The term “nationalism” is generally used to describe twophenomena:

1. the attitude that the members of a nation have when they careabout their national identity, and
2. the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking toachieve (or sustain) self-determination.

(1) raises questions about the concept of a nation (or nationalidentity), which is often defined in terms of common origin,ethnicity, or cultural ties, and specifically about whether anindividual’s membership in a nation should be regarded asnon-voluntary or voluntary. (2) raises questions about whetherself-determination must be understood as involving having fullstatehood with complete authority over domestic and internationalaffairs, or whether something less is required.

Nationalism came into the focus of philosophical debate three decadesago, in the nineties, partly in consequence of rather spectacular andtroubling nationalist clashes. Surges of nationalism tend to present amorally ambiguous, and for this reason often fascinating, picture.“National awakening” and struggles for politicalindependence are often both heroic and cruel; the formation of arecognizably national state often responds to deep popular sentimentbut sometimes yields inhuman consequences, from violent expulsion and“cleansing” of non-nationals to organized mass murder. Themoral debate on nationalism reflects a deep moral tension betweensolidarity with oppressed national groups on the one hand andrepulsion in the face of crimes perpetrated in the name of nationalismon the other. Moreover, the issue of nationalism points to a widerdomain of problems related to the treatment of ethnic and culturaldifferences within democratic polity, arguably among the most pressingproblems of contemporary political theory.

In the last two decades, migration crisis and the populist reactionsto migration and domestic economic issues have been the definingtraits of a new political constellation. The traditional issue of thecontrast between nationalism and cosmopolitanism has changed itsprofile: the current drastic contrast is between populist aversion tothe foreigners-migrants and a more generous, or simply just, attitudeof acceptance and Samaritan help. The populist aversion inherits somefeatures traditionally associated with patriotism and nationalism, andthe opposite attitude the main features of traditionalcosmopolitanism. One could expect that the work on nationalism will bemoving further on this new and challenging playground, addressing thenew contrast and trying to locate nationalism in relation to it.

In this entry, we shall first present conceptual issues of definitionand classification (Sections 1 and 2) and then the arguments putforward in the debate (Section 3), dedicating more space to thearguments in favor of nationalism than to those against it in order togive the philosophical nationalist a proper hearing. In the last partwe shall turn to the new constellation and sketch the new issuesraised by nationalist and trans-nationalist populisms and themigration crisis.

• 1. What is a Nation?
  • 1.1 The Basic Concept of Nationalism
  • 1.2 The Concept of a Nation
• 2. Varieties of Nationalism
  • 2.1 Concepts of Nationalism: Classical and Liberal
  • 2.2 Moral Claims, Classical Vs. Liberal: The Centrality of Nation
• 3. The Moral Debate
  • 3.1 Classical and liberal nationalisms
  • 3.2 Arguments in favor of nationalism, classical vs. liberal: the deep need for community
  • 3.3 Arguments in favor of nationalism: issues of justice
  • 3.4 Populism and a new face of nationalism
  • 3.5 Nation-state in global context
• 4. Conclusion
• Bibliography
  • Introduction
  • References
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. What is a Nation?

1.1 The Basic Concept of Nationalism

Although the term “nationalism” has a variety of meanings,it centrally encompasses two phenomena: (1) the attitude that themembers of a nation have when they care about their identity asmembers of that nation and (2) the actions that the members of anation take in seeking to achieve (or sustain) some form of politicalsovereignty (see for example, Nielsen 1998–9: 9). Each of theseaspects requires elaboration.

1. raises questions about the concept of a nation or nationalidentity, about what it is to belong to a nation, and about how muchone ought to care about one’s nation. Nations and nationalidentity may be defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, orcultural ties, and while an individual’s membership in thenation is often regarded as involuntary, it is sometimes regarded asvoluntary. The degree of care for one’s nation that nationalistsrequire is often, but not always, taken to be very high: according tosuch views, the claims of one’s nation take precedence overrival contenders for authority and loyalty.^[1]
2. raises questions about whether sovereignty requires theacquisition of full statehood with complete authority over domesticand international affairs, or whether something less than statehoodsuffices. Although sovereignty is often taken to mean full statehood(Gellner 1983: ch. 1),^[2] possible exceptions have been recognized (Miller 1992: 87; Miller2000). Some authors even defend an anarchist version ofpatriotism-moderate nationalism foreshadowed by Bakunin (see Sparrow2007).

There is a terminological and conceptual question of distinguishingnationalism from patriotism. A popular proposal is the contrastbetween attachment to one’s country as defining patriotism andattachment to one’s people and its traditions as definingnationalism (Kleinig 2014: 228, and Primoratz 2017: Section 1.2). Oneproblem with this proposal is that love for a country is not reallyjust love of a piece of land but normally involves attachment to thecommunity of its inhabitants, and this introduces “nation”into the conception of patriotism. Another contrast is the one betweenstrong, and somewhat aggressive attachment (nationalism) and a mildone (patriotism), dating back at least to George Orwell (see his 1945essay).^[3]

Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount ofagreement about the classical, historically paradigmatic form ofnationalism. It typically features the supremacy of the nation’sclaims over other claims to individual allegiance and full sovereigntyas the persistent aim of its political program. Territorialsovereignty has traditionally been seen as a defining element of statepower and essential for nationhood. It was extolled in classic modernworks by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and is returning to center stagein the debate, though philosophers are now more skeptical (see below).Issues surrounding the control of the movement of money and people (inparticular immigration) and the resource rights implied in territorialsovereignty make the topic politically central in the age ofglobalization and philosophically interesting for nationalists andanti-nationalists alike.

In recent times, the philosophical focus has moved more in thedirection of “liberal nationalism”, the view thatmitigates the classical claims and tries to bring together thepro-national attitude and the respect for traditional liberal values.For instance, the territorial state as political unit is seen byclassical nationalists as centrally “belonging” to oneethnic-cultural group and as actively charged with protecting andpromulgating its traditions. The liberal variety allows for“sharing” of the territorial state with non-dominantethnic groups. Consequences are varied and quite interested (for moresee below, especiallysection 2.1).

1.2 The Concept of a Nation

In its general form, the issue of nationalism concerns the mappingbetween the ethno-cultural domain (featuring ethno-cultural groups or“nations”) and the domain of political organization. Inbreaking down the issue, we have mentioned the importance of theattitude that the members of a nation have when they care about theirnational identity. This point raises two sorts of questions. First,the descriptive ones:

(1a)

What is a nation and what is national identity?

(1b)

What is it to belong to a nation?

(1c)

What is the nature of pro-national attitude?

(1d)

Is membership in a nation voluntary or involuntary?

Second, the normative ones:

(1e)

Is the attitude of caring about national identity alwaysappropriate?

(1f)

How much should one care?

