Skepticism about moral responsibility, or what is more commonlyreferred to asmoral responsibility skepticism, refers to afamily of views that all take seriously the possibility that humanbeings are never morally responsible for their actions in a particularbut pervasive sense. This sense is typically set apart by the notionofbasic desert and is defined in terms of the control inaction needed for an agent to betruly deserving of blame andpraise. Some moral responsibility skeptics wholly reject this notionof moral responsibility because they believe it to be incoherent orimpossible. Others maintain that, though possible, our bestphilosophical and scientific theories about the world provide strongand compelling reasons for adopting skepticism about moralresponsibility. What all varieties of moral responsibility skepticismshare, however, is the belief that the justification needed to groundbasic desert moral responsibility and the practices associated withit—such as backward-looking praise and blame, punishment andreward (including retributive punishment), and the reactive attitudesof resentment and indignation—is not met. Versions of moralresponsibility skepticism have historically been defended by Spinoza,Voltaire, Diderot, d’Holbach, Priestley, Schopenhauer,Nietzsche, Clarence Darrow, B.F. Skinner, and Paul Edwards, and morerecently by Galen Strawson, Derk Pereboom, Bruce Waller, Neil Levy,Tamler Sommers, and Gregg D. Caruso.

Critics of these views tend to focus both on the arguments forskepticism about moral responsibilityand on the implicationsof such views. They worry that adopting such a view would have direconsequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality,meaning, and the law. They fear, for instance, that relinquishingbelief in moral responsibility would undermine morality, leave usunable to adequately deal with criminal behavior, increase anti-socialconduct, and destroy meaning in life.Optimistic skeptics,however, respond by arguing that life without free will and basicdesert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many peoplebelieve. These optimistic skeptics argue that prospects of findingmeaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, forinstance, would not be threatened. They further maintain that moralityand moral judgments would remain intact. And although retributivismand severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out,they argue that the imposition of sanctions could serve purposes otherthan the punishment of the guilty—e.g., it can also be justifiedby its role in incapacitating, rehabilitating, and deterringoffenders.

• 1. Moral Responsibility Skepticism and Basic Desert
• 2. Arguments for Moral Responsibility Skepticism
  • 2.1 Hard Determinism
  • 2.2 Hard Incompatibilism
  • 2.3 Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility
  • 2.4 Luck
  • 2.5 Scientific Challenges to Moral Responsibility
• 3. Implications of Moral Responsibility Skepticism
  • 3.1 Illusionism vs/ Disillusionism
  • 3.2 Reactive Attitudes
  • 3.3 Morality
  • 3.4 Criminal Punishment
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Moral Responsibility Skepticism and Basic Desert

To begin, it is important to first get clear on what type of moralresponsibility is being doubted or denied by skeptics. Most moralresponsibility skeptics maintain that our best philosophical andscientific theories about the world indicate that what we do and theway we are is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control,whether that be determinism, chance, or luck, and because of thisagents are never morally responsible in the sense needed to justifycertain kinds ofdesert-based judgments, attitudes, ortreatments—such as resentment, indignation, moral anger,backward-looking blame, and retributive punishment. This is not to saythat there are not other conceptions of responsibility that can bereconciled with determinism, chance, or luck. Nor is it to deny thatthere may be good reasons to maintain certain systems of punishmentand reward. Rather, it is to insist that to hold peopletrulydeserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward, would be tohold them responsible for the results of the morally arbitrary or forwhat is ultimately beyond their control, which is fundamentally unfairand unjust. Other skeptics defend the more moderate claim that in anyparticular case in which we may be tempted to judge that an agent ismorally responsible in thedesert-based sense, we lack theepistemic warrant to do so (e.g., Rosen 2004).

Derk Pereboom provides a very helpful definition of the kind of moralresponsibility being doubted by skeptics, which he callsbasicdesert moral responsibility and defines as follows:

For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in this sense isfor it to be hers in such a way that she would deserve to be blamed ifshe understood that it was morally wrong, and she would deserve to bepraised if she understood that it was morally exemplary. The desert atissue here is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve to beblamed or praised just because she has performed the action, given anunderstanding of its moral status, and not, for example, merely byvirtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations. (2014a:2)

Consistent with this definition, other moral responsibility skepticshave suggested that we understand basic desert moral responsibility interms of whether it would ever be appropriate for a hypotheticaldivine all-knowing judge (who didn’t necessarily create theagents in question) to administer differing kinds of treatment (i.e.,greater or lesser rewards or punishments) to human agents on the basisof actions that these agents performed during their lifetime (seeCaruso & Morris 2017; cf. G. Strawson 1986, 1994). The purpose ofinvoking the notion of a divine judge in the afterlife is to instillthe idea that any rewards or punishments issued after death will haveno further utility—be it positive or negative. Any differencesin treatment to agents (however slight) would therefore seem warrantedonly from abasic desert sense, and not a consequentialistperspective.

Most moral responsibility skeptics distinguish betweenconsequentialist-based anddesert-based approachesto blame and punishment (see, e.g., Nadelhoffer 2011; Pereboom 2001,2014a; Morris, forthcoming; cf. Vargas2012a, 2015 who rejects this distinction as too simplistic).Consequentialist-based approaches are forward-looking in the sensethat agents are considered proper targets of reprobation or punishmentfor immoral actions on the grounds that such treatment will, say,prevent the agent (or other agents) from performing that type ofaction in the future.Desert-based responsibility, on theother hand, is considered to be backward-looking and retributivist inthe sense that any punitive attitudes or treatments that are deemedappropriate responses for an immoral act/decision are warranted simplyby virtue of the action/decision itself, irrespective of whatever goodor bad results might follow from the punitive responses (see Morris,forthcoming). Understood this way, basic desert moral responsibilityrequires a kind of power or ability an agent must possess in order tojustify certain kinds of desert-based judgments, attitudes, ortreatments in response to decisions or actions the agent performed orfailed to perform. These reactions would be justified on purelybackward-looking grounds and would not appeal to consequentialist orforward-looking considerations, such as future protection, futurereconciliation, or future moral formation. It is this kind of moralresponsibility that is being denied by moral responsibility skeptics(e.g., Pereboom 2001, 2014a; G. Strawson 1986; N. Levy 2011; Waller2011, 2014; Caruso 2012; Vilhauer 2009a,b, 2012; Sommers 2009; Focquaert, Glenn, & Raineforthcoming).

Importantly, moral responsibility skepticism, while doubting ordenying basic desert moral responsibility, is consistent with agentsbeing responsible in others senses. For instance,attributability responsibility is about actions or attitudesbeing properly attributable to, or reflective of, an agent’sself. That is, we are responsible for our actions in theattributability sense only when those actions reflect our identity asmoral agents, i.e., when they are attributable to us. Sinceattributability makes no appeal to basic desert or backward-lookingpraise and blame, it remains independent of desert-basedaccountability (see Shoemaker 2011, 2015; Watson 1996; Eshleman 2014)and is consistent with moral responsibility skepticism.

Theanswerability sense of responsibility defended by ThomasScanlon (1998) and Hilary Bok (1998) is also claimed by some skepticsto be consistent with the rejection of basic desert (see Pereboom2012, 2014a; cf. Jeppsson 2016a). According to thisconception of responsibility, someone is responsible for an action orattitude just in case it is connected to her capacity for evaluativejudgment in a way that opens her up, in principle, to demands forjustification from others (Scanlon 1998; Bok 1998; Pereboom 2014a).When we encounter apparently immoral behavior, for example, it isperfectly legitimate to ask the agent, “Why did you decide to dothat?” or “Do you think it was the right thing todo?” If the reasons given in response to such questions aremorally unsatisfactory, we regard it as justified to invite the agentto evaluate critically what her actions indicate about her intentionsand character, to demand an apology, or request reform.

According to Derk Pereboom (2014a), a leading moral responsibilityskeptic, engaging in such interactions is reasonable in light of theright of those harmed or threatened to protect themselves from immoralbehavior and its consequences. In addition, we might have a stake inreconciliation with the wrong doer, and calling her to account in thisway can function as a step toward realizing this objective. We alsohave an interest in her moral formation, and the address describedfunctions as a stage in the process. On this forward-looking reading,answerability responsibility is grounded, not in basic desert, but inthree non-desert invoking desiderata: future protection, futurereconciliation, and future moral formation (see Pereboom 2014a).

Basic desert moral responsibility has also been distinguished fromtake charge responsibility (Waller 1989, 1990, 2004, 2011,2014). Bruce Waller, for instance, has argued:

Just deserts and moral responsibility require a godlikepower—the existential power of choosing ourselves, the godlikepower of making ourselves from scratch, the divine capacity to be anuncaused cause—that we do not have” (2011: 40).

Yet, he maintains,

you [nevertheless] have take-charge responsibility for your own life,which is a responsibility you deeply value and enjoyexercising… (2011: 108).

Taking responsibility is distinguished frombeing morallyresponsible in that, if one takes responsibility for a particularoutcome it does not follow that one is morally responsible for thatoutcome. One can take responsibility for many things, from the mundaneto the vitally important. For example, one can take responsibility forteaching a course, organizing a conference, or throwing a birthdayparty. The responsibility taken, however, is profoundly different fromthe moral responsibility that would justify blame and punishment,praise and reward (Waller 2011: 105; Pereboom 2001: xxi).

While some philosophers may claim (or assume) that takingresponsibility entails being morally responsible (e.g., Smilansky2012), this seems to conflate a very important distinction. To takeresponsibility for, say, organizing a conference, is to agree to putforth the effort needed to achieve a certain set of goals ortasks—e.g., inviting speakers, putting out a CFP, reserving thespace, etc. If the conference were to fail for reasons completelyoutside the control of the agent—say there was a major snowstormthat day and several of the speakers could not make it—it wouldremain a separate and open question whether the agent who took chargefor organizing the conference was deserving of blame for the failure.For many, the intuition is rather strong that she is not, especiallyin cases where the reasons for failure are external to the agent(e.g., a snow storm, canceled flights, etc.). But skeptics wouldcontend that the same remains true when the failure is due to theagent’s own flaws (e.g., their laziness) since in a naturalisticworld devoid of miracles these too are the result of factors outsidethe control of the agent (e.g., determinism, chance, or luck).

