[Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Paul Kalligasreplaces theformer entry on this topic by the previous author.]

Plotinus’ philosophy represents one of the supreme intellectualachievements of the period that has come to be called “LateAntiquity”. Plotinus is generally regarded as the founder ofLate Antique Platonism, sometimes termed “Neoplatonism”, aschool of thought that, while claiming to be the inheritor of the longtradition of ancient Greek rationalism rooted in the period ofPresocratic philosophy, is also foreshadowing some of the culturaldevelopments that would take place in the following centuries, chieflyover the periods of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Basedprimarily on what are regarded as the fundamental principles ofPlatonic philosophy, it continues the optimistic and systematicversion of philosophy represented by the various schools of theHellenistic and Greco-Roman periods, though it also exhibits some ofthe uncertainties and ambivalences informing the unquestionably darkerand less self-assured worldview that became prevalent duringPlotinus’s own lifetime. In this way, although Plotinusmaintains a distinctly traditional outlook, he prefigures the adventof a new era of intellectual accomplishments, and that is why today,although he sometimes appears unduly attached to tradition, his viewsand sensitivities also strike us as astonishingly innovative or evenmodern.

• 1. Life and Writings
• 2. The Nature of Sensible Bodies
• 3. First Digression: The presence of the supra-sensible hypostases in the sensible domain
• 4. The Hypostasis of the Soul
• 5. Second Digression: The fundamental principles of Plotinus’ Metaphysics
• 6. The Hypostasis of the Intellect
• 7. The First Principle of Everything: the One, or the Good
• 8. Conclusion
• Bibliography
  • A. Primary Literature
  • B. Secondary Literature
    • B.1 General
    • B.2 Detailed Studies
  • C. Reference
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life and Writings

Thanks to Porphyry’s editorial solicitude, we possess almost theentirety of Plotinus’ oeuvre, grouped thematically into theEnneads, thus dubbed on account of their peculiar symmetricarrangement into six parts, each of which contains nine treatises.^[1] By arranging his teacher’s works into the arithmetical schemaof theEnneads, Porphyry attempted to order them inaccordance with their content. This represents an approach thatengages first with the more “accessible” and“simple”, in terms of their themes, treatments ofquestions of moral and anthropological nature (inEnnead I),moving on to issues pertaining to the sensible world and the basicprinciples that govern its functioning (inEnneads II andIII), and then proceeding to the more elusive and complex problemsconcerning the three supra-sensible so-called “hypostases”of his system, namely the soul (inEnnead IV), the Intellect(inEnneads V and VI) and the One (inEnnead VI),where Plotinus introduces and analyzes in detail the higher principleson the basis of which the entire sensible reality is produced andarticulated. It is unclear, however, whether this approach is indeedhelpful to readers, who are right from the start confronted with someof the most intractable and demanding of Plotinus’ treatises. Ingeneral, Porphyry’s arrangement has been repeatedly criticizedin the past as utterly artificial and arbitrary, echoing more theeditor’s views than those of Plotinus.

On the other hand, thanks to Porphyry again, we possess a completechronological table recording in detail the order of composition ofeach of the treatises that were subsequently incorporated into theEnneads (VP 4.22–6.25). Some of the morerecent editors have in fact opted to follow this order, havingentirely given up on the effort of organizing the relevant material onthe basis of its various themes. Despite the advantages of thisapproach, the fact remains that the chronological arrangement ofPlotinus’ works rarely helps readers form a complete and precisepicture of his philosophy. For although we can arguably discern somesigns of development in his thought regarding specific issues (see,e.g., Meijer 1992: 27–52), it appears fairly cohesive as a wholeand stable in its pivotal points. Any changes pertain chiefly to themanner in which he formulates his meanings, or perhaps to his morededicated focus on certain subjects, without substantial deviations interms of philosophical content and implications. Thus, for example, inhis early works Plotinus tends to rely somewhat more extensively on adoxographical type of analysis of earlier approaches to the questionat hand, but this is certainly no reason to regard these works as moreintroductory or more readily accessible to readers. Furthermore,throughout his authorialcursus he often revisits the samethemes over and over again, each time approaching them from a slightlydifferent perspective. In these cases, it is certainly preferable tohave before us all the treatises dedicated to connected issues or withcomplementary content. Furthermore, Plotinus began composing his worksapproximately in the last sixteen years of his life, which means hestarted when he was already at the mature age of fifty. In light ofthis, it appears unlikely that in this period of time hisphilosophical views changed or evolved significantly, especially sincehe regarded his philosophy as something complete and given from theoutset—with Plato having already furnished its fundamentals,albeit in a manner that required concerted effort so as to properlyinterpret and present it with the completeness it deserves.

Thanks to the introductory text, theVita Plotini(VP), with which Porphyry prefaces his edition, we can alsoavail ourselves of a sufficiently reliable account of Plotinus’life and milieu. It includes information on the way in which he taughtand composed his works, and also on how these were received by hiscontemporaries. Overall, Porphyry’s first-hand accountconstitutes an invaluable testimony on the way of life of one of thepreeminent thinkers of antiquity, while it also provides preciousinformation about one of the less well-known periods of the Roman era,which is often, and not without good reason, described as the“Third Century Crisis”. Porphyry was a student of Plotinusand lived with him for a period of roughly five years. We learn fromhis account that his master was a native of Egypt (we may infer thathe was born in 204 CE); that he came to attend the lectures of theelusive but evidently influential Ammonius Saccas in Alexandria at theage of 28 and that he stayed with his teacher for the next elevenyears, until he decided to follow the infelicitous expedition emperorGordian III launched against Persia in 243. We are told that he did sobecause he aspired to become “acquainted with the wisdom of thePersians and the Indians”. After the expedition was aborted whenGordian was murdered by his troops, Plotinus moved to Rome, where heappears to have had some important social connections, and settledpermanently there late in 244, teaching continuously for more thantwenty-five years, until his death in 270. He offered what appears tobe a fairly organized series of lectures that were open to the publicand regularly attended by a group of trusted pupils, well-versed inthe master’s distinctive approach and manner of exposition.

His written works, which vary in length from a single page to over ahundred, were firmly bound up with the activities of the“school” in which he taught, as they echo the manner ofpresenting and analyzing the various questions treated in thatenvironment (seeVP 4.9–14). Plotinus’“treatises” began to be composed ten years after hisarrival in Rome and they aimed mainly at recording the discussionsthat took place in the classroom, functioning as“reminders” (hupomnēmata) for those whoparticipated in the “meetings” (sunousiai)(VP 13.15–7). Porphyry describes how these meetingsunfolded, and his testimony is rather enlightening on this point, asit also offers us important insights into how Plotinus’ workswere composed.

As he recounts, thesunousiai usually commenced by readingout loud substantial passages from available treatises or commentarieson the works of Plato and Aristotle composed by various roughlycontemporary scholars; then, the master extensively discussed withthose present the “difficulties” (aporiai) of thesubject treated in these passages. Finally, Plotinus would outline hisown, often rather astute, analysis of the matter at hand andsubsequently announced the end of the meeting (VP14.10–8).

It is easy to identify traces of this method of addressingphilosophical questions in Plotinus’ works, and it is evidentthat these works were primarily addressed to a rather limited circleof students, those described as “auditors”(akroatai) or companions. These were already accustomed totheir teacher’s “usual manner of expressing himself”(VP 20.7) but also well-versed in the works contained in the“reading list”, which were discussed during thesemeetings. It is obvious that Plotinus’s readers were expected tobe well acquainted with the works of Plato and Aristotle, so as to beable to readily identify his frequent references, or even mereallusions, to them. We can rather easily recognize these“primary” sources today. It is a much more arduous task totrack down and highlight references to the “secondarybibliography”, by which I mean the exegetical works mentionedearlier which were one of Plotinus’ key instruments whenteaching. Although these works undoubtedly played a significant rolein shaping Plotinus’s thought—and are therefore importantfor any attempt at understanding it—it is nonetheless almostimpossible to accurately gauge their contribution beyond the generalremarks provided by Porphyry, as most are nowadays nonextant and thuslargely obscure to us. Things are further complicated byPlotinus’s habit of never mentioning by name sources that werechronologically closer to him. In this he differs radically from hispupil, Porphyry, who, after having studied grammar and rhetoric inAthens, was accustomed to meticulously quoting the works he employedin his writings; in fact, this earned him the—ratherderogatory—sobriquet “much-learned”(polumathēs). In contrast, Plotinus almost never revealsthe sources he is drawing on, although, as Porphyry informs us,“his writings are full of concealed Stoic and Peripateticdoctrines: Aristotle’sMetaphysics, in particular, isconcentrated in them” (VP 14.4–6).

This lack of references constitutes one of the main sources of thedifficulties modern readers face when engaging with theEnneads. Yet there are further challenges which are due tothe peculiar manner in which Plotinus often chooses to express histhoughts. Porphyry’s testimony proves once again instrumental.For he describes in rather vivid detail how his teacher composed histreatises (VP 8.1–19). He thus makes it possible for usto understand the reasons why Plotinus’ authorial style oftenexhibits an associative structure, with frequent repetitions andlabyrinthine interconnections, where we sometimes have the feeling ofwitnessing the oral expression of an internal monologue or even a livedialogue with an unnamed interlocutor, evidently without any sustainedeffort having gone into systematically revising or arranging therelevant material.

This, however, in no way implies that Plotinus’s thought isitself unsystematic. The reader readily perceives that the array ofphilosophical thoughts conveyed in these works aims to provide a fullyorganized and minutely arranged, comprehensive conception of reality,with each individual treatise attempting to reveal a particular facetof it that is—or seeks to be—harmoniously ordered in alarger overarching synthesis. Plato’s philosophy is central tothis systematic project, and it too is treated as a completephilosophical system, but one that can be readily developed, expanded,supplemented, and even corrected and adapted in certain minorrespects, to meet the new philosophical challenges of Plotinus’time. At any rate, Plato’s figure dominates Plotinus’thought, constituting the key source of inspiration for the worldviewof the founder of what in modern times has come to be called“Neoplatonism”.

