Supererogation is the technical term for the class of actions that go“beyond the call of duty.” Roughly speaking,supererogatory acts are morally good although not (strictly) required.Although common discourse in most cultures allows for such acts andoften attaches special value to them, ethical theories have onlyrarely discussed this category of actions directly and systematically.A conspicuous exception is the Roman Catholic tradition, which gaverise to the concept of supererogation, and the virulent attacks on itby Lutherans and Calvinists. Surprisingly, the history ofsupererogation in non-religious ethical theory is fairly recent,starting only in 1958 with J. O. Urmson’s seminal article,“Saints and Heroes.”

The Latin etymology of “supererogation” is paying out morethan is due (super-erogare), and the term first appears inthe Latin version of the New Testament in the parable of the GoodSamaritan. Although we often believe that Good Samaritanism ispraiseworthy and non-obligatory at the same time, philosophicalreflection raises the question whether there can be any morally goodactions that are not morally required, and even if there are suchactions, how come they are optional or supererogatory. Thus, thesubstantial literature on supererogation since the 1960s demonstratesthat even though the class of actions beyond duty is relatively smalland the philosophical attention paid to it is only recent, the statusof supererogation in ethical theory is important in exposing deepproblems about the nature of duty and its limits, the relationshipbetween duty and value, the role of ideals and excuses in ethicaljudgment, the nature of moral reasons, and the connection betweenactions and virtue. Supererogation raises interesting problems both onthe meta-ethical level of deontic logic and on the normative level ofthe justification of moral demands.

• 1. The Two Faces of Morality: Values and Duties
• 2. What is Supererogation: Problems of Definition
• 3. Three Views of Supererogation: Problems of Justification
  • 3.1 Anti-supererogationism
  • 3.2 Qualified Supererogationism
  • 3.3 Unqualified Supererogationism
• 4. Paradigm Examples
• 5. Complications and Extensions
• Bibliography
  • Monographs and Collections
  • Articles and Books Relating to Supererogation
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Two Faces of Morality: Values and Duties

Moral discourse is normative in nature, that is, concerned withguiding behavior rather than describing the world. But this normativecharacter of moral judgment falls broadly speaking under twocategories, the axiological and the deontic. The former refers togoodness, ideals and virtues; the latter to what ought to be done, toduties and obligations, to justice and rights. Whereas the object ofaxiological assessment is primarily states of affairs and humanagents, the object of deontic evaluation is human actions. Forinstance, the state of affairs of a world with no war is a moral idealand the individual Socrates is virtuous, whereas the practice ofpaying back debts is obligatory and acts of theft are prohibited.

The axiological face of morality, unlike its deontic counterpart, isopen-ended. Virtuous character traits, ethical ideals, or the goal ofpromoting human happiness have no fixed measure and can in principlebe always improved and further perfected or realized. Moralrequirements are relatively fixed and well defined, having clearcriteria of fulfillment and violation. Consequently, the deonticsphere of morality is often taken as describing theminimalconditions of morality, the basic requirements of social morality thatsecure a just society, while the axiological sphere aims at higherideals which can only be commended and recommended but not strictlyrequired. In its deontic nature, morality is closely associated withthe legal, while the axiological is closer to the ideal or theideological (sometimes referred to as “the ethical”).Furthermore, the way in which deontic norms are fixed and universallyexpected of all members of society presupposes the generalability of all moral agents to act in the light of thesenorms. Ideals of goodness and virtue, in their open-ended texture,cannot be similarly expected of everyone and their determination isnot subjected to the strict condition of “‘ought’implies ‘can’.”

Most ethical theories maintain some form of this two-tier structure ofthe moral system, although admittedly in different versions andemphases. But this double role of normative discourse inevitablyraises the idea of supererogation, the category of actions that arepraiseworthy (either in creating good states of affairs or inreflecting a particularly virtuous trait of character) yet at the sametime not obligatory. Supererogation lies at the intersection of theaxiological and the deontic, the ‘good’ and the‘ought’. Since moral theories of the past (like Aristotle,Kant and utilitarianism) all appeal in some form to both deontic andaxiological concepts, the scant and cursory discussion ofsupererogation in those theories is all the more surprising.

The most notable exception to this historical generalization is thelong-standing and elaborate Roman Catholic doctrine ofoperasupererogationis. The general background of this doctrine is therecognition of the two faces of morality under the concepts of“precepts” and “counsels.” The origins of thisdistinction go back to the New Testament, in which to the questionwhat one should do to gain eternal life, Jesus replies: “if thouwilt enter into life, keep the commandments,” but adds “ifthou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast and give to the poor andthou shalt have treasure in Heaven” (Matthew xix, 16–24).Beyond charity, the Church Fathers detected in the New Testament twoadditional evangelical counsels, chastity and obedience: taking a wifeor a husband is no sin, but virginity has a superior value; the lifeof an ordinary Christian cannot be blamed, but that of absolutemonastic dedication is far better. Forgiveness and love of one’senemies are also religious ideals that originate in the New Testamentand were sometimes given a supererogatory interpretation in laterChurch doctrine.

The Old Law of the Old Testament is regarded by early Catholicthinkers as reflecting the rigid and minimal demands of religiousmorality, typically formulated in the negative terms of prohibitionsand precepts (the violation of which entails punishment). The New Law,that of the New Testament, sometimes called the Law of Liberty, leavesthe individual free to pursue more edifying ideals of perfection.Tertullian called this freedomlicentia. According to theCatholic doctrine, the special merit of supererogatory acts accreditedto their agent can be used both for that individual’s ownsalvation and for the salvation of others. The “superabundantmerit,” most typically collected by the actions of Jesus and thesaints, who far exceeded what was required for their own salvation, isdeposited in the Spiritual Treasury of the Church to be disposed bythe Pope and the bishops for remitting the sins of other, ordinarybelievers. This is how the institution of Indulgences graduallydeveloped in the late middle ages: sinners could buy the remission oftheir sins, first by joining the Crusades and later by contributingmoney to the coffers of the Church.

The most articulate exposition of the doctrine of supererogation inthe Christian tradition is found in Thomas Aquinas (SummaTheologica). Thomas mentions two distinct sources of merit ofsupererogatory behavior. On the one hand supererogation serves as amore expedient or guaranteed way of achieving everlasting life; on theother, it is intrinsically good in being aimed at higher ends than themere fulfillment of the commandments. Precepts are universal in theirscope, whereas counsels are addressed to the few who have the capacityand inclination to pursue the life of perfection. For Thomas, theopen-texture character of the counsels of supererogation is what makesthe morality of love superior to the authoritarian nature of thestrict law. But Thomas does not draw a clear borderline between dutyand supererogation. It is, for example, not clear whether “lovethy enemy” is a precept or a supererogatory counsel. It issimilarly unclear whether beneficence (almsgiving) is a duty or liesbeyond duty. Nor is the role of virtue in demarcating thesupererogatory from the obligatory explained. Thomas says that bothnatural law and positive law prescribe acts of virtue in general butthey do not prescribe every specific virtuous act (except for thosethat promote the social good of justice and peace). And as for divinelaw, it prescribes also other, non-social actions that belong to therelations between man and God but leaves those actions of perfectvirtue to the realm of supererogatory counsel. For a morecomprehensive survey of the Catholic doctrine, see Dentsoras 2023.

The Catholic doctrine of supererogation met with an extremely fierceopposition in the times of the Reformation. Luther, Calvin andAnglican theologians attacked both the theory of“super-meritorious” actions and the corruption involved inthe commercialization of the institution of indulgences for which thetheory served as a cover. No human being, not even a saint, can do allthat is strictly required as a duty, let alone hope to go beyond that.The way to salvation is not through “works” but throughdivine grace alone (Luther 1957). Even the most dramatic acts ofmartyrdom and self-sacrifice, which served the Catholics as paradigmexamples of supererogation, are strictly speaking obligatory.Protestant ethics thus undermines the distinction between the twofaces of morality: on the one hand, normative requirements cannot bedefined in terms of rules fixing minimally prescribed behavior; on theother hand, every religiously good behavior is obligatory. Saints andsinners are equally dependent on God’s grace for theirsalvation. Paradoxically, it may be noted, exactly because humanactions can never fulfill God’s commandments, divine grace isneverdue or ethically called for: it is typicallysupererogatory, a free gift of God!

