Reconciliation

First published Mon May 11, 2015; substantive revision Fri Aug 2, 2019

Among the things commonly described as reconciled are ideas,narratives, persons, groups, and God. To reconcile theories with oneanother is to render them mutually consistent. To reconcile yourselfto the fact that you have cancer is to live better with the beliefthat you do. Reconciliation of the divine-human relationship is linkedin the Christian tradition to the notion of salvation. This essayconcentrates on the uses to which the concept of reconciliation hasbeen put in the treatment of moral and political issues that arise inthe aftermath of wrongdoing and conflict between persons andgroups.

The term ‘reconciliation’ is used to refer either to aprocess or to an outcome or goal. Reconciliation, as an outcome, is animprovement in the relations among parties formerly at odds with oneanother. The nature and degree of improvement required to qualify asreconciliation for any particular context is a matter of disagreementamong theorists. So too, the reasons why relations have improved mayplay a role in determining whether reconciliation has genuinely takenplace. That is, on some accounts, two parties will count as reconciledonly if their better future relations result from their havingsatisfactorily dealt with the emotional, epistemic, and/or materiallegacy of the past. While the outcome of reconciliation is orientedtoward a future marked by peaceful and just relations, the processesof reconciliation are typically oriented towards the continuing badfeelings, suspicions, or harms that were created by the conflicts andinjustices of the past.

Philosophical interest in reconciliation as a moral and politicalvalue grew in the 1990s in response to its invocation during SouthAfrica’s dramatic transition from apartheid to democracy(National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995;SouthAfrican Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report 1998).The South African case, as well as the difficult issues left in thewake of other civil conflicts and periods of repression of the era,including the transitions from military juntas in South America andthe wars in the former Yugoslavia, led political and legal thinkers todefine the topic of transitional justice (see the entry ontransitional justice). The question of transitional justice is: how can post-conflict and/orpost-repression societies justly make the transition to stable and (itis usually stipulated) democratic government given the reality of pastwrongs and harms (Minow 1998, Teitel 2002, C. Murphy 2017)? Ofoverriding importance is establishing the conditions that will ensurethat such abuses happen “Never Again.” In South Africa inthe 1990s, ‘reconciliation’ seemed to be of crucialimportance to a just transition. It was in the name of this value thatthe Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) offered amnesty fromprosecution to those guilty of politically motivated human rightsabuses in return for their full and truthful testimony. Theorists andpolitical analysts debate the extent to which the TRC contributed toreconciliation in South Africa, as well as whether its Commissionersproperly conceived of reconciliation (Tutu 1999, Rotberg and Thompson2000, Gibson 2004, Hamber 2009, Allais 2012, Bates et al. 2020).

Increasingly, theorists and philosophers apply the language andtheories of reconciliation, which were originally developed to dealwith transitional contexts, to stable, non-transitional democracies.Discussions of how white settler states such as the United States,Canada, and Australia deal with their own historical legacies ofinjustice are now often posed as debates about reconciliation(Thompson 2002, Brooks 2004, Barkan and Karn 2006, Kymlicka and Bashir2010, Coulthard 2014, Jung 2018). The value of reconciliation is alsosometimes appealed to within discussions of criminal law, especiallyamong those who are interested in investigating alternative sentencingprocedures and sanctions. “Restorative justice” advocatesconceptualize crime as a problem in the relationship among theoffender, the victim, and the local community, and look to measuressuch as restitution payments and face-to-face dialogue in order torestore that relationship (Braithwaite 2000, van Ness and Strong2002). Whether civil law, too, is amenable to interpretations thatemphasize broken and repaired relationships is an open question(Radzik 2014). Meierhenrich (2008) notes connections between the valueof reconciliation and practices in civil law traditions of“conciliation,” where the emphasis is on the accommodationof competing claims

Finally, reconciliation has emerged as a topic among moral theoristswho discuss the ethical issues that arise in the aftermath of everydayforms of wrongdoing, such as transgressions within friendships orfamily relationships (Walker 2006, Griswold 2007, Radzik 2009). Muchof this discussion takes place in the literature on forgiveness (seethe entry onforgiveness). Here, theorists ask whether one may reconcile with a wrongdoerwithout also forgiving him, or forgive a person without reconciling.Such questions arise as well in the literature on reconciliation inpolitical and legal contexts, where there are often strong objectionsto forgiving the wrongdoers (who may, after all, remain unrepentantfor committing atrocities) or to placing other people under pressureto forgive them. For some, a conception of reconciliation that doesnot require forgiveness offers a positive way forward in thesedifficult cases (e.g., Eisikovits 2009, Verdeja 2009, C. Murphy2010).

Discussion of the value of reconciliation, especially in politicalcontexts, often has a skeptical orientation. Dictators and war-makerspay lip-service to the value of reconciliation while aggressioncontinues. Such appeals reinforce skepticism about the value ofreconciliation. In transitional contexts, reconciliation is claimed toput unjustifiable demands on victims of wrongdoing and to sacrificejustice for peace (Rotberg and Thompson 2000). In non-transitionalcontexts, fundamental political change is rarely on the table. So, forexample, when the governments of white settler states call onindigenous peoples to reconcile, the politics of reconciliation maysimply look like a demand that indigenous peoples ‘reconcilethemselves to’ the status quo (Coulthard 2014).

Other critics charge that the language of reconciliation lends itselfto misuse because it is essentially empty. Given that the concept hasno widely recognized, determinate content or clear normativestandards, almost anyone can claim to be pursuing reconciliation(Schaap 2008). As this essay will indicate, defenders of the conceptof reconciliation do believe that it is amenable to furtherarticulation. However, while the concept of reconciliation is notempty, it defies easy or definitive analysis.