This section discusses the descriptive questions, starting with(1a) and(1b);the normative questions are addressed inSection 3 on the moral debate. If one wants to enjoin people to struggle fortheir national interests, one must have some idea about what a nationis and what it is to belong to a nation. So, in order to formulate andground their evaluations, claims, and directives for action,pro-nationalist thinkers have expounded theories of ethnicity,culture, nation, and state. Their opponents have in turn challengedthese elaborations. Now, some presuppositions about ethnic groups andnations are essential for the nationalist, while others aretheoretical elaborations designed to support the essential ones. Thedefinition and status of the social group that benefits from thenationalist program, variously called the “nation”,“ethno-nation”, or “ethnic group”, isessential. Since nationalism is particularly prominent with groupsthat do not yet have a state, a definition of nation and nationalismpurely in terms of belonging to a state is a non-starter.

Indeed, purely “civic” loyalties are often categorizedseparately under the title “patriotism”, which we alreadymentioned, or “constitutional patriotism”.^[4] This leaves two extreme options and a number of intermediates. Thefirst extreme option has been put forward by a small but distinguishedband of theorists.^[5] According to their purely voluntaristic definition, a nation is anygroup of people aspiring to a common political state-likeorganization. If such a group of people succeeds in forming a state,the loyalties of the group members become “civic” (asopposed to “ethnic”) in nature. At the other extreme, andmore typically, nationalist claims are focused upon the non-voluntarycommunity of common origin, language, tradition, and culture: theclassic ethno-nation is a community of origin and culture, includingprominently a language and customs. The distinction is related(although not identical) to that drawn by older schools of social andpolitical science between “civic” and “ethnic”nationalism, the former being allegedly Western European and thelatter more Central and Eastern European, originating in Germany.^[6] Philosophical discussions centered on nationalism tend to concern theethnic-cultural variants only, and this habit will be followed here. Agroup aspiring to nationhood on this basis will be called an“ethno-nation” to underscore its ethno-cultural ratherthan purely civic underpinnings. For the ethno-(cultural) nationalistit is one’s ethnic-cultural background that determinesone’s membership in the community. One cannot choose to be amember; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin andearly socialization. However, commonality of origin has becomemythical for most contemporary candidate groups: ethnic groups havebeen mixing for millennia.

Sophisticated, liberal pro-nationalists therefore tend to stresscultural membership only and speak of “nationality”,omitting the “ethno-” part (Miller 1992, 2000; Tamir1993,2013; Gans 2003). Michel Seymour’s proposal of a“socio-cultural definition” adds a political dimension tothe purely cultural one: a nation is a cultural group, possibly butnot necessarily united by a common descent, endowed with civic ties(Seymour 2000). This is the kind of definition that would be acceptedby most parties in the debate today. So defined, the nation is asomewhat mixed category, both ethno-cultural and civic, but stillcloser to the purely ethno-cultural than to the purely civicextreme.

Let us now turn to the issue of the origin and“authenticity” of ethno-cultural groups or ethno-nations.In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds ofviews, but there is a third group, combining element from both. Thefirst are modernist views that see nationalism as born in moderntimes, together with nation-states.^[7] In our times the view was pioneered by Ernst Gellner (see his 1983).^[8] Other modernist choose similar starting points with century or two of variation.^[9] The opposite view can be called, following Edward Shils (1957) “primordialist”.According to it, actual ethno-cultural nations have either existed“since time immemorial”.

The third, quite plausible kind of view, distinct from bothprimordialism-ethno-symbolism and modernism, has been initiated by W.Connor (1994).^[10] A nation is a politicized and mobilized ethnic group rather than astate. So, the origins of nationalism predate the modern state, andits emotional content remains up to our times (Conversi 2002: 270),but the actual statist organization is, indeed, modern. However,nation-state is a nationalist dream and fiction, never reallyimplemented, due to the inescapable plurality of social groups. Somuch for the three dominant perspectives on the origin ofnationalism.

Indeed, the older authors—from great thinkers like Herder andOtto Bauer to the propagandists who followed theirfootsteps—took great pains to ground normative claims upon firmontological realism about nations: nations are real,bonafide entities. However, the contemporary moral debate has triedto diminish the importance of the imagined/real divide. Prominentcontemporary philosophers have claimed that normative-evaluativenationalist claims are compatible with the “imagined”nature of a nation.^[11] They point out that common imaginings can tie people together, andthat actual interaction resulting from togetherness can engenderimportant moral obligations.

Let us now turn to question(1c) about the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issuethat has interested political and social scientists concernsethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-nationalattitude. Is it as irrational, romantic, and indifferent toself-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has dividedauthors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who tryto explain it as being in some sense rational. Authors who see it asirrational propose various explanations of why people assent toirrational views. Some say, critically, that nationalism is based on“false consciousness”. But where does such falseconsciousness come from? The most simplistic view is that it is aresult of direct manipulation of “masses” by“elites”. On the opposite side, the famous critic ofnationalism Elie Kedourie (1960) thinks this irrationality isspontaneous. A decade and a half ago Liah Greenfeld went as far aslinking nationalism to mental illness in her provocative 2005 article(see also her 2006 book). On the opposite side, Michael Walzer hasoffered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion in his 2002.Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeperexplanations. To mention one, the French structuralist ÉtienneBalibar sees it as a result of the “production” ofideology effectuated by mechanisms which have nothing to do withspontaneous credulity of individuals, but with impersonal, structuralsocial factors (Balibar & Wallerstein 1988 [1991]).^[12]

Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to becomenationalists (Hardin 1985). Can one rationally explain the extremes ofethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do soin terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: mosttypically, if an individual has no reason to trust someone, it isreasonable for that individual to take precautions against the other.If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see theother as increasingly inimical. It then becomes rational to starttreating the other as an enemy. Mere suspicion can thus lead by small,individually rational steps to a situation of conflict. (Such negativedevelopment is often presented as a variant of the Prisoner’sDilemma; see the entry onprisoner’s dilemma). It is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this generalpattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts (see alsoWimmer 2013).

Finally, as for question(1d), the nation is typically seen as an essentially non-voluntarycommunity to which one belongs by birth and early nurture and suchthat the belonging is enhanced and made more complete by one’sadditional conscious endorsement. Not everyone agrees: liberalnationalists accept the idea of choice of one’s nationalbelonging and of possibility for immigrants to become nationals bychoice and intentional acculturation.

2. Varieties of Nationalism

2.1 Concepts of Nationalism: Classical and Liberal

We pointed out at the very beginning of the entry that nationalismfocuses upon (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have whenthey care about their national identity, and (2) the actions that themembers of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) someform of political sovereignty. The politically central point is (2):the actions enjoined by the nationalist. To these we now turn,beginning with sovereignty and territory, the usual foci of a nationalstruggle for independence. They raise an important issue:

(2a)

Does political sovereignty within or over a territory requirestatehood or something weaker?

The classical answer is that a state is required. A more liberalanswer is that some form of political autonomy suffices. Once this hasbeen discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues:

(2b)

What actions are morally permitted to achieve sovereignty and tomaintain it?

(2c)

Under what conditions is it morally permitted to take actions ofthis kind?

