In introductory classes to epistemology, we are taught to distinguishbetween three different kinds of knowledge. The first kind isacquaintance knowledge: we know our mothers, our friends, ourpets, etc., by being acquainted with them. The second kind isknowledge of facts, propositional knowledge, orknowledge-that: this is the sort of knowledge we acquire whenwe learn that, say, Ithaca is in New York State or that Turin islocated in Italy. It is customary to add to the list athirdkind of knowledge that is supposed to be distinct both fromacquaintance knowledge and from propositional knowledge. One possessesthis knowledge when one can be truly described asknowing howto do something: play the piano, make a pie, walk, speak, create,build, and so on.

The distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that was broughtto scrutiny in analytic philosophy by Ryle in his seminalTheConcept of Mind (1949), where he raised some of the now classicalobjections to the so-called “intellectualist legend”: theview that knowledge-how amounts to knowledge-that. Ryle insteadadvocated an “anti-intellectualist” view of knowledge-howaccording to which knowledge-how and knowledge-that are distinct kindsof knowledge, and manifestations of knowledge-how are not necessarilymanifestations of knowledge-that. This anti-intellectualism has beenthe received view among philosophers for a long time. Evenpsychologists and neuroscientists have explicitly appealed toRyle’s classical distinction when discussing their empiricalfindings (e.g., Cohen & Squire 1980; Anderson 1983). Nevertheless,in the last twenty years, a renewed interest by epistemologists in thenature of knowledge-how has brought new life to the debate, where newversions of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism have beendeveloped and argued for. The debate is partly epistemological: isknowledge-how an altogether distinct kind of knowledge, different fromknowledge-that? But it is also about a psychological question: whatkind of psychological state is knowledge-how? The goal of this entryis to overview the debate between intellectualists andanti-intellectualists, while highlighting the implications of thisdebate for related questions concerning intelligence, cognition,language, and skills.

This entry starts by looking at some classical arguments againstintellectualism about knowledge-how: the regress argument (section 1),the insufficiency argument (section 2), and the gradability argument(section 3). Then two motivating arguments for intellectualism areconsidered: the linguistic argument (section 4) and the action theoryargument (section 5). Section 6 overviews the recent epistemologicaldebate on whether knowledge-how and propositional knowledge have thesame epistemic profile. Section 7 discusses the cognitive scienceargument against intellectualism. Section 8 surveys what formsanti-intellectualism about knowledge-how has taken in the recentliterature. Section 9 looks at the relation between knowledge-how andskills. Section 10 discusses knowledge-how and other relatedtopics.

• 1. The Regress Argument
  • 1.1 The Contemplation Argument
  • 1.2 The Employment Regress
  • 1.3 A Revival of the Regress Argument
  • 1.4 Lewis Carroll’s Regress
• 2. The Sufficiency Argument
• 3. The Gradability Argument
• 4. The Linguistic Argument
  • 4.1 The Details of the Intellectualist Proposal
  • 4.2 First Group of Objections
  • 4.3 Second Group of Objections
  • 4.4 Third Group of Objections
• 5. The Action Theory Argument and the Question of Joint Action
• 6. The Epistemology of Knowledge-How
  • 6.1 Knowledge-how and Belief
  • 6.2 Knowledge-How and Gettier
  • 6.3 Knowledge How, Defeasibility, and Testimony
• 7. The Argument from Cognitive Science
  • 7.1 The Argument
  • 7.2 Improving the Argument
  • 7.3 Articulability
  • 7.4 Knowledge-How in Preverbal Children and Nonhuman Animals
• 8. Varieties of Anti-Intellectualism
  • 8.1 Revisionary Intellectualism
  • 8.2 Ability Based Anti-Intellectualism
  • 8.3 Knowledge-How and Skill
• 9. Knowledge-How and Skill
  • 9.1 Skill Across Cultures
  • 9.2 Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism About Skill
  • 9.3 Skills in Epistemology
  • 9.4 The Nature of Skilled Action
• 10. Knowledge-How and Other Related Topics
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Regress Argument

Ryle’s most famous objection to intellectualist accounts ofskills and knowledge-how is that they lead to a vicious regress:

The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the executionof which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if,for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoreticaloperation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, itwould be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into thecircle. (1949: 19)

Ryle concludes:

“Intelligent” cannot be defined in terms of“intellectual” or “knowing how” in terms of“knowing that”, (1949: 20)

on pain of a vicious regress (see also Ryle 1946: 22). Exactly how toreconstruct Ryle’s argument is a matter of controversy (Stanley& Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011b; Bengson & Moffett 2011a;Cath 2013; Fantl 2011; Kremer 2020). The next sections discussdifferent possible ways of understanding the regress challenge andpossible responses on behalf of intellectualism.

1.1 The Contemplation Argument

The contemplation argument assumes forreductio that for anyaction to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation of“contemplating” has to be performed first :

Assume in addition the following definition of intellectualism:

And assume further that in performing an action Φ, one employsone’s knowledge-how to Φ:

With these premises the regress goes as follows. Suppose that oneperforms an action Φ:

1. By AP, one employs one’s knowledge-how to Φ.
2. By SI, one employs the knowledge thatp, for somep.
3. So, by CP, one contemplatesp.
4. But contemplatingp is an action.
5. So by AP, if one contemplatesp, one employs one’sknowledge-how to contemplatep.
6. By CP, one ought to contemplate another propositionq, forsomeq.

And so on.

The contemplation argument aims at showing the falsity of SI, byshowing that its truth, together with the truth of AP and CP, triggersan infinite regress. If SI were true, then performing any action wouldrequire contemplating an infinite number of propositions ofever-increasing complexity. On the assumption that this cannot be donein a finite amount of time, the argument goes, accepting SI would leadto the clearly absurd conclusion that no agent could ever perform anaction within a finite time (see Fantl 2011: 122).

The question is whether AP and CP are plausible premises. FollowingGinet (1975), Stanley & Williamson (2001) argue that AP isplausible only if the relevant Φ is anintentionalaction. To use one of Ryle’s (1949: 33) own examples, if aclumsy person inadvertently tumbles, it does not follow that in doingso, they employ their knowledge-how to tumble. By contrast, the clownemploys their knowledge-how when they tumble on purpose. Nevertheless,if we restrict AP to intentional actions, then the regress can bestopped by observing that contemplating a proposition might happennon-intentionally. For example, when I employ my knowledge that thereis a red light ahead by applying the brakes, I need not intentionallycontemplate the proposition that there is a red light ahead.Correspondingly, if contemplating a proposition can be donenon-intentionally, such contemplation is not the kind of action thatrequires us to know how to perform it—therefore, it does nottrigger the restricted AP and the regress is blocked altogether. Someobject that the contemplation in this example might be intentional butunconscious (as suggested by Noë 2005: 282). But it isunclear what reasons there are for thinking that every time oneemploys one’s knowledge, one intentionally contemplates therelevant proposition (Cath 2013: 365–366).

The Contemplation Argument also assumes CP—i.e., that in orderto employ propositional knowledge when acting, one ought tocontemplate the relevant proposition. Against CP, Ginet (1975: 7)observes that one might manifest one’s knowledge that one canget the door open by turning the knob and pushing it (as well as myknowledge that there is a door there) by performing that operationquite automatically as one leaves the room; and one may do thiswithout formulating (in one’s mind or out loud) that propositionor any other relevant proposition. Ginet concludes that Ryle’soriginal argument does not teach us that intellectualism aboutknowledge-how is false but only that knowledge can be acted upon andmanifested without requiring any contemplation on the part of theagent. Indeed, some scholars think that this last weaker claim was theonly goal of Ryle’s original argument (Rosefeldt 2004; Sax2010).

1.2 The Employment Regress

However, CP is not needed in order to trigger a regress. Perhaps theargument can be salvaged by replacing contemplation with a weakerrelation. Consider replacing CP with EP:

The regress is triggered as before. Suppose one Φs:

1. By AP, one employs one’s knowledge-how to Φ.
2. By SI, that amounts to employing one’s knowledge thatp, for somep.
3. By EP, one needs to employ one’s knowledge-how to employone’s knowledge thatp.
4. But employing one’s knowledge-how is an action.
5. By AP, one employs one’s knowledge-how about employing ourknowledge-how to employ one’s knowledge thatp.
6. By SI, that amounts to employing one’s knowledge ofq, for someq.

and so on.

Intellectualists might object to EP in ways similar to how CP wasresisted—i.e., that not every action requires for itsperformance the employment of one’s knowledge-how: onlyintentional actions do, as the clown example suggests. According tothis line of reply, employing one’s propositional knowledgemight be more like a reflex in response to stimuli, rather than anaction. Further, this version of the regress challenge may be accusedof assuming that knowledge-that is “behaviorally inert”and needs to be intentionally selected or employed in order to bemanifested. Yet, intellectualists have independent reasons to resistthis picture (Stalnaker 2012). On the other hand, if Ryleans insistthat employments of knowledge-that are actions of sort, it seems thereis no principled reason why employments of knowledge-how would not besubject to the same requirement. Therefore, it looks like any regressgenerated for the intellectualist is generated for Ryle as well(Stanley 2011b: 14, 26; though see Fantl 2011 for a possibledifference between the regress generated for Ryle and the regressgenerated for intellectualism).

