this, Schellenberg argues, “we need newwork to broaden what today is called Christian philosophy intosomething that might credibly be called the philosophy ofChristianity, by rigorously developing both arguments favouringclassical Christian doctrineand arguments opposing it”as by doing so “we may succeed in unsettling the currentconsensus, awakening many from their dogmatic slumbers, and thuschange the Christian climate of our field sufficiently to allow agreat many new ideas about religion to be exposed and receive theattention they deserve” (Schellenberg 2024, 40). While thegeneral arguments and concepts discussed below are not primarilyfocused on Christianity, the majority of the clarifying examples comefrom Christian (and to a lesser extent Muslim) sources.

Victoria Harrison maintains that we need a more global approach to thephilosophy of religion. For this to occur, she argues, we need morethan simply “expanding [philosophy of religion’s]traditional disciplinary scope or broadening its range ofquestions.” It will require that we have philosophers“conversant in more than one philosophical tradition” asthis will provide a “platform for deep and authentic engagementin philosophical inquiry that crosses traditional religious andphilosophical boundaries” (Harrison 2020, 20). While thre isclear value to a more global approach to the philosophy of religion ingeneral and to religious diversity in particular, the discussion thatfollows focuses primarily, but not solely, on the key diversityquestions currently under discussion in Western analytic philosophy ofreligion.

Mikel Burley fears that current philosophy of religion focuses toonarrowly on general abstract concepts of the divine at the expense ofdownplaying “the particularities of historically andgeographically distinct conceptions of God” in actual livedreligions (Burley 2024, 98). While there is a valid distinctionbetween focusing on the specific perspectives of various actualreligions on issues and focusing on issues that are relevant to manyactual religious perspectives, with examples from specific religions,the focus of this discussion is on the latter.

Finally, although there is obviously widespread diversity of thoughtamong monotheistic religions (theistic systems) on such coreissues as God’s nature and character, the relationship betweendivine control and human freedom, the extent to which God unilaterallyintervenes in our world, and how God would have us live, it isbecoming increasingly recognized that widespread diversity of thoughton all such issues also exists just as clearly, and in exactly thesame sense,within basic theistic systems. For example,within Christianity, believers differ significantly on the nature ofGod. Some see God as all-controlling, others as self-limiting, andstill others as incapable of unilaterally controlling any aspect ofreality. Some believe God to have infallible knowledge only of allthat has occurred or is occurring; others claim God also has knowledgeof all that will actually occur, while those who believe God possessesmiddle knowledge add that God knows all that would actually occur inany possible context. Some believe the moral principles stipulated byGod for correct human behavior flow from God’s nature orcharacter and thus that such principles determine God’sbehavior, while others believe that God acts in accordance with adifferent set of moral rules than the moral rules given to humans:that for God what is right is simply whatever God does. Some believethat only those who have consciously “given their lives toChrist” will spend eternity in God’s presence. Othersbelieve that many who have never even heard the name of Jesus willenter God’s presence, while others do not even believesubjective immortality (a conscious afterlife) to be a reality.

Muslims also differ significantly among themselves on these samedivine attributes, the autonomy of the individual when interpretingthe Qur’an, how best to apply core Islamic values to modernlife, and the status of women (Aijaz 2015). We find equally pervasive,significant intra-system diversity in Hinduism (Burley 2024) andJudaism (Shatz 2011).

It is also important to note that the perspective of a variant of agiven religion on an issue (for example, the perspective ofconservative Christians on God’s power and human freedom or therole of women) is often more closely aligned with the perspective ofvariants of differing religions on that issue (for example, theperspectives of conservative Muslims or conservative Jews on humanfreedom or the role of women) than with the perspective of othervariants within the same religion (Basinger 2023, 6).

Both inter-religious and intra-religious diversity will receiveattention in what follows.

2. Responses to Religious Diversity

Philosophical/theological responses to religious diversity arenormally divided into three categories: religious exclusivism,religious inclusivism, and religious pluralism. However, there is notalways agreement on the meaning of these categorizing terms. For ourpurposes, they will be defined as follows.

Individuals are religious exclusivists when they believe that theirperspective on some disputed inter-theistic truth claim—forexample, that Allah is the true God—or some disputedintra-theistic truth claim—for example, that the Christian Godcannot control free human choice—is the truth or at least closerto the truth than any other competing religious perspective on this issue.^[1] But even here, there is an important distinction to be made. As GuyAxtell rightly points out, one can be a “particularistexclusivist” who holds that only one of a number of perspectiveson a given issue can be uniquely true and no one can justifiablymaintain otherwise or a “mutualist exclusivist” who holdsthat while it can justifiably be maintained that only one perspectiveon a given issue is uniquely true, those holding differingperspectives can also justifiably claim that these perspectives areuniquely true (Axtell 2020). While Axtell, himself, does not believemutualist exclusivism to be coherent, others such as Dirk-Martin Grubemaintain not only that mutual exclusivism —couching discussionsof exclusivism in terms of justified belief rather than bivalenttruth—is coherent but also productive for inter-religious dialog(Grube 2019).

Individuals are religious inclusivists in the most general sense whenthey hold to the primacy of one religion but the validity of otherreligions. That is, inclusivists maintain that while their ownreligious perspectives are the fullest (most complete and accurate)understanding of ultimate reality, the perspectives of other religionscontain a partially complete and accurate understanding of ultimatereality, including genuine, albeit incomplete, experiences of thedivine. However, as will be discussed in Section 6, while allinclusivists agree that those who are not adherents to the one fullytrue religion can attain salvation, some maintain that only the onetrue religion can offer a valid path to eternal presence with God(Pinnock 1992) while others do not (Rahner 1966).

Individuals are religious pluralists when they deny the primacy of anyone religion. Those sometimes labeled philosophical (or metaphysicalor unitary) religious pluralists maintain that there is an ultimatereality and that various religions offer incomplete understandings ofthis reality. Accordingly, the religious perspectives of more than onebasic theistic system or variant thereof can justifiably be consideredequally close to the truth (Hick 2004). A key goal of these pluralistsis to identify those aspects of this ultimate reality to which thevarious religions imperfectly point (Hick 2004). Those sometimeslabeled radical religious pluralists maintain that differing religionsare ultimately irreducibly diverse and, thus, reject the attempt toidentify a unified ultimate reality or shared ethical framework andinstead encourage a focus on the differing aspects rather than theshared commonality of the various religions (Heim 1995; Runzo2011).

3. Religious Diversity and Epistemic Obligation

No philosopher denies that the awareness (realization) of seemingreligious diversity does at times have an impact onexclusivists—from causing minor uneasiness to significantlyreducing their level of confidence in the truth of certain beliefs toprecipitating belief abandonment. This is simply an empirical claimabout psychological states and behaviors (Alston 1988, 442–446;Plantinga 2000, 189).

How should, though, exclusivists coming to an awareness of religiousdiversity—the awareness that seemingly sincere, knowledgeableindividuals differ with them on issues of religioussignificance—respond to the reality of such diversity? Howshould, for instance, the devout Hindu or Christian who comes torealize that those of other religions who seem as knowledgeable anddevout hold incompatible religious perspectives on the nature of thedivine respond? Or how should a Christian who believes the Bibleclearly portrays a God with total control over all aspects of realityrespond to the realization that other seemingly sincere, devout,“Bible-believing” Christians see the Bible as clearlyportraying a God who has chosen not to control what occurs in thosecontexts in which humans have been granted meaningful moral freedom?Can exclusivists justifiably disregard such diversity, or doexclusivists have an obligation to attempt to resolve such epistemicconflicts – engage in belief assessment (or reassessment) withopenness to possible revision? Would it at least be a good idea to doso?

Before discussing these questions, we must note two challenges to anyform of epistemic obligation in this context. First, there arereligious individuals (and groups) who believe it is inappropriate tosubject religious beliefs to rational assessment of any sort. Certainindividuals (sometimes called fideists) have argued, for instance,that religious beliefs are not of a type properly subjected torational assessment and/or that assessing such beliefs demonstrates alack of faith (Peterson et al. 2013, 65–69). However, fewphilosophers currently hold this position. Most maintain thatexclusivists have at least the right to assess their beliefs in theface of religious diversity.

Second, we must consider the argument, put forth most forcefully byAlvin Plantinga, that the discussion of any form of epistemicobligation faced by exclusivists in response to seeming peer conflicton religious issues is based on a faulty premise: that the exclusivistmust acknowledge that peer conflict of the type in question actuallyexists.

Plantinga acknowledges that if proponents of a specific religiousperspective have no reason to doubt that those with whom they disagreereally are on equal epistemic footing, then they are under a primafacie obligation to attempt to resolve the conflict. However,Plantinga denies that Christian exclusivists need ever acknowledgethat they are facing true epistemic parity—need ever admit thatthey actually are differing with true epistemic peers. AlthoughChristian exclusivists, we are told, may grant that those with whomthey disagree have not violated any epistemic duty and may know of noarguments that would convince others of their wrongness whilemaintaining their rightness, exclusivists are likely to believe thatthey have in some way been epistemically favored. They might believe,for instance, that they have been graced by “the InternalWitness of the Holy Spirit; or perhaps [they] think the Holy Spiritpreserves the Christian church from serious error, at least withrespect to the fundamentals of Christian belief; or perhaps [theythink] that [they have] been converted by divine grace, so that [they]now see what was once obscure to [them]—a blessing not so farbestowed upon the dissenters” (Plantinga 1997, 296).