Concurrently, however, we should not underplay the very substantialcontribution of Aristotelian philosophy, which, as also noted byPorphyry, is ever present in Plotinus’ treatises. Plotinusconstantly applies himself to providing responses to the objectionsraised by Aristotle vis-à-vis Plato’s philosophy, andsimultaneously makes systematic efforts to incorporate some ofAristotle’s basic conclusions into the broader edifice ofPlatonism, as Plotinus understood it; Aristotelianism is a fundamentalcomponent in how he elaborated and presented his philosophicalquestions. Sometimes, this makes his exposition appear like a detailedand comprehensive dialogue with Aristotle as well as with some of hischief interpreters. Thus the need to grapple with the developments inthe interpretation of Plato and Aristotle—but also to engagewith the Stoics and other less well-known philosophical currents, suchas Neopythagoreanism and Gnosticism—shapes Plotinus’sthought, even though this is not immediately clear when we firstengage with his works (see, e.g., Chiaradonna 2002, Graeser 1972,Gertz 2022). Furthermore, by reading side by side thematicallyinterrelated passages dispersed throughout theEnneads we canreconstruct the path Plotinus followed in developing his philosophyand gain awareness of the manner in which each of his theoreticaltenets contributes to the overall system.

However, despite the systematic aspirations of his endeavor as awhole, it remains most challenging for his readers to discern aspecific path they are called on to follow in reading his treatises soas to navigate them in a way that is sufficiently consonant with itsinternal structure. In what follows, I freely treat ideas encounteredin different sections of theEnneads as forming parts of afairly coherent systematic edifice displaying remarkable consistencyof thought and of general theoretical outlook.

2. The Nature of Sensible Bodies

The analysis of sensible reality attempted by Plotinus exhibits, atfirst glance, important analogies as well as substantial differencesfrom the one we find in the works of Aristotle. In a word, Aristotletakes a hylomorphic model as its basis. According to this model, eachindividual body is comprised of two constituents, a material and aformal one, with both always forming a unity, and without any of thetwo being capable of existing independently of the other. ForPlotinus, however, their individual combinations are subject toendless alternation, resulting in the continuous fluidity of thephenomena observed in the sensible realm (III 6.6.76–77). In hisview, the material constituent of bodies is “matter”(hulē) conceived of as the permanent substrate of allthe changes occurring on the level of sensible reality.Plotinus’s matter differs from Aristotle’s because, incontrast to it, it is not that earlier stage of reality from which(ex hou) a body comes to be in virtue of a form through theoccurrence of certain changes. For Plotinus it never actually receivesa form but, on the contrary, it constitutes a stable and utterly inertsubstrate in which (en hōi) sensible forms becomemanifest (ΙΙΙ 6.17.27). In other words, sensible forms,for Plotinus, determine the identity and characteristics of eachmaterial thing, without the substrate itself incurring any realshaping or change. In itself, matter completely lacks qualitative orquantitative characteristics, such as size and extension (ΙΙ4.14.20–30; see Hutchinson 2022: 305–7). It is simplypredisposed to afford extension to whatever it takes on (ΙΙ4.11.17–19), thus enabling those formal components, whosecoexistence elicits the impression of a particular body extended inspace, to appear on it. Since matter is never endowed with anyqualities or quantities, as it is the substrate that merely renderstheir appearance possible, it is characterized by Plotinus as“non-being” (ΙΙΙ 6.6.29–32,7.1–12), in the sense that it possesses none of the qualitativeand quantitative characteristics that would impart on it a particularidentity (ΙΙ 5.5.6–13). This complete absence ofqualities makes it receptive to any form that is projected on it,since matter, by remaining totally unaffected, does not put up anyresistance and thus functions like an utterly impassible mirror, onwhich a variety of forms appear without ever truly shaping it; matteris incapable of acquiring any of these and making it truly its own(ΙΙΙ 6.18.29–41).

On the other hand, the formal component of sensible bodies, whichimparts on them a specific identity making each what it is, is not, asAristotle would put it, a simple eidetic shape, a form(eidos), but what Plotinus calls a “formativeprinciple” (logos) (ΙΙ 6.2.15–19,ΙΙ 7.3.6–14). Thislogos is each time acombination of formal characteristics, whose coexistence bestows oneach individual body its identity and, in that sense, could bedescribed—in Aristotelian terms—as its“essence”, that is, as what something is primarily, whichalso corresponds to its definition. Thus, for example, a particularinstance of fire will possess, among others, the qualitativecharacteristics of being hot, dry and moving upwards, whichdifferentiate it from other elements. In other words, it is theformative principle that determines each body for what it is, and thatdifferentiates it from, and associates it with, other bodies withinthe sensible world (VI 3.15.27–38; see Kalligas 2011:771–77 and cf. Chiaradonna 2016: 43–6).

At the same time, each individual body, whose identity has beendetermined in this manner by the corresponding formative principle, iscapable of taking on additional qualitative, quantitative or othercharacteristics; these will determine it further without, however,altering its fundamental character as the thing it is (VI3.8.23–30, 10.7–20), i.e., without depriving it of itsidentity or, in other words, its quasi-essence. Hence, the fundamentaldistinction introduced by Aristotle between the primary or“first” substance and the other categories that exist init as “inherent” qualities, predicated of it as “ina subject”, is retained by Plotinus. Plotinus, however, does notassign to this “substance” the key role it performs in theStagirite’s philosophy, insofar as a substance, for him, is a,more or less, contingent synthesis of qualitative (and possiblyquantitative) characteristics (which correspond to the specificformativelogos) and matter (VI 3.8.16–27,9.27–36; cf. D’Ancona 1997: 377–82).

But there is another point on which Plotinus differs from Aristotle inhis analysis of bodies. For Plotinus the qualitative (and possiblyother) characteristics, which convey on any given body the propertiesthat we, through our senses, recognize and perceive as inherent to it,do not constitute real entities possessing a self-subsistent identity,but are mere images or likenesses of the true intelligible beings(ΙΙΙ 6.7.23–42). The latter are intelligible, andconsequently supra-sensible Forms, and participation in these causesthe occurrence of the corresponding “phenomenalities” onmatter and thus the formation of the sensible images that we perceiveas present in it (ΙΙΙ 6.11.1–8; seeD’Ancona 1997: 393–7). The formative principle acts as anintermediary: it projects (temporarily and incidentally) on the levelof phenomenality (i.e., the sensible world) a reality that isestablished on the level of intelligible beings or of intelligibleEssence, and it thereby organizes what appears within it on the basisof principles and specifications that are determined by thatEssence.

For this formative process to take place, there needs to be themediation of an additional active causal factor, which will projectthese sensible reflections from the realm of intelligible entitiesonto that of sensible things. This is none other than the soul, whichis an utterly independent and self-subsistent entity that, by its veryconstitution, is capable of accessing both realms. The soul is incharge of enabling the formative principles to project forms onto thesensible world. The activity by which the soul carries out its task oftransmitting the reflections of the intelligible Forms to the sensibleworld is called “contemplation” (theōria).As will become clear insection 6, this mode of transmission is part of a broader tendency inherent inPlotinus’ ontological system, where the “higher”entities become manifest in the “lower” levels in theguise of “images” or “traces”. Throughtheōria, the soul is directed to the intelligible Formsand apprehends their representations. Having developed and processedthe content of these representations in accordance with its owncognitive abilities, the soul, so to say, transmits the informationcoming from the intelligible realm to the sensible world by shapingthe latter in the image of the former in a manner that corresponds toits own peculiar mode of contemplation (ΙΙΙ8.4.1–22). Hence, we could claim that the formative role playedin Aristotle’s philosophy by “enmattered form”(enhulon eidos) in the formation of bodies is fulfilled,according to Plotinus, by the (“secondary”, as will bedescribed further on) activity of the soul. This is because the soulitself, having contemplated the eidetic models of sensible things,i.e., the forms, can accordingly produce the characteristics of thelogoi in their role as formative principles of sensiblethings (ΙΙΙ 2.2.16–42, ΙΙΙ8.4.15–31).

Insofar as a body is animated by an individual soul, its soul will bein charge of shaping and arranging it. In the case of bodies that lackan individual soul, they will be shaped by what Plotinus calls“Nature”, a causal principle originating from the cosmicSoul, which, through its Providence, rules over the entirety of thesensible universe and it organizes it into a coherent and harmoniouswhole. This whole is governed by forces and interactions securing itsproper functioning as a complete, self-sustained and self-poweredorganism, albeit one that is unconscious of its actions, as it merelyconforms, involuntarily and almost automatically, to the instructionsresulting from the contemplation in which the cosmic Soul is engaged(ΙΙΙ 8.5.1–29).

We should note here that the apparent shaping of matter through theaction of the qualitative characteristics that are projected on iteither by a specific formative principle or, alternatively, by theactivity of individual souls is carried out gradually over successivephases. These phases render the substrate receptive to a furtherstratum of characteristics that specify the properties that willappear on a particular body. Thus, for example, the originallyshapeless “earth” formed by the fundamental properties ofthe “cold” and the “dry”, may become adefinite quantity of a certain material, such as, e.g.,psimuthion (“white lead”, a powder employed as acosmetic throughout antiquity), which possesses the furthercharacteristic properties of whiteness and toxicity (ΙΙ6.1.16–31). This layered formative process enables the gradualemergence of very complex kinds of corporeality, and it gives rise tothe almost inexhaustible variety of perceptible shapes observed in theuniverse, even prior to the appearance of any kind of living organismin it (V 8.7.16–24).

A characteristic feature of bodies is their extension anddivisibility. And insofar as the division of any body leads to theformation of two or more smaller bodies, for Plotinus the process ofsubdivision can continue in perpetuity, without some definitivelyindivisible bodily component ever emerging (IV 2.1.11–17).Moreover, Plotinus argues that any body can be arrayed next to otherbodies or intermingled with them in various ways while retaining itsbasic properties, at least in potentiality, and it may instantaneouslyrecover these once it becomes separated from them (ΙΙ7.2.22–42). These properties continue to characterize it and arenot diffused in its environment except by undergoing specificpredetermined processes that are governed by the natural laws, thatis, by the “instructions” with which the cosmic Soulregulates interactions between the different bodies through relationsof “affinity” and “disaffinity” that linkbodies to one another (IV 4.32.7–25).

The sum total of these laws, which remain constant and immutable as aconsequence of the stability of the cosmic Soul’s contemplationof intelligible Forms, is sometimes described as Nature or even asDestiny (heimarmenē) (III 1.10.1–10). It extendsalong the full expanse of the universe and ensures its eternalduration (ΙΙ 1.3.1–23). Destiny is a network ofdeterministic rules that operate almost automatically andunintentionally, responding to a kind of “hypotheticalnecessity”, where the same causes inexorably produce the sameeffects, provided that no other exogenous factor enters into play. Thenetwork of all these laws orderly regulates all changes occurringwithin the sensible universe, and it predetermines the behavior ofbodies in it in a manner that is consistent and predictable, so longas no additional causal factors intrude (II 3.13.3–45).

