Analytic feminists are philosophers who believe that both philosophyand feminism are well served by using some of the concepts, theories,and methods of analytic philosophy modified by feminist values andinsights. By using “analytic feminist” to characterizetheir style of feminist philosophizing, these philosophers acknowledgetheir dual feminist and analytic roots and their intention toparticipate in the ongoing conversations within both traditions. Inaddition, the use of “analytic feminist” attempts to rebuttwo frequently made presumptions: that feminist philosophy rejects allthe assumptions of modernism and that analytic philosophy isirredeemably male-biased.^[1] Thus by naming themselves analytic feminists, these philosophersaffirm the existence and political value of their work.

Readers with a strong desire to “cut to the chase” mayjump to the fourth section, oncharacteristics of analytic feminism. The first three sections set the context for analytic feminism byexplaining the relationships between analytic feminists and thevarious traditions they share.

• 1. The Tradition Analytic Feminists Share with Other Analytic Philosophers
• 2. What Analytic Feminists Share with Other Feminist Philosophers
• 3. Various Ways to Characterize Differences Among Feminist Philosophers
• 4. Characteristics of Analytic Feminism
  • 4.1 Doctrines, Desires, and Tools
  • 4.2 Bridge Building
  • 4.3 Style and Aggression
  • 4.4 Reconstructing Philosophy
• 5. Twentieth Century Feminist Criticism of Analytic Philosophy
• 6. Analytic Feminists’ Responses to Critiques
• 7. Analytic Feminism: Limitations and Challenges
• 8. Is it Important to Identify Feminists by Their Philosophical Methods?
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Tradition Analytic Feminists Share with Other Analytic Philosophers

Contemporary analytic philosophers, feminist and nonfeminist, can becharacterized roughly as follows: they consider (some of)Frege,Russell,Moore,Wittgenstein, and theLogical Positivists to be their intellectual ancestors; they tend to prize explicitargumentation and the literal, precise, and clear use of language;they often value the roles of philosophy of language, epistemology,and logic; and they typically view their stock of philosophicalconcepts, methods, and assumptions to be a) consistent with theirModern European heritage, and b) in contrast with methods originatingin continental Europe since 1900, from phenomenology andexistentialism through poststructuralism and new materialism.

Of course, each strand of mid-twentieth-century, “classic”analytic philosophy has changed greatly. Many central dogmas have beenundermined, and nonfeminists and feminists alike have“naturalized”, “socialized”, and otherwisemodulated the earlier, more abstract and highly normative enterprisesand doctrines. However, regardless of the extent of the evolution of“analytic philosophy”, the degree to which methodologicalboundaries are blurred today, and the fruitfulness of intersectionsamong methods, a number of feminist and nonfeminist philosopherscontinue to think of themselves in the historical trajectory ofanalytic philosophy and find the tradition valuable. They claim theterm “analytic philosopher” for themselves, even if othersmight prefer the term “post-analytic”.^[2]

2. What Analytic Feminists Share with Other Feminist Philosophers

One way to encapsulate the agreement in positions and values amongfeminist philosophers, regardless of their methodologicalinclinations, is to say that for feminist philosophers, bothphilosophy and gendermatter—both are important to thelives of human beings. Feminists recognize that philosophy andphilosophers are part of the wider set of institutions of culture inwhich human beings live, understand themselves, and, only sometimes,flourish. Among the many functions of philosophy are the following: tohelp us to understand ourselves and our relations to each other, toour communities, and to the state; to appreciate the extent to whichwe are counted as knowers and moral agents; to uncover the assumptionsand methods of various bodies of knowledge, and so on. These kinds ofphilosophical insights—ones that concern our methods,assumptions, theories, and concepts—can contribute to theoppression of human beings as well as to their liberation (see, forexample, Langton 2000 and Vogler 1995). Given the currentimbalances of power and privilege with which people live, philosophyhas social effects when it “leaves everything as it is”.When feminist philosophers say that traditional philosophy is alreadypolitical, they are calling attention to these social effects.Feminists seek “engaged” philosophy that is potentiallyuseful to empower human beings rather than contribute to theperpetuation of a status quo in which people are subordinated bygender, race/ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and so on. Ofcourse, feminist philosophers disagree about the appropriate ways towork this out, but they do agree that philosophy can influence livesand should influence them for the better.

A second area of agreement among feminist philosophers is that genderaffects not only our lives, but also philosophy itself. Feministscriticize the misogyny of philosophers and the overt and covertsexism, androcentrism, and related forms of male bias in philosophy.For example, philosophers have through the centuries made a variety offalse and demeaning claims about “the nature of woman”;they have defined central concepts such as reason in ways thatexcluded women of their cultures; they have made allegedly universalclaims about human nature, desire, or motivation that were, in fact,claims more likely to be true of men of their own social class; andthey have believed methods and positions to be“value-neutral” and “objective” that wereinstead promoting the interests of only the privileged groups. Onceagain, while feminist philosophers agree on the existence of suchkinds of male bias, they differ over the best ways to criticize it,the extent to which various philosophical approaches can bereconstructed for feminist use, and so on. We turn to examples insections five through seven below.

Feminist philosophers argue that the kinds of male-biased views justnoted limit and distort philosophy on many levels—fromindividual concepts such as reason or autonomy to entire fields suchas philosophy of mind. The remedy for these distortions andlimitations is not to substitute “female bias” for“male bias”, but to understand the variety of roles thatgender plays in the construction of philosophy. Feminists believe thateven as philosophers pursue their traditional goals, the likelihood ofprogress toward them is increased by heeding feminists’ moreinclusive and self-reflexive approach.

It is important to be clear that feminist philosophers realize thattraditional philosophy has been written largely by men who areprivileged in ways that go far beyond their gender. Feminists todaymaintain that gender is only one facet of a complex nexus of mutuallyinfluencing axes of oppression and privilege that structure societyand the social identities of human beings; other facets includerace/ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, class, and so on.Feminist philosophers doing “intersectional analysis” tryto attend to this complexity. Although gender is only one facet, it isnevertheless an important one with a wide variety of implications forthe way we should do philosophy. Most feminists share points in commonas they continue to critique other philosophers as well as try toreconstruct philosophy that is neither male-biased nor oppressive inany other respect. Let’s briefly note a few of these pointsbefore moving on to disagreements.

• Since many traditional philosophers believe that their owntheories or methods have universal applicability, feminists find itappropriate to hold these philosophers’ feet to the fire.Feminists explain that part of what it means for a moral theory or anepistemology to be universal is that it must be applicable to andusable by a full range of human beings, not just to and by members ofa dominant social group. For example, a moral theory should allow formoral agency for any person regardless of social status and specificcomplex identity. An epistemological theory should be able to analyzefairly a full range of cognitive situations of a wide variety of humanbeings. A good philosophical theory or method would systematicallydisadvantage no one: men, women—whether cis ortransgender—as well as nonbinary individuals from any socialgroup. For example, it would disparage no one’s experiences, noone’s authority as a knower, and no one’s goals as a moralor political agent. Such an approach postulates neither the“sameness” of everyone nor the existence of “groupdifferences”. Instead, it asks that philosophers attend to thefull range of human beings, including their wide variety ofexperiences, interests and situations, when purporting to construct“universally applicable” theories.
• It is dangerous to stop paying attention to gender too soon. Evenif a feminist philosopher has a long-term goal of minimizing theimportance of gender, there is a risk of leaving too much unanalyzedif one leaps immediately from male-biased philosophy to gender-neutralphilosophy. Attention to the influence of gender implies a recognitionthat philosophy is embedded in social structures and practices, sofeminist philosophers tend to use “naturalized” or“socialized” methods to explain the “located”or “situated” character of the subject who does philosophyas well as the objects of philosophical reflection. Of course, thedetails here vary widely among feminists. A related notion,“nonideal” philosophy (Mills 2005), is embraced by manyfeminists who express the desire to produce philosophy that isgrounded in the material world full of human beings and institutions,all of which are flawed in very complex ways.
• Philosophy must be normative at the same time it includes anaturalized or socialized component. Feminist philosophers, like manynonfeminist philosophers, struggle to maintain the level ofnormativity that they require in order to serve their philosophicaland political goals. Again, details will vary concerning what level orkind of normativity is necessary.