2. Arguments for Moral Responsibility Skepticism

Now that we understand the kind of moral responsibility being doubtedor denied by skeptics, we can examine the argumentsfor moralresponsibility skepticism. Traditionally, the concept of moralresponsibility has been closely connected to the problem of free will.In fact, many contemporary philosophers simply define free will interms of the control in action needed for moral responsibility (thoughan epistemic condition for moral responsibility is generally alsoadded)—see, for example, Pereboom (2001, 2014a), G. Strawson(1986, 1994), Campbell (1957), Clarke (2005a), N. Levy (2011),Richards (2000), Caruso (2012), Nahmias (2012), Mele (2006), Sommers(2007b, 2009), Vargas (2013), Wolf (2011), Vilhauer (2009a), Callender(2010). According to these theorists, the concepts of free will and moral responsibility stand or fall together. And while there are a few notable exceptions to definingfree will in this way—namely John Martin Fischer’ssemi-compatibilism (Fischer & Ravizza 1998; Fischer 2007)and Bruce Waller’s reverse semi-compatibilism (2015)—eventhese philosophers nevertheless acknowledge that moral responsibility,as an independent concept, can be threatened by the same kind ofconcerns as free will (e.g., determinism, indeterminism, chance, andluck). I will examine each of these threats in turn.

2.1 Hard Determinism

Causal determinism, as it is commonly understood, is roughlythe thesis that every event or action, including human action, is theinevitable result of preceding events and actions and the laws ofnature. The traditionalproblem of free will and determinismcomes in trying to reconcile our intuitive sense of free will with theidea that impersonal forces over which we have no ultimate control maycausally determine our choices and actions. [I should note that arelated problem arises with regard to God’s foreknowledge (seethe entry onforeknowledge and free will).] In the past, the standard view advancing moral responsibilityskepticism washard determinism: the view that causaldeterminism is true, and incompatible with free will and moralresponsibility—either because it precludes theability to dootherwise (leeway incompatibilism) or because it is inconsistentwith one’s being the “ultimate source” of action(source incompatibilism). For hard determinists,libertarianfree will is simply impossible because human actions are part of afully deterministic world andcompatibilism amounts to a“quagmire of evasion” (James 1884; see the entry onarguments for Incompatibilism).

Hard determinism had its classic statement in the time when Newtonianphysics reigned (see, Spinoza 1677 [1985]; d’Holbach 1770), butit has very few defenders today—largely because the standardinterpretation of quantum mechanics has been taken by many toundermine, or at least throw into doubt, the thesis of universaldeterminism. This is not to say that determinism has been refuted orfalsified by modern physics, because it has not. Determinism still hasits modern defenders (e.g., Honderich 1988, 2002) and the finalinterpretation of physics is not yet in (see, for example, the entryonBohmian mechanics). It is also important to keep in mind that even if we allow someindeterminacy to exist at the microlevel of our existence—thelevel studied by quantum mechanics—there would still likelyremaindeterminism-where-it-matters (Honderich 2002: 5). Thatis,

At the ordinary level of choices and actions, and even ordinaryelectrochemical activity in our brains, causal laws govern whathappens. It’s all cause and effect in what you might call reallife. (Honderich 2002: 5)

Nonetheless, most contemporary skeptics tend to defend positions thatare best seen as successors to traditional hard determinism.

2.2 Hard Incompatibilism

One of these positions ishard incompatibilism, whichmaintains that whatever the fundamental nature of reality, whether itis deterministicor indeterministic, we lack basic desertmoral responsibility. Hard incompatibilism amounts to a rejection ofboth compatibilism and libertarianism. It maintains that the sort offree will required for basic desert moral responsibility isincompatible with causal determination by factors beyond theagent’s control andalso with the kind of indeterminismin action required by the most plausible versions of libertarianism(see Pereboom 2001, 2014a).

The argument for hard incompatibilism can be sketched as follows:Against the view that free will is compatible with the causaldetermination of our actions by natural factors beyond our control(i.e., compatibilism), most hard incompatibilists maintain that thereis no relevant difference between this prospect and our actions beingcausally determined by manipulators (e.g., Pereboom 2001, 2014a). [Foradditional arguments against compatibilism, see the entry onarguments for incompatibilism.] Againstevent-causal libertarianism, hard incompatibilistsgenerally advance the “luck” or “disappearingagent” objection, according to which agents are left unable tosettle whether a decision/action occurs and hence cannot havethe control in action required for moral responsibility (Pereboom2001, 2014a; 2017c; Waller 1990, 2011, N. Levy 2008, 2011; fornon-skeptics who advance similar objections see Ekstrom 2000; Mele1999a, 2017; Haji 2001). The same problem, they contend, arises fornon-causal libertarian accounts since these too fail toprovide agents with the control in action needed for basic desert(Pereboom 2014a). Whileagent-causal libertarianism could, intheory, supply this sort of control, hard incompatibilists argue thatit cannot be reconciled with our best physical theories (Pereboom2001, 2014a; Waller 2011; Harris 2012; cf. N. Levy 2011)and faces additional problems accounting for mental causation. Since this exhausts the options for views on which we have the sort of free will needed for basic desert moral responsibility, hard incompatibilists conclude that moral responsibility skepticism is theonly remaining position.

Critics of hard incompatibilism include both compatibilists andlibertarians. See, for example, the entries oncompatibilism,incompatibilist (nondeterministic) theories of free will, andarguments for incompatibilism. I will here only briefly discuss one possible compatibilistreply—the attempt to block the conclusion of the manipulationargument, one of the main arguments employed by hard incompatibilistsand other incompatibilists.

Most manipulation arguments introduce various science-fiction-likescenarios, or manipulation cases, aimed to show that agents who meetall the various compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility cannevertheless be subject to responsibility-undermining manipulation.These arguments further maintain that these manipulation casesresemble in the relevant ways agents in the normal (non-manipulated)deterministic case. They go on to conclude that if agents fail to bemorally responsible in the manipulated cases they also fail to bemorally responsible in the normal deterministic case (see Pereboom1995, 2001, 2014a; Mele 2008; Todd 2013; for a less demanding versionof the argument, one that aims to show only that the manipulation inquestion ismitigating with respect to moral responsibility,see Todd 2011).

Consider, for example, Pereboom’s famous “four-case”argument. The argument sets out three examples of actions that involvemanipulation, the first of which features the most radical sort ofmanipulation consistent with all the leading compatibilist conditions,each progressively more like the fourth, which is an ordinary case ofaction causally determined in a natural way. The challenge is for thecompatibilist to point out a relevant and principled differencebetween any two adjacent cases that would show why the agent might bemorally responsible in the latter example but not the former. Here,for instance, is the second case:

Plum is just like an ordinary human being, except that a team ofneuroscientists programmed him at the beginning on his life so thathis reasoning is often but not always egoistic, and at times stronglyso, with the intended consequence that in his current circumstances heis causally determined to engage in the egoistic reasons-responsiveprocess of deliberation and to have the set of first and second-orderdesires that result in his decision to kill White. Plum has thegeneral ability to regulate his actions by moral reasons, but in hiscircumstances, due to the strongly egoistic nature of his deliberativereasoning, he is causally determined to make his decision to kill. Yethe does not decide as he does because of an irresistible desire.(2014a: 77)

Is Plum morally responsible in the basic desert sense for killingWhite? Defenders of manipulation arguments say “no.” Theyfurther argue that there is no relevant difference between this caseand mere causal determinism. By comparing this case to the other threecases—the final case being just like the above except thatnatural deterministic causes have taken the place of theneuroscientists—Pereboom and others argue that it is simplyirrelevant whether Plum’s psychological statesultimately trace back to intentional agents or non-intentional causes.What does matter, and what is responsibility-undermining, is that inall four cases the agent’s actions are ultimately the result offactors beyond their control.

In response, compatibilists adopt eitherhard-line orsoft-line replies (see McKenna 2008). Hard-line replies grantthat there is no relevant difference between agents in the variousmanipulated scenarios and ordinary (non-manipulated) agents indeterministic settings, rather they attack the intuition that agentsare not morally responsible in the manipulated cases. They maintainthat as long as the various compatibilist conditions for moralresponsibility are satisfied, manipulated agents are just as free andmorally responsible as determined agents—despite what might beour initial intuition. Soft-line replies, on the other hand, try todifferentiate between the various cases. They search for relevantdifferences between the cases, differences that would account for whymanipulated agents are not free and morally responsible, butnon-manipulated and causally determined agents are. There are,however, problems with both types of replies.

The main worry people have with the hard-line approach is that itconflicts too deeply with our intuitions about the relevant class ofmanipulation cases (Capes, forthcoming). Many people find it highlyimplausible that someone like Plum could be morally responsible in thebasic desert sense for his behavior given how the behavior came about(cf. Fischer 2011, 2014; McKenna 2008, 2014, 2017; Sartorio 2016;Tierney 2013, 2014; Capes 2013; Haji & Cuypers 2006). The mainworry with the soft-line approach, on the other hand, is that anydifference identified as the relevant one between manipulated agentsand ordinary determined agents may be a difference that applies onlyto current manipulation cases but not future cases. For example, mostextant manipulation cases involve external agents who act asintentional manipulators, whereas this is missing in the normal caseof natural determinism. Proponents of soft-line replies mighttherefore be tempted to point to this as the relevant difference.Setting aside for the moment the potential question-begging nature ofthis move, the reply also suffers from the fact that new manipulationarguments have recently been devised that avoid external agentsaltogether.

A similar problem confronts soft-line replies that point toresponsibility-conferring conditions not specified in a particularmanipulation case (Lycan 1987; Baker 2006; Feltz 2012; Murray &Lombrozo 2017). That is, even if one could point to a relevantdifference between an agent in an extant manipulation case and anagent in the naturally-determined case, this may only serve as aninvitation for proponents of the manipulation argument to revise thevignette on which their argument is based so that the agent nowsatisfies the relevant condition on which the soft-liner insists(Capes, forthcoming). The challenge, then, for defenders of thesoft-line approach is to show that there is some kind of requirementfor free action and moral responsibility that can be satisfied byagents in deterministic settings but which cannot (in principle) besatisfied by agents in manipulation cases. [For a recent attempt atsatisfying this challenge, see Deery and Nahmias (2017); for a reply,see Capes (forthcoming).]

