Tropes

First published Mon Sep 9, 2013; substantive revision Thu Mar 16, 2023

Trope theory is the view that reality is (wholly or partly) made upfrom tropes. Tropes are things like the particular shape, weight, andtexture of an individual object. Because tropes are particular, fortwo objects to ‘share’ a property (for them both toexemplify, say, a particular shade of green) is for each to contain(instantiate, exemplify) a greenness-trope, where thosegreenness-tropes, although numerically distinct, nevertheless exactlyresemble each other.

Apart from this very thin core assumption—that there aretropes—different trope theories need not have very much in common.^[1] Most trope theorists (but not all) believethat—fundamentally—there is nothing but tropes. Most tropetheorists (but, again, not all) hold that resemblance between concreteparticulars is to be explained in terms of resemblance between theirrespective tropes. And most (but not all) hold that resemblancebetween tropes is determined by their primitive intrinsic nature.

That there are tropes seemsprima facie reasonable if wereflect on such things as perception (I don’t see color ingeneral, but the color of this object) and causation (it’s theweight of this object that leaves an impression in the palm of myhand, not weight in general). Yet, neither perception nor causationmanage to distinguish between a theory positing tropes and onepositing, e.g., states of affairs (universal-exemplifications), whichmeans that the support they provide in favor of tropes is weak atbest.

Prima facie reasons to one side, no matter which terms theyuse to characterize their posits, most trope theorists agree thattropes occupy the sweet spot between universal realism and classicalnominalism, something that they believe allows them to reap all thebenefits of both of those views without having to suffer any of theirdisadvantages. More precisely, in accepting the existence ofproperties (or, at least, something ‘property-like’), thetrope theorist accepts an ontology that is fine-grained enough to beable to explain how distinct concrete particulars can besimultaneously similar to, and different from, each other (somethingthe classical nominalist arguably fails to do,cf. Armstrong1978). And in rejecting the existence of universals, she avoids havingto accept the existence of a kind of entity many find mysterious,counterintuitive, and ‘unscientific’ (Schaffer 2001: 249f;Molnar 2003: 22–25; and Armstrong 2005: 310).

In this entry, reasons both for and against the existence of tropesare surveyed. As we shall see, what those reasons are, and how wellthey manage to support (or cause trouble for) the trope-theoreticalthesis, depends on which version of the trope view they concern. Muchof the entry will therefore be dedicated to distinguishing differentversions of the theory from each other, and to see what costs andbenefits adopting either version brings with it.

1. Historical Background

The father of the contemporary debate on tropes was D. C. Williams(1953a; 1953b; 1963; 1986 [1959]; 2018).^[2] Williams defends a one-category theory of tropes (for the first timeso labeled), a bundle theory of concrete particulars, and aresemblance class theory of universals. All of which are now elementsof the so-called ‘standard’ view of tropes. Who to countamong Williams’ trope-theoretical predecessors is unavoidablycontentious. It depends on one’s views on the nature of thetrope itself, as well as on which theses, besides the thesis thattropes exist, one is prepared to accept as part of a trope—ortrope-like—theory.

According to some philosophers, trope theory has roots going back atleast to Aristotle (perhaps to Plato (cf. Buckels 2018), oreven the pre-Socratics (cf. Mertz 1996: 83–118)). IntheCategories, Aristotle points out that Substance andQuality both come in what we may call a universal and a particularvariety (man andthis man in the case of substance,andpallor andthis pale—to ti leukon—inthe case of quality). Not everyone believe that this means thatAristotle accepts the existence of tropes, however. On oneinterpretation (Owen 1965)this pale names an absolutelydeterminate, yet perfectly shareable, shade of pallor. But on a moretraditional interpretation (cf. Ackrill 1963 and, morerecently, Kampa & Wilkins 2018), it picks out a trope, i.e., aparticular ‘bit’ of pallor peculiar to the substance thathappens to exemplify it (for a discussion,cf. Cohen2013).

In view of the strong Aristotelian influence on medieval thinkers, itis perhaps not surprising that tropes or trope-like entities are foundalso here. Often mentioned in this connection is Ockham (cf.also Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Suarez). Ockham held that there are intotal four sorts of individual things: substances, qualities,substantial forms, and matter. Claude Panaccio (2015) argues that allfour sorts of individual things are best understood as tropes or, inthe case of substances, as bundles of tropes (more precisely asnuclear bundles of tropes similar to those defended by e.g.,Simons 1994 and Keinänen 2015).

This list of early proponents of trope-like entities could have beenmade much longer. D. W. Mertz (1996) mentions, besides those alreadylisted, Boëthius, Avicenna, and Averroës. And Kevin Mulliganet al. (1984) point out that similar views can be found defended byearly modern philosophers, including Leibniz, Locke, Spinoza,Descartes, Berkeley and Hume.

Still, it is in the writings of 19^th centuryphenomenological philosophers that the earliest and most systematicpre-Williams ‘trope’-theories are found (Mulligan et al.1984: 293). The clearest example of an early trope theorist of thisvariety is undoubtedly Edmund Husserl. In the third part of hisLogical Investigations (2001 [1900/1913]), Husserl sets outhis theory ofmoments, which is his name for theworld’s abstract (and essentially dependent) individual parts(Correia 2004; Beyer 2016). Husserl was most likely heavily influencedby Bernard Bolzano, who held that everything real is either asubstance or an adherence, i.e., an attribute that cannot be shared(Bolzano 1950 [1851]).^[3] Husserl thought of his moments as (one of) the fundamentalconstituents ofphenomenal reality. This was also how fellowphenomenologists G. F. Stout (1921; 1952),^[4] Roman Ingarden (1964 [1947–1948]) and Ivar Segelberg (1999 [1945;1947;1953])^[5] viewed their fundamental and trope-like posits. Williams’ viewsare not so easily classified. Although he maintained that all ourknowledge rests on perceptual experience, he agreed that it should notbe limited to the perceptually given and that it could be extendedbeyond that by legitimate inference (Campbell et al. 2015). That moreor less all post-Williams proponents of tropes treat their posits asthe fundamental constituents ofmind-independent—notphenomenal—reality, is however clear (cf. e.g., Heil2003).

After Williams, the second most influential trope theorist is arguablyKeith Campbell (1997 [1981]; 1990). Campbell adopted the basics ofWilliams’ (standard) theory and then further developed anddefended it. Later proponents of more or less standard versions of thetrope view include Peter Simons, John Bacon, Anna-Sofia Maurin,Douglas Ehring, Jonathan Schaffer, Kris McDaniel, MarkkuKeinänen, Jani Hakkarainen, Marta Ujvári, Daniel Giberman,Robert K. Garcia, and Anthony Fisher (all of whose most central workson the topic are listed in the Bibliography).

A very influential paper also arguing for a version of the theory(inspired more by Husserl than by Williams) is“Truth-Makers” (Mulligan et al. 1984;cf. alsoDenkel 1996). This paper defends the view that tropes are essentiallydependent entities, the objects of perception, and the world’sbasic truthmakers. Proponents of trope theories which posit tropes asone ofseveral fundamental categories include C. B. Martin(1980), John Heil (2003), George Molnar (2003), and Jonathan Lowe(2006). Molnar and Heil both defend ontologies that include (but arenot limited to) tropes understood as powers, and Lowe counts tropes asone offour fundamental categories. Even more unorthodox arethe views of Mertz (1996, 2016), whose trope-like entities arecategorized as a kind of relation.^[6]

2. The Nature of Tropes

According to several trope theorists—perhaps most notably,according to Williams—what exists when a trope does is anabstract particular. The word ‘abstract’ isambiguous. On the one hand, Williams tells us, it means“transcending individual existence, as a universal,essence, or Platonic idea is supposed to transcend it”(1953a: 15). On this meaning, to be abstract is to benon-spatiotemporal. Tropes—which are standardly taken to existin spacetime—are clearlynot (or, notnecessarily) abstract in this sense (which explains why somephilosophers—e.g., Küng 1967; Giberman 2014, 2022;cf. also Simons 1994: 557—insist on referring to thetrope as ‘concrete’). But then there is thisother—according to Williams “aboriginal”—senseof the term. A sense in which, to be ‘abstract’ is to be“partial, incomplete, or fragmentary, the trait of whatis less than its including whole” (Williams 1953a: 15).It is inthis sense that the trope is supposed to beabstract.

Is saying of the trope that it is abstract in this sense enlightening?Some have worried that it isn’t (cf. e.g., Maurin 2002:21;cf. also Daly 1997). That this worry is unwarranted hasrecently been pretty convincingly argued by Fisher (2020). WhenWilliams argues that the trope is abstract in the sense of“partial, incomplete, or fragmentary”, Fisher notes, whathe means is that it “fails to exhaust the content of the regionit occupies or is merely part of the content of that region”(Fisher 2020: 45;cf. also Williams 1986 [1959]: 3). Oneconsequence of this, is that the trope can only be attended to via aprocess ofabstraction. (In Campbell’s words (1990: 2),it can only be “brought before the mind ... by a process ofselection, of systematic setting aside, of these other qualities ofwhich we are aware”.) But this, Fisher points out, doesnot mean that the trope is abstractbecause it is aproduct of abstraction (if it did, then since attending to basicallyanything (short of everything) involves abstracting away from thesurrounding environment, saying of the trope that it is‘abstract’would be saying nothing veryinformative at all). What it means, rather, is that the trope issomething that requires abstraction to be brought before the mindbecause it is abstract (which, in turn, it isbecause it is such that it does not exhaust the content ofthe region it occupies or is merely part of the content of thatregion). This takes care of this worry (for more reasons to view theabstractness of the trope as integral to its nature, see thediscussion in section 3.1 below).

2.1 Property or Object?

In philosophy, new posits are regularly introduced by being comparedwith, or likened to, an already familiar item. Tropes are no exceptionto this rule. In fact, tropes have been introduced by being comparedwith and likened to not one buttwo distinct but equallyfamiliar kinds of things: properties and objects (Loux 2015). Up untilvery recently, that tropes can be introduced in both of these ways wasconsidered a feature of the theory, not a source of concern. Tropes,was the idea, can be compared with and likened to both properties andobjects, because tropesare a bit of both. Recently, however,both friends and foes of tropes have started to question whethertropescan be a bit of both. At any rate, this will depend onwhatbeing a property andbeing an object amountsto, an issue on which there is no clear consensus.

Looking more closely at existing versions of the trope view, whetherone thinks of one’s posit primarily as a kind of property or asa kind of object certainly influences what one takes to be true (ornot) of it. To see this, compare the tropes defended by Williams withthose defended by Mulligan et al. Williams seems to belong to the campof those who view the trope (primarily) as a kind of object. Tropesare that out of which everything else there is, is constructed. As aconsequence, names for tropes should not be understood as abbreviateddefinite descriptions of the kind ‘the Φ-ness ofx’. Instead, to name a trope should be likened withbaptizing a child or with introducing a man “present in theflesh”, i.e., ostensively (Williams 1953a: 5). Mulliganet al. (1984), on the other hand, seem to regard the trope more as akind of property, and as a consequence of this, argue to the contrarythat the correct (in fact the only) way to refer to tropes isprecisely by way of expressions such as ‘the Φ-ness ofx’. This, they claim (againpace Williams), isbecause tropes are essentiallyof some object, because theyareways the object is (cf. also Heil 2003: 126f).In general, a theory which models its posit primarily on the propertyhence thinks of it as a dependent sort of entity, asofsomething else. And a theory which thinks of its tropes more asobjects—as ‘the alphabet of being’—thinks ofthem as independent, either in the sense that they need not make upthe things they actually make up, or—more radically—in thesense that they need not make up anything at all (that they could beso-called ‘free-floaters’).