But apart from the inanimate bodies, the sensible realm also includesa great number of living organisms that are distributed in it inaccordance with the material constitution of the bodies they possess(ΙΙΙ 2.3.23–30). The life of these organisms isgoverned and regulated not only by the fundamental inexorable laws ofuniversal Nature but also by the individual souls, which coexist andcooperate with the cosmic Soul and jointly shape the universe (VI7.7.8–16; see Tornau 2016: 140–52). These souls arekindred and homologous to the cosmic Soul, which governs the universeas a whole (IV 3.2.54–58, 6.1–15), but they focus theiractivity on animating and managing individual bodies. The kinshiplinking them to one another enables souls to communicate and interact,even without the intervention of their corresponding bodies (IV9.3.1–9), and at the same time it makes them coordinate andharmonize their activity so as to bring about a unitary, although notfree of contrarieties and antagonism, harmonious whole (IV8.5.1–8).

As will be shown below insection 4, these individual souls do not actually descend nor do they inhabitthe bodies that they animate, but merely project upon them an image ofthemselves, which imparts on bodies a semblance of vital functions andleads to the formation of what is called the “livingorganism” or simply “living being”(zōion) (see I 1.7.1–6, III 4.3.24–27, III9.3.1–4, IV 3.26.1–9, IV 4.18.7, IV 8.8.1–3, VI4.16.14–17, VI 7.5.21–30, and Igal 1979: 330–40;Caluori 2022: 233–5). The life enjoyed by this organism and allits constituting parts is not real, but a mere effulgence of reallife, which is the soul’s primary activity. The souls remain“undescended” and untouched by corporeality, supervisingthe various functions and affections of the organic body, so to speak,“from above” (IV 3.12.1–8, IV 8.5.24–6.10, VI4.6.9–19), without ever becoming directly involved into what thebody incurs as a consequence of its interaction with other bodies inthe world. It is only a soul’s engagement with, and solicitudefor, the particular body that can, if it grows excessive, cause it tobecome emotionally entangled with the body and end up participating inwhat befalls it, in the form of pleasure or distress and pain, as wellas of the other affections associated with corporeal life (II9.2.4–10, III 2.7.15–28, IV 3.6.25–27, V1.1.9–19.). On the contrary, the “living being” isthe true subject of the so-called psychic affections, which the soulapprehends cognitively, without itself suffering anything (Ι1.2.9–11, ΙΙΙ 6.1.28–30).

The individual soul’s activity animates the organism as a wholein such a manner as to ensure interaction between its parts. Anythingthat happens to one part impacts all the other parts, and as a resultthe whole behaves and reacts as an organized unity that, in this way,appears to be pervaded by an internal “sympathy” andpossessed of a kind of precursory “intuition” (III6.4.18–23, IV 4.35.1–21; see Tornau 2016: 140–52).Correspondingly, on the cosmic level, the natural laws ensure theinteraction between the parts of the universe even when these are notin direct physical contact with one another, thereby producing thenetwork of sympathetic “magical” interactions thatpermeate Nature through and through (IV 4.32.10–25,37.11–25, 40.1–14). These interactions, as we have pointedout, manifest themselves automatically and involuntarily, notrequiring any conscious intervention or effort on the part of thecosmic Soul (III 4.4.2–13, IV 8.2.6–24). The nature of theactivities that determine these bonds can be described, on account ofthe mutual attraction they exercise, as “erotic”, in thesense that they echo the presence of cosmic Love as the cohesive powerof the universe (IV 4.40.1–12; cf. Hadot 1982: 286–9). Inthis way, the entirety of the sensible world is constituted into aunitary universe, which is held together by internal necessity andharmony, while it moves in a circle governed by the Soul that rulesover it, which in turn ceaselessly imitates the self-thinking motionof the divine Intellect (II 2.1.1–19, 2.5–15, III2.3.29–31, VI 4.2.34–49, VI 9.8.1–8; cf. Wilberding2006: 63–8). Interactions between the parts of the sensibleworld are governed by stable laws; in turn, these echo themathematical constitution of the cosmic Soul, resulting in a beautifuland harmoniously arranged whole, which corresponds, so far as this ispossible, to the sublime beauty of the model on the basis of which ithas been constituted (V 8.3.1–10, 8.1–7; see Armstrong1975: 156–60). Thus it is made clear that the organization andarrangement of the universe are expressions of cosmic Providence,through which the higher principles manifest themselves in the realmof sensible realities and determine the unfolding of phenomena on thebasis of an overall regulatory framework—the rational order ofthe cosmos (ΙΙ 3.13.34–38, ΙΙΙ2.11.6–16). The movements of the heavenly bodies as well as theinterplay between them and their interactions with earthly phenomenaalso submit to this rational order; at any rate, they cannot transcendthe level of unintentional and unconscious Destiny(heimarmenē) (II 3.14.2–21).

3. First Digression: The presence of the supra-sensible hypostases in the sensible domain

Plotinus takes for granted the fundamental Platonic distinctionbetween two levels of reality, an intelligible and a perceptible one(see III 7.1.1–3, VI 2.1.16–33, VI 4.2.1–3).Investigating the relation binding together these two levels isinstrumental to understanding the explanatory role supra-sensibleentities are called on to play with respect to what appears in thesensible realm.

The “participation” (methexis) of sensible thingsin the intelligible realities (these also include the souls) does notoccur through the “extension” of the latter into the spaceoccupied by the former (VI 4.2.17–34). For,quaincorporeal entities, intelligible beings can in no wise becomeextended in space, whose existence, in any case, depends on thepresence of perceptible bodies (II 4.12.11–12). The omnipresenceof intelligible entities consists in the fact that, jointly, theyconstitute a unitary, self-sufficient totality, with parts that arefully and mutually interrelated (VI 4.11.3–14). It is thesensible things that through their gradual shaping become, whereapplicable, susceptible to receiving the activity of the intelligiblebeings, thereby conforming with, and approximating, these, to theextent possible (VI 4.12.7–12, 33–41; see O’Meara1980: 67–70), echoing some of their characteristics in the guiseof the “images” or “traces” that are formedupon them, and which impart to them the various characteristics thatdistinguish them from one another. The causal relations that determinethem always flow from the higher toward the lower, but“participation in”, and conformation with, the higherrealities occur each time according to the ability of the lower tobecome a recipient of something that, while already present in it,does not manifest itself until the requisite response or adequacyobtains (VI 5.8.15–22). So the emergence of vital functions in aliving body is posterior to its organic constitution by the cosmicSoul. This constitution renders it capable of receiving the psychicpowers that will become manifest in the corresponding life-relatedactivities (VI 4.15.8–18). The gradual and increasingly morecomplex presence of such functions allows the manifestation ofprogressively higher, and fuller “echoes” from theintelligible realm, culminating with the appearance of rationalabilities in the human organism, and the activation of thecorresponding ratiocinative function. In this manner, as a microcosm,the structure of the human being reflects the overall constitution ofthe sensible macrocosm (ΙΙ 3.5.33–42,ΙΙΙ 4.2.6–11, 3.16–24, 6.18–28).

4. The Hypostasis of the Soul

What mainly distinguishes the various ontological levels posited inPlotinus’ philosophy is the different degree of unity thatcorresponds to each. Thus, while bodies are by their nature divisible,which means they become apportioned and parceled into ever smallerparts, the soul, which, according to the psychogony found inPlato’sTimaeus, is made of a divisible and anindivisible component (IV 1.10–22, IV 2.2.49–53), insofaras it is an incorporeal and supra-sensible entity (IV 7.2.4–25,8.43–9.16), has the characteristic of not becoming apportionedin the body that it animates. In contrast to, e.g., perceptiblequalities, whose division is a concomitant of the dispersion of thebodies in which they inhere (IV 2.1.29–41, VI 4.4.32–33),the soul is always present in its totality in every single part of thebody it animates (see Emilsson 1991: 152–61). This allows it tomanifest a unitary life as its primary activity (IV 2.1.62–76);though this life is expressed differently in each individual bodilyorgan, it retains its fundamental unity, which enables it tocoordinate all the specific faculties of the living body into aunitary “mode of life” (bios). This means thatall individual organs combine and coordinate their functions so thatthey carry out jointly a unitary work (VI 4.1.24–32), one thatcorresponds to the nature of the overall living organism that is madeup of these organs and is reflected in the corresponding formativeprinciple (IV 3.8.38–55).

The soul’s peculiar mode of life is also intertwined with time;the latter corresponds to, and is essentially produced by, thesuccession of individual psychic acts. The soul is by its natureforced to retrace the atemporal structure of the intelligible entitieson which it is focused in its “contemplation”, and to dealwith these one by one, since it is usually unable to comprehend themall together in their totality (V 1.4.17–20). This amounts to adistinctively discursive and distributive approach to intelligiblereality, even on the level of rational apprehension and elaboration ofthe relevant concepts, and it is a characteristic feature of psychiclife (V 1.4.18–20) as it apportions its activity in the contextof temporality, resulting in the birth of time itself, but also in theemergence of movement in the sensible realm (III 7.11.20–45; seeStrange 1994: 47–51).

Jointly, the souls comprise a unitary hypostasis, that is, theyrepresent a uniform mode of being, which is often described as“one and many” (hen kai polla) (IV2.2.39–42, IV 3.8.10–35, V 1.8.26). This means that, whilethey are many and different from each other, the souls are nonethelessinterconnected through relations of mutual kinship(sungeneia), which allow them to participate in commonexperiences (IV 9.3.1–9) without this compromising theindividuality of each. The question of how souls are individuated, ifwe discount their involvement in any manner of relation with thebodies they animate, preoccupied Plotinus in various phases of hiscareer. The solution he ultimately suggests consists in making thesoul’s individuality depend upon the peculiar perspective eachsoul possesses with respect to the way in which it contemplates theintelligible beings (IV 3.5.1–15, V 8.10.10–22; seeKalligas 1997: 222–6).