An interesting parallel to the Christian concept of supererogation canbe found in Jewish thought in the notion of “lifnim mishurathadin”. Typically, the rabbis dispute its philosophical meaningsince it could be literally understood as either “within theline of law” or – as it is more often understood –“beyond the line of law”. Some philosophers (likeNahmanides) follow the former reading, arguing that moral acts ofpiety or charity are obligatory, that is to say duties that apply toeverybody. Others (notably Maimonides) adhere to the latter, moresupererogatory understanding, holding that such acts are eitherobligatory only for the “pious” few or even not obligatoryfor anyone (Shilo 1978). This debate regarding the possibility ofsupererogatory acts reflects the deep underlying problem of the wholenormative discourse in Jewish thought, namely is there an independentsystem of moral norms and ideals which is not directly derived fromthe Halakhic, commandment-based, legally binding (and enforceable) law(Lichtenstein 1975 and Lebens 2023).

The hostile attitude of the Reformation to supererogation and thedisappearance of the institution of indulgences in the Catholic Churchled to the rapid decline in the theological and philosophical interestin the concept of supererogation in the modern era. But for a novelview of the Protestant recognition of some forms of supererogation,see Mellema 2023. Other religious traditions can also be interpretedas leaving room for supererogation – Islam (Abu Sway 2023, andZaroug 1985), Buddhism (Hongladarom 2023) and Confucianism (Zhong2016) – mostly in terms of virtue ethics. However, the greattheological debates about actions beyond the call of duty set thestage for the contemporary discussion of the subject. The revivedinterest in supererogation since the 1960s has completely shifted thefocus from the theological context to the ethical, but the structureof the argumentation is often reminiscent of the traditional Christiandebate.

2. What is Supererogation: Problems of Definition

The conceptual question of what wemean by supererogation andthe substantive question of whether there actuallyaresupererogatory acts (and how their normative value can be justified)are inextricably interrelated. Consequently, although the followingdiscussion will try to separate the two questions, addressing firstthe conceptual issue and only later the normative, the division isonly didactic. Much of the disagreement about the nature ofsupererogation and its proper definition is informed by normativeviews about the scope of moral duty, the legitimate expectations ofaltruistic behavior, and the value of the autonomy of the individualin pursuing personal goals. This interdependence of the meta-ethicaland the normative levels of discourse on supererogation becomesparticularly evident when paradigm examples are discussed: forinstance, is forgiveness obligatory or supererogatory is both aconceptual and a normative issue, and the same applies to charity, toacts of self-sacrifice and even to toleration, as will be shownbelow.

J.O. Urmson opened the contemporary discussion of supererogation(although hardly mentioning the term itself!) by challenging thetraditional threefold classification of moral action: the obligatory,the permitted (or indifferent) and the prohibited (Urmson 1958). Amore general schema of this classification runs thus (Chisholm1963):

1. actions that are good to do and bad not to do
2. actions that are neither good to do nor bad not to do
3. actions that are bad to do and good not to do

Urmson argued that a morally significant class of actions, to which hereferred as saintly and heroic (such as throwing oneself on anexploding hand grenade in order to save the lives of others), does notfall under any of these categories. He referred to this class aspraiseworthy though non-obligatory acts, or in terms of the abovegeneral schema as

4. actions that are good to do but not bad not to do

The scope of this further category became, however, the focus ofdebate (Chisholm 1964). Supererogatory acts in Urmson’s sense(which is reminiscent of the Catholic doctrine) include only actionsthat are morally praiseworthy, valuable, although not obligatory inthe sense that their omission is not blameworthy. But the generalformulation (iv) could consist also of small acts of favor,politeness, consideration and tact, which are good though not morallypraiseworthy, which can be expected of people even though not strictlydemanded. The latter, wider, definition of supererogation, covers alarger scope of actions that we tend to view asgood-though-not-obligatory; but the former, narrow, definition ofsupererogation as having a unique moral merit better captures theessential value and hence justification of supererogation as adistinct category of moral action, to which Urmson referred as saintlyand heroic.

The general schema underlying (iv), i.e. the combination of somepositive assessment of the action with a non-negative assessment ofits omission, can be filled in various ways. “Good to do, butnot bad not to do” appears to be too weak a definition forsupererogation, at least in the sense that some omissions ofsupererogatory action are (or lead to) bad states of affairs.“Right to do, but not wrong not to do” responds to thisconcern but seems an equally weak definition for supererogatoryaction, this time due to the overly wide characterization of thepositive condition (e.g. “right” falls short of the properdescription of the act of volunteering to risk one’s life inorder to save a stranger). “Praiseworthy to do, but notblameworthy not to do” seems closer to what we wish to say aboutsupererogatory acts. However, praiseworthiness is associated with theevaluation of the agent rather than the act, while supererogationrefers primarily to the act. Furthermore, we often praise agents fordoing their duty (e.g. in overcoming obstacles like natural fear) andwe often do not praise agents of supererogatory action (e.g. when noparticular effort, cost, or risk is involved). There is no necessaryconnection between supererogation and praiseworthiness, as somephilosophers argue (Archer 2015). It seems, therefore, that the neatschema of deontic logic, comprising of pairs of normative conceptsapplied symmetrically to commission and omission must be broken if wehope to arrive at a more useful characterization of supererogation(Schumaker 1972). This can be done by either mixing concepts fromdifferent pairs, such as “good to do but not wrong not todo,” or by enriching the schema itself by adding furtherconditions, such as the beneficent intentions of the agent and heraltruistic motives (Heyd 1982, Zimmerman 1996).

Definitions that are motivated by a skeptical attitude tosupererogation often try to salvage the three-fold classification ofobligation-permission-prohibition as exhausting the realm of moralactions. Some philosophers identify supererogation with imperfectduty, or with a weak duty, or with duty that is personal andnon-universalizable, or with duty that has no correlative right, orwith an ethical rather than legal duty, or with an “ought”which is not enforceable. Some even use the oxymoronic term“supererogatory duty” in trying to do justice to thephenomenon of supererogation without giving up the typically Kantianframing of all moral judgments in terms of duty. These are, however,mostly unsuccessful attempts. Imperfect duties, as many Kant scholarshave noted, are no less compelling than perfect duties and thedistinction between perfect and imperfect duty lies only in the modeof application (to what degree the conditions of its fulfillment arefixed or left to personal choice) rather than in the prescriptiveforce of the duty itself. And since Kant sometimes defines imperfectduties as duties to adopt ends (rather than engage in particularacts), supererogation and imperfect duty do not belong to the samelevel of discourse: by doing many acts of charity one does not actsupererogatorily, since one cannotbe more charitable thanrequired (Guevara 1999, Baron 1987). Douglas Portmore follows Kant inseeing imperfect duties as applying to the adoption of“attitudes” (in analogy to Kant’s adoption of ends).Adopting attitudes that are morally better than those that we musthave so as to be able to fulfill our perfect duties is supererogatory– for example, showing more compassion to others than expectedfrom a morally just person. Thus we can go beyond our imperfect duties(Portmore 2023). Furthermore, if supererogation is a personal (ratherthan universal) duty, then is it by a subjective judgment that it ismade to be so? If not, there must be some (universalizable)characteristic which lays the duty on thiskind ofindividual. Finally, there are many duties that have no correlativerights that have nothing to do with supererogation (e.g., at least forsome philosophers, duties to animals or to future people), so the testof the correlativity of duties to rights cannot account for thedistinction between obligation and supererogation.

Another issue raised by attempts to subject the concept ofsupererogation to some version of the general schema is that of“offence” or “suberogation”: if there arenon-obligatory well-doings (supererogation), are there also – astheir mirror image – non-prohibited wrong-doings(“permissive ill-doings”)? Or in other words, arethere

5. actions that are bad to do but not good not to do

Some philosophers (Chisholm 1963, Richards 1971, Forrester 1975, andDriver 1992) were attracted to the logically neat symmetry ofsupererogation and suberogation, but a critical examination of thisartificially invented category demonstrates both the difficulty infilling it with content and flaws in the general schema itself (Heyd1982, Mellema 1991). Examples for typical “offences” arehard to come by. At most one can think of permissible bad action inrelatively trivial cases, like taking too long in a restaurant whileothers are waiting, which is inconsiderate rather than immoral(Ullmann-Margalit 2011). These are uninteresting cases from a moralpoint of view as are their supererogatory counterparts of small favorsor acts of politeness. Chisholm and Sosa (1966) suggest thedistinction between moral neutrality and moral indifference:

For an indifferent act is one such that its intentional performanceas well as its intentional nonperformance is morally neutral; but anact will be morally neutral but not indifferent if its intentionalperformance is morally neutral and its intentional nonperformanceeither morally good or morally bad (p. 330).

