Daoism (also romanized as Taoism) generally names one of thethree main currents of traditional Chinese thought, although it shouldbe obvious that like any “ism,” it is anabstraction—what it names is not a uniform butmultifaceted tradition with rich internal differences.Specifically, “Daoism” encompasses both a philosophicaltradition and an organized religion, which in modern Chinese areidentified separately asdaojia anddaojiao,respectively. The two are deeply intertwined, and Laozi (or Lao-tzu)figures centrally in both.

Philosophical Daoism traces its origins to Laozi, an extraordinarythinker who flourished during the sixth century B.C.E., according toChinese sources. According to some modern scholars, however, Laozi isentirely legendary; there was never a historical Laozi. In religiousDaoism, Laozi is revered as a supreme deity.

The name “Laozi” is best taken to mean “Old(lao) Master (zi),” and Laozi the ancientphilosopher is said to have written a short book, which has come to becalled simply theLaozi, after its putative author, a commonpractice in early China.

When theLaozi was recognized as a “classic”(jing)—that is, accorded canonical status in theclassification of Chinese literature, on account of its profoundinsight and significance—it acquired a more exalted andhermeneutically instructive title,Daodejing(or Tao-te ching), commonly translated as the“Classic of the Way and Virtue.” Its influence on Chineseculture is pervasive, and it reaches beyond China. It is concernedwith the Dao or “Way” and how it finds expression in“virtue” (de), especially through what the textcalls “naturalness” (ziran) and“nonaction” (wuwei). These concepts, however, areopen to interpretation. While some interpreters see them as evidencethat theLaozi is a deeply spiritual work, others emphasizetheir contribution to ethics and political philosophy.

• 1. The Laozi Story
• 2. Date and Authorship of theLaozi
• 3. Textual Traditions
• 4. Commentaries
• 5. Approaches to theLaozi
• 6. Dao and Virtue
• 7. Naturalness and Nonaction
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Laozi Story

TheShiji (Records of the Historian) by the Han dynasty (206B.C.E.–220 C.E.) court scribe and historian Sima Qian (ca.145–86 B.C.E.) offers a “biography” of Laozi. Itsreliability has been questioned, but it provides a point of departurefor reconstructing the Laozi story.

Laozi was a native of Chu, according to theShiji, a southernstate in the Zhou dynasty (see Loewe and Shaughnessy 1999, 594 and597). His family name was Li; his given name was Er, and he wasalso called Dan.

Laozi served as a keeper of archival records at the court of Zhou.Confucius (551–479 B.C.E.) had consulted him on certain ritualmatters, we are told, and praised him lavishly afterward(Shiji 63). This establishes the traditional claim that Laoziwas a senior contemporary of Confucius. A meeting, or meetings,between Confucius and Laozi, identified as “Lao Dan,” isreported also in theZhuangzi and other early Chinesesources.

“Laozi cultivated Dao and virtue,” as Sima Qian goes on torelate, and “his learning was devoted to self-effacement and nothaving fame. He lived in Zhou for a long time; witnessing the declineof Zhou, he departed.”

When he reached the northwest border then separating China from theoutside world, he met Yin Xi, the official in charge of the bordercrossing, who asked him to put his teachings into writing. The resultwas a book consisting of some five thousand Chinese characters orgraphs, divided into two parts, which discusses “the meaning ofDao and virtue.” Thereafter, Laozi left; no one knew where hehad gone. This completes the main part of Sima Qian’s account.The remainder puts on record attempts to identify the legendary Laoziwith certain known historical individuals and concludes with a list ofLaozi’s purported descendants (see W. T. Chan 1963, Lau 1963, orHenricks 2000 for an English translation).

Few scholars outside China today would subscribe fully to theShiji report. Disagreements abound, including, for example,Laozi’s birthplace and the name Laozi itself. On thelatter, although most would accept “Laozi” to mean“Old Master,” a title of respect, some scholars believethat “Lao” is a surname. On this view, just as Confuciuswas referred to as “Kong zi,” “Master Kong,”after his family name, “Lao zi” should be readas “Master Lao.” TheZhuangzi and otherearly texts refer to “Lao Dan” consistently, but not“Li Er.” The name “Dan” is generallyunderstood to depict the bearer’s “long ears,” amark of longevity in Chinese physiognomy. According to Fung Yu-lan,Sima Qian had “confused” the legendary Lao Dan with Li Er,who flourished later during the “Warring States” period(480–221 B.C.E.) and was the “real” founder of the“Daoist school” (daojia) (1983, 171).

In an influential essay, A. C. Graham (1986) argues that the story ofLaozi reflects a conflation of different legends. The earliest strandrevolved around the meeting of Confucius with Lao Dan and was currentby the fourth century B.C.E. Subsequently, Lao Dan was recognized as agreat thinker in his own right and as the founder of a distinct“Laoist” school of thought. It was not until the Handynasty, when the teachings of Laozi, Zhuangzi, and others were seento share certain insights centering on the concept of Dao, that theywere classified together under the rubric of a distinct Daoist schoolof thought.

I cite these views here only to give a sense of the diversity andvolume of research on the Laozi story. It seems clear that by 100B.C.E. if not earlier, Laozi was already shrouded in legends and SimaQian could only exercise his judgment as a historian to puttogether a report that made sense to him, based on the different andsometimes competing sources at his disposal.

The fact that Laozi appears favorably in both Confucian and Daoistsources argues against the likelihood that the figure was fabricatedfor polemical purposes. It is conceivable that a philosopher known asLao Dan attracted a following based on his novel reading of the Wayand virtue. Deferentially, his followers would refer to him as“Laozi.”

Confucius had sought his advice presumably on mourning and funeralrites, given that the Confucian workLiji (Records of Rites)has Confucius citing Lao Dan four times specifically on these rites.Indeed, various dates have been proposed for the encounter—e.g.,501 B.C.E., following the account in theZhuangzi (ch. 14).In any case, testifying to its appeal, different accounts of themeeting circulated among the educated elite during the Warring Statesperiod. Other details then came to be associated with Lao Dan, whichformed the basis of Sima Qian’s reconstruction.

Admittedly, this is conjecture. Though I find little reason not toaccept the traditional claim that Laozi was a senior contemporary ofConfucius, the identity of the “Old Master” no doubt willcontinue to attract and divide scholarly opinion. In many popularaccounts, Laozi is described as the “founder” or“father” of “Daoism.” This begs a number ofquestions and therefore should not be taken uncritically, and this isthe reason why a discussion of theShiji Laozi story isoffered here.

The story of Laozi occupies a cherished place in the Daoist tradition.It is important also because it raises certain hermeneuticexpectations and affects the way in which theLaozi is read.If the work was written by a single author, one might expect, forexample, a high degree of consistency in style and content. If theLaozi was a work of the sixth or fifth century B.C.E., onemight interpret certain sayings in the light of what we know of theperiod. There is little consensus among scholars, however, on the dateor authorship of theLaozi, as we shall see below.

With the arrival of the “Way of the Celestial Masters”(tianshidao), the first organized religious Daoistestablishment in the second century C.E., the story of Laozi gained animportant hagiographic dimension.

The founding of “Celestial Master” or “HeavenlyMaster” Daoism was based on a new revelation of the Dao by Laozi(see Kohn 1998a and 1998b, Kleeman 2016, and the entry onReligious Daoism in thisEncyclopedia). In the eyes of the faithful, the Dao isa divine reality, and Laozi is seen as the personification of the Dao.Lao Dan is but one manifestation of the divine Laozi, albeit a pivotalone because of the writing of theDaodejing, which inreligious Daoism commands devotion as a foundational scripture thatpromises not only wisdom but also immortality and salvation to thosewho submit to its power. During the Tang dynasty (618–907 C.E.),the imperial Li family traced its ancestry to Laozi. Today,Laozi’s “birthday” is celebrated in many parts ofAsia on the fifteenth day of the second lunar month.

The influence of theLaozi on Chinese culture is both deepand far-reaching. One indication of its enduring appeal andhermeneutical openness is the large number of commentaries devoted toit throughout Chinese history—some seven hundred, according toone count (W. T. Chan 1963, 77). Indeed, according to the Yuan-dynastyDaoist master Zhang Yucai (d. 1316 C.E.), the number had exceededthree thousand by his time (Wang Zhongmin 1981, 203). TheLaozi has inspired an intellectual movement known asXuanxue, “Learning in the Profound”—or“Neo-Daoism,” as some commentators prefer,emphasizing its roots in classical Daoism—that dominated theChinese elite or high culture from the third to the sixth century C.E.(see the entry onNeo-Daoism). TheLaozi also played a significant role in informingthe development of Chinese literature, calligraphy, painting, music,martial arts, and other cultural traditions.

Imperial patronage enhanced the prestige of theLaozi andenlarged its scope of influence. In 733 C.E., the emperor Xuanzongdecreed that all officials should keep a copy of theDaodejing at home and placed the classic on the list of textsto be examined for the civil service examinations (see, e.g., thereport in the official Tang history,Jiu Tang shu 8). Inreligious Daoism, recitation of theDaodejing is a prescribeddevotional practice and features centrally in ritual performance. TheDaodejing has been set to music from an early time. The term“Laozi learning” (Laoxue) has come todesignate an important field of study. A useful work in Chinese thatsketches the major landmarks in this development isZhongguoLaoxue shi (A History ofLaozi Learning in China) (XiongTieji, et al. 1995); a follow-up effort focusing onLaozischolarship in the twentieth century by the same lead author waspublished in 2002.

The influence of theLaozi extends beyond mainland China. InHong Kong, Taiwan, and among the Chinese in Southeast Asia and beyond,Daoism is a living tradition. Daoist beliefs and practices havecontributed also to the formation of Korean and Japanese culture,although the process of cultural transmission, assimilation, andtransformation is complex, especially given the close interactionamong Daoism, Buddhism, and indigenous traditions such as Shintō(see Fukui, et al. 1983, vol. 3).

During the seventh century, theLaozi was translated intoSanskrit; in the eighteenth century a Latin translation was brought toEngland, after which there has been a steady supply of translationsinto different languages, yielding a bountiful harvest ofover 2,000, according to Misha Tadd (2022), with new ones stillhitting bookstores and internet sites almost every year. Some of themore notable recent translations in English are Roberts 2001, Ivanhoe2002, Ames and Hall 2003, Moeller 2007, Ryden and Penny 2008, Kim2012, Minford 2018, Fischer 2023, Ziporyn 2023, and Liu 2024.Tadd’s “Global Laozegetics” project seeks toprovide a comprehensive recordof Laozi translations, commentaries andinterpretations (2022).