Consider first the classical nationalist answer to(2a). Political sovereignty requires a state “rightfully owned”by the ethno-nation (Oldenquist 1997). Developments of this line ofthought often state or imply specific answers to(2b), and(2c), i.e., that in a national independence struggle the use of forceagainst the threatening central power is almost always a legitimatemeans for bringing about sovereignty. However, classical nationalismis not only concerned with the creation of a state but also with itsmaintenance and strengthening.

Classical nationalism is the political program that sees thecreation and maintenance of a fully sovereign state owned by a givenethno-national group (“people” or “nation”) asa primary duty of each member of the group. Starting from theassumption that the appropriate (or “natural”) unit ofculture is an ethno-nation, it claims that a primary duty of eachmember is to abide by one’s recognizably ethno-national culturein all cultural matters.

Classical nationalists are usually vigilant about the kind of culturethey protect and promote and about the kind of attitude people have totheir nation-state. This watchful attitude carries some potentialdangers: many elements of a given culture that are universal or simplynot recognizably national may fall prey to such nationalistenthusiasms. Classical nationalism in everyday life puts variousadditional demands on individuals, from buying more expensivehome-produced goods in preference to cheaper imported ones toprocreating as many future members of the nation as one can manage(see Yuval-Davies 1997, and Yack 2012).

Besides classical nationalism (and its more radical extremistcousins), various moderate views are also now classified asnationalist. Indeed, the philosophical discussion has shifted to thesemoderate or even ultra-moderate forms, and most philosophers whodescribe themselves as nationalists propose very moderate nationalistprograms.

Nationalism in this wider sense is any complex of attitudes,claims, and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political,moral, and cultural value to nation and nationality and derivingobligations (for individual members of the nation, and for anyinvolved third parties, individual or collective) from this ascribedvalue. The main representative of this group of views isliberalnationalism, proposed by authors like Miller, Tamir, and Gans(see below).

Nationalisms in this wider sense can vary somewhat in theirconceptions of the nation (which are often left implicit in theirdiscourse), in the grounds for and degree of its value, and in thescope of their prescribed obligations. Moderate nationalism is lessdemanding than classical nationalism and sometimes goes under the nameof “patriotism.” (A different usage, again, reserves“patriotism” for valuing civic community and loyalty tostate, in contrast to nationalism, centered on ethnic-culturalcommunities).

Let us now turn to liberal nationalism, the most discussed kind ofmoderate nationalism.

Liberal nationalists see liberal-democratic principles andpro-national attitudes as belonging together. One of the mainproponents of the view, Yael Tamir, started the debate in her 1993book and in her recent book talks about the nation-state as “anideal meeting point between the two” (2019: 6). Of course, somethings have to be sacrificed: we must acknowledge that either themeaningfulness of a community or its openness must be sacrificed tosome extent as we cannot have them both. (2019: 57). How much of eachis to give way is left open, and of course, various liberalnationalists take different views of what precisely the right answeris.

Tamir’s version of liberal nationalism is a kind of socialliberalism, in this respect similar to the views of David Miller whotalks about “solidaristic communities” in his 1999 bookPrinciples of Social Justice and also takes stance in his1995 and 2008 books. They both see the feeling of national identity asa feeling that promotes solidarity, and solidarity as means forincreased social justice (Tamir 2019, in particular ch.20; compareWalzer 1983, Kymlicka 1995a, 2001, and Gans 2003, 2008).

Liberal nationalists diverge about the value of multiculturalism.Kymlicka takes it as basic for his picture of liberalism while Tamirdismisses it without much ado: multicultural, multiethnic democracieshave a very poor track record, she claims (2019: 62). Tamir’sdiagnosis of the present day political crisis, with politicians likeTrump and Le Pen coming to the forefront, is that “liberaldemocrats were paralyzed by their assumed victory” whereas“nationalists felt defeated and obsolete” (2019: 7).

Tamir lists two kinds of reasons that guarantee special politicalstatus to nations. First kind, that no other political entity“is more able than the state to promote ideas in the publicsphere” (2019: 52), and the second kind that nation needscontinuous creative effort to make it functional and attractive.

The historical development of liberalism turned it into auniversalistic, anti-communitarian principle; this has been a fatalmistake that can be and should be corrected by the liberal nationalistsynthesis. Can we revive the unifying narratives of our nationalitywithout sacrificing the liberal inheritance of freedom and rights?Liberal nationalism answers in the affirmative. From its standpoint,national particularism has primacy: “The love of humanity is anoble ideal, but real love is always particular…” (2019:68).

Interestingly, Tamir combines this high regard of nation with anextreme constructivist view of its nature: nations are mentalstructures that exist in the minds of their members (2019: 58).

Is liberal nationalism implemented anywhere in the present world, oris it more of an ideal, probably end-state theory, that proposes apicture of a desirable society? Judging by the writings of liberalnationalists, it is the latter, although presented as a relativelyeasily reachable ideal, combining two traditions that are already wellimplemented in political reality.

The variations of nationalism most relevant for philosophy are thosethat influence the moral standing of claims and of recommendednationalist practices. The elaborate philosophical views put forwardin favor of nationalism will be referred to as “theoreticalnationalism”, the adjective serving to distinguish such viewsfrom less sophisticated and more practical nationalist discourse. Thecentral theoretical nationalist evaluative claims can be charted onthe map of possible positions within political theory in the followinguseful but somewhat simplified and schematic way.

Nationalist claims featuring the nation as central to political actionmust answer two crucial general questions. First, is there one kind oflarge social group that is of special moral importance? Thenationalist answer is that there certainly is one, namely, the nation.Moreover, when an ultimate choice is to be made, say between ties offamily, or friendship, and the nation, the latter has priority.Liberal nationalists prefer a more moderate stance, which ascribesvalue to national belonging, but don’t make it central in thisway. Second, what are the grounds for an individual’sobligations to the morally central group? Are they based on voluntaryor involuntary membership in the group? The typical contemporarynationalist thinker opts for the latter, while admitting thatvoluntary endorsement of one’s national identity is a morallyimportant achievement. On the philosophical map, pro-nationalistnormative tastes fit nicely with the communitarian stance in general:most pro-nationalist philosophers are communitarians who choose thenation as the preferred community (in contrast to those of theirfellow communitarians who prefer more far-ranging communities, such asthose defined by global religious traditions).^[13]

Before proceeding to moral claims, let us briefly sketch the issuesand viewpoints connected to territory and territorial rights that areessential for nationalist political programs.^[14] Why is territoryimportant for ethno-national groups, and what are the extent andgrounds of territorial rights? Its primary importance resides insovereignty and all the associated possibilities for internal controland external exclusion. Add to this the Rousseauian view thatpolitical attachments are essentially bounded and that love —or,to put it more mildly, republican civil friendship—forone’s group requires exclusion of some “other”, andthe importance becomes quite obvious. What about the grounds for thedemand for territorial rights? Nationalist and pro-nationalist viewsmostly rely on the attachment that members of a nation have tonational territory and to the formative value of territory for anation to justify territorial claims (see Miller 2000 and Meisels2009). This is similar in some respects to the rationale given byproponents of indigenous peoples’ rights (Tully 2004, but seealso Hendrix 2008) and in other respects to Kolers’ 2009ethno-geographical non-nationalist theory, but differs in preferringethno-national groups as the sole carriers of the right. Theseattachment views stand in stark contrast to more pragmatic views aboutterritorial rights as means for conflict resolution (e.g., Levy 2000).Another quite popular alternative is the family of individualisticviews grounding territorial rights in rights and interests ofindividuals.^[15] On the extreme end of anti-nationalist viewsstands the idea of Pogge) that there are no specific territorialproblems for political philosophy—the “dissolutionapproach”, as Kolers calls it.

