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1. There is someunclarity in the current literature as to whether theconceptual/non-conceptual distinction concernscontent —what is represented — or merelystyle ofrepresentationalvehicle. See Byrne 2002/3. See also Gunther2003 for a selection of important papers on non-conceptual content.

2. In the case ofproprioception, to internal bodily objects and properties. Thephenomenal character of pain, for example, is reducible to therepresentation of disturbances of a certain kind in some region of thebody.

3. Though thesetheories were introduced to account for the content of commonsensepsychological states, they may (in broad outline at least) also serveas theories of content determination for the various sorts ofsub-personal informational states postulated by cognitive science.

4. A representational system is productive if there are indefinitely manydistinct representations that may be constructed in it; it issystematic if the constructability of some representations isintrinsically connected to the constructability of others.

5.Though Putnam 1975 is frequently cited as alocus classicusof psychological externalism, in fact the arguments therein areforlinguistic externalism — i.e., the view that themeanings of some terms are not entirely determined by the contents ofthe mental representations they are used to express. In Putnam’sthought experiment, the twins arepsychologicalduplicates. (Though of course, as many (e.g., Burge 1979) havepointed out, Twin-Earth cases may be interpreted as supporting apsychological conclusion as well.)