Laozi is an “axial” philosopher whose insight helps shapethe course of human development, according to Karl Jaspers (1974). Theinfluence of theLaozi on Western thinkers is the subject ofClarke 2000. Memorable phrases from theLaozi such as“governing a large country is like cooking a small fish”(ch. 60) have found their way into global political rhetoric. At thepopular level, several illustrated or “comic” versions oftheLaozi reach out to a younger and wider readership (e.g.,Tsai Chih Chung, et al. 1995, now available also on YouTube). Some mayhave come to learn about theLaozi through such best-sellingworks asThe Tao of Physics (Capra 1975) orThe Tao ofPooh (Hoff 1982); and there is alsoA Taoist Cookbook(Saso 1994), which comes with “meditations” from theDaodejing. From nature lovers to management gurus, a growingaudience is discovering that theLaozi has something to offerto them. The modern reception of theLaozi falls outside thescope of this discussion; nevertheless, it is important to note thattheLaozi should be regarded not only as a work of earlyChinese philosophy, but also in a larger context as a classic of worldliterature with keen contemporary relevance.

The next three sections are intended for readers who are interested inthe textual history and commentarial tradition of theLaozi,including the major manuscripts recovered through archaeologicalexcavations or from the antiquities market. They are important tounderstanding theLaozi, but one may go directly to Section 5on the main interpretive approaches to the text if one wishes tobypass them.

2. Date and Authorship of theLaozi

The date of composition refers to the time when theLaozireached more or less its final form; it does not rule out laterinterpolations or textual corruptions.

The traditional view, of course, is that theLaozi waswritten by Lao Dan in the sixth or early fifth century B.C.E. Thisseems unlikely, however, if it is assumed that theLaozi waswritten by a single author. As the archaeological evidence to bepresented below will indicate, bodies of sayings attributed to Laoziwere committed to writing probably from the second half of the fifthcentury B.C.E., resulting in different collections with overlappingcontents. A process of oral transmission may have preceded theirapperance, but in any event, these collections grew, competed forattention, and gradually came to be consolidated during the fourthcentury B.C.E. By the middle of the third century B.C.E., theLaozi probably had reached a relatively stable form.

Although in this sense theLaozi may be regarded as acomposite work, an “anthology,” as D.C. Lau suggests(1963, 14), the product of many hands over a long period of time,it should not be assumed that the sayings that now inhabit theLaozi were put together at random. More likely, the finalproduct reflects a process of intellectual distillation on the part ofthe compilers, who arranged and/or altered the material at theirdisposal (see also Brooks and Brooks 1998, Hansen 1992, LaFargue 1992and Mair 1990 on the composition of theLaozi).

The language of theLaozi provides some clues to its date ofcomposition. Much of the text is rhymed. Focusing on rhyme patterns,Liu Xiaogan (1994 and 1997) concludes that the poetic structure of theLaozi is closer to that of theShijing (Classic ofPoetry) than that of the laterChuci (Songs of Chu).

The dating of theShijing and theChuci is by nomeans precise, although generally the poems collected in the formershould not be later than the early fifth century B.C.E., whereas thosecollected in the latter can be traced to no earlier than the middle ofthe Warring States period, around 300 B.C.E. For this reason, LiuXiaogan argues that the traditional view first articulated bySima Qian should be upheld. Examining a wider range of linguisticevidence, William Baxter agrees that theLaozi should bedated earlier than theZhuangzi and theChuci, buthe traces “the bulk of theLao-tzu to the mid or earlyfourth century” (1998, 249). Both Liu and Baxter provide aconcise analysis of the different theories of the date of theLaozi.

Why is this important? It may be argued that date and authorship areimmaterial to, and may detract from, interpretation. The“truth” of theLaozi is “timeless,”according to this view, transcending historical and culturalspecificities. Issues of provenance are important, however, if contexthas any role to play in the production of meaning.

Polemics among different schools of thought, for example, were farmore pronounced during the Warring States period than in the earlier“Spring and Autumn” period (770–481 B.C.E.). (Thereare different ways to date the Spring and Autumn and Warring Statesperiods, but they do not affect the discussion here.) The Zhougovernment had been in decline; warfare among the vassal statesintensified both in scale and frequency from the fourth century B.C.E.onward. As the political conditions deteriorated, philosophers andstrategists, who grew both in number and popularity as a social groupor profession during this time, vied to convince the rulers of thevarious states of their vision to bring order to the land. At thesame time, perhaps with the increased displacement and disillusionmentof the privileged elite, a stronger eremitic tradition also emerged.If the bulk of theLaozi had originated from the fourthcentury, it might reflect some of these concerns. From thisperspective, the origin of theLaozi is as much ahermeneutical issue as it is a historical one.

3. Textual Traditions

The discovery of twoLaozi silk manuscripts at Mawangdui,near the city of Changsha, Hunan province in 1973 marks an importantmilestone in modernLaozi research. The manuscripts,identified simply as “A” (jia) and“B” (yi), were found in a tomb that was sealed in168 B.C.E. The texts themselves can be dated earlier, the“A” manuscript being the older of the two, copied in alllikelihood before 195 B.C.E. (see Lau 1982, Boltz 1984, and Henricks1989). A documentary on the Mawangdui find is available onYouTube and the Hunan Provincial Museum website also providesuseful information.

Before this find, access to theLaozi was mainly through thereceived text of Wang Bi (226–249 C.E.) and Heshang Gong, alegendary figure depicted as a teacher to Emperor Wen (r.179–157 B.C.E.) of the Han dynasty. There are other manuscriptversions, but by and large they play a secondary role in the historyof the classic.

A more recent archaeological find in Guodian, Jingmen city, Hubeiprovince, the so-called “Bamboo-slipLaozi,”which predates the Mawangdui manuscripts, has rekindled debates on theorigin and composition of theLaozi. But first, a note on thetitle and structure of theDaodejing.

TheLaozi did not acquire its “classic” statusuntil the Han dynasty. According to theShiji (49.5b), theEmpress Dowager Dou—wife of Emperor Wen and mother of EmperorJing (r. 156–141 B.C.E.)—was a dedicated student of theLaozi. Later sources added that it was Emperor Jing whoestablished the text officially as a classic. However, the titleDaodejing appears not to have been widely used until later,toward the close of the Han era.

TheDaodejing is also referred to as theDaodezhenjing (True Classic of the Way and Virtue), theTaishangxuanyuan daodejing (Classic of the Way and Virtue of the HighestProfound Origins), and less formally the “five-thousandcharacter” text, on account of its approximate length. Mostversions exceed five thousand characters by about five to ten percent,but it is interesting to note that numerological considerations laterbecame an integral part of the history of the work. According to theseventh-century Daoist master Cheng Xuanying, it was Ge Xuan (fl. 200C.E.), a revered Daoist adept, who shortened theLaozi textthat accompanied the Heshang Gong commentary to fit the magical numberof five thousand. This claim cannot be verified, but a numberof Laozi manuscripts discovered at Dunhuang contain4,999 characters. Indeed, had the compound numeral“sanshi,” “thirty,” inchapter 11 not been abbreviated to a single character(“sa”), they would contain exactly 5,000characters.

The currentDaodejing is divided into two parts(pian) and 81 sections (zhang). For ease ofreference, I will refer to the sections as“chapters,” aligned with most translations. Part one,comprising chapters 1–37, has come to be known as theDaojing (Classic of Dao), while chapters 38–81 make uptheDejing (Classic of Virtue).

This is understood to be a thematic division—chapter 1 beginswith the word Dao, while chapter 38 begins with the phrase“superior virtue”—although the concepts of Dao andvirtue (de) feature in both parts. As a rough heuristicguide, some commentators have suggested that theDaojing ismore “metaphysical,” whereas theDejing focusesmore on sociopolitical issues.

In this context, it is easy to appreciate the tremendous interestoccasioned by the discovery of the MawangduiLaozimanuscripts. The two manuscripts contain all the chapters that arefound in the currentLaozi, although the chapters follow adifferent order in a few places. For example, in both manuscripts, thesections that appear as chapters 80 and 81 in the currentLaozi come immediately after a section that corresponds tochapter 66 of the present text.

Both the Mawangdui “A” and “B” manuscripts aresimilarly divided into two parts, but in contrast with the currentversion, in reverse order; i.e., both manuscripts begin with theDejing, corresponding to chapter 38 of the received text.“Part one” of the “B” manuscript ends with theeditorial notation, “Virtue, 3,041 [characters],” whilethe last line of “Part two” reads: “Dao,2,426.” Does this mean that the classic should be renamed, fromDaodejing to “Dedaojing” (Classic ofVirtue and the Way)? One scholar, in fact, has adopted the titleDedaojing (Te-Tao ching) for his translation of theMawangduiLaozi (Henricks 1989).

It seems unlikely that the Mawangdui arrangement stems simply fromscribal idiosyncrasy or happenstance—e.g., that the copyist, inwriting out theLaozi on silk, had made use of an originaltext in bamboo slips and just happened to start with a bundle of slipscontaining theDejing (Yan 1976, 12, explains how this ispossible). If the order is deliberate, does it imply that the“original”Laozi gives priority to sociopoliticalissues? This raises important questions for interpretation.

The division into 81 chapters reflects numerological interest and isassociated particularly with the Heshang Gong version, which alsocarries chapter titles. It was not universally accepted until muchlater, perhaps the Tang period, when the text was standardized underthe patronage of Emperor Xuanzong (r. 712–756). Traditionalsources report that some versions were divided into 64, 68, or 72chapters; and some did not have chapter divisions (Henricks 1982).

The Mawangdui “A” manuscript contains in some places a dotor “period” that appears to signal the beginning of achapter. The earlier Guodian texts (see below) are not divided intotwo parts, but in many places they employ a black square mark toindicate the end of a section. The sections or chapters so markedgenerally agree with the division in the presentLaozi. Thus,although the 81-chapter formation may be relatively late, some attemptat chapter division seems evident from an early stage of the textualhistory of theDaodejing.

In late 1993, the excavation of a tomb (identified as M1) inGuodian, Hubei province, yielded among other things some 800bamboo slips, of which 730 are inscribed, containing over 13,000Chinese characters. Some of these, amounting to about 2,000characters, match theLaozi (see Allan and Williams 2000, andHenricks 2000). The tomb is located near the old capital of the stateof Chu and is dated around 300 B.C.E. Robbers had entered the tombbefore it was excavated, although the extent of the damage isuncertain.

The bamboo texts, written in a Chu script, have been transcribed intostandard Chinese and published under the titleGuodian Chumuzhujian (Beijing: Wenwu, 1998), which on the basis of the sizeand shape of the slips, calligraphy, and other factors divides theLaozi material into three groups. Group A containsthirty-nine bamboo slips, which correspond in whole or in part to thefollowing chapters of the present text: 19, 66, 46, 30, 15, 64, 37,63, 2, 32, 25, 5, 16, 64, 56, 57, 55, 44, 40 and 9. Groups B and C aresmaller, with eighteen (chs. 59, 48, 20, 13, 41, 52, 45, 54) andfourteen slips (chs. 17, 18, 35, 31, 64), respectively.