1.3 A Revival of the Regress Argument

A variety of actions—say, remembering to check the car’sblindspot when reversing—can be intelligent even though they arenot intentional. Or one might manifest intelligence throughprocesses—e.g., by coming to understand a difficultproposition, without them even being actions. If one accepts thatintelligent performances, whether intentional or not, are necessarilyguided by knowledge-how, one might try to recast the regress argumentby replacing AP with IPP (Weatherson 2017):

Now it seems plausible that one’s manifestation of propositionalknowledge can be intelligent in some cases but not in others. Forexample, one might manifest one’s knowledge intelligently bybringing to bear one maxim that is appropriate instead of any otherthat is not to the particular situation which the agent faces. By IPP,if one’s manifestation of knowledge-that in a particularsituation is intelligent, it requires one’s manifestingone’s knowledge-how. If intellectualism is true, that would inturn require manifesting one’s knowledge-that. If thismanifesting of propositional knowledge is intelligent too, thoughunintentional, it requires knowledge-how. And so on. We get aninfinite regress if one accepts that manifesting propositionalknowledge can be an intelligent performance, also when it is not anintentional action. (For similar lines of argument, see also Fridland2013, 2015; Löwenstein 2016: 276–80; Small 2017:62–3).

Intellectualists might respond by distinguishingtwo sensesin which a performance can be intelligent and two corresponding sensesof manifestation, only one of which gives rise to the regress. First,an intelligent action might manifest one’s knowledge-how in thecase that it isguided by this knowledge-how. On thisreading, the regress is triggered. But there is alsoanother—epistemic—sense in which an intelligent actionmanifests knowledge-how as long as itprovides evidence forthat knowledge-how. For example, the rings on a tree provide evidencefor the tree’s age (hence manifest its age in the epistemicsense) but the rings on a tree are not guided by its age. Crucially,the regress does not arise on the epistemic sense of manifestation.Checking the blindspot might be intelligent in this epistemic sense ofmanifesting —providing evidence of—knowledge-how. Yet,this epistemic manifestation itself is not something that qualifies asintelligent or unintelligent.

1.4 Lewis Carroll’s Regress

A less discussed regress that can be found in Ryle (1946: 6–7)is an adaptation of Lewis Carroll’s (1895) regress. Suppose astudent understands the premises of an argument and also itsconclusion but fails to see that the conclusion follows. In order tohelp him, the teacher teaches him another propositionP—i.e., if the premises are true, then the conclusion istrue. The student understands this and yet fails to see how from thepremises and the additional premiseP the conclusion follows. Asecond hypothetical proposition is added to his store, the propositionthat if the premises is true, the conclusion is true too. The studentstill fails to see. And so on. Ryle concludes:

Knowing a rule of inference is not possessing a bit of extrainformation but being able to perform an intelligent operation.Knowing a rule is knowing how. It is realized in performances whichconform to the rule, not in theoretical citations of it. (1946: 7)

One might respond (cf. Stanley 2011b) to this regress challenge thatthe student does not really understand the premises of an argument bymodus ponens (p, ifp thenq), for thatinvolves grasping the concept of a conditional, and on aninferentialist understanding (Boghossian 1996, 2003), that woulddispose one to accept the conclusion of an inference by that rule.Inferentialism about meaning is, however, a controversial doctrine(for several criticisms, see Williamson 2011, 2012). Other repliesmight be available. Maybe the student does not represent the rulepractically (see next section), or she is simply incapable of grantingthat the rule applies to this case, for that would explain her failureto be appropriately disposed to arrive at the conclusion, given thetruth of the premises. (For yet other versions of the regresschallenge, see Noë 2005: 285–6 and Hetherington 2006).

2. The Sufficiency Argument

The claim that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that encounters animmediate incredulous stare: how could propositional knowledge besufficient for knowing how to do something? Ryle (1946: 5) himselfposes this challenge as a starting point for his argument:

Obviously there is no truth or set of truths of which we could say“If only the stupid player had been informed of them, he wouldbe a clever player”, or “When once he had been apprised ofthese truths he would play well”.

Certainly, one might know all the propositions that are relevant tohow to perform a task, and yet fail to know how to perform it:knowledge-that does not seem sufficient for knowledge-how (see alsoRyle 1940: 38–9).

In order to assess this objection, it is helpful to start with a toyintellectualist theory, on which knowledge-how is a matter of knowing,for some way or method to perform a taskw, thatw is infact a way to perform it. Insection 4, we will see in more detail a linguistic argument for identifyingknowledge-how with this sort of propositional knowledge (Stanley &Williamson 2001; Snowdon 2004). How could, the insufficiency objectiongoes, one know how to perform a task just in virtue of knowing aproposition about a way to perform it? Consider the followingcounterexample to intellectualism:

In response to this sort of counterexample, intellectualists oftenappeal to “practical modes of presentation”: knowing aproposition observationally or demonstratively is not the same asknowing it practically. Knowledge-how is, at least in part, a matterof representing propositions about tasks and ways of executing tasksin a distinctively practical fashion. For one to know how to swim, inthe relevant sense, one must know of a way to swim represented under adistinctive practical mode of presentation, which is essentiallydifferent from the observational or demonstrative mode of presentationinSwimming. This kind of practically representedpropositional knowledge is what (some) intellectualists callknowledge-how and is what is absent in the example above.

The notion of practical modes of presentation has received severalcriticisms (Schiffer 2002; Koethe 2002; Noë 2005; Fantl 2011;Glick 2015), on the ground that it seems excessively obscure or evenquestion begging. Koethe (2002: 327) worries that practical modes ofpresentation smuggle in an antecedent notion of knowledge-how (thoughsee Fantl 2008: 461 for a response). This widespread skepticism aboutpractical modes of presentation has led some intellectualists toexplore ways of responding to the insufficiency objection that do notappeal to practical modes of presentation. For example, Stanley(2011b: 126) considers answering the sufficiency challenge inSwimming by appealing to the context-sensitivity ofthe ability modal “could”. According to Stanley, dependingon how the context for the modal is restricted, “That is how youcould swim” could mean either that that is how you can swimgiven your current physical state or that that is how youcould swimafter training. But coming to know that that ishow I could swim after training is clearly not enough for me to cometo know how to swim now. Instead, the argument goes, what one needs toknow is the former proposition:that that is a way to swim givenmy current physical state.

Yet, it is unclear that even this response works. Consider a variantof the previous scenario, where Mary is a skilled swimmer who is oneday affected by memory loss and so forgets how she is able to swim(Glick 2015). Nothing has changed in Mary’s physical state: sheis still able to swim but she just has forgotten how she is able toswim. Suppose she is told, by looking at a recording of her swimmingthe day before, thatthat is how she can in fact swim givenher current physical state. She might come to know how she is in factable to swim (just like that!). Yet, she would still fail to know howto swim in the relevant sense and still drown if thrown into the pool.

So, practical modes of representation are hard to escape ifintellectualism is to be defended against the sufficiency objection.To assuage concerns about the intelligibility of practical modes ofpresentation, Pavese (2015b) proposes we think of them along the linesof practical senses, which in turn can be modeled after computerprograms. Programs determine an output, just like Fregean sensesdetermine a referent; and they are practical in that they break down atask into the smallest parts that the system can execute (theprimitive operations of the system as well as into primitive ways ofcombining those parts) so they ground the ability to perform a complextask in terms of the ability to perform all of its parts. On thisview, if one represents a task practically, one represents all of itsparts, and the combination of those parts, through instructions thatone has the ability to execute. So representing practically a taskentails that one has the ability to perform the corresponding task.(For a critical discussion of practical ways of thinking, see Mosdell2019. Habgood-Coote 2018c argues that the classical generality problemfor reliabilism (Feldman 1985; Conee & Feldman 1998) arises forintellectualism.)

The notion of distinctively practical concepts is motivated by workoutside the debate on intellectualism about knowledge-how. Otherscholars have discussed concepts that are practical in that theydissociate from semantic and observational concepts and play a centralrole in explaining behavior. Peacocke (1986: 49–50) talks of“action-based ways of thinking”, Israel, Perry,and Tutiya(1993: 534) of “executable ideas”, and Pacherie (2000,2006) of “action concepts”. Mylopoulous and Pacherie(2017) suggest that executable action concepts might be needed toovercome the interface problem—the problem of how cognitiverepresentations (intentions) interact with motor representations(Butterfill & Sinigaglia 2014). Pavese (forthcoming-b) advances anempirical-functional case for practical concepts, arguing that theyare needed to explain a distinctive sort of productive reasoning. Yet,other intellectualists argue we can dispense with practical modes ofpresentation altogether and instead appeal toways of knowingthat are distinctively practical or executive (Waights Hickman 2019;Cath 2020).

Levy (2017) argues that a form of intellectualism that only invokespractical ways of thinking and practical concepts might not be able toexplain skillful motor behavior, for motor representations of the sortrequired for skilled action and posited by cognitive psychologists arenon-conceptual. Along similar lines, Fridland (2014, 2017) arguesmotor control and motor representation cannot be countenanced byStanley & Williamson’s (2001) and Stanley’s (2011b)forms of intellectualism. So, more promising forms of intellectualismmight have to invoke, in addition to practical ways of thinking,non-conceptual practical representations (Pavese 2019;Krakauer 2020). Just like perceptual concepts are distinguished fromnon-conceptual perceptual representations, we might distinguishbetween practical conceptual representations and practicalnon-conceptual representations. Motor representations would fall underthe latter heading. Nonconceptual motor representations also representpractically, as they break down a task in terms of the most basicoperations that a system can perform.

