This entry examines the development and impact of the study ofphilosophical skepticism throughout Latin America. It also highlightssome significant trends and important contributions made to thisvenerable tradition by a number of Latin American philosophers.

Skepticism is a philosophical activity of investigation characterizedby the notion of suspension of judgment. Whereas dogmatists affirm ordeny a proposition on a given philosophical topic, skeptics neitheraffirm nor deny any proposition, i. e., they remain uncommitted to anydogmatic doctrine. According to skeptics, the basic opposition inphilosophy is that between those who endorse a philosophical theoryand those who, after having inquired into the truth, did not find ananswer to the questions under examination. That is why skepticism cameto be seen by dogmatic philosophers as a major challenge to theirphilosophical project of finding the truth. Epistemologists andmetaphysicians alike set themselves the task of overcoming skepticismin order to establish their own doctrines. Thus, one constantly findsdogmatic philosophers trying to refute the skeptic. One criterion toaccept a philosophical proposal is to determine to what extent itovercomes the skeptical challenge.

In ancient times, skepticism had two main different forms: Pyrrhonismand Academic skepticism. Rediscovered in the Renaissance, skepticismbecame one of the pillars of modern philosophy, not only after modernskeptics, such as Michel de Montaigne, Pierre Bayle and David Hume,gave new impulse to it, but also because of the many answers to itdeveloped by philosophers such as Francis Bacon, RenéDescartes, George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant. In the analytictradition, from G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell onwards, skepticismis a central topic of concern. This surprisingly long history showsnot only how deep is the skeptical challenge, but also how fascinatingthe skeptical stance turns out to be.

Similarly to philosophers in many other parts of the world, LatinAmerican philosophers have faced skeptical challenges and have devotedclose attention to skepticism. They adopt, by and large, the sameunderstanding of skepticism, share the same historical tradition, fromPyrrho to contemporary analytic philosophy, that philosopherselsewhere have engaged with, and carry out the same kind of researchas scholars all over the world do. What is specific about LatinAmerican scholars on skepticism is the fact that they are, in general,more sympathetic toward skepticism than philosophers elsewhere tend tobe. Consequently, one finds not only studies on the history ofskepticism and philosophical criticisms, but also developments of newforms of skepticism, which are worth considering with some care.

• 1. Introduction
• 2. Historical Background
• 3. Skepticism rediscovered
• 4. Neo-Pyrrhonism
• 5. Reactions to neo-Pyrrhonism
• 6. Contemporary skepticism
• 7. History of modern skepticism
• 8. History of ancient skepticism
• 9. Skepticism and literature
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Introduction

It may not be a mere coincidence that in 1991 Oswaldo Porchat, aleading Brazilian philosopher, and in 1994 Robert J. Fogelin coinedthe word “neo-Pyrrhonism” to describe their respectivephilosophical positions. That coincidence reflects both the increasingsignificance of the scholarship on skepticism, in Latin American andin Anglo-American philosophy, and a more sympathetic attitude towardthis venerable tradition.

To write about skepticism in Latin America is more difficult than onemay expect. First, the phenomena to be described are complex andmultifarious. Interest in skepticism is widespread in this part of theworld, and by no means confined to one country or to a small group ofphilosophers. On the one hand, the significance of skepticism in thephilosophy of each country seems to vary wildly; on the other, thehistory of studies on skepticism in each country has its own internaldevelopment, despite many connections among the various countriesinvolved. Second, interest in skepticism is so recent in Latin Americathat not enough time has elapsed to provide some perspective on theissue. It is perhaps still too soon to give an entirely balanced viewof skepticism in the region. But we will attempt our best to achievethat.

An interesting feature of the Latin American way of approachingskepticism is by not taking it just as the embodiment of an opponentto be refuted. At the very least, there is not a widespread prejudiceagainst skepticism. On the contrary, many Latin American philosophershave strong sympathy for the skeptical proposal, and even those whoare not skeptics themselves do not think that if the assumption of aphilosophical thesis leads to skepticism, this constitutes a kind ofreductio ad absurdum of the initial assumption. Skepticismis, for many Latin American philosophers, at least aprimafacie tenable position. That does not mean, of course, that themajority of those Latin American philosophers who deal with skepticismare skeptics, but we do find many that consider themselves as such.Even for those who are not skeptics, the significance of philosophicalskepticism is undeniable, and Latin American philosophers have madeefforts to understand carefully its meaning and historical role.

The best way to introduce skepticism in Latin America is not toexplain what goes on in each country, but to report what LatinAmerican philosophers have said concerning those topics that caughttheir attention. However, we will begin by presenting a briefhistorical background and the thought of the two founding fathers ofLatin American work on skepticism: Oswaldo Porchat (Brazil) andEzequiel de Olaso (Argentina). Special care must be taken with theirwork, because together they set the stage for a proper understandingof what happens in all other Latin American countries. We will thenexamine what Latin American philosophers have been doing both incontemporary skepticism and in the history of this philosophicaltradition. Ours is not an exhaustive account, and being selective, itis unable to accommodate every proposal in the field. We hope,however, to give a fair idea of what has happened and is currentlytaking place, in order to situate the reader and prompt additionalresearch in the area.

2. Historical Background

Contemporary studies of skepticism began in Latin America thanks tothe works of Oswaldo Porchat and Ezequiel de Olaso, a distinguishedArgentinian historian of philosophy. Due to their works, skepticismhas attracted a significant, although somewhat scattered, amount ofattention in Latin America. Both were already interested in skepticismbefore they met for the first time. In 1968, Porchat gave a famouslecture, published in the following year, in which he called attentionto a basic skeptical problem that every philosopher should try toovercome: the problem of the conflict of philosophies (roughly, thefact that philosophical doctrines often disagree on their answers toany given philosophical question). Given his B.A. in classics and hisPh.D. dissertation on Aristotle’s conception of science, it isnot surprising that Porchat came to know ancient skepticism very well.His perspective was philosophical, and he identified his ownphilosophical experience with that of the ancient skeptics. In thesame year of 1969, Olaso defended his Ph.D. dissertation on“Leibniz and the Ancient Skeptics” at Byrn Mawr College(Pennsylvania), in which he showed that Leibniz had a deep knowledgeof Greek skepticism, whose modes he clearly identified in theCartesian arguments. Thus, one can say that skepticism in LatinAmerican began in the end of the 1960s.

In 1975, invited by Porchat, Olaso went to Brazil where he became aprofessor at the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP) until 1977.This fact had a profound influence on the development of the studiesof skepticism in both countries and even in other Latin Americancountries. Their mutual collaboration proved very fruitful.Philosophers interested on skepticism soon got in touch, for theyorganized seminal conferences on the topic (1986, in Campinas, Brazil;in 1992, in Buenos Aires, Argentina; unfortunately, no proceedingswere published). Throughout the years, many other conferences onskepticism were held (in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico) in whichphilosophers from many countries took part and collective books onskepticism appeared.

Porchat’s and Olaso’s influence was huge. They were thefounding fathers of skepticism in Latin America. One can speak of asecond generation that was in touch from the 1990s onwards becausethey paved the way first. Philosophers in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico,and Colombia have been collaborating in the last twenty years becausethey both inaugurated a friendly, collaborative way of doingphilosophy that has been preserved by their followers. Though Olaso,Porchat and some of their disciples were in touch with manyphilosophers from other countries and had a far-reaching influence,there is no single, integrated explanation for that widespreadinterest.