This entry treats the topic of reconciliation in a manner thatrespects its significance across moral (viz. interpersonal andprivate), legal and political contexts. Many of the issues and debatesthat arise in the literature on reconciliation are relevant to each ofthese contexts. However, issues that are specific to politicalcontexts, where the philosophical literature on reconciliation is mostextensive, will receive special attention.

Particular conceptions of reconciliation vary across a number ofdimensions. As section 1 explains, the kind of relationship at issuein a specific context affects the type of improvement in relationsthat might be necessary in order to qualify as reconciliation.Reconciliation is widely taken to be a scalar concept. Section 2discusses the spectrum of intensity along which kinds of improvementin relationships fall, and indicates why, in particular contexts,theorists often disagree about the point along this spectrum that ismorally or politically most significant. Section 3 provides anoverview of the processes commonly cited as contributing toreconciliation. These processes are often controversial; those praisedby some commentators as appropriate and constructive responses to pastconflict are dismissed by others as undermining the moral or politicalconditions for just and peaceful relations. Section 4 concentrates onthe relationship between reconciliation and justice. While some seethese values as compatible and mutually supporting, others argue that,especially in the immediate wake of conflict, parties must oftenchoose between reconciliation and justice.

1. Types of Improvement

At the most abstract level, reconciliation can be characterized as animprovement in the relationship between two or more parties who werepreviously in conflict. A relationship with another party consists ofpatterns of interaction, the attitudes one tends to take toward thatparty, and the expectations of and beliefs about the other that onemakes. Five rough categories of improvement in relationships emergefrom the literature:

Changes in institutional structures: examples include policies forpolice reform, for building the rule of law, for overcoming alienationfrom the existing institutional order, and for renewed participationin shared institutions or practices (C. Murphy 2010, Lu 2017);
Changes in external behaviors: examples include a cessation ofaggressive or insulting behaviors, increased ability to function inclose proximity to the other party, and increased ability to cooperatewith the other party;
Changes in belief: for example, loss of the belief that the otherparty is inherently evil or of lower moral value compared to others,acceptance of a narrative of the past wrong according to which theother party once again seems predictable and coherent (Dwyer 1999),and belief that the other party is no longer likely to pose anunreasonable danger to oneself;
Resolving negative emotions and attitudes: in this category,examples include merely accepting what cannot be changed; overcomingresentment, fear, hate or anger toward the wrongdoing party; as wellas managing shame or guilt (Mihai 2016, Lu 2017).
Adopting or resuming positive emotions and attitudes: e.g., mutualrespect, compassion, love, a shared sense of identity (Hirsch 2011b)or solidarity, mutual recommitment to a shared set of moral orcommunal norms, or mutual trust.

The term ‘forgiveness’ does not appear on this list,though the substance of forgiveness may be broken down into thesecategories. As section 3.8 explains, theorists disagree about how toanalyze forgiveness. While some see it as primarily a change inattitudes and emotions, others take forbearance from certain behaviorsto be definitive of forgiveness.

Different kinds of relationships (friends, employer/employee, fellowcitizens, citizen/official) are marked by distinct sets ofinteractions, attitudes, and expectations. Different kinds ofrelationships can also be distinguished by the norms to which theyshould adhere. The legitimate expectations we have of our friendsdiffer from those we have of our employees, strangers who arenevertheless fellow citizens, or those who are acting in officialstate capacities. Some critics find the images of damaged and repairedrelationships rather strained, given that many of the cases ofcriminal or political wrongdoing that are spoken of in these termsinvolve people who are strangers to one another (Sher 2013). Inresponse, those who favor the language of relationships argue eitherthat the conflict itself creates a problematic relationship, whichthen must be reshaped or repaired (Govier 2002), or that evenstrangers hold attitudes and expectations of one another, as isrevealed by the resentful or indignant reactions we have when thosestrangers violate our expectations (Scanlon 2008).

In speaking of reconciliation, it is important for theorists tospecifywhich of the relationships between two parties isbeing reconciled. For example, two individuals may be friends,co-workers, co-religionists, fellow citizens, and fellow members ofthe Kantian Kingdom of Ends, among many other connections. After adispute at work, two people may reconcile their working relationshipbut not their friendship. On the other hand, they may decide that theonly way to save their friendship is by not working together anymore.One cannot say whether they have reconciled without specifying whichrelationship is in question.

Most theorists of reconciliation allow that, not only pairs ofindividuals, but also groups can be reconciled. Indeed, all of thefollowing combinations appear within the literature: thereconciliation of an individual with a small group (such as a family);an individual to a large group (such as a state); two smaller groupswith one another (such as two ethnic groups within a state); a smallergroup with a large group (such as a minority group to a state); andone group with a collection of groups (such as the internationalcommunity) (Govier and Verwoerd 2002a, Fabre 2016). Given that changesin beliefs and attitudes play a role in most accounts ofreconciliation, these views put pressure on theorists to explain inwhat sense groups can be described as having beliefs and attitudes(cf. Griswold 2007).

Theorists disagree about whether there is a general theory ofreconciliation that can cover all kinds and types of relationship.Some theorists offer accounts of reconciliation designed to cover therepair of a wide range of interpersonal and political relationships,including those among friends, co-workers, and fellow citizens (Govier2006). Such accounts recognize the above variations in relationships,but present a general characterization of categories that can befurther specified for relationships of different types. Othertheorists restrict their focus to a particular kind of relationship(C. Murphy 2010, May 2011).