Moreover, if any beliefs of this type are true, Plantinga contends,then Christian exclusivists are probably in a better epistemicposition, than those who reject the exclusivistic beliefs in question.Therefore, since it cannot be demonstrated that Christian belief ofthis sort is very likely false, Christian believers remain justifiedin maintaining that the proponents of other religious perspectives arenot actually on an equal epistemic footing. The same, Plantingaacknowledges, might well be true for exclusivists in other religiousbelief systems (Plantinga 1997, 296).^[2]

The strength of this line of reasoning depends in part on thedebatable question of who shoulders the burden of proof in the face ofreligious diversity. Those siding with Plantinga argue in essence thatunless exclusivists must acknowledge on epistemic grounds that are (orshould be) accepted by all rational people that those holdingincompatible beliefs are actually on equal footing, exclusivists canjustifiably deny that this is so and thus need not engage in beliefassessment (Kim 2011). Dissenters argue that exclusivists are the oneswho shoulder the burden of proof. Unless it can be demonstrated onepistemic grounds that are (or should be) accepted by all rationalpeople that proponents of the competing perspectives are not actuallyon equal epistemic footing, exclusivists must consider theirchallengers on equal epistemic footing and are thus obligated toengage in belief assessment (Basinger 2002, 26–27). Or, to statethis important distinction another way, Plantinga contends that weneed not acknowledge that those with whom we disagree are actually onequal epistemic footing unless it can be demonstrated objectively thatthey are equally knowledgeable and sincere, while his critics maintainthat we must acknowledge that those with whom we disagree are on equalepistemic footing unless we have an objective means of demonstratingthat we are in fact more knowledgeable and/or sincere than they. Mostphilosophers of religion side with the critics in this case and thusassume that actual peer conflict cannot justifiably be denied(Stenmark 2024; Byrne 2011, 30).

Assuming the reality of peer conflict, some claim that exclusivistsencountering peer disputes on religious issues are required (fullyobligated) to attempt to resolve such epistemic conflicts. Thecontention here, it must be emphasized, is not that such resolution isalways possible or that exclusivists must necessarily give up theirbeliefs if no resolution is forthcoming. Discussion concerning thoseissues is yet to come. The claim, rather, is only that exclusivistsare obligated at the very least to assess the evidence for and againstthe beliefs in question and try to “get a sense of the appealand of the concern of those who advocate them” (McKim 2001,146).

Other philosophers support qualified forms of obligation in the faceof peer conflict. Dirk-Martin Grube, for example, states thatexclusivists like Plantinga tend to focus on “the question ofwhether we are justified to make exclusivist truth claims in religionbut overlook the question of how we should make those claims”(Grube 2024, 111). Exclusivists, he maintains, can justifiably claimthat they are entitled to hold their beliefs—can fend offdefeaters. However, such exclusivists are often guilty of beingepistemically overconfident rather than epistemically humble. Whenfaced with cognitive ambiguity (peer conflict in relation to religiousbeliefs), exclusivists should be open to the possibility that theirjudgment is mistaken and therefore be open to humbly engaging in“robust dialogue” with those with whom they disagree(Grube 2024, 121–22). The goal of such dialogue, he noteselsewhere, is not to convert the other or even necessarily identifyareas of mutual agreement, although agreement of this sort may welloccur in some cases. The goal is to engage in a “meaningfulexchange” that will give exclusivists (and their challengers) abasis for reflecting more seriously on their own perspectives (Grube2019, 183).

Mikael Stenmark affirms a more qualified sense of obligation in theface of peer conflict. He maintains that “when we discover thatother intelligent, well-informed, and honest people around us do notshare but even deny some of our most fundamental religious or secularbeliefs, we [must] . . . actually take into consideration thepossibility that we may be wrong” (Stenmark 2024, 48). However,the principle of epistemic conservatism dictates that we should“initially assume that what we find ourselves believing is trueuntil a good reason arises for us to question whether we may have madea mistake” (Stenmark 2024, 46). Given this principle, hemaintains, exclusivists have no overarching epistemic duty(obligation) to always assess their current beliefs in the face ofacknowledged peer conflict, even if they must acknowledge they may bewrong. It is only when exclusivists, themselves, find otherperspectives worthy of consideration that they have an epistemicobligation to consider such perspectives. Given, though, thatexclusivists must acknowledge that they could be mistaken – thatthere is a “non-negligible risk” that they are wrong– exclusivists do have a reason (although not an obligation) toconsider the perspectives of others in relation to significant issues(Stenmark 2024, 53).

Jerome Gellman offers what can be viewed as a stronger version ofStenmark’s position. The focus of Gellman’s challengecenters on what he identifies as rock bottom beliefs. Such beliefs, asGellman defines them, are the epistemic givens in a religious beliefsystem—the assumed, foundational truths upon which all else isbuilt. Gellman grants that if a religious belief affirmed by anexclusivist is not rock bottom (is not a foundational assumption),then it may well be subject to obligatory belief assessment in theface of religious diversity. However, he argues, since beliefassessment only makes sense when one isn’t certain that thebelief in question is true, and since rock bottom religious beliefsare among the foundational truths—the basic, assumedtruths—in an exclusivist’s epistemic system, no assessmentis necessary. Rather, when exclusivists encounter a challenge to sucha belief—for example, a challenge to their rock bottom belief inGod’s ultimate control over all earthly affairs—they can,utilizing the G. E. Moore switch, justifiably maintain that becausetheir rock bottom belief is true, the competing belief can justifiablybe rejected (Gellman 1993, 345–364; Gellman 1998,229–235).

Furthermore, Gellman adds that even if we grant that rock bottombeliefs are at times open to belief assessment, exclusivists need notengage in such assessment in the face of religious diversity unlessthey find that the awareness of such diversity is causing them to losesignificant confidence in their own perspective. In the absence ofthis type of internal conflict, they “may rationally invoke[their] unreflective religious belief to defeat opposing religiousclaims, without having to consider the question any further”(Gellman 2000, 403).

It would seem, though, that even those who are sympathetic toGellman’s general line of reasoning would want to limit itsscope. Many religious beliefs held by exclusivists have practicalconsequences. That is, exclusivist beliefs are not isolated cognitiveassumptions; they motivate behavior. For instance, there are manytheists worldwide who not only still believe that men have some sortof God-given, inherent authority over women, or that certain ethnicgroups have God-given superiority, or that certain sexual orientationsare perversions of God’s ideal, or that humans have God-givenauthority over the rest of nature, or that God desires heretics to besilenced, they also act on these beliefs. However, it seems safe toassume that most exclusivists, including Gellman, believe that some ofthese actions are morally wrong and ought to be stopped to the extentpossible. In such cases, it is difficult to imagine many exclusivistsmaintaining that those who hold the beliefs on which these acts arebased have no need to reassess these beliefs unless they personallyfeel a need to do so. It seems, rather, that most exclusivists wouldwant those holding such beliefs to at the very least engage insignificant belief reassessment, even if they don’t at presentpersonally feel a need to do so.

Finally, Jennifer Jensen offers a different form of qualifiedobligation to assess religious beliefs in the face of peer conflict(Jensen 2024). Jensen grants that there are many weighty,long-standing unresolved disagreements on foundational religiousissues—for example, on whether God exists, and if so how God isinvolved in earthly affairs—with respect to which we have noreason to deny that those on both sides are epistemic peers—todeny that they are equally sincere, qualified, and knowledgeable.Moreover, Jensen acknowledges that exclusivists must always consideralleged defeaters to their religious beliefs—claims that thereare objective, non-question-begging criteria in relation to which itcan be demonstrated that a given religious belief is false or cannotjustifiably be affirmed. However, in the absence of such defeaters,the strength of any obligation to assess disputed beliefs, we aretold, depends on the similarity of the belief systems of theinterlocutors with respect to the beliefs in question.

Our beliefs, Jensen points out, do not exist in isolation. Our beliefsystems (noetic structures) are composed of properly basic (core,control) beliefs and beliefs that are layered upon these basicbeliefs. All of our religious beliefs except our core religiousbeliefs are grounded in (are based upon) a set of other more deeplyingressed (layered) beliefs. Moreover, the closer a disputed belief isto our core beliefs, the greater the impact on our belief system as awhole would be if it were abandoned or even held with significantlyless confidence.

Accordingly, assuming that there are no defeaters to a challengedreligious belief and given that all religious beliefs except properlybasic beliefs are grounded in (are based upon) a set of other moredeeply ingressed beliefs, exclusivists are rationally justified inretaining a challenged belief if giving up the belief would requirethem to abandon their (1) properly basic beliefs, (2) any beliefs thatare more closely connected to these core beliefs than the belief beingchallenged, or (3) those beliefs that are held with a greater degreeof confidence than the belief being challenged.