On the whole, the Guodian “bamboo-slipLaozi” isconsistent with the received text, although the placement or sequenceof the chapters is different and there are numerous variants orarchaic characters.  Particularly, whereas chapter 19 of thecurrentLaozi contains what appears to be a strong attack onConfucian ideals—“Cut off benevolence (ren),discard rightness (yi)”—the Guodian“A” text directs its readers to “cut offartificiality, discard deceit.” This has been taken to suggestthat in the course of its transmission, theLaozi has takenon a more “polemical” outlook. However, the Guodian“C” text indicates thatren andyi aroseonly after the “Great Dao” had gone into decline, whichagrees with chapter 18 of the currentLaozi. In other words,it would seem rather hasty to conclude that the Guodiantexts do not engage in a critique of some of the key ideas central tothe “Ru” or Confucian tradition.

It is unclear whether the Guodian bamboo slips were copied fromone source and meant to be read as one text divided into three parts,whether they were “selections” from a longer original, orwhether they were three different texts copied from different sourcesat different times (for a nuanced discussion, see Boltz 1999). Thereis one important clue, however. The “A” and“C” texts give two different versions of what is now partof chapter 64 of theLaozi, which suggests that they camefrom different sources. One scholar at least has suggested achronology to the making of the GuodianLaozi bamboo slips,with the “A” group being the oldest of the three, copiedaround 400 B.C.E. (Ding 2000). In any case, they remain the oldestextantLaozi texts to date (on the Guodian find, see Cook2012).

Taking into account all the available evidence, it thus seems likelythat different collections of sayings attributed to Laozi expanded andgained currency during the fourth century B.C.E. They would have beenderived from earlier, oral or written sources. During the thirdcentury B.C.E., theLaozi settled more or less into its finalform. It was then quoted extensively in such works as theHanfeizi and the “outer” and“miscellaneous” chapters of theZhuangzi, andbegan to attract commentarial attention.

More recently, the growing family ofLaozi texts welcomed yetanother new arrival. In January 2009, Peking University reportedlyaccepted a gift of a sizeable collection of inscribed bambooslips retrieved from overseas. Among them, we find a nearlycomplete version of theLaozi.

Although the authenticity of these slips has been challenged, theconsensus among the scholars who have worked with them is that theydate to the Western Han dynasty. More precisely, based especially onthe calligraphic form of the writing—a relatively mature form ofthe “clerical” script established during the Hanperiod—they have been dated to the second half of the reign ofEmperor Wu of the Han (141–87 B.C.E.).

Like the Mawangdui silk manuscripts, the Peking University text, nowreferred to as the “BeidaLaozi,” is divided intotwo parts. They are titled “Laozi Classic, Part 1”(Laozi shang jing) and “Laozi Classic, Part 2”(Laozi xia jing). This indicates that not only theLaozi was divided into two parts during the Western Hanperiod, but also it was accorded the status of a “classic”(jing), which may give some credence to the traditional claimthat theLaozi achieved canonical status during the precedingreign of Emperor Jing (156–141 B.C.E.).

The BeidaLaozi agrees with the Mawangdui manuscripts inanother important respect; that is, Part 1 also corresponds tochapters 38–81 of the current 81-chapter version, or theDejing, and Part 2, to chapters 1–37, orDaojing. Although this cannot be taken to mean that theLaozi was “originally” written in that order, itmay be the case that this was the dominant textual tradition duringthe Han period. Like the Mawangdui manuscripts, the BeidaLaozi also records the number of characters or graphs atthe end of each part.

In terms of wording, the BeidaLaozi agrees with theMawangdui manuscripts in many instances, although in some places itagrees rather with that of the received text. For example, whereasChapter 22 of the received text describes the sage as a“model” (shi) for the world, the BeidaLaozi agrees with the Mawangdui versions in likening the sagemore concretely to a “shepherd” (mu). However,the Beida text agrees with the standard version at the beginning ofChapter 2, as opposed to the shorter formulation found in the Guodianand Mawangdui versions.

What is equally significant is that the sequence or order of thechapters is exactly the same as that in the receivedLaozi.The difference lies in the division of some of the chapters. Chapters17–19 of the received text form one chapter in the BeidaLaozi. The same is true for chapters 6–7, 32–33and 78–79. However, the current chapter 64 appears as twochapters in the Beida slips. Altogether there are 77 chapters. Eachchapter is clearly marked, with a round dot at the start, and eachchapter starts on a separate bamboo slip.

The BeidaLaozi is almost intact in its entirety, missingonly some 60 characters when compared with the received text. While itoffers fresh glimpses into the development of the text, it does notprovide any significant new insight into the meaning of theLaozi. A series of articles on the Peking University bambooslips were published in the journalWenwu (2011, no. 6). TheBeidaLaozi was published in December 2012 and launched inFebruary 2013. Although the majority of scholars accept theauthenticity of the find, a notable critic is Xing Wen, who arguesstrongly that it is a forgery (Xing 2016; for a critical discussion inEnglish, see Foster 2017).

In summary, two approaches to the making of theLaozi warrantconsideration, for they bear directly on interpretation.

A linear “evolutionary” model of textual formation wouldsuggest that the earliest sayings attributed to Laozi addressprincipally issues of governance, reflecting a deep concern with thedecline of Zhou rule. Some of these sayings were preserved in theGuodian bamboo texts.

On this view, theLaozi underwent substantial change and grewinto a longer and more complex work during the third century B.C.E.,becoming in this process more polemical against the Confucian andother schools of thought, and acquiring new material of strongermetaphysical or cosmological interest. The Mawangdui manuscripts werebased on this maturing version of theLaozi; theoriginal emphasis on ethics and politics, however, can still bedetected in the placement of theDejing before theDaojing. Later versions reversed this order and in so doingsubsumed politics and self-cultivation under a broaderphilosophical vision of Dao as the beginning and end of allbeings.

As distinguished from a linear evolutionary model, what is suggestedhere is that there were different collections of sayings attributed toLaozi, overlapping to some extent but each with its own emphases andpredilections, inhabiting a particular interpretive context.

Although some key chapters in the currentLaozi that dealwith the nature of Dao (e.g., chs. 1, 14) are not found in the Guodiancorpus, the idea that the Dao is “born before heaven andearth,” for example, which is found in chapter 25 of thereceived text, is already present. The critical claim that“being [you] is born of nonbeing [wu]”in chapter 40 (see further discussion in Section 6 below) also figuresin the Guodian “A” text. This seems to argue against thesuggestion that theLaozi, and for that matter ancientChinese philosophical works in general, were not interested or lackedthe ability to engage in abstract philosophic thinking, an assumptionthat sometimes appears to underlie evolutionary approaches to thedevelopment of Chinese philosophy.

The Guodian and Mawangdui finds are extremely valuable. They aresyntactically clearer than the received text in some instances, thanksto the larger number of grammatical particles they employ.Nevertheless, they cannot resolve all the controversies anduncertainties surrounding theLaozi. In my view, the natureof Dao and the application of Daoist insight to ethics and governanceformed the twin foci in collections of Laozi sayings from the start.They were then developed in several ways—e.g., some collectionswere combined; new sayings were added; and explanatory comments,illustrations, and elaboration on individual sayings were integratedinto the text. The demand for textual uniformity rose when theLaozi gained recognition, and consequently the differenttextual traditions eventually gave way to the received text of theLaozi.

As mentioned, the currentLaozi on which most reprints,studies and translations are based is the version that comes down tous along with the commentaries by Wang Bi and Heshang Gong. Threepoints need to be made in this regard.

First, technically there are multiple versions of the Wang Bi andHeshang GongLaozi—over thirty Heshang Gong versionsare extant—but the differences are on the whole minor. Second,the Wang Bi and Heshang Gong versions are not the same, but they aresufficiently similar to be classified as belonging to the same line oftextual transmission. Third, the Wang Bi and Heshang Gong versionsthat we see today have suffered change. Prior to the invention ofprinting, when each manuscript had to be copied by hand, editorialchanges and scribal errors are to be expected. In particular, theLaozi text that now accompanies Wang Bi’s commentarybears the imprint of later alteration, mainly under the influence ofthe Heshang Gong version, and cannot be regarded as theLaozithat Wang Bi himself had seen and commented on. Boltz (1985) andWagner (1989) have examined this question in some detail.

The “current” version refers to theSibu beiyaoand theSibu congkan editions of theDaodejing. (TheSibu beiyao andSibu congkan are large-scalereproductions of traditional Chinese texts published in the earlytwentieth century.) The former contains the Wang Bi version andcommentary, which is based on a Ming-dynasty edition (seeespecially Hatano 1979). The Heshang Gong version preserved intheSibu congkan series is taken from the library of thefamous bibliophile Qu Yong (fl. 1850). According to Qu’s owncatalogue, this is a Song dynasty version, published probably afterthe reign of the emperor Xiaozong (r. 1163–1189). Older extantHeshang Gong versions include two incomplete Tang versions andfragments found in Dunhuang.

Besides the Guodian bamboo texts, the Mawangdui silk manuscripts, theBeidaLaozi and the received text of Wang Bi and HeshangGong, there is an “ancient version” (guben)edited by the early Tang scholar Fu Yi (fl. 600). Reportedly, thisversion was recovered from a tomb in 574 C.E., whose occupant was aconsort of the Chu general Xiang Yu (d. 202 B.C.E.). A later redactionof the “ancient version” was made by Fan Yingyuan in theSong dynasty. There are some differences, but these two can beregarded as having stemmed from the same textual tradition.

Manuscript fragments discovered in the Dunhuang caves form anotherimportant source inLaozi research. Among them are severalHeshang Gong fragments (especially S. 477 and S. 3926 in the Steincollection, and P. 2639 in the Pelliot collection) and the importantXiang’er Laozi with commentary (see the next section).Another Dunhuang manuscript that merits attention is the “SuoDan” fragment, now at the University Art Museum, PrincetonUniversity, which contains the last thirty-one chapters of theDaodejing beginning with chapter 51 of the modern text. It issigned and dated at the end, bearing the name of the third-centuryscholar and diviner Suo Dan, who is said to have made the copy,written in ink on paper, in 270 C.E. According to Rao Zongyi (1955),the Suo Dan version belongs to the Heshang Gong line of theLaozi text. William Boltz (1996), however, questions itsthird-century date and argues that the fragment in many instances alsoagrees with the Fu Yi “ancient version.”