Various kinds of consciousness emerge in the context of the life ofthe soul, depending on the functional level that is activated in eachcase. This is because, although the soul, as a hypostasis, is extendedfrom the realm of intelligible beings all the way to the fringes ofcorporeality, the epicenter of its consciousness—that is, the“I” which is usually denoted through the pronoun“we” (hēmeis) (I 1.7.6–9,10.1–11)—is commonly located in the area of the“representational faculty” which is dubbedphantasia, and the focus of this can shift either in thedirection of the higher entities of the intelligible realm (VI5.7.1–8: cf. Schroeder 1987: 682–93; Remes 2007:111–24; 170–5; and Tornau 2009: 351–5), or towardcorporeal experiences (I 1.11.5–8, IV 3.30.15–16, V1.12.15, V 3.3.36–40). This involves a reorientation of itsattention (III 6.5.19–22, IV 8.3.21–30, 8.16–23),and it enables the soul to understand itself and the world throughdifferent perspectives (IV 6.3.7–8, IV 8.7.1–17; cf. Rist1983: 142–8), which is why Plotinus can describe the soul as“amphibious” (amphibios) (IV 8.4.31–35).This shift of perspective has an impact both on the soul’sepistemic apprehension of reality and on its moral attitude. Asalready mentioned, the soul’s connection to the body it animatesis not real, in the sense that the soul itself, qua supra-sensible andutterly incorporeal entity, does not “descend” nor entersits body, but merely imposes on it the vital functions that the bodyis capable of assuming. Therefore the soul does not directly partakeof the affections and all the other things the body incurs from theother sensible bodies (IV 4.19.26–27, 12.30–32, IV6.2.16–18, VI 1.19.46–48), but simply possesses theability to become aware of these affections (ΙΙΙ6.1.1–8, IV 3.26.1–9) and to attune its reactions tothem—if any—depending on its predispositions to these (seeHutchinson 2018: 75–99). Unconscious apprehensions, whether theyoriginate from the intelligible or the sensible realm, also play animportant role in psychic life; for these may influence the soul anddetermine its activity without ever becoming fully perceived (I4.10.6–21, IV 3.28, IV 4.8.8–34, 20.18–36,21.10–12, IV 8.8.3–13, V 1.12.5–15; cf. Hadot 1980:249–56; Chiaradonna 2012: sect. 3 and 4).

The various ways in which the soul can activate its powers alsodetermine the animation of different kinds of organisms. Each type oforganism, in fact, comes to be as a consequence of the activation of aspecific type of psychic function. These functions correspond to therelevant psychic powers that are being activated through thecorresponding formative principles (V 7.2.5–21). The so-calledreincarnation of the souls is nothing more than the consequence of themanner in which each soul activates its powers, where the ones thatremain inert may resurface in another phase of its career through time(I 1.11.9–15, III 3.4.33–43, III 4.2.16–30, IV3.24.6–21, IV 9.2.13–22, VI 4.16.13–21, VI7.6.21–7.8; cf. Hutchinson 2018: 63–6). Even the“guardian spirit” (eilēchōsdaimōn) that, according to traditional beliefs current atthe time, watches over the soul and stands by it, overseeing itscritical decisions, is but a mere representative of the higher psychicpowers, which belong to the level immediately above the one that isactivated in any given soul (III 4.3.3–8; cf. Coope 2020:170–71).

Each soul, depending on the abilities it possesses, can fulfill aspecific role in the universe, contributing in its own way to theprovidential arrangement of all things (III 2.17.32–85). Whenthe soul comprehends this overall design and harmoniously adjusts itsactivity within it, then it participates, in the fullest way possible,to the overall good ordering, avoiding at the same time theself-seeking pursuits that cause it to divert from the purpose of itspresence in the world (IV 8.4.12–30), namely to render it morewell-regulated and beautiful, a worthy image of its intelligiblemodel.

In general, there is a tendency in Plotinus’ philosophy todisplay the natural world as a sphere for the soul’s activity;the world is an as-good-as-it-can-possibly-become imitation of themodel of the “perfect organism”—a view familiar tous from the cosmogony of theTimaeus (30d1–b3)—,which is distinguished by superb intelligible beauty (III2.2.1–3.13). This view brought Plotinus into directconfrontation with the views of his contemporary Gnostics, who heldthat the sensible world is the work of a foolish or even malevolentcreator (II 9.4.2–26), a place where the souls, created byanother, supreme and benevolent but also “unknown” God,are exiled. According to the Gnostics, human souls are at odds andconstantly in conflict with the cosmic forces, seeking to get rid ofthe fetters imposed on them when they became tied to their bodies (II9.5.8–16). Plotinus vigorously resisted this extremely dualisticand radically anti-cosmic vision of the world, consistently upholdingthe goodness and beauty of perceptible reality: its imperfectionsmust, in his view, be ascribed to the ramifications of its inescapablemateriality, from which, in fact, all forms of badness stem. Morespecifically, matter is the primary cause for the existence of evil inthe world, precisely because its nature consists in a completeprivation of any eidetic characteristic (I 8.11.1–4; seeEmilsson 2019: 84–88), a privation which makes it radicallydevoid of any trace of goodness. Nonetheless, in and of itself,qua nonbeing (I 8.3.3–7, 5.9–13), matter lacksthe potency to act as an autonomous causal factor, merely constitutingthe necessary objective precondition for the appearance of evil,chiefly in the form of wickedness in the soul (I 8.4.5–25,14.1–50, 15.13–21). Wickedness occurs when the soul isdiverted from its innate pursuit of goodness because it becomesdisoriented by the reflections of the Good appearing on matter (Ι1.9.4–8). These cause it to be carried away to aspiring afterthings that possess but a mere semblance of beauty and goodness. Bybecoming aware of the real nature of things, but also of its own truenature through philosophy, the soul is released from the illusionsengendered in it by matter (ΙΙΙ 6.2.22–41).Liberated from its engagement with corporeality and the associatedaffections, it can ultimately turn to the pursuit of the true Good inthe supra-sensible realm (V 1.1.8–29). Its consequent aiming atcontemplation has an impact even on the way it acts on the practicallevel. Indeed, practical action itself is caused by the soul’sinnate desire for contemplation, and it takes place when the soul isdistracted or misguided due to its feebleness and its inability tofocus completely on the proper objects of its contemplative activity,namely the intelligible realities (III 8.1.15–18, 4.31–47,6.1–14; cf. Wilberding 2008: 375–83; Coope 2020:188–90).

Naturally, humans occupy a central place among living beings, and allpsychic functions become fully manifest in them. In the case of ahuman being, the soul, as a self-contained principle(ΙΙΙ 1.8.4–10), is capable to activate by its ownvolition all of its powers, ranging from the lower ones, whichcorrespond to the “vegetative” functions of nutrition,growth, and reproduction, and the purely “vital” ones ofsensation motility and representational “imagination”(phantasia) (ΙΙΙ 6.4.18–23, IV3.30.1–13), to the higher ones, which pertain to humans only(but maybe also to the superhuman demonic and divine entities), thoseof discursive reasoning and intellection (VI 7.5.11–30). The“real man” is certainly something different from thecompound “living being”, which, as we have seen, is formedwhen the image of an individual soul is projected on an organic bodythereby animating it (VI 7.4.2–33). The “livingbeing” is produced by the eidetic cause, that is, the psychicconstituent to which the living organism owes its life, and whichotherwise transcends it (VI 7.5.2–8). This psychic constituentbrings us into contact with the even higher realm of the intelligiblebeings, affording us the ability to transcend the normal humancondition so as to become something truly divine (IV8.1.1–11).

To become truly divine, we need to develop not only epistemically butalso ethically. In this context we can appreciate how importantethical living is if people are to find their proper orientation inthe world. Plotinus classifies the basic virtues along a hierarchicalladder, with the so-called “political” virtues, whichpertain to the regulation and management of the soul’s lowerimpulses, those connected with the body, occupying the lowest step.“Cathartic” virtues are placed one step higher: throughthese, the soul becomes entirely free of its solicitude for the body(I 6.5.54–58, IV 7.10.40–52); on the third step we findthe “theoretical” virtues, which are connected with thesoul’s dedication to the intelligible truths. Finally, thehighest virtues, the “paradigmatic” ones, are theintelligible models, on the basis of which a human being’soverall ethical life is regulated—in other words, theintelligible Forms of virtues such as Justice, Temperance and the rest(I 2.2.13–6.19; see Tuominen 2022: 367–70). By conformingto these models through intellective contemplation, a human beingcomes to resemble God (I 2.6.2–27), thereby becoming trulyself-willed and self-ruled (VI 8.5.20–37). In so doing, onegains his or her “well-being” (eudaimonia), thesupreme and unshakable psychic state in which, through the fullactivation of intellective life (Ι 4.3.18–4.2), one comesto possess the intelligible truths as a part of oneself (VI8.5.30–37). This is the ultimate aspiration of all humanrational efforts, and it results in a kind of serene, eminentlyblissful state (Ι 6.4.12–22).

5. Second Digression: The fundamental principles of Plotinus’ Metaphysics

At this point, and before moving on to the presentation of the higherlevels of Plotinus’ philosophical system, we should summarilyset out some of the fundamental principles that govern thearticulation of his overall theoretical edifice, and are therebyimparting to it a notable unity and logical coherence. Although notall such principles are clearly expounded in his work, nonethelessthey can be gleaned from specific passages, references to which willbe provided in what follows. I will attempt to demonstrate that theyrest on a common logical underpinning, which connects them to oneanother but also to a number of complementary positions. Thesepositions are supported in various places of theEnneads, andthey reveal the importance of these principles and their implications.They are subdivided into fundamental (FP) and supplementary principles(SP): the former certainly hold greater significance in terms of theirtheoretical implications, yet the latter group also occupies animportant place in the structure of the overall system.

FP1: First we need to mention the “Principle ofthe (logical) Priority of the Simple vis-à-vis theMultiple”. According to this principle, what is ontologically(and explanatorily) prior is always simpler than what originates from,or depends causally on, it (V 3.12.9–10, 16.5–16, V4.1.5–15, V 6.3.21–22, V 9.8.12–14). This principleentails that any multiplicity presupposes and involves elements, eachof which may be considered something simple (V 6.3.1–25). Inother words, if anything multiple is to be obtained, it is necessarythat it be made up of constituent parts, each of which is one anddistinct from the rest. This means that every multiplicity presupposesthe existence of things that are, individually, simple and unitary;the collection of all these produces multiplicity. Furthermore, thecongregation of a multiplicity of things also presupposes theexistence of a single criterion of choice, on the basis of which thesethings can be set apart from each other and from everything else, andthis must be something that is unitary and applicable to all of them.For, each thing, whether sensible or intelligible, presupposes somekind of unity that constitutes it into what it is, even if the degreesof unity fulfilling this constitutive role may vary between them,provided this does not cancel its fundamentally unifying function (VI6.1.4–7, VI 9.1.1–17). Thus, for all these reasons, unityshould be regarded as logically, and thereby ontologically, prior tomultiplicity. This fact is emblematically reflected in the system ofthe so-called three “hypostases” as distinct modes ofbeing, which comprise the main axis around which Plotinus ontology isarticulated as a hierarchical structure (see O’Meara 1996:71–79). Because each of these hypostases depends on the priorone, and represents a further gradient along a scale of ever decliningunity: starting from the absolutely simple (and thus ineffable) One (V3.16.10–16, VI 9.3.1–6), we move to the Intellect, wherethe interconnected unity of the beings that comprise it entails theinherence of the whole in each of its parts (V 8.4.6–8, VI2.20.16–23). Subsequently we encounter the level of the soul,where its various parts are connected to each other throughindissoluble relations of “affinity” (sumpatheia)and interdependence (IV 4.40.1–6). Finally, matter, being theultimate and most distant product of psychic activity, ischaracterized by the extreme multifariousness of the utterly shapeless“unlimitedness” (apeiria) (II4.15.16–37).

