In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers toknowledge of one’s own mental states—that is, of what oneis feeling or thinking, or what one believes or desires. At leastsince Descartes, most philosophers have believed that self-knowledgediffers markedly from our knowledge of the external world (where thisincludes our knowledge of others’ mental states). But there islittle agreement about what precisely distinguishes self-knowledgefrom knowledge in other realms. Partly because of this disagreement,philosophers have endorsed competing accounts of how we achieveself-knowledge and of its epistemic status. These accounts haveimportant consequences for a broad range of issues in epistemology,the philosophy of mind, and moral psychology.

This entry focuses on knowledge of one’s own mental states. Aseparate topic sometimes referred to as “self-knowledge”is knowledge about a persisting self. This topic is addressed in asupplement:Knowledge of the Self.

• 1. The Distinctiveness of Self-Knowledge
  • 1.1 Epistemic security
  • 1.2 Special method
  • 1.3 Agency
  • 1.4 First-person authority
• 2. Doubts about the distinctiveness of self-knowledge
  • 2.1 General doubts
  • 2.2 Doubts based on empirical results
• 3. Accounts of Self-Knowledge
  • 3.1 Acquaintance Accounts
  • 3.2 Inner Sense Accounts
  • 3.3 Self-Interpretation Accounts
  • 3.4Empiricist TransparencyAccounts
  • 3.5 Reasons Accounts
  • 3.6 Rationalist Accounts
  • 3.7 Agentialist Accounts
  • 3.8 Expressivist Accounts
• Bibliography
  • Works Cited
  • Further Reading
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Distinctiveness of Self-Knowledge

What is special about self-knowledge, compared to knowledge in otherdomains? Self-knowledge is thought to differ from other sorts ofknowledge in one or more of the following ways.

1. Self-knowledge is especially secure, epistemically.
2. Self-knowledge is (sometimes) acquired by use of an exclusivelyfirst-personal method.
3. Our capacity for self-knowledge reflects our cognitiveagency.
4. One’s pronouncements about one’s own mental statescarry a special authority or presumption of truth.

The differences between these are subtle. Statement (1) identifies thedistinctive feature of self-knowledge as the epistemic status of acertain class of beliefs, whereas statement (2) identifies it by themethod one uses in forming these beliefs. Statement (3) emphasizes thesubject’s agency, typically in relation to attitudes likebeliefs and intentions, which are sensitive to reasons. Statement (4)focuses on the way that self-ascriptions of mental states, such assaying “I’m in pain”, are treated by others.Statements (1) and (2) are ways of cashing out the notion that weenjoy “privileged access” to our own mental states. Onlythese first two statements construe the distinctive feature ofself-knowledge as plainly epistemic; however, most who endorse (3)also claim that this agential relation grounds a special epistemicrelation. A minority of philosophers denies that self-knowledge isspecial at all (see Section 2).

1.1 Epistemic security

The strongest epistemic claims on behalf of self-knowledge areinfallibility and omniscience. One is infallible about one’s ownmental states if and only if (hereafter, “iff”)one cannot have a false belief to the effect that one is in a certainmental state. One is omniscient about one’s own statesiff being in a mental state suffices for knowing that one isin that state. (This omniscience thesis is sometimes expressed bysaying that mental states areself-intimating orself-presenting.) Few if any contemporary philosophersmaintain that we are infallible or omniscient about all of our mentalstates. Here is a simple example that challenges both infallibilityand omniscience. Kate trusts her therapist’s insights into herown psychology, and so she believes him when he tells her that shedistrusts her mother. But the therapist is mistaken—in fact,Kate trusts her mother. Hence, Kate’s self-ascriptionIdistrust my mother shows that she is fallible about her ownattitudes (mistakenly taking herself to distrust her mother) and thatshe is not omniscient (she fails to recognize that she trusts hermother).

In the case described, Kate’s belief about her attitude is basedon the testimony of another person. A more restricted infallibilitythesis would limit the relevant domain to self-ascriptions based on anexclusively first-personal method—perhapsintrospection. Descartes thought that we could in principleachieve infallibility in this circumscribed realm, but only byexercising meticulous care:

There remains sensations, emotions and appetites. These may be clearlyperceived provided we take great care in our judgments concerning themto include no more than what is strictly contained in ourperception—no more than that of which we have inner awareness.But this is a very difficult rule to observe, at least with regard tosensations. (Descartes 1644/1984: I.66, p. 216)

A common objection to even restricted infallibility claims is theidea, often attributed to Wittgenstein, that where one cannot bewrong, one cannot be right either. For instance, Wright maintains thatthe possibility of error is required for concept application, which isin turn required for substantialself-knowledge.“[E]rror—if only second-ordererror—has to be possible, if a genuine exercise of concepts isinvolved” (Wright 1989: 634).

In its unqualified form, the omniscience thesis seems even lessplausible than the unqualified infallibility thesis.^[1] On pain of regress, omniscience seems to require that self-knowledgeis not always a matter of grasping one mental state by being inanother: that is, it seems to require that some mental statescomprehend themselves (so to speak). James rejected this idea.

No subjective state, whilst present, is its own object; its object isalways something else. (James 1884: 2)

Some modify the omniscience thesis by claiming that, for some states,anyone who is in a state of that kind is justified in believing thatshe is, even if the thinker doesn’t actually have this belief(Peacocke 1999; Siewert 1998; Silins 2012; Smithies 2012). Horgan andKriegel (2007) defend a modified omniscience thesis, based on the ideathat sensations are by definition conscious.

Others argue that we are infallible or omniscient about our beliefsand other attitudes because there is a constitutive connection betweenthe first-order attitude and the belief that one has that attitude(see 3.6 and 3.7). This connection varies. On some views, so long aswe are rational and have the relevant concepts, believing thatpconstitutes a belief that one believes thatp (Shoemaker1994). Others reverse the constitution relation: taking oneself tobelieve thatp canconstitute believing thatp (Coliva 2012a, Bauman 2017).

Claims of infallibility and omniscience concern general relationsbetween beliefs about mental states and those mental statesthemselves. The most famous philosophical argument involvingself-knowledge, Descartes’cogito argument (Descartes1641/1895), does not concern these general relations. Instead, itconcerns thecertainty of a particular instance of belief.Descartes aims to demonstrate that, so long as you are carefullyattending to your own thoughts, you can know with certain thatyou’re thinking—and, hence, that you exist. This can becertain even if there is a supremely powerful evil genius who controlsyour thoughts and seeks to deceive you.

Perhaps the most widely accepted view along these lines is thatself-knowledge, even if not absolutely certain, is more secure,epistemically, than other kinds of empirical knowledge—mostobviously, perceptual knowledge. Some who take this line maintain thatthere is a causal gap between a perceptual state and its object, andthis gap introduces sources of error that are absent in directintrospective apprehension of a sensation (Russell 1917; Chalmers2003; Gertler 2012; Horgan 2012; Siewert 2012).

1.2 Special method

Most philosophers accept that there is some method of graspingone’s own mental states that isspecial in the sensethat it is available exclusively to the subject. Traditionally, thisspecial method was construed as a kind of “inward” gaze,directed at the mental state to be grasped.

The term “introspection”’—literally,“looking within”—captures a traditional way ofconceiving how we grasp our own mental states. This term uses aspatial metaphor to express a divide between the “inner”world of thought and the “external” world. The term“introspection” is used in various ways in theself-knowledge literature. Perhaps the most common usage is thatsuggested by the term’s literal meaning: on this usage,introspection is inner observation—or “inwardly directedattention” (Goldman 2006: 246)—that, when successful,yields awareness of a mental state. The notion that inner observationis the special method by which we achieve self-knowledge is central tothe acquaintance and inner sense accounts (see3.1 and3.2 below).

While the term “introspection” connotes a looking within,a view that has recently gained prominence envisions the method uniqueto self-knowledge as requiring precisely the opposite. On this view,we ascertain our own thoughts by looking outward, to the states of theworld they represent. This is known as thetransparencymethod, in that self-knowledge is achieved by “lookingthrough” the (transparent) mental state, directly to the stateof the world it represents. This view is associated with a famouspassage from Evans.

[I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so tospeak, or occasionally literally, directed outward—upon theworld. If someone asks me “Do you think there is going to be athird world war?”, I must attend, in answering him, to preciselythe same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answeringthe question “Will there be a third world war?” (Evans1982: 225)

The idea that the special method by which we achieve self-knowledgeinvolvestransparency is central to empiricist transparencyaccounts (see3.4) and to some agentialist accounts (see3.7).

1.3 Agency

Many of our mental states, such as itches and tickles, are states wesimply undergo. But some argue that others are active. “Ourrational beliefs and intentions are not mere mental attitudes, butactive states of normative commitment” (Korsgaard 2009: 39).This idea inspires the claim, central to many versions of agentialism,that the truly distinctive kind of self-knowledge is knowledge ofthese “active states of normative commitment” (see 3.7). Such self-knowledge is distinctive because believing and intendingare things wedo. According to these agentialists, this meansthat rational beliefs and intentions are not known simply throughobservation, which is the means by which we know other empiricalphenomena (including sensations).

1.4 First-person authority

The views just described take the subject to be in a special epistemicposition, vis-à-vis her own mental states. But a competingapproach, sometimes attributed to Wittgenstein (Wright 1989),maintains that the special authority of self-ascriptions is primarilya matter of social-linguistic practices, which dictate that we shouldtreat subjects as authoritative about their own states. On this view,one who responds to a self-ascription like “I believe thatit’s raining” with “no, you don’t” (inordinary circumstances) exhibits a misunderstanding ofsocial-linguistic norms.