While manuscript versions inform textual criticism of theLaozi, stone inscriptions provide furthercorroborating support. Over twenty steles, mainly of Tang andSong origins, are available to textual critics, although some are inpoor condition (Yan 1957). Students of theLaozi today canwork with several Chinese and Japanese studies that make use of alarge number of manuscript versions and stone inscriptions (notably Ma1965, Jiang 1980, Zhu 1980, and Shima 1973). Boltz (1993) offers anexcellent introduction to the manuscript traditions of theLaozi. Wagner (2003) attempts to reconstruct the originalface of Wang Bi’sLaozi (cf. Lou 1980 and Lynn 1999). Amajor contribution toLaozi studies in Chinese is Liu Xiaogan2006, which compares the Guodian, Mawangdui, Fu Yi, Wang Bi, andHeshang Gong versions of theLaozi and provides detailedtextual and interpretive analysis for each chapter. In an article inEnglish, Liu (2003) sets out some of his main findings.

4. Commentaries

Commentaries to theLaozi offer an invaluable guide tointerpretation and are important also for their own contributions toChinese philosophy and religion.

Two chapters in the currentHanfeizi (chs. 21 and 22) areentitled “Explaining (the Sayings of)Laozi”(Jie Lao) and “Illustrating (the Sayings of)Laozi” (Yu Lao), which can be regarded as theearliest extant commentary on the classic (Queen 2013). A newtranslation by Eric Hutton accompanied by several studies isforthcoming in 2026. 

The “bibliographical” section of theHanshu(History of the Former or Western Han Dynasty) lists four commentariesto theLaozi, but they have not survived. Nevertheless,Laozi learning began to flourish from the Han period. Thecommentaries by Heshang Gong, Yan Zun, Wang Bi, and theXiang’er commentary will be introduced in what follows.Some mention will also be made of later developments in the history oftheDaodejing. The late Isabelle Robinet has contributed animportant pioneering study of the earlyLaozi commentaries(1977; see also Robinet 1998).

Traditionally, the Heshang Gong commentary is regarded as a product ofthe early Han dynasty. The name Heshang Gong means an old master(gong) who dwells by the side of a river (heshang). An expert on theLaozi, he caught the attentionof Emperor Wen, who went personally to consult him. Heshang Gongrevealed to the emperor his true identity as a divine emissary sent bythe “Supreme Lord of the Dao”—i.e., the divineLaozi—to teach him. The emperor proved a humble student, as thelegend concludes, worthy of receiving theDaodejing withHeshang Gong’s commentary (A. Chan 1991).

Recent Chinese studies generally place the commentary at the end ofthe Han period, although some Japanese scholars would date it to aslate as the sixth century C.E. It is probably a second-century C.E.work and reflects the influence of the “Huang-Lao” (YellowEmperor and Laozi) tradition, which flourished during the early Handynasty (A. Chan 1991a).

Called in early sources theLaozi zhangju, it belongs to thegenre ofzhangju literature, prevalent in Han times, whichone may paraphrase as commentary by “section and semanticunits.” Its language is simple; its imagination, down-to-earth.The Heshang Gong commentary shares with other Han works the beliefthat the universe is constituted byqi, the energy-likebuilding blocks of life and the vital constituent of the cosmos,variously translated as “vital energy,”“life-force,” or “pneuma.” On this basis,interpreting the text in terms of yin-yang theory, theLaoziis seen to disclose not only the mystery of the origins of theuniverse but also the secret to personal well-being and sociopoliticalorder.

What theLaozi calls the “One,” according toHeshang Gong, refers to the purest and most potent form ofqi-energy that brings forth and continues to nourish allbeings. This is the meaning ofde, the “virtue”or power with which the “ten thousand things”—i.e.,all beings—have been endowed and without which life wouldcease.

The maintenance of “virtue,” which the commentary alsodescribes as “guarding the One,” is thus crucial toself-cultivation. A careful diet, exercise, and some form ofmeditation are implied, but generally the commentary focuses ondiminishing desire, which brings into view the ethical dimension ofqi-cultivation.

The government of the “sage”—a term common to allschools of Chinese thought but which is given a distinctive Daoistmeaning in the commentary—rests on the same premise. Policiesthat are harmful to the people such as heavy taxation and severepunishment are to be avoided, but the most fundamental point remainsthat the ruler himself must cherish what theLaozi calls“emptiness” and “nonaction.” Disorder stemsfrom the dominance of desire, which reflects the unruly presence ofconfused and agitatedqi-energy. In this way,self-cultivation and government are shown to form an integral whole(see Section 7 below and A. Chan 2025).

A second major commentary is theLaozi zhigui (The EssentialMeaning of theLaozi) attributed to the Han dynasty scholarYan Zun (fl. 83 B.C.E.–10 C.E.). Styled Junping, Yan’ssurname was originally Zhuang; it was changed in later written recordsto the semantically similar Yan to comply with the legal restrictionnot to use the name Zhuang, which was the personal name of EmperorMing (r. 57–75) of the Later or Eastern Han dynasty. Yan Zun iswell remembered in traditional sources as a recluse of great learningand integrity, a diviner of legendary ability, and an author ofexceptional talent. The famous Han poet and philosopher Yang Xiong (53B.C.E.–18 C.E.) studied under Yan and spoke glowingly ofhim.

TheLaozi zhigui (abbreviated hereafter asZhigui),as it now stands, is incomplete; only the commentary to theDejing, chapters 38–81 of the currentLaozi,remains. The best edition of theZhigui is that contained intheDaozang (Daoist Canon, no. 693), which clearly indicatesthat the work had originally thirteenjuan or scrolls, thefirst six of which have been lost. Judging from the availableevidence, it can be accepted as a Han product (A. Chan 1998a). TheLaozi text that accompanies Yan Zun’s commentary agreesin many instances with the wording of the Mawangdui silkmanuscripts.

Like Heshang Gong, Yan Zun also subscribes to the yin-yangcosmological theory characteristic of Han thought. Unlike HeshangGong’s commentary, however, theZhigui does notprescribe a program of nourishing one’sqi endowment oractively cultivating “long life.” This does not mean thatit rejects the ideal of longevity. On the contrary, it recognizes thatthe Dao “lives forever and does not die” (8.9b), and thatthe man of Dao, correspondingly, “enjoys long life”(7.2a). Valuing one’s spirit and vital energy is important, buttheZhigui is concerned that self-cultivation must notviolate the principle of “nonaction.” Any effort contraryto what theLaozi has termed “naturalness”(ziran) is counter-productive and doomed to failure.

The concept ofziran occupies a pivotal position in YanZun’s commentary. It describes the nature of the Dao and itsmanifestation in the world. It also points to an ethical ideal. Theway in which natural phenomena operate reflects the workings of theDao. The “sage” follows the Dao in that he, too, abides bynaturalness. In practice this means attending to one’s“heart-mind” (xin) so that it will not beenslaved by desire. Significantly, theZhigui suggests thatjust as the sage “responds” to the Dao in being simple andempty of desire, the common people would in turn respond to the sageand entrust the empire to him. In this way, theLaozi is seento offer a comprehensive guide to order and harmony at all levels.

An early commentary that maximizes the religious import of theLaozi is theXiang’er Commentary. Although itis mentioned in catalogues of Daoist works, there was no realknowledge of it until a copy was discovered among the Dunhuangmanuscripts (S. 6825 in the Stein collection). The manuscript copy,now housed in the British Library, was probably made around 500 C.E.The original text, disagreement among scholars notwithstanding, isgenerally traced to around 200 C.E. It is closely linked to the“Way of the Celestial Masters” and has been ascribed toZhang Daoling, the founder of the sect, or his grandson Zhang Lu, whowas instrumental in ensuring the group’s survival after thecollapse of the Han dynasty. Stephen Bokenkamp (1997) offersa detailed study and translation of the work.

TheXiang’er manuscript is unfortunately incomplete;only the first part has survived, beginning with the middle of chapter3 and ending with chapter 37 in the current chapter division of theLaozi. It is not clear what the title,Xiang’er, means. Following Rao Zongyi and ŌfuchiNinji, Bokenkamp suggests that it is best understood in the literalsense that the Dao “thinks (xiang) of you(er)” (1997, 61). This underscores the central thesisof the commentary, that devotion to the Dao in terms ofself-cultivation and compliance with its precepts wouldensure boundless blessing in this life and beyond.

TheXiang’er commentary accepts without question thedivine status of Laozi. While Yan Zun and Heshang Gong direct theircommentary primarily to those in a position to effect politicalchange, theXiang’er invites a larger audience toparticipate in the quest for the Dao, to achieve union with the Daothrough spiritual and moral discipline. It is possible to attainextraordinary longevity like those who have attained a transcendentstate of being. Nourishing one’s vitalqi-energythrough meditation and other practices is key to attaining “longlife” and ultimately forming a spiritual body devoid of theblemishes of mundane existence (Rao 1991; see also Puett 2004).

Spiritual discipline, however, is insufficient; equally important isthe accumulation of moral merit. Later Daoist sources refer to the“nine precepts” of theXiang’er. There isalso a longer set known as the “twenty-seven precepts” oftheXiang’er. These include general positive steps suchas being tranquil and yielding, as well as specific injunctionsagainst envy, killing, and other morally reprehensible acts. Likeningthe human body to the walls of a pond, the essentialqi-energy to the water in it, and good deeds the source ofthe water, theXiang’er commentary makes clear thatdeficiency in any of these would lead to disastrous consequences(Bokenkamp 1993).

Compared with theXiang’er, Wang Bi’sLaozi commentary could not be more different. There is noreference to “immortals”; no deified Laozi. TheDaodejing, as Wang Bi sees it, is fundamentally not concernedwith the art of “long life” but offers profound insightinto the radical otherness of Dao as the source of being and thepractical implications that follow from it.

Wang Bi (226–249) was one of the acknowledged leaders of themovement of “Learning in the Profound” (Xuanxue)that came into prominence during the Wei period (220–265) anddominated the Chinese intellectual scene well into the sixthcentury.

The wordxuan denotes literally a shade of black with darkred and is used in theLaozi (esp. ch. 1) to suggest theindescribable profundity of Dao, transcending ordinary perceptionand comprehension. The movement has been termed, perhaps not withoutambiguity, “Neo-Daoism” in some studies. It signifies abroad philosophical front united in its attempt to discern the“true” meaning of Dao but not a homogeneous or partisanschool. Alarmed by what they saw as the decline of Dao, influentialintellectuals of the day initiated a sweeping reinterpretation of theclassical heritage. They did not neglect the Confucian classics butdrew inspiration especially from theYijing, theLaozi, and theZhuangzi, which were then referred toas the “Three (Classics on the) Profound”(sanxuan); that is to say, the three key treatises unlockingthe mystery of Dao. Wang Bi, despite his short life, distinguishedhimself as a brilliant interpreter of theLaozi and theYijing (see A. Chan 1991a, Wagner 2000, Lynn 2015, andNeo-Daoism in thisEncyclopedia).