FP2: The second principle can be dubbed the“Principle of the Procreative Power of the Perfect”.According to it, whatever is perfect manifests its perfection by wayof an activity, through which it becomes complete as what it is. Theline of thought behind this principle appears to be the view that eachthing has a fundamental activity, and this activity is a manifestationof what that thing truly is (V 4.2.27–9). This means each thingis distinguished by an activity it exercises which is the veryexpression of its perfection and around which it articulates itsidentity: vision, for example, is the activity to which the eye owesits being what it is and its identity is determined by it.Consequently, this activity may be regarded as the directmanifestation of a thing’s “essence”, but also as“internal” and self-constituting, insofar as without itthe thing would not be what it is.

FP3: But, according to Plotinus, this primaryinternal activity is always accompanied by another, secondary and“external” activity, which depends on it but is directedtoward the outside of the thing that caused it, thereby impactingother things (V 1.6.38–39). Thus we have what is usuallydescribed as “the Theory of the Two Activities”, whichconstitutes the cornerstone of the so-called process of“emanation”, that is, the process by which the principlesof reality other than the first one come to be constituted (II9.8.21–26, IV 5.7.13–23). A characteristic feature of thesecondary activity is that it is derived from the primary one, andhence cannot exist without it (V 1.6.38). Nonetheless, it is somethingdistinct from, and therefore different from, it (IV 5.7.1–13, V4.2.30), as its presence or lack thereof in no way affects the primaryactivity, which continues to be what it is, irrespective of whether itbrings about any consequences for other things. In this manner aconception of difference is introduced that is“hierarchical” or “vertical”, given that itcharacterizes the effect’s relation of dependence on the alreadycomplete and perfect cause, but not vice versa. The secondary activityis like an image that is distinct and therefore“different” from its model, yet dependent on it (V1.7.1–5, V 8.12.20), whereas the model is not determined as whatit is on account of its otherness in respect to the image. The idea ofa secondary activity probably originated, at least partially, fromAristotle’s theory of procreation, and more specifically fromthe thesis that a perfectly developed organism has the ability toproduce offspring, with its progeny being in turn able to grow so asto approximate the original perfection of their progenitor (for analternative option, see Lloyd 1990: 98–100). Plotinus, though,habitually illustrates the relevant theory employing the example offire and the heat that it emits (I 2.1.31–36, IV3.10.30–34, V 1.3.10–12, V 3.7.21–25): while heat,qua primary “internal” activity, inheres in fire as itsessential feature (insofar as nothing can be fire unless it is hot),there is also another kind of heat, different from the former, which,qua secondary activity, is emitted by, or “flowsout” of, fire, heating the things that surround it, andimparting on these, incidentally this time, the property of becominghot (V 4.2.27–33). This second form of activity is evidentlydependent on the former, and it disappears as soon as that one ceasesto be. See further Emilsson 2017: 48–57; Kalligas 2012:51–61.

FP4: The fact that perfect activation brings aboutthe exhaustive manifestation of all existing possibilities brings usto another fundamental principle, which became known in the history ofideas as the “Principle of Plenitude”. According to this,any possibility, so long as it is real, cannot remain perenniallyunfulfilled. For, if it were never fulfilled, this would mean that itwas not a real possibility from the outset (II 9.13.3–6, IV8.6.1–18). This, of course, pertains chiefly to sensible thingsthat are subject to becoming, but it also appliesa fortiorito intelligible beings (II 5.1.7–10, VI 2.21.49–53). Thisis because a possibility that cannot be fulfilled, even if only intheory, certainly does not constitute a real possibility. In thismanner causal relations are established that connect, among others,all the three fundamental “hypostases” mentionedpreviously, which thus represent a series of successive causes; theseare all reducible to and draw their procreative power from theinexhaustible dynamism of the supreme First Principle (III2.2.10–12, III 8.10.1–5, V 1.7.9–22, V3.15.17–33, VI 5.12.1–7, VI 9.6.6–12). Of course,these relations are invariably unidirectional, as suggested bySP2, which is laid out in what follows.

SP1: A basic supplementary principle is that of the“Undiminishing Procreative Power”, according to which thesecondary activity produced on the basis ofFP3 will not cause the primary activity nor the substance to which itbelongs to become diminished in any way (seeSP2). This principle is often expressed with the termmenein ormonē (“abiding”), which denotes that inthese cases the procreative cause will remain utterly immutable andunaffected by what follows (V 2.2.1–3, V 4.2.19–26).

SP2: Another supplementary principle, one alsodirectly correlated withFP3, can be dubbed “the Principle of the Predominance of the(metaphysical) Cause”. According to it, anything that isproduced in line with FP3 will necessarily be less“perfect” than what produces it, insofar as it isdependent on it (V 1.6.37–39, V 4.1.40–2.3, V5.13.37–38). As a result, we have a gradual“degradation” of entities from the more to the lessperfect (I 8.7.18–19). This process occurs continuously, withoutany intervening “leaps” from the superior to the inferiorlevels (V 1.6.48–49); in this way, all of these ontologicallevels are connected to one another in an uninterrupted succession ofcauses and effects.

SP3: Finally, a further supplementary principledetermines the formation of each lower hypostasis in two distinctphases (III 4.1). In the first phase, that of “advance”(proodos), the secondary activity that is produced remainsshapeless and indeterminate, constituting a simple otherness, in the“vertical” sense of the term, with respect to its sourceof origin. In the second phase, that of “return”(epistrophē), this activity reverts to its source and isthereby articulated, shaped, and perfected, acquiring specific content(cf.FP2). The resulting perfection leads to the formation of a new hypostasis,which in turn acquires procreative power by virtue ofFP3 (V 1.6.50).

6. The Hypostasis of the Intellect

Broadly speaking, according to Plotinus the hypostasis of Intellectoccupies the domain where the intelligible Forms are established, inother words the entirety of intelligible Essence (ΙΙ6.1.1–8). These Forms, however, although autonomous andabsolutely determined in terms of their content, are not inertabstract entities (V 5.1.41–50), but active intellects in astate of full activation (cf.FP2). This activation allows them to be interconnected forming anorganically structured system of interrelated and mutuallyinterdependent truths (III 2.1.26–34, V 5.1.41–58,2.1–13, V 8.3.30–4.27). Dialectic is the science thatexamines the structure of this system so as to afford a completeunderstanding of the whole intelligible realm (Ι 3.4.1–17).Analysis of each of the beings that are included there reveals anetwork of interconnections (Ι 3.5.9–21), and Plotinusclaims that the unity holding them together is such that each of themcontains, potentially (dunamei), all the rest, and at thesame time it is present, in some manner, in all the others, jointlycomprising with them a multiple unity, or “one-many”(hen polla) (V 5.3.1–4, VI 5.9.31–40, VI7.14.11–18). To elucidate this peculiar mereology of thecontents of the Intellect, Plotinus resorts to the example of atheoretical, purely deductive science such as geometry (V9.6.1–10, VI 2.20.1–24, VI 9.5.18–20; cf. Tornau1998: 98–109). In geometry, every theorem, although in actualityfully individualized and identifiable, “contains”potentially in some manner all other theorems by virtue of relationsof indissoluble logical coherence (V 9.6.1–10, 8.1–7, VI2.20.10–23), that is, through the proof that establishes itstruth and the links that correlate it with all the other theorems ofthat science, insofar as these are presupposed by it or are derivedfrom its principles. In an analogous way, every intelligible Form haswithin itself, potentially, all other Forms (VΙ2.20.16–21.10).

Each of the Forms comprising the intelligible realm is a being,insofar as it is a stable and immutable entity; a living being, quapart of an organic and active whole; and a wakeful intellect, whichthrough its unitary and atemporal activation grasps at once thetotality of all other intellects with which it is correlated therebyachieving complete self-intellection. Therefore it constitutes acharacteristic feature of Plotinian ontology (probably arising fromthe influence of the corresponding Aristotelian theory; see Menn 2001:233–6) that Intellect encompasses the intelligible beings thatare the objects of its intellection, and that it does not come after,nor does it precede these, but is fully identified with them (V1.4.26–33, V 3.5.26–28, V 5.2.13–20, V 9.5.7,26–32). And that is why the Intellect does not intellectuallycognize by seeking after some object or other, but by alreadypossessing the objects of its intellection (V 1.4.16, V3.9.27–28, V 9.5.12–16; see O’Meara 2000:243–7). This means that the activation of its intellectionconstitutes for the Intellect perfect self-intellection (V3.5.28–48, 7.18–22, V 9.5.1–11), such that there isno room for any possibility of misunderstanding or error. Thedirectness of—every—intellect’s relation to itsintellection ensures the truth of all of its thoughts, which, as wasstated earlier, constitute a network of interconnected theorems. Onthe other hand, the very directness of the intellect’sinterconnection with the totality of the intelligible objects, towhich its activity is directed, precludes the mediation of discursivethought. As we have seen, this thought consists in a succession ofdistinct acts, and it is a characteristic not of Intellect but of thesoul (ΙΙΙ 8.6.21–26). The implication of this isthat the intellective apprehension of the intelligible truths isaccomplished “all at once”, in the context of a unitaryact (ΙΙΙ 8.8.8–30), and that this apprehensioncompletely bypasses the differentiations that characterize thediscursive grasp of their meanings as expressed when they arepropositionally articulated. Therefore this apprehension does notinvolve any propositional determinations or entailments (Ι3.5.1–18, IV 9.5.12–23) but is rather the jointapprehension of the already intertwined intelligible objects, in otherwords a complex network of truths combined in a unitary intellectiveact. It is similar to how vision is able to perceive at once acomposite object, such as a face, even before analyzing it into itsindividual constituent components (V 8.4.4–11). Intellectiondoes not distinguish between a truth’s content and its cause(the “why”), given that both necessarily coexist in theunitary apprehension and comprehension of that truth (VI7.2.3–12, 9.17–21). It is only on the lower psychic levelof “reasoning” (dianoia) that these truths may beexpressed as distinct propositions and theorems, where the overallcomprehensive contemplation is analyzed discursively intopropositional formulations (V 8.6.9–15). Even the language ofmyths can be employed to present the holistic synchronic structure ofthe intelligible in the form of temporally discrete episodes (III5.9.24–29, III 7.6.21–26, V 1.4.26–33,6.19–22, VI 7.35.27–32). It is in this sense that the lifeof the soul can be regarded as an “image” or reflection ofintellective life (V 1.3.6–12).

