Adam of Wodeham (c. 1295–1358) was one of the most significantphilosophers and theologians working at Oxford in the second quarterof the fourteenth century. A student of Ockham, Wodeham is best knownfor his theory of thecomplexe significabile and hisdistinctively English approach to questions of philosophical theology.His philosophy and theology were influential throughout the latemedieval and early modern periods.

• 1. Life
• 2. Writings
• 3. Position in the History of Philosophy
• 4. Psychology and Cognition
  • 4.1 Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition
  • 4.2 Skepticism and Aureoli
  • 4.3 Three Degrees of Evidence
  • 4.4 Evident Judgments
  • 4.5 The Complexe Significabile
• 5. Philosophical Theology
  • 5.1 Proofs of God’s Existence
  • 5.2 Proof of God’s Unicity
  • 5.3 Philosophy and the Trinity
• 6. Natural Philosophy
  • 6.1 TheContinuum
  • 6.2 The Latitude of Forms
• 7. Ethics
  • 7.1 Moral Goodness
  • 7.2 Morality, the Will, and the Nature of Faith
• Bibliography
  • Primary Literature
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life

Adam Wodeham [Goddam/Woodham] (c. 1295–1358) was born nearSouthampton. He entered the Franciscan order at a young age.Wodeham’s earliest philosophical education was at the Franciscanstudium in London where he first studied under Walter Chatton(c. 1317–1321) and then William of Ockham (1320–1324).During this period of intense study, Wodeham collaborated with Ockhamon his massiveSumma logicae, editing it and preparing it forpublication. After Ockham departed for Avignon in the summer of 1324,Wodeham was sent to Oxford to complete his studies. At Oxford heattended the sentential lectures of Richard FitzRalph(1328–1329), and subsequently qualified to read theSentences.

Wodeham lectured on theSentences of Peter Lombard at theLondon convent sometime in the 1320s, although his earliest lecturenotes have not survived. He later lectured at the provincial school inNorwich sometime in the late 1320s, a work that is now referred to astheLectura secunda [LS]. Finally, Wodeham delivered theOxford lectures (referred to as theOrdinatio Oxoniensis[OO]) between 1332 and 1334 (Streveler and Tachau 1995, 22–23,n. 61). According to Thomas de Eccleston (Eccleston 1951, 57), Wodehamwas the 61^st lector at Oxford, Greyfriars. As is the casewith many medieval philosophers, little is known about his latter lifeafter he completed is education. He apparently traveled to Basel in1339, survived the plague in 1348–49, and died at the Franciscanconvent at Babwell in 1358 (Courtenay 1978, 181).

2. Writings

The extant writings of Adam Wodeham include: his two commentaries ontheSentences of Peter Lombard (theLectura and theOrdinatio); a prologue to William of Ockham’sSummalogicae; a shortquaestio on thecontinuum; alongerTractatus de indivisibilibus; theTractatusalphabeticus, and perhaps the 51^st chapter of part Iof Ockham’sSumma logicae and the last question of bookIV of the same author’sReportatio.

Adam Wodeham’s most significant philosophical and theologicalworks are his two commentaries on theSentences. TheLectura (c. 1320s) is the earlier of the two works and is aloose commentary on the first 26 distinctions of the first book of theLombard’sSentences. The single manuscript of theLectura (Cambridge, Gonville and Caius, Ms 281 (674), ff.105–250) has been published in a modern critical edition(Gál and Wood 1990). TheOrdinatio (1332–34),Wodeham’s most mature extant work, is a more expansivecommentary, treating all four books of the Lombard’sSentences and extensively re-writing and re-organizing thefirst 26 distinctions of the first book. An edition of theOrdinatio is available at theLombard Presswebsite.

The shorter works of Wodeham comprise several collaborations with histeacher William of Ockham. These include Wodeham’s briefintroduction to Ockham’sSumma logicae, which has beenedited in the critical edition. Further, Courtenay argues that Wodehamis probably the disciple who wrote the 51^st chapter of partI of Ockham’sSumma logicae (Courtenay 1978, 34). Bothof these short works were written between 1320 and 1324, as Wodehamcollaborated with the Venerable Inceptor. Finally, Gedeon Gálalso noted that in one of the manuscripts of Ockham’sReportatio (Milan, Ambros. 281 inf., fol. 69^rb) onbook IV of theSentences, a marginal notation attributes thefinal question of the work to Wodeham (Courtenay 1978, 34, fn.61).

Wodeham’s shorter works also include two tracts on thecontinuum written against the indivisibilists or atomists andtheTractatus alphabeticus. The shorter work on thecontinuum (Murdoch and Synan 1966, 212–288), consistingof a singlequaestio, is an early redaction of the longerwork, theTractatus de indivisibilibus (Wood 1988). Both ofthe works were probably written between 1323 and 1331 (Wood 1998, 16).TheTractatus alphabeticus considers the latitude of formsand was written around 1333 (Wood 374).

Finally, the lost works of Adam Wodeham include Biblical commentarieson theCanticum canticorum and the first book ofEcclesiasticus. And, based on historical and textualevidence, it is generally held that Wodeham wrote a set ofDeterminationes, some of which were probably included in theTractatus de indivisibilibus.

3. Position in the History of Philosophy

Adam Wodeham’s place in the history of philosophy remainsdifficult to appreciate because of two related problems, here referredto as: (1) the historiographical problem; and (2) the textual problem.Historiographically, the field of medieval philosophy has been plaguedby various narrative accounts of the twelfth through fifteenthcenturies that characterize the period in which Wodeham flourished asan age in which fideism, skepticism and scholastic decadence ruled theday (Inglis, 1998). This basic historiographical approach to the latemedieval period has recently come under serious attack and scrutiny byspecialists working in the field, but a balanced picture of thephilosophers and theologians working during this period remains in itsinfancy. Second, an accurate understanding of Adam Wodeham’splace within the history of philosophy is handicapped by the lack ofcritical editions for Adam Wodeham, his immediate contemporaries, andnumerous medieval philosophers and theologians working in the latefourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Regarding Wodeham, it is importantto recognize that a critical edition of any complete text of Wodehamwas not available until recently (Wood 1988; Gál and Wood1990). Further, as already noted, an edition of Wodeham’s mostmature and complete work, theOrdinatio, is only nowunderway. As such, the place of Adam Wodeham within the history ofmedieval thought is difficult to trace at present, and WilliamCourtenay’s important study remains the most relevant point ofreference (Courtenay, 1978).