2.3 Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility

Another argument for moral responsibility skepticism, one that makesno appeal at all to determinism or indeterminism, was first introducedby Friedrich Nietzsche (1886 [1992]) and later revived and fleshed outby Galen Strawson (1994, 2011). This argument maintains that free willand ultimate moral responsibility are incoherent concepts, since to befree in the sense required for ultimate moral responsibility we wouldhave to becausa sui (or “cause of oneself”) andthis is impossible. Nietzsche, for example, writes:

Thecausa sui is the best self-contradiction that has beenconceived so far; it is a sort of rape and perversion of logic. Butthe extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundlyand frightfully with just this nonsense. The desire for “freedomof the will” in the superlative metaphysical sense, which stillholds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated; thedesire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one’sactions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, andsociety involves nothing less than to be precisely thiscausasui and, with more than Baron Munchhausen’s audacity, topull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps ofnothingness. (1886 [1992] sec. 21)

Galen Strawson makes a similar case for the impossibility of moralresponsibility with his so-calledBasic Argument (1986, 1994,2011). The central argument can be summarized as follows:

1. Nothing can becausa sui—nothing can be the causeof itself.
2. In order to be truly or ultimately morally responsible forone’s actions one would have to becausa sui, at leastin certain crucial mental respects.
3. Therefore, no one can be truly or ultimately morallyresponsible.

The expanded version of the argument runs as follows (Strawson2011):

1. Interested in free action, we’re particularly interested inactions performed for a reason (as opposed to reflex actions ormindlessly habitual actions).
2. When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how oneis, mentally speaking.
3. So if one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must betruly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking—at least incertain respects.
4. But to be truly responsible for how one is, in any mental respect,one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, in thatrespect. And it’s not merely that one must have caused oneselfto be the way one is, in that respect. One must also have consciouslyand explicitly chosen to be the way one is, in that respect, and onemust have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way.
5. But one can’t really be said to choose, in a conscious,reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is in any respect at all, unlessone already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with someprinciples of choice, “P1”—preferences, values,ideals—in the light of which one chooses how to be.
6. But then to be truly responsible, on account of having chosen tobe the way one is, in certain mental respects, one must be trulyresponsible for one’s having the principles of choice P1 in thelight of which one chose how to be.
7. But for this to be so one must have chosen P1, in a reasoned,conscious, intentional fashion.
8. But for this to be so one must already have had some principles ofchoice P2, in the light of which one chose P1.
9. And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we cannotstop. True self-determination is impossible because it requires theactual completion of an infinite series of choices of principles ofchoice.
10. So true moral responsibility is impossible, because it requirestrue self-determination, as noted in (3).

This argument trades on some strong and commonsense intuitions.It’s intuitive to think that one is initially the way one is asa result of heredity and early experience—and it’sundeniable that these are factors for which one cannot be held in anyway responsible (morally or otherwise). Yet, it also makes sense tothink that one cannot at any later stage of life hope to accede totrue or ultimate moral responsibility for the way one is by trying tochange the way one already is as a result of one’s geneticinheritance and previous experience, since both the particular way inwhich one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree ofone’s success in one’s attempt to change, will bedetermined by how one already is as a result of one’s geneticinheritance and previous experience. And any further changes that onecan bring about only after one has brought about certain initialchanges will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, byone’s genetic inheritance and previous experience. Such isStrawson’s argument for the impossibility of moralresponsibility.

While this argument is simple, eloquent, and rather intuitive, it hasbeen widely criticized by compatibilists and libertarians alike (see,e.g., Hurley 2000; Clarke 2005a; Bernstein 2005; Fischer 2006; Kane2000; Coates 2017; for replies see Istvan 2011; Parks 2009). Somecritics question Strawson’s notion ofultimateresponsibility, which he defines as

responsibility of such a kind that, if we have it, then itmakessense to suppose that it could be just to punish some of us with(eternal) torment in hell and reward others with (eternal) bliss inheaven. (2011: 43)

Others critics challenge the claim that in order to be responsible forone’s actions, one has to be the cause of oneself. In theopposite direction, others try to escape from the regress of theargument by making sense of the possibility of self-creation(Bernstein 2005; see also Kane 1996; Lemos 2015; Roskies 2012). Othersstill attack the claim that if what one does when one acts for areason is to be up to one, then how one is mentally, in some respect,must be up to one (Clarke 2005a). Finally, some simply suggest that accounts of free actionare often meant to be accounts of precisely how itcan bethat, even if it is not up to an agent how she is mentally, her actioncan still be up to her, she can still have a choice about whether sheperforms the action, even when she acts for reasons (Mele 1995:221–27).

Defenders of the Basic Argument have attempted to counter theseobjections in a number of ways. Some respond by arguing, contraFischer (2006), that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premisethat an agent can be responsible for an action only if she isresponsible forevery factor contributing to that action (seeIstvan 2011). Others argue, in response to Mele (1995) and Clarke(2005a), that it is highly counterintuitive to believe that an agentcan be morally responsible for an action when no factor contributingto that action is up to that agent (Istvan 2011). In response to thesuggestion that certain versions of agent-causal libertarianism canimmunize the agent to the Basic Argument (see Clarke 2005a), theyargue that such accounts actually fail to do so (Istvan 2011). Lastly,some defenders of the Basic Argument recast the argument in a formthat eliminates certain problems associated with Strawson’soriginal version and offer additional thought experiments to bolsterits underlying assumptions (see Parks 2009).

2.4 Luck

Another argument that maintains that regardless of the causalstructure of the universe we lack free will and moral responsibilityholds that free will and basic desert moral responsibility areincompatible with the pervasiveness ofluck (see N. Levy2009a, 2011; cf. Haji 2016). This argument is intended not only as anobjection toevent-causal libertarianism, as theluckobjection is, but extends to compatibilism as well. At the heartof the argument is the following dilemma: either actions are subjecttopresent luck (luck around the time of the action), or theyare subject to what Thomas Nagel (1979) influentially namedconstitutive luck (luck that causes relevant properties ofagents, such as their desires, beliefs, and circumstances), or both(N. Levy 2011). Either way, luck undermines moral responsibility sinceit undermines responsibility-level control. This is what Neil Levycalls theLuck Pincer and it can be summarized as follows(Levy 2011: 84–97; as summarized in Hartman 2017: 43):

Universal Luck Premise: Every morally significant act iseither constitutively lucky, presently lucky, or both.

Responsibility Negation Premise: Constitutive and presentluck each negate moral responsibility.

Conclusion: An agent is not morally responsible for anymorally significant acts.

Let us examine the argument in more detail, focusing first on whatexactly is meant by “luck.”

While there are several competing accounts of “luck” inthe literature, the Luck Pincer is couched in terms of a modal account(N. Levy 2011; cf. Pritchard 2005, 2014; Driver 2012; Hales 2015,2016; Latus 2000, 2003; Hartman 2017; Zimmerman 1987, 2002, 2009;Coffman 2015; see also entry onmoral luck). The modal account, as developed by Levy (2011), defines luck by wayof possible worlds without reference to indeterminism or determinism,and it classifies luck as eitherchancy ornotchancy. An agent’s beingchancy lucky is definedas follows:

An event or state of affairs occurring in the actual world is chancylucky for an agent if (i) that event or state of affairs issignificant for that agent; (ii) the agent lacks direct control overthe event or state of affairs; and (iii) that event or state ofaffairs fails to occur in many nearby possible worlds; the proportionof nearby worlds that is large enough for the event to be chancy luckyis inverse to the significance of the event for the agent. (N. Levy2011: 36)

On the other hand:

An event or state of affairs occurring in the actual world thataffects an agent’s psychological traits or dispositions isnon-chancy lucky for an agent if (i) that event or state of affairs issignificant for that agent; (ii) the agent lacks direct control overthat event or state of affairs; (iii) events or states of affairs ofthat kind vary across the relevant reference group, and…in alarge enough proportion of cases that event or state of affairs failsto occur or be instantiated in the reference group in the way in whichit occurred or was instantiated in the actual case. (N. Levy 2011:36)

Note that the first two conditions are the same for an agent’sbeing chancy and non-chancy lucky—i.e., (i)significance, and (ii)lack of direct control. Andwe can say that an event issignificant for an agent if shecares about the event and it can have either good or bad significancefor her (N. Levy 2011: 13). It may, for instance, be chancy whether Ihave an odd or even number of hairs on my head at 12 noon, but itwould be strange to say that this is a matter of luck since wegenerally reserve the appellation “luck” for events thatmatter (N. Levy 2011: 13)—i.e., we do not generallyspeak of entirely trivial events as lucky (i.e., as good or bad for anagent). With regard to the second condition, we can say that an agenthasdirect control over an event if the agent is able (withhigh probability) to bring it about by intentionally performing abasic action and if the agent realizes that this is the case (N. Levy2011: 19; cf. Coffman 2007).

To help understand how the third condition differs in the twodefinitions—i.e., themodal condition (chancy luck) andtheuncommon instantiation condition (non-chancyluck)—lets consider some examples. A paradigmatic example of achancy lucky event is Louis’s winning the lottery. This isbecause (i) he lacks direct control over winning the lottery sincethere is no basic action that he can perform to bring it about, (ii)the event of his winning the lottery is also at least minimallysignificant, and (iii)—the modal condition—in most closepossible worlds with a small divergence from the actual world, Louisdoes not win. On the other hand, Elaini may be non-chancy lucky forbeing a genius with a high IQ in comparison with her peers (Hartman2017: 44–46). This is because (i) Elaini lacks direct controlover being a genius, (ii) it is significant for her, and(iii)—the uncommon instantiation condition—being a geniusis not commonly instantiated in that reference group (assuming, ofcourse, that most of her actual peers are not geniuses).