2. Defining Normative Standards

Reconciliation has as its goal improved relationships. Reconciliationoften denotes restoration, which suggests a return to the status quoante, that is, the state of affairs before the wrong or conflict inquestion. This connotation has led some scholars to urge the use of‘conciliation’ rather than ‘reconciliation’ incontexts where groups or individuals have never lived according togood, just relations, such as the white and black populations of SouthAfrica at the moment the apartheid regime fell (Krog 2008, Moon 2009).But given the importance of the South Africa’s post-apartheidexperiences to the literature on reconciliation, other scholars chooseto brook the linguistic infelicity of defining the term‘reconciliation’ so that it includes the pursuit of goodrelations for the first time, and not merely the reestablishment offormerly good relations (Govier 2006, C. Murphy 2010, Philpott 2012).Here, the task is to articulate an account of improved relationshipsthat satisfies a normative standard for the relationship in question,a standard that may not have been previously realized in practice.

Theorists of reconciliation generally recognize that reconciliation isa “scalar” concept, which allows for minimal and maximalversions of improved relationships (Crocker 1999, Griswold 2007). Eachof the categories along which relationships might improve(institutions, behavior, beliefs, attitudes or emotions) admits ofdegree. For example, in the aftermath of a dispute between friends,the resumption of basic respect is a lower degree of emotionalrestoration than the resumption of love and trust. In the aftermath ofbloody civil war, the resumption of cooperation between two partiesmay be described as a greater change in behavior than their merepeaceful coexistence. Maximal forms of political reconciliation aretypically identified as either civic friendship (May 2011),forgiveness (Tutu 1999), or political or national unity (for anoverview of such conceptions see Allen 1999).

Though the term ‘reconciliation’ can be used to pick outan entire range of phenomena, theorists will often make an argumentfor somehow privileging one point on the scale. Some scholars attemptto fix the definition of reconciliation for a particular relationalcontext by looking to the nature of the relationship in question. Forexample, it may not make sense to talk about spouses as reconciledunless there is a reestablishment of trust, love and intimacy. Spousesmay get over their anger and resentment. They may cooperatesuccessfully in raising their children together. But if trust, loveand intimacy are not restored they have not reconciledasspouses. Similarly, in order to define what is necessary for thereconciliation of parties as members of a moral community (Radzik2009), a political community (C. Murphy 2010), or the internationalcommunity (Barry 1980), we might look to the ideals that appropriatelydefine those relationships. In the South African debate, somecommentators linked their conception of reconciliation to the moralvalue ofubuntu (Tutu 1999, Krog 2008).Ubuntu isfrequently summarized through the Zulu saying, “umuntungumuntu ngabantu,” which can be translated as “aperson depends on others to be a person” (see, for example,Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, who are more critical of the relevanceofubuntu in post-apartheid South Africa).

The debate about the nature of political reconciliation reflects aconcern, not only with ideals of political relationship, but also withnon-ideal facts about societies torn apart by injustice or violence.For example, Bhargava (2012) defends a weak conception ofreconciliation by emphasizing how significant an achievement peacefulcoexistence can be in the aftermath of atrocities. He worries thatadvocating the pursuit of stronger forms of reconciliation willrequire that the past be forgotten, leaving the victims to absorb thecosts of that past without protest. In contrast, C. Murphy (2010)argues that minimal versions should be rejected, for they suggest thatrelationships have been repaired and reconciliation achieved tooquickly. A more robust notion of political reconciliation highlightsthe profound impact of conflict and repression on politicalinteraction, and draws attention to the long-term and complex changesthe establishment of a just peace among those formerly in conflictdemands. Tutu (1999) suggests that forgiveness may be necessary forachieving a peaceful and stable political community. Others argue thatefforts at reconciliation should aim somewhere between the extremes ofa mere cessation of aggression and full-fledged forgiveness.Moellendorf (2007), for example, claims that reconciliation involvesformer enemies coming to see each other as fellow citizens, who shouldbe treated as equals. Gutmann and Thompson (2000) argue politicalreconciliation is oriented towards the cultivation of democraticreciprocity in interaction, which is a willingness to seek commonground with fellow citizens on matters of public policy.

Another view, which emerges specifically out of the literature onpolitical reconciliation, insists that reconciliation cannot bedefined pre-politically (Schaap 2005) or in a non-context specificmanner (Kofi Annan Foundation 2018). That is, the proper standards forreconciliation within a particular post-conflict society can only bedetermined through the free, deliberative and democratic processes ofthat society (Crocker 2008). It follows that what counts asreconciliation in one context will not count in another.

Some critics charge that even to pose the problem that facesconflict-ridden societies as an issue of reconciliation improperlyassumes that the project of political unity is legitimate and therebyundermines calls for decolonization, secession or other forms ofgreater political autonomy for disempowered groups (Woolford 2004,Alfred 2009, Jung 2018). Critics further argue that adopting the frameof a unifying rhetoric of reconciliation can blind the parties toroles that racial or ethnic identity, gender, colonization oroppression played in bringing the atrocities about in the first place,as well as the lopsided distribution of harms that they have caused(Corntassel and Holder 2008, Grey and James 2016). Theorists in the“agonistic” tradition are also asking whether the conceptof reconciliation can remain useful within a framework that assumesthat politics is and will properly remain confrontational (Hirsch2011a, Bohle 2017).