The first-person authority view diagnoses the authority granted toself-ascriptions as deriving from social norms rather than from thesubject's privileged epistemic position. Strictly speaking, then, thisposition is not concerned with self-knowledge. However, somecontemporary expressivist accounts (see3.8) regard the phenomenon of first-person authority as centrallyimportant to understanding self-knowledge.

2. Doubts about the distinctiveness of self-knowledge

2.1 General doubts

The idea that self-knowledge is not profoundly special was especiallyprevalent during the heyday of behaviorism. For instance, Ryle (1949)suggests that the difference between self-knowledge andother-knowledge is at most a matter of degree, and stems from themundane fact that each of us is always present to observe our ownbehavior.

Doubts about self-knowledge are also fueled by more generalepistemological concerns, such as doubts about the possibility oftheory-free observations (Dennett 1991), and the familiar worry thatthe observational process unavoidably alters the target of observation(Hill 1991).^[2] Others argue that while self-attributions may express self-knowledge,they are not epistemically superior to other kinds of beliefs.

I suspect … [that our] judgments about the world to a largeextent drive our judgments about our experience. Properly so, sincethe former are the more secure. (Schwitzgebel 2008: 268)

In the same vein, some (including Stich 1983) deny that self-knowledgeis special, relative to knowledge of others’ states, by claimingthat ordinary (“folk”) concepts of psychological statesare theoretical concepts. If psychological states are theoreticalentities, both self-ascriptions and other-ascriptions will proceed byinference from observed data—presumably, behavior. (See theentry onfolk psychology as a theory.)

Skepticism of a different kind stems from a puzzle raised byBoghossian (1989). On most accounts, attitudes such as desires andbeliefs are individuated in part by their relations to other statesand/or the environment.^[3] For example, a desire for lemonade partly consists in being disposedto go to the refrigerator when one believes that there is lemonadethere, and to feeling happy at the prospect of drinking lemonade.Believingthere is lemonade in the refrigerator partlyconsists in being disposed to go to the refrigerator when one desireslemonade, and to feeling surprise if one finds the refrigerator empty.More generally, dispositional (or “standing”) beliefs and desiresconsist, partly or wholly, in dispositions to reason, behave, andaffectively react in certain ways, relative to circumstances (see the entry on belief). Boghossian’s puzzle concerns how we could have privilegedaccess to our relationally-individuated mental states. He considersthree ways that self-knowledge could be achieved: (a) on the basis ofinner observation, (b) on the basis of inference, or (c) on the basisof nothing. He argues that (a) would not allow for knowledge ofrelationally-individuated states, and that (b) and (c) do not providefor access that is truly privileged. The result is a trilemmaregarding self-knowledge.

Philosophers have responded to Boghossian’s trilemma in avariety of ways. Some deny the assumption that recognizing arelationally-individuated state requires identifying the relationalproperties that make it the state that it is (Burge 1988; Heil 1988).Others argue that self-knowledge can be privileged even if it rests oninference (Dretske 1994; Byrne 2005; Lawlor 2009). And some maintainthat we can know our attitudes through introspective observation, andthat this weakens the case for relational construals of attitudes(Pitt 2004).

2.2 Doubts based on empirical results

Empirical work in psychology constitutes another source of doubt aboutthe epistemic status of self-ascriptions. In a widely cited paper,Nisbett and Wilson (1977) present studies showing that subjectsroutinely misidentify the factors that influenced their reasoningprocesses. For instance, subjects in one study explained theirpreference for a product by its apparent quality, when in fact theproducts were all precisely alike: the subjects’ preferenceswere apparently driven by the product’s spatial positionrelative to its competitors seemed to drive the preferences.

The accuracy of subject reports is so poor as to suggest that anyintrospective access that may exist is not sufficient to producegenerally correct or reliable reports. (1977: 33)

While these studies are instructive, Wilson acknowledges that theirresults are limited in that they apply only to the unconscious sourcesof decisions; they are silent as to our privileged access to ourcurrent states.

[T]o the extent that people’s responses are caused by theconscious self, they have privileged access to the actual causes ofthese responses; in short, the Nisbett and Wilson argument was wrongabout such cases. (Wilson 2002: 106)

Schwitzgebel (2002) has marshalled other sorts of empirical evidenceto show that introspective reports are unreliable. But he has alsosuggested that our attitudes about introspection may be particularlyobstinate. This conclusion is borne out by his collaboration with apsychologist on a study of introspection using a method calledExperience Sampling (Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 2007). Strikingly,their careful analysis of the study’s results does not resolvetheir differences about the reliability of introspection: Hurlburtremains “optimistic” about introspection’sreliability while Schwitzgebel remains “a skeptic”).

This outcome suggests that not only careful empirical work, but alsodifficult conceptual work, is required for determining the scope anddegree of introspection’s reliability—solving what Goldmanaptly terms “the problem of calibration” (Goldman 2004:14). Some targets of introspection, such as sensations, can beidentified only through introspection itself: third-personal methods(for instance, identifying pain via a brain scan) depend on priorcorrelations between third-personal and introspective data. Goldmannotes that, for this reason, we can fix the range of introspectivereliability only byusing introspection and evaluating itsresults for internal coherence and for consistency with other sources.But since there is no clear consensus as to how to evaluate theresults of introspection, or how to weigh its results against othersources of evidence about mental states, the problem of calibration isespecially thorny and complex as it relates to introspection. Spener(2015) proposes that we calibrate introspection by reference toabilities that we could not possess unless introspection were reliable(relative to certain circumstances, and about certain states). Forexample, our ability to focus binoculars on a distant object suggeststhat introspection is reliable in identifying when things lookblurry.

3. Accounts of Self-Knowledge

Accounts of self-knowledge vary across a number of dimensions,including: how self-knowledge is achieved; the kind and degree ofepistemic security that self-ascriptions possess; the nature of our(epistemic) privilege and (social-linguistic) authority relative toour mental states; and the role of our observational, rational,agential, and expressive powers in explaining first-person privilegeand authority.

These accounts also differ as to their scope. Acquaintance theoristsmainly aim to explain how we know what we’re currently thinkingand feeling (our “occurrent” states). Reasons theorists andAgentialists are exclusively concerned with self-knowledge of thoseattitudes that represent our commitments, such as beliefs andintentions. Proponents of the Inner Sense, Self-Interpretation,Empiricist Transparency, Rationalist, and Expressivist accounts differas to the scope of these accounts. Each of these is taken, by at leastone of its proponents, to apply to all kinds of mental states. Thisvariety means that hybrid views are possible. For instance, one mightthink that an Acquaintance account explains how we know our sensationswhile Agentialism best explains self-knowledge of beliefs.

In what follows, I proceed from broadly empiricist accounts, whichtake self-knowledge to be a form of empirical knowledge, to accountsthat emphasize the role ofa priori reasoning inself-knowledge, and finally to accounts that take the special featuresof self-knowledge to derive from our capacity for agency orself-expression.

3.1 Acquaintance Accounts

The idea that we know our mental states throughacquaintancewith them is usually associated with Russell (1917), but such accountstrace their lineage at least to Descartes (see the entry onknowledge by acquaintance vs. description). According to these accounts, our awareness of our mental states issometimes peculiarlydirect in both an epistemic sense and ametaphysical sense. It is epistemically direct in that I need not relyon awareness of something else in order to be aware of my mentalstate. It is metaphysically direct in that no event or processmediates between my awareness and the mental state itself. Bycontrast, my awareness of last night’s rain is epistemicallyindirect in that I achieve it only through being aware of somethingelse (such as the wet pavement). This awareness is metaphysicallyindirect in that various factors, including the wet pavement andperhaps my visual experience thereof, mediate between my awareness ofthe rain and the rain itself.

Acquaintance accounts hold special appeal for epistemicfoundationalists, who claim that all of our knowledge rests on afoundation of beliefs that are justified, but not justified by otherbeliefs.

The claim that introspective access is both epistemically andmetaphysically direct is most plausible for sensations like pain. Thisis because how a sensation appears—how itseems to thesubject—and how it actuallyis (its nature) are,according to many philosophers, one and the same. That is,“there is no appearance/reality distinction in the case ofsensations” (Hill 1991: 127; compare Kripke 1980:152–3).

Limiting acquaintance accounts to self-knowledge ofsensations—or, more strictly, to self-knowledge of mental statesindividuated by phenomenology—does not entirely fix their scope,as philosophers disagree as to which kinds of mental states areindividuated by phenomenology. Recently, the idea thatthoughts have a distinctive phenomenology has receivedrenewed attention (see the entry onconsciousness and intentionality). Pitt (2004) uses the fact that we seem able to know what we’rethinking in a direct, highly secure way—one that is bestexplained by an acquaintance model of introspection—to arguethat thoughts have distinctive phenomenological properties with whichwe are acquainted. Some philosophers also argue that consciousattitudes, such as judgments, have distinctive phenomenologies.

The purported epistemic and metaphysical directness of introspectiondoes not imply that we are either infallible or omniscient about ourown states, since it is an open question whether all of our states areintrospectible. But if introspection involves epistemically andmetaphysically direct access to one’s phenomenal states, thenits proper use may allow the relevant self-attributions to achieve ahigh degree of certainty. And some philosophers have drawn on theconcept of acquaintance to argue that at least some mental states,such as intense sensations, may be “luminous”: that is, that being ina state of that kind may ensure that one can know that one is(Weatherson 2004; Duncan 2018). These arguments are responses toWilliamson’s (2000) “anti-luminosity” argument, which seeks toestablish that no mental states are luminous.