The basic categories that govern the formation of the complex unity ofIntellect are identified by Plotinus with the five “greatestgenera” (megista genē) originally introduced inPlato’sSophist (II 6.1.1–8, V 1.4.34–43, V9.10.10–14. VI 2.8.25–46, VI 7.13.17–34). These areBeing—which determines each Form as what it is in itself, butalso as the cause of being for everything that participates init—Motion—which corresponds to Being’s processionfrom the first Principle, but also to its active coexistence with theother Forms—Rest—which expresses stillness, that is, theabiding of each being in what it is so that it always corresponds toits definition—(V 1.7.25–26, VI 2.7.26–45); and,finally, Sameness and Difference—through which each Form iscorrelated with the rest so that, in combination with them, it createsa network of ordered genera and species (III 7.3.8–11, VI2.8.25–49). These greatest genera coexist jointly in each of theForms of the intelligible realm, and they are thereby its constituentbuilding blocks. On the other hand, the arrangement of the Formsinside the intelligible realm is further determined by the arrangementof eidetic numbers (V 1.5.6–17, V 5.5.7–19). Theseprescribe the positions the Forms are called on to occupy within theoverall network of entities that comprise the “Perfect LivingOrganism” (VI 6.9.23–37), that is, the intelligible modelon the basis of which the Demiurge, i.e., Intellect as an activecontemplative entity, fashions the sensible universe (V9.9.3–8). The “being” of each intelligible entityforms part of an arithmetically ordered structure (VI 6.3.2,17.23–32).

The Intellect and its objects,qua contemplating subject andcontemplated object, respectively, although inseparably linked to eachother, are functionally discrete (V 1.4.26–34, V3.10.9–16, V 4.2.9–12, V 6.1.7–23, VI9.2.36–37), thus creating space for the appearance of amultitude of intelligible entities. Yet it is precisely this inherentduality of the Intellectqua hypostasis that renders itunsuitable for the role of the first principle of everything. Becausesuch a principle ought to be utterly unitary, inasmuch as anymultiplicity must, of logical necessity, be posterior to somethingsimpler and more unitary (seeFP1). This means that the first principle will have to be something thatalso transcends Intellect (VI 9.6.42–54) and its correlatedintelligible Essence. Intellect, then, results from the power ofsomething that comes before it and is more unitary than it. Theatemporal process through which this production is accomplished iscomplex, however, and it involves different stages that, among otherthings, determine the dynamic nature of the Intellect. During thefirst stage, the first principle gives rise to something, whose onlydefining characteristic is its otherness to this principle (cf.FP3). In other words, it gives rise to something that is fundamentallynon-One, something that lacks any element of unity. Something of thiskind cannot but be utterly shapeless and unarticulated, given thateach shape or articulation is governed by some manner of unity. Thisis why this early stage, from which the Intellect is to result, issometimes called “intelligible matter” (ΙΙ4.4.2–11), so as to emphasize, by analogy with the matter ofbodies, its complete formlessness. At the same time, however, thisintelligible matter owes its emergence to its othernessvis-à-vis the first principle, hence it is dependent on it asan activity that is “produced” by it (seeSP2). Nonetheless, because in the primordial One—which, as we willsee, is the first principle—there can be no“internal” activity, insofar as no distinction between“essence” and “activity” can obtain in it(Ι 7.1.15–20, V 6.6.1–11), this derivative and“external” activity is the “first” activitythat appears after it, as an effulgence of its inexhaustible dynamism(cf.FP4) (see I 8.2.21, III 9.9.7–12, V 1.6.28–30, V 3.5.35,12.27–41, 15.6, V 5.5.19–23, VI 7.18.12, 40.20–30).It thereby constitutes an activity not of the Good, but arising fromthe Good (ek tagathoū) (VI 7.21.5). The undifferentiatednature of this activity causes it to be bereft of specific content,which is why it is described as “unformed sight” and“unlimited life” (V 3.11.12, V 4.2.6, VI7.17.13–15). However, this activity possesses an innatepropensity for reversion to its origin (cf.SP3), and for this reason it is dubbed “only desire” (V3.11.12), which, however, is accompanied by a still convolutedprefiguration of the possibilities contained in it (V3.11.1–10).

In the second stage of the Intellect’s formation, its activitycan be analyzed into further constituents: the stability of theIntellect’s persistence in what constitutes it as Being(stasis ormonē; cf.SP1), and the abovementioned propensity for reversion to its origin(epistrophē) (V 5.5.17–19), which culminates in a“contemplative beholding” (horasis ortheōria) of that origin (III 8.11.1–2, V1.7.5–6, V 2.1.9–12, V 3.11.9–12). Since theIntellect is unable to apprehend what it beholds in its absoluteunity, what it contemplates is ultimately analyzed into a multitude ofinterconnected truths that are identified with the beings Intellectitself encompasses (V 1.5.18–19, V 3.11.1–16, VI7.15.18–22, 16.19–17.36). Thus, through its activation,Intellect becomes fully what it is: a perfectly active Intellectconstituted as a multifarious unity. And in that sense it can beregarded as self-subsistent, meaning that it makes itself perfect aswhat it is (V 1.7.11–17).

This self-constituting activity of the Intellect is also called Life(V 6.5.16–19, V 8.4.36–48, VI 2.21.24–37), and issometimes identified with what Plotinus calls “eternity”(III 7.2–6), in order to emphasize its atemporality, that is,the fact that its parts are always jointly present (V 1.4.21–25,V 9.10.9–11), whereas the supreme One is prior even to eternity(VI 8.20.24–25). Life, then, qua activation of the Intellect, isidentified with it, so that Intellect and its activity can togethercomprise one and the same Being (V 3.6.5–7, 31–35).

7. The First Principle of Everything: the One, or the Good

The extreme transcendence of the First Principle in respect toeverything entails a series of very challenging problems with whichPlotinus repeatedly grapples in various parts of his work, each timeattempting to approach them from a slightly different perspective. Indoing so, he has bequeathed us an exciting testimony of hisunremitting philosophical reckoning with the question of the limits ofintellection and of the verbal formulation of our thoughts (V3.13.1–12, 14.1–19, V 5.6.23–34, VI 7.38.1–9,VI 8.8.12–21, 13.1–11, VI 9.3.49–54, 5.38–40;see O’Meara 1990: 147–52).

As we have seen, on the basis ofFP1, every cause must be simpler than its effect, otherwise it wouldforfeit its explanatory function. The reason for this is that a causethat is more complex than the effect it brings about would fail toaccount for that effect, for it would lead to even greatercompositeness and complexity. A result of this line of reasoning isthat the First Principle has to be utterly uncompounded, that is, theabsolute One (V 1.8.25–6, V 3.15.26–16.5). The absoluteunity that characterizes the first principle of everything, though,renders it inaccessible to our normal intellective or ratiocinativepowers, hence any reference to it will necessarily be couched inmetaphors, similes, and other such catachrestic modes ofexpression.

The first question that arises is why should anything emerge from thefirst principle: could it not remain perpetually and entirely secludedin itself? Plotinus’s response is that the first principle hassuch unlimited power that it would be impossible for it (on the basisofFP4, mentioned in the Second Digression) to not “express”itself as some kind of “outflow” in the incessant activitythat originates from it (V 2.1.7–9); yet this effluence alsoconstantly seeks (on the basis ofFP3) to revert to its origin. This original Otherness has thecharacteristics of an utterly shapeless and unarticulatedmultiplicity, yet one whose reversion to the One gradually imparts onit elements of unity, echoes of the original unity of the One.Eventually, these echoes articulate it into a whole of interconnectedparts, thus comprising the hypostasis of the Intellect. It is clear,however, that if anything outside the first principle is to exist, itwill have to be something other than the One, and therefore non-One,which means something intrinsically multiple. Hence, the Intellect isconstituted as a “multiple unity” (hen polla) (V1.8.26, V 3.15.22, VI 2.15.14, VI 6.13.52–53, VI7.14.11–12), which allows for the further diffusion of theinexhaustible dynamism of the One through its organizedstructures.

According to Plotinus, the absolute unity of the primordial One alsoentails its complete self-sufficiency because it makes it such as tobe lacking in nothing (II 9.1.19, III 8.11.15–16, V 3.13.17, V4.1.12, V 5.12.40–44, V 6.4.1–2). It follows that, onaccount of this self-sufficiency, there is no other good for the One;in other words, there is nothing outside itself that it seeks after(VI 8.7.38–46, VI 9.6.24–27). In contrast, the Oneconstitutes the object of the striving of all other things (Ι7.1.4–10). The One, then, is what is good for everything whichis other than itself, by already encompassing everything that is good.This entails, however, that the One is identified with the absoluteGood (VI 9.6.12–20). We thus arrive at the identification of theabsolute One as the logical origin of everything with the Onedescribed in the First Hypothesis of Plato’sParmenides, and with the Form of the Good introduced in thesixth book of theRepublic as what is “beyondbeing”. The One is the supreme ontological principle, whichgrants to all intelligible entities their being and renders themknowable (I 7.1.19–20, III 8.9.2, 10.2–3, V 1.8.7–8,V 3.11.28, 12.47–48, V 4.2.2–3, V 5.6.11, V 6.6.30, V8.1.3–4, VI 7.17.10–11, 37.23–24, VI8.9.27–28, 16.34–36), while also being a universalproductive power (III 8.10.1–14), which is radically differentfrom the things that arise from it (III 8.9.39–54, V2.1.1–2, V 3.11.14–21, 13.2–3, V 4.2.31–43, V5.13.33–36). However, whereas each being is something specificand distinct from the rest, the One is nothing specific, constitutingsolely and simply the prerequisite for the existence of everythingelse (V 3.12.47–52, V 5.6.1–15).

In light of the role the One has in it, Plotinus’ ontologicalsystem can be described as utterly monistic, but also as“productive”, because everything originates from a singleand absolutely unitary first principle which does not depend on, norpresupposes, anything outside itself, but is, in and of itself,“the (productive) power of all things” (dunamispantōn) (III 8.10.1, V 1.7.9–10, V 3.15.32–35, V4.1.36, 2.38, V 5.10.10–22, VI 8.1.10–11), and cause evenof itself (VI 8. 14.41–42). One implication of this is thenecessity of what results from it (on the basis ofFP3 andFP4), and at the same time its total freedom, inasmuch as theprinciple’s activity is not limited by anything external to it,being determined solely by its nature as the primal Good. In fact,Plotinus goes so far as to identify the first Principle with its owncompletely unfettered “will” (boulēsis) (VI8.21.12–16; cf. Coope 2020: 88–94).