To these three conditions, we can now also add the distinction betweenpresent luck andconstitutive luck. We can say thatan agent’s decision is the result of present luck if acircumstantial factor outside of the agent’s control at or nearthe time of action significantly influences the decision. Suchcircumstantial factors could include the agent’s mood, whatreasons happen to come to her, situational features of theenvironment, and the like. For instance:

Our mood may influence what occurs to us, and what weight we give tothe considerations that do cross our mind…Our attention maywander at just the wrong moment or just the right one, or ourdeliberation may be primed by chance features of our environment. (N.Levy 2009a: 245; see also 2011: 90)

In contrast, we can say that an agent’s decision is the resultof constitutive luck if that decision is partially settled by herdispositional endowment, which is outside of her control (N. Levy2011: 87). Finally, while present luck is limited to cases of chancyluck, constitutive luck can be a subspecies of both chancy andnon-chancy luck since it can refer to a disposition that an agentpossesses in either a chancy or a non-chancy way (N. Levy 2011:87).

With these definitions in place we can now return to theLuckPincer and see how libertarian and compatibilist accounts fareagainst it. Libertarian accounts famously face the problem ofexplaining how a decision or action can be free, given the libertariandemand for indeterminacy immediately prior to directly free action.Moral responsibility skeptics and compatibilists alike have longargued that such indeterminacy makes the action unacceptably chancy,in a way that is responsibility-undermining (see, e.g., N. Levy 2009a,2011; Mele 1999a,b, 2006; Haji 2002, 2004, 2005, 2014; van Inwagen2000; Pereboom 2001, 2014a; for some replies seeKane 1999; Clarke 2005b; Mele 2017). And it is argued that thisapplies to both event-causal and agent-causal versions oflibertarianism (see Mele 2006; Haji 2004, 2016; N. Levy 2011). Thekind of luck that is problematic here ispresent chancy luck,since the agent’s putatively “free” decision ischancy (i.e., the same decision would fail to occur in many nearbypossible worlds), significant, and the circumstantial factor outsideof the agent’s control (i.e., the indeterminate event(s)) occursjust prior to the decision.

Peter van Inwagen (2000) makes vivid the lack of control a libertarianagent has over genuinely undetermined events by considering what wouldhappen if God rolled back the relevant stretch of history to somepoint prior to an undetermined event and then allowed it to unfoldonce more (N. Levy 2009a: 238). Since events would not unfold in thesame way on the replay as they did the first time round, since theseare genuinely undetermined, and nothing the agent does (or is) canensure which undetermined possibility is realized, the outcome of thissequence (in this case the agent’s decision) is a matter ofluck. Such luck, skeptics argue, is responsibility-undermining.

Compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility, on the other hand, arevulnerable to their own powerful luck objection (N. Levy 2009a, 2011;Haji 2003, 2016; cf. Vargas 2012b). We can divide compatibilistaccounts into two main categories:historical andnon-historical. Historical accounts are sensitive to themanner in which an agent comes to be the kind of person they are, inthe circumstances in which they find themselves (see Mele 1995, 2006;Fischer & Ravizza 1998). If an agent, for instance, decides todonate a large sum of money to Oxfam, historical accounts of moralresponsibility hold that it is important how the agent came to havesuch a generous nature and make the decision they did—forexample, did the agent have a normal history and acquire thedisposition to generosity naturally, or did a team of neuroscientists(say) engineer them to have a generous nature? Non-historicalaccounts, on the other hand, maintain that moral responsibilitydepends instead on non-historical factors—like whether an agentidentifies with his/her own desires (Frankfurt 1971) or the quality ofan agent’s will (Scanlon 1998).

The main problem with historical accounts is that they cannotsatisfactorily explain how agents can take responsibility for theirconstitutive luck. The problem here is analogous to the problem raisedby manipulation arguments (N. Levy 2009a, 2011). Manipulated agentsare the victims of (very bad) luck: the manipulation is significantfor them, they lack control over its (non-) occurrence, and it ischancy, in as much as there are nearby possible worlds in which themanipulation does not occur (N. Levy 2009a: 242). The problem ofconstitutive luck is similar in that an agent’sendowments—i.e., traits and dispositions—likewiseresult from factors beyond the agent’s control, are significant,and either chancy or non-chancy lucky. A historical compatibilistcould respond, as they often do to manipulations cases, that as longas an agenttakes responsibility for her endowments,dispositions, and values, over time she willbecome morallyresponsible for them. The problem with this reply, however, is thatthe series of actions through which agents shape and modify theirendowments, dispositions, and values are themselves significantlysubject to present luck—and, as Levy puts it, “we cannotundo the effects of luck with more luck” (2009a: 244). Hence,the very actions to which history-sensitive compatibilists point, theactions whereby agents take responsibility for their endowment, eitherexpress that endowment (when they are explained byconstitutive luck) or reflect the agent’s present luck, or both(see N. Levy 2009a: 247, 2011).

If this argument is correct, present luck is not only a problem forlibertarianism it is also a problem for historical compatibilism. Andwhile present luck may be abigger problem for libertarians,since they require the occurrence of undetermined events in the causalchain leading to free action, the problem it creates for historicalcompatibilists is nonetheless significant. With compatibilism, we needto assess the implications of present luckin conjunctionwith the implications of constitutive luck. When we do, we see thatthough it might often be the case that the role played by present luckin the decisions and actions of compatibilist agents is relativelysmall, it is the agent’s endowment—directly, or asmodified by the effects of present luck, or both—which explainswhy this is so (N. Levy 2009a: 248). An agent’s pre-existingbackground of reasons, desires, attitudes, belief, andvalues—against which an agent deliberates—is the endowmentfrom constitutive luck, inflected and modified, to be sure, butinflected and modified by decisions which eitherexpressconstitutive luck, or which were not settled by the endowment,andtherefore were subject to present luck (N. Levy 2009a: 248).Hence, the Luck Pincer: actions are either the product of constitutiveluck, present luck, or both.

Non-historical accounts, on the other hand, run into seriousdifficulties of their own with the epistemic condition on control overaction. The epistemic condition maintains that moral responsibilityfor an action requires that the agent understands that, and how, theaction is sensitive to her behavior, as well as appreciation of thesignificance of that action or culpable ignorance of these facts (N.Levy 2011: ch.5; cf. Rosen 2003, 2004, 2008; Zimmerman 1997, 2009;Vargas 2005a). Because the epistemic condition on control is sodemanding and itself subject to the Luck Pincer, non-historicalaccounts of compatibilism (as well as other accounts that may survivethe above arguments) face a serious challenge (see N. Levy 2011,2009b). Consider cases of non-culpable ignorance. Imagine, forinstance, that a 16^th century surgeon operates on a patientwithout washing his hands or sterilizing his equipment, and as aresult his patient gets an infection and dies. The surgeon would notbe blameworthy in this situation because he was non-culpably ignorantof the risks of non-sterilization, since germ theory was notestablished until much later. In this and other cases of non-culpableignorance, the fact that agents are ignorant of the relevant detailsis frequently a matter of luck—either present luck orconstitutive luck or both.

We can say that non-culpable ignorance is chancy lucky when an agentfails to know thatp (wherep is significant forher), lacks direct control over whether she knows thatp, andin a large proportion of nearby possible worlds does know thatp. Lets say I drop my daughter Maya off at a friend’shouse for a play date. She has a peanut allergy and I forget to informthe other parent, Dolores, at the time of drop-off. When I get to thecoffee shop, I realize this and immediately text Dolores about theallergy, but because I’m in a “dead zone” themessage does not go through. Not having received my text, Doloresproceeds to give the kids a snack with peanut butter in it, resultingin Maya having a near-fatal reaction. Dolores’ non-culpableignorance in this case is chancy lucky since in a large portion ofnearby possible worlds she would have received the text. The16^th century surgeon example, on the other hand, is betterseen as an example of non-chancy luck, since his ignorance is theresult of bad luck inasmuch as beliefs about germs vary across agentsin different historical periods (the relevant reference group here),rather than nearby possible worlds.

Since non-culpable ignorance is responsibility-undermining and muchmore common than philosophers typically think, it gives additionalforce to the Luck Pincer. Thanks to luck, distant or present, agentswho perform wrongful actionstypically lack freedom-levelcontrol over their actions because they fail to satisfy the epistemiccondition on such control (N. Levy 2011: 115–16). In cases ofunwitting wrongdoing, there often is no plausible candidate for aculpablebenighting action that could ground blameworthiness(N. Levy 2011: 131). Furthermore, it is often the case that we cannotreasonably demand of agents that they do not act in ways that expresstheir epistemic vices (N. Levy 2011: 126). When an agent does not seethat she is managing her moral views badly, it would be unfair toblame her for doing wrong if she had no internal reasons for omittingher bad behavior. This is because, when an agent is managing her moralviews badly from the point of view ofobjective morality, itis often the case that hersubjective moral values andbeliefs—whichex hypothesi she does not know arewrong—are governing herself in a perfectly rational andconsistent way. Since these internal moral values and beliefs arethemselves a matter of luck—either present, constitutive, orboth—we once again arrive at the Luck Pincer. It would seem,then, that present luck, constitutive luck, or both, swallows all, andboth libertarian and compatibilist accounts fail to preserve moralresponsibility.

For some objections to the Luck Pincer, see Talbert (2013, 2016),Hartman (2017), Hales (2016). For a different argument based on luck for the conclusion that agents arefar less morally blameworthy than we have hithertopresumed, see Haji (2016). For a compatibilism that is responsive toconcerns of luck but that resists full-blown skepticism about freewill and moral responsibility, see Paul Russell’sfree willpessimism (2017).

2.5 Scientific Challenges to Moral Responsibility

In addition to these philosophical arguments, there have also beenrecent developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciencesthat have caused some to take moral responsibility skepticismseriously. Chief among them have been findings in neuroscience thatputatively indicate that unconscious brain activity causally initiatesaction prior to the conscious awareness of the intention to act (see,e.g., Libet et al. 1983; Libet 1985, 1999; Soon et al. 2008; Wegner2002) and recent findings in psychology and social psychology onautomaticity,situationism, and theadaptiveunconscious (see, e.g., Bargh 1997, 2008; Bargh & Chartrand1999; Bargh & Ferguson 2000; T. Wilson 2002; Doris 2002).