Although we return later to controversial aspects of these points,feminist consensus is that although philosophy is a discipline thatpurports to be about and for all humanity, it has not been.Philosophers have not appreciated the extent to which their theoriesand methods have underwritten and perpetuated cultures that haveprevented the flourishing of at least half of their populations.Philosophy that reflects a feminist sensibility would take account ofthe relevance of philosophy to the lives of all human beings andpromote the flourishing of every person. At the same time it wouldhelp philosophy to more nearly approximate its own ideals.

3. Various Ways to Characterize Differences Among Feminist Philosophers

Although an essay on analytic feminism focuses our attention ondifferences among philosophical methods that feminists favor, thesedistinctions were not salient in the early days of contemporaryfeminist philosophy in the 1970s. Even during the 1980s and 1990s whenmethodological and other differences came under more scrutiny, thequestion of whether a feminist philosopher finds more valuableresources in analytic philosophy or in pragmatism, poststructuralism,phenomenology, Marxism, critical theory, or hermeneutics was of moreconcern to certain academic feminist philosophers than it was to thewider feminist scholarly or political communities. In fact, academicfeminist philosophers in many parts of the world report taking lessnote of feminists’ methodological distinctions than do feministphilosophers in North America.^[3]

Today, although many feminist philosophers’ mainstreamphilosophical education still often focuses on one philosophicalmethod or tradition, one can find “analytic feminists”discussing Beauvoir, Foucault, or Butler without hesitation. It isfair to say that because of feminist philosophers’ politicalvalues and desire to communicate with other feminists, they are moremotivated to search for methodological cross-fertilization than aremany nonfeminist philosophers. (See the entries onintersections between pragmatist and Continental feminism andintersections between analytic and Continental feminism.)

The categories of feminist philosophies/theories most widely knownoutside academic philosophy since the 1970s are those developed byAlison Jaggar based on political values, goals, and assumptions.Jaggar distinguishes liberal, radical, classical Marxist, andsocialist feminism. Each kind of feminism identifies the principalsources of women’s oppression and encompasses an epistemologyand a theory of human nature as well as political theory andstrategies for social change (1983)^[4] It is very important to note that some women of color have longobjected to the widespread and hegemonic use of these categories (seeSandoval 1991, 2000). In addition, because the categories are based inpolitical theories, it is not surprising that they function better insocial/political theorizing both in and outside of philosophy than forphilosophers doing metaphysics, philosophy of science, aesthetics, andso on.

Sandra Harding developed a different widely used set of categories offeminist philosophies in the context of philosophy of science andepistemology (1986). Harding distinguishes feminist empiricists(practicing natural and social scientists who tended to rely onlogical positivist theories), feminist standpoint theorists who drewfrom Marxist epistemology, and feminist postmodernists. AlthoughHarding is distinguishing feminists by philosophical methodology, itis important to emphasize that her category of “feministempiricist” captures a trend among pathbreaking women scientistswho aimed to hold scientific practice to alleged standards ofscientific objectivity and neutrality; however, the assumptions behindthis trend are not what philosophers today have in mind when speakingof feminist empiricism. Contemporary analytic feminist empiricistphilosophers tend to be post-Wittgensteinian-Quinean-Davidsonianempiricists, so not subject to the principal objections Harding raisedof the scientists. See, for example, Longino (1990, 2002), Nelson(1990), Solomon (2001), E. Lloyd (2008), as well as essays collectedin Scheman and O’Connor (2002), Nelson and Nelson (2003), Clough(2003), Superson and Brennan (2005), Grasswick (2011), Crasnow andSuperson (2012), and Garavaso (2018).

As we will see in more detail below, analytic feminists are amongthose who argue that they are not captured by either Jaggar’s orHarding’s sets of categories. The analytic feminists whodistinguish their philosophical method from their political values andassumptions would reject, for example, a necessary connection betweenbeing either an analytic philosopher or an empiricist and being a liberal.^[5]

4. Characteristics of Analytic Feminism

Although there had been feminist philosophers using analytic methodssince the late 1960s, as feminist philosophy developed in the areas ofepistemology, philosophy of science, and metaphysics there wereclusters of controversies over the compatibility of feminist politicswith a preference for analytic philosophical methods. Panels atAmerican Philosophical Association meetings and discussions at theSociety for Women in Philosophy generated essays that explored thesematters. See, for example, issues ofThe APA Newsletter onFeminism and Philosophy (Tuana 1992; Meyers & Antony1993).

The term “analytic feminist” came into use in the early1990s in North America. Virginia Klenk proposed a Society forAnalytical Feminism (seeOther Internet Resources) in 1991 and was its first president (Cudd & Norlock 2018 recountthe story). Ann Cudd characterized analytic feminism on theorganization’s website (see Cudd 1996 [2006) and in a specialissue ofHypatia on Analytic Feminism (Cudd & Klenk1995). She notes that there is at best a family resemblance amonganalytic feminists. Among the characteristics she cites are thefollowing:

Analytic feminism holds that the best way for scholars to countersexism and androcentrism is through forming a clear conception of andpursuing truth, logical consistency, objectivity, rationality,justice, and the good while recognizing that these notions have oftenbeen perverted by androcentrism throughout the history of philosophy…. Analytic feminism holds that many traditional philosophicalnotions are not only normatively compelling, but also in some waysempowering and liberating for women. While postmodern feminism rejectsthe universality of truth, justice and objectivity and the univocalityof “women”, analytic feminism defends these notions. (Cudd1996 [2006: 158])

As we flesh out the family resemblances among analytic feminists it isimportant to remember that these resemblances include not onlysubstantive positions, but also styles of presentation and otherpractices. Further, as we have already noted in the first twosections, analytic feminists share resemblances with others in theireven larger “family” that includes both non-analyticfeminists and nonfeminist analytic philosophers. A large and diversefamily indeed!

4.1 Doctrines, Desires, and Tools

Although Cudd lists a few traditional concepts that analytic feministswant to retain, she makes clear that this is no manifesto. Many whoconsider themselves feminists in the analytic tradition hold thatthere are no doctrines required of analytic feminists; indeed, thereis even a spirit of contrarianism about such matters, including over“the univocality of ‘women.’” Nevertheless,analytic feminists share something that we might call acoredesire rather than a core doctrine, namely, the desire to retainenough of the central normative concepts of the modern Europeantradition to support the kind of normativity required by both feministpolitics and philosophy. For example, they believe that feministpolitics requires that claims about oppression or denial of rights betrue or false and able to be justified and that philosophy requiresmuch the same thing.

This “core desire” finds its expression, for example, inthe ways analytic feminists use some of what we might call the“core concepts” that Cudd mentions above: truth, logicalconsistency, objectivity, rationality and justice. Although, as notedin thesection 1 above, analytic feminists agree with other feminist philosophers thatimportant facets of these concepts are male-biased, analytic feministsdefend the concepts in ways that other feminists do not. Atthe same time analytic feminists disagree among themselves about anumber of matters, for example, what kinds of accounts of truth orobjectivity should prevail or whether scientific realism oranti-realism is a better strategy. We will spell out some of thesedetails later as we discuss analytic feminists’ defense ofanalytic philosophy in the sixth section, onanalytic feminists’ responses to critiques.