How one views the nature of properties and objects, respectively, alsoplays a role for some of the criticisms the trope view has had toface. So, for instance, does Jerrold Levinson think that tropes cannotbe a kind of property because having a property—beingred—amounts to being in a certain condition, where conditionsare not particular (Levinson 1980; 2006). The alternative is thattropes are what he calls ‘qualities’, by which he meanssomething resembling bits of abstract stuff. However, since a theoryaccepting the existence of bits of abstract stuff would be both“ontologically extravagant and conceptually outlandish”(Levinson 2006: 564), abstract stuff most likely doesn’t exist.Which means that, according to Levinson, tropes areneither akind of propertynor a kind of object. A circumstance thatmakes him conclude that tropes do not exist.

Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, next, has argued that, although tropescan be viewed either as a kind of property or as a kind ofobject, they cannot be viewed as a bit of both (Chrudzimski 2002).Which means that the theory loses its coveted‘middle-position’, and with it any advantage it might havehad over rival views. For, he argues, to conceptualize the trope as aproperty—away things are—means imputing in it apropositional structure (Levinson 1980: 107 holds a similarview). Not so if the trope is understood as a kind of object. Butthen, although tropes understood as properties are suitable assemantically efficient truthmakers, the same is not true of tropesunderstood as a kind of object. Conversely, although tropes understoodas a kind of object are suitable candidates for being that from whichboth concrete particulars and abstract universals are constructed,tropes understood as properties are not. Whichever way we conceive oftropes, therefore, the theory’s overall appeal is severelydiminished.

Both Levinson’s and Chrudzimski’s pessimistic conclusionscan be resisted. One option is simply to refuse to accept that onecannot seriously propose that there are “abstract stuffs”.Levinson offers us little more than an incredulous stare in defense ofthis claim, and incredulous stares are well-known for lacking theforce to convince those not similarly incredulous. Another option isto reject the claim that tropes understood as properties must bepropositionally structured. Or, more specifically, to reject the claimthat complex truths need complex—(again)propositionally structured—truthmakers. Some truthmakertheorists—not surprisingly, Mulliganet al. (1984) areamong them—reject this claim. In so doing, they avoid having todraw the sorts of conclusions to which Levinson and (perhapsespecially) Chrudzimski gesture.

A more radical option, finally, is to simply reject the idea thattropes can be informatively categorized either as a kind of propertyor as a kind of object. Some of the features we want to attribute totropes seem to cut across those categories anyhow. So, for instance,if you think ‘being shareable’ is essential to‘being a property’, then, obviously, tropes are notproperties. Yet tropes, even if not shareable, can still beways objects are, and they can still essentially depend onthe objects that have them. Likewise, if ‘monopolizingone’s position in space-time’ is understood as a centraltrait for objects, tropes are not objects. Yet tropes can still be theindependent building-blocks out of which everything else there is, isconstructed.

According to Garcia (2015a, 2016), this is why we ought toframe our discussion of the nature(s) of tropes in terms of anotherdistinction. Rather than distinguishing between tropes understood as akind of property, and tropes understood as a kind of object—andrisk getting caught up in infected debates about the nature of objectsand properties generally—Garcia suggests we distinguish betweentropes understood as ‘modifiers’ and tropes understood as‘modules’. The main difference between tropes understoodin these two ways—a difference that is the source of a greatmany further differences—is that tropes understood as modifiersdo not have the character they confer (on objects), whereas tropesunderstood as modules do. With recourse to this way of distinguishingbetween different versions of the trope-view, Garcia argues, we cannow evaluate each version separately, independently of how we viewobjects and properties, respectively.^[7]

2.2 Complex or Simple?

According to most trope-theorists, tropes are ontologically simple.Here this should be taken to mean that tropes have no constituents, inthe sense that they are not ‘made up’ or‘built’ from entitiesbelonging to some othercategory. Simple tropes, thus understood, can still haveparts—even necessarily so—as long as those parts are alsotropes (cf. e.g., Giberman 2022; Robb 2005: 469).^[8]^,^[9]

That tropes are ontologically simple arguably provides the tropetheorist with a tie-breaker vis-à-vis states of affairs (ifstates of affairs are understood as substrates instantiatinguniversals).Prima facie a theory positing states of affairshas the same explanatory power as a theory positing tropes. But atheory of states of affairs posits—apart from the state ofaffairs itself—at least two (fundamental) sorts of things(universals and substrates), whereas a theory of tropes (at least atheory of tropes according to which tropes are simple and objects arebundles of tropes) posits only one (tropes). From the point of view ofontological parsimony, therefore, the trope view ought to be preferred.^[10]

Can the trope be simple? According to a number of thetheory’s critics, it cannot. Here is Herbert Hochberg’sargument to that effect (2004: 39;cf. also his 2001:178–179; for versions of the argumentcf. alsoBrownstein 1973: 47; Moreland 2001; Armstrong 2004; Ehring 2011):^[11]

Let a basic proposition be one that is either atomic or the negationof an atomic proposition. Then consider tropest andt* where ‘t is different fromt*’ and ‘t is exactly similar tot*’ are both true. Assume you take either‘diversity’ or ‘identity’ as primitive. Thenboth propositions are basic propositions. But they are logicallyindependent. Hence, they cannot have the same truth makers. Yet,for…trope theory /…/ they do and must have the sametruth makers. Thus the theory fails.

A number of different things can be said in response to this argument.It assumes, first, that if tropes are simple, trope theory mustviolate what appears to be a truly fundamental principle (call it HP,short for ‘Hochberg’s principle’): thatlogically independent basic propositions must have distincttruthmakers. Having to reject HP is hence a cost of having simpletropes. Perhaps this cost is acceptable. That it is, seems to be aview held by Mulligan et al. (a similar view is, according toArmstrong 2005: 310 also held by Robb). For, they claim (1984:296):

…[w]e conceive it as in principle possible that one and thesame truth-maker may make true sentences with different meanings: thishappens anyway if we take non-atomic sentences into account, and noarguments occur to us which suggest that this cannot happen for atomicsentences as well.

One reason for rejecting HP has been put forward by Fraser MacBride(2004). HP, he notes, is formulated in terms of‘logically independent basic propositions’.However, HP is only plausible if it takes more than logical (whatMacBride calls ‘formal’) (in)dependence into account:material independent also matters!^[12] Only if two propositions are logicallyand materiallyindependent does it follow that they must have distinct truthmakers.But formal and material independence can—and in this case mostlikely will—come apart. For (ibid: 190):

…[i]nsofar as truth-makers are conceived as inhabitants of theworld, as creatures that exist independently of language, it is farfrom evident that logically independent statements in the formal senseare compelled to correspond to distinct truth-makers.

Another argument against the simplicity of tropes comes from Ehringand was inspired by an argument first delivered by Moreland (2001:64). J. P. Moreland’s argument concludes that trope theory isunintelligible. Ehring thinks this is much too strong. This istherefore the formulation of the objection he prefers (2011: 180):

The nature and particularity of a trope are intrinsically grounded inthat trope. If tropes are simple, their nature and their particularityare hence identical. The natures of a red trope and an orange tropeare inexactly similar. Hence their respective particularities shouldbe inexactly similar as well. However, these particularities areexactly similar. Hence, their particularities are notidentical to their natures, and tropes are not simple.

Here the trope theorist could probably reply that the objection restson a kind of category mistake: that ‘particularities’ arequite simply not things amenable to standing in similarity relations.Alternatively, she might just concede that tropes are complex, yetargue that they are so in the innocent sense of having other tropes asparts (one particularity-trope and a distinct nature-trope). Againstthis, Ehring (2011: 183f) has argued that if the trope has itsparticularity reside in one of the tropes that make it up, we canalways ask aboutthat trope what groundsitsparticularity and nature respectively. Which would seem to lead usinto an infinite—and most probably vicious—regress.

Ehring’s own solution to the problem is to adopt a version ofthe trope view (what he calls Natural Class Trope Nominalism) on whichtropes do not resemble each other in virtue of their nature, butrather in virtue of belonging to this or that natural class. On thisview, what makes two tropes qualitatively the same (their belonging tothe same natural class of tropes) is different from what makes themdistinct (the tropes themselves, primitively being what they are).Which means that, that tropes can be distinct yet exactly resembleeach other is no longer a reason to think that tropes are complex.

A different kind of solution has recently been proposed by Giberman(2022,cf. also his 2014). According to him, becauseat least some of the tropes there are, are spatiotemporally located(they are what he calls ‘concrete’)^[13], they must have size, shape, and duration. That tropes have thesedifferent features means that they are capable of multipleresemblances. Which, claims Giberman, means that they arequalitatively complex. Yet that they are does not threaten the tropeview in any way. For, according to Giberman, tropes are (qualitativelycomplex)ostriches. What this means is that tropes are suchthat they “primitively account for their own multipleresemblance capacities”. Which means that “no (further)ontological machinery is required to explain that an ostrich trope hasmultiple properties” (even though we are admitting that itdoes!) (Giberman 2022: 18). In this sense, the trope is like theQuinean concrete particular (Giberman ibid.;cf. also Quine1948, Devitt 1980):

When the Quinean is asked what it is about a given electron thatmetaphysically explains its ability to resemble both massive thingsand charged things, he will likely answer ‘nothing!—itjust is that way’... Similarly, when asked what it is about then charge trope that metaphysically explains its ability toresemble both charged things and things of a certain size, the ostrichtrope theorist answers: ‘the trope itself—no morestructure to it than that’.

But then, on Giberman’s view—andpaceEhring—we arenot allowed to ask of the properties ofthe trope what groundstheir particularity and nature(that’s primitive!). And if asking this is not allowed, is theidea, no infinite regress can be generated (cf. also fn 20,this entry).

What about the advantage the trope view was supposed to have over thestate-of-affairs view? Primitive or not, if the complexity is there,doesn’t this mean that those views are now on a parparsimony-wise? Giberman doesn’t think so, and gives two reasonswhy not: (1) although the ostrich trope is qualitatively complex, itisnot—unlike the state of affairs—categoriallycomplex (no trope has a constituent from outside the categorytrope) (2022: 16); (2) (more contentiously) even states ofaffairs, in being spatiotemporal, need to have size and shape etc. Butthen, apart from having to accept the existence of categoriallydistinct substrates, the state of affairs theorist must also acceptthat universals—like tropes—are primitively qualitativelycomplex (ibid: 18).