Based on the work of Courtenay, the first references toWodeham’s place within medieval thought must begin byconsidering hissocii (or contemporarysententiarii). Wodeham lectured on theSentences atOxford in 1332–1334, and contemporaneous with his lectures therewere other bachelors lecturing on theSentences(baccalarius sententiarius) in the various other convents ortheological schools (Courtenay 1978, 89). Understanding who thesebachelors are is important because they often engaged with eachother’s work. In the case of Adam Wodeham the list ofsocii includes: Monachus Niger (Benedictine), Robert HolcotOP, William Crathorn OP, Roger Gosford OP, Edmund Grafton OFM, HughGrafton OESA, William Chiterne OFM, William Skelton: Mertonian,Richard of Radford, and an unnamed Carmelite (Courtenay 1978,89–111).

Beyond his immediatesocii, Wodeham’s influence between1334 and 1346 is evident in England, Paris and Cologne. Englishtheologians, between 1334 and 1350, often do not cite contemporariesby name. That said, there is substantial evidence that Wodeham’scontemporaries took his thought seriously. During these decades,Courtenay lists the following English theologians as making eitherimplicit or explicit reference to Adam Wodeham’slecturae: Thomas Bradwardine (Mertonian), Robert of HalifaxOFM, Roger Roseth OFM and Thomas Buckingham (Mertonian) (Courtenay1978, 116–123). In contrast to the English authors discussedabove, the Parisian authors between 1342 and 1345 were much morewilling to cite a contemporary author (Courtenay 1978, 123). Thus, inthis period almost all of the Parisian theologians commenting on theSentences cite Wodeham: Gregory of Rimini OESA, AlphonsusVargas OESA and John of Mirecourt (Cistercian). These authors exhibita strong knowledge of Wodeham and all had some access to the Oxford(Ordinatio) redaction of Wodeham’s work (Courtenay1978, 132). In particular one should note Gregory of Rimini’sextensive knowledge of the thought of Wodeham. The spread ofOckham’s philosophical and theological thought into Germany(both directly and indirectly through the study of Wodeham) took placebetween 1335 and 1350 and is evident in Cologne. This is perhaps dueto the fact that Wodeham traveled to Basel in the summer of 1339bringing with him a copy of hisOrdinatio (Courtenay 1978,133 and 181). How long Wodeham remained in Germany, or where hetraveled, remains unknown. But, it is significant that in Cologne,sometime before 1348, one theologian lectured on theSentencessecundum Adam (Courtenay 1978, 133). This and other evidencesuggest that Wodeham was being studied seriously in Cologne before1348.

In the aftermath of the Parisian condemnations of Nicholas ofAutrecourt in 1346 and John of Mirecourt in 1347, one may expect thatthe influence of Wodeham would have waned in subsequent years. But,Courtenay argues that the citations of Wodeham throughout thisturbulent period demonstrate that this was not the case (Courtenay1978, 135). Evidence of Parisian masters engaging the thought ofWodeham in the years after 1347 is evident in the works of: PeterCeffons O.Cist. and Hugolino Malabrancha of Oriveto OESA.

In the final four decades of the fourteenth century there is anincrease in the citations of themoderni as evidenced in theextant commentaries. The list of commentaries that cite Wodehamincludes: the anonymous author of ms. Vat. Lat. 986, John Hiltalingenof Basel OESA, James of Eltville O.Cist, Conrad of Ebrach O.Cist.,Pierre d’Ailly, Henry Totting of Oyta, John of Wasia, Henry ofLangenstein, Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl, Peter of Candia, JohnBrammart O.C., Peter Plaoul, and Marsilius of Inghen. This period ofmedieval philosophy remains understudied, but it is clear that therewas a strong interest in Wodeham at the close of the fourteenthcentury. Further evidence of this is found in Henry Totting ofOyta’sAbbreviato of Adam Wodeham’sOrdinatio produced between 1373 and 1378 (Courtenay 1978,147). Oyta’sAbbreviato of Wodeham was influential inthe fifteenth century, as is clear from the number of extantmanuscripts spread throughout Europe.

The influence of Wodeham’s thought in the fifteenth and earlysixteenth centuries is a chapter of medieval philosophy and theologythat has yet to be written. There are citations of Wodeham in theworks of Arnold of Sehnsen O.C., Peter Reicher/Pirchenward, JohnCapreolus, Gabriel Biel and John Mair (Major), although the evidenceat this point has yet to be analyzed in detail (Courtenay 1978,150–156). What is certain is that Wodeham remained important forphilosophers and theologians in the long fifteenth century, and JohnMair eventually, in the sixteenth century, published an edition ofOyta’sAbbreviato. This has been both positive andnegative for Wodeham studies: positive, as Wodeham has remainedavailable to those who do not have access to the manuscript tradition;and negative as it has meant that scholars often read and cite aninferior text that significantly abbreviates the original work. Moreattention should be given to the influence of Wodeham in thisperiod.

4. Psychology and Cognition

To the present day a significant part of Wodeham scholarship has beenfocused on his philosophy of mind and the sequence of events fromsense impression to complex scientific judgment. Modernscholarship’s focus here is partly due to the fact that this wasa clear area of interest for Wodeham, to which he devoted significantenergy. But it is also a reflection of the availability of texts; thecontracted nature of theLectura secunda has focused theefforts of scholarship on book I and issues of cognition. In thefollowing section, we will try to give an overview of the generalconsensus and debates of modern scholarship on the process ofcognition as it is currently found in theLecturasecunda.

4.1 Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition

Wodeham turns first to the question of intuitive and abstractivecognition: two concepts developed by John Duns Scotus and William ofOckham. But while they identify the parallel notions of intuitive andabstractive cognition proper to the sensitive and intellective soulsrespectively, Wodeham distinguishes himself from his predecessors byinsisting that this parallel reduplication is redundant and violatesthe principle of parsimony.

Regarding intuitive cognition Wodeham begins by stating that:“every act of science naturally caused presupposes evidence ofsome proposition or of the thing signified through the proposition.Science (or a scientific act of assent) is caused by the mediation ofthis evidence” (LS I:9, ll. 44–46).

The question is: what is the source of this evidence? The assumptionis that an evident proposition arises from, or is formulated from,certain types of simple evident apprehensions, namely, intuitiveapprehensions. Wodeham, then asks: does the intellect require anintuitive apprehension distinct from the act of sensation?

The definition of intuitive apprehension states that such anapprehension must be sufficient for the intellect to make a judgmentabout the existence of the object. Given this definition Wodehamwonders why a second act of intuitive apprehension, beyond theapprehension of sensation, is necessary in order for the intellect tomake this judgment. The fact that the present object in question hasbeen “sensed” ought to be sufficient for the intellect tofeel confident that such an object exists.