3. The Gradability Argument

Ryle (1949: 46) formulates the argument from gradability thus:

we never speak of a person having partial knowledge of a fact or truth… it is proper and normal to speak of a person knowing in parthow to do something. Learning how or improving in ability is not likelearning that or acquiring information. Truths can be imparted,procedures can only be inculcated, and while inculcation is a gradualprocess, imparting is relatively sudden.

As Kremer (2020: 102) points out, here Ryle is making twodistinguishable points: (i) ascriptions of knowledge-how are gradable,whereas ascriptions of know-that are not; (ii) the gradability ofthese ascriptions is explained by the fact that knowledge-how mustcome in degrees, because learning-how brings improvement inknowledge-how. There is no parallel phenomenon in learning-that, andso no need for degrees of knowledge-that. Others have followed Ryle inthinking that the gradability argument shows intellectualism wrong.For example, Bengson and Moffett (2011b) argue that becauseknowledge-how is gradable, knowledge-how is more similar toacquaintance knowledge, which also comes in degrees (see also Ryle1949: 46; Wiggins 2012; Santorio 2016; Kremer 2020: 102).

Pavese (2017) distinguishes between two kinds of gradability ofknowledge-how ascriptions: one might know how to do something in partor entirely (quantitative gradability) or one might know how to dosomething better than somebody else (qualitative gradability).Crucially, these two kinds of gradability are also present moregenerally in other knowledge-wh (knowledge-when, who, why, where)ascriptions, which do seem to reduce to propositional knowledge. Forinstance, one might know in partwho came to the party(Lahiri 1991, 2000; Roberts 2009) or know a better answer to thatquestion than somebody else (see also Stanley 2011b: 31–5). Ifparts of an answer are propositions, then knowing an answer mightstill amount to knowledge of all of its parts. Knowing in part ananswer would then amount to knowing at least one of the propositionsthat is part of that answer. Similarly, knowing a better answeramounts to knowing a proposition that better answers the relevantquestion. If this is true of other knowledge-wh ascriptions, it iscertainly plausible that it is true for knowledge-how. One might knowhow to Φ in part by knowing only certain (propositional) parts ofthe answer to “how does one Φ?” and one might know abetter answer to that question than someone else.

This response to the first part of the gradability objection inspiresa further response to the second part concerning learning-how. Supposethat knowledge-how is a matter of knowing a practical answer, where apractical answer encompasses a practical representation for a task ora way to Φ (section 2). As we have seen, practically representing requires possessing certainpractical capacities and entails certain sorts of abilities. On thispicture, one might gradually learn how to perform a task by graduallylearning a practical answer to that question, for one requires timeand practice to master a practical representation of how to performthe task. Thus, gradual learning may be compatible with theintellectualist picture, if it amounts to gradually coming to learnmore parts of a practical answer.

4. The Linguistic Argument

Intellectualism has been motivated on the basis of a linguisticargument concerning knowledge-how ascriptions in English (Vendler1972; Stanley & Williamson 2001; Snowdon 2004; Stanley 2011b,2011c). Begin by noticing that (1) is remarkably similar to(2)–(3) (“finite knowledge wh ascriptions” as theyembed a complement with a finitival verb) and to (4)–(5)(“infinitive knowledge-wh ascriptions” as they embed acomplement with an infinitival verb):

(1)

Marie knows how to play the piano

(2)

Mary knows where her piano is located in the house.

(3)

Mary knows who can play her piano.

(4)

Mary knows what to do in case of an emergency.

(5)

Mary knows where to find an Italian newspaper.

According to the standard syntactic analysis, (2)–(5) have aninterrogative as complement—“where is her piano located inthe house?”, “who can play the piano?”, “whatto do in case of an emergency?” are all interrogatives. Havingsaid this, in broad outline, the linguistic argument forintellectualism has three steps. The first step is to follow thesyntactic cues from (1)–(5) and identify the logical form of“S knows how to Φ” with that of “Sknows + interrogativeQ (= “how to Φ”). Callthis premiseLogical Form. The second step is toaccept the orthodox semantics of knowledge-wh ascriptions, accordingto which in “S knows + interrogativeQ”,Q denotes a question (C. Baker 1968) and according to which“S knows +Q” is true just in caseSknows a proposition answering to the question expressed byQ.Call this premiseSemantics for Knowledge-Wh (cf.,among many others, Hamblin 1958, 1973; Hintikka 1976; Karttunen 1977;Heim 1994; Groenendijk & Stokhof 1982, 1997; and Higginbotham1996). Finally, the third step is to extend this semantics toknowledge-how ascriptions, such that knowing how to Φ requiresknowing a proposition that answers the question “how can oneΦ?”

Next section (4.1) looks in some more detail to the intellectualistanalysis of the truth conditions for knowledge-how ascriptions. Thesection after next (4.2) discusses several objections to the linguistic argument.

4.1 The Details of the Intellectualist Proposal

The linguistic argument concludes that Intellectualism is true:

But what is the proposition that one knows by knowing how to Φ?

First, note that the subject of the infinitival construction(“How to Φ”), or PRO, can either be interpreteddese (de se PRO) or generically (generic PRO). Accordingto the first interpretation, that an agent knows how to perform a skistunt requires their knowing how to perform a ski stuntthemselves. According to the latter interpretation, itrequires knowing howone (as a generic agent or any otheragent) would perform a ski stunt. When it comes to ascriptions ofknowledge-how, we care aboutde se, and not generic, readingsof knowing how. If an agent knows how to Φ in the relevant sense,they know how to Φ themselves.

Secondly, infinitival interrogatives such as “how toΦ” and “what to Φ” are ambiguous between adeontic reading (how to Φ =how one shouldΦ;what to Φ =what one should do) and anability reading (how to Φ =how one could Φ;what to Φ =what one could do). The deonticreading does not seem relevant when we ascribe knowledge-how. Hencethe relevant reading must be an ability reading. Joining these twodisambiguations, the truth conditions of knowledge-how ascriptions are(cf. Schroeder 2012):

Now, what counts as an answer to the question? Linguists distinguishbetween different kinds of answers that one might give to a question.Anexhaustive answer to “How couldSΦ?” would specify all the ways in whichS couldΦ; amention-some answer, instead, would specify only oneway in whichS could Φ. For example, an exhaustive answerto the question “How couldS make pasta?” wouldspecify all different recipes for making pasta. A mention-some answerto the same question, instead, would specify (at least) only onerecipe. When we ascribe knowledge-how, we don’t expect people toknow all the possible ways of performing the relevant task. Forexample, “Mary knows how to make pasta” can be true, evenif Mary only knows one recipe for pasta. This gives us the followingtruth conditions:

As we have seen insection 2, in addition to knowing that a way to Φ is a way to Φ, oneneeds to think of that way under a practical mode of presentation. LetPr be a practical way of thinking of a way and letwayof Φ-ing be a way of thinking of the property ofbeing a way of Φ-ing; finally let ⦼ be a way of composingways of thinking into a proposition. Then <Pr ⦼wayof Φ-ing> is the practical proposition that onecomes to know when coming to know how to Φ. On how to implementFregean senses in the compositional semantics, see Yalcin (2015).

4.2 First Group of Objections

Several philosophers have objected that intellectualists are givingundue weight to linguistic considerations and that otherconsiderations, coming from the cognitive sciences, should be takeninto account too, when thinking about the nature of knowledge-how(Noë 2005, 2011; Devitt 2011; Brown 2013; Johnson 2006; Glick2011; Roth & Cummins 2011). It does not follow from this worrythat the linguistic argument ought to be dismissed as lackingany evidential value. Consider an analogy. Arguably, the besttheory of beliefs and desires is one on which these are propositionalattitudes. This theory is compatible with how we ascribe beliefs anddesires (i.e., ascriptions of beliefs are of the form “Sbelieves thatp”, where “p” isstandardly taken to stand for proposition). But it is also compatiblewith folk psychology, according to which thinking of beliefs anddesires as propositional attitudes helps explain behavior. By parityof reasoning, ideally, the best theory of knowledge-how shouldpresumably be compatibleboth with our best psychologicaltheory and our best linguistic theory of knowledge-how ascriptions(cf. Stanley 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Cath 2015a for a defense of thelinguistic methodology).

4.3 Second Group of Objections

Among those engaging with the linguistic argument, many have objectedthat it fails to adequately capture the truth conditions ofknowledge-how ascriptions (Roberts 2009; Brogaard 2009, 2011;Michaelis 2011; Bengson & Moffett 2011a; Ginzburg 2011; Abbott2013; Santorio 2016; Hornsby 2016). Some have argued against the claimthat knowledge-wh is a matter of knowing a proposition that answers aquestion (Semantics for knowledge-wh). For example,Carr (1979, 1981) argues that when you know how to do something, youhave an attitude that essentially takes an act as its object. But whenyou know that something is the case, you have an attitude thatessentially takes a proposition as its object. Yet, intellectualistsmight reply that knowledge-how might be an attitude towards an actin virtue of being an attitude towards a proposition aboutthat act.