2.3 Trope Individuation

What makes two tropes, existing in the same world at the same time, distinct?^[14]

A natural suggestion is that we take the way we normally identify andrefer to tropes very literally and individuate tropes with referenceto the objects that ‘have’ them:

Object Individuation (OI):: For any tropesa andb such thataexactly resemblesb,a ≠b iffa belongs to an object that is distinct from the object towhichb belongs.

No trope theorist endorses this natural suggestion, however. Thereason why not is that, at least if objects are bundles of tropes, theindividuation of objects will depend on the individuation of thetropes that make them up, which means that, on OI, individuationbecomes circular (Lowe 1998: 206f.; Schaffer 2001: 249; Ehring 2011:77). Indeed, matters improve only marginally if objects are understoodas substrates in which tropes are instantiated. For, although on thisview, OI does not force one to accept a circular account ofindividuation, this is because it is now the substrate which carriesthe individuating burden. This leaves the individuation of thesubstrate still unaccounted for, and so we appear to have gottennowhere (Mertz 2001). Any trope theorist who accepts the possibleexistence of ‘free-floating’ tropes—i.e., tropesthat exist unattached to any object—must in any casereject this account of trope individuation (at least as long as sheaccepts the possibility of there beingmore than onefree-floating trope at any given time).

The main-contenders are insteadspatiotemporal individuation(SI) andprimitivist individuation (PI). According to SI,first, that two tropes belonging to the same world are distinct can bemetaphysically explained with reference to a difference in theirrespective spatiotemporal position (Campbell 1990: 53f.; Lowe 1998:207; Schaffer 2001: 249; Giberman 2022: 18):

Spatiotemporal Individuation (SI):: For any tropesa andb such thataexactly resembleb,a ≠b iffais at non-zero distance fromb.

This is an account of trope individuation that seems to respect theway tropes are normally picked out, yet which doesnot—circularly—individuate tropes with reference to theobjects they make up and which does not rule out the existence of‘free-floaters’. In spite of this, the majority of thetrope theorists (Schaffer 2001 being one important exception) haveopted instead for primitivism (cf. e.g., Ehring 2011: 76;Campbell 1990: 69; Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2014). Primitivismis best understood as the denial of the idea that there is any trueand informative way of filling out the biconditional ‘For anyexactly resembling tropesa andb,a ≠b iff …’. Thata andb aredistinct—if they are—is hence primitive. It has no further(ontological) analysis or (metaphysical) explanation.

According to what is probably the most influential argument in favorof PI over SI (an argument that changed Campbell’s mind:cf. his 1990: 55f.;cf. also Moreland 1985: 65), SIshould be abandoned because it rules out the (non-empty) possibilitythat (parts of) reality could benon-spatiotemporal.^[15] Against this, proponents of SI have argued that the thesis thatreality must be spatiotemporal can be independently justified(primarily because naturalism can be independently justified,cf. Schaffer 2001: 251). And even if it cannot, SI couldeasily be modified to accommodatethe analogue of thelocational order of space (Campbell 1997 [1981]: 136; Schaffer ibid.).^[16]

A common argumentin favor of SI is that it allows itsproponents to rule out what most agreeare emptypossibilities: swapping and piling.

Swapping: According to the so-called ‘swappingargument’ (first formulated in Armstrong 1989: 131–132;cf. also Schaffer 2001: 250f; Ehring 2011: 78f.),^[17]^,^[18] if properties are tropes, and individuationis primitive, two distinct yet exactly similar tropes might swapplaces (this rednesshere might have beenthere, andvice versa). The result, post-swap, is a situation that isontologically distinct from that pre-swap. However,empirically/causally the pre- and post-swap situations are the same(cf. LaBossiere 1993: 262 and Denkel 1996: 173f. for reasonsto doubt that theyare the same). That is, given the naturallaws as we know them, that this red-tropehere swaps placeswith that red-tropethere makes no difference to the futureevolution of things. Which means that, not only would the world look,feel and smell exactly the same to us pre- and post-swap, it would bein principle impossible to construct a device able to distinguish thetwo situations from one another. For any device able to detect the(primitive) difference between the two situations would also have tobe a device able to communicate this difference (by making a sound, byturning a handle, etc…) yet this is precisely what the factthat swapping makes no difference to the future evolution of thingsprevents (cf. Dasgupta 2009). This makes admitting thepossibility of swapping seem unnecessary. If we also accept the(arguably reasonable) Eleatic principle according to which onlychanges that matter empirically/causally should count as genuine, wecan draw the even stronger conclusion that swapping is not genuinelypossible, and, hence, that any account of individuation from which itfollows that it is, should be abandoned.^[19]

To accept SI does not immediately block swapping (Schaffer 2001: 250).For, SI (just like OI and PI) is a principle about trope individuationthat holdsintra-worldly. In this case: within any givenworld, no two exactly similar tropes are at zero distance from eachother. Swapping, on the other hand, concerns what is possibly true (ornot) of exactly similar tropes consideredinter-worldly. Butthis means that, although SI does not declare swapping possible, itdoesn’t rule it out either. According to the proponent of SI,this is actually a good thing. For there is one possibility that itwould be unfortunate if one’s principle of individuationdid block, namely the possibility—calledsliding—that this red-tropehere could havebeenthere had the wind blown differently (Schaffer 2001:251). To get the desired result (i.e., to block swapping whileallowing for sliding), Schaffer suggests we combine trope theory withSIand a Lewisian counterpart theory of transworld identity(Lewis 1986). The result is an account according to which exactlyresembling tropes areintra-worldly identical if they inhabitthe same position in space-time. And according to which they areinter-worldly counterparts, if they are distinct, yet standin sufficiently similar distance- and other types of relations totheir respective (intra-worldly) neighbors. With this addition inplace, Schaffer claims, a trope theory which individuates its positswith reference to their spatiotemporal positionwill makeroom for the possibility of sliding, because (2001: 253):

On the counterfactual supposition of a shift in wind, what results isa redness exactly like the actual one, which is in perfectlyisomorphic resemblance relations to its worldmates as the actual oneis to its worldmates, with just a slight difference in distance withrespect to, e.g., the roundness of the moon.

…yet itwon’t allow for the possibility ofswapping, because:

…the nearest relative of the redness of the rose which ishere at our world would be the redness stillhere‘post-swap’. The redness which would be here has exactlythe same inter- and intraworld resemblance relations as the rednesswhich actually is here, and the same distance relations, and hence isa better counterpart than the redness which would bethere.

This is not necessarily a reason to prefer SI over PI, however. For,PI, just like SI, is an inter-worldly principle of individuation,which means that it, just like SI, could be combined with a Lewisiancounterpart theory, thereby preventing swapping yet making room forsliding. It is, in other words, the counterpart theory, and not SI (orPI), which does all the work. In any case, it is not clear thatintra-worldly swappingis an empty possibility. According toEhring, there are circumstances in which a series of slidingsconstitute one case of swapping, something that he thinks would makeswapping more a reasonfor than against PI (Ehring 2011:81–85).

Piling: Even if swapping does not give us a reason to preferSI over PI, perhaps its close cousin ‘piling’ does.Consider a particular red rose. Given trope theory, this rose is redbecause it is partly constituted by a redness-trope. But what is topreventmore than one—even indefinitelymany—exactly similar red-tropes from partly constituting thisrose? Given PI: nothing. It is however far from clear how one couldempirically detect that the rose has more than one redness trope, justlike it is not clear how one could empirically detect how many rednesstropes it has, provided it has more than one. This is primarilybecause it is far from clear how having more than one redness tropecould make a causal difference in the world. But if piling makes noempirical/causal difference, then given a (plausible) Eleaticprinciple, the possibility of piling is empty, which means that PIought to be rejected (Armstrong 1978: 86;cf. also Simons1994: 558; Schaffer 2001: 254,fn. 11).

In defense of PI, its proponents now point to a special case ofpiling, called ‘pyramiding’ (an example being a 5 kgobject consisting of five 1 kg tropes). Pyramidingdoes seemgenuinely possible. Yet, if piling is ruled out, so is pyramiding(Ehring 2011: 87ff.;cf. also Armstrong 1997: 64f.; Daly1997: 155). According to Schaffer, this is fine. For, althoughadmittedly not quite as objectionable as other types of piling (whichhe calls ‘stacking’), pyramiding faces a serious problemwith predication: if admitted, it will be true of the 5 kg object that“[i]t has the property of weighing 1 kg” (Schaffer 2001:254). Against this, Ehring has pointed out that to say of the 5 kgobject that “[i]t has the property of weighing 1 kg” is atmost pragmatically odd, and that, even if this oddness is regarded asunacceptable, to avoid it would not require the considerablecomplication of one’s theory of predication imagined by Schaffer(Ehring 2011: 88–91).

According to Schaffer, the best argument for the possibility ofpiling—hence the best argument against SI—is ratherprovided by the existence of so-called bosons (photons being oneexample). Bosons are entities which do not obey Pauli’sExclusion Principle, and hence such that two or more bosonscan occupy the same quantum state. A ‘one-high’boson-pile is hence empirically distinguishable from a‘two-high’ one, which means that the possibility of pilingin general is not ruled out even if we accept an Eleatic principle.Schaffer (2001: 255) suggests we solve this problem for SI byconsidering the wave—not the particle/boson—as the way theobject ‘really’ is. But this solution comes withcomplications of its own for the proponent of SI. For, “[t]hewave function lives in configuration space rather than physical space,and the ontology of the wave function, its relation to physical space,and its relation to the relativistic conception of spacetime which SIso naturally fits remain deeply mysterious” (Schaffer 2001: 256).^[20]

3. Tropes as Building Blocks

As we have seen, tropes can be conceptualized, not just asparticularizedways things are, but also—and on someversions of trope theory, primarily—as that out of whicheverything else there is, is constructed. Minimally, this means thattropes must fulfill at least two constructive tasks: that of making up(the equivalent of) the realist’s universal, and that of makingup (the equivalent of) the nominalist’s concrete particular.

3.1 Tropes and Universals

How can distinct things have things—their properties—incommon? This is the problem of ‘the One over Many’(cf. e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000; Maurin 2022: sect. 2).Universals provide a straightforward solution to this problem:distinct things can have things in common, because there is a type ofentity—the universal—capable of existing in (and hencecharacterizing) more than one object at once. The tropetheorist—at least if she does not accept the existence ofuniversalsin addition to tropes^[21]—does not have recourse to entities that can be likewise identical indistinct instances. She must therefore come up with an alternativesolution. Here I’ll consider three.

The Resemblance Class Theory: The most commonly acceptedtrope-solution to the problem of the One over Many takes two objectsa andb to ‘share’ aproperty—F-ness— if at least one of of the tropesthat make upa belongs to the same (exact) resemblance classas at least one of the (numerically distinct) tropes that make upb (cf. Williams 1953a: 10; Campbell 1990:31f.;cf. also Lewis 1986: 64f.). Exact resemblance is anequivalence relation (althoughcf. Mormann 1995 foran alternative view), which means that it is asymmetrical,reflexive, andtransitive relation. Because it is anequivalence relation, exact resemblance partitions the set of tropesinto mutually excluding and non-overlapping classes. Exact resemblanceclasses of tropes, thus understood, function more or less as thetraditional universal does. Which is why proponents of this view thinkthe problem can be solved with reference to them.