Wodeham’s position is distinctive because he denies what was atraditional distinction for Scotus and Ockham, namely, a distinctionbetween the sensitive and intellective soul (a real distinction in thecase of Ockham and a formal distinction in the case of Scotus). ForWodeham, the assumption of two separate acts of intuition mandatesthat a human being have either two souls or that the human has onesoul and also another vital power, separate from that soul. But,drawing on the authority of Augustine, Wodeham identifies the notionof two souls as a heresy to be avoided. Another option is to thinkthat the sensitive soul is not really a soul at all, but rather apower distinct and separate from the one human soul. But this too isunacceptable. To be a true sensitive potency, Wodeham insists that itmust be a living form (viva forma); if it were not, it wouldnot be able to receive “living” or vital acts, among whichapprehensive and appetitive acts are numbered. But if one admits thatthe sensitive power remains a “living form”, then twosouls are once more introduced into the single human being. This, atleast, is the case for Wodeham, who holds that to be a“soul” is to be a “living form” (LS I:11, ll.44–55). Thus, Wodeham is adamant that there can only be one soulin the single human being, and the intuitive act of sensation alone issufficient for the simple apprehension “presupposed” by an“evident assent” (LS I:9, ll. 44–48). However, bydenying this distinction, Wodeham must be willing to say that,strictly speaking, the “intellect senses” because it isthe same intellectual soul that both senses and thinks. This was anunsavory consequence for a thinker like Ockham, but one that Wodehamwas fully willing to accept (Wood 1990, 21*; LS I:14–15,ll.1–49).

Despite disagreeing with Scotus and Ockham on the nature of theintellective and the sensitive soul, Wodeham affirms the formaldefinition of intuition originally given by Scotus. This definition isformulated in the third conclusion of the second question of theprologue to theLectura Secunda: “the incomplex act,which is able to cause evident assent about a contingent truth of apresent object, and which naturally requires the existence andpresence of that object, is intuitive knowledge” (LS I, 37, ll.69–72). The presence of the object is required and not just itsexistence because intuitive cognition requires the object to functionas an efficient cause. The object, however, cannot function as anefficient cause unless it is also present to the knower (LSI:45–46, ll. 40–44).

With this definition Wodeham is also rejecting an important andcontroversial part of Ockham’s definition of intuitiveknowledge. For Ockham, not only was an intuitive knowledge able toproduce an affirmative judgment of the existence of an extant object,but it was also able to affirm the non-existence of a non-extantobject. By insisting on the criteria of a present object for any kindof intuitive knowledge, Wodeham denies that an intuition of anon-extant, non-present object is possible. Here Wodeham offers anillustrative example. He remarks that sometimes we can judge thatsomething does not exist as a consequence of having a positiveintuition. He gives the example of intuitively seeing the dead body ofSocrates and knowing that Socratesdoes not exist. Whileacknowledging that such an example might be the inspiration behindOckham’s controversial claim about an intuitive knowledge ofnon-existents, he points out that in this example, we do not have anintuitive knowledge of the same thing about which we are making ajudgment. Rather we are making an inference from our intuitiveknowledge of (and a judgment about) the existence of the dead body ofSocrates (LS I:38–39, ll. 4–15).

The difference, then, between intuitive knowledge and abstractiveknowledge is again taken from Scotus. Here, in Wodeham’s sixthconclusion, of the second question, the difference is attributable,not to diverse objects of knowledge, but to the attitude that one cantake towards that object with respect to existence (LS I:45, ll.22–26). Unlike intuitive knowledge, abstractive knowledge doesnot require the existence or presence of the object to be known.However, in this case “what is known” is indifferent tothe existence of that object and no judgment about that object’sexistence can be made.

4.2 Skepticism and Aureoli

Wodeham’s decision to identify the difference between intuitiveand abstractive knowledge with the presence or absence of an object,as Scotus and Ockham did, meant that he shared with these two thinkersa common opponent, namely Peter Aureoli. In response to Scotus’sdefinition of intuitive knowledge Aureoli identified severalexperiences wherein a person appears to have a sensitive intuition ofa non-present object. Such experiences, according to Aureoli, were theconsequence of lingering sensitive images that remain even after anobject is no longer present. Such lingering images (sometimes calledesse perspectivum oresse apparens) were used toexplain all sorts of visual anomalies that do not correspond toreality. Such experiences were enough for Aureoli to define intuitiveknowledge, not as the direct grasp of a present object, but asdirect knowledge (as opposed to knowledge arrived at througha discursive reasoning process). Rega Wood explains:

Abstract and intuitive cognition were distinguished by the manner inwhich their objects were presented. The objects of abstract cognitionappeared in a quasi-imaginary mode (quasi modo imaginario etabsente); intuitive cognition was direct rather than discursive,and it conveyed the impression that its objects existed and wereactually present (Wood 1982, 216).

In short, this meant that a direct grasp of a lingering appearance oresse apparens, even after the object was no longer present,could count as intuitive knowledge.

For those who came after Aureoli, his definition and his notion ofesse apparens raised a host of skeptical concerns. Ifsensation produces anesse apparens, the intellect must alsoproduce a similar object, something Peter Aureoli calledesseintentionale. And if intuitive knowledge is a direct knowledge ofeither theesse apparens or theesse intentionale,and not of the object itself, from where does the certainty come bywhich one can firmly and confidently state that “this thingexists”? Aureoli’sesse apparens opened up thepossibility of an experience, wherein what appears to be present,might actually not be present or even in existence.

Ockham’s answer to Aureoli’s insistence on the need for anesse apparens to explain certain strange and misleadingphenomena was to relocate the source of the error. The error does notcome from the impression of some non-existent object. On the contrary,the naturally produced intuitive cognition does not lie. Instead, asWood paraphrases Ockham, “error arises when the observer infersa proposition which does not follow formally from hisperceptions” (Wood 1982, 224). Ockham calls the intuition ofthose appearances that cause apparitions “imperfect intuitivecognition”. In such cases, the immediate judgment of theintellect is not “that the object represented exists”, but“that the object was impressed” (and, it would seem, thatthis impression exists). The intellect errs, then, when it assents towhat the “imperfect” intuition does not warrant.

A central concern with Ockham’s account, raised by WalterChatton and responded to by Wodeham, was the character of theseapparition causing “after-images”. For Ockham, the afterimages were not caused by the object, but by a lingering impressiondistinct from the object or impression-causing species. For Chatton,it could not be overlooked that these after-images appearedasif they were the object, notas if they were someleft-over impression caused by the object. Thus, he argued that theafter-images are caused by the lingering of the representative speciesof the object, even after the object is no longer present. Chatton wastherefore willing to admit that intuition of a non-present object waspossible, as long as its representative species lingered.

On this issue Wodeham takes sides with Ockham against Chatton. Heexpressly attacks Chatton’s description of the lingering speciesas having a likeness sufficient to cause the observer to believe inthe existence of the original object. Wood writes of Wodeham’sposition:

In after-images only the remains of the form or species caused by thefirst act of perception are seen. But the belief that the principalobject is seen when after-images are present is not caused by thefirst vision or even by the remains of the species imprinted duringvision. It is caused by strong imagination which leads the observer tojudge falsely that what he sees in an after-image is the same as whathe saw when the principal object was presented (Wood 1982, 228).