Others have questioned whether the complement “which team iswinning” in “S knows which team is winning”is, semantically, just like an interrogative (Brogaard 2009, 2011;Ginzburg 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 2011; Ginzburg & Sag 2000). Oneargument against this assumption is that, if, e.g., “which teamis winning” denoted a question, we would expect it to co-referwith “the question of which team is winning”. Yet wecannot substitute such expression-pairssalva veritate.Suppose Jenny knows/discovered/revealed an interesting question andsuppose the interesting question discovered by Jenny is “wholeft yesterday?”. Even so, it does not follow that Jennyknows/discovered/revealed who left yesterday. A response to thisobjection might be that these examples exploit a subtle equivocation(Stanley 2011b: ch. 2, following King 2002). Consider “Jamaaldiscovered a new element”. In it, “discovered”denotes a relation between Jamaal and an object, a chemical element.On the other hand, in the sentence “Jamaal discovered who leftyesterday”, “discovered” denotes a differentrelation, one that holds between Jamaal and something of a differentsort, namely, the proposition answering the question expressed by“who left yesterday”. It is this second relation which isrelevant for the intellectualist. This is supported by the fact thatthe “[t]he former relation would be expressed in German by‘kennen’, and the latter by‘wissen’” (Stanley 2011b: 66). (For morerelevant discussion, see Parent 2014.)

Others have questionedLogical form—the claimthat in knowledge-how ascriptions, the embedded complement is aninterrogative.Objectualists claim that the complement ofknowledge-how ascriptions (“how to Φ”) is not aninterrogative but an “objectual” complement—onedenoting ways to Φ instead of propositions representing these ways(Bengson & Moffett 2011a). Objectualism is motivated by theconsideration that “knowing how to Φ” seems to beequivalent to “knowing a way to Φ” in pretty muchevery context and by the apparent gradability of“knows-how” ascriptions (cf.section 3). An objectual semantics is in a good place to explain the gradabilityof knowledge-how ascriptions, since objectual knowledge ascriptionsalso permit degree modifiers—one can have partial knowledge ofParis, or know Paris better than someone else. Along similar lines,Bach (2012) and Abbott (2013) argue that in knowledge-how ascriptions“how to Φ” might work as afree relative. Afree relative is a wh-phrase that denotes an individual. So forexample, “what I was given for dinner” can be used as aninterrogative in “I asked what I was given for dinner” butalso as a free relative in “I ate what I was given fordinner”. In the latter ascription, it denotes some food that wasgiven to me for dinner. In that sense, “how to Φ”according to this proposal, in “S knows how toΦ” should be interpreted as a free relative denoting a wayto Φ, rather than an answer to the question “how toΦ?”

To this proposal, some respond that knowledge-how ascriptions do notpass the standard tests for detecting free relative complements(Schaffer 2009: 486–91; Habgood-Coote 2018a). Take thecoordinated use of knowledge-how and other knowledge-wh ascriptions in“S has always known how to swim and never has wonderedhow”. This coordination suggests that both kinds of ascriptionshave an interrogative as a complement (Bresnan & Grimshaw 1978:332; M. Baker 1996: 204–7). Further, knowledge-how ascriptionscan be extended to embed a multiple interrogative, as in “Markknows how to do what?” , whereas free relative complements donot tolerate multiple wh-phrases (C. Baker 1968; Bresnan &Grimshaw 1978: 335). Moreover, infinitival wh phrases, such as“what to do”, “how to do”, “who toask” never allow for free relative reading (Huddleston &Pullum 2002: 1070–3). Finally, a standard test for telling apartfree relatives and interrogatives is to see if they embed under“believe”, for “believe” does not takeinterrogatives as complements but it does tolerate free relatives.(For example, “Mark believed who was charged guilty”cannot mean “Mark believed the answer to the question “Whowas charged guilty?””. Rather, it means that Mark believedthe person who was charged guilty.) However, interestingly,“believe” can never embed infinitival constructions suchas “what to do”, “how to do”, or “who toask”.

Finally, some have questioned whetherSemantics forknowledge-wh applies to ascriptions embedding infinitivalcomplements, like knowledge-how ascriptions. Roberts (2009) arguesthat, as opposed to other wh complements, the meaning of“how” denotes a property rather than a proposition whenembedded in infinitival clauses. Santorio (2016) defends a Gibbardiansemantics for knowledge ascriptions embedding infinitiveinterrogatives, on which these ascriptions ascribe maximal performanceplans compatible with an agent’s plans (for more objections toSemantics for knowledge-wh, see also Sgaravatti &Zardini 2008 and George 2013).

4.4 Third Group of Objections

The perhaps most serious objection to the linguistic argument is thatit ignores cross-linguistic evidence about how knowledge-how isascribed in languages other than English (Rumfitt 2003; Roberts 2009;Glick 2012; Wiggins 2012; Abbott 2013; Douskos 2013; Ditter 2016).Rumfitt (2003) argues that the linguistic facts on behalf ofintellectualism are overstated. Many languages—e.g., French,Italian, Spanish, and Russian—ascribe knowledge-how not justthrough ascriptions embedding interrogatives (“S knowshow to Φ”) but also through ascriptions embedding bareinfinitivals (“S knows + (bare infinitive) toΦ” (= “S knows to Φ”)) as in“Marie sait nager” and “Maria sanuotare”. Stanley (2011b, 2011c) responds that theseascriptions are to be analyzed as embedding animplicitinterrogative—one where the question word “how” isnot explicitly articulated. However, Abbott (2013), Hornsby (2016),and Ditter (2016) have observed that this response does not help withyet other languages, such as Russian, in which knowledge-howascriptions—of the form “S (attitude verb)Vs + (infinitive) to Φ”—feature an embeddingverbV (“umetj”) thatneverlicenses an interrogative complement nor a declarative complement(i.e., athat-clause).

In order to assess what this cross-linguistic evidence reallyestablishes, consider a new version of the linguistic argument. Let“SVs Φ” be an ascription ofknowledge-how in an arbitrary languageL that is correctlytranslated in English by “S knows + (interrogative) how(de se) to Φ”. Assuming that translation preservesat least truth conditions, “SVs Φ” willbe true inL just in case “S knows +(interrogative) how (de se) to Φ” is true inEnglish. Call this theInterpretation Premise. By theDisquotational Schema, “S knows how to Φ” istrue in English just in caseS knows how to Φ; so, we havethat “SVs Φ” is true inL justin caseS knows how to Φ. This conclusion, together withtheSemantics for knowledge wh, theLogicalForm, and theInterpretation Premise, yieldsthat “SVs Φ” is true inL justin caseS bears a knowledge relation towards an answer to thequestion “How he himself could Φ”. Through thisargument, the truth conditions of any knowledge-how ascription,whether in English or in any other language, are reduced topropositional knowledge, whether the relevant knowledge-how ascriptionhas or not the interrogative form.

Proponents of the cross-linguistic argument might challengeLogical Form: the different ways of ascribingknowledge-how (through the infinitival form and through theinterrogative form) in these languages indicate that knowledge-howascriptions in English areambiguous between two nottruth-conditionally equivalent logical forms: an interrogative formand a bare infinitival form (Ambiguity Hypothesis) (Rumfitt2003; Wiggins 2012; Setiya 2012; Glick 2012; Ditter 2016; Hornsby2016). The main piece of evidence for theAmbiguityHypothesis is that in languages employing both the interrogativeform and the infinitival form, those different ascriptionscan come apart in their truth conditions. For example, it isclaimed that the Italian sentence “Mario sa comenuotare” (interrogative form = “Mario knows how toswim”) may be usedly true, while the sentence “Mariosa nuotare” (infinitival form = Mario knows to swim) isfalse. This would be the case, for example, if Mario lacks (in somesense) the ability to swim (so too for its French and Spanishtranslations). Similarly, Ditter argues that in Russian, theinterrogative construction must ascribe a different state from the“umetj” ascription (+ infinitival), on the groundthat one can coherently use in Russian sentences of the followingform:

(6)

John znaet kak igrat’ na pianino, no on ne umeyetigrat.

John knows + (interrogative) how to play the piano, but he does notknow (“umetj”) + (infinitival) to play thepiano.

“John knows how to play the piano, but he doesn’t know howto do it”.

According to these authors, this difference between interrogativeembedding constructions and infinitival embedding construction showsup also in English locally for the verblearn:“S learnt to swim” differs from “Slearnt how to swim” in that the former, but not the latter, isability-entailing (Rumfitt 2003; Glick 2012).

This argument for theAmbiguity Hypothesis might be incertain ways too quick. The only way to make(6) intelligible in English is to translate it as (7), where the genericinterpretation of the first knowledge-how ascription and thedese interpretation of the second ascription are made explicit:

(7)

Mary knows how one could play the piano but does not know how toplay the piano herself.

However,(6) cannot be interpreted as (8) on pain of contradiction:

(8)

Mary knows how she herself could play the piano but does not knowhow to play the piano herself.

If so, the fact that(6) is acceptable in Russian does not establish that the interrogativeform in Russian cannotalso have an interpretation (thede se interpretation) on which it is truth conditionallyequivalent to the Russian’s infinitival form. Here is acompetitive explanation of the available cross-linguistic evidencethat does not commit us to theAmbiguity Hypothesis. Justlike English’s ascriptions, the interrogative form in Russian isambiguous between ade se interpretation, on which it istruth conditionally equivalent to the infinitival form, and a genericinterpretation of the subject of the infinitival embedded verb, onwhich it comes apart from the infinitival form. This explains why(6) is felicitous and why it can be translated as (7) but not as (8). Onthis explanation, this evidence might be compatible with Englishknowledge-how ascriptions univocally having the same logical form (theinterrogative form), even though the embedded interrogative canreceive either the generic or thede se interpretation,depending on the subject of the infinitival embedded verb.