But see on that point Stocker’s critique of Chisholm for notdistinguishing between badness and wrongness (Stocker 1967). Aninteresting, though controversial, example is ingratitude, which istraditionally considered as a grave sin (gratitude being a duty, orfor Hobbes, even a natural duty), but which some treat as typicallysuberogatory (Wellman 1999). But once we look for examples of morallyvicious or villainous action that is nevertheless permissible (whichis the counterpart of a morally heroic action), we find it difficultto come up with an example (Stangl 2020, chap. 2). This should hardlybe surprising. By its nature, a moral system does not leave patentlybad action as morally permissible. In that respect, good and bad, thevirtuous and the vicious, arenot symmetrical from thedeontic point of view: the good is open-ended in a way that the bad isnot. The extremely good cannot be required, but the extremely bad(vicious) is the prime target of prohibition. Horgan and Timmonsintroduce the pair of “the expected” and the“contra-expected” as tools for understanding supererogationas well as the a-symmetry between supererogation and suberogation.One is morally expected to express gratitude for receiving a free giftalthough it is not one’s duty. Acting inconsiderately iscontra-expected despite not being a violation of a particular duty.But acting according to what one is expected to do is not praiseworthywhile acting in a contra-expected way is blameworthy. Hence thea-symmetry between supererogation and suberogation (Horgan and Timmons2023). Note, however, that these concepts do not capture the paradigmcases of supererogation. The heroic self-sacrifice of Urmson’ssoldier cannot be said to be morally expected of him. Although theexpected/contra-expected pair is deontically weaker than theobligatory/permissible, it is not weak enough to characterize thecompletely free nature of a supererogatory act. Paul McNamara hassuggested a rich conceptual analysis of the deontic neighborhood ofthe supererogatory which although leaving the question of a-symmetryopen, points to important analogies between the supererogatory and thesuberogatory. These can be shown once we switch our attention from theagent-evaluative component of suberogation as “offence” tothe objective, act-evaluative element of “permissiblesuboptimality” (McNamara 2011 and McNamara 2023).

Wider definitions of supererogation, which refer toanynon-obligatory good action, are at risk of losing sight of thespecificallymoral value usually associated with“acting beyond the call of duty” or “going thesecond mile.” Although “supererogatory” in Englishalso means superfluous, the technical Roman-Catholic meaning of theconcept is closer to what moral philosophy wishes to highlight as aseparate category of action. A typical ethically informed definitionof supererogation relates both to the element of over-subscription(doing literally more than duty requires) and to the high cost or riskinvolved in the action (Feinberg 1968). There is a debate whether costto the agent is a necessary condition of supererogation, for someminor supererogatory acts do not seem to involve costs, let alonerisks. Howeversome cost to the agent, even if marginal, ispart and parcel of supererogatory behavior, even if the agent enjoysengaging in it (Benn 2018b). Risk is not necessarily the source of thevalue of supererogation. But risk forms part of thedefinition of supererogation: an action is supererogatory if and onlyif it is better than some permissible alternative and better than (orat least as good as) all permissible alternatives that are as costlyor less costly (where the sense in which it is better is relative to aparticular beneficiary) (Benn 2023). Yet it is true that, unlikedefinitions offered by deontic logicians, an ethical definition ofsupererogation must include a condition that the action be of aparticularly moral value. The source of this particular value isdouble: the good intendedconsequences on the one hand, andtheoptional nature of the act on the other. The goodpromoted is typically of an altruistic nature and thus an act may besupererogatory even if the overall good in the world is not promoted(as might be the case in extreme acts of self-sacrifice for the sakeof another). Supererogatory behavior is typically other-regarding:even if there are duties “to oneself” (which many ethicaltheorists doubt), it is hard to see how they can be transcended in asupererogatory way. In that respect, most definitions ofsupererogation in modern ethics diverge from the Christian tradition:whereas for the latter paradigm examples of supererogation are pietyand chastity, for the former these are altruistic deeds of extremebeneficence. There are, however, contemporary non-religious viewswhich leave room for self-regarding actions of supererogation (Kawall2003).

An illustrative case for this altruistic characterization ofsupererogation is the understudied issue of whether governments canact supererogatorily (for an exception, see Weinberg 2011). Weinbergexamines all the possible objections to such a possibility, primarilyin terms of the government’s exclusive role to implementjustice, but still wishes to leave the door open for some possiblegovernmental acts which go beyond duty – such as throwing ablock party or investing money in the preservation of the historicallegacy of the nation. But these examples are not intuitively clearcases of government supererogation and even if they were, they wouldalways be entangled (as the author admits) with questions of the waythe money for these projects was collected and now spent (which istypically a matter of justice). Furthermore, if the definition ofsupererogatory action consists of a condition of beneficent intentionor altruism (like in Heyd), governments cannot be considered as agentsable to show these attitudes. For they are impersonal institutions.For that reason it is dubious whether governments, or otherinstitutions like the courts, can show forgiveness since theirfunction is to do justice and promote the good according to the lawrather than break the rules from an altruistic intention. And ofcourse it is hard to see how the government can “sacrificeitself” or its own interests for the sake of another individualor state.

As for the second source of value of supererogatory action, itsoptional nature, it should first be noted that such action must bevoluntary (unlike obligatory action, which is often forced orenforced). But again, the neutral deontic description of“neither obligatory nor forbidden” fails to capture thekind of freedom involved in such action. The agent has full discretionwhether to go beyond what is required and makes a personal choice todo so. She is neither under any external constraint (like the law),nor under internal demands (of rationality or of the Kantian morallaw). In other words, supererogatory behavior is fully optional. Thus,it would be absurd to force a person to do a supererogatory act, evenif that act had extremely beneficial consequences. The permission notto do the best we can is not derived from the unenforceability ofsupererogatory conduct but from agent-centred restrictions which limitthe force of the impersonal maximizing principle (Haydar 2002). Thisdoes not mean that the agent herself necessarily believes that heraction is optional. Many agents of supererogatory acts report that allthey did was what they felt they “had to do,” or what theythought was their duty although when asked whether they would expectsuch an action to be performed by everybody else in the samecircumstances they would probably answer in the negative, thus gettingentangled in an inconsistency typical of moral modesty. Such modestyraises a puzzle: how can it be that a person who acts supererogatorilyis no less virtuous (and maybe even more virtuous) than a person whoacts supererogatorily with full awareness of the act beingsupererogatory? (Archer and Ridge 2015).

Doing one’s duty does not win the agent any credit. She only didwhat she had to do. But going beyond the call of duty is meritoriousexactly in the sense that the agent did something “extra,”breaking the balance of justice or that of respect for claim-rightsand the fulfillment of duties. This merit of supererogatory actionshould be held distinct from the praise we often assign to the agent.Praise is a subjective assessment or recognition of the particular wayin which the agent faced a moral challenge and acted as she did (e.g.overcoming special difficulties or obstacles, or sacrificing herselfin the course of doing either what was her duty or what lay beyondit). Merit is an objective property of the act itself. It is typicallyattached to heroic and saintly acts, but it can also be gained byminor supererogatory acts of kindness or gifts, and is thus notnecessarily associated with particular praise for the agent (cf.Montague 1989, Trianosky 1986). Recent works on supererogation referto “moral-merit-conferring reasons” for action, i.e.reasons which are neither “requiring” nor“justifying” as a way to untie “the knot” (oralleged paradox) of supererogation (Horgan and Timmons 2010, Dreier2004). But unlike the Catholic doctrine, few theorists ofsupererogation believe that this merit is transferable or can serve ascompensation for other people’s moral failures. And althoughsupererogation cannot be hoped to simply offset even one’sown violations of duty, the merit of actions beyond the callof duty definitely plays an important role in the overall evaluationof one’s moral record. In cases of a high potential benefit wemay sometimes even be permitted to act supererogatorily rather than doour duty (Kamm 1985). Furthermore, the traditional idea of merit (or“superabundance”) associated with supererogation isreflected in secular ethical theory in the duty ofgratitude:acknowledging the meritorious nature of a gift or any non-obligatorywell doing is the morally obligatory response (irrespective of themoral praise which might or might not accrue to the agent of thesupererogatory act).

The characterization of supererogatory acts is highly controversialand cannot be captured by a strict formal definition. Furthermore, ashas already come up in the discussion in this section, the way wedescribe supererogation is closely dependent on the way we justify (ordeny) its moral value. Most typically, definitions of supererogationthat introduce conditions of altruistic intention, free choice andgood consequences are constructed in a way that betrays an underlyingview about its special moral value and hence justification. On theother hand, definitions that are merely formal (deontic) in nature arenot committed to the intrinsic value, indeed to the very existence ofsupererogatory actions.