In short, against Chatton, Wodeham defends an Ockham-like position,suggesting that the source of error is not the intuitive cognition ofsomething not actually there, but the fact that the intellect choosesto make a judgment about the existence of something other than whatwas intuited. In many ways, the case is similar to that inference madeabout Socrates’ non-existence, when Socrates’ dead body isintuitively grasped. The inference made from one intuitive cognitionis not always correct, even if the intuition itself remainsreliable.

4.3 Three Degrees of Evidence

What then does all this mean for the question of certitude and thepossibility of building a genuine and trustworthy science based onthese foundational impressions received from the natural world?Wodeham defended the reliability of our immediate simpleapprehensions, but he also admitted the possibility that theimagination can severely distort these impressions such that we areinclined to assent to what the simple apprehension itself does notwarrant.

Wodeham discusses the question of evidence for a proposition which canbe built from these initial apprehensions in the sixth question of theprologue. He says that the idea of “complex evidence” canbe understood in two ways: either as referring to the apprehension ofan evident proposition itself or to the so-called “evidentjudgment” which has been caused by this evident proposition.

What Wodeham means by an evident proposition is complicated andrequires that we have a clear sense of the distinction betweenapprehension and judgment, which are for Wodeham two distinct andseparate acts. An evident proposition for Wodeham can be of threekinds. The first and lowest degree of evidence is identified with theapprehension of the proposition (or what it signifies). Wodeham usesas his example the proposition, “a stick submerged in water isbroken”. The apprehension of this state of affairs has all thetrappings of an evident proposition, to such an extent that itinclines us to perform the separate act of producing an affirmativejudgment. Nevertheless, this type of proposition is one that can stillbe false, despite the fact that it has all the appearance of truth.This lingering possibility, however, allows the intellect to suspendits judgment on the basis of other experiences or reasons. Distinctiveof such propositions is their contingent nature. Though they canappear true, it remains possible that they are false.

The second degree of certainty associated with evident propositions isexemplified by a proposition that not only appears certain andinclines the judgment to assent, but is also a proposition that cannotfail to signify correctly. According to Wodeham all propositions ofthis type are categorical and necessary. And, he distinguishes themfrom those contingent types of propositions which may have everyappearance of being true but yet may turn out to be false (LS II:163,ll.17–20).

Finally, Wodeham distinguishes this second type of evident propositionfrom a third type of proposition which is also categorical andnecessary. This third type of proposition is the highest degree ofevidence, because, not only can it not fail to appearand betrue, but it also cannot be doubted. That is, it not only inclines toassent, but necessitates the intellect to assent. For Wodeham, this isdistinct from the second and less-evident type of proposition. Whilethis second type cannot fail to be true, it nevertheless can still bedoubted owing to the fact that other conflicting propositions alsoappear to be true. The third type cannot be doubted in this way, nomatter what other propositions appear to be true. If other evidentpropositions are genuinely in conflict with (i.e., are inconsistentwith) the proposition in question, those propositions cannot beevident in the highest degree. But nor can these conflictingpropositions be evident in the second highest degree since the secondand third types are both supposed to be necessary. Therefore theycannot actually be in conflict, though it is still possible that theymay appear to be in conflict. For Wodeham, propositions of the thirdand highest type can be known in themselves and are necessarilyper se nota (LS I:164, 36).

4.4 Evident Judgments

If this is how we can understand an evident proposition, what thenconstitutes an evident judgment? Again, a judgment, for Wodeham, issharply distinguished from the distinct act of apprehension or themental proposition. It amounts to a mental nod of approval to thecorrespondence between the apprehended proposition and the realitysignified. (See LS I, prol., d. 6, § 20, I:176–178.)Clearly, the first two types of propositions do not provide us withabsolute certainty. These propositions have all the appearance oftruth, but the judgment that follows from them cannot be calledevident as long as doubt remains, even if the judgment in question iscorrect.

When it comes then to a truly evident judgment, propositions which areper se nota can cause evident judgments because the truth ofthose propositions can in no way be doubted. However, besidespropositionsper se nota there are certain mechanisms throughwhich originally dubitable propositions can come to be evident in thethird degree, thereby necessitating assent and causing a truly evidentjudgment.

The most obvious mechanism is the demonstrative syllogism, which leadsus finally to Wodeham’s conception of a science and theimmediate object of this act of assent. In article two of questionone, he discusses whether a scientific act of knowing (the evidentassent given to the conclusion of a syllogism) has as its immediateobject “that which is signified by only one proposition, i.e.,the conclusion” or “that which is signified by theconclusion and the premises joined together at the same time through asyllogism” (LS I:199, ll. 5–11). Wodeham’sconclusion is decidedly in favor of the latter; namely, in order for apreviously dubitable proposition to be elevated to the third degree ofevidence, whereby the intellect is necessitated to assent, it mustacquire that evidence from the force of the syllogism as whole. Theconclusion by itself is notper se nota. Thus, for a trulyevident judgment to take place, a single evident proposition cannot beits cause, rather all three propositions of the syllogism must betaken together in order for the concluding proposition to have theevidence it needs to not only appear true, but to compel themind’s assent (LS I:199–208). This requirement thatscientific assent be given to the syllogism as a whole (and cannot besustained if one of the premises is forgotten) is a position that willbe explicitly opposed by the later Parisian reader of Wodeham, Gregoryof Rimini (Lectura, I, Prol., q. 3, a. 1, Trapp I:107ff).

4.5 The Complexe Significabile

If there is a topic that has dominated Wodeham scholarship, it is thecomplexe significabile or alternatively, that which issignifiable in a complex way, i.e., through a proposition. Thismysterious entity was intended by Wodeham to function both as theimmediate object of propositional knowledge and as a genuineviamedia between two extreme theories regarding the object ofknowledge offered by his contemporaries. Representing one extreme wasWilliam of Ockham, who was thought by Wodeham to identify the terms ofa proposition as the actual object. This is sometimes referred to asthe anti-realist position. On the other hand there was Walter Chatton,who argued that the object of propositional knowledge was the actualentity signified by the subject term of the proposition. Wodeham, inturn, rejected both these positions and stated that the object ofscience was an actual state of affairs which could only be signifiedthrough a complex or a proposition. Questions and puzzles havecontinued to linger regarding the exact ontological status of thesestates-of-affairs. While insisting that they have some realontological weight, they do not fit nicely under either of theAristotelian categories of real being, substance or accident. Thus,within an Aristotelian framework, it is difficult to articulateexactly how or in what way thecomplexe significabile isactually real.