The idea that we know (even some of) our sensations by acquaintanceremains highly controversial. The idea that we know our beliefs orother attitudes by acquaintance is even more controversial. As James(1884) observed, self-knowledge requires more than even direct contactwith a mental state: it requires that one properly conceptualize thestate, classifying it as e.g.pain orcoldness. Thegreatest challenge for acquaintance accounts is to explain how thisconceptualization occurs. In particular, they must show that awarenessof a mental state that is direct and immediate can also be anepistemically substantial grasp of the stateas a state of acertain kind.

One approach to this challenge draws on the phenomenon ofdemonstrative reference (Gertler 2001; Chalmers 2003). Demonstrativereference often involves literal pointing: by pointing to my desk, Ican demonstratively refer to it as “that (desk)”. When itcomes to experiences, we don’t pick them out by pointing but,instead, byattending to them. As Sosa aptly observes,“Selective attention is the index finger of the mind”(2003: 279). By attending to how an experience feels (or appears), onecan use this appearance—e.g., the itchiness of an itch—torefer to the feature demonstratively, as “thisquality”. One can then register the presence of the itch bythinking “I’m now experiencingthisquality” Since reference is secured by attending to theitchiness, one grasps the feature in question,as itchiness.Chalmers refers to this grasp of phenomenal features as a“direct phenomenal concept”.

The clearest cases of direct phenomenal concepts arise when a subjectattends to the quality of an experience, and forms a concept whollybased on the attention to the quality, “taking up” thequality into the concept. (Chalmers 2003: 235)

One worry about acquaintance accounts stems from the observation thatwe sometimes err about our experiences. However, most acquaintancetheorists will concede that we can be wrong about our own phenomenalstates. The theory implies only that, under certain conditions, anexperience’s phenomenal reality—the “quality” inChalmers’ terms—constitutes how it appears to thethinker—the “concept” of that quality (see also Horgan andKriegel 2007; Gertler 2012). When those conditions are met, we areaware of the experience in a way that could not occur in the absenceof that experience, and so our self-ascription of the experience willbe true.

Some critics charge that acquaintance accounts construe introspectivebeliefs as too close to their objects to qualify as genuine knowledge(Wittgenstein 1953; Stalnaker 2008). In effect, this objection deniesthat direct introspective attention to an instance of a phenomenalquality can provide an epistemically substantial grasp of thatquality.

3.2 Inner Sense Accounts

While acquaintance accounts construe introspection as fundamentallydifferent from perception in its epistemic and metaphysicaldirectness, inner sense accounts take the opposite tack: they construeintrospection as similar to perception in crucial respects.

Locke, an early inner sense theorist, described the introspectivefaculty as follows.

This Source of Ideas, every Man has wholly in himself … Andthough it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external Objects;yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call’dinternal Sense. (Locke 1689/1975: II.1.iv.)

Inner sense accounts construe introspection as similar to perceptionin that it involves a monitoring mechanism or “self-scanningprocess” (Armstrong 1993: 324) that takes mental states as inputand yields representations of those states as output. The monitoringmechanism involved in inner sense forms representations of the mentalstates it takes as input. This process is reliable, according to someinner sense accounts, because the mechanism “redeploys”the content of the input state in the representation of those statesthat is its output (Nichols and Stich 2003; Goldman 2006). On suchaccounts, and in contrast to acquaintance accounts, the connectionbetween the introspected state (the input) and the introspective state(the output) is causal and contingent. But inner sense accounts allowthat introspection also differs from perception in significant ways.Perception is achieved through dedicated organs such as eyes and ears,whereas there is no (literal) organ of introspection. Perceptionordinarily involves sensory experiences, whereas “No one thinksthat one is aware of beliefs and thoughts by having sensations orquasi-sense-experiences of them” (Shoemaker 1994: 255).

Because inner sense accounts construe introspection as a causalprocess, they are particularly well-suited to reliabilist (or, morebroadly, epistemically externalist) approaches to self-knowledge. Forexample, Armstrong characterizes the introspective process as “amere flow of information or beliefs” (Armstrong 1993: 326). Thecausal connections involved in self-monitoring need not be known bythe subject in order to deliver self-knowledge, and inner senseaccounts generally regard knowledge based in introspection asnon-inferential. Inner sense is a first-personal method because therelevant scanners or monitoring mechanisms are directed only towardsone’s own states. Strikingly, however, this asymmetry of accessis merely contingent. It is possible, in principle, for one’s“inner sense” mechanism to be linked to someoneelse’s mental states, thereby allowing for “direct [read:non-inferential] awareness of the mental states of others”,through a kind of telepathic scanning (Armstrong 1993: 124).

Perhaps the chief benefit of inner sense accounts is that they areespecially conducive to a broadly naturalistic picture of mentality.By assimilating introspection to perception, inner sense accountsconstrue mentality as epistemically continuous with the nonmental, andthus allow a single overarching epistemology to apply to bothself-knowledge and knowledge of external things. Since most of theleading arguments for mind-body dualism depend on the claim that ourepistemic relations to mental states diverge in crucial ways from ourepistemic relations to physical objects, the claim that the mental isepistemically continuous with the nonmental paves the way forassimilating mentality to the nonmental realm ontologically as well.^[4]

Shoemaker (1994) offers a sustained critique of inner sense accounts.His main objection centers on the charge that, in construing thecapacity for self-knowledge as similar to sensory capacities likevision, inner sense accounts imply that the capacity forself-knowledge is one that a rational person might lack. As he putsthis, they imply that a rational creature could be“self-blind”, unable to recognize its own mental states.But, he says, self-blindness is impossible in a rational creature (atleast, one with ordinary mental states and who possesses mental stateconcepts). Shoemaker’s discussion has been as influential forits positive suggestion—that our capacity for self-knowledge isclosely tied to rationality (see3.6 and3.7)—as for its critical treatment of inner sense accounts.

Kind (2003) contends that the possibility of self-blindness does notdirectly threaten inner sense accounts. Even if Shoemaker is rightthat rational creatures will generally be capable of self-awareness,this conclusion is silent as tohow such awareness occurs. Soit does not rule out the possibility that it is achieved through innersense. Gertler (2011a: ch. 5) argues that the inner sense theorist canblock Shoemaker’s objection by stipulating that no creaturequalifies asrational if it is self-blind. “No rationalcreature is self-blind” would then be ade dicto truth and,as such, is compatible with the inner sense account. Shoemaker’schallenge to inner sense views requires a stronger thesis, namely thatthe capacity for self-knowledge is ade re necessarycharacteristic of rational beings: that is, rational beings must becapable of self-knowledge in order to exist at all.

Another objection to inner sense accounts targets their epistemicexternalism. Inner sense accounts are not likely to appeal to thosewho take self-knowledge to involve internal or accessible reasons forbelief (Peacocke 1999: 224).

3.3 Self-Interpretation Accounts

Some philosophers maintain that grasping our beliefs anddesires—and perhaps also our emotions—requires engaging ina process of self-interpretation (Lawlor 2009; Carruthers 2011; Cassam2015). Self-interpretation accounts are one response to a pointmentioned earlier (sec.2.1): that our attitudes are partly defined by their causal roles,including how they dispose us to reason, behave, and affectively react(see the entries onbelief anddesire). Whether a given state plays the relevant causal role seems not to beknowable simply by introspective observation. (This point echoes thefirst horn of Boghossian’s trilemma. See also Peterson 2019.) Wecan know this only by interpreting our current thoughts or feelings,explaining them as manifestations of a particular belief, desire, orother attitude. Since this interpretive process relies on inference,self-interpretation accounts are sometimes labelled “inferentialism”.But inferentialism is a broader category, encompassing sometransparency accounts (sec. 3.4).

Lawlor uses the following example. A woman named Katherine findsherself thinking “have another” as she stands by her son’s crib.Hearing those words (in “inner speech”) does not, on its own, provideher with knowledge about whether she wants to have another child. Shemust interpret this thought: is it a genuine longing or just an idledaydream? The best interpretation is the one that best explains theintrospected thought. Arriving at this explanation will often involveimaginative exercises: e.g., Katherine may imagine a newborn baby inher arms and, noticing that this leads her to feel happy, infer thatshe desires another child. Lawlor’s approach is supported byresearch suggesting that “people can detect their nonconsciousdispositions and motives by vividly imagining a future situation andattending to how it would make them feel.” (Wilson and Dunn 2004,describing a study by Schultheiss and Brunstein (1999).)

Carruthers’ (2011) Interpretive-Sensory Access account similarlytakes self-knowledge to require self-interpretation. Rejecting theidea that there is an “inner sense”, a cognitive faculty dedicatedspecifically to self-knowledge, Carruthers proposes that a single“mindreading” system detects both one’s own mentalstates and the mental states of others. In fact, he hypothesizes thatour “mindreading” system “evolved for outward-lookingsocial purposes” and was only later co-opted for self-knowledge(2011:69). This system takes sensory data as input; interprets thesedata by drawing on situational facts and background information; andyields representations of mental states as output.

Like the inner sense view, Carruthers’ account takes the outputof these states to qualify as knowledge on epistemically externalistgrounds--roughly, because of the system’s reliability. Bycontrast, Lawlor’s account is friendly to epistemic internalism.Self-interpretation is based on internal, accessible evidenceincluding thoughts and feelings, as well as evidence from one’sown behavior.