3. Three Views of Supererogation: Problems of Justification

The modern debate whether there actually are supererogatory acts haslost its traditional fervor typical of the great religious disputesbetween Catholics and Reformers in the 16^th and17^th centuries. One reason is that there are no directpolitical or institutional stakes involved in the contemporarydiscussions, such as Church power in granting indulgences (althoughthere is a supererogatory dimension in the contemporary idea of Truthand Reconciliation Commissions). Yet, the issue betweensupererogationists, as they are often called, and their opponentsstill runs deep and involves the general relationship between the“good” and the “ought”.

The views about the possibility and value of supererogatory acts canbe grouped under three categories:

1. Anti-supererogationism: since all morally good action isobligatory, there cannot be a separate class of morally good actionthe omission of which is not wrong.
2. Qualified supererogationism: there are actions which lie beyondthe call of duty, but their value is derived from their beinghypothetical duties, subjective duties, duties from which one may beexcused, that is, duties in a weaker sense.
3. Unqualified supererogationism: supererogatory actions lie entirelyand without qualification beyond the requirements of morality and thatis the source of their unique value.

Like any classification, this one is somewhat artificial andarbitrary. Some particular views of supererogation cannot be easilyand neatly subsumed under one of its categories. The distinctionbetween (1) and (2) hinges on the nature of the relevant“qualification”: even the rigorous deniers ofsupererogation are willing to accept some form of excuse for notengaging in particularly difficult or demanding moral action, andqualified supererogationists may often admit that a heroic action isobligatory even if it is unrealistic for society to expect individualsto perform it. The borderline between (2) and (3) is also often vague,since when one tries to explain what makes a class of actionssupererogatory, in the unqualified sense of being fully optional, oneis often drawn back to the difficulty or risk in performing it, to theparticular personal virtue required to do so, or in general terms tocertain qualifying conditions which justify leaving them beyond thedemands of morality.

The three views of supererogation are three responses to the“paradox of supererogation,” namely how can the moral goodnot be required as a duty. The first view recognizes the paradox andaddresses it by denying the very possibility of supererogation; thesecond resolves what it sees as an apparent paradox by explaining theconditions under which duty loses its prescriptive force; the thirdview denies that there is in the first place any paradox in the gapbetween the “good” and the “ought,” thusleaving room for an independent category of supererogation.

3.1 Anti-supererogationism

The denial of supererogation is basically associated with therejection of the idea of the two faces of morality. Normativity is oneand cannot be split into two levels, that of the good (the desirable,the ideal, the recommended) and that of the required (the obligatory,the prescribed). What “ought tobe the case” also“ought to bedone.” A possible good state ofaffairs creates a reason for action. Furthermore, the fact that humanbeings, due to their limitations and flawed character, often fail tolive up to the standards of the ideally good behavior is a deplorablefact that does not undermine the normative power of the moraldemands.

This “good-ought tie-up” is a theoretically attractiveprinciple: whatever is good, ought to be done. If an action is good,then there must be reasons for doing it. If it is the best possibleaction, the reasons for doing it are conclusive, that is outweighingall other reasons for not doing it (or doing something else). Failingto do the best action cannot therefore be immune from blame orcondemnation. Or, in other words, doing the best is always obligatory,never optional. Supererogation is impossible (Moore 1948, New 1974,Feldman 1986, Pybus 1982).

The principled denial of supererogation was central in the theologicalconception of Lutherans and Calvinists. The demands of God are soextensive that human beings have not the slightest chance of eversatisfying them, let alone going beyond them. But there are alsonon-theological adherents to this idea of the“totalitarian” dominion of duty. Kantian ethics is basedon the general idea of an all-encompassing morallaw andconceives of duty as the only expression of moral value in humanaction. Universalizability of the maxim of action and acting from thesense of duty (or respect for the law) as a motive are twoconstitutive hallmarks of moral action according to Kant. But the twoare incompatible with the nature of supererogatory action, which isoptional and personal on the one hand and not motivated by thesubjection to the moral law on the other. Classical utilitarianism mayalso be interpreted as denying any space for supererogation. Ifpromoting the overall good in the world is the fundamental principleof action, there can be no (non-utilitarian) exemption from the dutyto do so. Both Kantians and utilitarians are highly suspicious of actsof great personal self-sacrifice (typical of some paradigm examples ofsupererogation). For Kant they may reflect moral self-indulgence andvanity unbound by the moral law or even be a violation of one’sduties to oneself (Kant 1949, Timmermann 2005). For utilitarians suchacts may end up decreasing the overall happiness in the world (sincethe loss to the agent could outweigh the gain for the beneficiary,either in the specific individual case, or when adopted as a generalrule of behavior). It should, however, be noted that there are seriousattempts to interpret Kant’s theory as leaving some room forsupererogation (Hill 1971, Eisenberg 1966, Heyd 1980) and there areutilitarians like Mill who specifically hail the value ofnon-obligatory meritorious action (Mill 1969). Furthermore, the ideaof “satisficing” (rather than optimizing or maximizing),i.e. aiming at the good enough rather than at the best, is acontemporary version of utilitarianism which leaves ample room forsupererogation (Slote 1989, Vessel 2010).

Susan Hale argued for a straightforward denial of supererogation.Every morally good act is required of us as a duty. All supererogatoryactions fall under the category ofimperfect duties. Onlywhen they conflict with a perfect duty can one be excused from doingthe imperfect (allegedly supererogatory) act. Usually, the allegedlysupererogatory act conflicts with another imperfect duty, and then oneshould balance which of the two is more important. But using my moneyfor a pleasant holiday is not something I have an imperfect duty tomyself and hence if called to donate this money for the relief ofsuffering of people in Africa is a duty – not a supererogatoryact. Furthermore, moral saints are right when they consider their ownbehavior as obligatory, even if they realize that they cannot expectit from most other people (Hale 1991). A similar denial ofsupererogation is based on the argument that all major ethicaltheories have never allowed room for this moral category and that itis difficult to accommodate supererogation in these theories. A betteralternative isperfectionism which does not leave room forthe sharp distinction between supererogation and duty (Fritts andMiller 2023).

The denial of the value of supererogatory action also appeals to itsincompatibility with the fundamental requirement of impartiality.Actions beyond the call of duty are not expected of everybody on anequal basis and are not bestowed on everybody in an impartial way. Inother words, there are no generalrules regarding either theagent or the recipient of supererogatory conduct. Thus, no generalspecification as to who deserves or is entitled to be the recipient ofsupererogatory giving can be formulated, and those who, for instance,are not given charity cannot complain for being discriminated against.Furthermore, some philosophers have noted (Wolf 1982) that despite thetraditional aura associated with saintly action, “moralsaints” are not very attractive human characters and most of usdo not take them as role models for the way we lead our lives. Theyare fanatically one-track minded in their pursuit of moral ideals,tending to disparage the more personal (non-moral) values which wetend to appreciate in ourselves and in others (such as achievingathletic excellence or dedicating one’s life to music). We feelsimilar repugnance towards a person who always goes beyond her duty aswe feel towards the person who never does anything beyond what isstrictly required of her. However, if a well-rounded life is theideal, then devoting one’s whole life to athletic excellence isequally one-track minded. And furthermore, supererogation is not evenfrom the saint’s perspective a universal ideal of the good lifeoverall, but only amoral standard of excellence (Grigoletto2019).

Despite its theoretical and moral purity, the anti-supererogationistview is open to criticism. The good-ought tie-up rests on an ambiguityin the concept ofought, which may be interpreted either in acommendatory sense or in a prescriptive sense. In their commendatorysense reasons allow latitude which permits us to choose the lesscommended course of action rather than the most commended (Little andMacNamara 2017). “You ought to see the current Caravaggioexhibition” provides one witha reason for action, anadvice, a recommendation that is not binding. “You ought toattend the next faculty meeting” may be aconclusivereason for action, a prescription. To further complicate matters,“ought” is often used impersonally, as in “it oughtto be nice weather for our picnic tomorrow,” but alsopersonally, as in “you ought to buy wine for the picnic.”And “the picnic ought to have been better organized” liesbetween the personal and the impersonal senses of “ought,”referring tosome unspecified agent without addressing aprescription to any particular individual.