There is no doubt that skepticism flourished in Brazil like in noother Latin American country. It is perhaps not amiss to say thatPorchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism is the most important achievement ofLatin American skepticism, providing material for further systematicdiscussions. In Brazil, an important group of philosophers aroundPorchat was organized throughout the country in the 1980s, and theywere devoted not only to understand the history of skepticism but alsoto discuss contemporary skepticism, by developing it and criticizingit. The group held conferences every year, sometimes twice a year, andmany books, individual monographs and edited collections, werepublished. Moreover, Porchat was professor and supervisor of a numberof young philosophers as well as a reference to all other philosophersstudying skepticism. Even philosophers who were not primarilyinterested in skepticism found the group’s way of doingphilosophy quite attractive. In fact, the group has alwayssystematically invited non-skeptical philosophers to enrich itsdiscussions. As a result, as time went by, the group grew larger andlarger.

Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia have also shown a lot of interest inskepticism with many important contributions to it, albeit perhaps notas systematically as in Brazil. In Argentina, work on skepticismremained at first somewhat confined to Olaso and to some historians ofmodern philosophy around him. Later, there has been a growing interestin Argentina, this time from philosophers belonging to the analytictradition, who were (and still are) also in touch with the Braziliangroup, including, more recently, a new impulse to the study of ancientskepticism.

In Mexico, there is also a deep interest in skepticism. History ofskepticism was not neglected, as we can be seen from the works ofLaura Benítez and José Antonio Robles, among others,both of whom worked with Olaso (and Popkin). Their focus is on modernskepticism. Some Mexican philosophers, working within a Kantiantradition, focused on transcendental arguments as weapons againstskepticism. Others work on contemporary skepticism in connection toquestions such as disjunctivism and perception. Finally, skepticismand its connections to fallibilism and skeptical or epistemicconcepts, such asdoubt andcertainty, were a majortheme of some Mexican philosophers.

There has also been some interest in skepticism in many othercountries, most notably in Colombia. Usually, this interest iscombined with a classic author, such as Descartes, Hume, or Kant, orwith an analytic philosopher, like Wittgenstein or Dennett. Morerecently, an interest in ancient skepticism has also arisen. In othercountries such as Peru, Chile and Uruguay, the interest in skepticalissues is more scattered. No more than a minor or incidental interestin either the history of skepticism or in current epistemologicalquestions that bear on the skeptical challenge is found.

3. Skepticism rediscovered

The study and diffusion of skepticism in Argentina and in othercountries such as Brazil and Mexico owes a great deal to Ezequiel deOlaso. When Olaso died, Porchat noted that, despite not being askeptic himself, Olaso “was indeed the father of Brazilianskepticism” (Porchat 1997). But his leadership and influence wasvast, as Popkin testified:

Ezequiel de Olaso was one of the most prominent historians ofphilosophy. He contributed enormously to arousing interest in a widerange of topics in the history of philosophy through his writings, histeachings and his lectures in Latin America, North America and Europe.(Popkin 1997)

Olaso taught in many universities both in Argentina and elsewhere. HisPh.D. dissertation has not been published, but many papers resultedfrom it. Olaso wrote a number of important papers on skepticism, bothancient and modern. He explored many authors in the 17^thand 18^th centuries: Hume, Benito JerónimoFeijóo, Rousseau, Hobbes, and Leibniz. These developments weresummarized in Olaso 1994. Many of his papers are dedicated toHume’s skepticism. Olaso argued that Hume was an Academicskeptic, not a Pyrrhonist, as Popkin had supposed. More importantly,his study of certain Enlightenment authors made Popkin revise hisinterpretation that, apart from Hume, there was no interest at all inskepticism during the 18^th century.

Olaso’s work was not limited to the presence of skepticism inmodern philosophy. He also devoted his efforts to interpret certainconcepts of the main lexicon of skepticism. He was not only interestedin skepticism from a historical point of view, but also from aphilosophical perspective: he argued vigorously against the coherenceof the skeptical position in “Zétesis” (Olaso 1988)a detailed paper on ancient Pyrrhonism, in which he displayed both anaccurate understanding of this philosophical stance and a highlycritical attitude toward the Pyrrhonian conception of investigation.His assessment of the concept ofzétesis was veryinfluential. Olaso interpreted it as an inquiry whose goal wassuspension of judgment, which defined Pyrrhonism, and contrasted it tothe open inquiry led by Academic and modern skeptics, whose goal istruth. Among his contributions, one finds also the distinction betweenthe concept ofdoubt, or suspension of the mind, and theconcept ofepokhé, or suspension of judgment, whichwould be the proper attitude of a skeptic, because it is beyond doubtitself and tries to overcome it. These new interpretations were partof his debate with scholars like Naess, Chisholm, Mates, Frede and, ofcourse, Porchat in order to find an acceptable form of contemporaryskepticism. Based on Ortega y Gasset’s distinction betweenbelief and knowledge, he proposed new accounts of Moore’snotions of common sense and certainty (Olaso 1975a) and the criticalanalysis carried out by Wittgenstein (Olaso 1999).

Olaso’s work on skepticism opened up two main directions thatwere followed by many philosophers, whether under his direct influenceor not. First, skepticism emerged as an epistemological problem and,in the light of the linguistic turn, he set the task of reinterpretingand making sense of this philosophical stance. Second, he initiated ascholarly investigation of the history of skepticism; particularly ofmodern skepticism, but also both versions of its ancient form.

4. Neo-Pyrrhonism

It is now time to present in some detail Porchat’sneo-Pyrrhonism, for it is arguably the most important contribution toLatin American skepticism. His seminal paper, “On WhatAppears”, was published in 1991, laying the foundations and theoutline of his skeptical stance. Later, in a number of papers, heexplored the main ideas further, corrected minor points, developed newaspects, and wrote some introductory and accessible texts.

One of the merits of Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism is that itprovides a general, articulated philosophical stance that one canadopt. Skepticism is not, as it is usually presented inepistemological circles, a mere doubt on this or that topic thatshould be superseded, that is, it is not a methodological doubt or anexpedient to strengthen a dogmatic position. For most philosophersconcerned with skepticism, the coherence and intelligibility of theskeptical position is not really important. Any doubt, however crazy, may be useful, if it allows the philosopher to learn something aboutan argument. But Porchat does not think so. For him, skepticism isthought of as an articulated, plausible stance proposed by somephilosophers. Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism is not even confined to abroad epistemological doctrine, since it is meant to be a generalphilosophical attitude, which includes epistemological aspects, but isnot restricted to them.

One should also emphasize that his neo-Pyrrhonism has to be sharplydistinguished from Cartesian skepticism. Porchat makes it clear thatneo-Pyrrhonianaporiai are a different sort of argument fromCartesian doubts. In particular, neo-Pyrrhonism is not committed tomentalism (the doctrine that one can conceive the mind, and itsrepresentations, as independent from the body) and does not it inviteany sort of solipsism. Thus, most of the criticisms leveled againstCartesian skepticism do not apply to neo-Pyrrhonism.

Neo-Pyrrhonism has two parts: one negative, and the other positive.The two most important concepts of the negative part arediaphonía (the conflict among the variousphilosophical doctrines) andepokhé (the suspension ofjudgment). For Porchat,ataraxía, or tranquility ofmind, is not an essential ingredient of Pyrrhonism and it is more ofhistorical interest. Given the conflict of philosophies, Porchat drawsthe skeptical conclusion: being genuinely unable to choose between thevarious philosophical views, he suspends his judgment. He arguesvigorously that the disagreement between philosophies is undecidable.Not even his previous “philosophy of the common view of theworld” (Porchat 1975, 1979) is able to solve or avoid theconflict. The conflict involves the dogmatism not only of philosophersof the common view of the world, but also of ordinary people. However,not all philosophies are part of the conflict, since some philosophiesare not dogmatic: they do not intend to describe the ultimate natureof things.