5. The Action Theory Argument and the Question of Joint Action

Ryle is often interpreted as claiming that knowledge-how ascriptionsare nothing more than ascriptions of an ability or a complex ofdispositions to act in a skilled or intelligent manner (though seeHornsby 2011: 82 and Waights Hickman 2019 for dissent). Thisinterpretation is based on passages in theConcept of Mind,such as the following:

When a person is described by one or other of the intelligenceepithets such as “shrewd” or “silly”,“prudent” or “imprudent”, the descriptionimputes to him not the knowledge or ignorance of this or that truth,but the ability, or inability, to do certain sorts of things. (Ryle1949: 27)

Early intellectualists argued that knowledge-how does not entailability (Ginet 1975; Stanley & Williamson 2001; Snowdon 2004). Forexample, a pianist who lost their arms in a car accident may have losther ability to play but still preserve her knowledge-how to play thepiano (cf. Snowdon’s 2004: 8 expert omelette maker); or a skiinstructor might know how to do a ski stunt and, according to Stanley& Williamson (2001), still fail to have the ability to do it. Bycontrast, anti-intellectualists argue that it is important todistinguish between knowing how to perform a task, which correspondsto a general ability, and being (actually and circumstantially) ableto perform it (Noë 2005; Glick 2012; Setiya 2012). So the pianistmight have both general ability as well as knowledge-how, though theylack circumstantial ability. By contrast, the ski instructor does notclearly have knowledge-how to perform the ski stunt themselves, whilethey know howone, in general, can do it. Recentintellectualist views also take knowledge-how to go together withabilities (understood along Hawley’s 2003 notion ofcounterfactual success) and argue that rightly construedintellectualism can vindicate this connection (Pavese 2015b; Cath2020).

Yet, everybody agrees that while knowledge-how might entail ability,ability is not sufficient for knowledge-how, as demonstrated by anexample from Hawley (2003):

Susie has the ability to annoy Joe, since she has the disposition toannoy Joe whenever she attempts to do so. But, intuitively, she doesnot know how to annoy him. A natural explanation of this is that shecannot annoy himintentionally (for structurally similarcases, see Carr 1979, 1981 and Bengson, Moffett, & Wright 2009).Pretty much all sides of the dispute agree on the following claim(Ryle 1949; Stanley & Williamson 2001; Hawley 2003; Hornsby 2004,2011; Stanley 2011b; Setiya 2012):

Many also endorse the biconditional (Knowledge-how/AbilityIntentional) (Hawley 2003; Setiya 2012):

Now, suppose that knowing how to Φ does require the ability tointentionally perform Φ. If so, whether knowledge-how requires apropositional attitude depends on whether or not one can intentionallyΦ without having a propositional attitude about how to Φ. Butaccording to many influential views of intentional action,intentionally Φ-ing does require a propositional attitude, namelya belief about how to Φ. In particular, intentionally Φ-ingrequires having an action plan, which is characterizable in terms of abelief about how to perform Φ. For example, on Goldman’s(1970) view, one intentionally Φs when one has a plan to Φ,where a plan to Φ is a belief that specifies the means to Φ(see, also, e.g., Harman 1976; Audi 1986; Bratman 1987; Velleman 1989;Ginet 1990; Mele & Moser 1994; Gibbons 2001). From this, weget:

Some intellectualists have argued on these bases that knowledge-how toΦ requires at least a propositional attitude about the means toΦ (Cath 2015b).

But is propositionalknowledge of means to ends required forintentional action, over and above true belief? Gibbons (2001)provides several examples to buttress the necessity of knowledge forintentional action. For example, one cannot plausibly intentionallywin a fair lottery , nor can one intentionally defuse a bomb if oneunintentionally and fortuitously chooses the correct wire; in bothcases, a plausible explanation for the lack of intentionality is thatthe subjects does not have the relevant propositional knowledge abouthow to accomplish those tasks. These cases buttress the claim thatintentional action requires knowledge of the means to execute it:

With these assumptions in the background, here is a non-linguisticargument for intellectualism. Start from(Knowledge-how/Intentionality): ifS intentionallyΦs,S knows how to Φ. Furthermore, suppose that(Intentionality/Knowledge) is true so that the intentionalityof an action is to be explained at least in part in terms ofpropositional knowledge. Then, by these two premises, we get that ifone intentionally Φs, one both knows how to Φ and one haspropositional knowledge of the means to Φ:

Now, according to standard formulations of intellectualism, one knowshow to Φ only if, for some meansm to Φ, one knows thatm is a means for one to Φ:

So, the argument from intentional action for intellectualism maintainsthat the intellectualist picture provides the best explanation for why(Knowledge-How, Intentionality, Knowledge) should hold.According to this explanation, (Knowledge-How, Intentionality,Knowledge) is true not just because of a coincidental alignmentof propositional knowledge and knowledge-how in intentional action.Rather, its truth is grounded on the very nature of knowledge-how: oneknows how to Φin virtue of knowing, for some meansm to Φ, thatm is a means for oneself to Φ.

The view that intentional action requires belief has been challengedfor the particular case ofbasic actions. Setiya (2012)observes that one can perform a basic action of clenching one’sfist without even having the belief that one can succeed at doing it.For example, someone might have had a paralyzing injury, fail tobelieve they have healed, and still form the intention to clench theirfist. Intellectualists might reply that, although that subject doesnot believe that one will succeed, they might have a sufficiently highcredence and that credence can amount to knowledge too (Pavese 2020).(For other possible responses to the idea that intentional actionrequires knowledge or belief, see Elzinga forthcoming).

A further related question is how to think of knowledge-how in thecase of joint actions. When two agents act jointly towards a goal, aswhen they row a boat together, they responsively coordinate andmonitor each other’s movements in ways that produce a jointaction. What kind of knowledge-how is manifested by successful jointaction? It must be possible for the agents to coordinate without eachhaving to know the different ways in which each must act to achievetheir common goals: you and I can jointly make risotto even if I donot know how to season it and you do. Correspondingly, Birch (2019)suggests that joint knowledge-how must be accounted fordistributively. If this is correct, then the agents canjointly know how to do something withouteach having a beliefabout how they jointly do it, but only in virtue of having acollective, or group, belief about how to do it. (For more discussionon group knowledge-how, see Palermos & Tollefsen 2018 andStrachan, Knoblich & Sebanz 2020)

6. The Epistemology of Knowledge-How

6.1 Knowledge-how and Belief

Some have observed that knowledge-how may differ from propositionalknowledge in that, whereas the latter plausibly entails belief,knowledge-how does not (Dreyfus 1991, 2005; Wallis 2008; Brownstein& Michaelson 2016). For example, consider Brownstein &Michaelson (2016)’s example. When catching a ball, ball playersmake anticipatory saccades to shift their gaze ahead of the ball oneor more times during the course of its flight towards them. Theseplayers know how to catch a ball, and their way of catching a ballrequires making anticipatory saccades when watching the ball as itfalls. Yet, the players do not believe that making anticipatorysaccades is part of how they catch the ball. Rather they believe thatthey are tracking the ball the whole time. However, from the fact thatthe subject has false beliefs about how she catches the ball, it doesnot follow that the subject does notalso have correctbeliefs about it. So, a natural response is that there issome sense in which the player correctly believes that hismanner of tracking the ball has a chance of resulting in success.

Whether this response is compelling might depend on what one takesbeliefs to be. On this topic, philosophers widely disagree. On an“intellectualist” account of belief, on which believingthatp requires the subject to acknowledge thatp, it isimplausible that the athletes have the relevant belief. Butintellectualists about knowledge-how might advocate replacing thisintellectual notion of belief with a less demanding one. According toa prominent functional characterization of belief, to believe thatp entails being disposed to act in ways that would tend tosatisfy one’s desires, whatever they are, in a world in whichp (together with one’s other beliefs) are true”(cf. Stalnaker 1984: 15; Stalnaker 2012). Now, suppose that in gameafter game, Athena catches the ball using a certain methodm,and that whenever she does so, her behavior is intentional. From thisit seems to follow that Athena is disposed to perform the actionsspecified bym. Since,ex hypothesi,m is a wayof catching the ball, it follows that in all the worlds where sheperforms these actions, she satisfies her desire of catching the ball(or at least is sufficiently likely to do so). By the previousfunctional characterization of belief, it follows that Athena believesthatm is a way for her to catch the ball. The lesson of thisdebate might be, following Stalnaker (2012), that intellectualismabout knowledge-how is best construed as a form ofanti-intellectualism about knowledge, belief, and the mental.

6.2 Knowledge-How and Gettier

Another way of challenging the intellectualist claim thatknowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that is to question whetherknowledge-how can be Gettiered. If knowledge-how survivesGettierization, that would be evidence that knowledge-how is not aspecies of knowledge-that, on the assumption that Gettiered justifiedtrue belief cannot constitute propositional knowledge (Gettier 1963).Stanley & Williamson (2001) argue that knowledge-how cannot beGettiered. However, Cath (2011) responds by proposing theLucky Light Bulb case, where Charlie wants to learnhow to change a lightbulb, but he knows almost nothing about lightfixtures or bulbs. Charlie consultsThe Idiot’s Guide toEveryday Jobs. Inside, he finds an accurate set of instructionsdescribing the shape of a light fixture and bulb, and the way tochange a bulb. Charlie grasps these instructions perfectly. And sothere is a way such that Charlie now believes truly that that way is away for him to change a light bulb, namely, the way described in thebook. However, unbeknownst to Charlie, he is extremely lucky to haveread these instructions, for the disgruntled author ofTheIdiot’s Guide filled her book with otherwise misleadinginstructions. Cath (2011) argues that intuitively Charlie still knowshow to fix the light bulb, despite his belief being Gettiered (cf.also Poston 2009: 744).