A point of contention among those who hold this view is if acceptingit mean having to accept the existence of resemblance relations. Thosewho think it doesn’t, point out that resemblance is aninternal relation which supervenes on whatever it relates:that the (degree of) resemblance between distinct tropes is entailedsimply given their existence.^[22] Assuming that our ontology is ‘sparse’ (a thought manybelieve can be independently justified,cf. e.g., Schaffer2004 and Armstrong 1978), only what is minimally required to make trueall truths exists. Which means that, if resemblance is an internalrelation, what exists when distinct tropes resemble eachother—and so what plays the role of the realist’suniversal—is nothing but the resembling tropes themselves(Williams 1963: 608; Campbell 1990: 37f.;cf. also Armstrong1989: 56).

Does it follow from the fact that exact resemblance must obtain giventhe existence of its relata, that it is no ontological addition tothem? Some philosophers (Daly 1997: 152 is among them) do not thinkso. But if it doesn’t follow, some have argued, the tropetheorist must combat a trope theoretical version of what has becomeknown as ‘Russell’s regress’. Russell’sregress (perhaps better: Russell’s regressargument) isan argument to the effect that, if some particulars (Russell wasthinking of concrete particulars, not of tropes) (exactly) resembleeach other, then either the relation of resemblance existsand isa universal, or we end up in (vicious) infinite regress (Russell1997 [1912]: 48;cf. also Küng 1967). Chris Daly (1997:149) provides us with a trope-theoretical version of this argument:^[23]

Consider three concrete particulars which are the same shade ofred…each of these concrete particulars has a redtrope—call these tropesF,G, andH—and these concrete particulars exactly resemble eachother in colour becauseF,G, andH exactlyresemble each other in colour. But it seems that this account isincomplete. It seems that the account should further claim thatresemblance tropes hold betweenF,G, andH. That is, it seems that there are resemblance tropesholding between the members of the pairsF andG,G andH, andF andH… Letus call the resemblance tropes in questionR₁,R₂, andR₃…each ofthese resemblance tropes in turn exactly resemble each other.Therefore, certain resemblance tropes hold between thesetropes…we are launched on a regress.

This regress is a problem only if it isvicious. The mostconvincing reason for thinking that it is not is provided if weconsider the ‘pattern of dependence’ it instantiates.^[24] For, as we have seen, even those who do not think that theinternality of exact resemblance makes it a mere‘pseudo-addition’ to its subvenient base, agree thatresemblance, whatever it is, is such that its existence is necessarilyincurred simply given the existence of its relata. But then, no matterhow many resemblances we regressively generate, ultimately they alldepend for their existence on the existence of the resembling tropes,which resemble each other because of their individual nature, which isprimitive. This means that the existence of the regress in no waycontradicts—it does not function as areductioagainst—the resemblance of the original tropes. On the contrary;it isbecause the tropes resemble each other, that theregress exists. Therefore, the regress is benign (cf. e.g.,Campbell 1990: 37; Maurin 2013).

This response only works if the nature of individualtropes—their being what they are—is primitive andnot further analyzable (i.e., it only works if we assume a standardview of the nature of tropes). To see this, compare the standard viewwith a view with which it is often confused: resemblance nominalism.On a version of the trope view according to which universals areresemblance classes of tropes, tropes have the same nature if theyresemble each other. Yet, importantly, they resemble each other (ornot)in virtue of the (primitive) nature they each‘have’ (or ‘are’). Resemblancenominalism, on the other hand, is the view that two objects have thenatures they do in virtue of the resemblance relations which obtainbetween them. This means that, whether they resemble or not, is notdecided given the existence and nature of the objects themselves.Rather, the pattern of dependence is the other way around. Andthis—arguably—makes the regress vicious. Perhaps for thatreason, resemblance nominalism has no explicit proponent among thetrope theorists.

The Natural Class Theory: Those not convinced that‘Daly’s regress’ is benign might prefer a view(first defended by Ehring 2011: 175f) according to which the trope isnot what it is either primitively or because of whatever resemblancerelations it stands in to other tropes, but because of the naturalclass to which it belongs. Accepting this view provides us with a newsolution to the problem of the One over Many, one that does not dependon the existence (or not) of exact resemblance relations. On thisview, more precisely, two objectsa andb‘share’ a property—F-ness— if atleast one of the tropes that make upa belongs to the samenatural class as at least one of the tropes that make upb.The problem with this alternative is that it appearsto—implausibly—turn explanation on its head. If accepted,tropes do not belong to this or that class because of their nature.Rather, tropes have the natures they do because they belong to this orthat class.

The Trope-Kind Theory: Although he in his (1953a)briefly ‘dallied’ (his word) with the view that, to be auniversal is to be a resemblance class of tropes, Williams soonthereafter changed his mind (cf. esp. his 1986 [1959] and 1963).^[25] According to the view he adopted instead of the resemblance view,universals are neither “made” nor “discovered”but are something we acknowledge “by a relaxation of theidentity conditions of thought and language” (1986 [1959]: 8;cf. also Campbell 1990: 44). If the F-ness ofa andthe F-ness ofb is counted in a way that is subject to therule that anything indiscernible is identical, their sameness isexplained with reference to the universal they share. And if theF-ness ofa and the F-ness ofb is counted in a waythatisn’t subject to that rule, their sameness isexplained with reference to their individual, distinct, yet exactlyresembling tropes. Importantly, Williams thinks of this as a kind ofrealism—animmanent realism—about universals(Fisher 2017: 346;cf. also Fisher 2018 and Heil 2012:102f.). It takes universals to be “present in, and in factcomponents of, their instances” (Williams 1986 [1959]: 10). Yet,as noted by Fisher (2017: 346) tropes are still the primitive elementsof being. Universals are real in virtue of beingmind-independent. Yet, universals aren’t fundamental(Fisher: ibid.):

Their reality is determined by mind-independent facts about tropes.Tropes manifest universals in the sense that universals are nothingover and above property instances as tropes are by their nature ofkinds.

The trope-kind theory offers an interesting and so far surprisinglylittle discussed solution to the problem of the One over Many. So far,it is a view with few if any explicit contemporary proponents (thoughcf. Paul 2002, 2017 and van Inwagen 2017: 348f.^[26]). It is not unlikely that this state of affairs is now about tochange.

3.2 Tropes and Concrete Particulars

The second constructive task facing the trope theorist is that ofbuilding something that behaves like a concrete particular, using onlytropes. Exactly how a concrete particular behaves is of course amatter that can be debated. This is not a debate to which the tropetheorist has had very much—or at least not anything veryoriginal—to contribute. Instead, the trope theoreticaldiscussion has been focused on an issue that needs solvingbefore questions concerning what a concrete particular can orcannot do more precisely become relevant: the issue ofif andhow tropes make up concrete particulars in the firstplace.

Whether this issue is best approached by considering if and how tropescan make up or ground the existence of what me might call‘ordinary’ or ‘everyday’ objects, or if it isbetter to concentrate instead on the world’s simplest, mostfundamental, objects—like those you find discussed in e.g.,fundamental physics—is another issue on which trope theoristsdisagree. Campbell thinks we should concentrate on the latter sort ofobject. In particular, he thinks we should concentrate on objects thathave no other objects as parts, as that way we avoid confusing‘substantial’ complexity (and unity) with the—hererelevant—qualitative one. David Robb (2005) and Kris McDaniel(2001) disagree. This may in part be due to the fact that they both(cf. also Paul 2002, 2017) think that objects aremereologically composedboth on the level of theirsubstantial parts and on the level of their qualitative—trope—parts.^[27]

According to a majority of the trope theorists, objects are bundles oftropes. The alternative is to understand objects as complexesconsisting of a substrate in which tropes are instantiated (a viewdefended by e.g., Martin 1980; Heil 2003; and Lowe 2006). Indeed,according to D. M. Armstrong (1989, 2004)—a staunch butcomparatively speaking rather friendly trope-critic—thisminority viewought to be accepted by the trope theorist.Armstrong is most likely wrong, however: several reasons exist for whyone ought to prefer the bundle view (Maurin 2016). One such reason hasto do with parsimony. If you adopt a substrate-attribute view, youaccept the existence of substrates on top of the existence of tropes.Accepting this additional category of entity makes at least some senseif properties are universals. For if objects are bundles of universalsand universals are entities which are numerically identical acrossinstances, then if objecta is qualitatively identical toobjectb,a is also numerically identical tob. Which means that, if objects are bundles of universals,the Identity of Indiscernibles is not just true, but necessarily true,a consequence few universal realists have been prepared to accept(indeed, a consequence that may turn out to be unacceptableas amatter of empirical fact—cf. e.g., French 1988).If objects are substrates exemplifying universals, on the other hand,althougha andb are qualitatively identical, theyare nevertheless distinct. They are distinct, that is,in virtueof being partly constituted by (primitively) distinctsubstrates.

This sort of argument in favor of the substrate-attribute view cannotbe recreated for a view on which properties are tropes, however. For,if objects are bundles of tropes, because tropes are particularsnot universals, even ifa andb arequalitatively identical, they are not numerically identical. And theyare not numerically identicalbecause they are constituted bynumerically distinct tropes. No need for substrates!

According to the bundle view, objects consist of, are made up by, orare grounded in, a sufficient number of mutuallycompresentand/or in some other way mutually dependent tropes (cf. e.g.,McDaniel 2001, 2006 and Giberman 2014 for slightly different takes onbundling). What is compresence? When the same question was asked about(exact) resemblance, the trope theorist had the option of treating therelation as a ‘pseudo-addition’. This was becauseresemblance is an internal relation and so holds necessarily simplygiven the existence of its relata. According to most trope-theorists,however, compresence is anexternal relation, and hence areal addition to the tropes it relates.^[28] But then adding compresence gives rise to an infinite regress (oftencalled ‘Bradley’s regress’ after Bradley 1930[1893];cf. also Armstrong 1978; Vallicella 2002 and 2005;Schnieder 2004; Cameron 2008, 2022; Maurin 2012).

Unlike what was true in the case of resemblance, this regress is mostlikely a vicious regress. This is because the ‘pattern ofdependence’ it instantiates is the opposite of that instantiatedby the resemblance regress. In the resemblance case, for tropest₁,t₂, andt₃ to exactly resemble each other, it is enoughthat they exist. Not so in the compresence case. Tropest₁,t₂, andt₃ could exist and not be compresent, which meansthat in order to ensure that theyare compresent, acompresence-trope,c₁, must be added to thebundle. Butc₁ could exist without beingcompresent with those very tropes. Therefore, in order fort₁,t₂,t₃andc₁ to be compresent, there must besomething—call itc₂—that makes themso. But sincec₂ could exist and not be compresentwitht₁,t₂,t₃ andc₁, it too needssomething that ensures its compresence with those entities. Enterc₃. And so on. The existence of this regressarguably contradicts—and hence functions as areductioagainst—the compresence of the original (first-order) tropesand, thereby, the (possible) existence of the concrete particular.