Porchat (1993) distinguishes between two kinds of skeptical arguments:dialectical and empirical. This is a significant contribution ofPorchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism to skepticism. Let us consider, first,dialectical arguments. The mode ofdiaphonía, inPorchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism, is the crucial one. But, of course,Porchat also considers the other modes of Agrippa as importantskeptical weapons against dogmatism. More importantly, he recognizesthat for ancient Pyrrhonism the skeptical method of antinomies(arguing both pro and con with equal persuasiveness) is indispensableagainst the dogmatic claim that some doctrines and arguments arefelt stronger than others. That is, the method isindispensable to neutralize that dogmatic experience of unbalancedarguments, by making stronger the weaker arguments. By arguing on bothsides of an issue, the skeptic experiences them as being equallystrong. Why do they seem equally powerful in the skeptic’sintellectual experience? For the following reason: any criterionproposed to decide the issue will itself be part of the dispute, anddisagreement about it re-emerges. Skeptics do not commit themselves tothese dialectical arguments. They just use what dogmatists admitagainst dogmatism. Their whole point is to induce suspension ofjudgment in dogmatists while still maintaining their ownepokhé.

There is, however, another route toward suspension of judgment.Skeptics can employ arguments they are able to endorse, which lead tothe conclusion that one ought to suspend judgment. As skeptics(Pyrrhonists) live their ordinary life like everyone else, they canalso reason like everyone else. They can search for the conjunction ofphenomena in the world, establish empirical correlations, and inferthe presence of fire from the fact of smoke or the occurrence of awound from the presence of a scar. Empirical reasoning leads us fromone phenomenon to another. Couldn’t it be the case that suchempirical arguments lead to suspension of judgment? These argumentshave as premises what is apparent, and they do not indicate aconclusion beyond the phenomena, sinceepokhé, theirconclusion, is an intellectual experience. According to Porchat(1993), Aenesidemus’ modes are empirical, not dialectical,arguments in support ofepokhé.

With regard to the positive part, neo-Pyrrhonism presents a detailedaccount of the crucial notion ofphainómenon. Porchatthought, in an earlier phase, thatphainómenon was tobe identified with, or assimilated to,phantasía(Porchat 1985, 1986). That explains why he once construed that notionas implying some form of mentalism: what appears was conceived of as amental representation. He later rejected that identification (Porchat1991). On his new explanation,phainómenon is bestaccounted for by another crucial notion:bíos, orcommon life. After all, says Sextus Empiricus, what appears isbíos. Thus, Sextus’ explanation of the skepticalstandard of action is also an explanation of the notion ofphainómenon. By paying close attention to the fourfoldeveryday observances, one may understand better what thephainómenon is. At the same time, common life is to beunderstood as what is apparent (what appears to those who live it),not as a reality in itself.

According to Porchat, phenomena are a kind of residue from suspensionof judgment; they are what is left after we have suspended judgmentabout dogmatic discourse. And once dogmatism is left behind, life iswhat is left for us. The phenomena impose themselves to us, and it isnot up to us to accept them or not. One could say that phenomenon iswhat is “given” to us, but that is misleading, for in onesense it is not “given” at all. At first, Porchat assertedthat language is a kind of constitutive ingredient of the phenomenaand language permeates all our experience (Porchat 1991); later,perhaps to avoid some Kantian or idealist connotation, he preferred totalk of an association between what appears and language (Porchat1995, 2013). Thus, phenomena are impregnated by language, not given tous.

One important comment Porchat makes concerning phenomena is that theyare always relative to someone. In fact, they may be personal orpublic. Something may appear to someone or to more than one person,maybe even to all of us. For instance, it may appear to you right nowthat your are reading this article; and it may appear to many of usthat Brasilia is the capital of Brazil; and it may appear to all of usthat there are trees in the world. Here it can be noted that there isno solipsistic tendency in neo-Pyrrhonism, since many people in factshare most phenomena. That solipsism is not an inherent tendency inneo-Pyrrhonism can already be seen due to the connections between thephenomena and common life. After all, what is apparent to us areobjects and events in the world, part of the life all of us live.

Another remark is that phenomena are sensible or intellectual. Whensomething appears to the senses, such as the perception of a table infront of you, it is a sensible phenomenon; when it appears to theintellect, such as a law, it is an intellectual phenomenon. ForPorchat, there is no sharp line between these two kinds of phenomena.A sensible phenomenon also has some intellectual aspect: when you seea table in front of you, the very idea of a table includes in itsomething that goes beyond what is present in your sensory modalities.However, although Porchat does not develop this idea explicitly, mostintellectual phenomena seem to have a reference to something sensible,or at least to have something sensible in its origin. Therefore, manyphenomena are typically of one kind, always including both a sensibleand an intellectual aspect in them. Very recently, however, Porchatdropped that doctrine, and he now prefers to distinguish between twokinds of phenomena (Porchat 2013).

Porchat’s interpretation of Pyrrhonism seems closer toFrede’s (1997) than to Burnyeat’s (1980). It seems that,for him just like for Frede, skeptics have many beliefs in ordinarylife, but are not committed to philosophical beliefs (beliefs aboutthe truth of various philosophical views about the world). Hisneo-Pyrrhonism, therefore, would seem to be an urbane form ofskepticism (cf. Barnes 1992). However, the very distinction at thebasis of that dispute between Frede and Burnyeat presupposes whatPorchat rejects: a contrast between philosophers and ordinary people.From a neo-Pyrrhonist point of view, both are typically, though notalways, dogmatists: most philosophers are dogmatists and so areordinary folk; dogmatic philosophers only tend to be more refined insome of their conceptions.

The crucial distinction is that between dogmatism and non-dogmatism.Sometimes, ordinary people are not dogmatic, and neither are somephilosophers, such the skeptics (Pyrrhonists). For Porchat, manycontemporary philosophers are skeptics or have a skeptical tendencywithout knowing it (Porchat 2001). Thus, what matters for aneo-Pyrrhonist is not whether the skeptic has no beliefs whatsoever oronly ordinary beliefs, but whether he has dogmatic beliefs (concerningádela) or non-dogmatic beliefs (concerning whatappears, that is, the world orbíos). Frede would havemissed the point concerning the scope ofepokhé fornot having understood properly the notion ofphainómenon (Porchat 1991).

Accordingly, the basic neo-Pyrrhonian distinction is that between thephenomena and what is said about the phenomena. Dogmatic discourse isabout the phenomena. When dogmatists say “roses arered” they mean “roses arereally red”, andthey have a theory to explain what that alleged reality consists in.Thus, they are no longer talking about the world, but about a furtherreality posited by their theory. No one disputes whether a roseappears red, but whether it is in fact red. Not all discourse,however, is about the phenomena and some merelyexpresses thephenomena. Such is ordinary language in daily life, and such is alsothe use of language by neo-Pyrrhonists: they use language to expresswhat appears to them (or to us, if the phenomenon is a common one),but not to state how things really are. In this sense, “rosesare red” expresses how roses appear to us; and in this sense,neo-Pyrrhonists may even say it istrue that roses are redand that weknow it. Therefore, neo-Pyrrhonism is not, in onesense of the word, a form of relativism, since it accepts an objectiveknowledge about the world.

Two other Pyrrhonian concepts are updated by the neo-Pyrrhonist in thepositive part:haíresis andzétesis.According to Porchat, neo-Pyrrhonists have a doctrine or “askeptical view of the world”. This skeptical view of the worldis an elaboration of how things appear to neo-Pyrrhonists. Skepticaldiscourse should be understood as an expression of phenomena. Thus,neo-Pyrrhonists may articulate explicitly their own view of the world.Since most phenomena are common, especially those that concernphilosophical issues, neo-Pyrrhonists will try to make explicit ourways of thinking, at least as they see them. However, each skepticwill have his or her own skeptical view of the world, since this viewdepends also on the circumstances in which they live.