Stanley replies that knowledge-whin general seems to beGettierable and that might be explained in terms of features having todo withknowing the answer. For example, considerHawthorne’s (2000) example of a teacher giving each child intheir class a note with the name of a city. “Vienna” iswritten only on one of the notes. In this context, it seems true thatone child knows the correct answer to the question “what is thecapital of Austria”, even though the child’s belief istrue by luck. (Though see Carter & Pritchard 2015c for a replythat while knowledge-how is similar to knowledge-that and knowledge-whin that it is incompatible with intervening luck, it differs withthese kinds of knowledge in being compatible with environmental luck.)Others still have responded that intuitions are subtle and not all ofthem favor anti-intellectualism (Marley-Payne 2016; Paveseforthcoming-a). For a recent experimental study with mixed results,see Carter, Pritchard, and Shepherd (2019). Hawley (2003: 28) arguesthat knowledge-how, like propositional knowledge, requires“warrant” on the ground that success on the basis of alucky guess does not seem to manifest one’s knowledge-how. Asimilar theoretical argument for thinking that lucky belief cannotsuffice for knowledge-how starts from the thesis that knowledge-howenters in explanations of success and that satisfactory explanationsmust be “modally robust”. From this, the argumentconcludes that the sort of belief that robustly explains intentionalsuccess must be knowledge, for knowledge has the relevant modalprofile (Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000; D. Greco 2016). Another line ofargument starts from the observations that knowledge-how to Φexplains the ability to intentionally Φ (seesection 4) and that only knowledge can explain intentional action (Gibbons 2001:589–590). On these bases, some argue that knowledge-how cannotfall short of non-getteriable knowledge (Cath 2015b for objections tothis line of argument).

6.3 Knowledge How, Defeasibility, and Testimony

Some object that while knowledge-that can be defeated by misleadingevidence, not so knowledge-how (see Carter & Navarro 2017 for thisline of argument and Pavese 2021 for a reply). Finally, some objectthat knowledge-how cannot be knowledge-that because the latter isacquirable by testimony and the former is not. While the followingargument (A–C) is valid, the following (i–iii) is not(Poston 2016):

1. Mark knows that Turin is in Northern Italy.
2. Mark tells that to John, who believes him.
3. John comes to know that Turin is in Northern Italy.

1. Mark knows how John could swim.
2. Mark tells John.
3. John comes to know how to swim.

Following Stanley’s (2011b: 126) modal restriction proposal (cf.section 3), Cath (2017, 2019) responds that depending on how the context for themodal is restricted, (i) could meaneither that Mark knowshow John could swimgiven his current physical state or howJohn could swimafter training. If only the latter, that isnot the sort of proposition that John needs to know in order for (iii)to be true: for that, John ought to know that that is how he couldswim under his current physical state. (Though seesection 2 for qualms about this intellectualist strategy.) Another avenue forreply to the challenge from testimony may be to insist that not everypropositional knowledge is transferable through testimony. Acomparison: visual knowledge that Mark murdered Tina differs incontent and mode of presentation from the knowledge that of the murderobtained by being told by his prosecutor. The former observationalknowledge is not transferable through mere testimony but (exactlybecause of that!) it is more helpful for the purpose of convictingMark than second-hand knowledge. That does not mean that observationalknowledge is not propositional. Like in the case of perceptualknowledge, the proposition that one knows by knowing how to dosomething involves distinct modes of presentation of ways of doingthings (section 2,section 3). We should not expect propositions under this mode ofpresentation to be transferable through testimony. (For a response toPoston 2016, see also Peet 2019).

7. The Argument from Cognitive Science

7.1 The Argument

The argument from cognitive science against intellectualism starts bypointing out that cognitive scientists distinguish between differentkinds of cognitive systems: It is often held that thedeclarativesystem is responsible for encoding propositional knowledge,whereas knowledge-how is encoded in theprocedural system.Given empirical evidence that the declarative and procedural systemsare separate (about which more below), it would seem to follow thatknowledge-how is not reducible to propositional knowledge (Wallis2008; Devitt 2011; Roth & Cummins 2011):

The usual evidence marshaled in favor of C1 relies on amnesiac casestudies (Milner 1962; see Cohen & Squire 1980 for discussion). Atypical example is HM. After bilateral removal of the hippocampus,parahippocampal gyrus, entorhinal cortex, and most of the amygdala torelieve debilitating symptoms of epilepsy, HM was unable to form newmemories of facts or events and he could no longer access memories heacquired in the few years leading up to his surgery. Nevertheless, itwas found that over 10 trials, HM tuned his motor skill to trace theoutline of a five-pointed star based only on looking at reflection ina mirror. Since he could not store new memories, HM’sdeclarative knowledge of the means of performing the task did notchange from one trial to the next. But his performance improved. So,the reasoning goes, the improvement of motor skills is governed by adistinct cognitive system from that which governs the retention ofdeclarative facts.

Many embrace C2 (e.g., Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman 1987: 523;Devitt 2011; Wallis 2008). But some object that a closer look at thedetails of HM’s case (as reported in Milner 1962) supports adifferent diagnosis, on which knowledge-how is realized by acombination of the procedural and the declarative system (Pavese 2013;Stanley & Krakauer 2013). At the beginning of each trial, prior tobeing given verbal instructions on how to perform the motor task, HMlacked the ability to intentionally perform it: HM was able to performthe motor taskonly after being reminded of what the taskconsisted in. This suggests, against C2, that there was animportant declarative component to HM’s ability to perform themotor task (for the role of declarative knowledge in skillful action,see also Christensen, Sutton, & Bicknell 2019).

7.2 Improving the Argument

Here is a possible way to patch up the Argument from Cognitive Science(Fridland 2014, 2017; Levy 2017). Replace C2 with:

C2*

Knowledge-how is not exhausted by declarative knowledge.

With C2*, the argument goes on as before. Stanley & Krakauer(2013) seems to accept this conclusion (for more discussion andcritiques, see Krakauer 2019; Springle 2019; De Brigard 2019; Schwartz& Drayson 2019). Other intellectualists reply that this argumentmisses the intellectualist target. Cath (2020) argues that proceduralrepresentation might be a prerequisite for knowledge-how rather than aconstituent. Pavese (2019) develops an account on which proceduralrepresentations, of the sort studied by motor scientists when givingan account of the procedural aspect of skill (Wolpert 1997; Jeannerod1997), can be understood as practical, albeit nonconceptual,representations—the sort of representations that intellectualismindependently requires for knowledge-how (section 2).

7.3 Articulability

According to C3, propositional knowledge corresponds to“declarative” knowledge—to a sort of knowledge thatis, at least in principle, verbalizable. Opponents of intellectualismoften uses C3 in a novel argument against intellectualism: ifpropositional knowledge has to be verbalizable, then knowledge-howcannot be propositional knowledge, for often subjects know how toperform tasks even though they cannot explain how they do it (Schiffer2002; Devitt 2011; Adams 2009; Wallis 2008). On behalf ofintellectualism, there do seem to be cases in which you come to knowhow to do something precisely by consulting a manual and learning somepropositions (see, e.g., Snowdon 2004: 12; Bengson and Moffett 2011a:8; and Katzoff 1984: 65ff). Moreover, it is not clear that theanti-intellectualist demand that propositional knowledge be alwaysverbalizable is motivated. In fact, it seems to conflate knowing howto perform a task withknowing how to explain how the task isperformed (cf. Fodor 1968: 634; Stalnaker 2012). Stanley (2011b:161) points out that there is a sense in which knowledge-howis always verbalizable. A punch-drunk boxer who can at bestdemonstratively refer to his re-enactment of the way of boxing againstsouthpaws, and says, “This is the way I fight against asouthpaw” intuitively knows that this is the way he fightsagainst southpaws. This knowledge has an essential demonstrative orindexical component. But the same goes for much other propositionalknowledge like, for example, the knowledge we express by saying,“This is the tool for the job”, or “That is going tobe trouble”. This reply assumes that ways to execute tasks areostensible and as such can be picked up by a demonstrative.This does not need to be so: on any single occasion, one may only actonparts of a way. So, one will not thereby be able to pickup thegeneral way one’s knowledge-how is about.Another reply on behalf of intellectualism is to point out thatpractical concepts for tasks differ from “semantic”concepts for the same tasks precisely in that, even if propositional,they are not necessarily verbalizable.

7.4 Knowledge-How in Preverbal Children and Nonhuman Animals

A final objection is that intellectualism overintellectualizesknowledge-how in a way that is incompatible with what we know aboutanimals’ cognition (Noë 2005; Hornsby 2007; Dreyfus 2007;Elzinga forthcoming). According to this objection, unsophisticated andnon- (or pre-) linguistic agents such as babies and non-human animalscan know how to perform certain tasks, while lacking the concepts thatare required for propositional knowledge. Some intellectualistsrespond that ordinary speakers routinely also ascribe propositionalknowledge to animals and babies, as we say that Fido knows that itsowner is arriving or that a baby knows that their mother is present(Stanley & Williamson 2001). Thus, while propositional knowledgemay require concept possession, our ordinary knowledge ascriptionssuggest that we regard relatively unsophisticated agents as possessingthe relevant concepts. Comparative psychologists do routinely creditmany non-human and non-linguistic animals with the possession ofconcepts. (See Allen & Bekoff 1999 for a comprehensive overview).