2.2 Moral Claims, Classical Vs. Liberal: The Centrality of Nation

We now pass to the normative dimension of nationalism. We shall firstdescribe the very heart of the nationalist program, i.e., sketch andclassify the typical normative and evaluative nationalist claims.These claims can be seen as answers to the normative subset of ourinitial questions about (1) pro-national attitudes and (2)actions.

We will see that these claims recommend various courses of action:centrally, those meant to secure and sustain a political organizationfor the given ethno-cultural national community (thereby making morespecific the answers to our normative questions(1e),(1f),(2b), and(2c)). Further, they enjoin the community’s members to promulgaterecognizable ethno-cultural contents as central features of thecultural life within such a state. Finally, we shall discuss variouslines of pro-nationalist thought that have been put forward in defenseof these claims. To begin, let us return to the claims concerning thefurthering of the national state and culture. These are proposed bythe nationalist as norms of conduct. The philosophically mostimportant variations concern three aspects of such normativeclaims:

1. The normative nature and strength of the claim: does it promotemerely a right (say, to have and maintain a form of politicalself-government, preferably and typically a state, or have culturallife centered upon a recognizably ethno-national culture), or a moralobligation (to get and maintain one), or a moral, legal, and politicalobligation? The strongest claim is typical of classical nationalism;its typical norms are both moral and, once the nation-state is inplace, legally enforceable obligations for all parties concerned,including for the individual members of the ethno-nation. A weaker butstill quite demanding version speaks only of moral obligation(“sacred duty”).
2. The strength of the nationalist claim in relation to variousexternal interests and rights: to give a real example, is the use ofthe domestic language so important that even international conferencesshould be held in it, at the cost of losing the most interestingparticipants from abroad? The force of the nationalist claim is herebeing weighed against the force of other claims, including those ofindividual or group interests or rights. Variations in comparativestrength of nationalist claims take place on a continuum between twoextremes. At one rather unpalatable extreme, nation-focused claimstake precedence over any other claims, including over human rights.Further towards the center is the classical nationalism that givesnation-centered claims precedence over individual interests and manyneeds, but not necessarily over general human rights (see, forexample, MacIntyre 1994, Oldenquist 1997). On the opposite end, whichis mild, humane, and liberal, the central classical nationalist claimsare accordedprima facie status only (see Tamir 1993, Gans2003, and Miller 2013; and for applications to Central Europe StefanAuer 2004).
3. For which groups are the nationalist claims, classical orliberal, meant to be valid? What is their scope? One approach claimsthat they are valid for every ethno-nation and thereby universal. Anexample would be the claim “every ethno-nation should have itsown state”. To put it more officially

   Universalizing nationalism is the political program thatclaims thatevery ethno-nation should have a state that itshould rightfully own and the interests of which it shouldpromote.

   Alternatively, a claim may be particularistic, such as the claim“GroupX ought to have a state”, where thisimplies nothing about any other group:

   Particularistic nationalism is the political program claimingthatsome ethno-nation should have its state, withoutextending the claim to all ethno-nations. It claims thus either

   1. by omission (unreflective particularistic nationalism), or
   2. by explicitly specifying who is excluded: “GroupXought to have a state, but groupY should not”(invidious nationalism).

   The most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism,i.e., (B), has been called “invidious” since it explicitlydenies the privilege of having a state to some peoples. Serioustheoretical nationalists usually defend only the universalist variety,whereas the nationalist-in-the-street most often defends the egoisticindeterminate one.

The nationalist picture of morality traditionally has been quite closeto the dominant view in the theory of international relations called“realism”. Put starkly, the view is that morality ends atthe boundaries of the nation-state; beyond there is nothing but anarchy.^[16] It nicely complements the main classical nationalist claim about thenation-state, i.e., that each ethno-nation or people should have astate of its own, and suggests what happens next: nation-states enterinto competition in the name of their constitutive peoples.

3. The Moral Debate

3.1 Classical and liberal nationalisms

Recall the initial normative question centered around (1) attitudesand (2) actions. Is national partiality justified, and to what extent?What actions are appropriate to bring about sovereignty? Inparticular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected(ethno-) national cultures goods independent from the individual willof their members, and how far may one go in protecting them? Thephilosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about themoral validity of its central claims. In particular, the ultimatemoral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morallypermissible or justified, and, if not, how bad are particular forms of it?^[17] Why do nationalist claims require a defense? In some situations theyseem plausible: for instance, the plight of some stateless nationalgroups—the history of Jews and Armenians, the historical andcontemporary misfortunes of Kurds—lends credence to the ideathat having their own state would have solved the worst problems.Still, there are good reasons to examine nationalist claims morecarefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shownthat the political form of the nation-state has some value as such,that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral andpolitical value, and that claims in its favor have normative validity.Once this is established, a further defense is needed. Some classicalnationalist claims appear to clash—at least under normalcircumstances of contemporary life—with various values thatpeople tend to accept. Some of these values are considered essentialto liberal-democratic societies, while others are importantspecifically for the flourishing of creativity and culture. The mainvalues in the first set are individual autonomy and benevolentimpartiality (most prominently towards members of groups culturallydifferent from one’s own). The alleged special duties towardsone’s ethno-national culture can and often do interfere withindividuals’ right to autonomy.

Liberal nationalists are aware of the difficulties of the classicalapproach, and soften the classical claims, giving them only aprima facie status. They usually speak of “variousaccretions that have given nationalism a bad name”, and they areeager to “separate the idea of nationality itself from theseexcesses” (Miller 1992, 2000). Such thoughtful pro-nationalistwriters have participated in an ongoing philosophical dialogue betweenproponents and opponents of the claim.^[18] In order to help the reader find their through this involved debate,we shall briefly summarize the considerations which are open to theethno-nationalist to defend their case (compare the useful overview inLichtenberg 1997). Further lines of thought built upon theseconsiderations can be used to defend very different varieties ofnationalism, from radical to very moderate ones.

For brevity, each line of thought will be reduced to a brief argument;the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch.Some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in thedebate will be indicated in brackets (see Miscevic 2001). The mainarguments in favor of nationalism will be divided into two sets. Thefirst set of arguments defends the claim that national communitieshave a high value, sometime seen as coming from the interests of theirindividual member (e.g., by Kymlicka, Miller, and Raz) and sometimesas non-instrumental and independent of the wishes and choices of theirindividual members, and argues that they should therefore be protectedby means of state and official statist policies. The second set isless deeply “comprehensive”, and encompasses argumentsfrom the requirements of justice, independent from substantialassumptions about culture and cultural values.