The neuroscientific threat to moral responsibility originates with thepioneering work of Benjamin Libet and his colleagues. In theirgroundbreaking study on the neuroscience of movement, Libet et al.(1983) investigated the timing of brain processes and compared them tothe timing of conscious will in relation to self-initiated voluntaryacts. They found that the conscious intention to move (which theylabeledW) came 200 milliseconds before the motor act, but350-400 milliseconds afterreadiness potential (RP)—aramp-like buildup of electrical activity that occurs in the brain andprecedes actual movement. These findings lead Libet and others toconclude that the conscious intention or decision to move cannot bethe true cause of action because it comes too late in theneuropsychological sequence (see Libet 1985, 1999; Wegner 2002; Soonet al. 2008; Pockett 2004; Obhi & Haggard 2004; Haggard &Eimer 1999; Roediger, Goode, & Zaromb 2008). For some scientificskeptics, these and other findings (e.g., Soon et al. 2008) suggestthat the causal efficacy of the kind of willing required for free willand moral responsibility is an illusion (e.g., Wegner 2002).

There are, however, powerful objections to this interpretation of theneuroscientific findings. Some critics argue that there is no directway to tell which conscious phenomena, if any, correspond to whichneural events (Mele 2009). In particular, it is difficult to determinewhat the readiness potential corresponds to—is it, for instance,anintention formation ordecision, or is it merelyanurge of some sort? Al Mele (2009), for instance, hasforcefully argued that the readiness potential (RP) that precedesaction by a half-second or more need not be construed as thecause of the action but rather is best interpreted as thebeginning of forming anintention to act. On this reading,conscious intentions can still be causes. Other critics have pointedto the “impossible demand” of Libet-like experiments (N.Levy 2005), or the unusual nature of its experimental design (Nahmias2002, 2011), or to its irrelevance to moral responsibility (N. Levy2014a), or to alternative explanations that are less threatening(Rosenthal 2002; Dennett 2003). These objections have led manycontemporary philosophers (including many skeptics) to reject theneuroscientific argument for moral responsibility (see, e.g., Pereboom& Caruso forthcoming; N. Levy 2005, 2014a; Morris 2009).

There are, however, other scientific threats to moral responsibilitybesides those posed by neuroscience. Recent work in psychology andsocial psychology onautomaticity,situationism, andtheadaptive unconscious, for instance, has shown that thecauses that move us are often less transparent to ourselves than wemight assume—diverging in many cases from the conscious reasonswe provide to explain and/or justify our actions (see, e.g., Nisbett& Wilson 1977; T. Wilson 2002; Doris 2002; Bargh 1997, 2008; Bargh& Chartrand 1999; Bargh & Ferguson 2000; Kahneman 2011). Thesefindings reveal just how wide open our internal psychologicalprocesses are to the influence of external stimuli and events in ourimmediate environment, without knowledge or awareness of suchinfluence. They also reveal the extent to which our decisions andbehaviors are driven by implicit biases (see, e.g., Uhlmann &Cohen 2005; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz 1998; Nosek et al. 2007)and other unconscious System-1 processes (Kahneman 2011). No longer isit believed that only “lower level” or “dumb”processes can be carried out non-consciously. We now know that thehigher mental processes that have traditionally served asquintessential examples of ‘free will’—such asevaluation and judgment, reasoning and problem solving, andinter-personal behavior—can and often do occur in the absence ofconscious choice and guidance (Bargh & Ferguson 2000; T. Wilson2002; Kahneman 2011).

While these findings may not be enough on their own to establishglobal skepticism about moral responsibility, they represent apotential threat to our everyday folk understanding of ourselves asconscious, rational, responsible agents, since they indicate that theconscious mind exercises less control over our behavior than we havetraditionally assumed. Even some compatibilists now admit that becauseof these findings “free will is at best an occasionalphenomenon” (Baumeister 2008: 17; see also Nelkin 2005; Herdova2016). This is an important concession because it acknowledges thatthethreat of shrinking agency (Nadelhoffer 2011) remains aserious one independent of the neuroscientific concerns discussedabove. The deflationary view of consciousness which emerges from theseempirical findings, including the fact that we often lack transparentawareness of our true motivational states, is potentially agencyundermining and could shrink the realm of morally responsible action(see N. Levy 2014a; Nadelhoffer 2011; King &Carruthers 2012; Sie & Wouters 2010, Brink 2013; Caruso 2015a; cf. Vargas 2013;K. Levy 2015; McKenna & Warmke forthcoming; Ciurria 2013; Mele& Shepherd 2013). A major point of disagreement, however, is overwhether consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility, and, ifso, what role or function it must serve (cf. N. Levy 2014a; Shepherd 2012, 2015a,b,c; Searle 2000, 2001; Hodgson 2005, 2012; Sher 2009; Doris 2002, 2015; Nahmias 2002;Smith 2005, 2008; Sifferd 2016).

Lastly, independent of the two more specific concerns mentioned above,there is also the more general insight, more threatening toagent-causal libertarianism than compatibilism, that as the brainsciences progress and we better understand the mechanisms thatundergird human behavior, the more it becomes obvious that we lackwhat some have called “soul control” (see Clark 2013).Naturalists about the mind argue that there is no longer any reason tobelieve in a non-physical self which controls action and is liberatedfrom the deterministic laws of nature; a littleuncausedcauser capable of exercising counter-causal free will. While mostcontemporary philosophers, including most compatibilists, have longgiven up on the idea of soul control, eliminating such thinking fromour folk psychological attitudes may not be so easy and may come at acost for some. There is some evidence, for example, that we are“natural born” dualists (Bloom 2004) and that, at least inthe United States, a majority of adults continue to believe in anon-physical soul that governs behavior (Demertzi et al. 2009;Fahrenberg & Cheetham 2000; World Values Survey 1991–2004; Riekki et al. 2013). To whatever extent, then, such dualistic thinking is present in our folk psychological attitudes about free will and moralresponsibility (cf. Nadelhoffer 2014; Mele 2014), it is likely to comeunder pressure and require some revision as the brain sciences advanceand this information reaches the general public (see, e.g., Greene& Cohen 2004). Of course, how and in what direction this revisionwill occur is an open empirical question—e.g., some may adopt arevisionism about free will and moral responsibility(à la Vargas 2005b, 2009, 2007, 2012a) while other may opt fora moreeliminativist response (à la Pereboom 2001,2014a; Waller 1990, 2011; Strawson 1986; Caruso 2015b).

[Note: While most anti-skeptical arguments focus on objections to themanipulation argument, the luck objection, the Basic Argument, theLuck Pincer, etc., some recent anti-skeptical arguments have alsofocused on the role of reference and alternative ways of thinkingabout free will and moral responsibility. See, for example, thearguments of Shaun Nichols (2013, 2015; Nichols et al. 2016) and Oisín Deery (2015)on reference andpreservationism,Kelly McCormick (2013, 2016) on anchoring reference in the context ofresponsibility talk, and Manuel Vargas on preferringrevisionism toeliminativism (2005b, 2009, 2007,2012a).]

3. Implications of Moral Responsibility Skepticism

Turning now to the practical implications of moral responsibilityskepticism, we can ask, what would happen if we came to accept thisview? In recent years a small industry has grown up around preciselythis question. Since disbelief in moral responsibility would clearlyhave profound consequences for our interpersonal relationships,society, morality, meaning, and the law, it’s important toquestion whether these consequences would be (on the whole) good orbad. Critics of moral responsibility skepticism fear that it wouldundermine morality, leave us unable to adequately deal with criminalbehavior, increase anti-social conduct, and/or destroy meaning inlife. Moral responsibility skeptics, on the other hand, offer up anumber of different views—includingillusionism(Smilansky 1999, 2000),disillusionism (Nadelhoffer 2011),andoptimistic skepticism (e.g., Spinoza 1677 [1985];Pereboom 1995, 2001, 2002b, 2009, 2011, 2013a, 2014a; Waller 1989,1990, 2004, 2006, 2011, 2014; Sommers 2007a,b; Caruso forthcoming-b; N.Levy 2011; Vilhauer 2009a,b, 2012, 2013a,b; Milam 2016, 2017; Smuts2014; Morris, forthcoming).

In recent years, empirical attempts have been made to test thepractical implications of moral responsibility skepticism. One widelycited study found that diminishing belief in free will, which isostensibly related to moral responsibility, caused participants to“cheat” more on a problem solving task (Vohs &Schooler 2008). Another study found that participants who were askedto read anti-free will prompts behaved more aggressively thanparticipants exposed to neutral or pro-free will prompts (Baumeister,Masicampo, & DeWall 2009). Another indicates that reduction inbelief in free will correlated with reduction in monitoring of errors(Rigoni, Pourtois, & Brass 2015). And two additional studies foundthat diminishing free will belief impairs learning from negativeemotions (Stillman & Baumeister 2010) and causes participants toexhibit more negative attitudes toward out-group members (Zhao, Liu,Zhang, Shi, & Huang 2014). Such findings seem to suggest thatdiminished belief in free will and moral responsibility would indeedhave negative consequences. Yet such a sweeping conclusion may be toohasty.

First, some have criticized these studies on philosophical andmethodological grounds (see, e.g., Miles 2013; Caruso, forthcoming-b;Morris, forthcoming). The “cheating” study, for instance,has failed to replicate on a number of occasions (Carey & Roston2015; Open Science Collaboration 2015; Zwaan 2013[seeOther Internet Resources]) and the passagesused to prompt anti-free will belief have been criticized for notbeing representative of what most free will and moral responsibilityskeptics claim (Morris, forthcoming). There is also the question ofwhether the negative effects tested in these studies indicate anythingabout thelong-term consequences of moral responsibilityskepticism. Most of these effects are short-lived and temporary. Butas people become more acquainted with the skeptical perspective, andas they come to understand what it does and does not maintain, itremains possible that these effects would fade over time. Lastly,there is also a growing body of evidence in the opposite directionsuggesting that certainpositive effects may follow from freewill and moral responsibility skepticism (Carey & Paulhus 2013;Nadelhoffer & Tocchetto 2013; Krueger et al. 2014; Shariff etal. 2014; Caspar et al. 2017).