The legacy of thecomplexe significabile has a somewhatinvolved history. We can find several examples of its use anddiscussion throughout the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenthcenturies. However, for many years the idea was thought to originatewith Gregory of Rimini. Modern scholarship slowly discovered, albeitnot immediately, that this particular terminology was original toWodeham and only later adopted by Rimini. (The idea, however, has manyprecursors evident in earlier debates over terms likedictaorenuntiabilia. See Klima 1993; Nuchelmans 1973; Bermon2007.) The most frequently cited misattribution in modern scholarshiphas been Hubert Elie’s “Le complexe significabile”(Elie 1936). In the following generation, Gedeon Gàl(Gàl 1977) discovered that Wodeham was actually the author ofthis idea. Gàl edited the first modern edition of theLectura Secunda dist. 1, q. 1, the traditional point of entryinto Wodeham’s thought on the matter. Since Gàl’sarticle, several studies have followed: Nuchelmans (1980), Tachau(1987), Grassi (1990), Zupko (1994–1997), Karger (1995), andBrower-Toland (2007). A frequent part of the contemporary discussioninvolves distinguishing the genuine doctrine of Adam Wodeham fromlater versions. Gàl’s initial characterization ofRimini’s position as a “mutilation” ofWodeham’s position has exerted its influence over the subsequentscholarship (cf. Nuchelmans, and esp. Zupko). Most complaints stemfrom the idea that Rimini gives too much ontological weight to thismysterious entity or at least lacks the nuance of Wodeham, exposingthe doctrine to objections that could not be addressed to Wodehamhimself (cf. Zupko 1994–1997). Brower-Toland has recentlychallenged this traditional reading. She suggests the “radicalnature of Wodeham’s claims” have largely goneunrecognized, and that hiscomplexe significabile representsa significant “ontological addition” to the Aristoteliansubstance-accident framework (Brower-Toland 2007:600n7,638–640).

5. Philosophical Theology

5.1 Proofs of God’s Existence

Wodeham’s approach to philosophical theology begins with atraditional attempt to determine whether or not God’s existencecan be philosophically and demonstratively proved.

In both theLectura secunda and theOrdinatio hisstrategy is structured by two proofs. The first is taken from andexplicitly attributed to Scotus. Of the Scotist proof, Wodeham remarksthat it seems very persuasive and more evident than any reason thatcan be brought against it. The second argument appears to be originalto Wodeham.

The first proof taken from John Duns Scotus is found both in hisOrdinatio andDe Primo Principio. The argumentfollows from an initial disjunctive premise: there is either somefirst uncaused cause or there is not. If the former, Scotus andWodeham argue that it is obvious that this is God. If the latter ischosen then unacceptable consequences follow. The most notable is thatthere would be an infinite series of caused causes without aterminating point. Two reasons are offered for why such an infiniteseries is impossible. The first is that, the whole of all“essentially ordered” causes must have a cause, but if thecause of this multitude comes from the totality of caused causes, thenthis cause will be the cause of itself, which is impossible. Thesecond reason that an infinite series of causes will not work is thiswould require that there are an infinite amount of causes acting atthe same time. This requirement is built into Wodeham’s (andScotus’s) conception of essentially ordered causes—whichWodeham later sharply distinguishes from a series of accidentallyordered causes.

Wodeham offers a second proof for the existence of God. Regarding thisproof he states that it is sufficient to incline the intellect toassent, but he also acknowledges that it is still able to be doubtedby “shameful adversaries” (LS II:121; OO I, d. 2, a. 1).According to Wodeham’s description of different types ofevidence, it is clear that this “proof” is not able tocompel a truly evident judgment because the proof remains open todoubt and thus only reaches the second degree of evidence.

The proof begins from another disjunctive proposition inspired byAnselm’sProslogion. Either there is some most noblebeing about which no more noble thing is able to be thought, or thereis no such most noble thing. Wodeham remarks that one possibleconsequence that might follow is that there would be an infinitesuccession of more noble things, thus permitting an infinity ofbeings. This conclusion, he says, is unpleasant to the mind; that is,the intellect is not able to admit an infinity of beings without“grumbling” (murmere). For this option at least,it is clear that the intellect can incline us to assent that Godexists, but it is still possible to doubt it, which is thedistinguishing mark of the second degree of evidence. The otheralternative is that there must be some most noble thing actuallyexisting (in actu existens), even though this is not the mostnoble thing possible. Wodeham finds this alternative opposed by themost evident of reasons—something akin to Anselm’sontological argument: whatever is actually existing (existens inactu) isde facto more noble than what is not inexistence. Thus, it is nonsensical to speak of something more noble,which is only potentially existing (LS II:121, ll.13–15).

5.2 Proof of God’s Unicity

From the philosophical proof of the existence of the highest being,not always demonstrative, but evident in at least the second degree,Wodeham turns to the question of whether there is one highest being ormany. The question found inLectura, I, q. 1, a. 3, and theOrdinatio I, d. 2, a. 2 is posed in an ambiguous way. It askswhether it isevidently probable that something absolutelyuncausable is only one in number. The question is ambiguous because itis not immediately clear whether Wodeham’s intention is to showthat there is only one God or if he intends to evaluate the relativedegrees of evidence of the existing proofs of God’s unicity ormultiplicity.

As the question progresses, it appears that Wodeham is primarilyinterested in evaluating the evidence of both pro and con arguments.Wodeham juxtaposes arguments of Scotus against counter arguments ofOckham in order to argue that the unicity of God cannot bedemonstrably proven. Ultimately, he argues that its seems that naturalreason is not able to prove evidently the numerical unity of God (LSII:144). He argues for the inconclusiveness of several argumentsincluding: the argument that proceeds from the belief that therecannot be several total causes of the same effect (LS II:144); thatthere cannot be more than one necessary being (LS II:159); and thatthere cannot be more than one final cause (OO I, q. 2, a. 2, dubium5). In the end, Wodeham is not interested in denying that there isonly one God, but he simply wants to show that the relatively strongarguments for God’s unicity do not reach the third and highestdegree of evidence.

Even when it comes to the specific unity of God, which is granted onlya brief discussion in theLectura secunda and is left out oftheOrdinatio altogether, Wodeham shows some hesitation. Hewrites: “I say that the argument of Scotus given above isprobably able to be persuasive” (LS II: 171). Thus he againshows that even though it is his own opinion that God is specificallyone, it is possible for doubt to continue to linger.

5.3 Philosophy and the Trinity

Adam Wodeham’s trinitarian theology is developed in theLectura (d. 2, d. 3 q. 5; d. 7; dd. 9–16; dd.18–21; dd. 23–26) and theOrdinatio I, d. 3; d.33 qq. 1–9. The two accounts, despite their various formalplacements in the two works, are often identical (e.g., LS d. 11, q.un. and OO d. 33, q. 6). Wodeham, however, did substantially re-workhis discussion of theimago Trinitatis (LS d. 3, q. 5; OO I,d. 3), focusing in the latter work on the writings of RichardFitzRalph instead of Richard Campsall. Further, in the closingdiscussion of distinction 2 of theOrdinatio, Wodeham tellshis readers that the discussion of the Trinity will be collected intothe numerous questions of distinction 33.