What follows for the question of epistemic obligation in the face ofpeer conflict, we are told, depends on the extent to whichexclusivists and their dissenters share the relevant set of undefeatedbeliefs. The rational response to epistemic peer conflict forexclusivists is to proportion the degree to which they are obligatedto give weight to the opinion of peer critics to the “degree towhich [they] and [their] interlocutor share the relevantbeliefs”—to the extent that their noetic structuresoverlap (Jensen 2024, 364). More specifically, the greater the extentto which a challenger shares the set of layered beliefs on which thechallenged belief is based, the greater the obligation to consider thechallenge. It also follows, though, that it is rational forexclusivists to give no weight to disagreements if they “havegood reason to believe that the relevant beliefs are not shared (ornot shared in the same way) between [them] and [those] with whom[they] disagree” (Jensen 2024, 368).

This, of course, as Jensen acknowledges, leaves open the question ofhow one determines, or the practicality of trying to determine, theextent to which those holding differing beliefs on an issue shareoverlapping belief structures. Jensen’s approach, though, doesexemplify a growing acknowledgment of the role that non-objectivecriteria can play in assessing the rationality of beliefs, which willbe discussed in greater detail in Section 4.

The conclusion of this section briefly notes the relevance of currentdiscussions around the extent to which belief assessment that resultsin belief retention, modification, or rejection is actually under ourcontrol.

When considering the extent to which the acknowledgment of diverseperspectives on religious issues carries with it an epistemicobligation to assess one’s belief about those issues, there isoften the explicit or implicit assumption that such assessment isfully or primarily a rational (cognitive) exercise. A person who isobligated or chooses to assess challenged beliefs is to consider allthe relevant evidence in relation to an accepted method fordetermining justified belief and make a rational determination toretain, modify, or give up the belief in question. This is even sowhen the valid role of non-objective criteria for belief assessment isacknowledged. We still often find in place a model of beliefassessment that is primarily cognitive (based on conscious rationalconsiderations).

However, to what extent is this rational assessment model accurate,especially in relation to strongly held, deeply engrained beliefs(including religious beliefs) that are close to the core (foundation)of our belief systems? Social psychologists continue to maintain thatsuch deeply engrained beliefs are often quite resistant to“neutral,” objective assessment. Whether this initialinability to assess such beliefs in an objective fashion is primarilythe result of the manner in which the brain functions, unconsciousearly childhood belief formation, and/or the unquestioned acquisitionof beliefs from respected adults, what does not seem open to debate isthat we all have person-specific beliefs related to deeply heldvalues, cultural norms, and/ or religious doctrines that are veryresistant to change, even in the face of seemingly strong contraryevidence (Haidt 2012; Mercer & Sperber 2011; Tappin, van der Leer,& McKay 2017).

More specifically, it appears to be the case that when confronted withcriticisms of, or counter-evidence to, deeply engrained beliefs thathave emotional and/or cultural anchoring in our sense of self or the“world” in which we exist, our initial conscious (orunconscious) response is not to welcome this information and considerhow it impacts these beliefs. Rather, our default response is to avoidthe evidence, discredit the source, reinterpret the evidence, and/orreframe the belief to absorb the counter-evidence without rejecting oreven significantly modifying the beliefs in question (Kahneman 2011).This default desire to retain beliefs of this type in the face ofseeming counter-evidence may be a possible explanation for the fact sofew facing such counter-evidence actually give up or modify thebeliefs in question when told that rationality requires that they needto do so based on the evidence at hand.^[3]

It does appear, though, that this default tendency towardnonfalsifiabilty can be minimized when consciously acknowledged andthat belief modification can and most often does occur whenindividuals face an internally generated, as opposed to an externallyimposed, sense of cognitive dissonance caused by seemingcounter-evidence to their beliefs. To the extent that this is true, itseems that those philosophers (or others) who maintain there is someepistemic obligation to assess religious beliefs in the face of peerchallenge and are, in addition, interested in the actualization ofthis obligation must do more than simply declare to those facing peerconflict that they have this obligation. They need to consider howthis obligation can best be shared in a way that will maximize thelikelihood that those facing diversity will experience the internalcognitive dissonance that often serves as the precursor to meaningfulbelief assessment and modification.

4. Religious Diversity and Justified Belief

Some philosophers/theologians assume that belief assessment, whenconducted properly, can often resolve epistemic peer conflict (Byrne2011, 31; Aijaz 2017). What if we assume, however, that while theconsideration of criteria such as self-consistency andcomprehensiveness can rule out certain options, there exists no set ofcriteria that will allow us to resolve most religious epistemicdisputes (whether between proponents of different religions orproponents of different variants of the same religion) in a neutral,nonquestion-begging fashion (Peterson et al. 2013, 69–74)? Inwhat epistemic position does this then place the exclusivist?

It is important that we clarify further the question being asked.Responses to seeming epistemic peer disagreement generally fall intoone of four categories: (1) asteadfast response whereindividuals retain their perspectives on the disputed contention withthe same degree of confidence, (2) some form ofconciliatoryresponse where individuals retain their perspectives but withreduced confidence and/or modify their perspective on the disputedcontention, (3) some form ofsuspension of belief responsewhere individuals have determined that they have no good reason tofavor their perspectives over the perspectives of those with whom theydisagree, and (4) some form ofdefeatist response whereindividuals relinquish their perspectives.

While interesting, we are not here concerned with the empiricalquestion of how many philosophers fall into each camp when facing peerconflict. Nor will we be considering alleged correlations between, forinstance, a conciliatory response and virtues such as intellectualhumility and open-mindedness or a steadfast response and vices such asintellectual arrogance or bias, although recent work in this area hasbeen done (Beebe & Matheson 2023). We are concerned with what itis “rational for the disagreeing parties to believe upondiscovering their disagreement” (Beebe & Matheson 2023,428). Or rephrased as a question for exclusivists, to what extent, ifany, is it reasonable for exclusivists to retain their exclusivisticbeliefs when it is acknowledged that epistemic peers disagree?^[4]

The answer, as some see it, is that exclusivists can no longerjustifiably maintain that their exclusivistic beliefs are true. JohnSchellenberg, for example, argues that because no more than one amonga set of incompatible truth claims can be true, disputants in a debateover such claims are justified in continuing to maintain that theirclaim is true only if they possess nonquestion-begging justification— justification based on assumptions and lines of reasoningacceptable to both parties — for believing the incompatibleclaim of any competitor to be false. However, since no disputant inreligious conflicts “has justification for supposing theothers’ claims false,” disputants cannot be justified“in holding [their] own claim to be true” (Schellenberg2000, 213). David Silver comes to a similar conclusion:“[Exclusivists] should provide independent evidence for theclaim that they have a special source of religious knowledge ... orthey should relinquish their exclusivist religious beliefs”(Silver 2001, 11).

Others have suggested that in the face of unresolved epistemic peerconflict, the (or a) rational course of action is to suspend judgment.Richard Feldman has argued, for instance, that in those cases ofacknowledged epistemic peer conflict where we have no good reason forbelieving that those disagreeing with us are “making some kindof mistake or failing to see some truth . . . the right thing for both[sides] is to suspend judgment” (Feldman 2007, 212)^[5].

Those who promote a conciliatory response don’t go this far.Specifically, they don’t maintain that exclusivists are requiredto abandon or suspend judgment on their beliefs in the face ofunresolved epistemic peer disagreement. Proponents of what is oftenlabeled the “Equal Weight View” maintain that in the faceof unresolved epistemic peer conflict, both exclusivists and thoseholding differing perspectives should adjust their confidence levelsto the point where those on both sides acknowledge that they and theirepistemic challengers have equally compelling evidence that they areright (Elga 2007). Proponents of what is normally labeled“Strong Conciliationism” do not require that exclusivistsgrant equal credence to the positions of their epistemic peer criticsbut do maintain that exclusivists are required to hold their beliefswith significantly less confidence (Christensen 2007, 2020). ThomasKelly, an influential critic of this position, argues that “whenfaced with a peer who disagrees, knowing how one is rationallyrequired to respond will typically require an extremely substantivejudgment about one’s overall epistemic situation, as opposed tothe straightforward application of a general norm that dictatesagnosticism in all such cases,” as the strong conciliationistholds (Kelly 2013, 52).

Those who fall into the camp of what can be labeled “WeakConciliationism” do not argue that exclusivists need to holdtheir beliefs with significantly less confidence in the face ofunresolved peer disagreement but do acknowledge that exclusivistsmust, or at least be willing to, hold their exclusive religiousbeliefs more tentatively—with somewhat lessconfidence—(Quinn 2005a). This reduction in confidence(tentativeness), Robert McKim tells us, has potential value in that itcan lead to deep tolerance: the allowance “that those with whomyou disagree are people whom it is worthwhile to approach withrational arguments” (McKim 2001, 178) And personal tolerance ofthis sort, we are told, may well lead to a more tolerant and opensociety that will permit and even encourage a diversity of opinion onall issues, including opinions on religious matters. [Whether this isin fact the case is considered in detail in Section 5]

William Alston is a leading representative of those who maintain thatthe exclusivist is justified in remaining steadfast in the face ofpeer conflict. His perspective is based on what he sees as a crucialdistinction between two types of epistemic disputes: those in which“it is clear what would constitute non-circular grounds forsupposing one of the contestants to be superior to the others”and those in which it is not. In the former case—in those casesin which there is a commonly accepted “procedure for settlingdisputes”—it is rational, he acknowledges, for individualsto engage in serious belief assessment that could result in beliefmodification or rejection (Alston 1988, 442–443).