3. Processes of Reconciliation

Processes of reconciliation are designed to contribute to theimprovement of relationships damaged as a result of wrongdoing. A widerange of such processes is examined in the literature. One that isbrought up, more often in the context of objections to reconciliationrather than defenses, is forgetting (Hughes 2001, Bhargava 2012).Since the past cannot be changed, wrongdoing cannot be undone.Therefore, one might argue, the only way to overcome a painful past isto suppress the memory of it. Policies of forgetting in the name ofreconciliation have been pursued by some states, including Cambodia,whose prime minister advised his fellow citizens in 1999 “to diga hole and bury the past,” while granting amnesty fromprosecution to Khmer Rouge leaders (Chandler 2003, 310).

However, those theorists who defend the political and moral value ofreconciliation more often reject the claim that reconciliationrequires forgetting. Instead, these defenders generally claim thatknowledge and acknowledgement of wrongdoing, as well as recognition ofthe victims, are crucial to successful reconciliation. Especially inpolitical contexts, knowledge of basic facts is critical because oftenvictims and the broader political community do not know who wasresponsible for the wrong suffered, nor the extent of violationscommitted. Acknowledgement refers to the official, public recognitionof what happened. This is often needed to counter official denial ofwrongdoing or responsibility for wrongdoing (Weschler 1998). Theunspoken, Freudian assumption is that suppressed traumas willinevitably reemerge in destructive ways. The more explicit argumentsare that the acknowledgement of wrongs and of victims helps healpsychic wounds (van Ness and Strong 2002), enable trust (Gibson 2004),reestablish normative standards for behavior (Walker 2006), andreassert that the victims are indeed members of the moral or politicalcommunity (Llewellyn and Howse 1999, du Toit 2000).

As will be discussed below, while there is wide agreement that theprocesses of reconciliation must acknowledge the wrongs of the pastand the proper standing of victims, theorists debate precisely howsuch acknowledgements are best communicated, so that they will besufficiently credible and effective in improving future relations.More broadly, theorists debate how effective past processes ofreconciliation have proven to be, and how to measure effectiveness(Bates et al. 2020)

There is also ongoing debate in the political realm about which wrongsmust be acknowledged and redressed. Violations of civil and politicalrights have historically been the focus of both theory and practice,but scholars also argue for the importance of addressing violations ofeconomic and cultural rights (Mamdani 2000, Arbour 2007, Sharp 2015).Theorists also disagree about what else, besides acknowledgement, mustbe achieved in order for reconciliation to be either likely orwarranted. Must material forms of harm be redressed? Must retributivejustice be achieved? Must the parties forgive? Disagreements aboutidentifying necessary or appropriate processes are typically connectedto the issue of the last section: disagreements about what degree ofimprovement in relations can reasonably be pursued in the aftermath ofwrongdoing. Finally, there is debate about who should decide whichprocess of reconciliation is adopted in a given context. In thepolitical context, this is in response to calls for greater localagency and decision-making (McEvoy 2007).

3.1 Apologies

Apologizing is perhaps the most explicit way in which wrongdoing canbe acknowledged. A well-formed apology requires at leastacknowledgement of both the fact of wrongdoing and responsibility bythe wrongdoer, as well as an expression of regret or remorse (Tavuchis1991). Ideally, the wrongdoer directly addresses the victim. This isnot possible in all cases, of course, as when victims have passedaway. However, apologies made to indirect victims, such as thefamilies of the deceased, as well as apologies performed beforebroader, interested communities are well established in practice. Inrecent decades, official apologies, delivered by state entities orcorporations, have become more common, raising questions about thevalidity and significance of apologetic statements made byrepresentatives on behalf of groups (Harvey 1995, Gibney et al 2008),especially when the events in question lie in the distant past(Pettigrove 2003).

Apologies are frequently valued, not merely as acknowledgements ofpast wrongdoing and gestures of respect to victims, but also asproviding evidence of a positive change in the wrongdoer or in thewrongdoers’ group. Parties who have come to take responsibilityfor and repudiate past wrongful actions are better candidates forrenewed relationships of cooperation and trust (de Greiff 2008). Thispotential is undermined, however, where apologies are overly vague,incomplete, or appear insincere. One may reasonably question whethermere admissions that “mistakes were made” (which do notown up to responsibility or specify what the mistakes themselves were)or that the speaker “regrets if anyone took offense”(which leaves open the question of whether the action was reallywrong) qualify as apologies at all (Smith 2008). The importance ofbeing sensitive to the gendered aspects of apology has also beenhighlighted (MacLachlan 2013).

While apologies are considered by some to make a significantcontribution to reconciliation (Brooks 2004, M. Murphy 2011), othersworry that, in political cases, apologies may be used as a substitutefor more substantive forms of redress (Corntassel and Holder 2008).Official state apologies for systematic or historic injustices oftenresult only after protracted and heated debate, leaving littlepolitical will to move on to other forms of redress that may be moresignificant to the victimized group. Such dynamics give credence tothe view that apology may amount to a “politics ofdistraction” (Corntassel and Holder 2008).

3.2 Memorials

Memorials take a number of different forms, such as monuments,preserved sites of important or tragic events, museums, archives,ceremonies or educational activities (Barsalou and Baxter 2007,Zembylas 2011). They may be officially or privately sponsored. Yet allprovide a shared focus for memory. Scholars argue that memorials ofpast wrongdoing have the potential to play a number of different rolesin the process of reconciliation. First and foremost, they helppreserve the memory of the past event, which counters any who woulddeny or forget the past. They help consolidate a communalunderstanding of history and provide a shared focus for emotions, suchas grief or remorse. By helping to forge a collective memory of thepast, memorials may also help rebuild or reshape a sense of collectiveidentity (Harjes 2005). Commemorations provided by groups responsiblefor wrongdoing may demonstrate a willingness to acknowledgeresponsibility for such wrongs, (renewed) respect for the victims, andcommitment never to repeat such misdeeds (Barsalou and Baxter 2007,Blustein 2014). For the victimized group, a memorial can encourageself-respect, show fidelity to the dead, and help preserve their senseof themselves as a people (Blustein 2014).