The idea that we must engage in interpretation to know our ownattitudes and emotions echoes Ryle’s (1949) view that our meansof achieving self-knowledge is broadly similar to our means of knowingothers’ states. In particular, self-interpretation theoristsmaintain that, just as we know others’ attitudes by inferencefrom what they say, self-knowledge often involves inference from innerspeech. (I’m indebted here to Byrne 2012a.) Ryle suggests thatthe experience of inner speech is a maximally effective type of“eavesdropping”.

We eavesdrop on our own voiced utterances and our own silentmonologues. … [T]here is nothing intrinsically proprietary aboutthis activity. I can pay heed to what I overhear you saying as well asto what I overhear myself saying, though I cannot overhear your silentcolloquies with yourself. (Ryle 1949: 184)

Self-interpretation accounts do recognize differences betweenself-knowledge and other-knowledge. Most crucially, in our own case wehave access to introspective evidence (about our experiences), whereasour only evidence for others’ states is their behavior,prominently including their verbal behavior.

Is our access to introspective evidence also inferential, in a waythat threatens a regress? Self-interpretation theorists maintain thateven understanding what you’re currently feeling will requireself-interpretation. Cassam explains this using Lawlor’sexample: “When you identify your feeling as the yearning for anotherchild what you are doing isinterpreting it” (Cassam 2015:163). Cassam argues that this process is holistic, as you rely onknowledge of your recent mental life (e.g., recently feeling envyabout others’ pregnancies) and perhaps your recent behavior(going out of your way to visit a friend with a newborn) to interpretyour current feelings.

The self-interpretation view is compatible with the idea that we knowsome of our states non-inferentially. Carruthers argues thatinterpretation is not required for knowledge of any state that can berecognized solely on the basis of raw sensory data, since sensory dataare the inputs to the mindreading system. Cassam is more circumspectabout this possibility, pointing out that even knowledge of basicsensations like pains sometimes requires cognitive effort (2015:164).

Critics of self-interpretation accounts contend that it neglects theprofound asymmetry between self-knowledge and other-knowledge: thatour rationality guarantees that we have non-inferential access to ourown attitudes (Shoemaker 1994) or that the need to engage inself-interpretation implies that we are alienated from our attitudes(Moran 2001). These claims form the basis for some rationalist andagentialist views (see 3.6 and 3.7).

3.4 EmpiricistTransparency Accounts

Transparency accounts are inspired by the idea discussed above inconnection with Gareth Evans’ famous remark: that if askedwhether you believe that there will be a third world war, you answerby directly considering the likelihood of a third world war. Themetaphor of transparency expresses the notion that one “looksthrough” the (transparent) mental state to directly considerwhat it represents.

Some philosophers use the idea that mental states are “transparent” toadvance rationalist or agentialist accounts of self-knowledge, whichare non-empiricist (see 3.6 and 3.7). The current subsection concerns transparency accounts that seeEvans’ procedure as generating empirical justification orwarrant for self-ascriptions (Dretske 1994; Fernández 2003,2013; Byrne 2005, 2018).

Dretske describes self-knowledge as “a form of perceptualknowledge that is obtained—indeed, can only be obtained—byawareness of non-mental objects” (Dretske 1994: 264). E.g., Ican know that I’m thinkingit’s snowing only byinference from my awareness of a non-mental object, such as thefalling snow. This account secures first-person privilege, since myawareness of the snow would not similarly support an inference aboutanyone else’s mental state. The account requires that we rely onbackground beliefs to justify the inference from seeing snow toI’m thinking that it’s snowing. One worry aboutthis account is that it’s not clear that the relevant backgroundbeliefs will be available or justified (Aydede 2003).

Fernández’s version of the transparency account avoidsthis worry by taking self-knowledge to be non-inferential. He arguesthat a single state can serve as the basis for both the belief thatp and the belief that one believes thatp. Forexample, seeing snow falling will ordinarily result in the belief thatit’s snowing; this visual experience may also form the basis forthe self-ascriptionI believe that it’s snowing.Fernández (2013) labels this “the bypass model”, toindicate that it takes self-attributions of belief to be baseddirectly on the basis for the first-order belief,“bypassing” the first-order belief itself. Theself-ascription is justified in a way that is “partlyinternalist” (ibid.: 44) in that I have access to the basis formy belief that I believe that it’s snowing, namely the fact thatI (seem to) see falling snow. The account is also “partly externalist”(ibid): my self-ascription is warranted because my perceptual statethat is its basis tends to correlate with the belief that it’ssnowing.

The bypass method is exclusively first-personal, since only I can basea belief directly onmy perceptual state. And it is moresecure than others’ knowledge of my mental states. Others knowmy states only by inference—from my behavior, and/or theirobservations of the evidence available to me. But self-knowledge thatsatisfies the bypass model is non-inferential, since theself-ascription (e.g., the belief that I believe that it’ssnowing) is not inferred from its basis (e.g., seeing fallingsnow).

By contrast, Byrne’s (2005, 2018) transparency account isexplicitly inferentialist. He claims that we know our beliefs byreasoning according to the “doxastic schema” (Gallois1996).

Byrne argues as follows. To reason in accord with the doxastic schemais to inferI believe that p from the premisep; onedoes not infer from a premise unless one believes the premise; so suchreasoning will yield true self-ascriptions. The doxastic schema isthus self-verifying.^[5] And it is self-verifying regardless of whether the premise isjustified, or even whether the thinker regards it as justified.

Byrne’s main thesis, that self-knowledge is achieved through useof the doxastic schema, rests on two basic claims. The first claim isthat it’s independently plausible that we actually use thedoxastic schema (as Evans’ remarks suggest). The second claim isthat the hypothesis that we use the doxastic schema best explains thespecial security and asymmetry of self-knowledge. On his proposal, thespecial epistemic security of self-knowledge is a matter ofexternalist warrant: the doxastic schema is not only self-verifyingbut also yields self-ascriptions that are “safe” in thatthey could not easily have been false.^[6] The asymmetry of self-knowledge consists in the fact that followingthis schema will not yield knowledge of others’ states.Reasoning fromit’s snowing toyou/they believethatit’s snowing will not reliably yield truebeliefs about others’ beliefs.

One objection to transparency accounts is that answering the question“Do you believe thatp?” by directly consideringwhetherp may not shed light on what one believed before thequestion arose (Shah and Velleman 2005). For example, to answer thequestion “Do you believe that there will be a third worldwar?” by considering geopolitical matters may produce a newbelief rather than revealing a pre-existing belief. In general,reflection on accessible evidence about whetherp mayactually change a pre-existing belief on this issue (Wilson and Kraft1993). The transparency theorist cannot avoid this worry bystipulating that, when considering whetherp, one should notdraw anew conclusion. Avoiding new conclusions would requirealready knowing one’s beliefs, that is, which conclusions onehad already drawn.

Transparency theorists can respond by arguing that the objectionmisconstrues the aim of these accounts. The objection charges that theaccount may not explain first-personaccess: how it is that,if you believe thatp, you can know that you do. Transparencyaccounts may be intended to address a different question, namely, whatkind of exclusively first-personal method could deliverself-ascriptions that constitute knowledge. And even if consideringgeopolitical matters produced a new belief that a third world war islikely, the inference that Byrne describes—froma thirdworld war is likely toI believe that a third world war islikely—would arguably yield self-knowledge. Still, theobjection exposes a possible limitation of transparency accounts.Because they cannot distinguish newly-formed judgments from previousdispositional beliefs, they cannot account for our apparent ability toknowledgeably answer the question “Do you believe thatp?”, where that question concerns what one believes atthe time the question is posed (Gertler 2011b).

Another objection concerns these accounts’ presumption thatself-knowledge need not meet epistemically internalist conditions onknowledge. Boyle (2011) targets Byrne’s view on this point,arguing that even if the inference fromp toI believethat p reliably yields true (and safe) self-ascriptions, thisinference cannot explain self-knowledge since it will not appearreasonable to the thinker: after all, in general the factthatp doesn’t imply that I believethatp. Fernández addresses this worry, in arguingthat beliefs formed through the bypass method will seem reasonable tothe subject. Other critics argue that the transition fromptoI believe that p is not a genuine inference. Valaris(2011) argues that, unlike genuine inferences, this transition cannotbe used in hypothetical contexts—e.g., when one reasons from apremise one doesn’t believe, to see what follows fromit. Barnett (2016) argues that this transition violates plausible,broadly evidentialist restrictions on inferences.

Fernández limits his account to explaining self-knowledge ofbeliefs and desires, while Byrne extends his account to encompassself-knowledge of all of our mental states. Critics express skepticismabout extending the transparency account beyond beliefs: to desires(Ashwell 2013a, 2013b), to thoughts or intentions (Samoilova 2016), orto beliefs held with less than 100% confidence (Tang 2017).

3.5 Reasons Accounts

Above, we saw that on standard views of beliefs and desires, theseattitudes are at least partly constituted by dispositions to reason,behave, and affectively react. This is one basis for thinking thatself-knowledge of attitudes must be inferential. After all,dispositions seem to be linked with counterfactual truths, and suchtruths can be known only through inference.

Thereasons account of self-knowledge, first advanced byPeacocke (1999), says that we can sometimes know our beliefs withoutrelying on inference. While beliefs are dispositional states,judgments are occurrent: a judgment thatp is anevent. Peacocke argues that judgingit’ssnowing (say) provides you with a reason to think that you havethe dispositions associated with the belief that it’ssnowing—e.g., to put on boots when leaving the house (if youdesire dry feet). In other words, Peacocke thinks that judgingit’s snowing gives you reason to believe that youbelieve that it’s snowing.