This response might be less plausible, though, when it comes to loweranimals, or insects. Here too, we might describe ants as knowing howto carry food back to their nest. And yet, there is less evidence fromcognitive science that insects are capable of concepts too (though seeGallistel & King 2009). In response, a different line of argumentmight be more promising (cf. McDowell 2007): it does not follow fromthe fact that we are disposed to ascribe knowledge-how to loweranimals that what explains their goal-directed behavior is the samesort of psychological state that underlies human knowledge-how andhuman action. For from the fact that their behavior resembleshumans’ in some respects (for example, in its goal-directedness)does not entail that it resembles humans’ skilled behavior inall respects that matter (for example, in the susceptibilityof the relevant behavior to rational revision).

8. Varieties of Anti-Intellectualism

8.1 Revisionary Intellectualism

According to orthodox intellectualism, knowledge-how is a species ofpropositional knowledge. Revisionary intellectualism, instead,contends that although knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that, therelevant knowledge issui generis and differs from standardpropositional knowledge in some important ways. For example, Brogaard(2009, 2011) argues that, in general, knowledge can have cognitiveabilities or practical abilities as its justificatory grounds. In thelatter case, agents know in virtue of ability states that are notsubject to the usual epistemic constraints that characterize beliefstates generated by cognitive abilities. Correspondingly,knowledge-how fits the bill for this practically grounded knowledge.Cath (2015b) argues that we should distinguish betweentheoretical knowledge-that andpracticalknowledge-that. The former is subject to the usual epistemicconstraints, like being sensitive to Gettierization (cf. also Zardini2013). The latter, instead, is not sensitive to the usual epistemicconstraints of theoretical knowledge-that—and can thereforeconstitute knowledge-that even if Gettierized. Waights Hickman (2019)suggests that knowledge-how is a distinct kind of knowledge-thatrelation, characterized by knowing something in “the executiveway”, which requires

possession of (a) dispositions to attend to features of anaction-context on which one’s knowledge (how) bears; and (b)dispositions to adjust one’s use of that knowledge accordingly.(2019: 333).

As we have seen (section 4), Bengson & Moffett (2007, 2011b) defendNon-propositional (orObjectualist) Intellectualism. On this view, knowing how to Φnecessarily involves havingobjectual knowledge of a way ofΦ-ing but having objectual knowledge of a way of Φ-ing is notsufficient to know how to Φ. For example, a tropical swimmer maybe acquainted with a way of escaping an avalanche, namely makingswimming motions. Yet, if this swimmer had no conception whatsoever ofan avalanche or of snow, he would not know how to escape an avalanche.This suggests that there must be some propositional/representationalaspect of knowing how to Φ. Hence, according to this view for oneto know how to Φ, (i) one must have objectual knowledge of a wayof Φ-ing and (ii) one must grasp a correct and complete conceptionof this way.

8.2 Ability Based Anti-Intellectualism

As we have seen, Ryle is often interpreted as claiming thatknowledge-how ascriptions are nothing more than ascriptions of anability or a complex of dispositions to act in a skilled orintelligent manner (Hornsby 2011). (For a recent defense ofknowledge-how as an ability, see Markie 2015.) Anti-intellectualism ofthis sort has been voiced by Lewis (1990) and has been thought toundercut the so-called “knowledge-argument” in thephilosophy of mind (see Jackson 1986 for a classic formulation. Forfurther discussion, see Nemirow 1990 and Alter 2001). However, Cath(2009) argues that similar worries about the argument survive even onsome prominent intellectualist views. For a survey of otherconsequences thought to follow from the various positions in theknowledge-how debate, see Bengson and Moffett (2011b:44–54).

However, few theorists nowadays identify knowledge-how with bareabilities. Setiya (2012) holds that to have knowledge-how is to havethe disposition to act guided by one’s intention; Constantin(2018) argues that knowing how to Φ is to have the disposition tohave the ability to Φ. Neo-Rylean views are also developed byCraig (1990), Wiggins (2012), and Löwenstein (2016). Craigsuggests that knowledge-how to Φ amounts to the ability to teachothers how to Φ. Wiggins argues that genuine knowledge-how stemsfrom a bundle of practical abilities that constitute the ethos of apractice and, while interrelated with propositional knowledge, cannotbe reduced to it. In turn, Löwenstein argues that knowledge-howto Φ is the ability to Φ intelligently guided by theunderstanding of the activity of Φ-ing.

Carter and Pritchard (2015a,b,c) develop an alternative view whichdoes not equate knowledge-how with an ability, but it still givesability a central theoretical role. In their view, knowing how toΦ is a cognitive achievement,given our abilities toΦ: if one successfully Φs because of one’s ability, thenone knows how to Φ. And if one knows how to Φ, then one ispositioned to successfully Φ because of one’s ability.Therefore, for them, knowledge-how does not reduce to the merepossession of abilities but it essentially involves the successfulenactment of these abilities. Habgood-Coote (2019) defends the viewthat knowing how to Φ just is the ability to generate the rightanswers to the question of how to Φ. Although on this view,knowledge-how is a relation an agent bears to a proposition—onethat answers the relevant practical question—this relation to aproposition is not understood in epistemic terms but in terms ofdispositions (see also Audi 2017 and Farkas 2017).

8.3 Radical Anti-Intellectualism: Practicalism

While the intellectualist holds that knowledge-how must be understoodin terms of knowledge-that,radical anti-intellectualismholds that knowledge-that must be understood in terms of knowledge-howor skill. As Hetherington puts it:

Your knowing thatpis your having the ability tomanifest various accurate representations ofp. The knowledgeas such is the ability as such. (2011: 42, original emphasis)

An agent knows that, for instance, she is in France whenever she isable to produce the corresponding true belief, to assert that she isindeed in France, provide justification, answer related questions,etc. (see Hartland-Swann 1956; Roland 1958 for classic formulation andHetherington’s 2006, 2011, 2020 “practicalism” for amore recent form of radical anti-intellectualism).

9. Knowledge-How and Skill

9.1 Skill Across Cultures

The most recent debate on knowledge-how has intertwined with a debateon the nature of skills. While there is no consensus on what counts asa skill, by and large people take skills to manifest in purposeful andgoal-directed activities and to be learnable and improvable throughpractice (Fitts & Posner 1967; Stanley & Krakauer 2013;Willingham 1998; Yarrow, Brown, & Krakauer 2009). Skills areusually contrasted withknacks (or mere talents). Somecontrast them with habits (Pear 1926; Ryle 1949) in that these areperformed automatically, whereas the exercise of intelligentcapacities involves self-control, attention to the conditions, andawareness of the task. Others, instead, argue that understanding skillrequires a better understanding of what habits amount to (Gallagher2017; Hutto & Robertson 2020).

The topic of skill and expertise is central since ancient philosophythrough the notion oftechnē. Although both Plato andAristotle tooktechnē to be a kind of knowledge, thereis significant controversy about their conceptions regarding thenature of this kind of knowledge and its relation to experience(empeiria) on one hand, and scientific knowledge(epistēmē) on the other (Johansen 2017; Lorenz& Morison 2019; Coope 2020). Annas (1995, 2001, 2011) develops aninterpretation on which skill and virtue (orphronēsis)are closer in Aristotle’s action theory than usually thought andthey are both conceived along a broadly intellectualist model.

In contemporary times, the notion of skill is central to thephilosophy of the twentieth-century French phenomenologist MauriceMerleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty (1945 [1962]) distinguishes betweenmotor intentionality—the sort of intentionalityrelevant for motor skills—andcognitive intentionality.While the latter is conceptual and representational, Merleau-Pontythought that motor intentionality is non-representational andnon-conceptual. Central to Merleau-Ponty is the role of motor skillsin shaping perceptual experience: in paradigmatic cases of perception,the flow of information taken in by perceivers is inseparable from theway they move through a scene. On this view, even superficially staticperceptions engage motor skills, such as seeing the color of a tableas uniform when different parts of it are differently illuminated (seeSiegel 2020 for an helpful introduction).

This phenomenological tradition inspires Dreyfus’ (1991, 2000,2002, 2005, 2007) critique of standard action theory. According toDreyfus, theories on which an action is intentional only if the agentis in a mental state that represents the goal of her action (cf.Searle 1980, 2001) or on which actions are permeated by conceptualrationality (cf. McDowell 2007) are not supported by the phenomenologyof purposive activity. Paradigmatic examples of these purposiveactivities are, for Dreyfus, skillful activities like playing tennisor habitual activity like rolling over in bed or making gestures whilespeaking. In this sort of skillful coping, Dreyfus thought that themind does not represent the world as detached from it. Rather, it isfundamentally embedded, absorbed, and embodied (see Gehrman &Schwenkler 2020 for an helpful introduction to Dreyfus on skills).

The notion of skill is central also in Eastern philosophy. Garfieldand Priest (2020) examine the various roles that the notion of skillplays in the Indian school of Mahayana Buddhism, in Daoism, and inChan/Zen thought. In Daoism as well as in Chan/Zen Buddhism, theemphasis on skill is also connected, fundamentally, to concerns aboutliving a good and ethical life. Sarkissan (2020) argues that twoprominent types of expertise often encountered in ancient Chinesethought from the sixth to third centuries BCE: The first is expertiseat a particular craft, occupation, ordao, as is mostfamously presented in the Daoist anthologyZhuangzi. Thesecond is ethical expertise in the Ruist (Confucian) and Mohistschools (cf. for more on skill in Buddhism, see also MacKenzie2020).