Since concrete particulars (possibly) exist, something must be wrongwith this argument. One option is to claim that compresence isinternal after all, in which case the regress (if there even is one)is benign (Molnar 2003; Heil 2003 and 2012;cf. alsoArmstrong 2006). This may seem attractive especially to those whothink of their tropes asnon-transferable and aswaysthings are. Even given this way of thinking of the nature of thetrope, however, to take compresence as internal means having to giveup what are arguably some deeply held modal beliefs. For even if youhave reason to think that properties must be ‘borne’ bysome object, to be able to solve the regress-problem one would have toaccept the much stronger thesis that every trope must be borne by aspecific object. If theonly reason we have forthinking that compresence is internal in this sense is that thissolves the problem with Bradley’s regress, therefore, we shouldopt to go down this route as a last resort only (cf. Cameron2006; Maurin 2010).

As a way of saving at least some of our modal intuitions while stillavoiding Bradley’s regress, Simons (1994;cf. alsoKeinänen 2011 and Keinänen and Hakkarainen 2014 for aslightly different version of this view^[29]) suggests we view the concrete particular as constituted partly by a‘nucleus’ (made up from mutually and specificallydependent tropes) and partly—at least in the normalcase—by a ‘halo’ (made up from tropes that dependspecifically on the tropes in the nucleus). The result is a structuredbundle such that, although the tropes in the nucleus at most dependfor their existence on the existence of tropesof the samekind as those now in its halo, they do not depend specifically onthose tropes. In this way, at least some room is made for contingency,yet Bradley’s regress is avoided. For, as the tropes in the halodepend specifically for their existence on the tropes that make up thenucleus, their existence is enough to guarantee the existence of thewhole to which they belong. This is better but perhaps not goodenough. For, although the same object could now have had a slightlydifferent halo, the possibility that the tropes that actually make upthe halo could exist and not be joined tothis particularnucleus is ruled out with no apparent justification (other than thatthis helps its proponent solve the problem with the Bradley regress)(cf. also Garcia 2014 for more kinds of criticism of thisview).

According to several between themselves very different sorts of tropetheorists, finally, we should stop bothering with the (nature anddependence of the) related tropes and investigate instead the(special) nature of compresence itself. This seems intuitive enough.After all, is it not the business of a relation to relate? Accordingto one suggestion along these lines (defended in Simons 2010; Maurin2002, 2010 and 2011; and Wieland and Betti 2008;cf. alsoMertz 1996, Robb 2005 and Giberman 2014 for similar views),non-relational tropes have an existence that is independent of theexistence of some specific—either non-relational orrelational—trope, but relational tropes (including compresence)depend specifically for their existence on the very tropes theyrelate. This means that ifc₁ exists, itmust relate the tropes it in fact relates, even though thosetropes might very well exist and not be compresent (at least not witheach other). There is, then, no regress, and except forc₁, the tropes involved in constituting theconcrete particular could exist without being compresent with eachother. And this, in turn, means that our modal intuitions are leftmore or less intact.^[30]

According to Mertz, moreover, to be able to do the unifying work forwhich it is introduced, compresence cannot be a universal. If it were,then if one of the concrete particulars whose constituents it joinsceases to exist, so will every other concrete particular unified bythe same (universal) relation of compresence. But, as Mertz pointsout, “this is absurdly counterfactual!” (Mertz 1996: 190).Nor can it be a state of affairs. For, states of affairs are inthemselves complexes, and so could not be used to solve the Bradley problem.^[31] It seems, then, that compresence, if understood in a way that blocksthe regress, is a trope. Assuming that Bradley’s regressthreatensany account according to which many things make upone unified thing (i.e., assuming that it does not only threaten thetrope-bundle theorist), that there is this threat may therefore turnout to be a reasonin favor of positing tropes (Maurin2011).

The suggestion is not without its critics. To these belong MacBridewho argues that, “…to call a trope relational is to packinto its essence the relating function it is supposed to performwithout explaining what Bradley’s regress calls into question,viz. the capacity of relations to relate” (2011: 173). Ratherthan solve the problem, in other words, MacBride thinks the suggestion“transfers our original puzzlement to that thing [i.e., thecompresence-relation]”. For, he asks “how can positing theexistence of a relational trope explain anything about its capacity torelate when it has been stipulated to be the very essence of R that itrelatesa andb. It is as though the capacity ofrelational tropes to relate is explained by mentioning the fact thatthey have a ‘virtus relativa’”(ibid.).

Assuming we agree that there issomething that needsexplaining (i.e., assuming we agree that how several tropescan—contingently—make up one object needs explaining), wecan either reject a proposed solution because we prefer what we thinkis a better solution, or we can reject it because it isinitself bad or unacceptable (irrespective of whether there are anyalternative solutions on offer). MacBride appears to suggest we do thelatter. More precisely, what MacBride proposes is that the solutionfails because it leaves unexplained the special ‘power’ torelate it attributes to the compresence trope. If this is why thesuggestion fails, however, then either this is becausenoexplanation that posits something (‘primitively’) apt toperform whatever function we need explained, is acceptable, or it isbecausein this particular case, an explanation of this kindwill not do. If the former, the objection risks leading to anovergeneration of explanatory failures. Everyone will at some pointneed to posit some things as fundamental. And in order for thosefundamental posits to be able to contribute somehow to the theory inquestion, it seems we must be allowed to say something about them. Wemust, to use the terminology introduced by Schaffer, outfit ourfundamental posits with axioms. But then, as Schaffer also points out(2016: 587): “it is a bad question—albeit one that hastempted excellent philosophers from Bradley through van Fraassen andLewis—to ask how a posit can do what its axioms say, for thatwork is simply the business of the posit. End of story”.

If, on the other hand, the problem is isolated to the case at hand, weare owed an explanation of what makes this case so special. MacBridecomplains that if the ‘explanatory task’ is that ofaccounting for the capacity of compresence to relate, being told thatcompresence has that capacity ‘by nature’, will not do.Perhaps he is right about this. But, then, the explanatory task isarguably not that one, but rather the task of accounting for thepossible existence of concrete objects (contingently) made up fromtropes. Ifthis is the explanatory task, it is far from clearwhy positing a special kind of (relational) trope that is ‘bynature’ apt to perform its relating function, will not do as anexplanation.

4. Trope Applications

According to the trope proponent, if you accept the existence oftropes, you have the means available to solve or to dissolve a numberof serious problems, not just in metaphysics but in philosophygenerally. In what follows, the most common trope-applicationsproposed in the literature are very briefly introduced.

4.1 Tropes in Causation and Persistence

According to a majority of the trope theorists, an important reasonfor thinking tropes exist is the role they play in causation. It isafter all not the whole stove that burns you, it is its temperaturethat does the damage. And it is not any temperature, nor temperaturein general, which leaves a red mark. That mark is left bytheparticular temperature had by this particular stove now. It makessense, therefore, to say that the mark is left by the stove’stemperature-trope, which means that tropes are very goodcandidates for being the world’s basic causal relata (Williams1953a; Campbell 1990; Denkel 1996; Molnar 2003; Heil 2003; ;Garcia-Encinas 2009; Ehring 2011).

That tropescan play a role in causation can hardly bedoubted. But can this role also provide the trope-proponent with areason to think that tropes exist? According to the theory’scritics, it cannot. The role tropes (can) play in causation does notprovide the trope proponent with any special reason to prefer anontology of tropes over alternative ontologies. More specifically, itdoes not give her any special reason to prefer an ontology of tropesover one of states of affairs or events. Just like tropes, state ofaffairs and events are particular. Just like tropes, they arelocalized. And, just like tropes, they are non-repeatable (although atleast the state of affairs contains a repeatable item—theuniversal—as one of its constituents). Every reason for thinkingthat tropes are the world’s basic causal relata is thereforealso a reason to think that this role is played by states of affairsand/or events.^[32]

Ehring disagrees. To see why, he asks us to consider the followingsimple scenario: a property-instance att₁ iscausally responsible for an instanceof the same property att₂. This is a case of causation which is also acase ofproperty persistence. But what does propertypersistence involve? According to Ehring, property persistence is notjust a matter of something not changing its properties. For, even incases where nothing discernibly changes, the property instantiated att₁ could nevertheless have been replaced byanother property of the same type during the period betweent₁ andt₂. To be able toontologically explain the scenario, therefore, we first need anaccount of property persistence able to distinguish ‘true’property persistence from cases of ‘non-salient propertychange’ or what may also be called propertytypepersistence. But, Ehring claims, this is something a theory accordingto which property instances are states of affairs cannot do (this hedemonstrates with the help of a number of thought experiments, whichspace does not allow me to reproduce here, butcf. Ehring1997: 91ff). Therefore, causation gives us reason to think that tropesexist.

Ehring is not the only one who regards the relationship between(theories of) persistence and tropes as an intimate one. According toMcDaniel (2001)—who defends a theory (TOPO) according to whichordinary physical objects are mereological fusions of monadic andpolyadic tropes—adopting (his version of) the trope view can beused to argue for one particular theory of persistence: 3-dimensionalism.^[33] And according to Benovsky (2013), because (non-presentist)endurantism isincompatible with the view that properties are(immanent) universals, the endurantistmust embrace trope theory.^[34]

According to Garcia (2016), finally, what role tropes can play incausation will depend on how we conceive of the nature of tropes. Iftropes are what he calls ‘modifiers’, they do not have thecharacter they confer, a fact that would seem to make them lesssuitable as causal relata. Not so if tropes are of the module kind(and so have the character they confer). But if tropes have thecharacter they confer, Garcia points out, we may always ask, e.g.: Isit the couch or is it the couch’s couch-shaped mass-trope thatcauses the indentation in the carpet? Garcia thinks we have reason tothink they both do. The couch causes the indentation by courtesy, butthe mass trope would have sufficed to cause it even if it had existedalone, unbundled with the couch’s other tropes. But thissuggests that if tropes are of the module kind, we end up with a worldthat is (objectionably) systematically causally overdetermined. Therole tropes play in causation may therefore be more problematic thanwhat it might initially seem (thoughcf. Giberman 2022 for anobjection to Garcia’s argument).

4.2 Tropes and Issues in the Philosophy of Mind

Suppose Lisa burns herself on the hot stove. One of the causaltransactions that then follow can be described thus: Lisa removed herhand from the stovebecause she felt pain. This is adescription which seems to pick out ‘being in pain’ as onecausally relevant property of the cause. That ‘being inpain’is a causally relevant property accords well withour intuitions. However, to say it is leads to trouble. The reason forthis is that mental properties, like that of ‘being inpain’, can be realized by physically very different systems.Therefore, mental properties cannot beidentified withphysical ones. On the other hand, we seem to live in a physicallyclosed and causally non-overdetermined universe. But this means that,contrary to what we have supposed so far, Lisa did not remove her handbecause she felt pain. In general, it means that mental properties arenot causally relevant, however much they seem to be (cf. Kim1989 for a famous expression of this problem).