However, as Alston sees it, there exists no such common ground forsettling basic epistemic disputes over religious truth claims, andthis, he contends, alters the situation drastically. It still remainstrue, he grants, that the reality of religious diversity diminishesjustification. But the fact that “we are at a loss to specify[common ground]” means, he argues, that with respect to thosereligious perspectives that are self-consistent, it is not“irrational for one to remain an exclusivist”—notirrational for proponents of any religious perspective to continue tohold that their perspective is true. That is, as Alston sees it, giventhe absence of common ground for resolving disputes, the proponent ofany self-consistent religious perspective can justifiably continue tobelieve this perspective to be true “despite not being able toshow that it is epistemically superior to the competition”(Alston 1988, 443–446). Stated differently yet, Alston grantsthat objective evidence is necessary for justified belief when thedebated issue is one for which such evidence is available. However,when objective evidence is not available—as is the case for mostimportant religious disputes—it cannot be required for justifiedbelief.

In fact, at one point he goes even further. Because there exists atpresent no neutral ground for adjudicating religious epistemicconflicts, it is not only the case, Alston argues, that exclusivistsare justified (rational) in continuing to consider their ownperspective superior. Since we do not even know in most cases what anon-circular reason for demonstrating superiority would look like, the“only rational course” for exclusivists “is to sittight” with the beliefs “which [have] served so well inguiding [their] activity in the world.” Or, to generalize thispoint, Alston speaks for those who maintain that, given the absence ofcommon ground for adjudicating disputes concerning self-consistentreligious perspectives, it is not rational for exclusivists to stopmaintaining that their system is superior (Alston 1988, 444).

Philip Quinn offers a noteworthy weak conciliatory response toAlston’s position. While he agrees with Alston that in the faceof diversity, exclusivists may well be justified in continuing to“sit tight”—in continuing to maintain that theirreligious perspective is true—he denies that this is the onlyrational course of action available (Quinn 2000, 235–246). Thebasis for this position is his distinction between a pre-Kantian and aKantian understanding of religious belief. To have a pre-Kantianunderstanding of religious belief is to assume that we have (or atleast can have) access to the truth as it really is. It is to believe,for instance, that we do (or at least can in principle) know what Godis really like. To have a Kantian understanding of religious belief isto assume that although there is a literal noumenal reality, ourunderstanding of this reality (and thus our truth claims about thisreality) will of necessity be relative to thecultural/social/psychological lenses through which ourconceptualization of this noumenal reality is processed. It is tobelieve, for instance, that although there is a divine reality aboutwhich we can make truth claims, our understanding of (and thus ourtruth claims about) this divine reality will necessarily to someextent be conditioned by the ways in which our environment (ourculture in the broadest sense) has shaped our categories of thought(Quinn 2000, 241–242).

Alston, Quinn contends, is essentially working off of a pre-Kantianmodel of religious belief when he encourages religious exclusivists tosit tight in the face of peer conflict since, in the absence of anyobjective basis for determining which perspective is right, theexclusivist has no sufficient reason not to do so. Quinn does not denythat this pre-Kantian approach is justifiable and thus does not denythat someone who follows Alston’s advice to sit tight isrational in doing so. However, Quinn believes that “it shouldnot be taken for granted that any of the [contending perspectives] inits present form is correct.” Hence, he believes it is equallyjustifiable for an exclusivist to adopt a Kantian approach toreligious belief. Specifically, he believes it is equally justifiablefor an exclusivist to assume that whatever any of us can know aboutthe truth of the matter will never be a description of religiousreality that is free of significant cultural/social/psychologicalconditioning. Accordingly, it is also rational, he maintains, forexclusivists encountering diverse truth claims to “seek a moreinclusivist or pluralistic understanding of their own faith” bymodifying their beliefs to bring them “into line with such anunderstanding” (Quinn 2000, 242).

In short, as Quinn sees it, those who hold a position such asAlston’s have left us, at least implicitly, with a falsedilemma: either we find common ground on which we can objectivelydetermine which religious perspective is the truth or we sit tightwith what we have. However, Quinn holds that once we realize it isperfectly reasonable for a person to assume that the proponent of noreligious perspective has (or even could have) an accurateunderstanding of divine reality as it really is, another rationalalternative appears. We then see that it is also perfectly rationalfor people to begin to revise their own phenomenological perspectiveon the truth in a way that will allow for greater overlap with thephenomenological perspectives of those with whom they disagree.

The approach to conflicting religious perspectives Quinn outlines hasin fact become increasingly prominent in some exclusivistic circles.Consider, for example, the ongoing debate among conservativeChristians over how God brought the rest of reality into existence.Some still claim the Bible clearly teaches that God created the“heavens and the earth” in six twenty-four-hour periodsabout ten thousand years ago. Others continue to maintain that thefact that “a day is to the Lord as a thousand years”(Psalms 90:4) means that while God is directly responsible for whatthe Bible says was created each “day,” it is mostreasonable to believe that the time frame for each instance ofcreative activity could well have been millions, or even billions, ofyears. And then some still hold that God’s direct creativeactivity consisted primarily of orchestrating the “BigBang.” However, more recently, many conservative Christians havetaken a more Kantian approach. Based on their assumption that we maywell not have access, even through Scripture, to exactly how God wasinvolved in the creative process, they have modified what is to beconsidered essential to Christianity on this issue. Rather thanaffirming any of the specific explanations of how God created allelse, they affirm a more general contention compatible with each ofthese specific explanations: that God is in some manner directlyresponsible for the existence of all else. They have, in Quinn’sterms, thinned their core theologies in a way that reconciles thedivergent perspectives. [We will see below that this emphasis onworking toward common belief is sometimes cited as a way to minimizediffering perspectives on the eternal destiny of humans (Section 6)and as a way to approach diversity of thought on controversial issuesin education (Section 7).]

Most realize, though, that moving toward a thinner theology can onlyresolve the epistemic tension produced by religious diversity to acertain extent. Let’s assume that it is perfectly reasonable,and possibly even preferable, for exclusivists to thin theirtheologies in an attempt to minimize that set of core beliefs thatmust be affirmed to remain proponents of the specific theologicalperspectives in question. To be an exclusivist—even a stronglyKantian exclusivist—is still to believe that one’sreligious perspectives on some religious beliefs are superior in thesense that they are in some important way closer to the truth than arethe competing perspectives of others. Accordingly, while thinningtheir theology may be a rational choice that can minimize conflict forexclusivists to some extent, few deny that a certain amount ofepistemic conflict will remain.

Finally, an increasing number of philosophers are at leastacknowledging a different, more pragmatic approach to addressingconflicting perspectives on religious issues. This approach, oftenlabeled “pragmatic encroachment,” is based on thedistinction between (1) personal pragmaticconsiderations—internal states such as psychological comfort,professional interests, or moral commitments—and (2) objectivepublic evidence—evidence available to all persons involved inthe dispute (Fantl & McGrath 2007). Proponents of this approachmaintain that while it is important to consider all objective evidencewhen assessing beliefs in the face of peer conflict, it is alsorational (justifiable) to consider personal pragmatic factors whenmaking one’s determinations.

Some philosophers acknowledge this distinction but maintain thatepistemic rationality in the face of diversity of thought requiresadherence to objective considerations, apart from pragmatic factors(Feldman 2007; Christensen 2020). Others, following in the spirit ofWilliam James, are more sympathetic to allowing justifiable responsesto such diversity to be based in part on personal pragmatic(practical) considerations to which only each participant has access.Anastasia Scrutton maintains, for example, that when facing religiousepistemic conflicts, pragmatic “considerations such as what isat stake are epistemically significant [in that] they can raise orlessen the extent to which your belief is justified or the amount ofknowledge you have” (Scrutton 2016, 347). Mikael Stenmarkagrees, noting that in situations in which the evidence (that is, theepistemic reasons) are approximately equal, pragmatic reasons canjustifiably play an important and at times decisive role (Stenmark2024, 59).

However, for exclusivists (or anyone) to justify the retention oftheir beliefs even in part on pragmatic or other subjective factorswill seem to some just another way of saying that those with whomexclusivists disagree are not fully their epistemic peers in the sensethat they don’t share full access to all the relevant data.While this is not, in and of itself, a non-question begging reason toreject non-objective considerations, to grant that one need notacknowledge that one’s critic is an epistemic peer doeschallenge the assumption of acknowledged peer conflict on which mostcurrent philosophical discussions of disputes over religious beliefsare based.