Pieranna Garavaso’s 2018 characterization of analytic feminismrecasts core concepts or desires in terms of toolkits and ways ofreading:

Analytic feminists are philosophers who use methodological approachesoften learned while training in analytic philosophy—that is, theever-expanding toolkit that may include such instruments as conceptualand logical analysis, use of argumentation, thought experiments,counterexamples, and so forth—and who read classical andcontemporary philosophical texts through a filter that highlights theexistence and the effects of various systems of social inequality suchas gender, race, class, physical and mental abilities, and sexualorientation. (Garavaso 2018: 8)

4.2 Bridge Building

Analytic feminists’ use of these toolkits and concepts and theirfeminist reading of the work of traditional analytic philosophersallow them to converse with and build bridges among different groupsof scholars, for example, traditional analytic philosophers, otherfeminist philosophers, and, in some cases, scientists or scholars insocial studies of science. This is sometimes an explicit goal of theirwork (see Fricker and Hornsby 2000, 4–5 and Superson 2011), butis more often implied. Two analytic feminist philosophers of sciencefor whom this is an explicit goal are Lynn Hankinson Nelson and HelenLongino. Nelson sees her work in feminist empiricism that builds uponQuine as a way to engage philosophers of science, scientists andfeminists in constructive conversation (Nelson 1990 and subsequentessays, e.g., 1996). Longino, inThe Fate of Knowledge (2002)takes bold steps to dissolve the rational-social dichotomy byuntangling the assumptions made by social and cultural studies ofscience scholars, historians and philosophers of science, andscientists. Interestingly, Longino’s 2002 and 2013 books are notcast in “feminist” terms, but build on her overtlyfeminist work from the 1980s and 1990s and are informed by manydecades of feminist philosophy conversations.

Analytic feminists’ styles of writing also have implications forbridge building. Because analytic feminists value explicitargumentation and clear, literal, and precise uses of language theirwork “looks like philosophy” to nonfeminist analyticphilosophers; it makes nonfeminist philosophers feel more comfortableengaging in feminist discussion. At the same time, feministphilosophers from various philosophical traditions often engage witheach other’s work outside their own “preferredmethod” because of feminists’ shared values and goals.Thus non-analytic feminists who might find an analytic writing styletediously overqualified or otherwise confining stillengage—along with nonfeminist analytic philosophers—infruitful bridge-building conversations. Editors of analytic feministanthologies and special issues of journals often have explicitbridge-building intentions that rest both on authors’ style and content.^[6] Examples of anthologies and journal issues that tie well withtraditional analytic philosophy are Antony and Witt (1993 [2002]),Cudd and Klenk (1995), Haslanger (1995a), Fricker and Hornsby (2000),Superson and Brennan (2005), Crasnow and Superson (2012), and Garavaso(2018); examples of books or symposia that intentionally build bridgesacross feminist methods include Superson (2003), Witt (2011b), Garry,Khader, and Stone (2017).

4.3 Style and Aggression

Although arguing explicitly is not to be equated with arguingaggressively or in an adversarial manner, analytic feminists haveaddressed the issue of stylistic aggressiveness. We must distinguishtwo related issues on this subject: first, an aggressive manner ofarguing in general, and second, Janice Moulton’s critique of the“adversary method” as a paradigm in philosophy—andspecifically in analytic philosophy (1983). Moulton’s point isnot simply that the socially constructed belief that aggression is anunladylike/unfeminine characteristic puts women at a disadvantage(indeed, in a double bind) in careers such as philosophy that equateaggression with competence. She also focuses on the ways in which theuse of the adversary method as a paradigm of philosophy limits anddistorts the work of philosophers.

Moulton uses “the adversary method” to refer to the viewof philosophy in which the philosopher’s task is to developgeneral claims, produce counterexamples to each other’s generalclaims, and use only deductive reasoning (1983: 152–153). Ifthis is the paradigm of philosophy rather than simply one strategyamong many, then the discipline excludes many fruitful kinds ofexploration and development, distorts the history of philosophy, and(because it works best in well-defined areas, even isolated arguments)greatly narrows the scope of philosophical concerns. Moulton also seesintegrated into this paradigm several ideals of which she is critical,for example, “value-free” reasoning and objectivity.Interestingly, she does not draw illustrations from the obviousexamples in analytic philosophy such as Edmund Gettier’sanalysis of “S knows thatp” and the decadesof responses to it. Instead she uses an early feminist essay, JudithThomson’s “A Defense of Abortion” (1971), to showways in which important facets of a substantive issue can be set asidebecause of restrictions imposed by the adversary method.

I know of no feminist who has argued in print against Moulton’sspecific argument opposing the adversary method, although some havemade further distinctions (for example, Govier 1999 and Rooney2010). Nevertheless, some analytic feminists have pointed to the valueof arguing aggressively in general. For example, Louise Antony valuesthe gender transgression and feelings of empowerment and freedom thatcan stem from a woman’s using an aggressive analytic style ofwriting and argument (Antony 2003, see also Baber 1993). More recenttreatments of aggressive or adversarial styles have arisen indiscussions of the persistently low number of women in philosophy,compared with other humanistic disciplines (see, for example, Burrow2010, Rooney 2010, Beebee 2014, and for a differing view that centersBlack women, see Henning 2018, 2020). This issue is not one that findsanalytic feminists (or any others) in unanimity. Underlying thedisagreement over style are important shared goals: to offer clear,rational support for feminist positions and to remain respectful ofthe other person while disagreeing. Feminist philosophers find thelatter to be especially important, but peculiarly elusive, when theyare disagreeing among themselves. The parameters of respectfuldisagreement have engendered interesting debate.^[7]

4.4 Reconstructing Philosophy

We noted in thesecond section that feminist philosophers with a variety of methodological andpolitical backgrounds would agree thatif a philosopherclaims universal applicability for a theory or method, it must beusable by people of any gender from a variety of complex sociallocations. Many analytic feminists use a similar approach to theconstruction of feminist philosophy. They tend to be wary ofcreating specialized fields/types of philosophy that are relevant onlyto (some or all) women or feminists, for example, ethics orepistemology that is only for lesbians or is“gynocentric”. Analytic feminists tend to propose thatfeminist ethics or feminist metaphysics would instead establish newcriteria of adequacy for ethics or metaphysics. The authorsinThe Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy provideexcellent examples of this approach (Fricker & Hornsby 2000). Thisapproach can be spelled out in terms similar to some used inSection 2: An adequate philosophical theory, method or concept is one that“works” for women as well as everyone else.“Works” is very inclusive here: it cannot be enmeshed in aphilosophical system that has oppressive consequences large or small;its theories and concepts must reflect and be applicable to the fullrange of experiences, interests, and situations of all sorts of women,men, and nonbinary people. Note that this view requires no commitmentto claims about feminist standpoints, nor does it treat women as auniform class of any kind. It is obvious that experiences varyaccording to a number of different axes—not only along thecommonly cited axes of social class, sexual orientation,race/ethnicity, physical or mental abilities, and gender—butalso in terms of individual variation as well as other generalfactors. This approach leaves open many substantive questions aboutthe long-term interests of different individuals and groups. It alsopermits one to point out the importance of having a variety ofperspectives without maintaining that there is something“essential” about these perspectives.

As analytic feminism has become an increasingly developed field, itspractitioners have expanded the range of resources upon which theydraw as they reconstruct philosophy. Some analytic feminists alongsideothers pursuing engaged scholarship, have argued that traditionalphilosophy and feminist philosophy alike need to reflect thecomplexities of intersectional analyses of gender, race/ethnicity,sexuality, disability, class, and so on (Bailey 2010 and Garry 2012took particular aim at analytic feminists in their arguments forintersectionality). Philosophers need to draw on feminist criticalrace theory, critical disability studies, and queer and trans theoryto enrich their understanding of the ways in which various axes ofoppression and privilege intermesh.

Reconstructing philosophy also requires understanding the roles thatprivilege and oppression play in the widespread construction ofepistemic ignorance and in practices that result in epistemicinjustice and epistemic oppression. A rapidly growing body ofliterature in the twenty-first century, for example, Miranda Fricker(2007) and Kristie Dotson (2011, 2014) as well as multiple authors inNancy Tuana and Shannon Sullivan (2006),in Sullivan and Tuana (2007),and in Ian Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus (2017) call toour attention both the depth with which privilege has been constructedand the ways its tentacles reach into multiple facets of our epistemicand moral lives.^[8]See entry onfeminist social epistemology for more detailed discussion.