Wodeham’s trinitarian theology has received little attentionfrom scholars. However, there are several notable exceptions. HesterGelber offers an analysis ofOrdinatio I, dd. 33, qq.1–3, concerning the formal distinction and formal non-identity(q. 1) and the complex problem of trinitarian paralogisms (qq.2–3) (Gelber 1974, 235–264, 629–648). RussellFriedman treats the relationship between Peter Auriol and Adam Wodehamin theLectura secunda, d. 7 on the question:utrumpotentia generandi possit communicari Filio (whether the power togenerate can be communicated to the Son) (1997, 342–349). OlliHallamaa considers Wodeham’s discussion of trinitarianparalogisms within the context of other fourteenth-century Franciscans(Hallamaa 2003). For our purposes Gelber’s and Hallamaa’sanalyses of trinitarian paralogisms are the most relevantphilosophically, as Wodeham debates the universality of Aristotelianlogic with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity.

Like many of his Oxford contemporaries, Adam Wodeham was particularlyconcerned with solving the tension between Aristotelian logic andtrinitarian theology. In theLectura secunda, Wodeham did notaddress the problem in a substantial way (see LS III, 446–448),although in theOrdinatio he devotes a specific question tothe problem of whether there is a “certain rule or art”through which one can solve trinitarian paralogisms (OO I, d. 33, q.3).

The problem of trinitarian paralogisms arises when one considerscertain syllogisms regarding the Trinity. God, according to Churchteaching, is one simple divine essence and three distinct divinepersons (Father, Son and Holy Spirit). And, when some valid syllogismsare formulated according to Aristotelian rules, paradoxes arise inwhich both premises are true and the conclusion is false. Forexample:

In this valid expository syllogism, both of the premises are trueaccording to Church teaching, but the conclusion is false. Thetheologians of the first half of the fourteenth century developed twostrategies when confronting such syllogisms. First, some theologiansdenied the universality of Aristotelian logic outside of the naturalorder. This approach, which remained in the minority, can be found inthe author of theCentiloquium theologicum (OPh VII,§ 56–59, 469–472) and in Robert Holcot’scommentary on theSentences (Holcot 1518, q. 5) (albeitHolcot’s position changes in other parts of his corpus, cf.Gelber 1974). In his commentary, Holcot remains ambiguous about hiseventual solution, although he writes that there are two logics: thelogic of faith (logica fidei) and the logic of the naturalorder (logica naturalis). Second, and more moderately, mosttheologians insisted that Aristotelian logic is universal—thus,valid in both the natural and supernatural realms—but that thetrinitarian syllogisms in question are not valid syllogisms, despitetheir seemingly valid form. This approach was shared by William ofOckham and Adam Wodeham.

Adam Wodeham, in the first two questions of distinction 33, surveysthe traditional methods of solving the problem of trinitarianparalogisms (Gelber 1974, 235–253), and in the third questionfinally offers his own response. It is not possible to recount all ofWodeham’s methods for addressing such paralogisms, but it isuseful to consider the following syllogism:

In the above case, the two premises are universal. As such, thesyllogism should be governed by “all or none”: meaningthat, with respect to a given subject and predicate, what is said ofall (dici de omni) of the subject (essence) must also be saidof the predicate (Father) (OO I, d. 33, q. 3, a. 2). In the aboveargument, there is a fallacy of the figure of speech because noteverything said of the divine essence is predicable to the Father,because the termdivine essence (subject) supposits for theSon and Holy Spirit while the termFather (predicate) doesnot. Thus, the premise is not sufficiently universal and violates therules of a valid expository syllogism (Gelber 1974, 255–256).This is one of Wodeham’s methods for addressing trinitarianparalogisms, and effectively captures his basic method and approach tosuch problems. Further, it helps elucidate Wodeham’s broaderapproach to the role of Aristotelian logic within theology and hischaracteristically “analytic” approach to questions ofphilosophical theology.

6. Natural Philosophy

Adam Wodeham’sTractatus de indivisibilibus andTractatus alphabeticus establish him as one of the leadingrepresentatives of thetheologia Anglicana. This group ofthinkers, including the Oxford Calculators, was heavily influenced bynatural philosophy and its implications for a range of philosophicaland theological problems. Wodeham’s discussion of thecontinuum and the latitude of forms demonstrates his placewithin this philosophical tradition.

6.1 TheContinuum

Adam Wodeham, like many of his English contemporaries in the firstdecades of the fourteenth century, was embroiled in the debate overdivisibilism and indivisibilism (atomism). Following William ofOckham, Adam Wodeham was a divisibilist who argued in hisTractatus de indivisibilibus against philosophical atomism(indivisibilism). Wodeham cites extensively from the writings ofdivisibilists and indivisibilists, such that hisTractatus deindivisibilibus is a rich source for tracing the history of thislong and complex debate (Wood 1988, 14).

Aristotle, in the sixth book of thePhysics, develops severalarguments against the idea thatcontinua are composed ofatoms or indivisibles. The majority of medieval philosophers acceptedAristotle’s position, but by the end of the thirteenth centurythere developed a minority opinion that supported indivisibilism. Themost famous proponents of indivisibilism were Robert Grosseteste (d.1253), Henry Harclay (d. 1317), Walter Chatton (d. 1343), Gerard Odon(d. 1349), William Crathorn (fl. 1330s) and Nicholas Bonet (d. 1360).The divisibilists/indivisibilist debate in the fourteenth century wasconcerned with the philosophical status of space and time.Spacial-temporal reality, according to the traditional Aristotelianview, was infinitely divisible. Thus, authors like Thomas Bradwardineand Adam Wodeham follow Aristotle and Averroes in defending the viewthat thecontinuum is composed of divisible parts withoutend, and not of atoms. This view (divisibilism) is the one defended byAdam Wodeham in his magisterialTractatus deindivisibilibus.

In response to the classical divisibilist position supported byAristotle, the indivisibilists held that there were“indivisibles” which constituted the composition oftemporal and spatialcontinua, e.g., temporal instants andlines respectively. Such “indivisibles”, in the early14^th century, were understood to be an extended and simpleontological unit, but not physical atomsper se. It ishelpful here to consider briefly an indivisibilist account, beforeturning to the divisibilism of Wodeham.