5. Religious Diversity and Religious Tolerance

Religious intolerance, defined as the practice of keeping others fromacting in accordance with their religious beliefs, is not new.However, there is justifiable concern worldwide over the increasingamount, and increasingly violent nature, of such behavior.Accordingly, there is understandably a continuing interest infostering religiously tolerant environments in which individuals withdiffering religious perspectives can practice their faithsunencumbered at international, national, and local levels. However,will acknowledged religious diversity lead to tolerance? Moreover,even if it does, is tolerance sufficient to achieve positive,productive interaction among adherents to different faithperspectives? Or do we need some level of religious understanding toachieve this end?

For our purposes, to be tolerant of those with different religiousperspectives is to allow them to hold and practice their beliefs freefrom interference or harassment. To have understanding is to learnabout and comprehend the practices and beliefs of those with differingreligious perspectives.

We will focus first on the question of whether the acknowledgment of,and subsequent reflection on, religious diversity might lead togreater religious tolerance. While many philosophers continue toemphasize the importance of religious tolerance in the face ofdiversity, Philip Quinn’s argument supporting the claim thatacknowledged diversity can foster tolerance is a good starting pointfor considering whether it is reasonable to believe this might occur(Quinn 2001, 2002, 2005a). Quinn maintains that (1) serious reflectionon the undeniable reality of religious diversity will necessarilyweaken people’s justification for believing that their religiousperspective is superior to the perspectives of others and that (2)this weakened justification can, and hopefully will for some, lead togreater religious tolerance—will, for example, lead to a moreaccepting, less confrontational attitude toward those with differingreligious perspectives.

Both contentions have been challenged. Considering first Quinn’sclaim that reflection on the acknowledged reality of religiousdiversity reduces individuals’ justified confidence in thesuperiority of their position, we have already seen in our discussionof religious diversity and epistemic obligation (Section 3) that somephilosophers maintain that exclusivists need not grant that theircompetitors are actually on an equal epistemic footing and are, thus,justified in continuing to maintain that their perspective is superiorwithout further reflection. Moreover, we saw in our discussion ofreligious diversity and justified belief (Section 4) that somephilosophers agree with Alston that exclusivists can grant that thosewith whom they differ on religious beliefs are epistemic peers whilejustifiably continuing to hold their beliefs with the same degree ofconfidence.

Quinn’s second contention—that weakened justification inthe superiority of a perspective has the promising potential forfostering religious tolerance—has also been challenged. Forinstance, William Hasker questions whether Quinn’s challenge tothose who hold firmly to the superiority of their religiousperspectives—that the reality of religious diversity requiresthat they hold their perspectives less firmly—will have theeffect Quinn intended. It was Quinn’s hope that those challengedin this fashion would “soften” their exclusivisticconvictions and thus be less likely to engage in intolerant behavior.However, might not just the opposite occur? Might not those told thatthe reality of religious diversity reduces their justified confidencein their beliefs feel threatened and thus, in an attempt to“stand up for the truths” they still firmly believe,become even more intolerant of those with other perspectives (Hasker2008)? Others will agree with Bassam Al-Mannai that at least at thenational and international levels, “the presence of diversity,whether religious or ethnic, has little to do with tolerance.It’s rather the case that the racist ideologies followed byabsolute leaders cause friction to occur” (Al-Mannai 2006,87).

Even if we assume that acknowledged religious diversity will lead toreligious tolerance—a more peaceful coexistence—is thatsufficient? Dirk-Martin Grube argues that whatever the value oftolerance in the political realm, tolerance “underdetermines arobust interreligious dialogue” since if I simply“tolerate the religious Other, I do not learn from her. Nor do Iconsider her beliefs to be a reason to reflect on my own beliefs in aself-critical fashion” (Grube 2019, 187). It is only if we moveto a level of understanding that we will engage in the type ofinterreligious dialog that will lead to fruitful, respectfulinteraction.

Several well-known commentators on the relationship between religioustolerance and understanding, including Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum2012), Karen Armstrong (Armstrong 2010, 2014), and Tariq Modood(Modood 2013), are even more specific. They agree that tolerance aloneis insufficient since it often lacks meaningful engagement among thoseholding diverse perspectives on religious issues. It is moving to thelevel of understanding that has the potential to reduce ignorance,dispel stereotypes, and foster mutual respect, which in turn has thepotential to lead to cohesive communities where members respect andsupport one another.^[6]

However, as was noted in the discussion of epistemic obligation inSection 3, it appears to be the case that when confronted withcriticisms of, or counter-evidence to, deeply engrained beliefs thathave emotional and/or cultural anchoring, one aspect of our defaultepistemic response is to discredit the source—to challenge theknowledge, motives, and/or character of those with whom we disagree.To the extent this is true, moving from tolerating those with whom wedisagree to a form of understanding that includes respect for theirbeliefs and practices will be more difficult than it might appearwould be the case.

6. Religious Diversity and the Eternal Destiny of Humankind

Historically there is one specific “diversity issue” withwhich many philosophers of religion have been concerned: the questionof the eternal destiny of humankind, that is, the question of who canspend eternity in God’s presence—who can obtain salvation.^[7]

Those who are salvific religious exclusivists on this question claimthat only those who have met the necessary conditions set forth by onereligious perspective can spend eternity in God’s presence.^[8] Adherents of other religious perspectives, it is acknowledged, canaffirm truth related to some or many issues. However, with respect tothe question of salvation (one’s eternal destiny), a person mustcome to understand and adhere to the unique way offered in onereligion. Or, to be more specific, as salvific exclusivists see it,the criteria for salvation specified by the one correct religiousperspective are both epistemologically necessary in the sense thatthose seeking salvation must be aware of these conditions forsalvation and ontologically necessary in the sense that theseconditions must really be met (Peterson et al. 2013, 322).

Within Christianity, these conditions often include acknowledging(confessing) that one’s sinful nature has caused a separationfrom God, acknowledging that this separation can only be repairedthrough the atoning work of Christ, and then asking God to forgivethese sins and, based on this act, to be reinstated into a personalrelationship with God both now and through eternity. Within Islam,these conditions often include absolute belief in the oneness ofAllah, acceptance of the Prophet Muhammad as the final messenger fromAllah, acceptance of the truth of and living in accordance with theQuran, and adherence to the additional pillars of Islam. Sincesalvific exclusivism, in general, requires a conscious understandingof these necessary conditions and a conscious decision to eitheraccept or reject what is required for salvation, exclusivists facequestions about (1) the eternal destiny of children (or adults) whodie before (or without) having the capacity to accept or reject whatis necessary for salvation and (2) the eternal destiny of those whothrough no fault of their own never became aware of what was necessaryfor salvation and, therefore, were not able to accept or reject whatis required.

There are at least two basic types of salvific exclusivists.Predestinarian exclusivists hold that for those who are aware of thenecessary conditions for salvation, God has for God’s reasonspredetermined who will be saved and who will not—that is, haspredetermined how they will freely (with compatiblistic freedom)respond to what they know is necessary for salvation. The majority ofChristian predestinarians hold that those who will never become awareof the necessary conditions for salvation have not been predestined tobe saved and thus will spend eternity apart from God (Piper 2010;Henry 1991). Some Muslim predestinarians agree (Aijaz 2024,12–13).

Predestinarian salvific exclusivists differ on the eternal destiny ofthose who die in childhood. Those Christians in the Augustiniantradition maintain that all will spend eternity apart from God; thosein the Roman Catholic tradition tie salvation for children who die tothe sacrament of baptism; and those in the Reformed tradition maintaineither that only the deceased children of believers are allowed toenter heaven or that some or all of these children may be predestinedto spend eternity with God. Muslim predestinarian salvificexclusivists also differ on this question.

Universal access exclusivists hold that all will have the opportunityto understand what is necessary to attain salvation and freely make(with indeterministic freedom) the decision to confess their sins andask God to reinstate them into a personal relationship with God nowand for eternity. Most universal access exclusivists (both Christianand Muslim) maintain that God’s justice and mercy require thatchildren (or adults) who die before (or without) having theopportunity to hear and respond to what is necessary for salvationwill spend eternity in God’s presence. Proponents of this viewdiffer on the question of the eternal destiny of those who, through nofault of their own, die without having become aware of what isnecessary for salvation. Some Christian universal exclusivistsmaintain, for example, that while many humans do not have access toknowledge of Christ, all humans do have access to the existence of Godas a divine being through experiencing God’s creation and willbe judged on the basis of how they respond to this knowledge. This isalso a common belief in mainstream Sunni Muslim thought (Aijaz 2024,11). Other Christian universal exclusivists ground their response onthe concept of divine middle knowledge—the belief in this casethat God knows counterfactually for each individual how thatindividual would freely respond if presented with the gospel. WilliamCraig maintains, for instance, that since God is just, “God inHis providence has so arranged the world that anyone who would receiveChrist has the opportunity to do so” (Craig 1989, 185). Anothermiddle knowledge option is to argue that God counterfactually knowsfor every person who will never actually hear the necessary conditionsfor salvation how that person would have responded if this individualhad become aware of these conditions and judges the person accordingly(Lake 1975, 43). Still other Christian universal exclusivists maintainthat all who die without becoming aware of these conditions will havethe opportunity in some manner to understand and respond to theseconditions after death (Walls 2015). Finally, some Christian andMuslim universal exclusivists admit they do not know exactly how Godwill judge those who were never aware of the requirements forsalvation but believe that a just and merciful God will treat all inthis category fairly (Stott & Edwards 1988; Rahman 1980).