5. Twentieth Century Feminist Criticism of Analytic Philosophy

Although every philosophical method is subject to feminist critique,“classic” analytic philosophy might seem to be a paradigmcase of “male-biased philosophy”—a kind ofphilosophy least hospitable to feminist values. Among the featuresthat feminists have criticized are that it is committed to pureobjectivity and value-neutrality, and uses an unlocated, disembodied,disinterested, autonomous individual reasoner, knower, and agent.Having stated it this boldly, let us look briefly at examples of latetwentieth-century arguments offered by feminists who themselves hadanalytic training that became classic critiques of analyticphilosophy. InSection 6 we will turn to the responses of other analytic feminists tounderstand why they nevertheless find valuable resources in theanalytic tradition.

In some respects it is hard to disentangle feministphilosophers’ critiques of analytic philosophy from theirbroader critiques of Western thought because sometimes their critiqueof analytic philosophy is supported by their critiques of either itsantecedents in modern philosophy or its sister scientific disciplines.For example, when Jaggar criticized abstract individualism and otherconcepts of modern liberal political theory her critique was alsorelevant to the disinterested, detached investigator prized by thelogical positivists. Jaggar faults liberalism for

1. its normative dualism that arises when the mental capacity forrationality is “what is especially valuable about humanbeings” (1983: 40),
2. abstract individualism—“the assumption that theessential human characteristics are properties of individuals and aregiven independently of any particular social context” (1983:42), and
3. its assumption that rationality is instrumental, value-neutral,and detached.

Jaggar did not claim that her critique applied to analytic philosophybeyond positivism, but notes that neopositivist values are held innormative theories even in the late twentieth century. She isthinking, for example, of political or moral theorists’characterization of objectivity as impartiality and lack of bias(1983: 357).

Among Sandra Harding’s analyses of the discourses upon whichfeminists draw, the most relevant to analytic philosophy is heraccount of empiricism as practiced by natural and social scientists.Although Harding is speaking about scientists rather thanphilosophers, her critique of the limitations of the empiricistview—especially its assumed account of “value-free”objectivity—is also applicable to philosophers who utilize thisconcept of objectivity. Harding advocates that feminists retain anotion of objectivity that incorporates appropriate values (her“strong objectivity”) and criticizes theempiricists’ alleged “value-free” objectivity by theuse of the arguments below.

1. It perpetuates the values of the researchers, and is, in differingways, both too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow because it candetect only values that differ between researchers and“competent” critics, and too broad because it purports toeliminate all social values, when it may well be that some valuesbenefit science while others undermine it (Harding 1991:143–4).
2. It is politically and morally regressive; for example, itconstructs science in a way that permits scientists to be “fastguns for hire” rather than individuals who attend to the moraland political values that support and are implied by their actions.(Harding 1991: 158–9)
3. It is linked to other implausible views. Examples include, first,that only false beliefs have social causes while true beliefs havenatural ones, and, second, that the ideal agent must create andconstantly police the borders of a gulf, a no-man’s-land,between himself as the subject and the object of his research,knowledge, or action
   in order to be “a self whose mind would perfectly reflect theworld” (1991: 158). Harding utilizes Nancy Hartsock’s term“abstract masculinity” for this last idea (Harding 1991:158).

Nancy Holland utilizes the overlapping critiques of Harding andJaggar, particularly that of abstract individualism, and takes them tobe telling of Anglo-American philosophy in general (she considersLocke and Hume as well as contemporary analytic philosophers toexemplify Anglo-American philosophy). Holland focuses on themetaphysical assumptions of empiricism that exclude women fromphilosophy. She writes that contemporary analytic philosophy,

by remaining within the Empiricist tradition, inherits not only theproblems of that tradition, but also a self-definition that identifiesit as necessarily men’s philosophy…. [Men’s]philosophy defines itself throughout its history in such a way as toexclude what our culture defines as women’s experience from whatis considered to be properly philosophical. (1990: 3)

Although Jane Duran values the rigor of analytic philosophy and wantsto incorporate it into feminist epistemology, she sees analyticepistemology (“pure epistemology”) as a recent incarnationof “a masculinist, androcentric tradition that yields ahypernormative, idealized, and stylistically aggressive mode ofthought” (1991: 8). She appeals not only to Harding, but also toEvelyn Fox Keller (1985) and Susan Bordo (1987) as well as to JaniceMoulton’s (1983) critique of the adversary paradigm discussedabove inSection 4. Duran’s examples of traits that have been seen as androcentricinclude,

analysis in terms of logically necessary and sufficient conditions,lack of allusion to descriptively adequate models, the importance ofcounterexampling, putative universalization of the conditions, and soforth. (1991: 44)

Naomi Scheman refers to herself as an “analytic philosophersemi-manqué”—one who has left the analyticneighborhood of her philosophical training. She has made several kindsof arguments that bear on the adequacy of analytic philosophy: theimpact of individualism in philosophy of mind, the nature of the self,and the nature of the normative philosophical subject (see her paperscollected in 1993 and 2011). For example, Scheman argues that it isthe ideology of liberal individualism rather than sound argument thatunderlies the widespread belief that psychological objects such as“emotions, beliefs, intentions, virtues, and vices” areproperties of individuals (1993: 37). In fact, part of Jaggar’sargument against abstract individualism relies on Scheman’sconceptual point that questions of identifying and interpretingpsychological states must be answered in a social context, not inabstraction from it. Scheman acknowledges her debt to Wittgenstein inmaking this point, but goes beyond his views by arguing thatwomen’s experiences and psychosexual development do not bear outthis kind of individualistic assumption.

In other essays Scheman argues that the philosophical“we”—the subject who has philosophicalproblems—is anormative subject, one that bears themarkings of various kinds of privilege. Her examples of normativesubjects are the ideally rational scientist or the citizen of aliberal state (1993: 7). In this way she shifts her argument away fromthe experiences and developmental differences between actual men andwomen (or between white people/people of color, or other actualdifferences of privilege/marginality) in order to focus on theconnection between privilege and normativity. If one were to take aFreudian-tinted view that philosophical problems are“intellectual sublimations of the neuroses of privilege”,then their resolution would come, à la Wittgenstein, throughchanges in our forms of life (1993: 8).^[9]

Lorraine Code is among those who have criticized analytic philosophyfor use of a moral-epistemic individual who is “abstract,‘generalized,’ and disengaged” and a tradition thatis more concerned with what an ideal agent or knower would do thanwith a real one (1995: xi). Code uses the example of an“S knows thatp” epistemology to focus oneof her most widely known critiques. The knowing subjectS, inwhat Code hyphenates as the “positivist-empiricist”epistemology, is an individual—a detached, neutral,interchangeable spectator whose knowledge is most reliable when his orher sensory observations occur in ideal conditions, not real, everydayones. Code argues that “S knows thatp”models of knowledge work only in a prescribed area; indeed, they favora narrow kind of scientific knowledge. A more adequatecharacterization of knowing must be applicable to a broad range ofexamples in the lives of real people. In order to do so, it cannot usethe interchangeable subject,S, but must include subjectivefeatures ofS such as the person’s identity, interests orcircumstances. For without these features we cannot explain complex,relational knowing, for example, knowing a person. In addition, anadequate account of knowledge should uncover ways in which politicalinterests are used to determine who is allowed to be a standardknower, that is, anS (Code 1991, 1995, 1998). This is only oneof Code’s early lines of argument against analytic philosophy.InSection 7 we will discuss her arguments that point to the limitations ofnaturalized epistemology in the analytic style as well.

As we close our discussion of some of the important classic feministcritiques of analytic philosophy, recall that another criticism wasdiscussed inSection 4: Janice Moulton’s critique of the adversary method as a paradigmof philosophy. Although use of the adversary method need not belimited to analytic philosophers, Moulton’s critique is clearlyapplicable to widespread practices in twentieth century analyticphilosophy.