Henry Harclay and Walter Chatton are two relatively well knownmedieval philosophers who supported indivisibilism. Thinkers such asHarclay and Chatton argued, in response to Aristotle, for thepossibility that acontinuum is composed of indivisibles. Theindividual components, or indivisibles, were generally held to beextensionless regardless of whether or not the individual thinkerunderstood there to be an infinite (Harclay) or finite (Chatton)number of indivisibles in a givencontinuum. But, as is wellknow, such indivisibilists accounts were generally so defensive intheir posture—arguing for the mere possibility ofindivisibles—that it is difficult to ascertain the broaderphilosophical motivations which grounded such arguments. John Murdochargues that there are perhaps two motives that can be gleamed for thetexts: (1) indivisibles may have been useful as a method of accountingfor the motion of angels; or (2) indivisibles may have been usefulwhen addressing the inequality of infinites (Murdoch 1982,576–577). Although, he notes that such motivations are mentionedonly in passing and that a broader motivation could have simply beenthat “the analysis of Aristotle’s arguments againstindivisibilism uncovered loopholes in them” (Murdoch 1982,577).

TheTractatus de indivisibilibus consists of five questionsand it is instructive to consider the content briefly.

1. In the first question, containing three articles, Wodehamconsiders whether or not forms, or extendedcontinua, arecomposed of indivisibles. In the first article Wodeham develops twelvearguments against the indivisibilists, anticipates responses to thosearguments, and rejects them (TI 35–93). In the second article,he considers twelve arguments, from Henry Harclay and Walter Chatton,in support of the thesis that forms are composed of indivisibles (TI93–101). And, in the third article, Wodeham responds to thearguments of Harclay and Chatton (TI 103–121). This firstarticle comprises about a third of the work, and the first article inparticular contains many of Wodeham’s most significantarguments.
2. In the second question, Wodeham treats the problem of whether ornot extended forms or objects are composed of indivisibles. Inresponse, Wodeham (following Ockham) argues in the first articleagainst the existence of points, lines or surfaces (TI 123–139).And, as with the previous question, the second and third articlesconsider arguments in defense of indivisibles and responses to thosearguments (TI 139–163).
3. The third question entertains seven doubts relating to thedivisibilist position. In the first four doubts Wodeham treatsZeno’s famous paradoxes (as reported by Aristotle in hisPhysics VI) (TI 165–183), and in the last three doubtshe treats more contemporary arguments (TI 183–211).
4. The fourth question considers whether or not acontinuumis infinitely divisible. Thus, if acontinuum can be divided,why cannot it be infinitely divided? To this question Wodeham providesan argument that acontinuum cannot be divided (a. 1) (TI213–225) and an argument to the contrary (a. 2) (TI225–235).
5. The final question considers whether or not there are more parts,of the same proportion, in a largercontinuum than in asmaller one. In three articles, Wodeham considers an argument for theclaim that there are more respective parts in a largercontinuum (a. 1) (TI 239–247), objections to thisargument (a. 2) (TI 247–261), and finally replies to theobjections (a. 3) (TI 261–273).

In the second doubt of question 3 (LT 171–175;¶13–20), as noted above, Wodeham considers the argument ofZeno (recorded in Aristotle’sPhysics) against thosewho argue that motion is compatible with the divisibility of acontinuum. This particular argument, familiar to all studentsof ancient philosophy, is exemplary both of Wodeham’s historicalapproach to the questions posed by thecontinuum and his ownmethod of argumentation. Thus, it is instructive to consider theargument in some detail. Wodeham records Zeno’s argument as:

If every continuum is infinitely divisible, then every movable objecttraversing any space will reach the middle of that [space] before theend, and consequently it will reach the middle of the second halfbefore reading [the end] of the completing [part] of that half, andthen [it will reach] the middle of that next fourth [before] itscompleting [part]. Therefore if such halves are infinite proportional[parts], and if it does not happen that [a moveable object] traversesinfinitely many [parts] in a finite time, then it is impossible thatany space be traversed in a finite time. And consequently, it isimpossible that anything move locally (LT 172–173;¶14).

Wodeham, who is a divisibilist, offers a response to Zeno’s“paradox” because it is necessary to avoid thereductio ad absurdum (i.e., there is no motion) posed by theclaim that an infinitely divisible finite space is nottraversable.

Wodeham begins by considering Averroes’s argument thatAristotle, in thePhysics VI, contradicts the “words,not the substance, of Zeno’s discourse” (LT 173;¶15). But, Wodeham does not agree with Averroes’sinterpretation of Aristotle, and he defends Aristotle’sargument. Wodeham argues that Aristotle recognizes that Zeno’sargument “supposes falsely” that it is “not possibleto traverse something infinite … in a finite time” (LT173; ¶16), although he also correctly recognizes that there ismore to be said in response to Zeno. Further, Wodeham argues thatAristotle recognized that there is an equivocation with respect to theterm “infinite” as applied to acontinuum ofspace or time: infinite can be understood with respect to“division”, or with respect to “infiniteends”. That is, the term infinite can refer to the infinitedivisibility of a given finitecontinuum of space or time, orthe term can refer to the fact that space or time extends without endor termination (LT 173; ¶17). Because of this equivocation, thephrase “a moveable object may traverse infinitely many things ina finite time” can be understood in two ways: either (1) asstating that a moveable object traverses infinitely many things thatare extensively never terminated in a finite time; or (2) as statingthat a moveable object traverse infinitely many non-equal things (thata givencontinuum is divided into) in a finite time (LT173–175; ¶18). In the former sense the claim is false, inthe latter sense it is true. And, in this way, Aristotle solvesZeno’s “paradox” to Wodeham’ssatisfaction.

Finally, Wodeham analyzes William of Ockham’sinterpretation—in theExpositio Physicorum (OP V, ll.49–56)—of Averroes’s argument that Aristotleaddresses the words and not the substance of Zeno’s argument.Wodeham, recording Ockham’s argument, implies thatOckham’s reading of Averroes is too “charitable”,concluding that “if [Averroes] did understand [the matter] inthe manner expounded here, both his exposition and what he expoundsare false” (LT 175; ¶175).

As demonstrated by this brief example, in theTractatus deindivisibilibus Adam Wodeham engages at length with the ancientand medieval philosophical tradition. Further, throughout the work hequotes extensively from William of Ockham’sExpositionPhysicorum and hisTractatus de quantitate. Wodeham alsoconsiders in detail the arguments of Henry Harclay and Walter Chatton,all of which provides a useful historical record of this heateddebate. But, ultimately, the work remains a barrage of argumentsagainst the indivisibilist, or atomist, position as defended in theearly fourteenth century.