9.2 Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism About Skill

What is the relation between knowledge-how and skill? For many tasksat least, it is intuitive that one cannot be skilled at it withoutknowing how to perform it. At first, it also seems as if knowledge-howentails skill: one does not really know how to swim if one does nothave the skill to swim; and one cannot know how to tell apart birdswithout the skills of a bird watcher. One might object to thesufficiency of knowledge-how for skill on the grounds that it isnatural to say things such as “John may know how to makerisotto, but I would not say he is skilled at it”. However,knowing how to make risottosufficiently well (relative tocontextually determined standards) might entail being skilled at it(relative to the same standards) (Cath 2020).

Ryle (1946, 1949) used “skill” and“knowledge-how” interchangeably in his criticism of the“Intellectualist legend” (for discussion, see Kremer2020). In fact, Ryle’s view of knowledge-how is stated,literally, as the view that “skill” is a complex ofdispositions (Ryle 1949: 33; see also Ryle 1967, 1974, 1976 for hisviews on how skill as a form of knowledge is distinguished by theforms on how it is taught and learned through training). Thisdiscussion brings us to whether intellectualism about knowledge-howandintellectualism about skill stand or fall together.Should intellectualists about knowledge-how identify skill too withpropositional knowledge? While Stanley and Williamson (2001) embracethe view that knowledge-how is propositional knowledge, in a recentpaper (Stanley & Williamson 2017), they refuse to think ofskill as a standing propositional knowledge state. Rather,they argue that skills are dispositions to know. One motivation forthis view is that this addresses the novelty challenge raised byDreyfus (1991, 2005). According to this challenge, propositionalknowledge cannot explain the ability to respond intelligently tosituations that have not been encountered by the agent before. Ifskills are dispositions to know, it is no mystery how novel situationscan be handled by skillful agents. Stanley & Williamson (2017)claim that the resulting view is still broadly intellectualist in asense, because on it, skillful action manifests propositionalknowledge (for a criticism of this response to the novelty objection,see Pavese 2016 inOther Internet Resources).

Some authors argue that while skills may be related to propositionalknowledge, they do not reduce to it. Dickie (2012) suggests that anagent is skilled at Φ whenever her intentions to Φ arenon-lucky selectors of non-lucky means to Φ; while, in turn, thesemeans might manifest propositional knowledge. Some argue that controlis necessary for skills, and control cannot fully be understood interms of propositional knowledge (Fridland 2014, 2017a, 2017b). Inorder to provide a theory of skill that makes room for control,Fridland (2020) develops a “functional” account of skills.In this view, a skill is a function from intentions to action,implemented through certain “control structures”, whichinclude attention and strategic control. Among these controlstructures, there is also propositional knowledge, which is requiredfor strategic control. In contrast, intellectualists about skillsargue that being in control is not intelligible unless it isunderstood in terms of knowing what one is doing in virtue of knowinghow to perform that action. Therefore, they argue that agentivecontrol itself is best understood in terms of the capacity forpropositional knowledge.

9.3 Skills in Epistemology

Understanding the nature of skill and its relation with knowledge isof crucial importance for virtue epistemology—the view thatknowledge is to be defined in terms of the success of our cognitiveskills (Zagzebski 2003, 2008; Sosa 2007, 2009; J. Greco 2003, 2010;Pritchard 2012; Turri 2013, 2016; Beddor & Pavese 2020; Pritchard2020). Nevertheless, if it turns out that skill must be explained interms of knowledge, virtue epistemology would be trying to account forknowledge in terms of knowledge and so would be viciously circular(see Millar 2009; Stanley & Williamson 2017 for an argument inthis spirit). Some virtue epistemologists have responded by offeringan anti-intellectualist account of knowledge-yielding cognitiveskills. Sosa and Callahan (2020) describe the relevant skills asdispositions to succeed when one tries—such that knowledge isobtained when agents in the right shape and in the right situationenact these skills appropriately.

9.4 The Nature of Skilled Action

Recent discussions on skill include a renewed debate on the nature ofskilled action—i.e., on the sort of processes that are involvedin the manifestation of skills. The most recent discussion on skilledaction concerns the extent to which they are automatic or underconscious control. A long tradition has taken skilled action to beparadigmatically a matter of “absorbed coping” (Heidegger1927; Merleau-Ponty 1945 [1962]; Dreyfus 1991)—characterized asimmersion in the situation and intuitive response to its demands, withlittle awareness of the body, tools or even possibly the activityitself. Following Dreyfus and the phenomenological tradition, someenactivists (e.g., Noë 2004) highlight the analogies betweenskillful behavior and perception; other enactivists (e.g., Gallagher2017; Hutto & Robertson 2020) argue that in order to understandthe automaticity and unreflectiveness of skilled action, we ought tobetter understand habitual behavior. Even outside the phenomenologicaltradition, people have emphasized the unreflective aspect of skilledaction. For example, Papineau (2013) argues that skilled actions aretypically too fast for conscious control. One important argument forthe unreflectiveness of skilled action starts from the phenomenon ofchoking under pressure, where an individual performs significantlyworse than would be expected in a high-pressure situation. Thisphenomenon has been taken to be evidence that skillful action proceedswithout conscious attention, because choking episodes are thought toarise from the fact that anxiety leads one to focus and directone’s mind on the performance, which would proceed smoothly ifmindless (Baumeister 1984; Masters 1992; Beilock & Carr 2001;Ford, Hodges, & Williams 2005; Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy2006; Gucciardi & Dimmock 2008). Some argue that unreflectivenessalso characterizes skillful joint action (Høffding 2014;Gallagher and Ilundáin-Agurruza 2020).

In recent years, however, some have emphasized the role of attentionand consciousness in skillful performance (Montero 2016, 2020; Wu2016, 2020). Montero argues against the Dreyfusian idea of skillfuland mindless coping, by noting that online conscious thought aboutwhat one is doing is compatible with expertise and by surveyingempirical evidence that suggests revisiting the choking argument.Christensen, Sutton and McIlwain (2016) and Christensen, Sutton, andBicknell’s (2019) argue for the centrality of cognition inexplaining the flexibility of skilled action in complex situations andadvance a “mesh theory” of skilled action, according towhich skilled action results for a mesh of both automatic andcognitively controlled processes (for a survey of some of theseissues, Christensen 2019. See also Sutton 2007 and Fridland2017b).

10. Knowledge-How and Other Related Topics

Knowledge-how is related to but distinct frompracticalknowledge (Anscombe 1957). Practical knowledge is occurrentduring intentional action: when one intentionally acts, one knows whatone is doing while knowing it. While being capable of practicalknowledge might require knowledge-how, knowing how to perform anaction does not entail performing that action, and so does not entailpractical knowledge (Setiya 2008; Schwenkler 2019; Small 2020). Somehave argued knowledge-how is the norm of intention (Habgood-Coote2018b), so that one can properly intend to perform an act only if oneknows how to perform it.

An important question is whether knowledge-how is connected todistinctive kinds of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007; Dotson 2011;Collins 1990, 1998; Medina 2011). Hawley (2011) discusses thephenomena whereby people ascribe less knowledge-how and ability tofemale musicians (Goldin & Rouse 2000) and whereby standards forjudgments of success due to ability rather than luck or“instinct” tend to be higher for women and non-white men(Biernat & Kobrynowicz 1997). In these cases, agents may betransmitting knowledge by being direct sources of information, ratherthan by testifying to the truth of a proposition. If so, the harmsthat they suffer might call for a different account than standardcases of epistemic injustices like Fricker’s (2007), which focuson testimonial transmission of knowledge-that.

A final topic of interest is the relation between knowledge-how andfaith. While most views on faith focus on its doxastic aspect, Sliwa(2018) argues that faith essentially involves agents acting in theright way with respect to the object of their faith. Having faith in aperson, for instance, requires knowing how to interact with them so asto trust them, help them, and ensure their autonomy in general.Religious faith, similarly, requires faithful agents to know how toenact the relevant practices like going to mass, declaring one’sfaith, and praying.

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Other Internet Resources

• Weatherson, Brian, 2006, “Ryle on Knowing How ’, blogpost at Thoughts Arguments and Rants.
• Links in Phil Papers to recent work on knowledge-how, edited by John Bengson.
• “Know-how,’ by Charles Wallis inDictionary of Philosophy of Mind.
• “Knowledge,” by Stephen Hetherington inInternet Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy.
• Pavese, Carlotta, 2016, “Comments on “Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions” by Joshua Habgood-Coote”,Minds Online (blog), 5September 2016.
• Fantl, Jeremy, “Knowledge How”,Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition),Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/knowledge-how/>. [This was the previous entry on this topic in theStanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy — see theversion history.]

Related Entries

action |epistemology: virtue |intention |knowledge: analysis of |knowledge: by acquaintance vs. description |propositional attitude reports |Ryle, Gilbert

Acknowledgments

The author would like to acknowledge the contributions of AlejandroVesga to this entry. He brought to my attention recently publishedpapers on knowledge-how; brainstormed with me about the structure ofthe entry and the order of the topics to be discussed; providedsubstantial criticisms of, and suggestions for, drafts of the content;contributed the idea of adding a final section that relatedknowledge-how to other related topics; and compiled the bibliographyonce the bulk of the entry was finished.