The good-ought tie-up works for the commendatory use of“ought” as well as for the impersonal, but not for theprescriptive and personal. “Ought” in the personal senseinvolves human agency as well as personal responsibility. Laying aduty on an individual requires both having a particularly strong (notjusta) reason and showing how the reason is related to theparticular agent. Just being a good state of affairs (even the best)does not create a reasonfor x to bring it about. X muststand in a particular position to the desirable state of affairs tomake her have a (conclusive) reason to bring it about. Once thegood-ought tie-up is broken in those central prescriptive contexts ofpersonal “ought,” anti-supererogationism loses much of itsbite. Supererogation is exactly what one does not personally have todo, even if it either ought to be done bysomeone or wouldlead to a state of affairs which “ought to exist.” Howeverit remains for the supererogationist view to explain why the personalought does not extend to the whole scope of the good.

3.2 Qualified Supererogationism

Completely denying the existence and value of supererogatory actiondoes not fit with most people’s intuitions. One way to accountfor supererogation without giving up the moral and theoreticalprinciple relating the ‘good’ to the ‘ought’,value to duty, is to distinguish between different kinds of duties andobligations or to specify conditions and limits of the application ofduties. Supererogation is a legitimate class of moral action but onlyin a qualified sense, i.e. due to certain conditions that make themoral ‘ought’ inapplicable or not fully prescriptive. Thisintermediate position seems to be the most common in the literature onsupererogation, but it has many forms and variations.

Accounts of supererogation belonging to this group typically appeal tothe linguistic hybrid “supererogatory requirements” oreven “supererogatory duties.” Thus, for instance, contracttheorists (Richards 1971) describe principles of supererogation asthose that ideal contractors in the original position would consentnot toenforce in society. Supererogatory behavior is arequirement, but punishing those who do not fulfill the requirementwould be too costly in terms of the relative pain incurred to theagent as against the benefit to the potential beneficiary. Failure toact supererogatorily is blameworthy and wrong, but lends itself onlyto informal criticism rather than to institutionalized sanction.Supererogation is justified only in qualified, circumstantial termsrelating to the limited effectiveness of its enforcement. It has nointrinsic value. The idea of ‘Forced supererogation’belongs to this kind of account: there are actions which arepraiseworthy and although their omission not blameworthy it is plainlywrong not to do them (Cohen 2013).

Another line of justifying supererogation without relinquishing theprinciple of ‘good’-entails-‘ought’ goes backto Thomas Aquinas but has some contemporary followers who sometimesspeak in terms ofvocation. Supererogatory behavior isrequired, but not ofeverybody. It can be expected only fromthose who subjectively feel the commitment to do it or from those whoare objectively blessed with the necessary strength of character andvirtue. Unlike the previous view, which distinguished between duty andsupererogation in terms of the overall costs of enforcing duty, thisapproach is based on a principle ofexcuse: most humanbeings, due to their frail moral nature and imperfection are excusedfrom omitting what from an ideal (religious, ethical) point of view isprescribed as a duty. The problem with this excused-based view ofsupererogation is that it is either subjectivist (the individualchooses her duties) or aristocratic (distinguishing between classes ofmoral agents). Furthermore, it fails to distinguish between the commonappeals to excuses from obligatory action based on the particulardifficulty or risk involved in its performance and the generalexemption from supererogatory action that is sometimes easy andpossible for everybody (like doing a small favor or showingforgiveness). Rawls’ analysis of supererogation also appeals toan argument from exemption: “Supererogatory acts are notrequired, though normally they would be were it not for the loss orrisk involved for the agent himself. A person who does asupererogatory act does not invoke the exemption which the naturalduties allow” (Rawls 1971, p. 117).

A structurally similar analysis of supererogation is offered in termsof reasons for action. We may have a good (even a conclusive) reasonto act in a certain way, but also a second-order permission not to acton that good reason. This permission, called“exclusionary,” is based on a second-order reason andallows the agent to disregard the balance of first order reasons foraction. An agent acts supererogatorily if despite the permission toignore these reasons, decides to act on them (Raz 1975). Typically,other-regarding considerations such as promoting the overall goodserve as the kind of first-order conclusive reasons for an action(making it prima facie obligatory), whereas self-regardingconsiderations of the individual’s autonomy to pursue her owngoals in life support the second-order permission not to engage inthat action. Self-sacrifice is again a paradigm example ofsupererogation. Although personal autonomy is not strictly speaking anexcuse, it creates a kind ofexemption from doing the morallyrequired act. But the autonomy of the individual cannot serve to breakthe good-ought tie-up, since itpresupposes the independentvalue of the personal good from what ought to be done rather thanestablish it (Dancy 1988). Furthermore, supererogationists of theunqualified kind would resist this exemption-based analysis as playingdown the positive moral value of supererogation and relegating it tothe morally neutral category of the “permitted” (Heyd1982). According to another critique of the purely reason-basedaccount is that it “must include prerogatives, which can make anaction permissible without counting in favor of doing it”(Baron-Schmitt and Muñoz 2023, p. 165). Raz might answer thathis exclusionary reasons may exactly provide the explanation of theseprerogatives in terms of reasons. But then the question would be whythese second-order reasons override the first order reasons for doingthe supererogatory act.

There is an interesting suggestion that supererogatory action isgrounded in moral reasons which are opposed by rational reasons of anonmoral kind (Portmore 2003, Portmore 2008). Thus, I have a perfectlygood moral reason to help an AIDS stricken community, but such achoice would, all things considered, be irrational due to the risk tomy life and health or to the loss in achieving personal projects withwhich I identify. Thus, nonmoral reasons can prevent moral reasonsfrom having amorally requiring force. Theoretically thisanalysis opens a wide gap between rationality and morality whichphilosophers are reluctant to accept. Moral requirements according tothis view have force only when they are backed not only by directmoral reasons but also by the entire scheme of reasons by which I makepractical choices and these might point to a conclusive reason not toact morally. “Supererogatory actions just are those that aremorally good, but for which one does not have decisive practicalreason” (Dorsey 2013, pp. 381–2). Critics of this approachhave pointed out that first, not all supererogatory action isirrational and secondly, a moral theory which encourages us to performirrational action is defective (Postow 2005). But note that thiscritique implies a qualified form of supererogationism since the onlyway to explain why we are free not to act on the best reason overallis that we are excused or exempted from the action supported by theset of moraland rational reasons.

Qualified versions of supererogationism try to salvage a prescriptiveelement in the analysis of the concept without collapsingsupererogation into duty (which would amount to denying its separateexistence). Identifying supererogation with a weaker kind of duty, animperfect duty, a non-universalizable duty, an ‘ought’rather than a duty are all forms of recognition of supererogatory actsbut only as being an integral part of an overall conception of duty.They maintain the deontic integrity of the moral system but by thatrun the risk of losing sight of what makes supererogatory actionuniquely meritorious, sometimes praiseworthy, and often touching.

3.3 Unqualified Supererogationism

Imagine a world in which all morally good acts are also obligatory andin which individuals are capable of carrying out their duties withease (and with no conflict with their personal goals and aims). Issomething of moral value missing in such a world? Bothanti-supererogationists and qualified supererogationists would answerin the negative. Those who believe in the intrinsic value ofsupererogatory conduct would disagree. What would be missing in such aworld is what Tertullian referred to aslicentia, thatspecial field of liberty, which allows human beings to exercise theirpower of moral choice. Even Kant, who suggests the ideal of theKingdom of Ends in which members of the moral community exercise theirfree will (Wille) by the necessity of their nature, believes thatimperfect moral creatures like us have a free choice (Willkür)between good and evil. In this discretionary power to adopt the morallaw (or reject it) lies the particular value of morality, at least forhuman beings. Going beyond duty might be considered as a display ofthis power of free choice. The pure or unqualified version ofsupererogationism highlights the moral potential of good human actionnot prescribed or commanded, imposed or demanded in any sense. Inother words, supererogation is good, not only due to the promotion ofoverall value in the world (which would not be denied by the other twoviews either), but also due to the kind of liberty in which it isperformed. If that is the case, then an inherent part of the value ofsupererogation lies exactly in its lyingbeyond duty. Thesupererogatory is something that is not required in any sense and itsomission does not call for an appeal to a special permission,exemption or excuse.