The first set will be presented in more detail since it has formed thecore of the debate. It depicts the community as the source of value oras the transmission device connecting its members to some importantvalues. For the classical nationalist, the arguments from this set arecommunitarian in a particularly “deep” sense since theyare grounded in basic features of the human condition.

The general form of deep communitarian arguments is as follows. First,the communitarian premise: there is some uncontroversial good (e.g., aperson’s identity), and some kind of community is essential foracquisition and preservation of it. Then comes the claim that theethno-cultural nation is the kind of community ideally suited for thistask. Then follows the statist conclusion: in order for such acommunity to preserve its own identity and support the identity of itsmembers, it has to assume (always or at least normally) the politicalform of a state. The conclusion of this type of argument is that theethno-national community has the right to an ethno-national state andthe citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor theirown ethnic culture in relation to any other.

Although the deeper philosophical assumptions in the arguments stemfrom the communitarian tradition, weakened forms have also beenproposed by more liberal philosophers. The original communitarianlines of thought in favor of nationalism suggest that there is somevalue in preserving ethno-national cultural traditions, in feelings ofbelonging to a common nation, and in solidarity between anation’s members. A liberal nationalist might claim that theseare not the central values of political life but are valuesnevertheless. Moreover, the diametrically opposing views, pureindividualism and cosmopolitanism, do seem arid, abstract, andunmotivated by comparison. By cosmopolitanism we refer to moral andpolitical doctrines claiming that

1. one’s primary moral obligations are directed to all humanbeings (regardless of geographical or cultural distance), and
2. political arrangements should faithfully reflect this universalmoral obligation (in the form of supra-statist arrangements that takeprecedence over nation-states).

Confronted with opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism,many philosophers opt for a mixture of liberalism-cosmopolitanism andpatriotism-nationalism. In his writings, B. Barber glorifies “aremarkable mixture of cosmopolitanism and parochialism” that inhis view characterizes American national identity (Barber 1996: 31).Charles Taylor claims that “we have no choice but to becosmopolitan and patriots” (Taylor 1996: 121). Hilary Putnamproposes loyalty to what is best in the multiple traditions in whicheach of us participates, apparently a middle way between anarrow-minded patriotism and an overly abstract cosmopolitanism(Putnam 1996: 114). The compromise has been foreshadowed by Berlin(1979) and Taylor (1989, 1993),^[19] and in the last two decades it has occupied center stage in thedebate and even provoked re-readings of historical nationalism in its light.^[20] Most liberal nationalist authors accept various weakened versions ofthe arguments we list below, taking them to support moderate orultra-moderate nationalist claims.

Here are then the main weakenings of classical ethno-nationalism thatliberal, limited-liberal, and cosmopolitan nationalists propose.First, ethno-national claims have onlyprima facie strengthand cannot trump individual rights. Second, legitimate ethno-nationalclaims do not in themselves automatically amount to the right to astate, but rather to the right to a certain level of culturalautonomy. The main models of autonomy are either territorial ornon-territorial: the first involves territorial devolution; thesecond, cultural autonomy granted to individuals regardless of theirdomicile within the state.^[21] Third, ethno-nationalism is subordinate to civic patriotism, whichhas little or nothing to do with ethnic criteria. Fourth,ethno-national mythologies and similar “importantfalsehoods” are to be tolerated only if benign and inoffensive,in which case they are morally permissible despite their falsity.Finally, any legitimacy that ethno-national claims may have is to bederived from choices the concerned individuals are free to make.

3.2 Arguments in favor of nationalism, classical vs. liberal: the deep need for community

Consider now the particular pro-nationalist arguments from the firstset. The first argument depends on assumptions that also appear in thesubsequent ones, but it further ascribes to the community an intrinsicvalue. The later arguments point more towards an instrumental value ofnation, derived from the value of individual flourishing, moralunderstanding, firm identity and the like.

1. The Argument From Intrinsic Value. Each ethno-nationalcommunity is valuable in and of itself since it is only within thenatural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions thatimportant meanings and values are produced and transmitted. Themembers of such communities share a special cultural proximity to eachother. By speaking the same language and sharing customs andtraditions, the members of these communities are typically closer toone another in various ways than they are to the outsiders.
2. The Argument from Flourishing. The ethno-nationalcommunity is essential for each of its members to flourish. Inparticular, it is only within such a community that an individual canacquire concepts and values crucial for understanding thecommunity’s cultural life in general and the individual’sown life in particular. There has been much debate on thepro-nationalist side about whether divergence of values is essentialfor separateness of national groups.

The Canadian liberal nationalists Seymour (1999), Taylor, and Kymlickapointed out that “divergences of value between different regionsof Canada” that aspire to separate nationhood are“minimal”. Taylor (1993: 155) concluded that it is notseparateness of value that matters.

3. The Argument from Identity. Communitarian philosophersemphasize nurture over nature as the principal force determining ouridentity as people—we come to be who we are because of thesocial settings and contexts in which we mature. This claim certainlyhas some plausibility. The very identity of each person depends uponhis/her participation in communal life (see MacIntyre 1994, Nielsen,1998, and Lagerspetz 2000). Given that an individual’s moralitydepends upon their having a mature and stable personal identity, thecommunal conditions that foster the development of personal identitymust be preserved and encouraged. Therefore, communal life should beorganized around particular national cultures.
4. The Argument from Moral Understanding. A particularlyimportant variety of value is moral value. Some values are universal,e.g., freedom and equality, but these are too abstract and“thin”. The rich, “thick” moral values arediscernible only within particular traditions; as Charles Taylor putsit, “the language we have come to accept articulates the issuesof the good for us” (1989: 35). The nation offers a naturalframework for moral traditions, and thereby for moral understanding;it is the primary school of morals.
5. The Argument from Diversity. Each national culturecontributes uniquely to the diversity of human cultures. The mostfamous twentieth century proponent of the idea, Isaiah Berlin(interpreting Herder), writes:

   The ‘physiognomies’ of cultures are unique: each presentsa wonderful exfoliation of human potentialities in its own time andplace and environment. We are forbidden to make judgments ofcomparative value, for that is measuring the incommensurable. (1976:206)

Assuming that the (ethno-)nation is the natural unit of culture, thepreservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionallyprotecting the purity of (ethno-)national culture. The plurality ofcultural styles can be preserved and enhanced by tying them toethno-national “forms of life”.