According to Wang Bi, the concept of Dao indeed points to the“beginning” of the “ten thousand things.”Unlike Heshang Gong or theXiang’er, however, he didnot pursue a cosmological or religious interpretation of the processof creation. Rather, Wang seems more concerned with what may be calledthe logic of creation.

Dao constitutes the absolute “beginning” in that allbeings have causes and conditions that derive logically from anecessary foundation. The ground of being, however, cannot be itself abeing; otherwise, infinite regress would render the logic of theLaozi suspect. For this reason, theLaozi would onlyspeak of Dao as “nonbeing” (wu). We will comeback to this point in Section 6 below.

The transcendence of Dao must not be compromised. To do justice to theLaozi, it is also important to show how the function of Daotranslates into basic “principles” (li) governingthe universe. The regularity of the seasons, the plenitude of nature,and other expressions of “heaven and earth” all attest tothe presence of Dao. Human beings also conform to theseprinciples and in this sense are “modeled”ultimately after Dao, as theLaozi intimates.

Wang Bi is often praised in later sources for having given the conceptofli, “principle,” its first extendedphilosophical treatment. In the realm of Dao, principles arecharacterized by “naturalness” (ziran) and“nonaction” (wuwei). Wang Bi definesziran as “an expression of the ultimate.” In thisregard, attention has been drawn to Yan Zun’s influence.Nonaction helps explain the practical meaning of naturalness. Inethical terms, Wang Bi takes nonaction to mean freedom from thedictates of desire. This defines not only the goal of self-cultivationbut also that of government. The concepts of naturalness and nonactionwill be discussed further below. Wang Bi’sLaozicommentary has exerted a strong influence on modern interpretations oftheLaozi. There are four English translations available (Lin1977, Rump 1979, Lynn 1999, and Wagner 2003).

Among these four commentaries, Heshang Gong’sLaozizhangju occupied the position of preeminence in traditionalChina, at least until the Song dynasty. For a long period, WangBi’s work was relatively neglected. The authority of the HeshangGong commentary can be traced to its place in the Daoist religion,where it ranks second only to theDaodejing itself. BesidesHeshang Gong’s work and theXiang’er, there aretwo other commentaries, theLaozi jiejie (SectionalExplanation) and theLaozi neijie (Inner Explanation), thatare closely associated with religious Daoism. Both have been ascribedto Yin Xi, the keeper of the pass who “persuaded” Laozi towrite theDaodejing and who, according to Daoist hagiographicrecords, later studied under the divine Laozi and became an“immortal.” These texts, however, only survive incitations (see Kusuyama 1979).

From the Tang period, one begins to find serious attempts to collectand classify the growing number ofLaozi commentaries. Anearly pioneer is the eighth-century Daoist master Zhang Junxiang, whocited some thirty commentaries in his study of theDaodejing(Wang Zhongmin 1981). Du Guangting (850–933) provided alarger collection, involving some sixty commentaries (Daodezhenjing guangshengyi,Daozang no. 725). According toDu, there were those who saw theLaozi as a political text,while others focused on spiritual self-cultivation. There wereBuddhist interpreters (e.g., Kumārajīva and Sengzhao), andthere were those who explained the “Twofold Mystery”(Chongxuan). This latter represents an important developmentin the history of interpretation of theDaodejing (Assandri2009).

The term “Twofold Mystery” comes from chapter 1 of theLaozi, where Dao is metaphorically described as “darkupon dark,” or the mystery of all mysteries, in thesense of an incomparably profound reality beyond ordinarycomprehension (xuan zhi you xuan). As a school of Daoistlearning, “Twofold Mystery” seizes this to be the key tounderstanding theLaozi.

Daoist sources relate that the school goes back to the fourth-centurymaster Sun Deng. Through Gu Huan (fifth century) and others, theschool reached its height during the Tang period, represented by suchthinkers as Cheng Xuanying and Li Rong in the seventh century. Theschool reflects the growing interaction between Daoist and Buddhistthought, particularly Mādhyamika philosophy. Unlike Wang Bi, itsees “nonbeing” as equally one-sided as“being” when applied to the transcendence of Dao. Nonbeingmay highlight the profundity or unfathomable depth of Dao, but itdoes not yet reach the highest truth, which according to ChengXuanying can be called the “Dao of Middle Oneness” (Kohn1992, 144; Assandri 2009 and 2022). Like other polar opposites,the distinction between being and nonbeing must also be“forgotten” before one can achieve union with Dao.

TheLaozi has been viewed in still other ways. For example, aTang commentary by Wang Zhen, theDaodejing lunbing yaoyishu(Daozang no. 713), presented to Emperor Xianzong (r.806–820) in 809, sees the text as a treatise on militarystrategy (Rand 1979–80; see also Wang Ming 1984 and Mukai 1994).The diversity of interpretation is truly remarkable (see Robinet 1998for a typological analysis). TheDaodejing was givenconsiderable imperial attention, with no fewer than eight emperorshaving composed or at least commissioned a commentary on the work.These include Emperor Wu and Emperor Jianwen of the Liang dynasty,Xuanzong of the Tang, Huizong of the Song, and Taizu of the Mingdynasty (see Liu Cunren 1969 for a discussion of the last three).

By the thirteenth century, students of theDaodejing werealready blessed, as it were, with an embarrassment of riches, so muchso that Du Daojian (1237–1318) could not but observe that thecoming of the Dao to the world takes on a different form each time.That is to say, different commentators were shaped by the spirit oftheir age in their approach to the classic, so that it would beappropriate to speak of a “HanLaozi,”“TangLaozi,” or “SongLaozi,” each with its own agenda (Xuanjing yuanzhifahui,Daozang no. 703). A good number ofLaozi commentaries are collected in theQing-dynasty work Daozang jiyao (Essentials of theDaoist Canon), on which see Lai 2021. 

5. Approaches to theLaozi

Is theLaozi a manual of self-cultivation and government? Isit a metaphysical treatise, or does it harbor deep mysticalinsights?

Chapter 1 of the currentLaozi begins with the famous words:“The Way that can be spoken of is not the constant Way.”Chapter 10 speaks of nourishing one’s “soul” andembracing the “One.” Chapter 80 depicts the ideal polityas a small country with few inhabitants.

TheLaozi is a difficult text. Its language is often cryptic;the sense or reference of the many symbols it employs remains unclear,and there seems to be conceptual inconsistencies. For example, whereaschapter 2 refers to the “mutual production of being andnonbeing,” chapter 40 declares, “Being originates innonbeing” (Henricks, trans. 1989). Is it more meaningful tospeak of the “worldviews” of theDaodejing,instead of a unified vision?

If theLaozi were an “anthology” put together atrandom by different compilers over a long period of time, occasionalinconsistencies need not be an issue. Traditionally, however, this wasnever a serious option. Most modern studies are equally concerned todisclose the coherence or unified meaning of the classic. Whilesome seek to recover the “original” meaning of theLaozi, others celebrate its contemporary relevance. Consider,first of all, some of the main modern approaches to theDaodejing (cf. Hardy 1998).

One view is that theLaozi reflects a deep mythologicalconsciousness at its core. The myth of “chaos,” inparticular, helps shape the Daoist understanding of the cosmos and theplace of human beings in it (Girardot 1983). Chapter 25, for example,likens the Dao to an undifferentiated oneness. The myth of a greatmother earth goddess has also been seen to have informed the worldviewof theLaozi (Erkes 1935; Chen 1969), which explains itsemphasis on nature and the feminine (Chen 1989). Chapter 6, forexample, refers to the “spirit of the valley,” which isalso called the “mysterious female.”

A second view is that theLaozi gives voice to a profoundmysticism. According to Victor Mair (1990), it is indebted to Indianmysticism (see also Waley 1958). According to Benjamin Schwartz(1985), the mysticism of theDaodejing issuigeneris, uniquely Chinese and has nothing to do with India.Indeed, as one scholar suggests, it is unlike other mystical writingsin that ecstatic vision does not play a role in the ascent of theDaoist sage (Welch 1965, 60). According to another interpretation,however, there is every indication that ecstasy forms a part of theworld of theLaozi, although it is difficult to gauge the“degree” of its mystical leanings (Kaltenmark 1969, 65).As Harold Roth sees it, Daoist “inner cultivation” andIndian yoga may be similar, but “they are parallel developmentsin different cultures at different times.” (Roth 1999, 137).

It is possible to combine these two approaches. Although thepresence of ancient religious beliefs can still be detected, they havebeen raised to a “higher” mystical plane in theLaozi (e.g., Ching 1997). Broadly, one could carve out athird category of interpretations that highlights the spiritualsignificance of theLaozi, whether in general terms oraligned with the tenets of religious Daoism.

A fourth view sees theLaozi mainly as a work of philosophy,which gives a metaphysical account of reality and insight into Daoistself-cultivation and government; but fundamentally it is not a work ofmysticism (W. T. Chan 1963). The strong practical interest of theLaozi distinguishes it from any teachings thateschew worldly involvement. In H. G. Creel’s (1977) words,it is “purposive” and not purely“contemplative.”

Fifth, to many readers theLaozi offers essentially aphilosophy of life. Remnants of an older religious thinking may havefound their way into the text, but they have been transformed into anaturalistic philosophy. The emphasis on naturalness translates into away of life characterized by simplicity, calmness, and freedom fromthe tyranny of desire (e.g., Liu Xiaogan 1997). For Roger Ames andDavid Hall (2003), indeed, the essence of theLaozi is“making this life significant.” Unlike the claim thatthe Laozi is an esoteric work directed ata restricted audience, this view highlights its universal appeal andcontemporary relevance.

Sixth, theLaozi is above all concerned with realizing peaceand sociopolitical order. It is an ethical and political masterpieceintended for the ruling class, with concrete strategic suggestionsaimed at remedying the moral and political turmoil engulfing late ZhouChina. Self-cultivation is important, but the ultimate goal extendsbeyond personal fulfillment (Lau 1963, LaFargue 1992, Moeller 2006).TheLaozi criticizes the Confucian school not only for beingineffectual in restoring order but more damagingly as a culprit inworsening the ills of society at that time. The Daoist ideal pointsinstead to a pristine state of affairs where people would dwellin simplicity, harmony and contentment, not fettered by ambition ordesire.