Rather than argue that a supererogatory act is that which the agent ispermitted not to do, the unqualified analysis argues that itis anoption for the agent. Permissions, at least“strong permissions,” are given to people to act in a waywhich there is some reason not to, whereas options are the positivecounterparts of permissions. Options, as the etymology of the termattests, are actions the agentwishes to do, actions thatseem to him good and worthy of choice. The point of supererogatoryaction lies, accordingly, in the good will of the agent, in hisaltruistic intention, in his choice to exercise generosity or to showforgiveness, to sacrifice himself or to do a little uncalled favor,rather than strictly adhering to his duty. Supererogatory action is amatter of personal initiative; it is spontaneous (i.e. originating inpersonal choice rather than in any external or universal demands). Itallows for the expression of personal care or concern for anotherindividual and thus may either reflect a particular personalrelationship to another or create such a relationship. Supererogationis valuable because we believe that beyond the impersonal andegalitarian social web created by the universal morality of duty,there is space left for particular relationships that are not governedby the principles of justice and rights. From society’s point ofview, leaving a separate space for supererogatory action maystrengthen mutual trust and communal bonds since it often indicatesand promotes love and personal concern rather than mere respect forpersons and a sense of justice. This view of supererogation locates itin the open-ended dimension of morality, that of ideals rather thanprinciples, what Urmson calls “the higher flights ofmorality” and Bergson (1956) “the morality ofaspiration.” The Talmud suggests this idea epigrammatically:“Jerusalem was only destroyed because judgments were givenstrictly upon Biblical Law and did not go beyond the requirements ofthe law”.

Furthermore, supererogation is closely related to the ideal of moralperfection. For the anti-supererogationist we are under a duty to dothe very best, to be perfect. But this may be a demand with whichpeople would not be always able to comply but a counter-productiveexpectation which would lead to despair and constant fear of failure(Benn 2018a). Allowing space for the supererogatory enables humanbeings to try to go beyond the required and towards perfection withouta sense of guilt and failure.

The justification of a principled (rather than pragmatic orcircumstantial) demarcation between duty and supererogation isreminiscent of the analogous demarcation between the legal and themoral. Beyond the obvious reasons for avoiding the legal enforcementof all moral duties, many philosophers believe that part of the valueof acting on one’s moral duty has to do with the intention to dothe right act, with acting for duty’s sake. This serves as aprincipled ground for leaving morality free from legal enforcement.Similarly, unqualified supererogationists argue that the value of somevirtuous actions like giving and forgiving would be lost if thesebecome morally obligatory, demands whose omission entails blame andcondemnation. The optional nature of supererogatory behavior is onestep beyond the Kantian-like freedom of acting from moral duty. Themoral non-enforcement of the supererogatory is analogous to the legalnon-enforcement of the moral.

All this leaves the question of the substantive demarcation of dutyand supererogation unsettled. Those who deny the existence ofsupererogation are not bothered by the issue. Those who explain it interms of exemptions and excuses can appeal to cost-benefit analyses ofthe enforcement of high standards of behavior on morally weak humanbeings. But for those who ground supererogation in the intrinsic valueof individual autonomy and altruistic intention, personal concern andthe expression of virtue, there are no easy criteria for establishingthe limits of duty and the space of the supererogatory. One method ofdrawing this line is phenomenological, that is to say to proceed from“the inside of the agent” and her experience which atteststo the difference between the sense of external requirement and thefree choice of the individual (Horgan and Timmons 2010). Howeveradvocates of this method are fully aware that it can at most serve asan empirical support to the possibility of supererogation, but not asits philosophical justification.

The recent renewal of interest in virtue ethics led philosophers toexamine whether there is a place for supererogation in suchvirtue-based theories. On the face of it, Aristotelian ethics cannotaccommodate supererogation since it does not share the deonticconditions on which the idea of transcending duty is based. However,Roger Crisp argues that this view is based on a misreading ofAristotle, for whom both doing the virtuous act (fitting thecircumstances) and being a virtuous person are obligatory. It is theduty of a virtuous person to become angry when it is fitting to feelso. Thus, Crisp is led to a sharp anti-supererogationist view. Sincevirtue is itself a kind of excess, one cannot go beyond it (Crisp2013). But then, one may wonder, how would Aristotle (according toCrisp’s reading) evaluate the act of throwing oneself on ahand-grenade in order to save the lives of others? Aristotle shouldeither judge it as plainly wrong, wasteful or unfitting (and hencecontrary to duty), or as “a noble” deed which isultimately self-serving, adding glory to the agent, even if onlyposthumously. This understanding of virtue ethics is extremelydemanding in comparison to theories which recognize the separate realmof the supererogatory. However, there are proponents of virtue ethicswho believe that supererogation is not only possible but can beanalyzed in Aristotelian terms (Stangl 2016, Stangl 2020). Thisincludes even the Urmsonian cases of particularly heroic acts, whichseem to resist a virtue-ethical analysis. Thus Stangl defines asupererogatory act as virtuous act for which “there is someoverall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whoseperformance in its place would not be overall vicious” (Stangl2023, p. 117).

It should be noted that in virtue-based ethics (for exampleAristotle’s) the demarcation issue becomes moot: supererogatorytranscendence of the demands of morality does not play a major rolesince ethical norms do not consist of well-defined moral duties withwhich supererogation is correlated. There are contemporary attempts toanalyze supererogation in terms of virtue (Kawall 2009), but they seemto fall into circularity: if the supererogatory is defined as what the(idealized) perfectly virtuous person would judge to be so, we stillhave to decide, independently of a theory of supererogation, who thisideal moral agent is. The ideal of virtue is therefore not veryhelpful in providing us with criteria for supererogation and for itsdemarcation from duty. A similar problem faces Michael Slote’stheory based on empathy. If supererogatory behavior is that performedout of an exceptional level of empathy, how do we decide the normallevel which underlies people’s normal moral behavior (offulfilling their duties)? Isn’t some normative principleinvolved in the choice of that level and the demarcation between theobligatory and the supererogatory? For a critique of this position,see Roberts 2014.

Thirty years after publishing his ground-breaking article“Saints and Heroes”, J. O. Urmson (1988) expressed regretfor having introduced the theological term“supererogation” into moral philosophy since he reachedthe conclusion that it only replaced “the old over-simpletrichotomy” with “a new over-simple tetrachotomy”.This change of heart for the philosopher most associated with themodern revival of the debate on supererogation is striking. His lateview cannot, however, be categorized as anti-supererogationist sincehe does not deny the special moral value of saintly and heroic actionswhich are by no way obligatory. Yet, he wishes “todissociate” himself from using the concept of supererogation asa “blanket-term” which covers both saintly and heroic actsand acts of considerateness, decency, chivalry and self-denial. Urmsonbelieves that these kinds of actions are too heterogeneous to betreated under a distinct category in moral theory. The response toUrmson’s (self) critique is that the less dramatic cases of“non-obligatory well doings” are a significant challengeto deontological theory no less than the rare acts of extraordinarysacrifice and altruism. At least this seems to be the assumption inmost of the literature on the subject following Urmson’sretraction.

There is no knockout argument for any of the three views ofsupererogation. The relative merits and defects in each have to dowith the kind of definition of the supererogatory as well as with somefundamental beliefs about the nature of morality and the source ofmoral value. However, a more “local,” less abstract,discussion of paradigm examples of supererogatory action may be ofhelp in the overall assessment of the three views.

4. Paradigm Examples

The analysis of concrete cases or examples is methodologicallyimportant in the philosophical discussion of supererogation. Unlikeother subjects in ethics, like justice or duty, in which there is wideagreement about some core cases, supererogation is a concept theapplicability of which is controversial. Unlike the concepts ofjustice and duty, which have deep roots in both ordinary language andeveryday moral judgment, the idea of supererogation is only tenuouslyanchored in common moral discourse and the concept itself is atheoretical construct. Examples cannot in themselves prove the truthof any of the previously discussed analyses of supererogation, butthey can definitely help in revising the various definitions of theconcept as well as make a case for one or another of itsjustifications. Admittedly, some measure of circularity is inevitablein such a method, since the way examples are understood and analyzedis also informed by the definition and the construction of thetheoretical concept.