Salvific inclusivists agree with salvific exclusivists that the actualbasis on which a person can be reconciled and spend eternity with Godis only found in one religion. For example, Christian inclusivistsagree that humans can only be reconciled with God because of theatoning act of Christ. Muslim exclusivists emphasize that Allah is theultimate arbiter of salvation, and no one has eternal life exceptthrough His will and mercy.

However, salvific inclusivists do not maintain “that only thebelievers or practitioners of [the one true religion] during theirearthly lives, will be redeemed” (Benton 2020). Salvificinclusivists allow that some adherents of other religions can be savedbecause of the provisions of the one true religion, even if theindividuals in question haven’t made the personal commitmentsnormally stipulated as necessary to appropriate these salvificprovisions. Stated in philosophical language, as inclusivists see it,particular salvific events may be ontologically necessary forsalvation in the sense that salvation cannot occur without them butnot epistemically necessary in the sense that one need not know aboutor act upon them to be saved or liberated (Moser 2011; Peterson et al.2013, 334).

For example, Christian inclusivists maintain that Christians need notbe aware of the atoning act of Christ, confess one’s sins, andask for forgiveness to become reconciled to Christ and spend eternityin God’s presence. Muslim inclusivists don’t insist that aperson must believe in the oneness of Allah, accept the ProphetMuhammad as the final messenger from Allah, accept the truth of andlive in accordance with the Quran, and adhere to the additionalpillars of Islam to spend eternity in Paradise.

With respect to the question of whether religions other than the onetrue religion can offer pathways to salvation, those sometimes labeledrestrictive salvific inclusivists hold that while an individual neednot be aware of the one true pathway for reconciliation to utilizethis pathway to access reconciliation, no other religion offers asufficient pathway to access this salvific reconciliation (Pinnock1992). Most salvific inclusivists, however, are non-restrictive(sometimes referred to as pluralistic) inclusivists on this questionin that they hold that while salvation (reconciliation with God) isonly possible because of the pathway for reconciliation found in onereligion, other religions may serve as imperfect but sufficientpathways to access salvific reconciliation with God (D’Costa2022). For instance, a non-restrictive salvific inclusivistic Muslimwould hold that following the Christian path to salvation may serve asan imperfect but sufficient pathway to eternal reconciliation with Godand vice versa. In the words of Muslim inclusivist V.A. MohamadAshrof, there are deep roots in the Islamic tradition that“distinguish ‘Islam’ (capital‘I’)—the historical, institutionalized faithrevealed to Muhammad—and ‘islam’ (small‘i’)—the universal, primordial faith of submissionto God’s will that transcends specific religioustraditions” and “this distinction allows inclusivists toassert that non-Muslims, through their respective beliefs, may alsosubmit to God’s will and, thus, attain salvation” (Ashrof2024).

Probably the best-known Christian proponent of non-restrictiveinclusivism is Karl Rahner. Christianity, he argues, cannot recognizeany other religion as providing the source of salvation, andChristianity is the normative and most complete path to salvation.However, other religions can serve as imperfect means through whichindividuals can encounter God’s grace and respond to the divinewill. Just as adherents to pre-Christian Judaism were able, throughthe redemptive acts of Jesus of which they were not aware, to enterGod’s presence, so, too, is it possible for adherents of otherreligions to enter God’s presence, even though they do notacknowledge the necessary redemptive acts of Jesus Christ that makesthis possible (Peterson et al. 2013, 334–335). Since God is loveand desires everyone to be saved, God can apply the results ofJesus’s atoning death and resurrection to everyone, even tothose who have never heard of Jesus and his death or have neveracknowledged his lordship. Rahner used the term “anonymousChristian” for non-Christians who unknowingly appropriate thesalvific work of Christ.

All salvific inclusivists, like some exclusivists, maintain thatchildren and those adults without the capacity to understand the truepath to salvation will when they die be in God’s presenceeternally due to God’s justice and mercy. With respect to thosewho have the capacity to follow the true path but die withoutknowledge of this true path, inclusivists differ on the conditions“anonymous Christians” must meet to receive salvificgrace. Some, like Rahner, maintain all have some innate knowledge ofGod and the freedom to establish a relationship with God and,therefore, that the eternal destiny of those in this category isdependent on the extent to which they sincerely seek truth and respondto their inner moral conscience—on the extent to which theycommit as much as they know of themselves to as much as they know ofGod through, or even apart from, a religion other than Christianity.Other inclusivists are not as specific, maintaining only that, becauseGod is just, there will surely be some adherents of other religions orno religion at all who will be in God’s presence because theyhave met some set of divine conditions they have it within their powerto meet. All agree, though that these “anonymousChristians” are the recipients of divine grace.

But what of those who have become aware of what is required forreconciliation with God in the true path to salvation but have notdone what is necessary for such reconciliation —for example,what of those who become aware of the opportunity for reconciliationwith God through Christ’s atoning act or the conditions forsalvation in Islam but choose not to do what is required for suchreconciliation. While all exclusivists clearly hold that theseindividuals will not receive salvific reconciliation, theinclusivistic response to those who are aware of the true path tosalvation but do not choose to follow it is more complicated. Somemake a distinction between willful and circumstantial rejection. Theymaintain that while willful, informed rejections of this true pathmight well prohibit salvific reconciliation with God (Erickson, 1983),the fact that someone has chosen not to follow the path to salvificreconciliation of which this person is seemingly aware doesn’tmean that this person truly understands what this path is, based oncultural, historical, or psychological barriers, and thusdoesn’t mean that this person will not spend eternity with God.That is a judgment only a just but merciful God can make.

Morteza Mutahhari is a proponent of Muslim salvific inclusivism whomakes this distinction. He maintains that non-Muslims are at adisadvantage because it is the Islamic Divine Law that leads people toGod. Those who fully understand this law (Islam) but choose not toaccept the truth will be damned. However, in accordance with Islamicjurisprudence, God will be merciful to those who seek the truth butfrom whom, through no fault of their own, the reality of Islam remainshidden. Such people cannot be called unbelievers; they are rather“dispositional Muslims” since it is possible to possessthe requisite spirit of submission without being Muslim in name. Theseindividuals will receive the divine grace necessary to achievesalvation from Hell (Mutahhari 2006; see also Legenhausen 1997[1999]).

Salvific pluralists, however, find such reasoning no more convincingthan that offered by salvific exclusivists. Inclusivists are right,pluralists grant, to say that individuals need not necessarily know ofor fulfill certain requirements specified in a given religion toattain salvation. However, salvific inclusivists, like salvificexclusivists, are wrong to argue that salvation is, itself, possibleonly because of certain conditions or events described in the one truereligion. There is no one true religion and, therefore, no single pathto eternal existence with God. Stated differently, there are multiplevalid paths to salvation, with no single religious tradition holdingexclusive or privileged access to it; people from different faiths canachieve salvation fully within their own traditions.

It’s important to note that to be a salvific pluralist does notprohibit an individual from identifying with or worshipping within agiven religious tradition – for example, Christianity or Islam.Nor does it prohibit an individual from identifying strands of thoughtwithin a given religious tradition that support pluralism – seeYaser Ellethy (2022) for a good example of this within Islam. To be asalvific pluralist requires only that one believes that no onereligious tradition has privileged access to salvation but rather thatthe paths to salvation within various religious traditions, includingthose traditions that one might not happen to identify with, are ofequal salvific efficacy.

The best-known and most influential variation of salvific pluralism isunitary pluralism, which holds that all religions “are, or canbe, equal and valid paths to the one divine reality”(D’Costa 2022, Section 3), a divine reality that ischaracterized in different ways in various religions. A more recentbut significant form of salvific pluralism is pluriform pluralism,which holds that there is no single divine reality underlying allreligious traditions but, rather, multiple, distinct paths todifferent divine realities in various religions. Stated differently,pluriform salvific pluralism holds that different religions may beaccessing different divine realities or “gods” throughtheir practices, implying a plurality of divine realities rather thana single one (D’Costa 2022).

John Hick is the most influential proponent of unitary salvificpluralism. Hick has never denied that the major worldreligions—Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam—makeconflicting truth claims. In fact, he believes that “thedifferences of belief between (and within) the traditions arelegion” and has often discussed these conflicts in great detail(Hick 1983, 487). His basic pluralistic claim, rather, is that suchdifferences are best seen as differing ways in which differingcultures have conceived of and experienced the one ultimate divineReality. Each major religious perspective “constitutes a validcontext of salvation/liberation; but none constitutes the one and onlysuch context” (Hick 1984, 229, 231).