A recent study by Shariff et al. (2014), for instance, found thatpeople with weaker belief in free will endorsed less retributiveattitudes regarding punishment of criminals, yet theirconsequentialist attitudes about punishment were unaffected. They alsofound that learning about the neural bases of human behavior, eitherthrough reading popular science articles or taking an undergraduateneuroscience course, similarly reduced people’s support forretributive punishment. The same connection between belief in freewill and increased punitiveness has also been found in a number ofother studies (see, e.g., Carey & Paulhus 2013; Clark et al. 2014;Aspinwall, Brown, & Tabery 2012; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey2003). Additional studies have found thatwhere belief in free will is strongest we find increasedreligiosity and increased commitment to a cluster ofpotentially dangerous political beliefs and attitudes such asJustWorld Belief andRight Wing Authoritarianism (see Carey& Paulhus 2013; Nadelhoffer & Tocchetto 2013). The belief in ajust world, for instance, is the belief that we live in a world wherepeople generally get what they deserve. But stronger commitment tojust world belief is problematic since it correlates with the tendencyto blame the victims of misfortunes for their own fate (see Lerner& Simmons 1966; Lerner 1965, 1980; Lerner & Miller 1978;Wagstaff 1983; Furnham & Gunter 1984; Furnham 2003; Harper &Manasse 1992; Montada 1998).

Given the mixed results of these empirical studies and the fact thatthey tell us very little about any long-term consequences of adoptingthe skeptical perspective, the real-life practical implications ofmoral responsibility skepticism remain an open question. Perhaps, asthese studies indicate, it would haveboth good and badconsequences. In which case, the practical question would shift to theoverall balance—i.e., whether,on the whole, theconsequences would be good or bad. Or perhaps adopting the skepticalperspective wouldover time reduce or eliminate any initialnegative reactions—i.e., after an initial adjustment period,people would come to terms with the new reality and their behaviorwould normalize. An illustrative analogy might be made here withsimilar concerns voiced in the past about disbelief in God. It waslong argued (and perhaps still is argued in certain quarters ofsociety) that if people were to come to disbelieve in God, the moralfiber of society would disintegrate and we would see a marked increasein anti-social behavior. These fears, however, have not materialized,as society has grown more secular over time.

The debate over the philosophical and practical implications of moralresponsibility skepticism nevertheless continues, and there is evensome debate among skeptics themselves.

3.1 Illusionism vs/ Disillusionism

Illusionism is the view that while we lack free will andmoral responsibility, we should nonetheless promotebelief inthese notions since to disbelieve in moral responsibility would havedire consequences for society and ourselves (see Smilansky 1999, 2000,2002, 2013). According to Saul Smilansky, one of the lead proponentsof illusionism, most people not only believe in actual possibilitiesand the ability to transcend circumstances, but have

distinct and strong beliefs that libertarian free will is a conditionfor moral responsibility, which is in turn a condition for just rewardand punishment (2000: 26–27; for more on the folk psychology offree will and moral responsibility, cf. Nichols & Knobe 2007;Nichols 2004; Deery et al. 2013; Sarkissian et al. 2010; Nahmias etal. 2005; Nahmias et al. 2007; Murray & Nahmias 2014).

Smilansky and other proponents of illusionism go on to argue thatwhile our commonplace beliefs in free will and desert-entailing moralresponsibility are illusions, if people were to accept this truththere would be wide-reaching negative intrapersonal and interpersonalconsequences. It would be devastating, they warn, if we were todestroy such beliefs since the difficulties caused by “theabsence of ultimate-level grounding” are likely to be great,generating “acute psychological discomfort” for manypeople and “threatening morality” (Smilansky 2000: 166).To avoid such deleterious social and personal consequences, and toprevent the unraveling of our moral fabric, illusionism contends thatpeople should be allowed their positive illusion of free will andmoral responsibility—i.e., we should not take these beliefs awayfrom people, and for those of us who have already been disenchanted,we ought simply to keep the truth to ourselves.

In direct contrast to illusionism, isdisillusionism: theview that to the extent that folk intuitions and beliefs about thenature of human cognition and moral responsibility are mistaken,philosophers and psychologists ought to do their part to educate thepublic—especially when their mistaken beliefs arguably fuel anumber of unhealthy emotions and attitudes such as revenge, hatred,intolerance, lack of empathy, etc. (Nadelhoffer 2011: 184). Proponentsof disillusionism typically point to the benefits of a world withoutmoral responsibility. They cite the many instances in which moralresponsibility practices are counterproductive from a practical andhumanitarian standpoint—notably in how they stifle personaldevelopment, encourage punitive excess in criminal justice, andperpetuate social and economic inequalities (see Waller 2011; N. Levy2012, 2015; Morris, forthcoming). They maintain that if we abandon moral responsibility “we can look more clearly at the causes and more deeply into the systems that shape individuals and their behavior” (Waller 2011: 287), and thiswill allow us to adopt more humane and effective interpersonalattitudes and approaches to education, criminal justice, and socialpolicy.

A policy of disillusionism is present in theoptimisticskepticisms of several leading moral responsibility skeptics(e.g., Spinoza, Pereboom, Waller, Levy, Caruso, Harris, Vilhauer,Milam, and Morris). These optimistic skeptics maintain that lifewithout basic desert moral responsibility is not only possible, butalso preferable. Prospects of finding meaning in life or sustaininggood interpersonal relationships, for instance, would not bethreatened (see Pereboom 2001, 2014a; Waller 2011; Sommers 2007a; Milam 2016, 2017). They further maintain that morality and moral judgments would remain intact (see Pereboom 2001, 2014a; Waller 1990, 2004). And although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, wouldbe ruled out, they argue that the imposition of sanctions could servespurposes other than the punishment of the guilty—e.g., it canalso be justified by its role in incapacitating, rehabilitating, anddeterring offenders (see Pereboom 2001, 2013b, 2014a; N. Levy 2012,2015; Caruso 2016, 2017, forthcoming-a; Pereboom & Carusoforthcoming; Corrado 2013, forthcoming-a; Vilhauer 2013a,b; Focquaert,Glenn, Raine 2013, forthcoming; Murtagh 2013).

3.2 Reactive Attitudes

One concern people have with moral responsibility skepticism is thatit would threaten our personal relationships and the fulfillment inlife that they provide. P.F. Strawson (1962) famously argued that ourjustification for claims of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness isgrounded in the system of humanreactive attitudes, such asmoralresentment,indignation,guilt, andgratitude. Strawson contends that because our moralresponsibility practices are grounded in this way, the truth orfalsity of causal determinism is not relevant to whether wejustifiably hold each other and ourselves morally responsible.Moreover, if causal determinism were true and did threaten theseattitudes, as some moral responsibility skeptics are apt to maintain,we would face instead the prospect of the cold and calculatingobjective attitude, a stance that relinquishes the reactiveattitudes and treats individuals as objects to be manipulated andfixed for consequentialist ends. Strawson argues that adopting theobjective attitude would rule out the possibility of the meaningfulsorts of personal relationships we value (see also Wolf 1981, 1990).Summarizing the Strawsonian concern, then, we can say that adoptingglobal skepticism about moral responsibility, assuming it waspsychologically possible, would undermine expressions of ourinter-personal reactive attitudes essential to good personalrelationships, and would jeopardize our intra-personal reactiveattitudes such asguilt andrepentance, which arecrucial to personal moral development.

Moral responsibility skeptics generally respond to this Strawsonianconcern in two ways. One response argues that, contra Strawson, itis possible to adopt the objective attitude in a way thatrespects persons and does not hinder our personal relationships(Sommers 2007a). The second and more common response acknowledges thatStrawson may be right about the objective attitude, but denies thatskepticism about moral responsibility requires us to reject all thereactive attitudes (Pereboom 1995, 2001, 2014a; Waller 1990, 2006, 2011; Milam2016). This latter approach maintains that the attitudes we most want to retain either are notundermined by moral responsibility skepticism because they do not havepresuppositions that conflict with this view, or else they havealternatives that are not under threat. And what remains does notamount to Strawson’s objectivity of attitude and is sufficientto sustain the personal relationships we value.

Perhaps no one has done more to develop this second line of reply thanDerk Pereboom (see 1995, 2001, 2002a,b, 2009, 2012, 2013a, 2014a). Heargues, for instance, that while certain kinds of moral anger, such asresentment andindignation, would be undercut ifmoral responsibility skepticism is true, these attitudes aresuboptimal relative to alternative attitudes available to us, such asmoralconcern,disappointment,sorrow, andresolve. The expression of these replacement attitudes canconvey the same relevant information as moral anger but in a way thatis less harmful and consistent with the denial of basic desert moralresponsibility. Expression of resentment and indignation “oftenfails to contribute to the well being of those whom it isdirected” and is “apt to have harmful effects”(Pereboom 2014a: 180). Moral anger frequently is intended to causephysical or emotional pain, and can give rise to “destructiveresistance instead of reconciliation” (Pereboom 2014a: 180). Asa result it has the potential to damage or destroy relationships. Italso often leads to excessively punitive and counterproductive socialpractices and policies (see Waller 2011, 2014; Carey & Paulhus2013; Nadelhoffer & Tocchetto 2013; Shariff et al. 2014). [Foradditional arguments against moral anger and the benefits ofrelinquishing it, see Flanagan (2016) and Nussbaum (2016).]

Guilt also appears to be one of the reactive attitudesimperiled by moral responsibility skepticism since it involves thesupposition that one is blameworthy in the basic desert sense for animmoral action one has performed. Strawsonians fear that absent guiltwe would not be motivated to moral improvement after acting badly, andwe would be kept from reconciliation in impaired relationships.Furthermore, because guilt is undermined by the skeptical view,repentance is also ruled out, because feeling guilty is aprerequisite for a repentant attitude. It is unclear, though, whetherguilt is really needed to perform the functions mentioned above.Suppose instead of guilt an agent acknowledges that she has actedimmorally and she feels deep sorrow for what she has done, and as aresult she is motivated to eradicate her disposition to behave in thisbad way (see Waller 1990: 165–66). Such a reaction, skepticscontend, can secure the good that guilt can also secure, and it iswholly compatible with the skeptical perspective (see Pereboom 2001,2014a; Waller 1990; cf. Bok 1998). Furthermore, since self-guilt canoften be crippling and counterproductive for moral development, anapproach that avoids guilt may actually be more successful in bringabout the desired change in agents (Sommers 2007a).