Beneficence and charity are often considered as typical examples ofsupererogation. Unlike giving what is the recipient’sdue (or what is owed to him as his right), charity is notrequired by justice, lies beyond one’s duty. As the term“gratuity” indicates, it is not necessary but optional.Charity is typically open-ended (i.e. there is no specified limit tohow much one may give), is driven by altruistic intention, and isjudged to be morally praiseworthy in a different sense than thefulfillment of a duty or respect for others’ rights. Butanti-supererogationists hold a harsher view of charity. Some regardcharity as a condescending attitude; others expose the underlyingexpectation of return involved in any system of gifts (Mauss 1954) oreven the logical impossibility of a real, free and gratuitous giftrelationship, since every giving involves an expectation of return– of both gratitude and a future gift (Derrida 1992). There areethical theorists who believe that our standards of distributivejustice are far too minimalist and that much of what is consideredsupererogatory in the transference of wealth from the rich to the poorshould really be considered obligatory. The more extreme version ofthis critique suggests a principle of giving according to which oneshould give all one’s luxuries in order to satisfy the basicneeds of others. Thus, the realm of the supererogatory is radicallynarrowed down, although it is hard to see how anti-supererogationistscan completely abolish it. Supererogationists for their part arguethat some distinction between justice and charity, between marketexchange and voluntary giving, is good for both society andindividuals because it creates a sense of community and good will, notto speak of more utilitarian benefits. One classical example is thesystem of the provision of blood for medical purposes. Socialscientists as well as philosophers have argued for the advantages of acompletely voluntary (supererogatory) system of blood donation overthe commercialized or “enforced” systems (Titmuss 1973).But it seems that the issue of the deontic status of charity is oftenof a normative rather than conceptual kind. It focuses on thedemarcation line between the obligatory and the gratuitous, both onthe personal level of the behavior of the individual and on the socialand political level (e.g. how much do rich countries owe poorcountries and how much should be left to voluntary charity).

The problem of demarcation also plagues the paradigm case ofsupererogatory behavior, the so-called saintly and heroic acts. Firefighters rushing to a burning house to save its residents risk theirlives in a way that moves every spectator. But are they not paid forit? Is it not “their job”? Are they not justified when ina later response to a journalist’s question they insist thatthey only did their duty? The supererogationist might respond byturning our attention to a similar risk taken by a by-stander whojoins the professional emergency forces and literally jumps into thefire. Deniers of supererogation might argue that although such anaction is heroic, it ought not to have been performed, since theslight chances of saving the victims of the fire do not justify thevery high risk of loss of life of the volunteer. Kant at one pointexpresses his doubts about the moral motive behind some of the extremecases of moral heroism and warns against moral fanaticism andsentimentalism (Kant 1949).

There are however examples of morally good actions which can be denieda supererogatory status only with much difficulty. Volunteering is atypical act that cannot be reduced to a duty, even not in ahypothetical manner as qualified supererogationism might try to do.When a job or a task must be done by a group of people, the groupmight select the individual who will do the job on the basis of someprinciple of justice or desert or, in the absence of such principle,by lot. In extreme cases, such as taking part in a highly riskymedical experiment, it may be the case that no selection process,including lottery, should be deployed. If an individual volunteers totake upon herself the task rather than leaving it to the selectedperson, and particularly when it is wrong to selectanyone,then clearly her act is supererogatory. Volunteering highlights theoptional nature of supererogatory action in its purest form (the agentcan hardly hide behind the morally modest expression “I only didmy duty”). Dale Dorsey discusses a case ofcollectiveduty which gives rise to the question which individual in thecollective ought to fulfill it. A frail woman struggles with herluggage on the escalator in a station crowded with people. She mayhave a claim for help bysomeone in the crowd. But who is it?The person who ultimately stops to help the lady is one who hasdeveloped a “disposition of attunement”, which consists ofthe ability to pay attention or to be sensitive to such circumstances.This disposition is not common among people due to the psychologicalconstitution of most people and hence this person is regarded asperforming a supererogatory act (Dorsey 2023).

Promising is similar to volunteering in its optional nature which isnot associated with the demarcation problem. One ought to fulfillone’s promises, but making them in the first place issupererogatory (Heyd 2023). This might solve a paradox which has beenraised: is a promise to do a supererogatory act possible? It seemsnot, since the promise fulfilling act cannot be both an obligatory actof promise keeping and a supererogatory act at the same time (Kawall,2005). This may lead us to the conclusion that it is impossible topromise to do a supererogatory act since no act can secure the bareminimum of the obligation created by the promise maker: only asupererogatory act would be considered as promise fulfilling and suchan act is by definition not obligatory (Benn 2014). However, if theact of promising itself is supererogatory, then so is its fulfillment,even though the expectation created by the promise means that afterbeing made it must be fulfilled. The paradox may prove to be illusoryonce we distinguish between the general supererogatory nature of thecontent of the act (e.g. giving you a ride to the airport in themiddle of the night) and the obligatory nature of its performanceunder the specific circumstances of having promised to do so (Heyd2005b).

Of course, anti-supererogationists could argue that volunteering andpromising are both imperfect duties, i.e. not obligatory in any givenindividual case but nevertheless general requirements of virtue.People who never volunteer are morally condemnable; people who nevercommit themselves by promising are morally defective and fall short ofstandards of friendship and social behavior.

There are cases in which the supererogatory response is expressed inomission rather than in action. Forgiveness is a prime example ofsupererogatory forbearance. The offended party refrains from reactingnegatively to the wrong done to him. Rather than the morally justifiedhostility and resentment that he was entitled to express, he showsforgiveness. There is, however a heated debate in ethical theory aboutthe deontic nature of forgiveness. Many philosophers andnon-philosophers alike believe that forgiveness is a moralduty, particularly if certain conditions like expressions ofregret by the offender have been satisfied (e.g. Rashdall 1924). Anunforgiving person is, accordingly, morally blameworthy. But forothers, forgiveness is the epitome of supererogatory action since itis completely gratuitous, dependent on the good will of the offendedparty (Heyd 1982). There is also a middle way (Gamlund 2010) whichconsiders “unconditional forgiveness” (that which is shownto unrepenting wrongdoers) as typically supererogatory, but“conditional forgiveness” (granted to offenders whoexpress regret) as possibly a duty (depending on other considerations;see also Cowley 2023, and a critique of Gamlund’s analysis inArcher 2017). For supererogationists the touching aspect offorgiveness lies exactly in its optional nature. Since the offenderdeserves punishment (or at least resentment), he cannot at the sametime deserve (or have the right to) forgiveness. Despite the closesimilarity between giving and forgiving, it seems that the latter is apurer example of supererogatory act since it has a better chance ofbreaking what Derrida (see Heyd 2005a) refers to as an endless circle:while a gift imposes a duty (debt) which can be satisfied only by aslightly larger counter-gift (which would initiate yet another roundof giving), forgiveness is more a matter of attitude and has nomeasure.

It has also been suggested that toleration is, like forgiveness, anact of supererogatory forbearance: although the tolerator has a goodreason for intervening in the wrong behavior of another, she choosesto refrain from such interference, letting the other lead her life asshe wants (Newey 1997, Benbaji & Heyd 2001). Thus, an analysis oftoleration as supererogatory is a possible solution of the“paradox of toleration,” viz. how can refraining fromintervening in the wrong beliefs or behavior of others be considereddesirable. Note, though, that if toleration is taken as assupererogatory, it cannot, for the reasons discussed above, beascribed to governments but only to individuals and groups ofindividuals.

However, even if certain acts of forgiveness and toleration exemplifya supererogatory response, there surely are cases in which both areforbidden (the unforgivable and the intolerable) and there may becases in which they are both obligatory (persistent pleas of theoffender to be forgiven or the political demands of toleration ofminorities in a multi-cultural society). A conceptually neat case fortesting our intuitions about the deontic status of forgiveness (andtoleration) is God’s attitude to human sinners: is Godbound by the principles of just retribution, i.e. not toforgive? Does he have a duty to forgive? Or is divine forgiveness apure act of gratuitous grace? If God can act supererogatorily, howdoes that reflect on the perfection of divine justice that ittranscends? The application of the concepts of forgiveness on thepolitical level raise further questions. Even if the universal andunbiased rules of justice can be surpassed by individuals who showforgiveness or toleration, can institutions like the state or thecourts exercise such supererogatory restraint without violating thedemands of impartiality and equality before the law (Heyd 1978)? Legalpardon granted by kings and presidents reflects this tension betweenthe wish to leave some measure of individual discretion in showingmercy to some public figures and the concern for the impartialapplication of such supererogatory grace.

There are of course many other examples of supererogatory actionalthough the length and nature of the list is dependent on thedefinition of supererogation we adopt and the view of its value. Wemay add to the above-mentioned examples, some practices in bioethics:blood donation, organ donation, serving as a surrogate mother, andtaking part in medical experiments. There are of course arguments forthe prohibition of organ donation and surrogacy, and some argumentsfor the commercialization of the practice, which also undermines thesupererogatory nature of the act. But social scientists andphilosophers often point to the value of altruism in society and thecreation of social solidarity through the exercise of supererogatorygiving (Heyd 1995). However to the extent that actions andforbearances are supererogatory we may summarize their source of valueas belonging either to their good consequences (as in the case ofgiving and charity) or to the strength of character or virtue of theagent (as in the risky acts of heroism) or to the pure good willinvolved in choosing to do what lies beyond duty (volunteering,forgiveness, small favors).