Hick’s main argument for his position is what he sees as thereality of transformation parity. An efficacious salvific processchanges lives in the sense that it begins to turn people from thinkingabout, and acting only to enhance, their own personal well-being toviewing themselves as responsible participants in a much greater, moreexpansive reality. And all the evidence we have, Hick maintains, showsthat many religions are equally transformational, given any generalstandard for positive transformation we might want to consider (Hick2004, chapter 3).

There continues to be debate, however, over whether there is anobjective basis for claiming that the same basic personaltransformation actually does occur within various religions—overwhether there is real transformational parity. Also, it appears thatindividuals making a “secular” (non-religious) commitmentto some goal, value, or metaphysical perspective—be it a concernfor the environment, world hunger, or emotional health—oftenhave their lives transformed in ways quite similar to the ways inwhich the lives of religious believers are transformed. If this is so,however, then might it not be that the religious transformationalparity we observe is simply a subset of the general transformationalparity we find among individuals who commit themselves to anyperspective on life that centers reality outside of self, and thusthat it is just as plausible to assume that all religioustransformational parity is the result of some form of internalconceptual realignment rather than the result of some form ofconnection with an external divine reality (Clark 1997)?

Hick also argues that a credible religious hypothesis must account forthe fact, of which “we have become irreversibly aware in thepresent century, as the result of anthropological, sociological, andpsychological studies and the work of philosophy of language,”that there is no one universal and invariable pattern for theinterpretation of human experience, but rather a range ofsignificantly different patterns or conceptual schemes “whichhave developed within the major cultural streams.” Whenconsidered in this light, a “pluralistic theory becomesinevitable” (Hick 1984, 232).

While no one denies that culture shapes reality to some extent, it canagain be argued, as noted in Sections 3 and 4, that when comparing theplausibility of specific beliefs, we must consider not only thesespecific beliefs themselves but also the basic background beliefs inwhich they are embedded. Thus, even if we grant that a pluralisticresponse to the obvious shaping power of culture is preferable to anyexclusivistic response when such shaping power is considered inisolation, it is not clear that exclusivists must acknowledge thatHick’s hypothesis is so strong that it renders implausible thewhole set of basic background beliefs out of which theexclusivist’s response to the profound shaping influence ofculture on religious belief arises. It appears, rather, thatexclusivists can justifiably reject Hick’s contention that apluralistic cultural/religious interpretation of reality mustinevitably be considered superior.

Others have questioned why Hick has selected only the paths offered bythe world’s “great religions” as ways to salvation?For Hick, the answer lies in the fact that, unlike “Satanism,Nazism, the Order of the Solar Temple, etc.,” the world’sgreat religions offer paths that lead us away from “hatred,misery, aggression, unkindness, impatience, violence, and lack ofself-control” to love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness,faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control (Hick 1997b, 164). Some,though, see this sort of ethical standard for acceptable salvificperspectives to be as arbitrary as the standard for acceptable pathsto salvation set forth by exclusivists or inclusivists (Meeker 2003).In fact, some have questioned whether, given this rather specificethical criterion for assessing the salvific adequacy of religions,Hick’s perspective should actually be considered pluralistic atall.

Pluriform salvific pluralist Mark Heim also argues that unitarypluralists such as Hick are really inclusivists in disguise in thatthey advocate only one path to salvation— for example, thetransformation from self-centeredness toreality-centeredness—and thus, in essence, deny that diversereligions have real, fundamental salvific differences. A better, morehonest salvific pluralism, we are told, is to acknowledge that eachreligion has its own path to salvation that may be either similar toor different from that of other religions. That is, a more honestpluralistic perspective is to deny that the seemingly differentsalvific paths offered by various religious traditions are all justculturally distinct manifestations of the same fundamental path andmaintain instead that salvific paths of various religions remainincompatible, but equally valid ways to achieve salvation (Heim1995).

Other pluriform pluralists include theologian Raimon Panikkar, whoseconcept of “cosmotheandric reality” (theinterconnectedness of the divine, human, and cosmic dimensions ofreality) supports differing understandings of how to access andunderstand the divine in various religious traditions without assumingthat all these paths to the divine ultimately lead to one divinereality (Panikkar 1973, 1987).

Some might argue, though, that while this variation of pluralism doesseem to do justice to the concern raised in Section 1 that philosophyof religion ought to focus more on the distinctions found in variousreligions rather than trying to highlight only that which they have incommon, pluriform pluralism’s focus on the equal validity ofpaths to the divine that affirm seemingly inconsistent understandingsof divine reality—e.g., incompatible claims about the nature ofself in an afterlife—make it difficult to address questionsabout the ultimate nature of reality in a non-relativistic manner.

Others wonder whether this seeming disagreement between unitary andpluriform pluralists is in one key sense primarily a difference infocus. Pluriform pluralists like Heim can appear to be bypassing thequestion of whether there is some sort of final, ultimateeschatological salvific state that the proponents of various religiousperspectives will all experience, emphasizing rather that manydistinct religious paths can liberate people (produce salvation) hereand now (Peterson et al. 2013, 333). Unitary pluralists like Hick, onthe other hand, seem most concerned with the nature of the finaleschatological state all will experience while not denying that thereexist in this world differing ways that remain distinct to access thisultimate salvific experience.

7. Religious Diversity in Public Education

Public education in Western culture has always been to some extent a“melting pot.”^[9] However, the increasing number of students with non-Western culturalvalues and religious traditions is causing public school educators tograpple in new and sometimes uncomfortable ways with the challengessuch diversity poses. Some of these challenges arepractical—e.g., should Muslim girls be allowed to wear hijabs,should schools designate only Christian religious holy days as schoolholidays, and how should educators respond to political efforts tofavor one religion? The focus of this section, however, will be apedagogical question of growing interest in the philosophy ofeducation: How ought the increasing religious diversity to whichstudents are exposed affect public school curricula?

Assuming the separation of church and state, it can initially appearnon-problematic to stipulate guidelines for addressing religion in thepublic school classroom. Educators should encourage “studentawareness of religions, butnot acceptance of aparticular religion;studying about religion, butnotpracticing religion;exposing students to a diversity ofreligious views, butnot imposing any particular view; andeducating students about all religions, butnot promotingor denigrating religion” (Moore 2010, 1). However, as wewill see, educators sometimes differ on the application of thesedistinctions to specific pedagogical questions.

Most public school educators do agree that increasing studentunderstanding of diverse religious perspectives can have significantpositive social outcomes. It is often argued, for instance, thathelping students better understand the increasing diversity, includingreligious diversity, they face will better prepare them to live in apeaceful, productive, less prejudicial environment with those withdiffering cultural and/or religious values (Kunzman 2006; Rosenblith,2017). In fact, some have gone so far as to say such understanding“is necessary for effective and engaged citizenship in aninterconnected and diverse nation and world” (College, Career,and Civic Life 2013, 92).

Many educators, however, want to go further. It is also important,they maintain, for students to clarify their feelings about otherreligions and their followers. Specifically, they want to foster amore empathetic understanding of other religious perspectives, anunderstanding that encourages students to appreciate other religionsfrom the perspective of an adherent of that religion (Kunzman2006;Tinklenberg, 2020).

While few challenge this as a valid goal, there is, though, continuingcontroversy over one common method by which educators sometimesattempt to engender this type of empathy in students. As some see it,an impactful way to help develop an empathetic understanding of otherreligions is to have students directly experience these religions insome way—for instance, have students visit a local mosque orhave a representative from a Hindu Temple share with students in aclass.

Not surprisingly, while no one denies that these forms of directexperience might broaden a student’s empathetic understanding ofa religion, concerns have been raised. First, some believe that havingstudents experience a religion, even as “observers,” cantest the limits of the separation of church and state. While theintent of having students attend a mosque or having a Buddhist talkwith students is seldom to “promote” a religion, the linebetween “exposure” and intended or unintended promotion(or even proselytization), they maintain, is a fine one. This isespecially the case given the widely varying communication skills anddeeply embedded values and preconceptions of the teacher and/or therepresentatives of a given religion with whom students might interact.Second, there is a continuing ethical concern that to experience areligion as an observer might in some cases trivialize or demean thereligion in question. Some Native Americans, for instance, continue tobe concerned with the desire of “outsiders” to seek anunderstanding of their religion(s) by watching or experiencing sacredceremonies since such observation, they believe, can trivialize theseceremonies (Kasprisin 2003, 422; Taliman 1993).

Is it justifiable for the public school educator to go even furtherthan disseminating accurate information and attempting to engender anempathetic understanding of other religions? Is it justifiable toattempt to bring it about that all students affirm a core set of“appropriate” beliefs about other religions and theiradherents?

It is clearly the case that almost all public school educatorscurrently do attempt to bring it about that students hold certainbeliefs related to pervasive human characteristics, such as race,gender, and disabling conditions. Students are encouraged, forinstance, to continue to believe, or come to believe, that engaging inintolerant or discriminatory behavior is wrong and that they shouldaffirm, or come to affirm, the inherent worth and rights of thedisabled, those of other racial/ethnic backgrounds, etc. Therefore, ifthe desire is simply to also encourage students to believe it wrong totreat those of other religions in intolerant or discriminatory waysand to believe it right to accept those of other religions as personswith equal inherent value, few will object.