6. Analytic Feminists’ Responses to Critiques

The most frequent kinds of responses by analytic feminists to feministcritiques of analytic philosophy are variations of the followingarguments and claims:

1. Feminist critiques may have been legitimate forsome kinds of analytic philosophy, especially logical positivism, butbecause analytic philosophy has changed, the objections do not holdfor most contemporary work. The analytic feminist then develops astrand of analytic philosophy that is not subject to a particular kindof objection, for example, that knowers are unlocated.
2. There were errors of interpretation infeminists’ critiques, for example, concerning the extent towhich analytic philosophy incorporated empiricism. After correction,analytic philosophy will not be vulnerable to this particular kind ofcriticism.
3. Critics have gone too far in undermining fields ofphilosophy such as metaphysics and central concepts such asrationality. Such fields and concepts are needed both on philosophicaland feminist grounds.

All three kinds of responses allow analytic feminists to engage inactivities on which they thrive—disentangling strands ofargument from each other, making distinctions among concepts,searching for kernels of truth among points with which they disagree,and so on.

Response (1). Regardless of the precise characterization of contemporary analyticphilosophy, it clearly cannot to be equated with logical positivism.So to the degree that feminist critiques focus on logical positivismrather than current analytic work, they will likely be off the mark.As analytic feminists respond to other feminists’ critiques,they try to decipher which strands of analytic philosophy might bemost useful and the degree to which old assumptions and concepts thatare male-biased still linger. Although some feminists have defendedfacets of the work of Neurath (Okrulik 2004) and Carnap (Yap 2010) asuseful for feminism, most analytic feminists find resources inphilosophers who themselves reject central dogmas and methods ofclassical analytic philosophy, for example,Wittgenstein,J.L. Austin,Quine,Davidson, and others.

Let’s take as examples of argument (1) feminists who believethat useful strands of analytic philosophy will benaturalized in some way. We need to cast a wide, permissivenet here for what counts as “naturalized” and toacknowledge some controversies over its relation to analyticphilosophy and to feminism. As used here, “naturalizedphilosophy” includes philosophy that is explicitlyinformedby, rather than replaced by, empirical information about knowers,agents, and social structures from psychology/cognitive science,sociology, anthropology, and elsewhere. Although most analyticfeminists favor “naturalizing” philosophy (with a strongpreference for its subcategory of social epistemology), they arecritical of many nonfeminist ways of doing it.^[10]

For example, the focus in traditional naturalized epistemology on“individual” rather than “social” sciencesneglects the “situatedness” of our thinking. A finalcaveat about terminology: since there is disagreement over the properscope of both “naturalized” and “analytic”,some will object that naturalized philosophy is not a strand ofanalytic philosophy at all. For example, Quine, who might beconsidered the father of naturalized epistemology, fits squarely intoour characterization of analytic philosophy; however, Lynn HankinsonNelson considers him post-analytic (Nelson and Nelson 2003). And, ofcourse, there is no necessary link between naturalized philosophy andanalytic philosophy in any case; one need only think of Foucault orDewey to sever that connection.

Keeping in mind all these caveats and controversies, let’s turnto the example of naturalized epistemology to consider what“naturalizing” can do to help feminists overcomedifficulties with analytic philosophy. Feminists criticize analyticphilosophy for its concepts of a knower (and an agent), for example,that it is anindividual who is abstract, idealized,interchangeable, unlocated, disconnected, disembodied, disinterested,etc. The first thing that naturalized epistemology can do is to shiftthe focus from the abstract or idealized knower to the concrete facetsof the person who has beliefs and knowledge. Although this move is notin itself feminist, Jane Duran finds it a positive step toward“gynocentric”, i.e., woman-centered, epistemology. Shebelieves that naturalized epistemology—by its descriptivecharacter and its concern with the context and details ofknowing—is capable of including features valued by feministstandpoint epistemology, for example, the relational aspects ofknowing and the grounding that knowledge has in the body and inactivities of daily life (1991: 112, 246). Duran is one of the firstfeminists who explicitly combined feminist standpoint theory withanalytically oriented naturalized epistemology, and is an exception tothe widespread tendency of analytic feminists to stay clear ofgynocentrism. Of course, one need not agree with the specifics ofDuran’s analysis to appreciate the importance of naturalizedepistemology’s descriptive attention to context and concretedetails: this descriptive attentionallows gender intoepistemology as facets of the knower and the context becomerelevant. One can then debate what kinds of social structures,individual variations, and their interactions are fruitful avenues ofexploration.

A second naturalized approach is Louise Antony’s argumentconcerning a different aspect of the knower—neutrality. Antonymaintains that naturalized epistemology resolves the “paradox ofbias” (how one can consistently critique male bias and at thesame time object to the notion of unbiased, neutral, objective, orimpartial knowledge). Naturalized epistemology rejects the ideal ofneutrality and instead gives us empirical norms by which todifferentiate good from bad biases, that is, biases that lead ustoward rather than away from truth (1993 [2002: 113–116, 134–144]).^[11] Antony also engages in many other facets of the debate betweenanalytic and non-analytic feminists to which we will return later.

A third strategy, still within the context of a naturalizedepistemology/philosophy of science, is to change the relationshipbetween empiricism and the individual. Lynn Hankinson Nelson and HelenLongino are empiricists not in the style of Locke or Hume, but intheir positions thatevidence comes from the senses, fromexperience (Nelson 1990: 21; Longino 1990: 215). This is encapsulatedby saying that empiricism is a theory of evidence. Using differentlines of argument, they both shift the focus from the individual tocommunities. Nelson argues that communities rather than individuals“‘acquire’ and possess knowledge” (Nelson1990: 14). She wants to use both Quinian and feministresources to forge an empiricism sufficiently rich and sophisticatedto overcome critiques of earlier feminist empiricism offered, forexample, by Harding as well as to avoid feminist objectionsto individualism (whether to Jaggar’s “abstractindividualism” or the other forms discussed above). Nelsonmaintains that Quine—while remaining an empiricist—hadalready undermined or abandoned many of the postpositivistcharacteristics to which Jaggar and Harding object. Thus empiricism,tempered by Nelson’s focus on communities as knowers, canadequately take into account the social identities of knowers and thecomplex dependencies of individuals on epistemologicalcommunities.

Helen Longino’s approach inScience as Social Knowledge(1990) is to argue that among the many ways in which science is socialis that epistemologicalnorms apply to practices ofcommunities, not just to individuals. InThe Fate ofKnowledge (2002), she further develops her contextual empiricistargument along lines that break down the dichotomy between therational and the social (and many other dichotomies along the way).Although her argument has a wide scope, we are now concerned only withthe ways in which her view breaks the connection between individualismand empiricism. Longino distinguishes between individualism as aphilosophical position (that, among other things, tends to considerknowers interchangeable) and whether individuals, in fact, haveknowledge (2002: 14–48). She does not deny that epistemic normsapply to the practices of individuals or that Einstein had an“extraordinary intellect, but what made [Einstein’s] brilliantideas knowledge were the processes of critical reception” (2002:122). Knowledge requires social interaction, not a dichotomybetween the rational and the social; it also integratesvalues—some of them social—at both the constitutive andcontextual levels.

The responses of Longino, Nelson, Antony, and Duran to feministcritiques of earlier stages of analytic philosophy all illustratevariations on theme (1): they agree with certain facets of thefeminist critique, but draw on resources within particular strands ofanalytic philosophy (in their cases naturalizedepistemology/philosophy of science) as well as other feministresources to produce epistemologies that overcome the objections toanalytic epistemology. Their strategies vary: Longino and Nelsonde-emphasize the individual in favor of communities; Antony and Durankeep the focus on individuals, but make them more concrete; inaddition, Antony tries to resolve the paradox of bias.