David Miller has developed an interesting and sophisticatedliberal pro-national stance over the course of decades from his workin 1990 to the most recent work in 2013. He accepts multiculturaldiversity within a society but stresses an overarching nationalidentity, taking as his prime example British national identity, whichencompasses the English, Scottish, and other ethnic identities. Hedemands an “inclusive identity, accessible to members of allcultural groups” (2013: 91). miller claims such identity isnecessary for basic social solidarity, and it goes far beyond simpleconstitutional patriotism. A skeptic could note the following. Theproblem with multicultural society is that national identity hashistorically been a matter of ethno-national ties and has requiredsameness in the weighted majority of cultural traits (common language,common “history-as-remembered”, customs, religion and soon). However, multi-cultural states typically bring together groupswith very different histories, languages, religions, and even quitecontrasting appearances. Now, how is the overarching “nationalidentity” to be achieved starting from the very thin identity ofcommon belonging to a state? One seems to have a dilemma. Groundingsocial solidarity in national identity requires the latter to berather thin and seems likely to end up as full-on, unitary culturalidentity. Thick constitutional patriotism may be one interestingpossible attitude that can ground such solidarity while preserving theoriginal cultural diversity.

3.3 Arguments in favor of nationalism: issues of justice

The arguments in the second set concern political justice and do notrely on metaphysical claims about identity, flourishing, and culturalvalues. They appeal to (actual or alleged) circumstances that wouldmake nationalist policies reasonable (or permissible or evenmandatory), such as (a) the fact that a large part of the world isorganized into nation-states (so that each new group aspiring tocreate a nation-state just follows an established pattern), or (b) thecircumstances of group self-defense or of redressing past injusticethat might justify nationalist policies (to take a special case). Someof the arguments also present nationhood as conducive to importantpolitical goods, such as equality.

1. The Argument from the Right to CollectiveSelf-determination. A group of people of a sufficient size has aprima facie right to govern itself and decide its futuremembership, if the members of the group so wish. It is fundamentallythe democratic will of the members themselves that grounds the rightto an ethno-national state and to ethno-centric cultural institutionsand practices. This argument presents the justification of(ethno-)national claims as deriving from the will of the members ofthe nation. It is therefore highly suitable for liberal nationalismbut not appealing to a deep communitarian who sees the demands of thenation as independent from, and prior to, the choices of particular individuals.^[22]
2. The Argument from the Right to Self-defense and to RedressPast Injustices. Oppression and injustice give the victimizedgroup a just cause and the right to secede. If a minority group isoppressed by the majority to the extent that almost every minoritymember is worse off than most members of the majority simply in virtueof belonging to the minority, then nationalist claims on behalf of theminority are morally plausible and potentially compelling. Theargument establishes a typical remedial right, acceptable from aliberal standpoint (see the discussion in Kukathas and Poole 2000,also Buchanan 1991; for past injustices see Waldron 1992).
3. The Argument from Equality. Members of a minority groupare often disadvantaged in relation to the dominant culture becausethey have to rely on those with the same language and culture toconduct the affairs of daily life. Therefore, liberal neutralityitself requires that the majority provide certain basic culturalgoods, i.e., granting differential rights (see Kymlicka 1995b, 2001,and 2003b). Institutional protections and the right to the minoritygroup’s own institutional structure are remedies that restoreequality and turn the resulting nation-state into a more moderatemulticultural one.
4. The Argument from Success. The nationstate has in thepast succeeded in promoting equality and democracy. Ethno-nationalsolidarity is a powerful motive for a more egalitarian distribution ofgoods (Miller 1995; Canovan 1996, 2000). The nation-state also seemsto be essential to safeguard the moral life of communities in thefuture, since it is the only form of political institution capable ofprotecting communities from the threats of globalization andassimilationism (for a detailed critical discussion of this argumentsee Mason 1999).

Andreas Wimmer (2018) presents an interesting discussion of thehistorical success of nation-state (discussed in Knott, Tolz, Green,& Wimmer 2019).

These political arguments can be combined with deep communitarianones. However, taken in isolation, their perspectives offer a“liberal culturalism” that is more suitable forethno-culturally plural societies. More remote from classicalnationalism than the liberal one of Tamir and Nielsen, it eschews anycommunitarian philosophical underpinning.^[23] The idea of moderate nation-building points to an openmulti-culturalism in which every group receives its share of remedialrights but, instead of walling itself off from others, participates ina common, overlapping civic culture in open communication with othersub-communities. Given the variety of pluralistic societies andintensity of trans-national interactions, such openness seems to manyto be the only guarantee of stable social and political life (see thedebate in Shapiro and Kymlicka 1997).

In general, the liberal nationalist stance is mild and civil, andthere is much to be said in favor of it. It tries to reconcile ourintuitions in favor of some sort of political protection of culturalcommunities with a liberal political morality. Of course, this raisesissues of compatibility between liberal universal principles and theparticular attachments to one’s ethno-cultural nation. Veryliberal nationalists such as Tamir divorce ethno-cultural nationhoodfrom statehood. Also, the kind of love for country they suggest istempered by all kinds of universalist considerations, which in thelast instance trump national interest (Tamir 1993: 115; 2019: passim,see also Moore 2001 and Gans 2003). There is an ongoing debate amongphilosophical nationalists about how much weakening and compromisingis still compatible with a stance’s being nationalist at all.^[24] There is also a streak of cosmopolitan interest present in the workof some liberal nationalists (Nielsen 1998–99).^[25]

In the last two decades, the issues of nationalism have beenincreasingly integrated into the debate about the international order(see the entries onglobalization andcosmopolitanism). The main conceptual link is the claim that nation-states are natural,stable, and suitable units of the international order. A relateddebate concerns the role of minorities in the processes ofglobalization (see Kaldor 2004). Moreover, the two approaches mightultimately converge: a multiculturalist liberal nationalism and amoderate, difference-respecting cosmopolitanism have a lot in common.^[26]

3.4 Populism and a new face of nationalism

“Populism” is an umbrella term, covering both right-wingand left-wing varieties. This section will pay attention to right-wingpopulist movements, very close to their traditional nationalistpredecessors. This corresponds to the situation in the biggest part ofEurope, and in the US, where nationalist topics are being put forwardby the right-wing populist.^[27]

However, it has become quite clear that nationalism is only one of thepolitical “isms” attracting the right-wing populists. Themigration crisis has brought to the forefront populistself-identification with linguistic-cultural communities (“we,French speaking people” for the former, “weChristians” for the later) that goes beyond nationalism.

Jan-Werner Müller (2016) and Cas Mudde (2007) note that the formcommon to all sorts of populism is quite simple and describe it as“thin”. Mudde explains: “Populism is understood as athin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimatelyseparated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘thepure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and whichargues that politics should be an expression of thevolontégénérale (general will) of the People” (2007:23). Populism, so defined, has two opposites: elitism and pluralism.First, there is the elite vs. people (“underdog”)contrast. Second, it is possible to distinguish two ways ofcharacterizing “the people”: either in terms of socialstatus (class, income-level, etc.) or in terms of ethnic and/orcultural belonging (see also de Cleen 2017).