On the other hand, memorials are frequently surrounded by controversy,as parties disagree over the version of history put forward or themanner in which it is displayed (Minow 1998). Attempts to aestheticizepast horrors may be offensive to some viewers (Young 2008). Memorialsmay cynically divert attention from ongoing problems (Blustein 2014)or serve as a rallying point for those who would like to renew theconflict (Barsalou and Baxter 2007). Furthermore, the meanings ofmemorials change over time, as they are continually reinterpreted bylater audiences inhabiting different political circumstances. There isthus no guarantee that a memorial that contributes to reconciliationat one point in time will continue to do so (Blustein 2014).

3.3 Truth Telling

Both apologies and memorials combine an acknowledgment of atroublesome past with the suggestion of an emotional reaction to thatpast, such as remorse, regret or grief. Yet, even without suchemotional content, the communication of the facts of the past can playa role in reconciliation. Individual victims and survivors often findthemselves unable to move on when they are uncertain about crucialfacts of the past. What precisely happened to their loved one? Did shesuffer? Who exactly committed the violent act? Who gave the order?Where is the body buried? Moreover, in political contexts wrongdoingis frequently officially denied, either in the refusal to acknowledgethat violations of rights occurred or that a particular agent such asthe state was responsible for the violations that are known.

Truth telling, some scholars claim, can ameliorate ongoing sufferingof victims and survivors who lack information about what happened andwho was (or was not) responsible for abuses (Zalaquett 1995). It cancounter certain forms of denial (Zalaquett 1995, Dyzenhaus 2000) andhelp combat the social structures that cultivate ignorance among moreprivileged populations (Regan 2010, Steyn 2012). Truth telling mayalso serve as a way of making reparation for those not actuallyimplicated in crimes. Efforts to record and archive this information,as well as to distribute it in the form of educational materials, aimat ensuring that future generations will not repeat the past.

In restorative justice processes, criminals are often required to givea narrative of the crime (Llewellyn and Howse 1999). In the politicalsphere, one formal mechanism for uncovering and documenting the pastis a truth commission. Truth commissions are temporary officialinstitutions established to examine patterns of specified human rightsabuses over a given time period (Hayner 2010). Dozens of truthcommissions have been established in communities around the globe,including Chile, Chad, and Canada. Commission reports provide asummary of such findings and typically issue recommendations on how toprevent such abuses in the future. These reports vary in the degree towhich the proceedings and findings are made public. Some nameindividual perpetrators and some do not. The South African Truth andReconciliation Commission, which was marked by a high degree ofopenness, televised the testimony of many victims andperpetrators.

In the literature, a variety of claims are advanced regarding howtruth commissions can contribute to reconciliation, both amongindividual perpetrators and victims as well as within nationalcommunities. At the individual level, talking through the past isoften represented as a form of catharsis, wherein the trauma of thepast can be re-experienced, dealt with, and let go. The South AfricanTRC appeared to offer several examples of such a process, includingspontaneous requests for forgiveness by perpetrators and offers offorgiveness by victims (Tutu 1999, South AfricanTruth andReconciliation Commission Final Report 1998).

In terms of societal reconciliation, it is claimed that truthcommissions reintegrate victims in a number of ways. The very factthat victims state publicly what happened to them contributes tore-establishing their civic and political dignity as well asparticipatory standing (Kiss 2000). Officially recording the wrongsdone to victims, which were typically officially denied in the past,reinforces the equal moral standing of victims (du Toit 2000). Thereport produced by a commission, especially when made public, cancultivate collective reconciliation by aiding a community to alter itsself-understanding. A narrative must be produced of how a communitycould at once have a past full of abuses as well as a present andideal future in which those abuses are rejected (Dwyer 1999). It canalso challenge stereotypes that dehumanized members of the communityin the past (C. Murphy 2010) and foster sympathy (Eisikovits 2009).The proceedings and report of a truth commission can foster trust ininstitutions (Gibson 2004). By condemning actions of the past, truthcommissions reassert the force of normative standards that have beenviolated, or establish new normative standards for conduct when theextant terms for a relationship are unjust or immoral (Walker 2010).Telling the truth is taken to be a form of reparation for victims(Zalaquett 1995, Walker 2010). Finally, the recommendations issued bycommissions can contribute to the prevention of future wrongdoing.

Truth commissions remain controversial. Many of the criticisms target,not the value of establishing the truth itself, but the means used toencourage perpetrators to testify, such as amnesty from prosecution.Others object to the ways in which truth commissions (sometimessubtly) pressure victims toward a forgiveness or reconciliation theymay want to resist (Dyzenhaus 2000, Gutmann and Thompson 2000, C.Murphy 2010), or question the psychological benefits of givingtestimony for victims (Hamber 2009). Still other critics of truthcommissions charge that the pursuit of narrative self-understanding isobjectionable, insofar as it tries to establish a single authoritativeinterpretation of the past (Gutmann and Thompson 2000, Regan 2010).Finally, there are doubts about the reconciliatory effects ofcommissions that uncover the truth, but fail to take action againstthose implicated in wrongs (Hamber 2009).