Another reactive attitude that some think would be threatened by moralresponsibility skepticism isgratitude. Gratitude arguablypresupposes that the person to whom one is grateful is praiseworthy inthe basic desert sense for a beneficial act (cf. Honderich 1988:518–19). But even if this is so, certain aspects of gratitudewould not be undercut, and these aspects would seem to provide what isrequired for the personal relationships we value (Pereboom 2001,2014a; Sommers 2007a). Gratitude involves being thankful toward theperson who has acted beneficially. This aspect of gratitude is in theclear—e.g., one can be thankful to a young child for somekindness without supposing that she is praiseworthy in the basicdesert sense. And while gratitude also often involves joy as aresponse to what someone has done, skepticism about moralresponsibility does not yield a challenge to being joyful andexpressing joy when others act beneficially, so this too is in theclear.

Of course, some of the recommended transformations in emotionalattitudes may not be possible for us. In certain situations refrainingfrom resentment or moral anger may be beyond our power, and thus eventhe committed skeptic might not be able to make the change theskeptical view suggests. Yet, a committed skeptic need not eliminatethese attitudes completely to accept the conclusion that agents arenever deserving of praise and blame, she must attempt instead not toengage orentertain them (Sommers 2007a: 328;Russell 1992: 296). Shaun Nichols (2007), for example, invokes thedistinction betweennarrow-profile emotional responses, e.g.,local or immediate emotional reactions to situations, andwide-profile responses, which are not immediate and involverational reflection (see also Pereboom 2014a). We might expect to beunable to appreciably reduce narrow-profile moral anger as animmediate reaction upon being deeply hurt in an intimate personalrelationship. In wide-profile cases, however, diminishing or eveneliminating moral anger is open—or, at least, we can disavow itin the sense of rejecting any force it may be assumed to have injustifying a harmful response to wrongdoing. Thismodification of moral anger, skeptics contend, might well beadvantageous for our valuable personal relationships, and it has thepotential to bring about the equanimity that Spinoza (1677 [1985])thought skepticism about free will and moral responsibility, moregenerally, would secure (see Pereboom 2001, 2014a; cf. Russell2004).

3.3 Morality

Since moral responsibility skepticism would require us to reject ourordinary view of ourselves as blameworthy and praiseworthy in thebasic desert sense, critics also fear that it would underminemorality. Peter van Inwagen, for example, writes:

I have listened to philosophers who deny the existence of moralresponsibility. I cannot take them seriously. I know a philosopher whohas written a paper in which he denies the reality of moralresponsibility. And yet this same philosopher, when certain of hisbooks were stolen, said, “That was ashoddy thing todo!” But no one can consistently say that a certain act was ashoddy thing to doand say that its agent was not morallyresponsible when he performed it. (1983: 207)

Fellow libertarian C.A. Campbell agrees and asserts that denying moralresponsibility would destroy “the reality of the morallife” (1957; quoted from Waller 2004: 427). The view that moralresponsibility is required for morality is not limited, however, tolibertarians. Susan Wolf also contends that if we deny moralresponsibility, then we must

stop thinking in terms of what ought not to be. We would have to stopthinking in terms that would allow the possibility that some lives andprojects are better than others. (1981: 386)

And compatibilist W.T. Stace flatly states, “it is certain thatif there is no free will [and basic desert moral responsibility] therecan be no morality” (1952). Similar remarks can be foundthroughout the literature—see, e.g., Copleston (1965: 488),Murphy (1988: 400), Hintz (1958), Rychlak (1979), Babbitt (1999: 88),and Smilansky (2000, 2005).

The notion, though, that moral responsibility is a necessary conditionfor morality may not be as clear as these philosophers contend and isdirectly challenged by most skeptics (see Pereboom 2001, 2014a; Waller1989, 2004, 2011, 2014; Sommers 2007a; see also Haji 1998, 2002). First, it’s unclear what exactly these critics mean when they say that ‘morality’would be undermined by moral responsibility skepticism. Are theyclaiming that axiological judgments about intrinsic good and evil,aretaic judgments concerning virtue, deontic judgments about moralobligations, right and wrong, etc. areall undermined? If so,that would be an extreme claim. Even if we came to hold that a serialkiller was not blameworthy due, lets say, to a degenerative braindisease, skeptics contend that we could still justifiably agree thathis actions are morally bad (Pereboom 2001, 2014a; Waller 2004, 2011). Judgments of moral goodness and badness need not require an agent who is blameworthy or praiseworthy, they simplyrequire grounds by which we can differentiate between the two types ofjudgments. If one were a Calvinist, for example, they could point thetranscendent moral law as a way to judge while simultaneouslyrejecting all moral responsibility (Waller 2004: 428). Less exaltedmoral systems, such as utilitarianism or Kantianism, providealternative ways of grounding moral judgments. Of course, if one wereto adopt a Kantian test of universalizability while rejecting the restof Kant’s moral views (which do presuppose agents are morallyresponsible), it would hardly be an orthodox Kantian view. But, asseveral skeptics have noted, the denial of moral responsibility is notinconsistent with the principles of Kantian moral rationalism (seeWaller 2004: 429; Vilhauer 2013a,b; Pereboom 2014a). It is arguable, then, thataxiological judgments of moral goodness and badness would not beaffected by moral responsibility skepticism (Haji 1998; Pereboom 2001,2014a), and this may be sufficient for moral practice.

Nonetheless, critics might question that if determinism precludedbasic desert blameworthiness, would it not also undercut judgments ofmoral obligation? Kant famously argued that “ought impliescan,” and that if the moral law commands that weoughtto perform some action, it “inescapably follows” that wemust becapable of performing that action (1793 [1998: 94];1781 [1998]: A548/B576). And G.E. Moore, following Kant, argues thatone “cannot say of anyone that he ought to do a certain thing,if it is a thing which it is physically impossible for him todo” (1922: 317). But if ‘ought’ implies‘can,’ and if because determinism is true an agent couldnot have avoided acting badly, it would be false that she ought tohave acted otherwise (see Nelkin 2011: 100–101; cf. Jeppsson2016b). Furthermore, if an action is wrong for an agent just in caseshe is morally obligated not to perform it, determinism would alsoundermine judgments of moral wrongness (Haji 1998).

There are, however, a number of possible ways to respond to thiscriticism. One is to argue, as Waller (2004, 2011) does, that whilethe ‘ought implies ‘can’ principle (OIC for short)is widespread and deeply entrenched, it is nonetheless false (see alsoSinnott-Armstrong 1984; Ryan 2003; Graham 2011). In fact, recent workin experimental philosophy suggests that the principle may not be asintuitive as philosophers think. Buckwalter and Turri (2015), Mizrahi(2015a,b), Chituc et al. (2016), Henne et al. (2016), and Turri(2017) have all run experiments testing ordinary “folk”intuitions about the link between moral requirements and abilities.They each independently found that commonsense morality rejects theOIC principle for moral requirements, and that judgments about moralobligations are made independently of considerations about ability. Bycontrast, they also found that judgments ofblame were highlysensitive to considerations about ability, which suggests thatcommonsense morality might accept a “blame implies can”principle or that judgments of blame may play a modulatory role injudgments of obligation (see Buckwalter & Turri 2015; Chituc etal. 2016). These empirical findings support Waller’s claim thatthe OIC principle is a philosopher’s invention infected bymistaken assumptions about moral responsibility (cf. Kurthy &Lawford-Smith 2015; Kurthy et al. 2017; Cohen forthcoming; Graham2011; Zimmerman 1996).

Another option for skeptics is to accept the OIC principle but adoptanaxiological understanding of ‘ought’ and anepistemic reading of ‘ought implies can’(Pereboom 2014a). On this reading of the principle, when we say thatan agent ‘ought to x,’ we are simply making an axiologicaljudgment about x and recommending that the agent perform x at somefuture time. When we say ‘ought implies can,’ on the otherhand, we mean that it isepistemically open to the agent thatshe will develop the requisite motivation to x, and in this sensecan perform x. Furthermore, the axiological and epistemiccomponents are connected in that the recommendation made by theaxiological judgment may itself contribute causally to producing themotivation (Pereboom 2014a: 140). Of course, this is not the‘ought’ of obligation Kant and others may have had inmind, since given the assumption of determinism and that determinismprecludes alternatives, when one tells an agent that she ought torefrain from performing an action of some type in the future,it’s not the ‘ought’ of specific action demand, butrather the ‘ought’ of axiological evaluation that islegitimately invoked (Pereboom 2014a: 141). Pereboom calls this the‘ought’ ofaxiological recommendation (2014a:141), and it should not be understood as presupposing a route actuallyassessable to an agent, via reasons for action, to her acting in somerelevant way. All that is required for the legitimate use of‘ought,’ on this account, is that one be unsureepistemically about whether such a route is accessible, and in mostreal-life cases this requirement is satisfied since we lack certaintyabout the future (cf. Nelkin 2014; for reply see Pereboom 2014b).

From the skeptical perspective, then, morality is not aboutbackward-looking assessments of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness,since these are rejected. Rather, morality is forward-looking andfunctions by invoking the ‘ought’ of axiologicalrecommendation, the epistemic sense of the notion of‘can,’ and (at least in the case of Pereboom (2014a,2017b)) a forward-looking notion of blame grounded in the goods ofprotection, reconciliation, and moral formation. While critics mayfear this is still not enough since morality must be capable ofgrounding backward-looking judgments of blameworthiness andpraiseworthiness, the skeptic’s conception of morality maynevertheless be sufficient for the vast majority of our moralpractices. [Cf. Fischer 2004; Athanassoulis 2005; Edmundson 2007;Rosen 2004; Moya 2010; Morris 2015]

3.4 Criminal Punishment

One last practical concern about moral responsibility skepticism isthat it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and thatthe responses it would permit as justified are insufficient foracceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. Thefirst is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishingcriminals,retributivism, is incompatible with moralresponsibility skepticism. The second concern is that alternativejustifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per seface independent moral objections. Critics contend that these moralobjections are decisive. Skeptics about moral responsibility, on theother hand, argue that non-retributive alternatives exist that areboth ethically defensible and practically workable (see, e.g.,Pereboom 2001, 2013b, 2014a; N. Levy 2012, 2015; Caruso 2016; Corrado 2001,2013, 2014, 2017,, forthcoming-a,b; Vilhauer 2013a,b; Focquaert,Glenn, Raine 2013, forthcoming; Shaw 2011; Murtagh 2013).