Beyond the complex philosophical debate about the nature and scope ofsupererogation, the discussion of paradigm examples indicate that anyethical system which does not allow for any actions beyond the call ofduty would prove to be distressingly impoverished, even ifcoherent.

5. Complications and Extensions

As early as 1982 Derek Parfit raised the following question: imaginethat you can save the right arm of another person at a great cost toyourself; but if you decide to do so, you can save also his left armat noextra cost to you; are you under a duty to save botharms? Parfit’s answer is the intuitive one: yes, you ought to doso (Parfit 1982, pp. 131–2). Yet this answer does not easily fittheories of supererogation according to which if saving one arm issupererogatory, saving two arms musta fortiori besupererogatory. This seeming paradox was called The All or NothingProblem (Horton 2023). The paradox is that if you save only one armyou are doing somethingwrong, while if you do nothing in thefirst place you do nothing wrong since there is nothing wrong infailing to do a supererogatory act. Frances Kamm added a similarparadox, that of intransitivity: You promised to meet a friend in acafe; on your way you saw a burning house with a child trapped in it.You can at immense risk to your life save the child. This would meanthat you cannot fulfill your promise to meet your friend, but it ismorally acceptable reason for violating your promise. But if youdecide not to save the child you ought to proceed to fulfill yourpromise. Now, I am permitted to either save the child or do nothingand I am permitted to save the child thus violating my promise; yet Iam not permitted to do nothing (i.e. avoid saving the child andviolate my promise). Daniel Muñoz (2021) offers a solution toboth Horton and Kamm’s paradoxes in terms of his above-mentionedconcept ofprerogatives. Transitivity does not work here forthe simple reason that we are have a ranking of options based ontwo dimensions: wrongness and value. We have a prerogative todo nothing to save the child but we do not have the prerogative toviolate our promises.

This problem also gave rise to more recent debates about“Effective Altruism”. The idea is that even if there is noduty to give to charity, it is wrong to give to a charity which isineffective; or in other words, once the bounds of duty are crossedand one’s action is supererogatory, it ought to be optimal,especially if the extra costs and risks are only marginal ornon-existent (Pummer 2016). If two children are stranded in a burninghouse and you risk your life by entering the house and save one child,you ought to save also the other child if that does not incur furtherrisk to you. The two children have no claim on you as long as youstand outside just doing what your duty demands (calling the firefighters); but once you are inside, the second child has a claim onyou to be saved too. The same justification not to save a child from aburning house (the extreme risk) must apply to both children. But onceyou are inside the house and have already risked your life, thisjustification does not work if you choose not to save the other(Horton 2017). Against this demand for optimization (limited only byagent-relative qualifications) there is the unqualified,non-consequentialist argument that one needs no excuse or exemptionfrom avoiding entering the burning house and that optimization is nota duty. Thus neither the two children together, nor the second childseparately, have a claim against the bystander for not acting in theoptimal way (Sinclair 2018). Although for the non-consequentialistthere is no duty of optimizing the good, he or she admits that onceone gave up the justification for not entering the burning house, onecannot use the risk in order to avoid saving the second child becausethe risk has already been undertaken in saving the first child(Sinclair 2018). Muñoz and Pummer (2022) introduce the idea ofconditional obligations and permissions. If you have decided to saveonly one child you are permitted to prefer saving that child than tosave no child at all.

A similar case of effective altruism is the following: By donating $0you save no one; by donating $50 you save 1 person; by donating $5000you save 500 people (which is proportionate to the previous option);by donating $10,000 you save 101 (which is irrational and a waste ofmoney in comparison to the previous option); by donating $10,050 yousave 200 people (Wessels 2015, p. 90). Now, although the last optionis very “effective” and makes excellent use of the extra$50 (in comparison to the second option), the question is whetheradding the extra $50 donated by the generous donor who gives $10,000is obligatory. The poor person is commended for his supererogatory actof giving $50 to save one person; cannot we regard the extra $50 ofthe rich person who donated $10,000 as his duty, especially in lightof the possibility of saving 100 more people by this small sum? Onceyou donate $10,000 it is reasonable to expect of you to give the extramarginal addition of another $50 so as to double the benefit of yourdonation (i.e. saving 200 people). This demonstrates that thethreshold conception of the supererogatory as everything lying beyondthe obligatory requires some refinement. There are circumstances inwhich in the realm of the supererogatory some new obligations may becreated (Wessels 2015). As we have seen, such circumstances exist inthe case of promises: promising itself is supererogatory; but once apromise is made, actions fulfilling the promise become obligatory.

It is usually thought that one may perform a supererogatory act onlyafter having fulfilled all her obligatory commitments or duties, i.e.go the second mile only after completing the first. Frances Kamm haschallenged this assumption. If by getting a minor cut in my finger Ican save one life, I obviously have at least an imperfect duty to doso. But if instead of saving that one life I can save a hundred livesby sacrificing my life, this is definitely supererogatory. Now, once Iam willing to do the heroic supererogatory act, my duty to the singleperson does not serve as an inhibition to the supererogatory act andthe single person who is not going to be saved has no claim against me(Kamm 2023). In cases of perfect duties, things may become morecomplicated and the single person can for example claim compensationfor the losses she incurred due to my violation of the obligation(like a promise) to her.

In recent years there have been attempts to extend the scope of thecategory of the supererogatory tonon-moral normativedomains. Some discuss the idea ofepistemic supererogation,the idea that in one’s search for knowledge one goes beyond somereasonable measure of epistemic responsibility by being more diligentor looking for more evidence than is usually required in such search(Hedberg 2014). All that is needed for such an extension of theapplicability of the supererogatory is a normative domain which has ascale of value on the one hand (e.g. degrees of epistemicresponsibility) and standards of expected time and energy involved inthe search of the relevant value (e.g. knowledge). We can also saythat based on the very same evidence Watson forms a certain beliefwhich turns out to be false while Sherlock Holmes, with his creativeepistemic skills, forms the correct doxastic state. We may say thatWatson’s belief was rational, even if ultimately wrong, becauseit followed normal standards of inference from the given evidence; butHolmes showed epistemic supererogation (Li 2017). Similarly one mayalso speak of supererogation in the context ofprudence, whenone does more than can be expected of a normal level of care andself-control in sticking to a medically desirable diet (McElwee 2017and McElwee 2023). Even inbusiness ethics the category ofsupererogation is used to describe behavior of firms which not only gobeyond legal and economic norms but also beyond corporate socialresponsibility and “positive deviance” (such asphilanthropic activities) (Mazutis 2014). One example isJohnson&Johnson’s decision to the recall of Tylenol afterthe 1982 poisoning affair, in which legal counsels, consumers and eventhe media did not consider it as morally necessary. This was anunprecedented decision which meant a huge financial sacrifice on partof the firm. Finally, supererogation is also applied in the sphere ofprofessional ethics, such as the behavior of doctors. Asagainst Rawls and Heyd, it is argued that supererogatory behavior isnot confined to the domain of natural duties but may hold also incases of surpassing professional duties. For example, a nurse whobrings books from home to a patient in her ward is acting beyond herprofessional duty but she is still acting as a nurse and in that senseher act is “continuous” with her professional duties. Thegood promoted beyond the normal professional standard is“profession specific” (Eriksen 2015). There are nowsuggestions to apply the category of the supererogatory to aestheticsand sports (see Archer 2023). Think of a soccer player who, knowingthat the opponent player did not foul him and and hence was unjustlyaccorded a foul kick, intentionally kicks the ball so as to miss thegoal.

Another recent perspective which has not been given any attention inthe past work on supererogation is feminism. Some theorists correctlynote that the heroic (although not necessarily the saintly) model ofsupererogatory sacrifice is typically male-centered, with somemilitary overtones. But obviously, as noted in the variety of examplesof supererogatory behavior, this model should be abandoned in favor ofthe recognition of some typically female contexts in whichsupererogation is demonstrated, such as motherhood and other forms ofpersonal sensitive altruism (Naumann, Raters and Reinhardt 2023).

These complications and possible extensions of the category of thesupererogatory challenge the “standard model” ofsupererogation by questioning the assumptions about the specificallymoral nature of supererogation and the clear demarcation between theobligatory and the supererogatory.

Bibliography

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Chisholm, Roderick |consequentialism |ethics: deontological |ethics: virtue |forgiveness