3.4 Amnesties

Amnesties, which grant legal protection from civil and/or criminalliability, are a particularly controversial form of reconciliationprocess. Amnesty can be granted to individuals or classes of persons.It can be granted unconditionally or conditionally. If conditional,the granting of amnesty occurs only if certain provisions are met. Forexample, in South Africa, perpetrators had to make a completedisclosure of the rights violations for which they were responsibleand demonstrate that such violations were committed for politicalreasons (Dyzenhaus 2000). Amnesties may also be conditional onnonrecidivism (Freeman 2011). Finally, amnesties vary in the extent towhich they preclude other negative consequences (e.g., being fired)(Greenawalt 2000).

A number of moral objections to amnesties have been raised. Amnestiesseem at leastprima facie unjust; specifically, amnestyprevents retributive and/or corrective justice from being done(Greenawalt 2000). Granting amnesty is claimed to be inimical tocountering historical impunity for political leaders and governmentagents responsible for egregious violations of human rights. Andachieving the aspiration of “Never Again” seemsintuitively less likely if future political leaders and actors believethey will not be held accountable for their actions. The danger posedby amnesty policies is that, in failing to hold wrongdoers accountableand undermining the ability of victims to seek legal recourse fortheir harms, they may (inadvertently) send the message that the abusesof the past were not wrong or that the victims did not deserve bettertreatment (Pensky 2008). Justified anger against the perpetrators willnot be exorcised, and may instead find expression in acts ofrevenge.

Amnesties continue to be used by states and in fact have increased infrequency (Mallinder 2008). Communities adopt amnesties for a varietyof reasons. Amnesties may encourage perpetrators to give full andtruthful testimony to truth commissions. Here, the value ofremembering the past is emphasized. In contrast, as in Cambodia,amnesties can be used as part of a strategy to forget the past.Amnesties also may be used to incentivize an end to conflict, as wasthe case in South Africa (Dyzenhaus 2000).

Arguments for the moral permissibility of amnesty challenge the ideathat granting amnesty reinforces impunity or undermines stability andjustice (Mallinder 2008). Freeman (2011) claims that amnesties can bejustified as a measure of last resort, so long as victims are includedin the process of deciding to pass an amnesty and amnesties are usedfor the sake of facilitating an end to conflict or reconciliation.Greenawalt (2000) argues that amnesties can be justified whennecessary to prevent even greater injustice from occurring, such asviolations of human rights as part of an ongoing conflict. Bydemonstrating mercy to perpetrators, amnesties might help end a cycleof violence (O’Shea 2002).

3.5 Trials and Punishment

Punishment is the intentional infliction of harm or suffering on awrongdoer in response to a wrong committed. Although transitionalsocieties are sometimes portrayed as having to choose betweenreconciliation and punishment, these responses are not necessarilyopposed (Bennett 2008, Verdeja 2009). As is often clear ininterpersonal or criminal cases, the punishment of a wrongdoer (andespecially the wrongdoer’s acceptance of that punishment) can bea process by which the wrongs of the past are redressed. The power ofpunishment to put the past to rest has been explained in a number ofdifferent ways, such as repaying a debt, removing an unfair advantage(Morris 1968), satisfying the victim’s anger (Hershenov 1999),or reaffirming the equal moral status of victims (Hampton 1992).Implicit in this last analysis is the assumption that wrongdoing isfundamentally expressive, and what is expressed is the inferior moralstanding of the victim, which permits the infliction of harm. Criminalprosecutions help victims re-gain sense of status as rights holder andso enhance dignity (Nino 1998, Bennett 2008).

In the context of transitions to democracy, some scholars concentratespecifically on the significance of trials in response to collectiveand politically significant crimes, such as those involving humanrights abuses by officials. Criminal trials mark a clear break fromthe past (Malamud-Goti 1990). Trials signal the official disapprovalof the actions for which an individual is being prosecuted, actionsthat may not have been officially condemned before. Criminal trialsand punishment are also claimed to make a crucial contribution tosocietal reconciliation by reaffirming the normative standards thatshould govern interaction. Punishment can signify or cultivate acommitment to the rule of law, as well as the faith in law and decencyamong officials upon which the rule of law depends (C. Murphy2010).

On the other hand, a number of scholars are skeptical about thereconciliatory impact of criminal trials, especially in response towidespread wrongdoing. Judith Shklar (1964) and Hannah Arendt (1977)argue trials do little to heal victims wounded by wrongdoing and havelittle pedagogical role regarding the normative standards that shouldgovern relations. Trials fundamentally are oriented towards theestablishment of the guilt of individual perpetrators, not the pursuitof the truth about the past. This can lead to a very limitedunderstanding of the collective character of the injusticesperpetrated, their impact on victims and the broader context that madesuch wrongdoing possible, all of which may be important forreconciliation (Llewellyn and Howse 1999, Isaacs 2016). Moreover, theability of domestic criminal justice systems in transitional societiesto adhere to internationally recognized procedural standards has beenquestioned, as has the justifiability of selectively prosecuting onlya fraction of the perpetrators involved in collective crimes (van Zyl2000).