This list is far from exhaustive. Chad Hansen (1992), for example,focuses on the “anti-language” philosophy of theLaozi. Different combinations are also possible. A. C.Graham, for example, emphasizes both the mystical and politicalelements, arguing that theLaozi was probably targeted at theruler of a small state (1989, 234). For Hans-Georg Moeller (2006), theLaozi may have been a work of political philosophyin its original context, but it offers a powerful critique of“humanism” that is ethically as relevant then as it isnow. TheLaozi could be seen as encompassing all of theabove—such categories as the metaphysical, ethical, political,mystical, and religious form a unified whole in Daoist thinking andare deemed distinct only in modern Western thought. Alternatively,coming back to the question of multiple authorship and coherence, itcould be argued that theLaozi contains “layers”of material put together by different people at different times(Emerson 1995).

Is it fair to say that theLaozi is inherently“polysemic” (Robinet 1998), open to diverseinterpretations? This concerns not only the difficulty of theLaozi but also the interplay between reader and text in anyact of interpretation.

Polysemy challenges the assertion that the “intended”meaning of theLaozi can be recovered fully. However, it isimportant to emphasize, it does not follow that context isunimportant, that parameters do not exist, or that there are no checksagainst particular interpretations. While hermeneutic reconstructionremains an open process, it cannot disregard the rules of evidence.Questions of provenance, textual variants, as well as the entiretradition of commentaries and modern scholarship are important forthis reason. And it is for this same reason thatwe leave a discussion of theLaozi itself tillthe end. The following presents some of the main concepts and symbolsin theLaozi based on the current text, focusing on the keyconceptual cluster of Dao,de (virtue),ziran(naturalness), andwuwei (nonaction). It seems tome that the two readings represented by the Heshang Gong and WangBi commentaries both bring out important insight from theLaozi.

6. Dao and Virtue

To begin with “Dao,” the etymology of the Chinese graphsuggests a pathway, or heading in a certain direction along a path.Most commentators agree in translatingdao as“way.” In early Chinese literature,dao generallydepicts a relatively wide thoroughfare or carriage way, and in somecontexts waterways, but it is used also to convey what is deemed theright or proper course, and by extension the teachings that set forthsuch a course, or the means and methods that would bring it about.Laozi 53, for example, states, “The greatdaois very even (flat, easy to travel on), but people like (to take)by-ways (jìng).” The literal sense ofdao as a path, contrasted in this instance withjìng, a small trail off the main road, is clearlypreserved here, but it is also easy to see how it can be used as ametaphor, how the extended ethical and spiritual sense ofdaocomes into the picture.

As a verb, perhaps on account of the directionality involved,dao also conveys the sense of “speaking.” A poemin theShijing, for example, intimates that what wasspoken (yan) within one’s privatechamber must not be told (dao) beyond its walls (Songsof Yong, “Qiang you ci”). Thus, the opening phrase ofchapter 1,dao ke dao, literally “Dao that can bedao-ed,” is often rendered, “The Way that can be spokenof.” Becausedao is paired with “name”(ming) in the next line—“ming keming,” “the name that can benamed”—forming a parallel couplet construction, there isreason to interpret the verbal usage in the sense of somethingverbalized, as opposed to a pathway that is travelled on, trodden, orfollowed. This is also how most commentators in traditional China haveunderstood it: the many normative discourses that clamor to representthe right way are seen to be fickle, partial and misleading. In mostEnglish translations, the capitalized form—“Way” or“Dao” (or “Tao”)—is used, to distinguishit from other usages of the term.

The concept ofdao is not unique to theLaozi. A keyterm in the philosophical vocabulary, it informs early Chinesephilosophy as a whole. It is interpreted differently, signifying ameans to a higher end in some writings and as an end in itself inothers. TheLaozi underscores both the ineffability andcreative power of Dao. This is distinctive and if one accepts theearly provenance of the text, charts a new course in the developmentof Chinese philosophy.

The ineffability of Dao is highlighted in chapter 1: the“constant” (chang, also translated as“eternal”—e.g., W. T. Chan 1963) Dao cannot bedefined or described; it is “nameless.” Chapter 14 bringsout clearly that Dao transcends sensory perception; it has neithershape nor form. Nameless and formless, Dao can only be described asutterly profound, and in this sense “dark” or“mysterious” (xuan), or aswu, literally“not having” any name, form, or other characteristics ofthings (see also chs. 21 and 32). Indeed, though suggestive, the term“Dao” itself is no more than a symbol—as theLaozi makes clear, “I do not know its name; I style itDao” (ch. 25; see also ch. 34). This suggests a sense of radicaltranscendence, which explains why theLaozi has beenapproached so often as a work of mysticism.

The concept ofwu is central to understanding theLaozi. As applied to Dao, it has been translatedvariously as “nothing,” “nothingness,” or“nonbeing.” It seeks to explain the mystery of Dao bypointing to its limitlessness and inexhaustibility (e.g.,ch. 4). Not having any form, Dao cannot be reduced to any particularthing. Names serve to delimit, to set boundaries; in contrast, Dao iswithout limits and therefore cannot be captured fully by language. Assuch, Dao can only be described aswu, “nothing”in this sense. Yet, theLaozi also affirmsthe inexhaustible fecundity of Dao: “All things underheaven are born of being (you); being is born ofwu” (ch. 40). What does this mean?

Elsewhere in theLaozi, Dao is said to be the“beginning” of all things (chs. 1, 25). Daoist creationinvolves a process of differentiation from unity to multiplicity:“Dao gives birth to One; One gives birth to Two; Two gives birthto Three; Three gives birth to the ten thousand things” (ch.42). The text does not indicate tense or spell out what the numbersrefer to—is it saying that something called the“One” produced or produces the “Two” in thesense of two other things?

The “nothingness” of Dao helps impose certain constraintson interpretation. Specifically, the idea of a creator god withattributes, like the “Lord on High” (Shangdi) in ancientChinese religion, does not seem to fit with the emphasis ontranscendence.

The dominant interpretation in traditional China is that Daorepresents the source of the original, undifferentiated, essentialqi-energy, the “One,” which in turn produces theyin and yang cosmic forces. While the “lighter,” morerarefied yang energy-stuff rises to form heaven, the“heavier” yin solidifies to become earth. A further“blending” of the two generates a “harmonious”qi-energy that informs human beings.

This is essentially the reading of the Heshang Gong commentary.Although theLaozi may not have entertained a fully developedyin-yang cosmological theory, which took shape during the Han period,it does suggest at one point that natural phenomena are constituted byyin and yang: the “ten thousand things” or myriadcreatures, as it rather lyrically puts it, “carry yin on theirbacks and embrace yang with their arms” (ch. 42). That whichgave rise to the originalqi-energy, however, isindescribable. TheLaozi calls it Dao, or perhaps moreappropriately in this context, “the Dao,” with thedefinite article, to signal its presence as the source of the createdorder.

In modern terms, minus the language of yin-yang cosmology, thistranslates into an understanding of the Dao as “an absoluteentity which is the source of the universe,” as theOxfordEnglish Dictionary (online edition, under “Tao”)defines it. Again, not being anything in particular, the Dao may bedescribed as “nothing,” but on this reading,wu does not mean “nothingness,”“negativity” or absence in the nihilistic sense, in viewof the creative power of the Dao.

Alternatively, one could argue that Dao signifies a conceptuallynecessary ontological ground; it does not refer to any indescribableoriginal substance or energy. “Beginning” is not a term oftemporal reference but suggests ontological priority in theLaozi.

The process of creation does proceed from unity to multiplicity, buttheLaozi is only concerned to show that “two”would be impossible without the idea of “one.” Theassertion inLaozi 42, “One gives birth to Two,”affirms that duality presupposes unity, but to render it as“The One gave birth to the Two” is to turn what isessentially a logical relation into a cosmogonic event.

As the source of being, Dao cannot be itself a being, no matter howpowerful or perfect; otherwise, it, too, would be bound by thelimits of finitude. For this reason, theLaozimakes use of the concept ofwu, “nothing” or“nonbeing,” not to suggest a substance or something ofwhich nothing can be said, but to signify the conceptual“otherness” and radical transcendence of the ground ofbeing.

This agrees with Wang Bi’s interpretation. Ifwu pointsto a necessary ontological foundation, the distinction between“Dao” and “One” seems redundant. Commenting onchapter 42 of theLaozi, Wang Bi writes, “One can besaid to bewu.” Elsewhere, Wang Biexplains, “One is the beginning of numbers and the ultimateof things” (commentary on ch. 39; see also Wang’scommentary on theYijing, trans. in Lynn 1994, 60). Theconcept of “One” and the concept ofwu thuscomplement each other in disclosing, from differentperspectives, that unity and nonbeing are both necessaryto understanding the generation of beings.

Comparing the two interpretations, both must explain whythe Laozi describes (the) Daoas wu. Whereas the first, the Heshang Gongreading, focuses on the pervasive presence and infinitepower of the Dao, which on account of its limitlessness andunfathomability may therefore be describedas wu, the second, aligned with Wang Bi’s,emphasizes the centrality of “nonbeing,” for which“Dao” is but one possible designation, expressive as itmay be. For the latter, “Dao” is entirelyconceptual and interpreting it as “theDao” would misconstrue it for some mysterious substance,whereas the former envisages “the Dao” as referringto an indescribably vast, pure, and potent qi-energythat brings about the cosmos and continues to sustain and regulate it.Depending on the interpretation,wu may be translated as“nothing” or “nonbeing” accordingly. Thelatter may be awkward, but it serves to alert the reader that thenothingness or emptiness of Dao may not be understood referentially orreduced simply to the fullness ofqi.

In light of the interest in cosmology during the Warring Statesperiod, the Heshang Gong reading may be privileged, but theLaozi is also open to an ontological interpretation. Both arehermeneutically compelling. The ontological reading mayaccommodate a qi-based yin-yang cosmology as part of thenatural order of things, although there is significant divergence inthe interpretation of the ethics of theLaozi, as we shallsee in the next section. In either case, the metaphor of“Dao” is apt. It shows that all things are derivedultimately from an absolute “beginning,” in either senseof the word, like the start of a pathway. It also suggests a directionto be followed, which brings out the ethical interest of theLaozi.

TheDaodejing is concerned with both Dao andde. Thegraphde has also made it into theOxford EnglishDictionary: “In Taoism, the essence of Tao inherent in allbeings”; “in Confucianism and in extended use, moralvirtue.”De has been translated variously as virtue,potency, efficacy, integrity, or power (for an etymological study, seeNivison 1978–79, and Hall and Ames 1987, 216).

Like Dao,de is a general concept open to diverseinterpretation. The Confucian understanding ofde is by nomeans uniform (A. Chan 2011). While some early Ru scholars emphasizein their interpretation of “virtue” the roles andresponsibilities embedded in the network of kinship ties andsociopolitical relationships that constitute the ethical realm, othersfocus on the formation of individual moral character throughself-cultivation. Confucius may have emphasized the latter, but thereis ample evidence in theAnalects and other Confucian workstestifying to the importance of the former as well. TheLaoziseems to be suggesting a “higher”de against anymoral achievement attained through repeated effort (e.g., ch.38). 