One way to discursively approach the One is to provide arguments forits totally unitary and simple nature by relying precisely on its roleas the absolutely primordial first Principle. As the cause ofeverything (V 5.13.35–36, VI 9.6.55) it must be prior(ontologically, not temporally) to the things that result from it (onthe basis ofFP1), in such a way that its presence can justify the realization of anygiven outcome. It follows that everything ought to be“other”, that is, all things must differ from it (on thebasis ofFP3), so that they may result from it. This leads us to the negativeconception of this first Principle as that which is different from allthe things that derive their being from it, which means different fromeverything (III 8.9.48–54, V 1.7.19, V 3.11.18, V4.1.5–6). Since all predicates refer to beings, that is, tothings that “are” something, in one way or another, nopredicate can be accurately attributed to it, insofar as it transcendseverything (V 3.31.2, V 4.2.39–40, V 5.13.20–32).

To conclude, then, although direct intellective apprehension of thefirst principle is impossible, reason is in a position to devisetechniques through which it can manage to approach, to a certaindegree, its unfathomable nature (VI 7.36.6–8). In parallel,through “cathartic” practices, humans can develop (I3.17.37–38, VI 7.34.1–4, VI 9.3.14–27,9.50–60) abilities that allow a complete, experiential“union” or “contact” with it (V3.10.42–44, 17.25–28, VI 7.34.8–21,36.8–21).

8. Conclusion

We need to keep in mind that any attempt, such as this, that seeks topresent Plotinus’ philosophical system by reference to ahierarchical arrangement of the various modes of “being”,viz. to the so-called “hypostases”, and to the peculiarkind of unity that informs each of these, runs the risk of overlookingthe dynamic character of the whole. For we ought to keep in mind thatthe different ontological levels are held together by a dual tendencythat emerges in each of them, a tendency that connects them with thosethat precede and those that come after them. In fact, at eachontological level we can observe a tendency of“procession” (proodos), or decline towards thelower hypostasis (through the implementation ofFP3 andSP2), but also a countervailing aspiration of reversion and“ascent” towards the higher one (cf.SP3), through which a given hypostasis is constituted and ultimatelypreserved, or “abides” in what it is (cf.SP1). These three stages of “abiding”,“procession”, and “reversion” comprise adialectical schema that runs through Plotinus’ entire system,endowing it with remarkable cohesiveness and consistency (see Hadot1960). Thus, the “hypostasis” of the soul, for instance,is derived from the secondary activity of the Intellect’saction, while at the same time it realizes itself as the sort ofentity it is on account of its tendency to re-ascend to Intellectthrough its contemplation. This contemplative activity is what impartsto this hypostasis the characteristic kind of discursive unity thatdistinguishes it. The soul, in turn, besides engaging in thisself-constituting activity, manifests its solicitude for what liesbeneath it in the form of its secondary activity. This secondaryactivity results in the production of an “image” of thesoul, which brings it into contact with corporeality and ultimately“produces” matter itself (ΙΙΙ4.1.5–17, ΙΙΙ 9.3.7–13; on this point, seeO’Brien 1991). Finally, a further expression of the dynamiccharacter of this hypostasis is “love”(erōs). The soul’s unremitting dedication, as wellas that of all other ontological gradients, is expressed through itslove which is directly focused on the supreme principle, i.e., theGood (ΙΙΙ 5.4.18–25, V 5.12.7–44). Thuslove constitutes the main motive for the re-ascent to the Good through“reversion”. This is because, apart from the soul, whosepursuit is motivated by Beauty (Ι 6.9.34–43, V8.3.1–10, VI 7.32.1–10, 25–39; see Armstrong 1975:159–62), even Intellect itself tends to elevate itself to theGood by transcending itself and thereby entering a state of inspired“inebriation” (V 1.6.50–53, VI 7.35.19–27; seeO’Meara 2022, 120–1). Therefore love is elevated to thestatus of a universal tendency of all things that has as its objectthe Good in itself, within whose perspective everything is coordinatedand conjoined, in imitation of its transcendent unity.

In this way Plotinus’ philosophy is revealed as a comprehensiveconception of reality as a whole, grounded on certain fundamentalfirst principles. It develops into a rather sophisticated system ofinterrelated conclusions that jointly attempt to account for theappearance and constitution of all the different phenomena thatcomprise the world that surrounds us. It furthermore seeks toprescribe the basic directions along which human life may be organizedso as to become more consonant with our truest and at the same timemost intimate aspirations.

Bibliography

A. Primary Literature

The standard critical edition of Plotinus’ works is:PlotiniOpera, 3 volumes, Greek text edited by Paul Henry and Hans-RudolfSchwyzer, Oxford 1964–82 (editio minor). Theeditiomaior (Bruxelles & Paris: L’Édition Universelle& Desclée de Brouwer 1951–73) provides a full accountof the primary manuscript readings.

English translation with Greek facing text:Plotinus, 7volumes, by A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library,1968–88.

The most recent English translation with no Greek facing text:Plotinus. The Enneads, translated by George Boys-Stones, JohnM. Dillon, Lloyd P. Gerson, R. A. King, Andrew Smith and JamesWilberding, general editor Lloyd P. Gerson, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2018.

A recent French translation with useful notes:Plotin.Traités, 9 volumes, by Luc Brisson and J.-F.Pradéau et al., Paris: Flammarion, 2002–2020.

On Porphyry’sLife of Plotinus see the two-volumecollection of essays edited by L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé,R. Goulet, D. O’Brien et al.,Porphyre: La Vie dePlotin, Paris: J. Vrin, 1982–1992.

There is an increasing number of Translations including Introductionsand Commentaries on separate treatises of theEnneads:

• A French collection of such volumes, following the chronologicalorder of the treatises, was started in 1988 under the direction ofPierre Hadot:Les écrits de Plotin, Paris: Leseditions du Cerf; it was continued after 2016 by the Librairiephilosophique J. Vrin under the direction of Dominic O’Meara,Gwenaëlle Aubry, Anne-Lise Darras-Worms and FrançoisBalaudé. 18 volumes have appeared until now.
• An English collection named “TheEnneads ofPlotinus with Philosophical Commentaries”, comprising separatetreatment of individual treatises, has been undertaken since 2012 byParmenides Publishing, Las Vegas and Zurich, under the direction ofJohn M. Dillon and Andrew Smith. 15 volumes are available so far.
• A new Budé edition of Plotinus’ works has begun toappear in 2017 under the direction of L. Ferroni and J.-M. Narbonne,with two volumes available so far:Plotin, Œuvrescomplètes, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

See further:

• Atkinson, Michael, 1983,Plotinus, Ennead V. 1: On the ThreePrincipal Hypostases: A Commentary with Translation (OxfordClassical and Philosophical Monographs), New York: Oxford UniversityPress.
• Fleet, Barrie (trans.), 1995,Plotinus Ennead III.6: On theImpassivity of the Bodiless, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Helleman-Elgersma, Wypkje, 1980,Soul-Sisters: A Commentary onEnneads IV 3 (27), 1–8 of Plotinus (Elementa 15),Amsterdam: Rodopi.
• McGroarty, Kieran, 2006,Plotinus on Eudaimonia: A Commentaryon Ennead I.4, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287123.001.0001
• Meijer, P. A., 1992,Plotinus on the Good or the One (EnneadsVI, 9): An Analytical Commentary (Amsterdam Classical Monographs1), Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben.
• Tornau, Christian, 1998,Plotin, Enneaden VI 4-5 (22-23): EinKommentar, Stuttgart: Teubner.
• Wilberding, James, 2006,Plotinus’ Cosmology: A Study ofEnnead II.1 (40): Text, Translation, and Commentary, Oxford/NewYork: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/oso/9780199277261.001.0001

B. Secondary Literature

B.1 General

• Armstrong, A. H., 1967, “Plotinus”, inTheCambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy,A. H. Armstrong (ed.), London: Cambridge University Press,195–268.
• Bertozzi, Alberto, 2021,Plotinus on Love: An Introduction toHis Metaphysics through the Concept of Eros (PhilosophiaAntiqua : A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy 155),Leiden/Boston: Brill.
• Blumenthal, H. J., 1971,Plotinus’ Psychology: HisDoctrines of the Embodied Soul, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Bussanich, John, 1988,The One and Its Relation to Intellectin Plotinus: A Commentary on Selected Texts (Philosophia Antiqua,49), Leiden/New York: E.J. Brill.
• Caluori, Damian, 2015,Plotinus on the Soul, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316226681
• Chiaradonna, Riccardo, 2002,Sostanza, movimento, analogia:Plotino critico di Aristotele (Elenchos 37), Napoli:Bibliopolis.
• ––– (ed.), 2005,Studi sull’anima inPlotino (Elenchos 42), Napoli: Bibliopolis.
• Collette-Dučić, Bernard, 2007,Plotin etl’ordonnancement de l’être: étude sur lesfondements et les limites de la“détermination” (Histoire des doctrines del’Antiquité classique 36), Paris: Vrin.
• Coope, Ursula, 2020,Freedom and Responsibility inNeoplatonist Thought, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/oso/9780198824831.001.0001
• Emilsson, Eyjólfur Kjalar, 1988,Plotinus onSense-Perception: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/New York:Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511720017
• –––, 2007,Plotinus on Intellect,Oxford: Clarendon Press.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281701.001.0001
• –––, 2017,Plotinus, New York:Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203413159
• Gerson, Lloyd P., 1994,Plotinus (Arguments of thePhilosophers), London/New York: Routledge.
• ––– (ed.), 1996,TheCambridge Companion to Plotinus, Cambridge/New York: CambridgeUniversity Press. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521470935
• Gerson, Lloyd P. and James Wilberding (eds), 2022,The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge Companionsto Philosophy), Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/9781108770255
• Graeser, Andreas, 1972,Plotinus and the Stoics: A PreliminaryStudy (Philosophia Antiqua 22), Leiden: Brill.
• Hutchinson, D. M., 2018,Plotinus on Consciousness,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108344104
• Kalligas, Paul,The “Enneads” of Plotinus: ACommentary, Princeton, NJ/Oxford: Princeton University Press
  • 2014, Volume 1, Elizabeth Key Fowden and Nicolas Pilavachi(trans), Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press. First publishedin Greek under the titlesPorphyriou: Peri tou Plōtinoubiou (1991),Plōtinou: Enneas Prōtē(1994),Plōtinou: Enneas Deutera (1997), andPlōtinou: Enneas Tritē (2004) by The Academy ofAthens, Athens. doi:10.1515/9781400852512
  • 2023, Volume 2, Nickolaos Koutras (trans.), First published inGreek under the titlesPlōtinou: Enneas Tetartē(2009) andPlōtinou: Enneas Pemptē (2013) by TheAcademy of Athens, Athens. doi:10.1515/9780691241821
• O’Brien, Denis, 1991,Plotinus on the Origin of Matter:An Exercise in the Interpretation of the Enneads (Elenchos 22),Napoli: Bibliopolis.
• O’Meara, Dominic J., 1993,Plotinus: An Introduction tothe Enneads, Oxford: Clarendon Press.doi:10.1093/0198751478.001.0001
• Remes, Pauliina, 2007,Plotinus on Self: The Philosophy of the“We”, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/CBO9780511597411
• Rist, John M., 1967,Plotinus: The Road to Reality,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Schniewind, Alexandrine, 2003,L’éthique du sagechez Plotin: le paradigme du spoudaios, Paris: J. Vrin.