3.6 Lustration

Lustration refers to legal measures that permit or require theinvestigation of individuals running for election, serving in themilitary, or working in government agencies, universities, or themedia. Individuals found to have connections to past injustices orperpetrating groups may then be publicly exposed or excluded fromserving in public roles (David 2011). Such measures are frequentlyadopted during postwar occupations or in countries transitioning todemocracy. Lustration is sometimes conceived of as a punitive measure,which opens practitioners up to charges of engaging in collectiveforms of punishment that ignore individual desert and violatingprohibitions on retroactive law (Cohen 1995, Meierhenrich 2006).Lustration has also been defended in forward-looking terms as a meansof securing peace or a political transition as well as reestablishingtrust in government by assuring the public that past wrongdoers willno longer be in power (Chiu 2011). Criticisms of lustration as a meansof pursuing political reconciliation highlight the potential forbiased application of the law (Cohen 1995), warn of the difficultiesof re-establishing a functional government when much of theexperienced and educated workforce is excluded from participation(Hollywood 2007), and worry that lustration encourages thecontinuation of suspicion rather than cooperation among former enemies(Govier 2006).

3.7 Reparations

The term ‘reparations’ has been used more and less broadlyto refer to efforts to repair the harm that results from a wrong orconflict. A narrow use of the term refers to a transfer of land,goods, or wealth that is intended to directly compensate for goodsthat were taken, damaged or destroyed. The payment is made either bythe party who was responsible for the harm, by the wrongdoers’descendants or other beneficiaries, or potentially by a third partyacting on the wrongdoers’ behalf. This sort of transfer isperhaps better labeled ‘restitution.’ Transfers made inresponse to losses that are not literally replaceable or monetizable,such as deaths or injuries, are also referred to as restitution orreparation. A still broader use of the term includes materialtransfers that have a more purely symbolic function. These paymentsare meant to send a conciliatory message of some sort rather than tosuggest that the wrong or harm is being paid back. One friend’sgift to another after a quarrel could be an example of a symbolicreparation in everyday life. So could investments in the economy of aformer foe. The term ‘reparations’ is also used even morebroadly to include acts other than material transfers, such asapologies or instances of truth-telling (Torpey 2003, Walker2010).

As we will discuss further in section 4, arguments for materialtransfers may appeal directly to principles of corrective justice.Those commentators who defend material reparations in the name ofreconciliation frequently interpret such payments as acknowledgementsof responsibility, expressions of respect for the moral status of thevictims, acts of remorse or caring, evidence of increasedtrustworthiness or a recommitment to the norms of justice (Thompson2002, Brooks 2004, Gray 2010, Walker 2010). Yet the meanings ofreparations can change, be undermined or repudiated, depending on themanner and context in which they are offered (Brooks 1999, Barkan2000, de Greiff 2006). Still, when combined with apologies,truth-telling, and other measures, reparations have the potential toimprove relations. Perhaps more importantly, leaving identifiableharms uncompensated may undermine the effectiveness of apologies andother efforts to reconcile.

Reparations for historical injustice are particularly controversial.One ongoing debate concerns the guilt or liability of those who wouldpay, the claim-rights and connection to the victims of those who wouldreceive payment, and the difficulty in calculating the proper sum ofrestitution (Waldron 1992, Wheeler 1997, Boxill 2003). Such debatessuggest that reparations are being interpreted as restitution, wherethe legalistic logic of property rights and inheritance are paramount,rather than under the broader project of repairing relationships(Thompson 2002, Brooks 2004).

Victims and their descendants, for their part, sometimes worry thataccepting reparation payments may be seen as drawing a line under thepast, as implying the moral debt is paid or that all is forgiven(Barkan 2000). They also object to the suggestion that the people andother valuable things lost could be repaid by money or other materialgoods.

3.8 Forgiveness

There is considerable disagreement, especially in the politicalliterature, on the relationship between forgiveness andreconciliation. Can parties be reconciled if forgiveness is refused?Is forgiveness genuine if the victim refuses to restore herrelationship with the wrongdoer? In part, differences of opinion onthese matters are traceable to the sorts of disagreements aboutdefining reconciliation that have been surveyed here (namely,regarding the kinds and degrees of improvement that must be madebefore a specific kind of relationship may be described asreconciled). Similar disagreements over the nature of forgivenesscomplicate matters even further.

In the literature on interpersonal forgiveness, definitions offorgiveness commonly focus on the overcoming or forswearing ofresentment (or similar negative attitudes) that were the result ofwrongdoing, and (some would add) the reestablishment of positiveattitudes, such as goodwill, toward the wrongdoer (J. Murphy 2003,Pettigrove 2012). Where such changes in attitude do not occur, butwhere the parties to the wrong manage to reestablish peacefulcoexistence, cooperation or even trust, talk of reconciliation seemsreasonable. This would be a case of reconciliation withoutforgiveness. Similarly, a victim might let go of her resentment ofsomeone who mistreated her and yet take steps to avoid future contactwith that person out of concern for her safety. Such a case exhibitsforgiveness without reconciliation. Forgiveness and reconciliation, onthis account, appear to be distinct and independent phenomena.

Still, the attitude-centered account of forgiveness is compatible withthe view that forgiving is a powerful means to reconciliation. Thesorts of negative attitudes that are overcome by forgiveness arepowerful obstacles to good relations. When those attitudes areresolved, reconciliation is an unsurprising result. It also makessense, given this view of forgiveness, to argue that a case ofreconciliation that does not include forgiveness is less complete thanone that does include forgiveness. Depending on the circumstances, animprovement in relations that leaves resentment and ill will in placemay not seem worthy of the label ‘reconciliation.’ Inthese cases, one might say that forgiveness is necessary forreconciliation.