Within the American criminal justice system, the most prominentjustification for criminal punishment isretributivism. Thisretributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reasonthat shedeserves something bad to happen to her just becauseshe has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain,deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is thebasicdesert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone thatprovides the justification for punishment (see, e.g., Moore 1997;Berman 2008, 2013). This means that the retributivist position is notreducible to consequentialist considerations nor in justifyingpunishment does it appeal to wider goods such as the safety of societyor the moral improvement of those being punished. A number of sentencingguidelines in the U.S. have adopteddesert as theirdistributive principle, and it is increasingly given deference in the“purposes” section of state criminal codes, where it canbe the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of thecode’s provisions (see Robinson 2008). Indeed, the American LawInstitute recently revised the Model Penal Code so as to set desert asthe official dominate principle for sentencing. Andcourts have identified desert as the guiding principle in a variety ofcontexts, as with the Supreme Court’s specifying retributivismas the “primary justification for the death penalty” (seeRobinson 2008: 145–146; see also the entries onlegal punishment andretributive justice.)

While there may be independent reasons for rejecting retributivism,reasons that have nothing to do with free will and moralresponsibility, it is clear that moral responsibility skepticism isincompatible with the retributive justification for punishment sinceit does away with the idea ofbasic desert. If agents do notdeserve blame just because they have knowingly done wrong, neither dothey deserve punishment just because they have knowingly done wrong(Pereboom 2014a). The challenge facing moral responsibilityskepticism, then, is to explain how we can adequately deal withcriminal behavior without the justification provided by retributivismand basic desert moral responsibility. While some critics contend thiscannot be done, moral responsibility skeptics point out that there areseveral alternative ways of justifying criminal punishment (anddealing with criminal behavior more generally) that do not appeal tothe notion of basic desert and are thus not threatened by theskeptical perspective. These include deterrence theories, moraleducation theories, punishment justified by the right to harm inself-defense, and incapacitation theories.

Deterrence theories are typically classified as a subspecies ofconsequentialist theories of punishment. Consequentialist theoriesattempt to justify punishment as the best means to achieving certainindependently identifiable goods (see, e.g., Bentham 1823; J. Wilson1983; Walker 1991; see also entry on Legal Punishment). Whiledifferent consequentialist theories explain the final good or goods atwhich all our actions aim differently, the most plausible immediategood that a system of punishment can bring about is the reduction ofcrime. For this reason, consequentialist theories generally suggestthat punishment can help to reduce crime by deterring, incapacitating,or reforming potential offenders. Deterrence theories, in particular,hold that punishment can serve the dual purposes of deterring futurebad or illegal behavior in the individual (him or herself) who ispunished, as well as deter others from similar acts (Ellis 2003, 2005;Hoskins 2011). Such theories are perfectly consistent with moralresponsibility skepticism since they are forward-looking and make noappeal to notions ofjust deserts and blameworthiness.

The most common objection to consequentialist deterrence theories isthat they would allow for manifestly unjust punishments. For example,excessively harsh punishment of the guilty or punishment of theinnocent could in principle be justified if it were to effectivelyserve the aim of deterrence and crime reduction (see McCloskey 1957;Hart 1968; Nozick 1974; Ten 1987; Smilansky 1990; Primoratz 1999;Pereboom 2001, 2014a; Honderich 2006; Boonin 2008; Brooks 2012). This issometimes called theuse objection since it holds thatconsequentialist theories allow, at least in principle, for theuse of persons to achieve certain desirable ends, inviolation of the Kantian intuition that persons should be treated asends-in-themselves. There are, however, a number of common responsesto this objection. One is to argue that such ‘unjust’punishmentswould be justified if they would really producethe best consequence (e.g., Smart 1973: 69–72; Bagaric &Amarasekara 2000; taken from Duff & Hoskins 2017). Another is toargue that in the real world it would be extremely unlikely that suchpunishment would ever be for the best, and even less likely that thestate could be trusted to reliably pick out those rare cases in whichthey would be—thus the criminal justice system should adopt theview that such punishment is wrong and unjustifiable (see Rawls 1955;Hare 1981; paraphrased from Duff & Hoskins 2017). Finally, somereply that a richer or subtler account of the ends that the criminallaw should serve will generate suitable protections against unjustpunishments (see Braithwaite & Pettit 1990; Tadros 2011).

Another approach consistent with skepticism about moral responsibilityis moral education theories. These theories typically maintain thatpunishment can be justified only if it benefits the person beingpunished. An analogy is sometimes drawn with the justification forpunishing children—i.e., children are typically not punished toexact retribution, but rather to educate them morally. Jean Hampton,for instance, writes, “punishment should not be justified as adeserved evil, but rather as an attempt, by someone who cares, toimprove a wayward person” (1984: 237). On Hampton’s moraleducation account, punishment is justified if and only if it gets thewrongdoer

to reflect on the moral reasons for [the law’s prohibition] sothat he will make the decision to reject the prohibited action formoral reasons, rather than for the self-interested reason ofavoiding pain. (1984: 212)

Critics, however, object on number of different grounds. Some pointout that while moral education may beone plausible aim ofpunishment, it is not the “full and completejustification” Hampton (1984: 209) and others claim it to be(see Dagger 2011). Others argue that it is far from evident thatpunishing adult criminals is similarly likely to result in moralimprovements (Pereboom 2001: 162–3; 2014a: 161). Children andadult criminals differ in significant respects—i.e., adultcriminals, unlike children, typically understand the moral codeaccepted in their society, and children are generally morepsychologically malleable than adults criminals are (Pereboom 2014a:162; 2001: 163).

Whether or not moral education theories succumb to these objections(cf. Drucker 1986; Shook 2004; Shafer-Landau 1991; Dagger 2011), thereis another non-retributive alternative available to moralresponsibility skeptics: an incapacitation account based on the rightof self-defense analogous to the justification for quarantine. This isthe approach favored by Pereboom and Caruso, and it draws on acomparison between treatment of dangerous criminals and treatment ofcarriers of dangerous diseases (Pereboom 2001, 2013b, 2014a, 2017a;Caruso 2016, 2017, forthcoming-a; Pereboom & Carusoforthcoming). In its simplest form, it can be summarized as follows:(1) Moral responsibility skeptics claims that criminals are notmorally responsible for their actions in the basic desert sense; (2)plainly, many carriers of dangerous diseases are not responsible inthis or in any other sense for having contracted these diseases; (3)yet, we generally agree that it is sometimes permissible to quarantinethem, and the justification for doing so is the right toself-protection and the prevention of harm to others; (4) for similarreasons, even if a dangerous criminal is not morally responsible forhis crimes in the basic desert sense (perhaps because no one is everin this way morally responsible) it could beas legitimate toincapacitate him as to quarantine the non-responsible carrier of aserious communicable disease.

This account differs from the previous ones in two important ways.First, although one might justify quarantine (in the case of disease)and incapacitation (in the case of dangerous criminals) on purelyutilitarian or consequentialist grounds, Pereboom and Caruso resistthis strategy. The incapacitation of dangerous criminals is instead justified on the ground of the right to harm in self defense and defense of others—a right thatarguably has broader appeal than consequentialism. They contend thatthis justification makes the view more resilient to objections,especially the use-objection mentioned above (Pereboom 2017a). This is because, as it is illegitimateto treat carriers of a disease more harmfully than is necessary toneutralize the danger they pose, treating those with violent criminaltendencies more harshly than is required to protect society will beillegitimate as well. Furthermore, innocent people could not beincapacitated on this account since they pose no direct threat toothers.

Second, the quarantine model places several constraints on thetreatment of criminals (see Pereboom 2001, 2014a). First, as less dangerous diseases justify onlypreventative measures less restrictive than quarantine, so lessdangerous criminal tendencies justify only more moderate restraints.In fact, for certain minor crimes perhaps only some degree ofmonitoring could be defended. Secondly, the incapacitation accountthat results from this analogy demands a degree of concern for therehabilitation and well-being of the criminal that would alter much ofcurrent practice. Just as fairness recommends that we seek to cure thediseased we quarantine, so fairness would counsel that we attempt torehabilitate the criminals we detain. If a criminal cannot berehabilitated, and our safety requires his indefinite confinement,this account provides no justification for making his life moremiserable than would be required to guard against the danger he poses.Finally, there are measures for preventing crime more generally, suchas providing for adequate education and mental health care, which themoral responsibility skeptic can readily endorse. Thepublichealth-quarantine model proposed by Caruso, for instance, extendsthe quarantine analogy into the arena of public health and attempts toprioritizeprevention andsocial justice. It calls for a shift away fromthe myopic focus on punishment and toward a more holistic approach tocriminal behavior aimed at addressing the causal determinants of crimeand the social injustices that give rise to crime. (For criticisms ofthe quarantine model, see Corrado 1996; Smilansky 2011, 2017; Lemos2016; Tadros 2017).

Given the various non-retributive options available to moralresponsibility skeptics—for additional options see Corrado(2001, 2013, 2014, 2017, forthcoming-a,b), Vilhauer (2013a,b), N. Levy(2012, 2015)—it would be hasty to conclude that the skepticalperspective leaves us unable to adequately deal with criminalbehavior. It may even be the case, as many skeptics are apt topropose, that rejecting retributivism and basic desert would allow usto adopt practices and policies that are more humane and effective.

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Other Internet Resources

• PhilPapers Entries on Moral Responsibility Skepticism
• PhilPapers Entries on Free Will Skepticism
• PhilPapers Entires on Moral Responsibility
• Google Scholars Entries on Moral Responsibility Skepticism
• Psychology Today basics: punishment
• Psychology Today basics: ethicsand morality
• Zwaan, Rolf, 2013, “The Value of Believing in Free Will: AReplication Attempt”, 18 March 2013; updated 26 February 2014. [Zwaan 2013 available online]

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compatibilism |determinism: causal |free will |free will: divine foreknowledge and |incompatibilism: (nondeterministic) theories of free will |incompatibilism: arguments for |justice: retributive |luck: moral |moral responsibility |punishment, legal |quantum mechanics: Bohmian mechanics

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Derk Pereboom, Neil Levy, Bruce Waller, ManuelVargas, Ishtiyaque Haji, Joseph Campbell, and Paul Russell for helpfulcomments on an earlier draft.