Admittedly, “virtue” is ambiguous, and in Latin, as manyscholars have noted, “virtus” has more to do withstrength and capacity than moral virtues. Nevertheless, there areadvantages to translatingde as “virtue,” as itkeeps in the foreground that theLaozi is giving new meaningto an established concept, as opposed to introducing a new concept notfound in other schools of thought. From this perspective, both Laoziand Confucius are interpreters ofde-virtue.

The marriage of Dao andde effectively bridges the gapbetween transcendence and immanence. Traditional commentariesbeginning with theHanfeizi often play on the homonymicrelation betweende (virtue) and another character alsopronouncedde, which means to “acquire” or“obtain” something.De is thus what one has“obtained” from (the) Dao, a “latent power” by“virtue” of which any being becomes what it is (Waley1958, 32). In this sense, theLaozi speaks ofde asthat which nourishes all beings (e.g., ch. 51).

Within these parameters, interpretations ofde follow fromthe understanding of Dao andwu. On the one hand, for HeshangGong and other proponents of the cosmological view, what one hasobtained from the Dao refers specifically to one’sqiendowment, which determines one’s physical, intellectual,affective, moral, and spiritual capacity. Read this way, the titleDaodejing should be translated as the “Classic of theWay andIts Virtue,” given thatde isunderstood to have emanated from the Dao.

On the other hand, for Wang Bi and others who do not subscribe to asubstantive view of Dao,de represents what is“genuine” or “authentic” (zhen) inhuman beings (e.g., see Wang Bi’s commentary onLaozichs. 3, 5, 16, 51). Becausewu does not refer to anysubstance or power, what theLaozi means byde, the“virtue” that one has “obtained” from Dao, canonly be understood as what is originally, naturally present inall beings.

In either case, the concept ofde emerges as a Daoistresponse to the question of human nature, which was one of the mostcontested issues in early Chinese philosophy. The two readings of theLaozi outlined here, despite their differences, agreethat it is an inherentde that enables a person to conform tothe way in which Dao operates. “Virtue” may be corruptedeasily, but when realized, it radiates the full embodiment of the Daounderstood in terms ofqi on Heshang Gong’s view, orthe flourishing of authenticity on Wang Bi’s interpretation. Assuch, Dao points to not only the “beginning” but alsothroughde the “end” of all things.

7. Naturalness and Nonaction

TheLaozi makes use of the concept ofziran,literally what is “self (zi) so (ran),”to describe the workings of Dao. As an abstract concept,ziran gives no specific information, except to say that Daois not derived from or “modeled” (fa) afteranything (ch. 25). However, since “heaven andearth”—interpreted as nature in most modernstudies—are said to be born of Dao and come to be in virtue oftheirde, theLaozi is in effect saying that theways of nature reflect the function of Dao.

As the Heshang Gong commentary sees it, this suggests an understandingof nature as governed by the operation ofvital qi-energies in an ideal yin-yang systemcharacterized by harmony and fecundity. As interpreted by Wang Bi, theLaozi means more generally that there are“principles” (li) inherent in nature.

Human beings are, in turn, born of heaven and earth and so are“modeled” after them, either in terms of theirqi-constitution or in the sense that they are governed alsoby the same basic principles. Usually translated as“naturalness” or “spontaneity,”ziranthus builds on the concept ofde in suggesting not only thatthe power of Dao finds expression in nature, but also at the practicallevel a mode of being and way of action in accordance with the ways ofnature.

Nature in the Daoist sense, it is important to note, does notexclude the spiritual and the social. The existence of gods andspirits, which can be understood also as being constituted byqi energies, was hardly questioned in early China. TheLaozi makes clear that they, too, stem from Dao and form apart of the order ofziran (e.g., chs. 39, 60).

Furthermore, nature encompasses not only natural phenomena but alsosociopolitical institutions. The king clearly occupies a central placein the realm of Dao (chs. 16, 25); the family also should be regardedas a “natural” institution (chs. 18, 54). As an ethicalconcept,ziran thus extends beyond the personal to thesociopolitical level. It is worth mentioning thatziranremains an influential idea today, especially in conceptions of love,beauty, and one’s attitude toward life and death in Chineseculture.

The concept ofwuwei, “nonaction,” serves toexplain naturalness in practice. Like “nonbeing,”“nonaction” is awkward, and some translators have optedfor “non-assertive action,” “non-coerciveaction” or “effortless action,” but itidentifieswuwei as a technical term. For this reason, Iprefer “nonaction,” or better still, retainingwuwei in its transliterated form and explaining what it meansin theLaozi.

Wuwei does not mean total inaction. Later Daoists oftenemphasize the close connection betweenwuwei and techniquesof spiritual cultivation—the practice of “sitting inforgetfulness” (zuowang) and “fasting of themind” (xinzhai) discussed in theZhuangzi aresingled out as prime examples in this regard. In theLaozi,while meditation and other forms of spiritual practice may beenvisaged, the concept ofwuwei seems to be used more broadlyas a contrast against any form of action driven by self-servingdesire (e.g., chs. 3, 37). This is where commentarialintervention must come in, to bring out the full meaning ofnonaction.

It is useful to recall the late Zhou context, where disorder marchedon every front. TheLaozi, one assumes, is not indifferent tothe forces of disintegration tearing the country asunder, although theremedy it proposes is subject to interpretation. The problems ofpolitical decline are broadly traced to excessive desire, aviolation ofziran. Naturalness encompasses basic humanneeds, but these are to be distinguished from desire that fuels andinflates self-gratification, which knows no end. Nonaction thusentails at the personal level simplicity and quietude, which naturallyfollow from having few desires.

At the political level, theLaozi condemns aggressivemeasures such as war (ch. 30), cruel punishment (ch. 74), and heavytaxation (ch. 75), which reflect but the ruler’s own desire forwealth and power. If the ruler could rid himself of desire, theLaozi boldly declares, the world would be at peace of its ownaccord (chs. 37, 57).

In this sense, theLaozi describes the ideal sage-ruler assomeone who understands and followsziran (e.g., chs. 2, 17,64). In this same sense, it also opposes the Confucian program ofbenevolent intervention, which addresses at best the symptoms but notthe root cause of the disease. The Confucian project is in factsymptomatic of the decline of the rule of Dao. Conscious efforts atcultivating moral virtues only accentuate the loss of naturalgoodness, which in its original state would have been entirelycommonplace and would not have warranted distinction or specialattention (chs. 18, 38). Worse, Confucian ethics assumes that learningand moral self-cultivation can bring about personal and socialimprovement. From the Daoist perspective, artificial effort to“change” people, “improve” things or to“correct” the order ofziran only perpetuates afalse sense of self that alienates human beings from their inherent“virtue.”

The concept of nonaction is exceedingly rich. It brings into play acutting discernment that value distinctions are ideological, thathuman striving and competitive strife spring from the samesource. Nonaction entails also a critique of language and conventionalknowledge, which to the Daoist sage has become impregnated withideological contaminants.

The use of paradoxes in theLaozi especially heightens thispoint. For example, the person of Dao is depicted as“witless” or “dumb,” whereas people driven bydesire appear intelligent and can scheme with cunning (ch. 20). Theway of learning, as one would normally understand it,“increases” the store of knowledge and adds value to goodsand services; in contrast, questioning the very meaning of suchknowledge and value, theLaozi describes the pursuit of Daoas constantly “decreasing” or chipping away at theartifice built by desire (ch. 48).

Driving home the same point, to cite but one more example, theLaozi states, “The highest virtue is not virtuous;therefore it has virtue” (ch. 38). In other words, those whofully realize “virtue” in the Daoist sense do not act inthe way that men and women of conventional morality typically act orare expected to act. Paradoxes of this kind function as a powerfulrhetorical device, which forces the readers, so to speak, to move outof their “comfort zone,” to wake up from their dogmaticslumber, and to take note of the proposed higher truth of Dao (seealso, e.g., chs. 41, 45, 56). In this context, one can also understandsome of the provocative statements in theLaozi telling theruler, for example, to keep the people in a state of“ignorance” (ch. 65).

Some scholars would object that this interpretation misses thereligious import of theDaodejing, while others wouldquestion whether it is too eager to defend the philosophical coherenceof the classic. Perhaps theLaozi in chapter 65 of thecurrent text did mean to tell the ruler literally to keep the peopleignorant or stupid for better control, which as a piece of politicaladvice is not exactly extraordinary. There is also a suspicion thatsome kind of relativism may be at play. These issues need to befurther delineated. The remarks offered here take nonaction as centralto the Daoist view of life, recognizing that the concept ofwuwei does not only initiate a critique of value but alsopoints to a higher mode of knowledge, action, and being.

The Laozi critically establishes the relativity ofknowledge and value. Things appear big or small, for example, only inrelation to other things; knowledge and ignorance are meaningful onlyin relation to each other. Good and bad, being and nonbeing, and otheropposites should be understood in the same light (ch. 2).

However, distinctions as such are not necessarily problematic; forexample, an object can be described as rare or difficult to find ascompared with other objects. Problems arise only when rareobjects are deemed more valuable than commonplace objects, when“big” is deemed superior to “small,” or ingeneral terms when distinctions become a basis for valuediscrimination. When certain things or features (e.g., preciousstones, reputation, being slim, skin color) are regarded as“beautiful” or “worthy”—i.e.,desirable—other things will inevitably be deemed“ugly” and “unworthy,” with serious social,economic, and political consequences (ch. 3).

Viewed in this light, the recognition of the relativity of value doesnot end in a kind of moral relativism or ethical paralysis. TheLaozi also does not appear to be advocating theobliteration of all distinctions, and by extension civilization as awhole, in a state of mystical oneness. For example, while there issome concern that technology may bring a false sense of progress, theantidote does not lie in a deliberate rejection of technology butrather in a life of natural simplicity and contentment that stems fromhaving few desires (ch. 80).

The deconstruction of conventional beliefs and values crucially opensthe door to deeper reflection on the order ofziran. Itwould be a mistake to equate, for example, “hardness”with strength and assign a higher value to it over“softness.” However, once such value discrimination isshown to be arbitrary, theLaozi can then make use ofqualities such as softness, weakness or yieldingness (e.g., ch. 78) tointimate the Daoist way of life as grounded in nonaction. Similarly,once the nature of Daoist virtue is made clear, theLaozi can also speak of it as the “highest good”(ch. 8) and “highest virtue” (ch. 38). The reversal ofunderstanding, far from rendering the message inconsistent, wouldhave made a strong impact on the audience.