Let us turn much more briefly to strategies(2) and(3). The claim in (2) is that there were errors of interpretation in thefeminist analyses of analytic philosophy and its antecedents thatweaken the feminist critiques. In (3) it is that critics have gone toofar in undermining fields of philosophy such as metaphysics or centralnotions such as rationality that we need to retain. Examples of bothapproaches (sometimes even in one paper) can be found in Louise Antonyand Charlotte Witt’sA Mind of One’s Own, acollection of papers that focused on reason and objectivity in boththe history of Western philosophy and various fields of contemporaryphilosophy (1993 [2002]). Those who propound claim (2) includeMargaret Atherton and Louise Antony. Atherton (1993 [2002]) criticizesboth Genevieve Lloyd (1984) and Susan Bordo (1987) for theirinterpretations of Descartes. Although Atherton’s piece ispurely historical, it is relevant to our discussion because feministsof all persuasions who debate the merit of analytic philosophyacknowledge historical analyses, especially Lloyd’s extensivework on “the man of reason”. Louise Antony argues thatJaggar (1983) and Jane Flax (1987) mischaracterize the rationalist orempiricist traditions, and so miss the extent to which analyticphilosophers have already rejected aspects of them. This leadsfeminists to misidentify analytic epistemology with empiricism andoverlook more rationalistic possibilities (Antony 1993 [2002]).

Finally,strategy (3). When analytic feminists defend a field or a concept from critiques ofother feminists who have “gone too far”, they might befending off poststructuralist critics who do not want to dotraditional metaphysics at all or they might be arguing about whichaspects of the field are male-biased (for example, foundationaliststyles of metaphysics or the tendency to see selected categories asnatural). Both Charlotte Witt and Sally Haslanger argue that there isno specifically feminist reason for rejecting metaphysics in general.Witt considers the particular case of “what it is to behuman”. She argues that feminists, in fact, need assumptions andtheories about what it is to be human even in order to criticizetraditional metaphysical theories (1993 [2002]). Haslanger discusses arange of issues concerning social construction, realism, and naturaland social kinds. In the course of her discussion of feminists such asCatharine MacKinnon and Judith Butler, Haslanger makes manydistinctions among kinds and functions of social constructions, sortsout ways in which metaphysics and politics are related, and, ingeneral, provides an example of feminist metaphysical debate thatdistinguishes male-biased facets of metaphysics from facets useful forfeminists (1995b, 1996, 2000, 2012). One way of characterizing thisapproach is that it goes for the “kernels of truth” withinlarger, more problematic (or at least more polemical) discussions, andthereby performs a service for readers who might be sympathetic withsome aspects of the views of MacKinnon or Butler, but who are notwilling to accept the body of work that encompasses them.

A more controversial analytic feminist response that fits into(3) is Martha Nussbaum’s defense of concepts and standards ofobjectivity and reason. She argues forcefully that it is infeminists’ interests, both theoretically and practically, toretain fairly traditional ideals of objectivity and rationality whileacknowledging their abusive use. This position, in itself, would nothave generated great controversy, even if not universally accepted.However, because Nussbaum sees certain critics of the male-biasedaspects of objectivity and reason as part of a “feminist assaulton reason” (1994: 59), her essay and her interpretation of otherfeminists’ views generated wide and heated discussion amongfeminist philosophers at the time.^[12]

As we close the discussion of analytic feminists’ responses tocritiques of analytic philosophy, it is important to restate theobvious: not every analytic feminist would agree with the responsesarticulated in the few examples chosen here. Indeed, in spite of thedesire that analytic feminist philosophy be sufficiently normative,there is disagreement over issues such as the attitude to take towardconcepts that have typically embodied that normativity. Considertraditional ideals of objectivity: views range from the claim thatalthough the ideals of rationality and objectivity are “bothunattainable and undesirable”, we nevertheless ought to embracethem as “regulative norms” or “heuristics”(Antony 1995: 87) to a number of different understandings ofobjectivity that would make them not so subject to distortion ormisuse (for example, E. Lloyd 1995a, 1995b; Haslanger 1993 [2002];Scheman 2001a; Heldke 2001; Janack 2002).

Finally, we need to remember that what feminists expect of aphilosophical method—their own preferred method(s) orothers—will influence their critique of it. It is important tobe realistic in considering what any particular method might offer afeminist. For example, an analytic method is likely to provide afeminist with much more assistance in clarifying concepts, makingdistinctions, and evaluating arguments than with creating her“vision” or defining the goals of her work (see Garry1995).

7. Analytic Feminism: Limitations and Challenges

Although traditional analytic philosophy seemed to many to be theleast hospitable philosophical method for feminism, analyticfeminists’ work over the decades has greatly increased themethod’s hospitality and showed its promise. Let’s nowconsider some limitations and challenges that remain for analyticfeminism.

The strengths and limitations of various kinds of feministphilosophies can grow from the same sources—if feminists areclose to a mainstream tradition, they are subject to at least some ofits limitations although they stand a better chance of influencing itand “building bridges” than do those who critique thetradition more deeply. Audre Lorde, addressing the racism andheterosexism of a feminist conference in 1979, pointed to one riskquite powerfully by saying, “The master’s tools will neverdismantle the master’s house” (Lorde 1984: 112). Althoughover the decades Lorde’s claim sent chills down the spines offeminists across the disciplines, the very existence of feministphilosophy requires that neither the “tools” of thephilosophical trade nor the house(s) are the sole property of the“master”. Feminist philosophers, analytic or not, build onthe work not only of other feminists and other scholars doing engagedwork, but also ofsome traditional philosopherssometimes. Because of the desire to utilize as well as modifytraditional philosophy, feminists must always be alert for deeperlevels of male or other kinds of bias that may become apparent intheir work—possible unwanted baggage of traditional analyticphilosophy.

Some potentially relevant “baggage” for analytic feministsinclude the deeper limitations of their concepts and methods and thelevel of abstraction at which they tend to work. For example, when anyof these contribute to an inability to notice and center diverseexperiences, analytic feminists do not attend to a full range ofcomplex human lives that they hope to encompass; the impact andmeaning of race/ethnicity, social class, religion, nationality, queerand trans lives, lives of people with disabilities, and others will belost. Examples of such limitations as well as others are below.

1. Kristie Dotson, while praising Fricker’s (2007) strongcontribution to understanding epistemic injustice, argues thatFricker’s lack of an “open conceptual structure”about what constitutes epistemic injustice leads her work toperpetuate epistemic injustice. This has happened, Dotson argues,because Fricker contrasts epistemic injustice with epistemic bad luck(Dotson 2012: 25). Dotson explores epistemic oppression in moreexpansive ways that speak more directly to the different levels ofsystemic oppression and that encompass various important forms ofepistemic exclusion and violence, including, for example, silencingand smothering (2011, 2012, 2014).
2. Naomi Scheman and Linda Martín Alcoff point out ways inwhich analytic feminists may not fully appreciate all the political,metaphysical and epistemological baggage that has already been packedinto their theories and concepts. Scheman thinks that Nussbaum stopslistening too soon to attacks on rationality and fails to appreciatethat openness to reasonable argument (advocated by Nussbaum) impliesthat we recognize when our own conception of reasonableness is beingquestioned (Scheman 2001b). Alcoff, maintaining that we needsome concept of reason, makes a similar argument againstNussbaum and points out the dogmatic character of claiming that someparticular concept of reason isthe concept thatcannot be given up (Alcoff 1995).

3. A closely related objection is that it is not always easy or evenpossible to detach one’s method from one’s politics.Because some analytic feminist work is liberal, for example, Nussbaum(2000a), Cudd (2006), and Bhandary (2020), other analytic feministstake pains to separate their method from their politics. Antony arguesthat her own socialist politics are compatible with an analytic method(2003). Although one can appreciate Antony’s point, if ananalytic feminist is articulating a socialistfeminism,rather than favoring some kind of socialism or other, then the facetsof her position derived ultimately from Marx, from Quine, and fromfeminism need to be hammered out carefully in order to settle downtogether well.