Notably, on this view the judgment can serve as a reason for thecorresponding self-ascription of belief so long as the judgment isconscious. You need not beaware of the judgment. An analogymay illuminate the basic idea here. An itch can serve as a reason forscratching even if there is no further conscious state (distinct fromthe itch) that constitutes an awarenessof the itch. Peacockeargues that, in a broadly similar way, a conscious judgment thatp can serve as a direct reason for my self-ascribing thebelief thatp, without my introspecting the judgment andinferring that I believe thatp, or even having any distinctawarenessof that judgment. (Compare Silins 2012.)

The non-inferential transition from judging thatp (aconscious, occurrent state) to believing that one believes thatp (that is, to self-ascribing a belief) is a rational one, onthis view, because judging is conceptually linked with believing:making a judgment “is the fundamental way to form abelief” (Peacocke 1999: 238). Similarly, since remembering thatp is conceptually linked with believing thatp, aconscious memory thatp can justify the belief that onebelieves thatp. And anyone in a position to self-ascribe abelief will possess the concept of belief, and so will grasp—orat least, manifest cognitive dispositions appropriatelyreflecting—these conceptual truths.^[7]

Drawing on Peacocke, Paul (2012) develops a reasons account of how weknow our intentions. On this account, the transition from deciding todo something (or remembering that one has so decided) to believingthat one intends to do that thing is rational, since it is aconceptual truth that deciding normally suffices for intending.

Silins (2020) presents a different argument for the reasons account asapplied to belief. He thinks that judgments likeit’ssnowing but I don’t believe that it is—known as“Moore-paradoxical judgments”—are plainly irrational. But if thejudgment thatp didn’t provide justification forself-ascribing the belief thatp, these judgments could beperfectly rational. Silins concludes that judging thatpprovides (propositional) justification for self-ascribing the beliefthatp. This explains why Moore-paradoxical judgments areirrational: in making such a judgment “you flout the justificationgiven to you by your judgment that p” (Silins 2020: 334).

Coliva (2008) objects that judgments cannot rationalizeself-ascriptions of belief in the way the reasons theorist contends,because they are not suitably accessible. Her argument rests, in part,on a claim reminiscent of the self-interpretation view: that thephenomenology of a conscious thought—such as “things willlook up”—does not indicate whether this is the content ofa judgment or, instead, of a wish. McHugh (2012) responds on behalf ofthe reasons account, arguing that there is a “phenomenologycharacteristic of judging thatp” that is present incases where ordinary self-knowledge is possible (2012: 148). Thisdispute suggests that the prospects for the reasons account, as anaccount of self-knowledge of the attitudes, may depend in part onwhether attitudes have “proprietary phenomenology” (Pitt2004). (For more on that question, see the entry onconsciousness and intentionality.)

3.6 Rationalist Accounts

Rationalist accounts of self-knowledge maintain that our status asrational thinkers guarantees our capacity for self-knowledge. Someagentialist accounts (discussed in the next subsection) agree withthat claim, but on agentialist views this guarantee stems from theagency exercised in rational deliberation. I reserve the term“rationalist” for accounts that focus on rationality andare independent of claims about agency.

Shoemaker explains the link between rationality and self-knowledgewith his “constitutivist”^[8] thesis, namely: for rational thinkers with the appropriate conceptualrepertoire, being in certain mental statesconstitutesknowledge that one is in them. What it is for a rational creature tofeel pain is, in part, for that creature to believe that they are inpain; what it is for a rational creature to believe thatpis, in part, for it to believe that it believes thatp; etc.Shoemaker cashes out this idea with a functionalist analysis of mentalstates, proposing that in rational creatures, the causal role defininga mental state are also sufficient for belief that one is in thatmental state (Shoemaker 1994: 287–9).

Inspired in part by Shoemaker’s arguments, Stoljar (2018, 2019)has recently proposed an ambitious, systematic explanation of the(supposed) fact that rational thinkers are necessarily capable ofself-knowledge. Stoljar posits that what it means to berational is to be guided by the rules of rationality, whichinclude the following “introspective principle”:

If one is in a conscious state C, … one will believe that one is inC. (Stoljar 2019: 405; ellipsis in original)

(The ellipsis indicates that further conditions must be added; thedetails are not crucial here.) If rationality partly consists infollowing this principle, then no rational creature will beself-blind. Stoljar (2019) argues that his proposal also explains why,as Evans claimed, we can know that we believe thatp byconsideringp. He proposes that a belief is conscious, in therelevant sense, when one attends to its content—e.g., toit’s snowing. Together with the introspective principleabove, this means that a rational person who believes thatp,and who attends top, will believe that they believe thatp.

Smithies (2019) also defends the idea that rational thinkers arenecessarily capable of knowing their beliefs. His starting point isthe claim that Moore-paradoxical beliefs are always irrational. Henotes that such beliefs mayseem rational if a thinkerdoesn’t know what they believe: e.g., if someone believes thatp but has misleading evidence suggesting that theydon’t believe thatp. Smithies concludes that, sincesuch beliefs are always irrational, a rational thinker will know allof their beliefs. “Rationality requires knowing what you believe,since otherwise you’re liable to fall into an irrational Mooreanpredicament” (ibid.: 174). To explain how we are able to know all ofour beliefs, he proposes a nonstandard conception of belief: “tobelieve thatp is to be disposed to judge thatpwhen you consciously entertain whetherp” (ibid.: 175–6).Given that conception, beliefs are necessarily accessible to thesubject, since they consist in dispositions to conscious judgments.This means that a rational thinker who believes thatp willhave (available) justification for believing that they believe thatp.

Rationalist accounts face two related challenges. First, to defend theidea that rationality guarantees the capacity for self-knowledge,these accounts must adopt a fairly demanding conception of what it isto be rational. But if a conception of rationality is too demanding,then it is questionable whether it applies to cognitively flawedcreatures like us (Kornblith 2012; Cassam 2015). Second, in order toexplain how we can meet their demanding standards forrationality—how we can follow Stoljar’s introspectiveprinciple, or can know all of our beliefs—rationalists tend toinvoke nonstandard conceptions of “conscious” or “belief”. Thechallenge here is to show that the process of achieving self-knowledgeis psychologically realistic and that it applies to the kinds ofstates that we actually possess.

Many philosophers share the intuition that, necessarily, no rationalthinker is self-blind. The success of rationalist accounts ofself-knowledge depends on whether there are conceptions ofrationality, consciousness, belief, etc. that are robust enough toexclude the possibility of self-blindness yet psychologicallyrealistic enough to explain the cognitive achievements of actual humanbeings.

3.7 Agentialist Accounts

The accounts of self-knowledge canvassed thus far treat self-knowledgeas a largely epistemic phenomenon. But as noted inSection 1, some philosophers deny that the special character of self-ascriptionsis primarily epistemic. One version of this denial charges that byfocusing on ouraccess to our mental states, standardaccounts of self-knowledge portray the introspective thinker aspassive, a mere spectator (or detector) of a cognitive show.Agentialists contend that the special character of self-knowledgestems from the fact that we exercise agency over our mental states,and hence are responsible for them.

The privilege of first-person knowledge is … really more like theknowledge of a person driving a car as opposed to that of herpassenger. The passenger may very well see where the driver is going,but still does not know in the immediateexecutive sense ofthe driver herself. (McGeer 1996: 505)

The phenomena of self-knowledge … are themselves based as muchin asymmetries of responsibility and commitment as they are indifference in capacities or in cognitive access. (Moran 2001: 64)

Many versions of agentialism are inspired by a broadly Kantianapproach to reason and agency (Burge 1996; Moran 2001; Bilgrami 2006;Boyle 2009). On this approach, a thinker’s most basicself-conception (as an “I”) is agential: we see ourselvesasauthors of our beliefs and intentions, rather than as aninert thing in which attitudes merely occur. This authorial agency isessentially rational: it is exercised when we believe or intend on thebasis of reasons. Agentialism differs from rationalism in taking ourcapacity for self-knowledge to derive from our agency and not (just)from our rationality. Agentialists maintain that our rational agencyguarantees that we are capable of—or even that wepossess—self-knowledge.

Agentialists differ as to the precise link between agency andself-knowledge. I begin with Burge, who argues that our responsibilityfor our beliefsentitles us to belief self-ascriptions. Burgeuses the following reasoning. Our rational agency confers on us theobligation to (try to) satisfy certain rational norms: thatone’s beliefs should conform to one’s evidence; that abelief set should be internally consistent; etc. In order to satisfythese rational norms—e.g., to assess our beliefs for conformancewith our evidence, or for consistency with other beliefs—we mustrely on judgments as to which beliefs we have. So our responsibilityto satisfy rational norms epistemically entitles us to those judgmentsabout our beliefs (and other attitudes) that are crucial forsatisfying those norms.

[I]f one lacked entitlement to judgments about one’s attitudes,one could not be subject to rational norms governing how one ought toalter those attitudes given that one had reflected on them. (Burge1996: 101)^[9]

This appears to be a version of “ought implies can” reasoning. Theupshot is that being responsible for one’s attitudes requires,and thereby implies, that we can know those attitudes.

Burge's reasoning has a distinctly transcendental flavor (see theentry ontranscendental arguments). Transcendental reasoning also fuels Moran’s agentialism. Butwhile Burge uses it to establish a general entitlement toself-ascriptions, Moran deploys it to show that self-knowledge can beachieved in a specific way, namely by reflection on reasons. Hereasons as follows. We could not engage in rational thought unless wehad the “epistemic right” to the assumption that our attitudes areshaped by our reasons. (This is “something like a Transcendentalassumption of Rational Thought” (Moran 2003: 406).) So we dohave the epistemic right to that assumption. And our right to thatassumption gives us the epistemic right to use the transparency methodassociated with Evans’ famous remarks: to answer the question“do you believe thatp?” by considering reasons bearingonp (ibid.) So the self-ascriptions produced by thetransparency method constitute knowledge.