The second, horizontal dimension distinguishes the predominantlyleft-wing from the predominantly right-wing populisms and leaves aplace for a centrist populist option. Take classical strong ethnicnationalism. The relation between right-wing populism and such anationalism is very tight. This has led some theoreticians (Taguieff2015) to present “nationalist populism” as the only kindof populism. The term captures exactly the synthesis of populism andthe strong ethnic nationalism or nativism. From populism, it takes thegeneral schema of anti-elitism: the leader is addressing directly thepeople and is allegedly following the people’s interest. Fromnationalism, it takes the characterization of the people: it is theethnic community, in most cases the state-owing ethnic community, orthe ethno-nation. In his work, Mudde documents the claim that purelyright-wing populists claim to represent the true people who form thetrue nation and whose purity is being muddied by new entrants. In theUnited States, one can talk about populist and reactionary movements,like the Tea Party, that have emerged through the recent experience ofimmigration, terrorist attacks, and growing economic polarization. Wehave to set aside here, for reasons of space, the main populistalternative (or quasi-alternative) to national populism. In somecountries, like Germany, some populist groups-parties (e.g., GermanAfD party (Alternative for Germany)), appeal to properties much widerin their reach than ethno-national belonging, typically to religiousaffiliations. Others combine this appeal with the ethno-nationalone. This yields what Riva Kastoryano (2006) calls “transnationalnationalism”.

Interestingly, liberal nationalism is not very attractive to thepopulists. On the theoretical side one can note that Tamir (2019) seesher liberal nationalism as a good recipe against the threat ofdemagogues like Trump and Boris Johnson (she avoids the use of thelabel “populist”, e.g., 2019: 31).

The rise of populism is changing the political playfield one must workwith. The tolerant (liberal nationalist or anti-nationalist) views areconfronting new problems in the populist age marked by migrationcrisis, etc. The dangers traditionally associated with militarypresence are gone; the national populists have to invent and constructa presumed danger that comes into the country together with foreignfamilies, including those with children. In short, if theseconjectures hold, the politicians and theoreticians are faced with achange. The traditional issue of the contrast betweenpatriotism/nationalism and cosmopolitanism has changed its profile:the current drastic contrast is between the populist aversion to theforeigners-migrants and a more generous attitude of acceptance andSamaritan help. Finally, the populist understanding of “ourpeople” (“we-community”) encompasses not onlynationalist options but also goes way beyond it. The important elementis the promiscuous character of the populist choices. It is probablethat the future scholarship on nationalism will mainly focus on thisnew and challenging playfield, with an aim to address the new contrastand locate kinds of nationalism in relation to it.^[28]

3.5 Nation-state in global context

The migration crisis has made the nation-state in global context thecentral political topic concerning nationality. Before moving on tocurrent events, the state of art before the crisis should besummarized. First, consider the debates on territory and nation andissues of global justice.

Liberal nationalists try to preserve the traditional nationalist linkbetween ethnic “ownership” of the state and sovereigntyand territorial control, but in a much more flexible and sophisticatedsetting. Tamar Meisels thus argues in favor of “taking existingnational settlements into account as a central factor in demarcatingterritorial boundaries” since this line “has both liberalfoundations” (i.e., in the work of John Locke) andliberal-national appeal (2009: 159) grounded in its affinity with theliberal doctrine of national self-determination. She combines it withChaim Gans’ (2003: Ch. 4) interpretation of “historicalright” claims as “the right to formativeterritories”. She thus combines “historical arguments,understood as claims to formative territories”, with herargument from settlement and insists on their interplay and mutualreinforcement, presenting them as being “most closely relatedto, and based on, liberal nationalist assumptions and underlyingideas” (Meisels 2009: 160). She nevertheless stresses that morethan one ethnic group can have formative ties to a given territory,and that there might be competing claims based on settlement.^[29] But, given the ethno-national conflicts of the twentieth century, onecan safely assume that culturally plural states divided into isolatedand closed sub-communities glued together merely by arrangements ofmodus vivendi are inherently unstable. Stability mighttherefore require that the pluralist society envisioned by liberalculturalists promote quite intense intra-state interaction betweencultural groups in order to forestall mistrust, reduce prejudice, andcreate a solid basis for cohabitation.

But where should one stop? The question arises since there are manygeographically open, interacting territories of various sizes.Consider first the geographical openness of big continental planes,then add the modern ease of interaction (“No island is an islandany more”, one could say), and, finally and dramatically, thesubstantial ecological interconnectedness of land and climate. Here,the tough nationalistic line is no longer proposed seriously inethical debates, so the furthest pro-national extreme is in fact arelatively moderate stance, exemplified by Miller in the works listed.Here is a typical proposal of his concerning global justice based onnation-states: it might become a matter of national pride to have setaside a certain percentage of GDP for developmentalgoals—perhaps for projects in one particular country or group ofcountries (2013: 182).

This brings us to the topic of migrations, and the heated debate onthe present scene.^[30] In Europe immigration is probably the main topic of the present daypopulist uproar, and in the United States it is one of the maintopics. So, immigration plus the nationalist-populist reactions to itare in the current decade the main testing ground for nationalist andcosmopolitan views.

Let’s look at the pro-national side in the debate. Liberalnationalists, in particular Miller, have put forward some thoughtfulpro-nationalist proposal concerning immigration. Miller’sproposal allows refugees to seek asylum temporarily until thesituation in their country of origin improves; it also limits economicmigration. Miller argues against the defensibility of a globalstandard for equality, opportunity, welfare, etc., because measures ofjust equality are context-bound. People do have the right to a minimumstandard of living, but the right to migrate only activates as a lastresort after all other measures within a candidate-migrant’scountry of origin have been tried. However, he also (particularly inhis book on “Strangers in our midst”, 2016), claims thatnational responsibility to accept immigrant refugees is balanced byconsiderations of the interest of would-be immigrants and theinterests that national communities have in maintaining control overtheir own composition and character.

If we agree with the liberal nationalists on the positive side, we canask about the dynamics of the help required for the immigrants.Distinguish at least three stages, first, the immediate emergency(starvation, freezing, urgent medical problems) and catering to it,second, settlement and learning (on the host and the immigrantnewcomer side), and third, the stage of (some kind of) citizenship, ofrelatively stable life in the host country.

In the first phase, the immediate help comes first, both normativelyand causally: just accept the would-be refugees (indeed, the would-berefugees should be helped in leaving their countries and travelling tothe host country). In longer term, staying should involve opportunityfor work and training.

But there is more. The Samaritan obligation can and should function asa preparation for wider global activity.^[31] So, we have two theoretical steps, first, accepting Samaritanism andsecond, agreeing with deeper trans-national measure of blockingdistant causes, like poverty and wars in the Third world. Let us callthis “Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model”. The model isgeared to the dramatically changed playground in which the nationalismissues are played out in the context of populism and refugee crisis,raising issues that were not around two decades ago.