   Others raise more general questions about the relation betweenphilosophical method and feminist and anti-racist politics. Forexample, Alice Crary, taking on the general relation betweenphilosophical method and feminist politics, finds that Fricker’sneutral philosophical methods and concepts of reason (2007) are notsufficiently radical to support feminist politics (2018). TinaFernandes Botts (2018) and Jana Cattien (2019) both criticize analyticfeminists’ highly abstract level of analyzing race and gender aswell as their use of similar models for both. Instead, specific livedexperiences of marginalized people need to figure more centrally inour thinking (Botts 2018). Cattien argues that what is at stakepolitically is obscured by analytic feminist metaphysicians (includingtheir normative assumptions) and that they need “to be able totake themselves as objects of a politically charged critique”(2019: 733). For example, she finds Haslanger’s (2012) analysisthat places all races on one conceptual plane can’t do justiceto “white complicities in perpetuating racist powerrelations” (2019: 720).

4. Clusters of separate objections focus around subjectivity andstandpoints. Traditional analytic philosophy has been rightlycriticized for its inability to handle subjectivity. In thinking aboutwhether this criticism applies to analytic feminists as well,let’s consider it in the context of knowledge. ElizabethAnderson calls the position that knowledge is “situated”the fundamental point of feminist epistemology (seefeminist epistemology and philosophy of science). Can “situated” knowledge as developed by analyticfeminists capture both the individual subjectivity of human beings andthe ways in which material conditions and complex social institutionsstructure the standpoints of women and others in marginalized groups?There are obviously two separate questions here—asked togetherbecause they focus on whether analytic feminism has the resources tocapture what is very important to other feminist methodologicaltraditions: standpoint theory, psychoanalysis, andpoststructuralism.

   Consider Longino as an example: she is dealing with situated knowledgein the context of the sciences. Her contextual empiricism and her morerecent argument to dissolve completely the rational/social dichotomyand the dichotomies that underlie it allow her to delve into the rightareas. Of course, science is not all of life or knowledge, so herargument would need to be extended into areas of everyday life thatCode, among others, has discussed. Whatever the limitations ofcontextual empiricism, it is better at analyzing the structural andmaterial features that construct subjectivity than it is atilluminating individual subjectivity. It is in the latter area thatpoststructuralist and psychoanalytic approaches flourish (see, forexample, Butler 1990; Butler & Salih 2003; Irigaray1991; Whitford 1991; Kristeva & Oliver 2002). Their focus onthe opaque, fragmented, or unfinished character of human subjectivitymay be a bit untidy for many analytic feminists. But given theimportance of this topic for feminist philosophy, there is a need forfruitful dialogue about it.

5. Feminist standpoint theory, drawing originally from Marxist theory,raised a cluster of questions for analytic feminists: whether they canexplain the political/material construction of standpoints in theproduction of knowledge, how they treat community-wide biases andassumptions, what criteria they use to distinguish “good”and “bad” biases, and so on. Harding advocates apluralistic form of standpoint theory that focuses on the importanceof starting research from the lives of marginalized people (1991).Doing so has many advantages, including an increased likelihood thatwe will be able to uncover community-wide biases and assumptions ofthe privileged as we produce knowledge in a number of fields. Althoughinitially analytic feminist empiricists and standpoint theorists saweach other as embodying rival traditions and were often critical ofeach other, analytic feminist empiricists then developed significantinterest in looking at the resources offered by standpoint theory aswell as pursuing common themes or consensus in the two kinds ofapproaches (see, for example, Wylie 2004; Potter 2006; Crasnow 2008;Intemann 2010, 2016; Anderson 2020; and a 2009Hypatiasymposium that includes Crasnow, Harding, Rouse, Kourany, Rolin, andSolomon, all 2009). A range of possibilities include

   1. incorporating the insights of standpoint theory into empirical(and empiricist) work (Wylie 2004),
   2. maintaining that in a number of their forms they are compatible(Anderson 2020), or
   3. arguing that feminist empiricism and standpoint theory havesignificant overlaps but that their remaining differences show thatthey need each other (Intemann 2010).

   Fuller discussion of these issues can be found in Intemann (2010,2016), Anderson (2020), and entries onfeminist social epistemology andfeminist perspectives on science.

6. Related objections arise concerning naturalized epistemology. Asmentioned above, feminist social epistemology is the most typical formof naturalized feminist epistemology today. Social epistemologistshave deep critiques of individually oriented and“scientistic” analytic naturalized epistemology. Inaddition to feminists already discussed above, Code and Phyllis Rooneyhave both argued that there is tension between typical naturalizedepistemology and feminist epistemology; Rooney calls it an“uneasy alliance” (Rooney 2003). Code offers an ecologicalmodel that she maintains is preferable to analytically andindividualistically oriented naturalism (1996, 2006). Rooney appealsto psychological studies of gender and cognition to provide evidencefor her critique of assumptions of empirical studies (and of theepistemology that structures and then uses the empirical results). Forexample, Rooney wants to critique the assumption of the stability ofthe individual/social distinction, the stability of gender—oreven that gender is either stable or situational, for there might bemore choices (Rooney 2003). Although analytic feminist naturalizedepistemologists might well agree with much of Rooney’s critique,Code’s 2006 ecological model would be a nearly impossiblestretch. In any case, analytic feminists must be very careful as theychoose their own models to reflect upon the kinds of assumptions towhich they acquiesce, whether those just mentioned or others thatmight go under the label “scientism”.

7. The final cluster of challenges concerns language, images, and“rhetorical space”. These challenges are meant to callattention to other kinds of “baggage” of which analyticfeminists need to be aware. Although both feminist and nonfeministanalytic philosophers are thought to favor literal uses of language,they also rely on metaphors, analogies, images and the like in thecourse of making their philosophical cases (think of the frequency ofNeurath’s ship via Quine). Analytic feminists need to giveattention to the assumptions and implications of their literal uses oflanguage, their images and how they relate to what Lorraine Code callsthe “rhetorical spaces” in which they function (or, inother cases, fail to function). In using “rhetoricalspaces” Code is thinking of the ways in which our discourses arestructured to limit what can count as meaningful, be taken seriously,yield insight, expect uptake, and so on (1995: ix–x; withcontinued discussion in Code 2006).

   Marguerite La Caze, using methodology developed by Michèle LeDœuff, argues that both feminist and nonfeminist analyticphilosophers use images that can unwittingly perpetuate images thatexclude women—think of mythical social contracts in politicalphilosophy and visual and spatial metaphors about knowledge (La Caze2002, Le Dœuff 1980 [1989]; see also Gatens 1991). Analyticfeminists are being called upon to widen the rhetorical spaces inanalytic philosophy as well as to recognize and scrutinize the imagesthat they, in fact, use in the course of their allegedly literalspeech.

Most analytic feminists welcome challenges to their positions fromother feminists of any background. For, after all, there is no easierway to be kept honest and to recognize one’s own collusion withmale or other biases in philosophy than to have feminist colleaguespoint it out. It is part of any reasonable feminism to want to remainopen to the ongoing possibility of collusion and self-deception.Candid, fair-minded conversation benefits all forms of feminism.

8. Is it Important to Identify Feminists by Their Philosophical Methods?

Although methodology is the focus in this entry, it is neverthelessimportant to ask to what extent there is value in identifying feministphilosophy by method (see Garry 2018). The field of academic feministphilosophy has developed, even flourished, across most allphilosophical fields and topics since the 1970s—in spite ofbacklash and lingering resistance harbored in some quarters. Feministphilosophers have taught and mentored multiple generations of studentswho themselves generate new directions in feminist philosophy;feminist dissertations, publications, and organizations haveincreased; feminists drawing on many different philosophical methodslearn from and cite each other; practitioners of fields such asfeminism, critical race theory, trans and queer theory, criticaldisability theory, decolonial theory, and others, understand theimportance of engaging across and integrating work in these fields.Many feminist philosophers, especially from more recent generations,simply go about their work without concerning themselves with labelsof philosophical method. In this context there are reasons to downplaydifferences in method. In addition, it makes sense not to emphasizephilosophical method if it unnecessarily limits the appeal ofsomeone’s work, especially in interdisciplinary or transnationalfeminist contexts. Nor would one want a focus on method to beaccompanied by a lack of open-mindedness or a sense of“superiority”.