Wuwei ultimately derives its meaning fromwu, whichas an ethical orientation privileges “not having” over theconstant strivings of the mundane world. This constitutes a radicalcritique of a world given to the pursuit of wealth and power. Moreimportantly, in being “empty,” the person of Dao is shownto be “full”; without desire, he or she is able torediscover the riches ofziran and finds fulfillment.

The critique of value demonstrates the way in which desire(yu) perverts the mind—xin, literally,“heart,” but understood as the seat of both cognition andaffectivity—and colors our judgment and experience of reality.Desire is a complex concept pivotal to explicating theLaozi.

Fundamentally, desire depicts the movement of the“heart-mind” as it is drawn to things it finds agreeable(e.g., pleasure) or away from those it dislikes (e.g., pain).Phenomenologically, the mind is always in motion. Calmness ortranquility of mind does not mean the cessation of all cognitive oraffective functions. Properly understood, it is willfuldesire for self-gratification that transgresses the order ofnature, resulting in a plethora of instantiated desirescausing the heart to go wild, as it were, and pulling the mind indifferent directions. This is the root cause of the disease thatafflicts the human condition, according to theLaozi.Nonaction contrasts sharply with the way people typically act ina world in which the rule of Dao no longer prevails, with profitmotives, calculated steps, expectations, longings, regrets, and otherexpressions of desire. Put differently, nonaction would be“normal” action in the pristine order of nature, in whichthe mind is at peace, free from the incessant stirring of desire.

The world, of course, has strayed far from that state, which forms thestarting point of the Daoist critique. The concept ofwuwei thus seeks to portray a mode of beingthat governs existential engagement at all levels, transforming theway in which we think, feel, and experience the world. However, itdoes not stipulate what one ought to do or ought not to do inmeasured ethical conduct, notwithstanding later interpretationssuch as that found in theXiang’er commentary ascribing a set ofmoral precepts to the Laozi. Terms such as quietude,emptiness, and simplicity favored by theLaozi describe ageneral ethical orientation rather than specific practices. To besure, in followingwuwei there are things that a person ofDaonaturally would not do (e.g., wage a war ofaggression). However, philosophicallywuwei is not aboutnot doing certain things (thus, military engagement is not ruled outentirely—e.g., see chs. 67, 68, 69), but suggests areorientation of perception and value that ideally would bring an endto the dominance of desire and a return to the order ofziran.

The distinction here is worth repeating. As an ethical-spiritualideal, wuwei entails that the person whoembodies fully the virtue or power of Dao, i.e., the sage, would befree from the disquieting movement of desire. This wouldnaturally find expression in a way of life characterized by notdoing certain things (e.g., binge drinking) or doing less of certainthings (e.g., consumption of alcohol). This is to be distinguishedfrom the view that wuwei prescribes not doing ordoing less of certain things, which would entailpurposeful striving.

The transformative power of nonaction would ensure not only personalfulfillment but also sociopolitical order. This seems to weigh againsta strictly mystical reading of theLaozi, if mysticism isunderstood to involve a kind of personal union with the Daotranscending all political interests. The concept of“virtue,” whether interpreted in terms of authenticity orthe purity and fullness ofqi-energy, depicts a pristinenatural and sociopolitical order in which naturalness and nonactionare the norm. The ethics ofwuwei rests on this insight.

As a guide to recovering or attaining that ideal, there may be roomfor governments to impose conditions that would diminish thesupply and demand of desire, e.g., by not elevating individualswho are deemed “worthy” by worldly standards or valuinggoods that are difficult to obtain (ch. 3). However, effective as theymay be, the deeper point remains that the true sage-ruler,embodying wuwei in his being, would nothave elevated such individuals or valued such goods in the firstplace. Similarly, although it may be said that nonaction points to astate of mind in which one does everything that one does, it is on theunderstanding that in that ideal state certain actions simply wouldnot occur, as the heart-mind would not be aroused and move in theirdirection. For example, to argue that there is a qualitativelydifferentwuwei way of stealing or cheating would not bemeaningful, because such action would not arise in the ideal realm ofnaturalness, although it is not difficult to see how such aninterpretation would enter the popular imagination.

At the political level, according to the HeshangGong commentary, the dispensation ofqi gives riseto a pristine hierarchical order in which those who are blessed with aperfectqi endowment, the rare sages, would govern withnonaction. It can be assumed that the sages are naturally predisposedto quietude, whereas the common people are driven by desire in varyingdegree. Indeed, at one point, theLaozi seems to distinguishthree different grades of human beings (ch. 41), which on this viewwould be the result of their unequalqi endowment. The roleof the sage-ruler, then, would be to guide the people to abide bysimplicity through personal charisma and example, and also as anatural consequence by means of policies designed to cultivate anenvironment in which desire would not run rampant. In the absence of atrue sage-ruler, theLaozi is saying, according to thisinterpretation, those in power should emulate the Daoist sage,cultivate their internalqi energies, and empty their mindsof desire, to restore peace and harmony to the land.

The reading represented by the Wang Bi commentary can accommodate thetheory that heaven and earth and the “ten thousand things”are all constituted byqi. The decisive difference is that onthis account, human beings all share the same essential nature, asdistinguished from theirqi-constituted capacities. Forexample, some people may be better endowed and therefore could live toa ripe old age, while others with a poorer endowment may dieprematurely; but this does not detract from the fundamental assertionthat they share the same inherentde, which defines theirnature.

Sages are not a different kind of being with a radicallydifferent nature; rather, they are individuals who manage to realizetheir authenticde-virtue to the full. Unlike theHeshang Gong interpretation which essentially traces“sagehood” to a special inborn sage-nature, the idea of anauthentic ontological core assures the possibility of attaining thehighest virtue. Being one with Dao does not describe any mysticalunion with a divine source or sacred power, but reflects a mode ofbeing that accords with the assumed original nature marked by naturalgoodness and the absence of excessive desire. Because the world is ina state of decline, theLaozi therefore speaks of a“return” to Dao, to naturalness and nonaction.

Regardless of the position one takes, in this general interpretiveframework a number of symbols which both delight and puzzle readers oftheLaozi can be highlighted. Suggestive of its creativityand nurturance, Dao is likened to a mother (e.g., chs. 1, 25). Thiscomplements the paradigm of the feminine (e.g., chs. 6, 28), whose“virtue” is seen to yield fecundity and to find expressionin yieldingness and non-contention. The infant (e.g., chs. 52, 55)serves as a fitting symbol on two counts. First, it brings out therelationship between Dao and world; second, the kind of innocence andwholesome spontaneity represented by the infant exemplifies thepristine fullness of virtue in the ideal Daoist world.

Natural symbols such as water (e.g., chs. 8, 78) further reinforce thesense of yielding and deep strength that characterizes nonaction. Thelow-lying and fertile valley (e.g., chs. 28, 39) accentuates both thecreative fecundity of Dao and the gentle nurturance of its power.Carefully crafted and ornately decorated objects are treasured by theworld, and as such can be used as a powerful symbol for it. Incontrast, the utterly simple, unaffected, and seemingly valuelesspu, a plain uncarved block of wood, brings into sharp reliefthe integrity of Daoist virtue and of the person who embodies it(e.g., chs. 28, 32). Finally, one may mention the notion of reversal(e.g., chs. 40, 65), which suggests not only the need to“return” to Dao, but also that the Daoist way of lifewould inevitably appear the very opposite of “normal”existence, and that it involves a complete revaluation of values.

In sum, any interpretation of the currentLaozi as a wholemust take into account (a) the “nothingness” of Dao and(b) the way in whichwuwei andziran provide a guideto the good life.

With respect to the latter, it is true that in many instances thetext seems to be addressing the ruler or the ruling elite, explainingto them the ideal government of the Daoist sage. This is notsurprising given the Zhou context and given that the production ofwritten documents and the access to them were generally the preserveof the ruling class in ancient China. However, this need not restrictinterpretation to politics in the narrow sense of statecraft orpolitical strategies. In the light of the emphasis onziranandwuwei, there is sufficient evidence that theLaozi views politics in a larger ethical-spiritual context,in which the flourishing of sociopolitical order is rooted inself-cultivation.

In the final analysis, naturalness and nonaction are seen to reflectthe function of the nameless and formless Dao. As such, Daoist ethicsis anchored in an idealized view of nature, characterized byinherentde-virtue. It is on this basis that the concept ofde is raised to a higher level than “virtues” inthe sense of moral attainments. Perhaps for this reason, to ensurethat virtue as the power of Dao is properly understood, theLaozi did not resort to the language of “humannature” (xing) commonly employed in early Chinesephilosophy.

The understanding ofde, however, is dependent on that ofDao, which in turn hinges on the interpretation ofwu aseither original substance or nonbeing. Both readings are plausible andare within the semantic range of theLaozi. Whereas theformer subscribes to the prevalentqi theory that underliesmuch of Chinese philosophy and on that basis provides anintegral view of the cosmos, self-cultivation and government, thelatter focuses on the fundamental unity of being characterized bynatural simplicity and quietude that ideally should define the ethicalcourse for both the individual and society.

TheLaozi should be recognized as a seminal work. It isprofoundly insightful, but it is the task of the interpreter towork out the full implications of its often provocative insight. Itseems reasonable to assume that while theLaozi has somethingnew to offer, it nonetheless shares certain background ideas andassumptions with other early Chinese philosophical works. As such, theHeshang Gong interpretation should be given due consideration.However, in bringing into view the nothingness of Dao and the order ofziran, theLaozi invites reflection on the very coreof being beyond itsqi constitution. While theproduction of meaning is context dependent, new horizons do emergefrom great works of philosophy. The two lines of interpretationoutlined here have different ethical implications regarding the natureof the ideal sage, but neither can be said to have transgressed thehermeneutic boundaries of theDaodejing. The suggestion thatthey both arise from theLaozi is not a matter ofequivocation but an acknowledgement of its hermeneutical depth.

The power of theDaodejing does not lie in a clearly laid outset of doctrines, but in its seminal insights. The concept ofqi may be culture specific, and the prospects of realizinguniversal Daoist order may seem remote, but the recognition of thefundamental problem of desire should still give us pause. The ills ofdiscrimination, exploitation and intellectual hubris, so deeplyembedded in language and value systems, remain as serious today asthey were in early China. The healing power of nonaction still strikesa chord and commands continuing reflection and engagement. Although inworking out these insights differences will no doubt arise, they uniteall interpreters of theLaozi and draw new generations ofreaders into the mystery of Dao and (its) virtue.

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Acknowledgments

Some of the material presented above first appeared in “TheDaodejing and Its Tradition,”Daoism Handbook,edited by Livia Kohn [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999], pp. 1–29;permission by the publisher to rework them here is gratefullyacknowledged.