Lastly, it should be noted that neo-Pyrrhonists are empiricists, buttheir empiricism is improved by current philosophy of science. Forinstance, they may endorse the hypothetic-deductive method. For them,we can explore the world empirically, and in their skeptical view ofthe world they may incorporate scientific results. For instance, wethink that the earth moves, and we no longer think that the earth isat the center of the universe. Scientific results may and do haveimportant impacts on our view of the world, including on theneo-Pyrrhonists’. Porchat went as far as to distinguish betweena philosophical realism and a scientific realism (Porchat 1991, 1994),asserting that neo-Pyrrhonists need not be instrumentalists, but couldhold scientific realism, although not, of course, philosophicalrealism. If there is objective knowledge of the common world, it seemsthat the sciences can improve on that knowledge being guided by anexperimental method such as the hypothetic-deductive. Neo-Pyrrhonianzétesis is not only a philosophical inquiry to destroydogmatism, as in the case of Sextus, but also an empirical explorationof the world of phenomena.

5. Reactions to neo-Pyrrhonism

Neo-Pyrrhonism provoked a lot of different reactions in Brazil andelsewhere. Since it is impossible to review them all here, our purposewill be to give a fair idea of them.

The first important reaction came from philosophers concerned withscientific knowledge. Hilan Bensusan and Paulo Souza (1994) thoughtthat Pyrrhonism was an outdated philosophy. In the face ofcontemporary science, Pyrrhonism would no longer be a viablealternative, for it had not the adequate concepts to explain thatscience. Therefore, the fact that science has evolved in unforeseeableways is an objection to neo-Pyrrhonism. Luiz Henrique de AraújoDutra (1993, 1995, 1996, 1997b), also criticizing Porchat’sconception of science, came to propose another skeptical position,which he called “alethic skepticism”. Dutra thought thatthe metaphysical notion of truth is indispensable to scientificresearch. Both held that modern science establishes theories thatcannot be doubted by the neo-Pyrrhonist. Otávio Bueno has amore sympathetic proposal toward skepticism and develops aneo-Pyrrhonist approach to contemporary science by combining it withvan Fraassen’s view (Bueno 2015). Neo-Pyrrhonian empiricismemphasizes the notion of empirical adequacy.

A second kind of response was given by those who want to develop orimprove on basic features of neo-Pyrrhonism. Some, such asPlínio Junqueira Smith (1995b), tried to purify neo-Pyrrhonismfrom what still looked like a dogmatic notion. For instance, the ideathat dogmatism is a disease and that the skeptic (Pyrrhonist) offers abetter way of life by curing dogmatists of their disease may be mereprejudice. Therefore, the skeptical idea of therapy is perhapsdogmatic. The notion of common life as used by the neo-Pyrrhonist alsoseems to be an inheritance of Porchat’s “philosophy of thecommon view of the world” (Porchat 1975, 1979). The skepticalview of the world has an undeniable personal aspect. WaldomiroJosé da Silva Filho explored, on the one hand, skepticaldifficulties in common life neglected by the neo-Pyrrhonist (SilvaFilho 2015) and, on the other, difficulties in self-knowledge, therebytrying to extend neo-Pyrrhonism to subjects not touched upon byPorchat (Silva Filho 2007, 2008).

Another important discussion intended to correct and improve onneo-Pyrrhonism concerns the neo-Pyrrhonist view on truth. Porchatdeveloped in an important paper a skeptical doctrine of truth (Porchat1995). According to Porchat, once they have divorced from ametaphysical notion of reality, neo-Pyrrhonists can defend acorrespondence theory of truth: what we say and what appears would becorrelated in our experience; it appears that there is a link betweenwhat we say and what appears to us. Eduardo Barrio (2000), however,thinks that the only alternative to a neo-Pyrrhonist is to adopt adeflationist theory of truth, like the redundancy theory, and that anycorrespondence theory would imply dogmatism.

An unexpected and important development of neo-Pyrrhonism came fromphilosophers who were also concerned with political philosophy. Theywere interested in knowing what would be the skeptical (Pyrrhonian)proposal in politics. Porchat (in conversation) has always been veryclear on this issue, for he holds that the skeptic could have anypolitical doctrine, including a radical one: from extreme right toextreme left. After all, skepticism would not exclude any content ofphainomena. But most think that not all alternatives areaccessible to a skeptical position. Renato Lessa (1995) argues thatthe neo-Pyrrhonist would be a liberal; Paulo Jonas de Lima Piva (2002)thinks he could be a social democrat or a socialist; CiceroRomão Araújo (2007, 2008) connects the notion ofskepticism with the notion of citizenship. This debate opened up a newline of research concerning skepticism.

Very recently, an internal criticism of neo-Pyrrhonism emerged and itdeserves to be mentioned. Vitor Hirschbruch Schvartz (2015) and DiegoMachuca (2013a) argue for a rustic version of neo-Pyrrhonism,according to which Pyrrhonists hold no beliefs, and do not stop shortof all the consequences that one should derive from the force of theskeptical attack on dogmatism. A truly skeptical position woulddestroy all beliefs, whether ordinary or philosophical. Accordingly,Schvartz and Machuca see themselves as rustic neo-Pyrrhonists, and donot accept Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism with its non-dogmaticbeliefs.

But there have been many external criticisms whose intention is toreject neo-Pyrrhonism. Roberto Bolzani Filho developed an incisivecriticism of Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism. Bolzani (1996, 2003)identified a sort of “naturalized reason” or some dogmaticpresuppositions in the idea of a “healthy philosophy” inPorchat’s thinking. One could apply to skepticism the same kindof argument that the skeptic uses against other philosophies. In theend, skepticism would be part of the conflict among philosophies ittries to avoid. Bolzani also attempted to show that, despitePorchat’s intention, neo-Pyrrhonism is an outdated way ofphilosophizing. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira (2003)presented a Kantian answer to Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism. Heraised a number of difficulties to understand Porchat’sconception of phenomena, and argued that an acceptable solution wouldcome only from a transcendental philosophy. These two criticisms, ifsound, should make one reconsider neo-Pyrrhonism. More recently,Pereira (2015) came to defend naive realism against Pyrrhonism.

6. Contemporary skepticism

Just as in many other parts of the world, contemporary skepticism inLatin America deals with epistemological issues within analytic theoryof knowledge. Many anti-skeptical strategies, such as contextualismand externalism, deserved close scrutiny by Latin Americanphilosophers. Also the transcendental strategy has captured theattention of many philosophers interested in skepticism. Butcontemporary skepticism is not confined to epistemology alone and itengages with, more broadly, analytic philosophy as a whole. Analyticworries about language and, more specifically, the notion of meaninghave led to the development of a new form of skepticism, known asmeaning skepticism. We will review some of the discussions on thesetopics, beginning with the connections between skepticism and analyticphilosophy.

Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho (Brazil) developed some skepticalconcepts using Austin’s pragmatist view of language, and he alsoidentified many common ideas between Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism(Marcondes de Souza Filho 1988, 1996a,b). Thus, Marcondes wasarticulating Pyrrhonism further in a similar spirit as Porchat.Another groundbreaking work on skepticism derived from the linguisticturn is that of Samuel Cabanchik (Argentina). Cabanchik was interestedin the possibility of a linguistic form of skepticism or skepticismabout meaning not only in Wittgenstein, but also in Aristotle andFrancisco Sanchez. His main focus, however, was Wittgenstein, aboutwhom he wrote two books (2003, 2010) and many papers (1990,2008a,b).