Moran’s agentialist transparency account differs markedly fromempiricist transparency accounts (3.4). For empiricists, the transparency method provides for self-knowledgebecause it is reliable or generates self-ascriptions that could noteasily be false. For agentialists, our entitlement to use thetransparency method is rooted in a normative fact: that we areresponsible for our attitudes.

Some worry that Moran’s account is too demanding. O’Brienargues that I am not justified in self-attributing the belief thatthere will be a third world war, on the basis of consideringgeopolitics, unless I recognize that my reasons for expecting a thirdworld war constitute evidence that I believe it will occur. But thisrecognition in turn requires a reflective grasp of the nature ofdeliberation that seems unnecessary for ordinary self-attributions(O’Brien 2003: 379–81).

Other philosophers have supplemented Moran’s argument byclaiming that the agentialist transparency account is needed to makesense of various phenomena. Keeling (2018) cites the fact that weconfabulate reasons for our attitudes (Nisbett and Wilson 1977) asshowing that, as rational agents, we take ourselves to be obligated toknow the rational basis for our attitudes, and hence to be justifiedin taking our attitudes to reflect our reasons. Marcus and Schwenkler(2019) argue that we cannot satisfy the honesty norm for assertionsunless we have non-empirical knowledge of what we believe, of the sortprovided by the transparency method.

Like Burge and Moran, Bilgrami (2006) regards self-knowledge asintimately tied to the phenomenon of rational agency. But his view isnot merely that, as rational agents, we are necessarily capable ofknowing our attitudes. He argues that we could not exercise the agencyinvolved in believing unless weactually knew our beliefs.Beliefs are necessarily known by the thinker because they arecommitments.

[C]ommitments [such as beliefs] … are states that, were we notto live up to them, we should be prepared to criticize ourselves andbe prepared also to try and do better, by way of living up to them… We cannot therefore have commitments without believing thatwe have them. … Thus the very condition for having a commitmentpresupposes that one has a second-order belief that one has thatcommitment. (2006: 287)

Boyle also thinks that our responsibility for our attitudes means thatwe must be generally aware, at least tacitly, of our consciousbeliefs. The capacity to deliberate about whetherp requiresan awareness of howp is being represented: e.g., awarenessthat it is represented as a settled matter, as opposed to a hypothesisto be examined (Boyle 2019: 1034). This means that a rational thinkerwho consciously believes thatp has a tacit awareness of thatbelief. Importantly, for Boyle this awareness is not higher-order: thebelief thatp is not anobject of a separate stateof awareness. Instead, it is an in-built awareness:

[F]or a person who consciously believes thatp, being awareof her own belief and seeing the world from the perspective ofp-believer are two aspects of the same awareness. (ibid.:1018)

The agentialist views discussed thus far have been inspired by theKantian idea that we are responsible for our beliefs and intentionsbecause, in believing or intending, we exercise a distinctive type ofagency, viz.rational agency. Whether positive thisdistinctive type of agency is needed to explain the epistemic andnormative aspects of self-knowledge invoked by agentialists is amatter of controversy (Gertler 2018; Sorgiovanni 2019).

Some agentialist views are independent of the idea that our attitudesare exercises of rational agency. McGeer’s (1996) view, apioneer of empiricist agentialism, takes self-ascriptions to be“commissive”: in self-ascribing an attitude, we commit to behaving inways that fit that attitude.

[W]e areactors as well as observers and so can be good, evenexcellent, “predictors” of our future behavior becausewehave the power to make these “predictions” come true. … [W]e do notjust wait to see if our actions make sense in light of intentionalself-attributions, but rathermake them make sense. (McGeer1996: 507)

McGeer’s account does not invoke the idea of rational agency.This means that it does not rest on positing a distinctive agentialfaculty, and allows its scope to extend beyond reasons-sensitiveattitudes such as beliefs and intentions. For example, saying (orjudging) “I want to go to the beach” commits one to act in ways thatmake sense given that desire: e.g., to go to the beach when anopportunity presents itself. The normativity of this commitment stemsnot from the requirements of rationality but, instead, from ourordinary practical obligations. In expressing an attitude, we provideothers with ways of explaining and predicting our behavior; thisobligates us to behave in ways that fit the attitudes we express orself-ascribe (or to convey that our attitudes have changed).

Coliva (2012a) develops a related view concerning self-ascriptions ofcommitments—which for her include not only beliefs andintentions but also rationally held conative attitudes, such asdesires. Provided that a thinker is rational and has the relevantconcepts, their self-ascriptions of commitments will be true becausethey willcreate the attitudes ascribed.

[A] judgement (or a sincere assertion) such as 
“Ibelieve/desire/intend/wish/hope that P” is like aperformative, namely like “I promise to buy you anice-cream”… : it makes a certain thinghappen,for it does create the first-order propositional attitude as acommitment. … [J]udging “Ibelieve/desire/intend/wish/hope that P” becomes just analternative way of undertaking the same commitments one would make byjudging thatP (is worth pursuing or having)… (Coliva2012a: 235–6)

The agency operative in Coliva’s account is our power toundertake commitments through self-ascriptions. This contrasts withthe kind of agency at work in Kantian agentialist views, which isexercised simply in having beliefs or intentions. However,Coliva’s account still has a rationalist element in thatself-ascriptions involve committing to there being goodreasons for the attitude.

We now consider the prospects for agentialism generally. Theagentialist’s primary burden is to explain the epistemicdimension of self-knowledge. After all, most cases of knowledgeinvolve a belief being controlled by what is known: e.g., I know mydog’s location only if my belief about his location iscontrolled by (sensitive to) his actual location. By contrast, theagential approach focuses on our controlover what is known.Agentialism is not a genuine competitor to the accounts ofself-knowledge unless it explains how agency relative to our attitudesprovides for self-knowledge. (Parrott’s (2015) non-epistemicversion of agentialism is explicitly not a competitor to thoseaccounts, as its aim is to explain why it is reasonable to defer toothers’ self-ascriptions.) Because the various versions ofagentialism differ as to the way that agency secures justification orwarrant for self-ascriptions, their responses to this challenge willdiffer.

A possible drawback of agentialism is its limited application. Mostversions of agentialism apply only to attitudes are sensitive toreasons. (McGeer’s is an exception.) But arguably,non-instrumental desires and some other types of attitudes areinsensitive to reasons: this is part of the motivation forself-interpretation accounts (3.3). And some beliefs and intentionsare insensitive to reasons. Beliefs that are deeply entrenched (suchas superstitions) or comforting (as in wishful thinking) sometimespersevere in the face of counter-evidence. Intentions that run counterto one’s goals (e.g. akratic or self-sabotaging intentions)sometimes withstand practical deliberation.

Agentialists generally hold that we can know such recalcitrantattitudes, but only through a process of self-observation, which theyregard as problematic. (McGeer is again an exception.) Agentialistsargue that if I can know about my own attitude only throughobservation, then I am “alienated” (Moran 2001) from thatattitude; my relation to it, qua agent, is “brute, contingent,non-rational” (Burge 1996); and I can view it only from a“third-person perspective” (Bilgrami 2006) and not“as my own” (Boyle 2009).^[10] Some of agentialism’s critics maintain that knowing an attitudethrough an observational process does not preclude a thinker fromregarding it asher own in the relevant sense (Reed 2010;Borgoni 2015). Some even claim that a detached perspective onone’s own attitudes can be especially enlightening: it can helpus to recognize and combat recalcitrant attitudes (McGeer 2008; Levy2016), and it may be necessary for genuine self-understanding (Doyle2019).

3.8 Expressivist Accounts

Expressivist views highlight similarities between utterances like“I’m in pain” and direct expressions of one’smental states, such as wincing or saying “ouch!”(Wittgenstein 1953; Finkelstein 2003; Bar-On 2004; Campbell 2020). Inparticular, these views center on the idea that utterances like“I’m in pain”—avowals—directlyexpress the mental states they ascribe. The most radical version ofexpressivism—what Bar-On (2004) calls Simple Expressivism,sometimes attributed to Wittgenstein—says that avowals, likenon-linguistic expressions of mental states such as wincing, areneither true nor false. On that view, avowals do not expressknowledge any more than wincing does. Most contemporaryexpressivists take avowals to express self-knowledge. Since ourconcern is with self-knowledge, our discussion will be limited tothose views.

Avowals include thoughts likeI want some water as well asutterances like “I’m in pain”. According to the expressivist,the relation between an avowal and the mental state it expresses isdirect in two respects. First, no judgment to the effect thatI’m in pain or desire water intervenes between my pain or desireand my avowal. Just as a wince flows from my pain directly, aspontaneous avowal flows from my pain (or desire) directly, unmediatedby any judgment. Second, the knowledge expressed in such avowals isepistemically “groundless” in that it is not based onevidence that one is in pain or desires water. Obviously, thesubject can directly express only her own mental states.

Expressivist approaches differ as to the feature of avowals that theyaim to explain. Finkelstein and Bar-On focus on the social-linguisticaspect of avowals, known as first-person authority: we ordinarilydefer to others about their own mental states, so avowals are presumedto be true. Campbell focuses on the epistemic aspect of avowals, knownas first-person privilege: our capacity to avow our mental statesconstitutes a privileged epistemic position vis-a-vis thosestates.