If properties are tropes, some trope theorists have proposed, thisconclusion can be resisted (cf. Robb 1997; Martin and Heil1999; Heil and Robb 2003; for a hybrid versioncf. Nanay2009;cf. also Gozzano and Orilia 2008). To see this, we needfirst to disambiguate our notion of a property. This notion, it isargued, is reallytwo notions, namely:

Property₁ = that which imparts on an individual thingits particular nature (property astoken), and
Property₂ = that which makes distinct things the same(property astype).

Once ‘property’ has been disambiguated, we can see howmental properties can be causally relevant after all. For now, ifmental properties₁ are tropes, they can be identified withphysical properties₁. Mental properties₂ canstill be distinguished from physical properties₂, forproperties considered astypes are—in line with thestandard view of tropes—identified withsimilarity classesof tropes. When Lisa removes her hand from the stove because shefeels pain, therefore, she removes her handin virtue ofsomething that is partly characterized by a trope which is such thatit belongs to a class of mentally similar tropes. This trope isidentical with a physical trope—it isboth mental andphysical—because italso belongs to a (distinct)similarity class of physically similar tropes. Therefore, mentalproperties can be causally relevant in spite of the fact that themental is multiply realizable by the physical, and in spite of thefact that we live in a physically closed and non-overdetermineduniverse.

This suggestion has been criticized. According to Paul Noordhof (1998:223) it fails because it does not respect the “bulge in thecarpet constraint”. For now the question which was ambiguouslyasked about properties, can be unambiguously asked about tropes: is itin virtue of being mental or in virtue of being physical that thetrope is causally relevant for the effect (for a response,cf. Robb 2001 and Ehring 2003)? And Sophie Gibb (2004) hascomplained that the trope’s simple and primitive nature makes itunsuitable for membership in two such radically different classes asthat of the mentally and of the physically similar tropes,respectively (for more reasons against the suggestioncf.Macdonald and Macdonald 2006 and Zhang 2021).

4.3 Tropes and Perception

Another important reason for thinking that tropes exist, it has beenproposed, is the role tropes play in perception. That what we perceiveare the qualities of the things rather than the things themselves,first, seems plausible (for various claims to this effect,cf. Williams 1953a: 16; Campbell 1997 [1981]: 130;Schaffer 2001: 247;cf. also Nanay 2012 and Almäng2013). And that the qualities we perceive are tropes rather thanuniversals or instantiations of universals (states of affairs) is,according to Lowe, a matter that can be determined with reference toour experience (cf. e.g., Skrzypulec 2021 for an argument tothe contrary). Lowe argues (1998: 205;cf. also, Lowe 2008;Mulligan 1999):

[W]hen I see the leafchange in colour—perhaps as itturned brown by a flame—I seem to see somethingcease toexist in the location of the leaf, namely, its greenness. But itcould not be theuniversal greenness which ceases to exist,at least so long as other green things continue to exist. My opponentmust say that really what I see is not something ceasing to exist, butmerely the leaf’s ceasing to instantiate greenness, or greennessceasing to be ‘wholly present’ just here. I can only saythat that suggestion strikes me as being quite false to thephenomenology of perception. The objects of perception seem, one andall, to be particulars—and, indeed, a causal theory ofperception (which I myself favour) would appear to require this, sinceparticulars alone seem capable of entering into causal relations.

A similar view is put forth by Mulligan et al. They argue (1984:306):

[W]hoever wishes to reject moments [i.e., tropes] must of course givean account of those cases where we seem to see and hear them, cases wereport using definite descriptions such as ‘the smile that justappeared on Rupert’s face’. This means that he must claimthat in such circumstances we see not justindependent things perse, but alsothings as falling under certain concepts oras exemplifying certain universals. On someaccounts…it is even claimed that we see the universal in thething. But the friend of moments finds this counterintuitive. When wesee Rupert’s smile, we see something just as spatio-temporal asRupert himself, and not something as absurd as a spatio-temporalentity that somehow contains a concept or a universal.

These are admittedly not very strong reasons for thinking that it istropes and not state of affairs that are the objects of perception.For the view that our perception of a trope is not only distinct, butalso phenomenologically distinguishable, from our perception of astate of affairs seems grounded in little more than itsproponent’s introspective intuitions. States of affairs, justlike tropes, are particulars (cf. Armstrong 1997: 126 on the“victory of particularity”). And to say, as Mulligan etal. do, that the very idea of something spatiotemporal containing auniversal is absurd, clearly begs the question against the view theyare opposing.

4.4 Tropes and Semantics

That language furnishes the trope theorist with solid reasons forthinking that there are tropes has been indicated by several tropetheorists and it has also been forcefully argued, especially byFriederike Moltmann (2003, 2007, 2009, 2013a and2013b;cf. also Mertz 1996: 3–6). Taking(Mulligan et al. 1984) as her point of departure, Moltmann argues thatnatural language contains several phenomena whose semantic treatmentis best spelled out in terms of an ontology that includes tropes.

Nominalizations, first, may seem to point in the oppositedirection. For, in the classical discussion, the nominalization ofpredicates such asis wise into nouns fit to refer, has beentaken to count in favor of universal realism. A sub-class ofnominalizations—such asJohn’s wisdom—can,however, be taken to speak in favor of the existence of tropes. Thisis a kind of nominalization which, as Moltmann puts it,“introduce ‘new’ objects, but only partiallycharacterize them” (2007: 363). That these nominalizations referto tropes rather than to states of affairs, she argues, can be seenonce we consider the vast range of adjectival modifiers they allowfor, modifiers only tropes and not states of affairs can be therecipients of (2009: 62–63;cf. also her 2003).

Bare demonstratives, next, especially as they occur inso-called identificational sentences, provide another reason forthinking that tropes exist (Moltmann 2013a). In combinationwith the prepositionlike—as inTurquoise lookslike that—they straightforwardly refer to tropes. But evenin cases where they do not refer to tropes, tropes neverthelesscontribute to the semantics of sentences in which they figure. Inparticular, tropes contribute to the meaning of sentences likeThis is Mary orThat is a beautiful woman. These areno ordinary identity statements. What makes them stand out, Moltmannpoints out, is the exceptional neutrality of the demonstratives insubject position. These sentences are best understood in such a waythat the bare demonstratives that figure in them do not refer toindividuals (like Mary), but rather to perceptual features (whichMoltmann thinks of as tropes) in the situation at hand.Identificational sentences, then, involve the identification of abearer of a tropevia the denotation (if not reference) of a(perceptual) trope.

Comparatives—likeJohn is happier thanMary—finally, are according to the received view such thatthey refer to abstract objects that form a total ordering (so-calleddegrees). According to Moltmann, a better way to understand thesesorts of sentences is with reference to tropes.John is happierthan Mary should hence be understood asJohn’shappiness exceeds Mary’s happiness. Moltmann thinks thisway of understanding comparatives is preferable to the standard view,because tropes are easier to live with than “abstract, rarelyexplicit entities such as degrees or sets of degrees” (Moltmann2009: 64).

Whether nominalizations, bare demonstratives and/or comparativessucceed in providing the trope theorist with strong reasons to thinktropes exist will, among other things, depend on whether or not theyreally do manage to distinguish between tropes and states of affairs.Moltmann thinks they do but, again, this depends on how oneunderstands the nature of the items in question. It will also dependon if and how one thinks goings on at the linguistic level can tell usanything much about what there is at the ontological level. Accordingto quite a few trope theorists (cf. esp. Heil 2003), weshould avoid arguing from the way we conceptualize reality toconclusions about the nature of reality itself. Depending onone’s take on the relationship between language and world,therefore, semantics might turn out to have precious little to sayabout the existence (or not) of tropes.

4.5 Tropes in Science

Discussions of what use can be made of tropes in science can be foundscattered in the literature. Examples include Rom Harré’s(2009) discussion of the role tropes play (and don’t play) inchemistry, and Bence Nanay’s (2010) attempt to use tropes toimprove on Ernst Mayr’s population thinking in biology. Mostdiscussions have however been focused on the relationship betweentropes and physics (Kuhlmann et al. 2002). Most influential in thisrespect is Campbell’s field-theory of tropes (defended in his1990: Ch. 6;cf. also Von Wachter 2000) and Simons’‘nuclear’ theory of tropes and the scientific use hetentatively makes of it (Simons 1994;cf. also Morganti 2009and Wayne 2008).

According to Campbell, the world is constituted by a rather limitednumber of field tropes which, according to our (current) best science,ought to be identified with the fields of gravitation,electromagnetism, and the weak and strong nuclear forces (plus aspacetime field). Standardly, these forces are understood as exertedby bodies that are not themselves fields. Not so on Campbell’sview. Instead, matter is thought of as spread out and as present invarious strengths across a region without any sharp boundaries to itslocation. What parts of the mass field we choose to focus on will beto a certain degree arbitrary. A zone in which several fields allsharply increase their intensity will likely be taken as one singleentity or particle. But given the overall framework, individuals ofthis kind are to be viewed as “well-founded appearances”(Campbell 1990: 151).

Campbell’s views have been criticized by e.g., ChristinaSchneider (2006). According to Schneider, the field ontology proposedby Campbell (and by Von Wachter) fails, because the notion of a fieldwith which they seem to be working, is not mathematically rigorous.^[35] And Matteo Morganti who, just like Campbell, wants to identify tropeswith entities described by quantum physics, finds several problemswith the identifications actually made by Campbell. He proposesinstead that we follow Simons and identify the basic constituents ofreality with the fundamental particles, understood as bundles oftropes (Morganti 2009). If we take the basic properties described bythe Standard Model as fundamental tropes, is the idea, then theconstitution of particles out of more elementary constituents can bereadily reconstructed (possibly by using the sheaf-theoreticalframework proposed by Mormann 1995, or the algebraic frameworksuggested by Fuhrmann 1991).

4.6 Tropes and Issues in Moral Philosophy

Relatively little has so far been written on the topic of tropes inrelation to issues in moral philosophy and value theory. Two thingshave however been argued. First, that tropes (and not, as is morecommonly supposed, objects or persons or states of affairs) are thebearers of final value. Second, that moral non-naturalists (who holdthat moral facts are fundamentally autonomous from natural facts) mustregard properties as tropes to be able to account for thesupervenience of the moral on the natural.

That tropes are the bearers of (final) value is a view held by severaltrope theorists. To say that what we value are theparticularproperties of things and persons isprima facieintuitive (Williams 1953a: 16). And since concreteparticulars—but not tropes—are sometimes the subjects ofsimultaneous yet conflicting evaluations, tropes seemespecially suited for the job as (final) value-bearers(Campbell 1997 [1981]: 130–131). That tropes are theonly bearers of final value has however been questioned.According to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003), this isbecause different pro-attitudes are fitting with respect to differentkinds of valuable objects. However, according to Olson (2003), even ifthis is so, it does not show that tropes are not the only bearers offinal value. For that conclusion only follows if we assume that, towhat we direct our evaluative attitude is indicative of where value islocalized. But final value should be understood strictly as the valuesomething hasfor its own sake, which means that if e.g., aperson is valuable because of her courage, then she is not valuablefor her own sake but is valuable, rather, for the sake of one of herproperties (i.e., her tropes). But this means that, although theevaluative attitude may well be directed at a person or a thing, theperson or thing is nevertheless valued because of, or for the sake of,the tropes which characterize it.