Marcondes’ and Cabanchik’s concern with analyticphilosophy and its relation to skepticism was truly a guide to otherphilosophers. The connections between skepticism and the philosophy ofthe later Wittgenstein have been highlighted by many scholars.Plínio Junqueira Smith (1994) tried to show the strongaffinities between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and ancientPyrrhonism, to which Paulo Roberto Margutti (Brazil) (Pinto 1996a)offered a criticism. In the same spirit, Guadalupe Reinoso (Argentina)(2006, 2008, 2009) calls our attention to the value of skepticism inboth Sextus and Wittgenstein as anars vivendi: theircriticism of language’s bewitchment, anti-theoreticalperspective, and conception of philosophy as a therapy. MagdalenaHolguín (Colombia) (1997) and R. Meléndez (Colombia)(2014) also analyze the relations between skepticism and Wittgenstein.Pamela Lastres (Peru) (2011) has recently been doing some promisingwork on Wittgenstein and Moore, but also on Pyrrhonian skepticism. Itis also worth noting that Oscar Nudler (Argentina) (2010) hasdeveloped what he calls a “philosophy of the limits”,inspired both by Wittgenstein and the Socratic awareness of ourignorance, which, although not properly skeptic, is a doctrine atleast closely associated with skepticism.

More recently, Glenda Satne (Argentina) (2003, 2005a,b, 2008) alsopursued a line of research based on analytic theories of meaning and,more specifically, on meaning skepticism. She has been busy withskeptical arguments derived from contemporary semantics, such asQuine’s argument from the indeterminacy of radical translation,Putnam’s model-theoretic argument, Dummett’s argument fromthe manifestation of linguistic knowledge and, above all,Kripke’s (or Kripkenstein’s) skeptical arguments. Meaningskepticism was also the subject of a very well informed book by SilvioMota Pinto (Brazil/Mexico) (2009, 2014), and Efraín Lazos(Mexico) (2002) published interesting papers on Wittgenstein, Kripke,and meaning skepticism as well.

Thus, the connection between skepticism and analytic philosophy becamea topic to be further explored by Latin American philosophers. Porchathad argued that contemporary analytic philosophy was to a good extentskeptical without knowing it. According to him, many analyticphilosophers don’t understand very well what skeptics had saidand what they call a skeptic does not correspond to skepticism,properly understood. If they had the appropriate knowledge of thehistory of skepticism, they would perhaps acknowledge the skepticalorientation of their doctrines. It is not clear, however, that that isthe case in analytic philosophy. One debate that has received someattention is how far this or that analytic philosopher is close toskepticism. For instance, against Porchat’s opinion about Quine,Marcos Nascimento Bulcão (Brazil) wrote a book on Quine’snaturalistic realism, denying that he is a skeptic (Bulcão2008). However, the perception of a skeptical Quine still persists insome places.

Davidson is another analytic philosopher whose connections toskepticism have been assessed by Latin American philosophers. EleonoraOrlando (Argentina) (2000) wrote a paper criticizing Davidson, for hisconception of language would end up, despite his intentions, into akind of semantic skepticism. Cristian Barturén (Peru), on theother hand, is interested on Davidson’s critique of globalSkepticism. Otávio Bueno (Brazil/USA) criticized the way inwhich Davidson tries to respond to skepticism (Bueno 2005).

The relation between P.F. Strawson and skepticism has also beenassessed by a number of Latin American scholars on contemporaryskepticism or on analytic philosophy. Perhaps the most importantcontribution comes from a Mexican group. We will talk more about thembelow, when we discuss transcendental arguments as an anti-skepticalstrategy. Sergio Sanchez (Argentina) (2006), Marco Franciotti (2009)and Plínio Junqueira Smith (2015) have also done some work inthis topic.

Other analytic philosophers engaged with the issue further. To givebut one example, Miguel Ángel Fernández (Mexico) (2014)criticized the incoherence of the anti-skeptical epistemology ofbelief attribution developed by Crispin Wright. According toFernández, Wright intends to combine twodesiderata ina single anti-skeptical strategy, to wit, aconcessiveelement to the skeptic, on the one hand, and arescueelement, on the other. However, he argues, that combination isimpossible.

Perhaps one should note that contemporary skepticism was alsodeveloped along other philosophical traditions, not only of ananalytic orientation. Under the influence of Wittgenstein, but also ofStanley Cavell, Mario Gensollem (Mexico) (2006) explored the role ofskepticism not only in philosophy, but also in common life. He came toembrace the Cavellian thesis that philosophical skepticism is the bestexpression of the intrinsic finitude of human nature. SergioSánchez (Argentina) (2006) called attention not only toStrawson’s but also to Heidegger’s assessment of skepticalarguments. Jônadas Techio (Brazil) (2013) also investigated,from a Cavellian and Heideggerian points of view, the importance ofphilosophical skepticism.

Skeptical worries are usually linked to epistemological issues. Wefind in Mexico a group of philosophers who have a very strongconnection to skepticism. They go as far as proposing new forms ofskepticism. Armando Cíntora (Mexico) (2010), for instance,holds a Pyrrhonian position in philosophy of science. According toCíntora, a methodological Pyrrhonism would be of great help toliberate scientists from the dogmas that keep them captive when theytry to develop their scientific research. Just like in Sextus’case, Cíntora argues that this kind of methodologicalPyrrhonism is not an epistemic paralysis: Pyrrhonian scientists canpractice science, since they are aware of the non-dogmatic (temporal)character of their ontological, methodological and semanticprinciples. Such acknowledgment will keep them safe from a dogmaticoutlook.

Jorge Ornelas (Mexico) (2012, 2014a; Cíntora and Ornelas2013a), a younger member of that group, focused on the mainanti-skeptical strategies in contemporary philosophy (contextualism,belief-attribution epistemology, dogmatism, transcendental approach,externalism, etc.). Ornelas tried to show that none of thesestrategies succeed or dislodge the traditional skeptical challenge,chiefly because they lack a satisfactory diagnosis of the motivationsbehind the skeptical problematic. Therefore, they fall prey to adouble error: not only do they fail to eradicate the basic motivationsbehind skepticism, but also they pay no attention to the fact that thetraditional skeptical problematic emerges only for theories andconcepts of knowledge that do not threaten ordinary knowledgeattributions.

Fallibilism and skepticism were the topics of some papers written byGuillermo Hurtado (Mexico). Hurtado (2002a) holds that, although thesetwo positions are closely related, one must keep them apart; herejects fallibilism because it is revisionist. Not much later, heargues in favor of using more fine-grained epistemic terms. Accordingto Hurtado (2005), one should distinguish various senses of“doubt”, introduce the notion of “suspicion”,and accept various degrees of certainty. His basic idea is to enrichthe vocabulary of epistemology, including more sophisticated skepticalterms.

Many, of course, reject the skeptical position. Paulo FranciscoEstrella Faria (Brazil) (2007, 2012), for instance, argued againstskepticism. In fact, he thinks, skepticism is committed to a kind ofidealism, even in the case of Porchat and despite his explicitrejection of this philosophical view. According to Faria, anyassertion implies a claim to absolute truth and, if skeptics assertanything, as they do in ordinary life, then they are committed to whatthey would rather avoid. The skeptic view of language is, therefore,untenable, and there is a type of pragmatic contradiction in theskeptic’s position. That criticism has been endorsed by RobertoHorácio de Sá Pereira (Brazil) (2003, 2015).

The works of Eleonora Cresto (Argentina) and Alejandro Miroli(Argentina) also distance themselves from the skeptical position.Cresto (1996, 1997) focused on anti-skeptical strategies that arisefrom naturalistic positions, whether along Wittgensteinian lines orfollowing F. Dretske and other reliabilists. Miroli (2007, 2008,2010), in turn, dealt with scientific skepticism, addressing bothgeneral cases and socially important ones. He also examinedDretske’s relevant alternatives argument, and tried to determinewhich kinds of alternatives one should exclude and which one canneglect in knowledge attributions.