However, need teachers stop there? Might there not be other beliefsabout religions and their adherents that public school educators canjustifiably attempt to bring about that all students accept? We canextrapolate from the work on religious diversity by Robert Wuthnow tointroduce two beliefs that some might propose fit into this category.As Wuthnow sees it, the most appropriate response to the increasingreligious diversity we face in the United States is what he labels“reflective pluralism” (Wuthnow 2005, 286–307). Toengage in this sort of reflection, he tells us, is not simply tobecome better informed, or to strive to “live peacefully withthose with whom one disagrees” (be tolerant), or even to attemptto develop an empathetic understanding of diverse religions. It is atthe very least (1) to recognize that since all of our beliefs,including our religious beliefs, depend on a point of view“shaped by the culture in which we live,” we should notregard our “own position[s] as inherently superior” and(2) to promote “a principled willingness to compromise” inthe sense that we must be willing to move out of our social andemotional comfort levels “in order to arrive at a workablerelationship with another person” (Wuthnow 2005, 292).

The benefit of this form of engagement, we are told, is not only thatit can minimize the likelihood of the sorts of “religioustensions, conflicts, and violence [that] have been so much a part ofhuman history” (Wuthnow 2005, 293). Such reflective engagementalso allows us to focus on “the shared concerns for basic humandignity” found in the teachings of many of the world’sreligions, which can furnish a basis for inter-religious cooperationto combat social ills and meet basic social needs (Wuthnow 2005,294).

It is important to note that Wuthnow does not explicitly claim or denythat encouraging students in a public school setting to becomereflective pluralists would be appropriate. However, he not onlyhighlights two increasingly popular pluralistic claims aboutreligion—(1) that the beliefs of many religions are equallyvalid expressions of faith, expressions that adherents of thesereligions should be allowed or even encouraged to maintain and (2)that religious believers of all faiths should identify and focus onwhat these religions have in common—he highlights what suchpluralists often note as the main benefits of widespread affirmationof these beliefs: a reduction in violent religious conflicts and anincrease in socially beneficial inter-religious cooperation. Theseoutcomes are clearly quite compatible with what we have seen to be akey reason why public-school educators want to increase studentunderstanding of other religions—namely, their desire to betterprepare students to live in a peaceful, productive manner in socialcontexts that will increasingly be characterized by religiousdiversity. Accordingly, since it seems reasonable to believe thatwidespread acceptance of the validity of diverse religiousperspectives and increased focus on the commonalities in diversereligions might well result in more peaceful, mutually beneficialinteraction among followers of diverse religions, the question ofwhether public school teachers can justifiably attempt to bring itabout that students affirm the beliefs in question appears worthy ofexploration.

Let’s first consider the contention that many religions containequally valid expressions of faith. Even if we accept the debatableassumption that this is true, it will understandably not be clear tomany that public school teachers could justifiably attempt to bring itabout that their students believed this to be so. The problem is thatvarious religions affirm conflicting doctrinal beliefs on significantissues. For example, while conservative Christians maintain that onemust affirm certain beliefs about the saving power of Christ to spendeternity in God’s presence, conservative Muslims strongly denythis. Orthodox Christians and Muslims are taught not only that thesacred scriptures of other religions contain false beliefs; they areoften encouraged to try to convert those of other religions to theirreligious perspective. And while many Muslims, Christians, and Jewsbelieve in a personal supernatural creator and personal immortality,some Buddhists deny both. In short, the problem here, as stated byStephen Prothero, is that “one of the most common misconceptionsabout the world’s religions is that they plumb the same depths,ask the same questions. They do not” (Prothero 2010, 24). Ifthis is so, it appears that educators can justifiably attempt toconvince students that all religions are equally valid expressions offaith only if educators can justifiably attempt to convinceconservative proponents of some of these religions that some of theircore doctrinal beliefs need to be modified or rejected. However,attempting to do this in a public school setting will be seen by manyas violating the prohibition against both restricting the freeexercise of religion and promoting a given religion (Basinger2011).

Might it not, though, at least be justifiable for a public schooleducator to encourage students to respect the right of adherents toother religions to retain their current religious beliefs? If weinterpret this as asking whether an educator can justifiably encouragestudents to not attempt to prohibit adherents to other religions fromexpressing and acting in accordance with their beliefs, a positiveresponse is noncontroversial since this is only to say once again thateducators should encourage students to be tolerant of others. However,to encourage respect for the religious beliefs of others often carrieswith it the explicit or implicit assumption that it is inappropriate,if not unethical, to attempt to convince adherents of one religion toconvert to another. For a public-school educator to attempt toconvince all students that it is wrong to proselytize will again beseen by some as placing this educator in the legally and morallyquestionable position of attempting to convince some students toreject or modify what for them is a very fundamental, core religiousbelief.

Perhaps, however, there is a different, less controversial option forthose educators who want to do more than simply encourage tolerance ofexpression and empathetic understanding. Is it not at leastjustifiable for the public school teacher to attempt to point out theimportant common values affirmed by most of the world’s majorreligions, values that we can all accept and should all desire to seelived out? Is it not justifiable for an educator to point out, forinstance, that most of the world’s major religions prohibit suchthings as killing, lying, stealing, dehumanizing racism, and sexualexploitation, and that these same religions encourage such things ashelping those in need and treating adherents of other religions withrespect? To do so, it has been argued, would not simply be of valuewithin the classroom or community. Since religious convictions clearlyinfluence social, political, and economic activity on a global scale,emphasizing the shared common values of religions has the potential tofacilitate better global relationships. And to encourage suchrelationships is surely an appropriate goal of public education(Haynes 2007; Shingleton 2008).

Some concerns have been raised even here. First, the values of variousreligions are embedded in various cultures, and there are oftendiffering cultural understandings of these values – for example,differing understandings of what it means for humans to have personalsocial or political freedom, what it means to care for those in need,etc. In other words, we must be aware that in some cases seemingcommonality in values may be in name only (Prothero 2010). Second,some argue that this approach can lead to a superficial, homogenizedunderstanding of religions that can prevent students from respectingthe distinctiveness of each religious tradition and thus failing tofully appreciate the unique contributions each has made (Skrefsrud2023; Ilosvay 2016). Finally, some will see any focus on“positive commonalities” as yet another thinly veiledinappropriate attempt to encourage students to modify or water downtheir current religious beliefs in ways that make such beliefs moreaccommodating of other religious perspectives. Still others, though,will not see these concerns as reasons not to expose students to the“positive commonalities” in various religions but, rather,as cautionary factors to keep in mind when doing so.

8. Conclusion

As we have seen, discussions of religious diversity do not lendthemselves to easy answers. The issues are many, the argumentscomplex, and the responses varied. It would be hard, though, tooverstate the practical significance of this topic. While some (many)issues that philosophers discuss have practical implications for howwe view ourselves and treat others, none is more relevant today thanthe question of religious diversity. Religious convictions have notonly motivated impassioned behavior in the past—behavior thathas affected significantly the lives of many—such convictionsclearly continue to do so today. So ongoing philosophical discussionsof religious diversity that clarify issues and assess varyingperspectives have the potential to be of great practical value.

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Other Important Works

• Ahmad, Saiyad F., and Ahmad, Saiyad S., 2004,God, Islam, andthe Skeptic Mind: A Study on Faith, Religious Diversity, Ethics, andthe Problem of Evil, 2nd edition, Berlin: Blue NilePublishing.
• Aijaz, Imran, 2014, “Traditional Islamic Exclusivism: ACritique”,European Journal for the Philosophy ofReligion, 6: 185–209.
• Anderson, Pamela, 2011, “A Feminist Perspective”, inChad Meister (ed.),The Oxford Handbook of ReligiousDiversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.405–420.
• Baker-Hytch, Max, 2014, “Religious Diversity andEpistemic Luck”,International Journal for Philosophy ofReligion, 76: 171–191.
• Cheng, Chung-Ying, 2011, “A Chinese ReligionsPerspective”, inThe Oxford Handbook of ReligiousDiversity, Chad Meister (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,pp. 351–364.
• Christenson, David, 2009, “Disagreement as Evidence: TheEpistemology of Controversy”,Philosophy Compass, 5:756 –767.
• –––, 2016, “Conciliation, Uniqueness, andRational Toxicity”,Noûs, 50: 584–603
• Craig, William Lane, 2008, “Is Uncertainty a SoundFoundation for Religious Tolerance?” inReligious ToleranceThrough Epistemic Humility: Thinking With Philip Quinn, J. JamesKraft and D. David Basinger, (eds.), Burlington, VT: AshgatePublishing Company, pp. 13–28
• Dastmalchian, Amir, 2013, “The Epistemology of ReligiousDiversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion”,Philosophy Compass, 8: 298–308.
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disagreement |fideism |religion: epistemology of |religious commitment and reason |religious experience |toleration