4. Conclusion

In presenting the claims that the pro-nationalists defend, we haveproceeded from the more radical towards more liberal nationalistalternatives. In examining the arguments for these claims, we havepresented metaphysically demanding communitarian arguments restingupon deep communitarian assumptions about culture, such as the premisethat the ethno-cultural nation is the most important community for allindividuals. This is an interesting and respectable claim, but itsplausibility has not been established. The moral debate aboutnationalism has resulted in various weakenings of culture-basedarguments, typically proposed by liberal nationalists, which renderthe arguments less ambitious but much more plausible. Having abandonedthe old nationalist ideal of a state owned by a single dominantethno-cultural group, liberal nationalists have become receptive tothe idea that identification with a plurality of cultures andcommunities is important for a person’s social identity. Theyhave equally become sensitive to trans-national issues and morewilling to embrace a partly cosmopolitan perspective. Liberalnationalism has also brought to the fore more modest, lessphilosophically or metaphysically charged arguments grounded inconcerns about justice. These stress the practical importance ofethno-cultural membership, ethno-cultural groups’ rights to haveinjustices redressed, democratic rights of political association, andthe role that ethno-cultural ties and associations can play inpromoting just social arrangements.

The events in the current decade, the refugee crisis and the rise ofright-wing populism, have dramatically changed the relevant practicaland theoretical playground. The traditional nationalism is stillrelevant, but populist nationalism attracts much more attention: newtheories are being produced and debated, coming to occupy the centerstage. On the other hand, migration crisis has replaced the typicalcosmopolitan issue of solidarity-with-distant-strangers with burningissues of helping refugees present at our doors. Of course, the causesof the crisis are still the same ones that cosmopolitans have beenworrying about much earlier: wars and dramatically unequal globaldistribution of goods, and of threats, like illnesses and climatedisasters. The task of the theory is now to connect these deeperissues with the new problems occupying the center-stage of the newplayground; it is a challenge now formulated in somewhat differentvocabulary and within different political conceptual frameworks thanbefore.

Bibliography

Introduction

This is a short list of books on nationalism that are readable anduseful introductions to the literature. First, two contemporaryclassics of social science with opposing views are:

• Gellner, Ernest, 1983,Nations and Nationalism, Oxford:Blackwell.
• Smith, Anthony D., 1991,National Identity,Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Three presentations of liberal nationalism, two of them by the sameauthor, Yael Tamir, offer the best introduction to the approach:

• Miller, David, 1995,On Nationality, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press. doi:10.1093/0198293569.001.0001
• Tamir, Yael, 1993,Liberal Nationalism, Press, Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 2019,Why Nationalism, Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Two short and readable introductions are:

• Özkirimli, Umut, 2010,Theories of Nationalism: ACritical Introduction, second edition, London: PalgraveMacmillan. First edition is 2000; third edition is 2017.
• Spencer, Philip and Howard Wollman, 2002,Nationalism, ACritical Introduction, London: Sage.

The two best anthologies of high-quality philosophical papers on themorality of nationalism are:

• McKim, Robert and Jeff McMahan (eds), 1997,The Morality ofNationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Couture, Jocelyne, Kai Nielsen, and Michel Seymour (eds.), 1998,Rethinking Nationalism,Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, Supplement Volume 22, Calgary, AB: University ofCalgary Press.

The debate continues in:

• Miscevic, Nenad (ed), 2000,Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict:Philosophical Perspectives, La Salle and Chicago: OpenCourt.
• Dieckoff, Alain (ed.), 2004,The Politics of Belonging:Nationalism, Liberalism, and Pluralism, Lanham: Lexington.
• Primoratz, Igor and Aleksandar Pavković (eds), 2007,Patriotism, Philosophical and Political Perspectives, London:Ashgate.
• Breen, Keith and Shane O’Neill (eds.), 2010,After theNation? Critical Reflections on Nationalism and Postnationalism,London: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9780230293175

A good brief sociological introduction to nationalism in generalis:

• Grosby, Steven, 2005,Nationalism: A Very ShortIntroduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

and to the gender-inspired criticism of nationalism is:

• Yuval-Davis, Nira, 1997,Gender & Nation, London:Sage Publications.

and also:

• Heuer, Jennifer, 2008, “Gender and Nationalism”, inHerb and Kaplan 2008: vol. 1, 43–58.
• Hogan, Jackie, 2009,Gender, Race and National Identity:Nations of Flesh and Blood, London: Routledge.

The best general introduction to the communitarian-individualistdebate is still:

• Avineri, Shlomo and Avner de-Shalit (eds.), 1992,Communitarianism and Individualism, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

For a non-nationalist defense of culturalist claims see:

• Kymlicka, Will (ed.), 1995a,The Rights of MinorityCultures, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

A very readable philosophical defense of very moderate liberalnationalism is:

• Gans, Chaim, 2003,The Limits of Nationalism, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511490231

And for application to Central Europe see:

• Auer, Stefan, 2004,Liberal Nationalism in CentralEurope, London: Routledge.

A polemical, witty and thoughtful critique is offered in:

• Barry, Brian, 2001,Culture and Equality: An EgalitarianCritique of Multiculturalism, Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

And a more recent one in

• Kelly, Paul, 2015, “Liberalism and Nationalism”, inThe Cambridge Companion to Liberalism, Steven Wall (ed.),Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 329–352.doi:10.1017/CBO9781139942478.018

Interesting critical analyses of group solidarity in general andnationalism in particular, written in the traditions of rationalchoice theory and motivation analysis, are:

• Hardin, Russell, 1985,One for All, The Logic of GroupConflict, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Yack, Bernard, 2012,Nationalism and the Moral Psychology ofCommunity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

There is a wide offering of interesting sociological and politicalscience work on nationalism, which is beginning to be summarizedin:

• Motyl, Alexander (ed.), 2001,Encyclopedia ofNationalism, Volumes I and II, New York: Academic Press.

A fine encyclopedic overview is:

• Herb, Guntram H. and David H. Kaplan, 2008,Nations andNationalism: a Global Historical Overview, four volumes, SantaBarbara, CA: ABC Clio.

A detailed sociological study of life under nationalist rule is:

• Billig, Michael, 1995,Banal Nationalism, London: SagePublications.

The most readable short anthology of brief papers for and againstcosmopolitanism (and nationalism) by leading authors in the fieldis:

• Cohen, Joshua (ed.), 1996,For Love of Country: Debating theLimits of Patriotism, Martha Nussbaum and respondents, Boston,MA: Beacon Press

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Other Internet Resources

• Nussbaum, Martha C. 2002, “Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice”, Tanner Lecture, Australian National University.
• Waldron, Jeremy, 2005, “Proximity as the Basis of Political Community.”
• Nationalism – A Bibliography, compiled by Peter Rasmussen. A good collection of links andbibliographies, but no longer maintained.
• The Warwick Debates, debate between Ernest Gellner and Anthony D. Smith at the LondonSchool of Economics, 1995.
• ARENA: Centre for European Studies; ARENA is a research centre at the University of Oslo studying thedynamics of the evolving European systems of governance. This sitecontains a good selection of papers on ethics of internationalrelations.
• Global Policy Forum, has papers on the future of nation-states.
• Academy of European Law, at the European University Institute.
• Territory and Justice network: repository of pre-publication papers.

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