Several additional epistemological strategies were put under closescrutiny by Latin American epistemologists. Here are a few of them.Diana Hoyos (Colombia) (2006) works on contemporary theory ofknowledge, linking the concepts of epistemic responsibility, Gettierexamples and skepticism. Jorge Gregorio Posada (Colombia) (2007) hasresponded to her work. Ignacio Ávila (Colombia) (2003)confronts Davidson’s thesis that most of our beliefs are truewith the corresponding skeptical challenge. Another popularanti-skeptical strategy is contextualism. Flávio Williges(Brazil) devoted his Ph.D. dissertation to that subject, from whichresulted a paper (Williges 2013), and André Joffily Abath(Brazil) (2012) uses contextualism to refute Cartesian skepticism.

Among the anti-skeptical strategies, the one that invokestranscendental considerations deserves special mention. A group ofphilosophers in Mexico is the most distinguished one concerning thisKantian-Strawsonian-inspired answer to skepticism. Pedro Stepanenko(Mexico) explored the anti-skeptical potential of the Kantian conceptof the synthetic unity of apperception in many papers (2001, 2002a,2006, 2007, 2008). According to his interpretation, this unity shouldbe considered as the unity of our mental states that is possible onlythrough the inferential relations to their contents. This unity makespossible the self-consciousness that any argumentative practicerequires. If we could suspend judgment with respect to any subject, wewould renounce to establish inferential relations among the contentsof our mental states; in that case, there would be no consciousnessunity, nor knowledge of our mental states.

In that same Kantian group, the works of Efraín Lazos(México) are outstanding. Lazos (2002, 2014) was able tocombine Kantian and Wittgensteinian anti-skepticism to produce newperspectives on the skeptical challenge. More recently, Lazos appealedto a transcendental strategy based on the works of Barry Stroud toshow the anti-skeptical force of transcendental arguments. IsabelCabrera (Mexico) (1999) edited a book on transcendental arguments, inwhich the force and limits of such arguments as tools againstskepticism are assessed. Cabrera (2002) also worked out the relationsbetween Buddhism and skepticism. In particular, she showed that bothin Buddhism and in Humean skepticism there is an attack on the notionof substance, and that the lack of commitment to substances inone’s understanding of the world has a therapeutic function,namely, to avoid suffering.

The so-called Agrippan trilemma is an important argument forcontemporary skepticism. Some Latin American philosophers have triedto answer this deep, difficult skeptical challenge. José deTeresa (Mexico) (2000, 2013, 2014) developed an anti-skepticalstrategy inspired in Plato’s dialectic. According to de Teresa,Plato’s strategy is effective against the trilemma presented bythe skeptic, because it escapes the three alternatives underconsideration.

Among the Agrippan modes, however, the most important for LatinAmerican skepticism seems to bediaphonía ordisagreement. We saw how important it is to Porchat’sneo-Pyrrhonism (1969, 1991, 1993). Some efforts have recently beenmade to compare the skeptical, Agrippan mode ofdiaphonía to contemporary reflections on disagreement.Of particular importance is Diego Machuca’s (Argentina) (2013a)idea thatdiaphonía is different from disagreement.Machuca accuses contemporary epistemologists who defend thatdisagreement leads to suspension of judgment of dogmatism. Accordingto Machuca, they base their arguments on dogmatist principles to reachsuspension of judgment. It also deserves to be noted OtávioBueno’s (Brazil) defense ofdiaphonía fromrecent attacks, such as Barnes’ criticism (Bueno 2013). Buenooffers an interpretation ofdiaphonía free from theproblems that arise from faulty interpretations. Perhaps this isanother topic in which one may discover some original contributionsfrom Latin American skepticism. There has also been some efforts toextend the mode of disagreement in contemporary skepticism intological matters (Barrio 2015), as well as some discussion concerningevaluative judgments and the notion of relative truth (Orlando2014).

7. History of modern skepticism

The history of skepticism has also attracted the attention of manyscholars throughout Latin America. As in most places, historicalinvestigation tended to concentrate in the modern period, mostly onCartesian and Humean skepticism, though many other authors, such asMontaigne, Bacon, Bayle, and Kant, were also on the spot. AlthoughBrazilian scholarship has perhaps made more contributions, one shouldnot neglect the huge and widespread interest in modern skepticismthroughout Latin America.

The most important work on the history of skepticism is arguably thatof José Raimundo Maia Neto (Brazil), who worked with Popkin.Maia Neto got interested in skepticism through his contact with DaniloMarcondes and, some time later, with Porchat’s works. His maincontribution is that Academic skepticism played a more important rolein modern skepticism than Popkin’s interpretation recognizes(Maia Neto 1997a, 2005, 2013a). According to Maia Neto, Popkinemphasized the importance of Pyrrhonism for modern philosophy, butneglected the fact that Academic skepticism was also widely known andused by many philosophers. In order to defend this interpretation,Maia Neto wrote a number of papers on philosophers like Montaigne(Maia Neto 2004, 2012), Pierre Charron (Maia Neto 2014), Descartes(Maia Neto 2001), Gassendi (Maia Neto 1997b) and Pierre-Daniel Huet(Maia Neto 2008a,b). In fact, he explored the whole modern skepticismfrom Montaigne onwards, with important texts on Pascal (Maia Neto1995), Bayle (Maia Neto 1996), and Hume (Maia Neto 1991).

Another important contribution is that of Luiz Antonio Alves Eva(Brazil), who has studied in great detail Montaigne’sEssays, publishing two books (2004, 2007b) and a number ofpapers in Brazil and elsewhere (2001a, 2012, 2013a). Still in Brazil,Renato Lessa (Brazil) (1995, 2003) has done some work onMontaigne’s political skepticism, showing that skeptics, byacknowledging the role of habit, would be realists in politics. Smith(2012a), criticizing Eva’s interpretation, who insists on theaffinities between Montaigne and ancient skeptics, tries to uncovermore differences. In Argentina, there has also been some work onMontaigne’s skepticism. In addition to Fernando Bahr(Argentina), to whom we shall return, Soledad Croce (Argentina) (2006,2007), for instance, has published many papers on what she takes asthe practical skepticism of Montaigne.

Luiz Eva (Brazil) (2006, 2008, 2011) also focused on the relationsbetween Francis Bacon and skepticism. He proposed some carefulinterpretations of the Theory of the Idols and skeptical argumentsstemming from ancient Pyrrhonism and from Montaigne and Sanchez. Heshowed not only the skeptical origins of most Baconian idols, but alsohow their structure changed the skeptical Modes, thereby revealingwhat is properly new in Bacon. Silvia Manzo (Argentina) (2009) wroteon the same subject, holding a balanced view, in which there is adouble attitude in light of the skeptical threat. More recently, shereturned to that topic (Manzo forthcoming), providing a reconstructionof Francis Bacon’s reception of Academic skepticism. She dealswith the assessment of ancient skepticism throughout Bacon’swritings and argues that he, on the one hand, approved of the state ofdoubt and the suspension of judgment and, on the other hand, rejectedthe notion of acatalepsia. Plínio Junqueira Smith (Brazil)(2012b), referring to both scholars, showed that Bacon’s mainfocus is on the propositions “nothing is known” and“nothing can be known”, to which he devoted carefulattention. According to him, Bacon used skeptical weapons to rejectthe whole traditional philosophy (including skepticism), not only tocriticize dogmatism, thereby distancing himself from it.

Danilo Marcondes (Brazil) (2009, 2012) has been doing original,important research on the ancient Modes and the discovery of the NewWorld. This discovery offered not only many more examples of the samekind of diversity Europeans were familiar with, but also of adifferent, more radical kind, strengthening the force of the skepticalModes. That is a vast and rich literature not yet explored by scholarson the history of skepticism.