At the same time, methodological labels can be useful. They can helpus understand feminists’ framing of issues, terminology,probable toolboxes, and the feminist and traditional philosophers mostlikely to have influenced their work. After all, feminist philosophersoften carry the methodological influence of their graduate philosophydepartments for many decades thereafter, albeit with varying strengthsof attachment. In addition, some feminists want to acknowledgeexplicitly their connection to analytic philosophy; for example, CuddinAnalyzing Oppression, makes a point to situate her work inand defend both the analytic and liberal traditions (2006: ix).

In fact, some discussions are best understood in an analytic contextand are engaged in primarily by analytic feminists, for example,twenty-first century debates in philosophy of language and metaphysicsconcerning the categories of woman/man, sex, and gender. They haveencompassed disagreements over the nature of social categories andsocial construction, the degree to which social categories havegrounding in the material world or should be analyzed as dispositionsto behave, the moral and political values assumed in metaphysicaldiscussions, the meaning of the categories for trans, queer, andnonbinary people (including their legal implications), and so on (forexample, see Witt 2011a; Haslanger 2012; Saul 2012; Bettcher 2013,2017; Diaz-Leon 2016; Jenkins 2016, 2018; Mikkola 2016; Ásta2018; Dembroff 2018, 2020; Barnes 2020; Antony 2020—among manyothers. More detailed discussion can also be found in the entries onfeminist philosophy of language,feminist metaphysics, andfeminist perspectives on sex and gender.)

Another reason to wonder about the importance of methodological labelsis that methods can work in varied ways across philosophicalsubfields. Consider whether fields such as moral, social, andpolitical philosophy frequently have separate analytic discussions ormethodological identifications. Although feminist philosophers inthese fields might prefer a particular writing or argumentative styleor prefer to engage with Rawls rather than Levinas or Habermas, thefault lines or “sides” in major feminist controversiesrarely fall neatly into divisions among analytic and non-analyticfeminists. Instead, early typical feminist controversies in moralphilosophy, for example, concerned whether one should favor an ethicsof justice over an ethics of care or a virtue ethics, or whether oneshould prefer Kant over Hume or Aristotle as a starting point formoral thinking (see, for example, Held 1993, Herman 1993, Homiak 1993,Larrabee 1993, Baier 1994). Interestingly, the degree to whichfeminist moral philosophers—analytic or not—rely upon andintegrate historical figures into their work seems to be greater thanamong analytic feminists doing epistemology and metaphysics.

Another persistently debated topic that does not divide neatly bymethodological orientation is the extent to which liberalism issatisfactory for feminist politics and ethics. For example, Nussbaumdefends her well known liberal “capabilities” approach asapplicable across cultures against anti-liberal opponents (2000a,2000b, entry onthe capability approach). Asha Bhandary also supports liberalism and maintains that it canadequately support dependency care provided that we make sure thatcaregiving and caregivers do not remain invisible due to sexism andracism (2020). However, Serene Khader, argues that although feminismneeds “universalist” opposition to sexism, it does notrequire Western liberalism, which itself can even perpetuate sexistoppression in some cultures (2019). Debates over liberalism are notlikely to end soon, especially given the number of philosopherswriting from decolonial perspectives.

As feminists explore a wide range of topics in moral, social, andpolitical philosophy the salience of their methodological backgroundoften recedes, especially when their work draws on resources bothoutside and inside philosophy—sometimes including theauthors’ own social locations and experiences. Their work alsobears on urgent public issues. Let’s note briefly a fewdifferent kinds of examples. Serena Parekh combines multiplephilosophical and empirical methods in writing on refugees and theethics of forced displacement (2017). For many decades Anita Allen hascombined law and philosophy in her work on privacy (1988, 2019).Myisha Cherry writes about rage and other emotions and attitudes inpublic life (2019, forthcoming). Ayanna De’Vante Spencer isamong those writing about the missing narratives of Black women andgirls who have been victims of police brutality (2018). Eva FederKittay has written for many years on the ethics of dependency andcare, cognitive disabilities, and their impact on moral philosophy(for example, 1999, 2019). And, of course, there are entire fields offeminist ethics that cross many kinds of methodological lines, forexample,feminist bioethics andfeminist philosophy of disability, and the wider field ofcritical disability theory.

When philosophers’ own intersectional identities are reflectedin their writing, their identities usually have more prominence thantheir choice of philosophical toolbox or a preference for an“analytic writing style”. For example, Alcoff and NaomiZack have both written on race and mixed race for decades (Zack 1993,Alcoff 2006); some of their more recent work on mixed race has beencollected along with other feminists and philosophers of race in Botts(2016). For other philosophers, writing as lesbian feminists and morerecently as trans feminists is salient. For example, since thebeginning of academic feminist philosophy Marilyn Frye, Claudia Card,and Sarah Hoagland have provided decades of lesbian feministphilosophy (see, for example, Frye 1983, 1992, 2001; Card 1995, 1996,2002; Hoagland, 1988). Cheshire Calhoun’sFeminism, TheFamily, and the Politics of the Closet explores the structure ofgay and lesbian subordination and its relation to feminism (2000).Trans feminist philosophers work on topics in moral and politicalphilosophy as well as metaphysics and epistemology; they aim to maketrans lives visible, livable, valued, and understood (See, forexample, Bettcher 2019, forthcoming; Kapusta 2016; McKinnon 2014; Zurn2019).

As we draw this section to a close, it is important not to overstatethe way differences in philosophical methods play out in generationsof feminists or in subfields of feminist philosophy: the differencesare matters of degree. It is even more important to remind ourselvesthat feminist philosophy, whatever its method, retains both feministand philosophical roots. It is not to be subsumed solely under apatrilineal philosophical identity. In the context of discussing theimportance of constructing a feminist genealogy of feminist thought byclaiming and engaging with other feminist thinkers, Frye notesironically how much “better placed in history” it seems tobe when one is seen

in that august Oxbridge lineage [of Austin and Wittgenstein, rather]than in a lineage featuring dozens of mimeographed feminist pamphletsauthored by collectives, … Kate Millett, Mary Daly, AndreaDworkin, … [feminist philosophers such as] Claudia Card, NaomiScheman, Maria Lugones, Sarah Hoagland, and troubadours like AlixDobkin and Willie Tyson. (Frye 2001: 86–87)

In order to resist the comfort/erasure of the patrilineal heritage,analytic feminists, echoing Frye, can claim and engage other feministthinkers, critical race theorists, trans and queer theorists, andmore. Many already do so. This will not only help to sustain afeminist tradition, it will also increase the richness of feministwork and decrease the odds of feminists being held captive bymale-biased philosophical methods, theories, concepts and images.

Analytic feminists have left barely any philosophical topic untouched.Readers who want to review the most recent work by analytic feministsin specific areas of philosophy should consult the entries listedhere. A longer list that includes entries that broadly incorporateseveral methods or are simply hard to categorize appears as“Related Entries” after theBibliography.^[13]

• Feminist Metaphysics
• Feminist Philosophy of Language
• Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender
• Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
• Feminist Social Epistemology
• Feminist Perspectives on Science
• Feminist Philosophy of Biology
• Liberal Feminism
• Feminist Moral Psychology
• Feminist Philosophy of Law
• Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy
• Feminist Perspectives on Bioethics
• Feminist Perspectives on Objectification
• Feminist Perspectives on Reproduction and the Family

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Other Internet Resources

• Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy. Contains some open access articles.
• Feminist Philosophy Quarterly (FPQ). Online, open access, peer-reviewed journal.
• American Philosophical Association Committee on the Status of Women, Publications page
• Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory
• Society for Analytical Feminism
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• Resources listed on websites of individual philosophers, forexample,Sally Haslanger
• See also Other Internet Resources listed underFeminist Philosophy andFeminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.

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