Finkelstein allows that my avowal “I’m so happy!”may be caused by my happiness. But he denies that this is a matter ofbrute causation, as hitting someone’s knee with a hammer brutelycauses his leg to kick out. Rather, what differentiates these cases isthat my happiness and my spontaneous avowal “have, we might say, aparticular kind of intelligibility” (Finkelstein 2003: 126). This doesnot mean that my happiness rationalizes the avowal. (A relevantcontrast here is with the reasons account.) Instead, he says, myavowal, like my smiling, makes sense together with my happiness insomething like the way that a dog’s pain and its moaning makesense together, in “the logical space of animate life”.

Since dogs are not usually thought to possess self-knowledge, thisanalogy raises the question: Does my avowal “I’mhappy” expressknowledge that I’m happy? Theanswer is complex, on Finkelstein’s view. Whether the avowingsubject is to be credited with self-knowledge depends, he thinks, onhow one understands “knowledge”: in particular, avowals donot express knowledge if knowledge requires an epistemic grounding inevidence.

Bar-On’s account focuses on the fact that avowals enjoy apresumption of truth. To use one of her examples: if I say“I’m so happy!”, it would be inappropriate (inordinary circumstances) for you to question whetherI am theone who is happy, or whether what I’m feeling ishappiness. This presumption of truth is explained, onBar-On’s account, by the fact that my avowal flows directly frommy happy feeling. That is, my avowal is not based on evidence abouthow I feel, and no judgment to the effect that I’m happymediates between my happiness and the avowal.

Bar-On maintains that avowals can represent “genuine andprivileged self-knowledge” (Bar-On 2004: 405), although theavowing subject typically has not “formed the active judgment[that he is happy] on some basis”, and cannot offer evidencebearing on his happiness (ibid.: 363). She is not committed to aparticular account ofhow avowals constitute knowledge, butshe presents a number of approaches compatible with her view, whichshe calls Neo-Expressivism.

On one of these approaches, a conscious state can provide epistemicwarrant for a self-ascription directly, in the two senses ofdirectness mentioned earlier: that is, without mediation by a judgmentand without serving as evidence for the avowal.

[A]vowing subjects enjoy a special epistemic warrant, since theirpronouncements, when true, are epistemically grounded in the verystates they ascribe to themselves, which states also serve as thereasons for their acts of avowing. (Bar-On 2004: 405)

(By “epistemically grounded”, Bar-On simply meanswarranted: such avowals are not based on evidence.)

Although both Finkelstein and Bar-On maintain that avowals may qualifyas knowledge, providing an epistemology of self-knowledge is, forthem, at most a peripheral goal. These views are concerned withavowals that issue directly from the states they express, in somethinglike the way a dog's moaning issues directly from its pain. But tosome critics, this spontaneous, reflexive quality ofavowals—that they are not informed by evidence orreasoning—means that they cannot represent to the kind ofepistemic achievement required for knowledge.

Campbell (2020) draws on the idea at the core ofexpressivism—that only the subject can directly express theirmental states—to explain our special epistemic position relativeto our own mental states. Her account contrasts withFinkelstein’s and Bar-On’s in taking the epistemicdimension of avowals (first-person privilege) to be the basis fortheir social-linguistic dimension (first-person authority).

Campbell proposes that an avowal like “I’m in pain” can expressnot onlypain but alsoknowledge that I’m inpain (2020: 15). This proposal draws on her Rational Response accountof knowledge, which says that knowing thatp is “being abletorationally respond to oroperate with, the factthat p” (ibid.: 12). On this account, to know thatI wantwater is to have the rational capacities to act on, express, andreason with my desire for water. I exercise these capacities when Irationally respond to my desire in any of a variety of ways: pouringmyself a glass of water, or altering my route so that I will pass adrinking fountain, or saying “I want some water”. The utterance “Iwant some water” expresses self-knowledge, of the uniquelyfirst-personal kind, if it is a direct, rational response to my desirefor water. This response must bedirect in the ways describedearlier: not based on an intermediate judgment or on evidence about mydesire. The requirement that it berational distinguishesexpressions of self-knowledge from brute reactions, e.g. a dog’sresponding to his thirst by going to his water bowl.

This last point highlights an aspect of Campbell’s account thatdeserves further discussion. The account rests on distinguishingrational responses to the fact thatp from non-rational (or“brute”) reactions. If the account is to explain rather thanpresuppose first-person privilege, what makes a responserational must not be analyzed in epistemic terms. E.g., therationality of a response must not lie in its being justified orwarranted. This is a fruitful area for future work on this newcontribution to the self-knowledge literature.