Non-naturalists, next, are often charged with not being able toexplain what appears to be a necessary dependence of moral facts onnatural facts. Normally this dependence is explained in terms ofsupervenience, but in order for such an account to be compatible withthe basic tenets of moral non-naturalism, it has been argued, thissupervenience must, in turn, be explainable in purely non-naturalisticterms (for an overview of this debate,cf. Ridge 2018).According to Shafer-Landau (2003) (as interpreted by Ridge 2007) thisproblem is solved if moral and physical properties in the sense ofkinds, are distinguished from moral and physical properties in thesense of tokens, or tropes. For then we can say, in analogy with whathas been suggested in the debate on the causal relevance of mentalproperties, that although (necessarily) every moral trope isconstituted by some concatenation of natural tropes, it does notfollow that every moral type is identical to a natural type. Thissuggestion is criticized in Ridge (2007).

Bibliography

Ackrill, J. L., 1963,Aristotle: Categories and DeInterpretatione, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Almäng, J., 2013, “The Causal Self-Referential Theoryof Perception Revisited,”Dialectica, 67(1):29–53.
Armstrong, D. M., 1978,Nominalism &Realism—Universals & Scientific Realism, vol. 1,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1989,Universals, Boulder:Westview Press.
–––, 1997,A World of States ofAffairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 2004,Truth and Truthmakers,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 2005, “Four Disputes AboutProperties,”Synthese, 144(3): 309–320.
–––, 2006, “Particulars Have theirProperties of Necessity,” inUniversals, Concepts andQualities:New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates, P.F. Strawson and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bacon, J., 1995,Universals and Property Instances—TheAlphabet of Being, Oxford: Blackwell.
–––, 2011, “Tropes,”TheStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), EdwardN. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/tropes/>.
Bennett, J., 2002, “What Events Are,” inTheBlackwell Guide to Metaphysics, R. M. Gale (ed.), Oxford:Blackwell, pp. 43–65.
Benovsky, J. 2013, “New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory:Endurantism and Perdurantism,”Acta Analytica, 28(2):223–227.
Beyer, C., 2016, “Edmund Husserl,”The StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/husserl/>.
Bolzano, B., 1950 [1851],Paradoxes of the Infinite, D.A. Steele (ed.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul and New Haven: YaleUniversity Press.
Bradley, F. H., 1930 [1893],Appearance and Reality,Oxford: Clarendon Press. 9th impression (with corrections), firstpublished 1893.
Brownstein, D., 1973,Aspects of the Problem ofUniversals, University of Kansas Publications, HumanisticStudies, 44. [Brownstein 1973 available online]
Buckels, C., 2018, “Triangles, Tropes, andτὰτοιαῦτα: A PlatonicTrope Theory,”Plato Journal: The Journal of theInternational Plato Society, 18: 9–24.
Cameron, R., 2006, “Tropes, Necessary Connections, andNon-Transferability,”dialectica, 60(2):99–113.
–––, 2008, “Turtles All the Way Down:Regress, Priority and Fundamentality,”The PhilosophicalQuarterly, 58(230): 1–14.
–––, 2022,Chains of Being: InfiniteRegress, Circularity, and Metaphysical Explanation, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
Campbell, K., 1997 [1981], “The Metaphysics of AbstractParticulars,” inProperties, D. H. Mellor and A. Oliver(eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 125–139. Firstpublished 1981,Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 6:477–488.
–––, 1990,Abstract Particulars,Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Campbell, K., J. Franklin, and D. Ehring, 2015, “Donald CaryWilliams,”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/williams-dc/>.
Chrudzimski, A., 2002, “Two Concepts of Trope,”Grazer Philosophische Studien, 64: 137–155.
Cohen, S. M., 2013, “Accidental Beings in Aristotle’sOntology,” inReason and Analysis in Ancient GreekPhilosophy: Essays in Honor of David Keyt, G. Anagnostopoulos andF. D. Miller (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 231–242.
Cook Wilson, J., 1926,Statement and Inference, vol. 2,A. S. L. Farquharson (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Correia, F., 2004, “Husserl on Foundation,”dialectica, 58(3): 349–367.
Daly, C., 1997, “Tropes,” inProperties, D.H. Mellor and A Oliver (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.140–159.
Dasgupta, S., 2009, “Individuals: An Essay in RevisionaryMetaphysics,”Philosophical Studies, 145(1):35–67.
Denkel, A., 1996,Object and Property, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Devitt, M., 1980, “‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or‘Mirage Realism’?,”Pacific PhilosophicalQuarterly, 61(4): 433–449.
Ehring, D., 1997,Causation & Persistence: A Theory ofCausation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2003, “Part-Whole Physicalism andMental Causation,”Synthese, 136(3):359–388.
–––, 2011,Tropes: Properties, Objects, andMental Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fisher, A. R. J., 2017, “Donald C. Williams’s Defenceof Real Metaphysics,”British Journal for the History ofPhilosophy, 25(2): 332–355.
–––, 2018, “Instantiation in TropeTheory,”American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(2):153–164.
–––, 2020, “Abstracta and Abstraction inTrope Theory,”Philosophical Papers, 49(1):41–67.
French, S., 1988, “Quantum Physics and the Identity ofIndiscernibles,”British Journal of the Philosophy ofScience, 39: 141–166.
Fuhrmann, A., 1991, “Tropes and Laws,”Philosophical Studies, 63(1): 57–82.
Garcia, R. K., 2014, “Tropes and Dependency Profiles:Problems for the Nuclear Theory of Substance,”AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly, 51(2): 162–176.
–––, 2015a, “Is Trope Theory aDivided House?,” inThe Problem of Universals inContemporary Philosophy, G. Galluzzo and M. J. Loux (eds.),Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 133–155.
–––, 2015b, “Tropes as DivineActs: The Nature of Creaturely Properties in a World Sustained byGod,”European Journal for Philosophy of Religion,7(3): 105–130.
–––, 2016, “Tropes asCharacter-Grounders,”Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, 9483]: 499–515.
Garcia-Encinas, M. J., 2009, “Tropes for Causation,”Metaphysica, 10(2): 157–174.
Geach, P. T. and G. E. M. Anscombe, 1961,Three Philosophers:Aristotle; Aquinas; Frege, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Gibb, S. C., 2004, “The Problem of Mental Causation and theNature of Properties,”Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, 82(3): 464–476.
Giberman, D., 2014, “Tropes in Space,”Philosophical Studies, 167(2): 453–472.
–––, 2022, “Ostrich Tropes,”Synthese, 200(1): 1–25.
Goodman, N., 1951,The Structure of Appearance, CambridgeMA: Harvard University Press.
Gozzano, S. and F. Orilia (eds.), 2008,Tropes, Universals andthe Philosophy of Mind, Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag.
Hakkarainen, J. and M. Keinänen, 2017, “The OntologicalForm of Tropes: Refuting Douglas Ehring’s Main Argument AgainstStandard Trope Nominalism,”Philosophia, 45(2):647–658.
Harré, R., 2009, “Trope Theory and the Ontology ofChemistry,”Foundations of Chemistry, 11(2):93–103.
Haslanger, S., 1989, “Endurance and TemporaryIntrinsics,”Analysis, 49(3): 119–125.
Heil, J., 2003,From an Ontological Point of View,Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 2012,The Universe as We Find It,Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Heil, J. and D. Robb, 2003, “Mental Properties,”American Philosophical Quarterly, 40(3): 175–196.
Heller, M., 1992,The Ontology of Physical Objects: FourDimensional Hunks of Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
Hochberg, H., 1988, “A Refutation of ModerateRealism,”Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66(2):188–207.
–––, 1999,Complexes and Consciousness,Stockholm: Thales.
–––, 2001, “Individuation and IndividualProperties: A Study of Metaphysical Futility,”The ModernSchoolman, 79(2–3): 107–135.
–––, 2004, “Relations, Properties, andParticulars,” inRelations and Predicates, H. Hochbergand K. Mulligan (eds.), Ontos Verlag, pp. 17–53.
–––, 2014, “The Facts of Tropes” inMind, Values and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor ofKevin Mulligan, A. Reboul (ed.) Geneva: Springer, pp.117–140.
Husserl, E., 2001 [1900/1913],Logical Investigations, D.Moran (ed.), J. N. Findlay (trans.), London & New York: Routledge.First published, in two volumes in German, in 1900 and 1901; secondedition in 1913; English translation in 1970.
Ingarden, R., 1964,Time and Modes of Being, H. R.Michejda (trans., from parts ofDer Streit), Springfield,Illinois: Charles C. Thomas.
Jonston, M., 1989, “Is there a Problem aboutPersistence?,”Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,61: 107–135.
Kampa, S. and S. Maxwell Wilkins, 2018, “Aristotle as aNon-Classical Trope Theorist,”History of PhilosophyQuarterly, 35(2): 117–136.
Keinänen, M., 2011, “Tropes—The BasicConstituents of Powerful Particulars?”dialectica,65(3): 419–450.
–––, 2015, “A Trope Nominalist Theory ofNatural Kinds,” inNominalism about Properties, G.Guigon and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Routledge, pp.156–174.
Keinänen, M. and J. Hakkarinen, 2014, “The Problem ofTrope Individuation: A Reply to Lowe,”Erkenntnis,79(1): 65–79.
Kim, J., 1989, “Mechanism, Purpose, and ExplanatoryExclusion,”Philosophical Perspectives, 3:77–108.
Kuhlmann, M., H. Lyre, and A. Wayne, 2002,Ontological Aspectsof Quantum Field Theory, Singapore: World Scientific.
Küng, G., 1967,Ontology and the Logistic Analysis ofLanguage, Dordrecht: D. Riedel Publishing Company.
LaBossiere, M. C., 1993, “Swapped tropes,”PacificPhilosophical Quarterly, 74: 258–264.
Levinson, J., 1980, “The Particularization ofAttributes,”Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58(2):102–115.
–––, 2006, “Why There are NoTropes,”Philosophy, 81: 563–579.
Lewis, D., 1986,On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers.
Loux, M. J., 2015, “An Exercise in ConstituentOntology,” inThe Problem of Universals in ContemporaryPhilosophy, G. Galluzzo and M. J. Loux (eds.), Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp. 9–45.
Lowe, E. J., 1998,The Possibility of Metaphysics,Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 2006,The Four-Category Ontology: AMetaphysical Foundation for Natural Science, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
–––, 2008, “Tropes and Perception,”inTropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind—Essays atthe Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology, S.Gozzano, and F. Orilia (eds.), Heustenstamm: Ontos Verlag, pp.175–192.
MacBride, F., 2004, “Whence the Particular-UniversalDistinction?”Grazer Philosophische Studien, 67:181–194.
–––, 2011, “Relations and TruthmakingII,”Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111(1):161–179.