As expected, Cartesian skepticism is one of the main objects of study.In almost every country we find scholars trying to understand itssources, the nature of its arguments, their force and persuasiveness.One decisive contribution, already noted above, is that of Porchat,who credited Descartes’s methodological use of skepticism aspecial place in the philosophy. In Porchat’s view of the 1980s(Porchat 1985, 1986), there was a strong affinity between ancientskepticism and Cartesian doubt, so that one could speak properly of askeptic-Cartesian model. The problem of the external world became,thereby, a crucial issue for those concerned with skepticism, becauseit was thought of as a skeptical problem. Following his lead, manyother philosophers in Brazil, like Paulo Francisco Estrella Faria(2007), Luiz Eva (2001b, 2013b), Alexandre Noronha Machado (2007a),Flávio Williges (2007), among others, wrote papers on thetopic.

In Mexico, concern with Cartesian skepticism was once the dominantfocus of research on skepticism. One reason for this predominance isthe connection between the group of Laura Benítez (Mexico) andJosé Antonio Robles (Mexico) with Ezequiel de Olaso and RichardPopkin. This group was strongly oriented toward the work of Descartesand modern science. Consequently, Cartesian skepticism ormethodological skepticism was an important subject to them. Manymembers of the group shared, perhaps implicitly, the belief that theCartesian anti-skeptical strategy was successful to avoid disastrousskeptical consequences. Benítez (1987), for instance, hasdevoted many of her works to Cartesian studies, and explored thepositive methodological aspects of Cartesian skepticism to reach plaincertainty, as well as the relevance of skepticism for discussionsconcerning the nature of human knowledge.

Something similar can be said about the situation in Colombia, whereJean Paul Margot (2003) and Adolfo León Gómez (2002)gave a lot of attention to Cartesian skepticism. Also very importantare the contributions of Mauricio Zuluaga, who has examinedcontemporary interpretations of Cartesian skepticism, especially thosebased on the closure principle (Zuluaga 2012), the Agrippan Trilemma(Zuluaga 2005) and the relations between Pyrrhonism and Cartesianskepticism (Zuluaga 2014). Zuluaga published an important book thatemerged from his Ph.D. dissertation (Zuluaga 2007) and, with Margot,edited a collection (Margot and Zuluaga 2012), in which one finds manypapers on modern skepticism, including on Montaigne, featuringscholars from Colombia and elsewhere.

In Peru we also find some interest in the relation between Descartesand skepticism. Jorge Secada (2000) has done work on Descartes andSuarez, but focused on Descartes with regard to skepticism. HumbertoQuispe (1996) has also done research on this topic, mainly under theinfluence of Jorge Secada.

French skepticism of the 17^th century was given someattention, although not as much as one would like. Besides the alreadynoted contribution by José Raimundo Maia Neto (Brazil), theworks of Flávio Fontenelle Loque (Brazil) (2012) and FernandoBahr (Argentina) deserve to be highlighted. Loque’s book is onthe relation between skepticism and religion, more specifically on thevery notion of a Christian skepticism. He devoted attention not onlyto Montaigne and Pierre Charron, but also to François de laMothe Le Vayer. Bahr (1999, 2000a,b, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2010) focusedmainly on Pierre Bayle, whose skeptical arguments touch on three mainpoints: the problem of evil, the foundations of religious belief andcivil tolerance. These topics led Bahr to study both the18^th century, where he examines the influence of Bayle onHume (that was the topic of his Ph.D.), and to the first half of the17^th century, where he focused his attention on therelation between La Mothe Le Vayer and Descartes. Plinio JunqueiraSmith (2013) shows the importance of the skeptical method both inBayle's historical work and in his philosophical thinking.Sébastien Charles (Québec, Canada) (forthcoming a,b) hasalso been working recently on some French skeptics, namely SimonFoucher and Pierre-Daniel Huet. His historical research follows thecurrent trend of erudition, discovering and exploring less knownfigures, but who were very important at their time.

Berkeley’s reaction to skepticism or his alleged skepticism didnot go unnoticed, despite not having received enough attention. Oneexception is José Antonio Robles (Mexico). Robles (1996) showsthat the Berkeleyan skeptical thesis that rejects the existence of amaterial substance has important consequences, such as the rejectionof many other subsidiary problems: matter’s indivisibility andthe idea of an extended God. Jaimir Conte (Brazil) (2008) alsoexplored the connections between Berkeley and skepticism in animportant paper. Sébastien Charles (Québec, Canada)(2003) wrote a book on the early reception of Berkeley’simmaterialism in France. At that time, Berkeley was considered thegreatest skeptic, until Kant pronounced Hume to be even greater.Charles shows, with plenty of erudition, how this image of Berkeleywas created in France.

Not much attention was given to skepticism in the 18^thcentury French materialist philosophy. However, Paulo Jonas de LimaPiva (Brazil) (2007, 2008a,b) has done some work focusing especiallyon Diderot. Sébastien Charles (Québec, Canada) (2007)called attention to some clandestine skeptical manuscripts as well asto many less known skeptics of the period, not only in France, butalso in Germany. Charles (2012) and Rodrigo Brandão (2008)explored the relations between Voltaire and skepticism.

An important contribution to understand Hume’s skepticism wasprovided by Plínio Junqueira Smith, who published a book(1995a) on that topic and many papers (2011a,b). His main idea is thatthe debate between Hume’s skepticism and Hume’s naturalismpresupposes a false dichotomy. What commentators call Hume’snaturalism is what Hume himself called his skepticism. Moreover,commentators tend to think of skepticism as a mere negative doctrine,not paying enough attention to its positive side. He also devoted mucheffort to show how Hume’s mitigated skepticism was connected toancient skepticism, in both its forms, and to modern skepticism. Oneshould also note the works of Livia Guimarães (Brazil) (1996,2008) who has devoted her career to the study of Hume’s thought,not only his skepticism, but also many other aspects of the philosophyof the greatest modern skeptic. Humean scholarship has increased somuch in Brazil that it is not possible to give a fair survey of itsstatus in a limited space.

Interest in Hume’s skepticism is not confined to Brazil.Lisandro Aguirre (Argentina) (2007, 2008, 2010a,b), for instance, haspublished many papers on Hume. His main point is that Hume followsPyrrhonism precisely when he thinks he is avoiding it, i.e., when Humeis saved by nature, he thinks he is not a Pyrrhonian, but in fact thatwould be the hallmark of a Pyrrhonist. Humean skeptical arguments arealso studied in Colombia, for instance by Catalina Gonzalez (2010,2011). Humean skepticism was perhaps what generated Peruvian interestin modern skepticism. Although Juan Bautista Ferro Porcile (Peru) wasmainly concerned with logic, he lectured extensively on modernphilosophy, especially in the empiricist tradition and in the Humeanbranch of skepticism, on which he published an influential paper.

The relations between Kant and skepticism attracted much attention inLatin America, most of all in Mexico. We have already seen that agroup of philosophers, most notably Pedro Stepanenko (2002a, 2006,2007), Efraín Lazos (2014), Isabel Cabrera (1999), and JorgeOrnelas (2005), combined historical scholarship with systematicworries, producing a number of publications on transcendentalarguments and skepticism, discussing the works of Wittgenstein, P.F.Strawson and Barry Stroud, among others, from a Kantian point of view.Stepanenko, in particular, was more historically orientated. RobertoHorácio de Sá Pereira (2003) and Marco Franciotti (1994,1995), in Brazil, follows a similar path. In Colombia, Alejandro Rosas(Colombia) (1990) opened up this field of research with an influentialpaper. Following this path, Catalina González (Colombia) (2010)developed a historical study of the relations between Kant and hisancient skeptical sources.