Bibliography

Works Cited

• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981, “The First Person”, inTheCollected Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, vol. II: Metaphysics and thePhilosophy of Mind, Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress.
• Armstrong, D., 1968/1993,A Materialist Theory of theMind, London: Routledge.
• Ashwell, L., 2013a, “Deep, Dark, …or Transparent?Knowing Our Desires”,Philosophical Studies, 165:245–256.
• –––, 2013b, “Review of JordiFernández,Transparent Minds: A Study ofSelf-Knowledge”,Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews,2013.08.34,available online.
• Aydede, M., 2003, “Is Introspection Inferential?”, inGertler 2003: 55–64
• Barnett, D., 2016, “Inferential Justification and theTransparency of Belief”,Noûs, 50: 184–212.
• Bar-On, D., 2004,Speaking My Mind: Expression andSelf-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Bilgrami, A., 2006,Self-Knowledge and Resentment,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Boghossian, P., 1989, “Content and Self-Knowledge”,Philosophical Topics, 17: 5–26.
• Borgoni, C., 2015, “On Knowing one’s own ResistantBeliefs”,Philosophical Explorations, 18(2):212–225.
• Boyle, M., 2009, “Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78:133–164.
• –––, 2011, “TransparentSelf-Knowledge”,Aristotelian Society SupplementaryVolume, 85: 223–241.
• –––, 2019, “Transparency andReflection”,Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49:1012–39.
• Brewer, B., 1995, “Bodily Awareness and the Self”, inBermúdez, Marcel, and Eilan (eds.),The Body and theSelf, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 291–303.
• Burge, T., 1988, “Individualism and Self-Knowledge”,The Journal of Philosophy, 85: 649–663.
• –––, 1993, “Content Preservation”,The Philosophical Review, 102: 457–488.
• –––, 1996, “Our Entitlement toSelf-Knowledge”,Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, 96: 91–116.
• Byrne, A., 2005, “Introspection”,PhilosophicalTopics, 33(1): 79–104. [Byrne 2005 available online]
• –––, 2012, “Review of Peter Carruthers,The Opacity of Mind”,Notre Dame PhilosophicalReviews, 2012.05.11,available online.
• –––, 2018,Transparency andSelf-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Carruthers, P., 2011,The Opacity of Mind: An IntegrativeTheory of Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Campbell, L., 2020, “Self-Knowledge: Expression withoutExpressivism”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Researchfirst online 20 October 2020. doi:10.1111/phpr.12739
• Cassam, Q., 1997,Self and World, Cambridge, MA: MITPress.
• –––, 2015,Self-KnowledgeforHumans, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Castañeda, H-N., 1966, “‘He’: A Study inthe Logic of Self-Consciousness”,Ratio, 8:130–157.
• Chalmers, D., 2003, “The Content and Epistemology ofPhenomenal Belief”, inConsciousness: New PhilosophicalEssays, Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 220–271.
• Coliva, A., 2008, “Peacocke’s Self-Knowledge”,Ratio, 21: 13–27.
• –––, 2012a, “One Variety ofSelf-Knowledge: Constitutivism as Constructivism”, in Coliva2012b: 212–242.
• ––– (ed.), 2012b,The Self andSelf-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Cunning, D., 1999, “Agency and Consciousness”,Synthese, 120: 271–294.
• Dainton, B. and T. Bayne, 2005, “Consciousness as a Guide toPersonal Persistence”,Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, 83: 549–571.
• Dennett, D., 1991,Consciousness Explained, Boston:Little, Brown & Company.
• Descartes, R., 1641/1984, “Meditations on FirstPhilosophy”, in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (trans.),The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume II, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1644/1984, “Principles ofPhilosophy”, in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (trans.),The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume I, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
• Doyle, C., “Deferring to Others about One’s OwnMind”,Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 100:432–452.
• Dretske, F., 1994, “Introspection”,Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, 94: 263–278.
• Duncan, M., 2018, “What It’s Like to Have a CognitiveHome”,European Journal of Philosophy, 26: 66–81.
• Evans, G., 1982,The Varieties of Reference, Oxford:Oxford University Press (ed. J. McDowell).
• Fernández, J., 2003, “Privileged AccessNaturalized”,The Philosophical Quarterly, 53:352–372.
• –––, 2013,Transparent Minds: A Study ofSelf-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Finkelstein, D., 2003,Expression and the Inner,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Frankfurt, H., 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept ofa Person”,Journal of Philosophy, 68: 5–20.
• Gallois, A., 1996,The Mind Within, The World Without,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Gertler, B., 2001, “Introspecting Phenomenal States”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63:305–328.
• ––– (ed.), 2003,Privileged Access:Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Aldershot: AshgatePublishing.
• –––, 2011a,Self-Knowledge, London:Routledge.
• –––, 2011b, “Self-Knowledge and theTransparency of Belief”, in Hatzimoysis 2011:125–145.
• –––, 2012, “Renewed Acquaintance”,in Smithies and Stoljar 2012: 89–123.
• –––, 2018, “Self-Knowledge and RationalAgency: A Defense of Empiricism”, inPhilosophy andPhenomenological Research, 96: 91–109.
• Goldman, A., 2004, “Epistemology and the Evidential Statusof Introspective Reports”,Journal of ConsciousnessStudies, 11(7–8): 1–16.
• –––, 2006,Simulating Minds, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
• Hatzimoysis, A. (ed.), 2011,Self-Knowledge, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
• Heil, J., 1988, “Privileged Access”,Mind,97: 238–251.
• Hill, C., 1991,Sensations: A Defense of TypeMaterialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Horgan, T. and U. Kriegel, 2007, “Phenomenal Epistemology:What is Consciousness That We May Know It So Well?”Philosophical Issues, 17: 123–144.
• Horgan, T., 2012, “Introspection About PhenomenalConsciousness”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012:405–421.
• Howell, R., 2006, “Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72:44–70.
• Hume, D., 1739–1740/1978,A Treatise of HumanNature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.); revised by P.H. Nidditch,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hurlburt, R. and E. Schwitzgebel, 2007,Describing InnerExperience? Proponent Meets Skeptic, MIT Press.
• James, W., 1884, “On Some Omissions of IntrospectivePsychology”,Mind, 33: 1–11.
• Kind, A., 2003, “Shoemaker, Self-Blindness, andMoore’s Paradox”,Philosophical Quarterly, 53:39–48.
• Kornblith, H., 2012,On Reflection, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Korsgaard, C.M., 2009, “The Activity of Reason”,Proceedings and Addresses of the American PhilosophicalAssociation, 83(2): 23–43.
• Kriegel, U., 2013 (ed.),Phenomenal Intentionality,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lawlor, K., 2009, “Knowing What One Wants”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79:47–75.
• Levy, N., 2016, “‘My Name is Joe and I’m anAlcoholic’: Addiction, Self-Knowledge, and the Dangers ofRationalism”,Mind and Language, 31: 265–276.
• Lewis, D., 1979, “AttitudesDe Dicto andDeSe”,Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543.
• Locke, J., 1689/1975,An Essay Concerning HumanUnderstanding, P.H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
• Lycan, W.G., 1996,Consciousness and Experience,Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Marcus, E., and J. Schwenkler, 2019, “Assertion andTransparent Self-Knowledge”,Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, 49: 873–889.
• McElvie, S.J., 1995, “The VVIQ as a psychometric test ofindividual differences in visual imagery vividness: A criticalquantitative review and plea for direction”,Journal ofMental Imagery, 19: 1–106.
• McGeer, V., 1996, “Is ‘Self-Knowledge’ anEmpirical Problem? Renegotiating the Space of PhilosophicalExplanation”,Journal of Philosophy, 93: 483–515.
• –––, 2008, “The Moral Development ofFirst-Person Authority”,European Journal ofPhilosophy, 16: 81–108.
• McHugh, C., 2012, “Reasons and Self-Knowledge”, inColiva 2012b: 139–163.
• Meyers, D. T., 2002,Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imageryand Women’s Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Mill, J.S., 1865,An Examination of Sir WilliamHamilton’s Philosophy, London: Longmans.
• Moran, R., 2001,Authority and Estrangement: An Essay onSelf-Knowledge, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 2003, “Responses to O’Brien andShoemaker”,European Journal of Philosophy, 11:402–419.
• Neisser, U. and D. Jopling (eds.), 1997,The Conceptual Selfin Context: Culture, Experience, Self-Understanding, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
• Nichols, S. and S. Stich, 2003,Mindreading: An IntegratedAccount of Pretence, Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Nisbett, R. and T. Wilson, 1977, “Telling more than we canknow: Verbal reports on mental processes”,PsychologicalReview, 84: 231–259.
• Nozick, R., 1981,Philosophical Explanations, HarvardUniversity Press.
• O’Brien, L., 2003, “Moran on Agency andSelf-Knowledge”,European Journal of Philosophy, 11:375–390.
• Parrott, M., 2015, “Expressing First-PersonAuthority”,Philosophical Studies, 172: 2215–2237.
• Paul, S., 2012, “How We Know What We Intend”,Philosophical Studies, 161: 327–346.
• Peacocke, C., 1999,Being Known, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Perry, J., 1979, “The Problem of the EssentialIndexical”,Noûs, 13: 3–21
• Peterson, J., 2019, “A Puzzle about Desire”,Synthese, 196: 3655–3676.
• Pitt, D., 2004, “The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What isit Like to Think that P?”Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 69: 1–36.
• Reed, B., 2010, “Self-Knowledge and Rationality”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80:164–181.
• Rovane, C., 1993, “Self-Reference: the radicalization ofLocke”,Journal of Philosophy, 60: 73–97
• Russell, B., 1917, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledgeby Description”, inMysticism and Logic, London: GeorgeAllen and Unwin.
• Ryle, G., 1949,The Concept of Mind, New York: Barnes andNoble.
• Samoilova, K., 2016, “Transparency and IntrospectiveUnification”,Synthese, 193: 3363–3381.
• Schultheiss, O. and J. Brunstein, 1999, “Goal imagery:Bridging the gap between implicit motives and explicit goals”,Journal of Personality, 67: 1–38.
• Schwitzgebel, E., 2002, “How Well Do We Know Our OwnConscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery”,Journalof Consciousness Studies, 9(5–6): 35–53.
• –––, 2008, “The Unreliability ofNaïve Introspection”,Philosophical Review, 117:245–273.
• Searle, J., 1983,Intentionality, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Shah, N. and D. Velleman, 2005, “DoxasticDeliberation”,Philosophical Review, 114:497–534.
• Shoemaker, S., 1968, “Self-Reference andSelf-Awareness”,Journal of Philosophy, 65:555–567.
• –––, 1994, “Self-Knowledge and‘Inner Sense’”,Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 54: 249–314.
• Siewert, C., 1998,The Significance of Consciousness,Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 2012, “On the Phenomenology ofIntrospection”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012:129–168.
• Silins, N., 2012, “Judgment as a Guide to Belief”, inSmithies and Stoljar 2012: 295–328.
• –––, 2020, “The Evil Demon Inside”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100:325–43.
• Smithies, D., 2012, “A Simple Theory ofIntrospection”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012:259–294.
• –––, 2019,The Epistemic Role ofConsciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• ––– and D. Stoljar (eds.), 2012,Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
• Sorgiovanni, B., 2019, “The Agential Point of View”,Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 100: 549–572.
• Sosa, E., 2003, “Reply to BonJour”, In BonJour andSosa,Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism,Foundations vs. Virtues, Malden, MA: Blackwell.
• Spener, M., 2015, “Calibrating Introspection”,Philosophical Issues, 25: 300–321.
• Stalnaker, R., 2008,Our Knowledge of the Internal World,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Stich, S., 1983,From Folk Psychology to CognitiveScience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Stoljar, D., 2018, “Introspection and Necessity”,Noûs, 52: 389–410.
• –––, 2019, “Evans on Transparency: ARationalist Account”,Philosophical Studies, 176:2067–2085.
• Strawson, G., 1997, “The Self”,Journal ofConsciousness Studies, 4(5/6): 405–28.
• Tang, W.H., 2017, “Transparency and Partial Beliefs”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95: 153–166.
• Taylor, C., 1985, “Self-Interpreting Animals”, ch. 2of hisHuman Agency and Language (Philosophical Papers: VolumeI), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Valaris, M. 2011, “Transparency as Inference: Reply to AlexByrne”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111:319–324.
• Velleman, J.D., 1989,Practical Reflection, Princeton:Princeton University Press.
• Weatherson, B., 2004, “Luminous Margins”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 373–383.
• Williamson, T., 2000,Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
• Wilson, T., 2002,Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering theAdaptive Unconscious, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress.
• Wilson, T. and E.W. Dunn, 2004, “Self-Knowledge: Its Limits,Value, and Potential for Improvement”,Annual Review ofPsychology, 55: 493–518.
• Wilson, T., and D. Kraft, 1993, “Why Do I Love Thee? Effectsof Repeated Introspections about a Dating Relationship on Attitudestoward the Relationship”,Personality and Social PsychologyBulletin, 19: 409–441.
• Winkler, K., 1991, “Locke on Personal Identity”,Journal of the History of Philosophy, 29: 201–226.
• Wittgenstein, L., 1953,Philosophical Investigations,G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell.
• Wright, C., 1989, “Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy ofMind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention”,Journal ofPhilosophy, 86: 622–634.

Further Reading

Anthologies on self-knowledge:

• Cassam, Q. (ed.), 1994,Self-Knowledge, New York: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Coliva, A. (ed.), 2012,The Self and Self-Knowledge,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Gertler, B. (ed.), 2003,Privileged Access: PhilosophicalAccounts of Self-Knowledge, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
• Hatzimoysis, A. (ed.), 2011,Self-Knowledge, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
• D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (eds.), 2012,Introspection andConsciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
• Wright, C., B. Smith, and C. Macdonald, (eds.), 1998,KnowingOur Own Minds, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Academic Tools

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at theFriends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
	Enhanced bibliography for this entryatPhilPapers, with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

• Philpapers. Topic: self-knowledge, compiled by Bourget and Chalmers.
• Philpapers. Topic: introspection, compiled by Bourget and Chalmers.

Related Entries

belief |certainty |consciousness |consciousness: and intentionality |consciousness: higher-order theories |dualism |epistemology |externalism about the mind |folk psychology: as a theory |folk psychology: as mental simulation |introspection |justification, epistemic: foundationalist theories of |justification, epistemic: internalist vs. externalist conceptions of |Kant, Immanuel: view of mind and consciousness of self |knowledge: analysis of |knowledge: by acquaintance vs. description |mental content: causal theories of |personal identity |physicalism |private language |propositional attitude reports |self-consciousness |self-deception |transcendental arguments