Macdonald, C. and G. Macdonald, 2006, “The Metaphysics ofMental Causation,”The Journal of Philosophy, 103(11):539–576.
Manley, D., 2002, “Properties and ResemblanceClasses,”Noûs, 36(1): 75–96.
Martin, C. B., 1980, “Substance Substantiated,”Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58(1): 3–10.
Martin C. B., and J. Heil, 1999, “The OntologicalTurn,”Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23(1):34–60.
Maurin, A.-S., 2002,If Tropes, Dordrecht: KluwerAcademic Publishers.
–––, 2010, “Trope Theory and the BradleyRegress,”Synthese, 175(3): 311–326.
–––, 2011, “An Argument for the Existenceof Tropes,”Erkenntnis, 74(1): 69–79.
–––, 2012, “Bradley’sRegress,”Philosophy Compass, 7(11):794–807.
–––, 2013, “Infinite RegressArguments,” inJohanssonian Investigations, C.Svennerlind, J. Almäng, and R. Ingthorsson (eds.), Heusenstamm:Ontos Verlag, pp. 421–438.
–––, 2016, “Tropes: For andAgainst,” inMetaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays inHonour of David Malet Armstrong, Berlin: De Gruyter, pp.85–103.
–––, 2022,Properties, CambridgeElements in Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McDaniel, K., 2001, “Tropes and Ordinary PhysicalObjects,”Philosophical Studies, 104(3):269–290.
–––, 2006, “Modal Realisms,”Philosophical Perspectives: Metaphysics, 20:47–54.
Mertz, D. W., 1996,Moderate Realism and Its Logic, NewHaven and London: Yale University Press.
–––, 2001, “Individuation and InstanceOntology,”Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79(1):45–61.
–––, 2016,On the Elements of Ontology:Attribute Instances and Structure, Berlin: De Gruyter.
Molnar, G., 2003,Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, S.Mumford (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moltmann, F., 2003, “Nominalizing Quantifiers,”Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32(5): 445–481.
–––, 2007, “Events, Tropes, andTruthmaking,”Philosophical Studies, 134(3):363–403.
–––, 2009, “Degree Structure as TropeStructure: A Trope-Based Analysis of Positive and ComparativeAdjectives,”Linguistics and Philosophy, 32(1):51–94.
–––, 2013a, “Tropes, BareDemonstratives, and Apparent Statements of Identity,”Noûs, 47(2): 346–370.
–––, 2013b,Abstract Objects andthe Semantics of Natural Language, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
Moreland, J. P., 1985,Universals, Qualities, and QualityInstances: A Defense of Realism, Lanham: University Press ofAmerica.
–––, 1989, “Keith Campbell and the TropeView of Predication,”Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, 67(4): 379–393.
–––, 1997, “A Critique of Campbell’sRefurbished Nominalism,”The Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, 35: 225–246.
–––, 2001,Universals, Montreal &Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Morganti, M., 2009, “Tropes and Physics,”GrazerPhilosophische Studien, 78: 185–205.
Mormann, T., 1995, “Trope Sheaves: A Topological Ontology ofTropes,”Logic and Logical Philosophy, 3:129–150.
Mulligan, K., 1999, “Perception, Particulars andPredicates,” inConsciousness and Intentionality: Models andModalities of Attribution, D. Fisette (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer,pp. 163–194.
–––, 2006, “Facts, Formal Objects, andOntology,” inModes of Existence, Papers in Ontology andPhilosophical Logic, A. Bottani and R. Davies (eds.), Frankfurt:Ontos Verlag, pp. 31–46.
Mulligan, K., P. Simons, and B. Smith, 1984,“Truth-Makers,”Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 44: 287–321.
Nanay, B., 2009, “The Properties of SingularCausation,”The Monist, 92(1): 112–132.
–––, 2010, “Population Thinking as TropeNominalism,”Synthese, 177: 91–109.
–––, 2012, “Perceiving Tropes,”Erkenntnis, 77(1): 1–14.
Noordhof, P., 1998, “Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of MentalCausation?”Philosophical Quarterly, 48(191):221–226.
Olson, J., 2003, “Revisiting the Tropic of Value,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67:412–422.
Orilia, F., 2009, “Bradley’s Regress and UngroundedDependence Chains: A Reply to Cameron,”dialectica,3(3): 333–41.
Orilia, F. and Swoyer, C., 2017, “Properties,”TheStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 ed.), Edward N.Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/properties/>.
Owen. G. E. L., 1965, “Inherence,”Phronesis,10: 97–105.
Panaccio, C., 2015, “Ockham’s Ontology,” inNominalism about Properties, G. Guigon and G.Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 63–78.
Paul, L. A., 2002, “Logical Parts,”Noûs, 36(4): 578–596.
–––, 2017, “A One CategoryOntology,” inFreedom, Metaphysics, & Method: Themesfrom van Inwagen, J. A. Keller (ed.), Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, pp. 32–61.
Quine, W. V., 1948, “On What There Is,”The Reviewof Metaphysics, 2(5): 21–38.
Rabinowicz, W. and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2003, “Tropicof Value,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,66(2): 389–403.
Ridge, M., 2007, “Anti-Reductionism andSupervenience,”Journal of Moral Philosophy, 4(3):330–348.
–––, 2018, “Moral Non-Naturalism,”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/moral-non-naturalism/>.
Robb, D., 1997, “The Properties of Mental Causation,”The Philosophical Quarterly, 47(187): 178–194.
–––, 2001, “Reply to Noordhof on MentalCausation,”The Philosophical Quarterly, 51(202):90–94.
–––, 2005, “Qualitative Unity and theBundle Theory,”The Monist, 88(4): 466–92.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., 2000, “What is the Problem ofUniversals?”Mind, 109(434): 255–273.
Russell, B., 1997 [1912], “The World of Universals,”inProperties, D. H. Mellor and A Oliver (eds.), Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp. 45–56. First published 1912 inProblems of Philosophy, chapter 9.
Schaffer, J., 2001, “The Individuation of Tropes,”Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79(2):247–259.
–––, 2003, “The Problem of Free Mass: MustProperties Cluster?”Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 66(1): 125–38.
–––, 2004, “Two Conceptions of SparseProperties,”Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85(1):92–102.
–––, 2016, “It is the Business of Laws toGovern,”dialectica, 70(4): 577–588.
Schneider, C., 2002, “Relational Tropes: A HolisticDefinition,”Metaphysica, 2: 97–112.
–––, 2006, “Towards a FieldOntology,”dialectica, 60(1): 5–27.
Schnieder, B., 2004, “A Note on Bearer-Uniqueness andParticularized Qualities,”Ratio, 17:218–228.
Segelberg, I., 1999 [1945, 1947, 1953],Three Essays inPhenomenology and Ontology, H. Hochberg and S. RingströmHochberg (trans.), Stockholm: Thales. The three essays were originallypublished in Swedish as: 1945, “Zenons paradoxer: Enfenomenologisk studie,” Stockholm: Natur och Kultur; 1947,“Begreppet egenskap: Några synpunkter,” Stockholm:Svenska Tryckeriaktiebolaget; and 1953, “Studier övermedvetandet of jagidén,” Stockholm: SvenskaTryckeriaktiebolaget.
Shafer-Landau, R., 2003,Moral Realism—A Defence,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Simons, P., 1994, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: ThreeTrope Theories of Substance,”Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 54(3): 553–575.
–––, 1998, “Farewell to Substance: ADifferentiated Leave-Taking,”Ratio, 11(3):235–252.
–––, 2010, “Relations andTruthmaking,”Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,supp. vol., 94: 199–213.
–––, 2016, “Armstrong and Tropes,”inMetaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of DavidMalet Armstrong, Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 71–3.
Skrzypulec, B., 2021, “Tropes, Universals, and VisualPhenomenology,”Theoria, 87(2): 435–456.
Smith, B., 1981, “Logic, Form and Matter,”Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 55:47–74.
Smith, B. and K. Mulligan, 1983, “Framework for FormalOntology,”Topoi, 2(1): 73–85.
Stout, G. F., 1921, “The Nature of Universals andPropositions,”Proceedings of the British Academy, 10:157–172.
–––, 1923, “Are the Characteristics ofParticular Things Universal or Particular?”Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 3: 114–122.
–––, 1952,God and Nature, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Strawson, P. F., 1959,Individuals: An Essay in DescriptiveMetaphysics, New York: Routledge.
Ujvári, M., 2013,The Trope Bundle Theory of Substance:Change, Individuation and Individual Essence, Frankfurt:Ontos.
Vallicella, W. F., 2002,A Paradigm Theory ofExistence—Onto-Theology Vindicated, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
–––, 2005, “Relations, Monism, and theVindication of Bradley’s Regress,”dialectica,56(1): 3–35.
Van Inwagen, P., 1990,Material Beings, Ithaca andLondon: Cornell University Press.
–––, 2017, “Afterword,” inBeing, Freedom, and Method, J. A. Keller (ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press, esp. pp. 348–352.
Von Wachter, D., 2000, “A World of Fields,” inThings, Facts, and Events, J. Faye, U. Scheffler, and M.Urschs (eds.), Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 305–325.
Wayne, A., 2008, “A Trope-Bundle Ontology for FieldTheory,” inThe Ontology of Spacetime II, D. Dieks(ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1–15.
Wieland, J. W. and A. Betti, 2008, “Relata-SpecificRelations: A Response to Vallicella,”dialectica,62(4): 509–524.
Williams, D. C., 1953a, “On the Elements of BeingI,”Review of Metaphysics, 7(1): 3–18.
–––, “On the Elements of Being II,”Review of Metaphysics, 7(2): 171–192.
–––, 1963, “Necessary Facts,”The Review of Metaphysics, 16(4): 601–625.
–––, 1986 [1959], “Universals andExistents,”Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(1):1–14.
–––, 2018,The Elements and Patterns ofBeing, A. Fisher (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wolterstorff, N., 1970,On Universals, Chicago: ChicagoUniversity Press.
Zhang, W., 2022, “Trope Mental Causation: Still Not QuaMental,”Ergo, 8(53): 815–832.

Academic Tools

How to cite this entry.
Preview the PDF version of this entry at theFriends of the SEP Society.
Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
Enhanced bibliography for this entryatPhilPapers, with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

Bacon, John, “Tropes”,Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/tropes/>. [This was the previous entry on tropes in theStanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy — see theversion history.]

Acknowledgments

For helpful comments and corrections, I would like to thank AlexanderSkiles, Daniel Giberman, Robert Garcia, Markku Keinänen, AnthonyFisher, Oliver Seidl and Christopher von Bülow. A very specialthanks to Johan Brännmark whose invaluable help in allmatters—theoretical, practical, and (not least)emotional—I could not live without.

Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative.
The Encyclopedia Now Needs Your Support
Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia Free

Browse

About

Support SEP

Mirror Sites

View this site from another server:

USA (Main Site)Philosophy, Stanford University

Info about mirror sites

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Movatterモバイル変換