6.2 The Latitude of Forms

In his minor work, theTractatus alphabeticus, Wodeham takesup the question of qualitative change and offers a position that isconsistent with his overall opposition to atomism (cf. Wood 1990).According to Sylla, there were three dominant views of qualitativechange that shaped the context of the discussion: the successiontheory, the addition theory, and the admixture theory (Sylla 1973,230–232). The succession and addition theory distinguishthemselves from the admixture theory in that they are both committedto the fact that qualitative forms themselves do not change in degree.Rather it is the subject that changes in degree through theacquisition of a new qualitative form (cf. Sylla 1973, 232; Wood 1990,375). Wodeham, in relative concord with the views of Ockham andFitzRalph and against the Mertonian Campsall and his usual nemesisWalter Chatton, argues against the admixture theory. He claims that itis impossible for one and the same quality to be changed whileretaining its identity. As Wood says:

Addition and succession of forms theorists agree on this issue; in nosense is it true that the same form undergoes remission orintension…strictly speaking it is the subject, not the form,which becomes more white, more hot or more charitable. (Wood 1990,375)

A helpful analog can be found in the case of numbers. When the number9 is increased to 10, Wodeham understands the admixture theorist to beclaiming that the same form has been intensified, but he wonders howthis numerically identical form can really be said to retain its oldidentity now that it has been increased to 10 and is no longer 9.

While the succession and addition theorist are united in theiropposition to any admixture, and while both believe that intension andremission occur in the subject and not in the qualitative form, theydisagree about just how this intension and remission occurs. In theTractatus alphabeticus, Wodeham shows himself to be numberedamong the addition theorists. The key difference here is that thesuccession theorist believes that when a quality increases a new formof a given quality destroys and then replaces the old form. Wodehamand the addition theorist disagree. They hold that when qualitativechange happens, a new form is indeed acquired, but it does not destroythe proceeding form. On the contrary, the new form takes in thepreceding form as one of its parts. And here, the analogy ofquantitative change is again helpful. When 9 increases to 10, thesuccession theorist argues that the old form of 9 is completelydestroyed and replaced by an entirely new form, where no part of theold form of 9 contributes to the new form of 10. In opposition, theaddition theorist argues that when a quality increases, this isanalogous to the number 1 being added to 9, and through this addition,the new form of 10 is created. In this case, the old form of 9 has notbeen destroyed, but rather becomes a part of the new whole.

A critical underlying difference between the succession and additiontheorists is the question over whether forms are indivisible or can beperpetually broken down into smaller parts. The succession theoristthinks forms are indivisible and do not contain parts (Sylla 1973,231). But Adam Wodeham, in harmony with his general anti-atomistsposition, argues that forms can be infinitely divided. In this way,there is no trouble in saying that, through addition, a new form iscreated, which contains the old form as one of its parts.

7. Ethics

7.1 Moral Goodness

Since theLectura secunda does not extend beyond book I, themoral philosophy of Adam Wodeham found in book IV of theOrdinatio has remained relatively unexamined. However, in1981 Marilyn Adams and Rega Wood edited the tenth question of Book IVof theOrdinatio, providing us with a glimpse intoWodeham’s moral philosophy.

Question ten concentrates on the moral worth or goodness of an action.Here the philosophical debate is about whether the moral worth ofaction resides in the choice of the will alone (in the manner of Kant)or whether moral goodness can be ascribed to the performance ofactions themselves, independent of the intention of the agent.Wodeham’s discussion is embedded in a larger Franciscandiscussion, whose main players are Scotus and Walter Chatton on theone hand, and Ockham and Wodeham on the other.

The discussion is grounded in the distinction between purely internalacts (or volitional acts, acts within the power of the will) andexternal acts (or acts that can only be indirectly controlled by thewill). In the case of the latter (an external act), the power of thewill is not sufficient, and another source of power is needed.Scotus’s position, as understood by Wodeham, states that whilean external act can only be good if it falls under the control of thewill (cf. Adams and Wood 1981, 9), the external and indirectlycontrolled act can nevertheless contributean additionalmoral goodness beyond the moral value accrued through the act ofvolition. The result is that while willing to do the right thing orbad thing is in itself praiseworthy or blameworthy, executing andperforming that act can impute to the agent further praise or blame,depending on how well one performs the willed act (cf. Adams and Wood1981, 9).

Wodeham, like Ockham, finds this position rather confusing. If someoneperforms a morally praiseworthy volition, but this volition is notable to be executed, the only reason for this failure of performanceis some impotency within the agent. But Wodeham insists that no oneshould be damned for not doing what is not in their power to do (OOIV, 57–59, ll. 11–30; cf. Adams and Wood 1981, 14). Thus,no one can earn more merit for simply having the potency to performthe action that they willed meritoriously. Having or not having thepotency to execute that volition does not fall under the free power ofthe agent, and, even for Scotus, only those acts that “are underthe free power of the agent” are imputable acts (Adams and Wood1981, 9 and 14).

7.2 Morality, the Will, and the Nature of Faith

For Walter Chatton, Ockham and Wodeham’s position on the amoralstatus of external acts leads to unsavory consequences. Among otherthings, Chatton is concerned about the implications of Wodeham’sposition for the necessity of faith. Wodeham’s reply not onlygives us a nice illustration of how his moral theory plays out inconcrete instances, but also provides us with a helpful introductionto his position on the nature of belief and its connection to thewill.

Chatton is concerned that if one holds a position similar to the oneof Wodeham there will no longer be any need for faith or belief, butonly the desire to believe. Chatton has this concern because, for him,the act of belief is not directly under the control of the will (cf;OO IV 36, ll. 20–23). Wodeham responds by starkly distinguishingbetween two kinds of faith. Infused faith, which appears to be a pureact of the will and acquired faith which is not a direct act of thewill and is not required for salvation (OO IV 58, ll.13–14).Presumably, this act of acquired belief is an act of the intellect anda response to the relative evidence of a given proposition or anentire syllogism taken together (see aboveAn EvidentJudgment).

With this distinction in place, Wodeham uses his moral theory to showthat the act of acquired belief, described as the act of believingcalmly (quiete) and presumably without intellectualhesitation or doubt, does not add any moral worth. This is the casesince, as we have already seen, if one wishes to believe, but isprevented from doing soby a lack of power, the agent shouldnot be held responsible for this lack of power. Reasons for such alack of power include a melancholic disturbance, a passion, or sophism(OO IV 58, ll. 15–18). He further concludes, it is quitepossible that the person who wishes to believe, but is not able to doso calmly (quiete), may be more morally praiseworthy than theperson who intellectually believes “quietly” and is notbeset by doubt. Intriguingly, he critiques Lombard at this point,saying:

If the Master means to say that in order to achieve salvation one mustbelieve with something more than a perfect will, but must also havebelief calmly (quiete), then he does thinkcorrectly … . (OO IV 58, ll. 26–29)

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Acknowledgments

We wish to thank Professor Simo Knuuttila, Dr. Olli Hallamaa and theDepartment of Systematic Theology of the University of Helsinki,Finland, where this article was written. Further, we thank theparticipants of the Adam de Wodeham Workshop (Helsinki, 2011) forreading a draft of this article and providing useful criticism.Finally, thanks are due to Gyula Klima for reading the draft on behalfof SEP and providing us with several important corrections which havebeen reflected in the final version.