B.2 Detailed Studies

• Alt, Karin, 1990,Philosophie gegen Gnosis: Plotins Polemik inseiner Schrift II 9 (Abhandlungen der Geistes- undSozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrg. 1990, Nr. 7), Mainz: Akademieder Wissenschaften und der Literatur.
• Armstrong, A. H., 1975, “Beauty and the Discovery ofDivinity in the Thought of Plotinus”, inKephalaion: Studiesin Greek Philosophy and Its Continuation Offered to Professor C.J. deVogel (Philosophical Texts and Studies, 23), Jaap Mansfeld, andL. M. de Rijk (eds.), Assen: Van Gorcum, 155–163.
• Caluori, Damian, 2022, “The Embodied Soul”, inGerson and Wilberding 2022: 219–240 (ch. 9). doi:10.1017/9781108770255.010
• Chiaradonna, Riccardo, 2012, “Plotinus’ Account of theCognitive Powers of the Soul: Sense Perception and DiscursiveThought”,Topoi, 31(2): 191–207.doi:10.1007/s11245-011-9114-7
• –––, 2014, “Plotinus on SensibleParticulars and Individual Essences”, inIndividuality inLate Antiquity (Ashgate Studies in Philosophy & Theology inLate Antiquity), Alexis Torrance and Johannes Zachhuber (eds),Farnham: Ashgate, 47–61 (ch. 3).
• –––, 2016, “Are There Qualities inIntelligible Being? On Plotinus VI.2 [43] 14”,Documenti eStudi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 27:43–63.
• D’Ancona Costa, Cristina, 1992,“ΑμορϕονΚαιΑνειδεον.Causalité des Formes et Causalité de l’un chezPlotin”,Revue de Philosophie Ancienne, 10(1):69–113.
• –––, 1997, “Separation and the Forms: APlotinian Approach”,American Catholic PhilosophicalQuarterly, 71(3): 367–403. doi:10.5840/acpq199771334
• Emilsson, Eyjólfur Kjalar, 1991, “Plotinus andSoul-Body Dualism”, inPsychology (Companions toAncient Thought 2), Stephen Everson (ed.), Cambridge/New York:Cambridge University Press, 148–165.
• –––, 2019, “Plotinus’ Doctrine ofBadness as Matter in Ennead I.8 [51]”, inPlatonism andChristian Thought in Late Antiquity, Panagiotis G. Pavlos, LarsFredrik Janby, Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, and Torstein TheodorTollefsen (eds), Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 78–99.
• Gertz, Sebastian, 2022, “Plotinus, Gnosticism, andChristianity”, inGerson and Wilberding 2022: 41–64 (ch. 4). doi:10.1017/9781108770255.003
• Hadot, Pierre, 1960, “Être, Vie, Pensée chezPlotin et avant Plotin”, inLes sources de Plotin(Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique 5), Genève:Fondation Hardt, 105–141.
• –––, 1980, “Les niveaux de conscience dansles états mystiques selon Plotin. [Levels of consciousness inPlotin’s mystical states.]”,Journal de PsychologieNormale et Pathologique, 77(2–3): 243–266.
• –––, 1982, “L’ « amourMagicien ». aux Origenes de la Notion de« magia Naturalis »: Platon, Plotin, MarsileFicin”,Revue Philosophique de La France et del’Étranger, 172(2): 283–292.
• –––, 1987, “L’union del’âme avec l’intellect divin dansl’expérience mystique plotinienne”, inProcluset son influence: actes du colloque de Neuchâtel, juin1985, Gilbert Boss and Gerhard Seel (eds), Zürich:Éditions du Grand Midi, 3–27.
• Hutchinson, D. M., 2022, “Composition of SensibleBodies”, inGerson and Wilberding 2022: 289–311 (ch. 12). doi:10.1017/9781108770255.013
• Igal, Jesús, 1979, “Aristóteles y laevolución de la antropología de Plotino”,Pensamiento: Revista de investigación e Informaciónfilosófica, 35(138): 315–346.
• Kalligas, Paul, 1997, “Forms of Individuals in Plotinus: ARe-Examination”,Phronesis, 42(2): 206–227.doi:10.1163/156852897762700106
• –––, 2011, “The Structure of Appearances:Plotinus on the Constitution of Sensible Objects”,ThePhilosophical Quarterly, 61(245): 762–782.doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.702.x
• –––, 2012, “From ‘Energeia’ toEnergy: Plotinus and the Formation of the Concept of Energy”,Hermathena, 192: 45–64.
• Lloyd, A. C., 1990,The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford:Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198238061.001.0001
• Menn, Stephen, 2001, “Plotinus on the Identity of Knowledgewith Its Object”,Apeiron, 34(3): 233–246.doi:10.1515/APEIRON.2001.34.3.233
• O’Brien, Denis, 1977, “Le volontaire et lanécessité : réflexions sur la descente del’âme dans la philosophie de Plotin”,RevuePhilosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 167(4):401–422.
• O’Meara, Dominic J., 1980, “The Problem ofOmnipresence in Plotinus Ennead VI, 4-5: A Reply”,Dionysius, 4: 61–73.
• –––, 1990, “Le problème du discourssur l’indicible chez Plotin”,Revue deThéologie et de Philosophie, 122(2): 145–156.
• O’Meara, Dominic J., 1996, “The Hierarchical Orderingof Reality in Plotinus”, inGerson 1996: 66–81 (ch. 3). doi:10.1017/CCOL0521470935.004
• –––, 2000, “Scepticism and Ineffability inPlotinus”,Phronesis, 45(3): 240–251.doi:10.1163/156852800510207
• –––, 2022, “Love in Plotinus’Thought”, inPlatonic Love from Antiquity to theRenaissance, Carl Séan O’Brien and John Dillon(eds), Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 111–124.doi:10.1017/9781108525596.009
• Remes, Pauliina, 2005, “Plotinus On The Unity And IdentityOf Changing Particulars”, inOxford Studies In AncientPhilosophy XXVIII, David Sedley (ed.), Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 273–302. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199281930.003.0010
• Rist, John M., 1983, “Metaphysics and Psychology inPlotinus’ Treatment of the Soul”, inGraceful Reason:Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens,CSSR, on the Occasion of His Seventy-Fifth Birthday and the FiftiethAnniversary of His Ordination (Papers in Mediaeval Studies 4),Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), Toronto, Ont: Pontifical Institute of MediaevalStudies, 135–151 (ch. 7).
• Schroeder, Frederic M., 1987, “Synousia, Synaisthaesis andSynesis: Presence and Dependence in the Plotinian Philosophy ofConsciousness”, inPhilosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik.Philosophie (Historische Einleitung; Platonismus) (Aufstieg undNiedergang der Römischen Welt, II 36.1), Wolfgang Haase (ed.),Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 677–699.doi:10.1515/9783110861570-016
• Strange, Steven K., 1994, “Plotinus on the Nature ofEternity and Time”, inAristotle in Late Antiquity(Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 27), Lawrence P.Schrenk (ed.), Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,22–53.
• Tornau, Christian, 1998, “Wissenschaft, Seele, Geist. ZurBedeutung einer Analogie bei Plotin (Enn. IV 9,5 und VI 2,20)”,Göttinger Forum für Altertumswissenschaft, 1:87–111. doi:10.14628/GFA.1998.0.77012
• –––, 2009, “Qu’ est-ce qu’unindividu? Unité, individualité et conscience de soi dansla métaphysique plotinienne de l’âme”,Les Études Philophiques, 2009(3): 333–60.
• –––, 2016, “Seelenspur undAufnahmefähigkeit: ein plotinischer Zirkel?”, inSeeleund Materie im Neuplatonismus (Heidelberger Forschungen 39), JensHalfwassen, Tobias Dangel, and Carl O’Brien (eds), Heidelberg:Winter, 135–160.
• Tuominen, Miira, 2022, “Virtue and Happiness”, inGerson and Wilberding 2022: 363–385 (ch. 15). doi:10.1017/9781108770255.016
• Wilberding, James, 2008, “Automatic Action inPlotinus”, inOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,David Sedley (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 373–408.doi:10.1093/oso/9780199544875.003.0011

C. Reference

• Blumenthal, H. J., 1987, “Plotinus in the Light of TwentyYears’ Scholarship, 1951 – 1971”, inPhilosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. Philosophie (HistorischeEinleitung; Platonismus) (Aufstieg und Niedergang derrömischen Welt, II 36.1), Wolfgang Haase (ed.), Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter, 528–570. doi:10.1515/9783110861570-013
• Corrigan, Kevin, 1987, “The Course of Plotinian Scholarshipfrom 1971 to 1986”, inPhilosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik.Philosophie (Historische Einleitung; Platonismus) (Aufstieg undNiedergang der römischen Welt, II 36.1), Wolfgang Haase (ed.),Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 571–623.doi:10.1515/9783110861570-014
• Dufour, Richard, 2002,Plotinus: A Bibliography,1950–2000, Revised edition, Leiden/Boston: Brill. [updated version of Dufour 2002 available online]
• Sleeman, J. H. and Gilbert Pollet, 1980,LexiconPlotinianum (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy: Series 1, 2),Leiden: E. J. Brill and Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Academic Tools

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at theFriends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
	Enhanced bibliography for this entryatPhilPapers, with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

• Gerson, Lloyd, “Plotinus”,Stanford Encyclopediaof Philosophy (Fall 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & UriNodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/plotinus/>. [This was the previous entry on this topic in theStanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy – see theversion history.]

Related Entries

Aristotle, commentators on |Cambridge Platonists |Ficino, Marsilio |Iamblichus |Neoplatonism |Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni |Porphyry