More recently, still in Mexico, Ornelas (2014a, 2015) developed aninterpretation of Kantian anti-skepticism, according to which the“Refutation of Idealism” is not relevant, as is commonlyassumed, but the “Fourth Paralogism” is. PlínioJunqueira Smith (2008a) holds a similar view, while at thesame time offering a wider interpretation. According to Smith, Kantresponded to three different kinds of modern skepticism: Cartesianskepticism concerning the external world (which Kant came torecognize, in the second edition of theCritique of PureReason, as an idealist problem, not a skeptical one); Bayleanskepticism and the antinomies, and Humean skepticism on the objectivevalidity of the categories.

Luis Eduardo Hoyos (Colombia) (2001) has already published hisimportant bookEl escepticismo y la filosofíatrascendental in which he assesses the argumentative potential ofthe transcendental argument against Humean skepticism as received inthe philosophical German scene of the 18^th century. Hoyosworks motivated a number of Colombian philosophers to devote theirattention to the subject and the period. Ignacio Ávila(Colombia) (1996) explored this same vein, while Carlos Patarroyo(Colombia) sides with the Kantian position against Humean skepticism.Catalina González (Colombia) (2011) worked out the distinctionbetween Academic skepticism and Pyrrhonism in Kant.

As many scholars have perceived the fundamental importance of Kant tomodern skepticism (andvice versa), it should not come as asurprise that many others also perceived what is now calledpost-Kantian skepticism. Perhaps the first important study on thetopic is that of Luis Eduardo Hoyos (Colombia) (1995), when hepublishes his Ph.D. dissertation, followed by two papers (Hoyos 1998,1999), to which Raúl Meléndez (Colombia) (2000) replied.Interest in post-Kantian skepticism is spreading around. EduardoBrandão (Brazil) (2013) devotes his attention to skepticism inphilosophers such as G.E. Schulze, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Fichte.Ricardo Cattaneo (Argentina) (2009, 2010) focuses both on discussionson skepticism in Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy (Jacobi, Schulze)and on the interpretation and assimilation of skepticism in Hegel andGerman Idealism. Luiz Fernando Barrère Martin (Brazil)(2007a,b, 2011) has written his Ph.D. dissertation and published somepapers on Hegel and skepticism.

Sergio Sánchez (Argentina) is an important reference forstudies concerning skepticism in the 19^th and20^th century. Sánchez (2010) focused on the presenceof skepticism in Nietzsche, especially the influence of Sextus andCicero. In his papers, one important topic is that ofNietzsche’s analysis of belief and its relation to skepticism.In connection with Nietzsche, Kathia Hanza (Peru) (2011) has exploreddifferent sides of skepticism. The works of Rogério Lopes(Brazil) (2006, 2012) on Nietzsche and skepticism, very similar inspirit to those of Sánchez and Hanza, also deserve to bementioned.

8. History of ancient skepticism

Ancient skepticism has also attracted a lot of attention, though, likein almost all places, it has received less attention than modernskepticism. Roberto Bolzani Filho (Brazil) published a book (Bolzani2013) and a number of papers on the topic (Bolzani 1990, 1998, 2000,2005a). His book on Academic skepticism and Pyrrhonism is verycarefully written, well informed, and presents a detailed account ofthe relationship between these two forms of ancient skepticism. VitorHirschbruch Schvartz (2012) defends a rustic interpretation ofSextus Empiricus. Recent scholarship is improving, as is shown by theworks of Rodrigo Pinto de Brito (Brazil) (2014) on Sextus.

More recently, studies on ancient skepticism grew thanks to the worksof Diego Machuca (Argentina) (2006a,b, 2009, 2013a). His Ph.D.dissertation was on Sextus’ ethics. Afterwards, he has publishedmany papers and reviews, as well as organized events. He has alsoedited a number of important collections on the history of skepticism(2011a,b, 2013b). It is fair to say that no one gave more impulse toimprove Latin American scholarship on ancient skepticism than he did.With Duncan Pritchard, Machuca is the editor of theInternationalJournal for the Study of Skepticism. Thus, both for his personalpapers and books and for his involvement in organizing research,Machuca is a leading figure in ancient skepticism.

Colombia has also given its contribution to the field. InCuadernos de Filosofía y Letras, we find not only thefirst book of theEsbozos Pirrónicos of SextusEmpiricus translated by the philologist and Hellenist JorgePáramo (1989), but also many papers by scholars such as Popkin,Giorgio Tonelli, Porchat and Olaso, together with an examination ofthe importance of philosophical skepticism by Carlos B.Gutiérrez (Colombia) (1989). In Mexico, Ornelas (Mexico) (2013,2014b) read Sextus’ works carefully, and found theoreticalresources that can help with the engagement with contemporaryepistemological issues.

Studies on the history of skepticism before the modern period are notrestricted to Pyrrhonism and Academic skepticism. It should not gounmentioned Maurício Pagotto Marsola’s paper (Brazil)(2007) on Plotinus and skepticism, for this is a very unexpectedaspect of Plotinus’ philosophy. In connection to the origins ofMedieval Philosophy, and especially Augustine and Descartes, LuisBacigalupo (Peru) (1999) has also done some research. Rodrigo Pinto deBrito (Brazil) (2015) has been working on the impact of skepticism inChristian thought.

One should also pay attention to Mauricio Beuchot (Mexico) (1996,2003) who devoted two papers to skepticism in the Middle Age. Hispoint is that skepticism attracted some attention even beforeRenaissance. According to him, many medieval authors developedskeptical positions. Among them, Augustine’s PlatonicChristianity appealed to Academic skepticism in its theory ofillumination, in which Augustine emphasized the fallibility of humanknowledge; Averroes’ theory of double truth, according to whichthere are two kinds of truth (truths for science and truths for faith)similarly has a skeptical tone, and those who thought that God couldperhaps fool us were considering skeptical argument (Ockham, PedroLombardo, Tomás de Aquino and Buenaventura, among others).Beuchot also remembers that Nicolás d’Autrecourt, aFrench monk (1300–1350 approximately), active in the Universityof Paris, anticipated Humean skepticism concerning causality.

9. Skepticism and literature

Perhaps it should also be mentioned some other studies on the historyof skepticism. On the one hand, there are some literary studies.Machado de Assis, one of the best Brazilian writers, has been seen asa skeptic by many people. One reason is that Machado read and usedextensively Montaigne’s skepticism. José Raimundo de MaiaNeto (1994) published a book on the topic. The novelty of his book isthat it was the first discussion on Machado’s skepticism basedon the history of skepticism. Paulo Roberto Margutti Pinto (2007) andGustavo Bernardo Krause (2007a) discussed Maia Neto’sinterpretation, and Maia Neto replied to them. Krause is a Braziliannovelist as well as a professor of literature who published many booksand papers on skepticism and literature (Krause 2004), on Machado(Krause 2006) and other writers such as the well-known Brazilian poetCarlos Drummond de Andrade (Krause 2007b). On the other hand, PauloRoberto Margutti Pinto has been studying the history of Brazilianphilosophy, in which he sees an important role for skepticism longbefore Porchat brought it to center stage. In Pinto 2010, he arguesfor the influence of Francisco Sanches on Brazilian colonial thought.One of the reasons for Porchat’s success is that it seems thatBrazilian thought has always had, at least in some places, a tendencytowards skepticism. Machado de Assis would not be an exception.

Bibliography

Multiply Cited Edited Collections

Other Secondary Literature

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Fernando Bahr (Argentina), José TomásAlvarado (Chile), Mauricio Zuluaga (Colombia), Jorge Ornelas (Mexico),Pablo Quintanilla (Peru), and Carlos Caorsi (Uruguay) for theirfeedback on this entry. We also would like to thank Edward N. Zalta for his help in correcting and improving this entry.