When commentators work with a different conception of forgiveness, thediscussion of reconciliation is also different. One alternative view offorgiveness, which appears to be more popular in political thaninterpersonal contexts, places emphasis on the actions of victimsrather than their internal mental states, suggesting that when aperson or group forgives they gives up their moral right to hold thewrong against the wrongdoer (Digeser 2001, Wolterstorff 2013). Suchviews have been labeled ‘relational’ or‘commissive’ accounts of forgiveness (Blustein 2014,Pettigrove 2012). Exactly how much one gives up in forgiving is notalways specified and opinions seem to differ. At a minimum, the victimforswears his right to personally retaliate against the wrongdoer. Butdoes forgiving entail that he also forswears calling for punishment bythe proper authorities, or reparations for the harms he suffered, orhis right to remind the wrongdoer and others of the wrong? If onethinks of forgiveness as relinquishing a (more or less broad) right tohold a wrong against a wrongdoer, then it seems forgiveness may wellbe productive of reconciliation. However, depending on how muchvictims give up in forgiving, this kind of reconciliation may bepurchased at the cost of justice (Blustein 2014). In contrast, thosewho think of forgiving as the overcoming of resentment often arguethat victims can forgive yet also call for punishment, reparations andremembrance of the wrong (J. Murphy 2003).

However one defines forgiveness, the claim that victims should forgivein order to bring about valuable reconciliation is likely to becontroversial because it asks the very people who were most deeplyinsulted, wronged and harmed by the past conflict to bear the burdenof repairing it. Another point of concern is whether the victims arebeing asked to forgive unconditionally (that is, without any prior,ameliorative response from the wrongdoer) or conditionally (that is,in response to a morally significant change in or act by thewrongdoer) (Garrard and McNaughton 2011). Furthermore, whether or nota particular act of forgiveness would be morally appropriate,virtuous, or even prudent for the victim, pressuring a victim toforgive is widely regarded as problematic (Govier and Verwoerd2002b).

Efforts to make forgiveness central to reconciliation also run intoquestions about who has the standing to forgive. To forgive on behalfof a living victim is morally unacceptable, if not simply impossible(Govier and Verwoerd 2002b). Some theorists also hold that it isimpossible to forgive on behalf of deceased victims, from which itfollows that wrongs such as murder will be unforgivable(Jankélévitch 2005). In these cases, the possibility ofa reconciliation that is distinct from forgiveness offers a way toconceive of a positive resolution of the past. Theorists debatewhether states or other groups might have the standing to forgive ontheir own behalf, independent of the choices of individual victims.Those who think of forgiveness as primarily a change in attitudes mustmake sense of attributing such mental states to groups, perhaps byexplaining how attitude changes in representative persons (such asleaders or spokespeople) qualify as group forgiveness (cf. Griswold2007). The claim that groups can forgive is easier to make for thosewho think of forgiveness as the waiving of a set of rights(Wolterstorff 2013).

3.9 Participation in Deliberative Processes

At this point, a wide variety of processes that promise to repairrelationships in the aftermath of wrongdoing or conflict have beenreviewed. Perhaps one of the greatest factors in determining whetherreconciliation efforts will be successful is the manner in which theyare selected. A number of measures (e.g., apologies, truth telling)are aimed at restoring a sense of dignity and inclusion to formerlymistreated or disempowered parties. This effect may be magnified ifthose parties also have a say, for example, in choosing criminaltrials or truth commissions, determining the form reparations wouldtake, or designing memorials.

Restorative justice approaches to criminal sentencing place a premiumon victims’ participation (Johnstone 2002). In practices such assentencing conferences and victim-offender mediation, the victim playsan active role in determining the manner in which the offender willmake up for her crime. In this way, the victim has a greater chance ofreceiving a form of satisfaction that he will value more (e.g.,restitution payments rather than the imprisonment of the offender).The victim’s active participation may also provide him with anopportunity to exorcise his resentments or fears, restore his sense ofcontrol over his life, and reaffirm his status as a valued member ofthe community who should not have been mistreated (Johnstone2002).

Restorative justice models also value the active participation ofoffenders in finding a resolution to wrongdoing (Zehr 1990). Forexample, offenders may be asked to propose forms of reparation theycould offer to victims. In being allowed an opportunity to play a rolein building a better future, the offender may avoid a dangerousrage-shame spiral and regain a sense of self-worth (Braithwaite2000).

In political cases, the roles of victim and perpetrator are often notclear-cut or agreed upon. Here, incorporating input from the variousparties to the conflict in designing reconciliation processes willincrease the chances that those measures will be viewed as legitimateacross the entire community (Barsalou and Baxter 2007). Inclusivedeliberative processes for the selection, design, and interpretationof reconciliation efforts can also provide a valuable model for thefuture of the community (Crocker 1999, Anker 2016). The future willnever be free of conflict, so an appropriate goal of reconciliationprocesses is to establish norms for resolving disagreements in apeaceful, just and equitable manner.

4. Reconciliation and Justice

Wrongdoing has implications for multiple moral values, including, mostfundamentally, justice. Justice-based concerns traditionally dominatephilosophical discussions of responding to wrongdoing. What is therelationship between justice and reconciliation? Discussion of thisquestion occurs most explicitly in the political context, especiallyin debates about the moral justifiability of non-punitive responses towrongdoing such as truth commissions. This section provides anoverview of the various positions that have been advanced concerningthe relationship between justice and reconciliation.

Whether reconciliation is compatible with justice turns, of course, onhow one conceives of justice. In some parts of the literature, thequestion concerns corrective justice. For example, critics object tocalls for reconciliation that are not accompanied with restitution forharms suffered, such as the appropriation of land (Alfred 2009). Insection 3.7, we describe how, in other cases, restitution andreparation are defended as a means to reconciliation. However, asHoward McGary (2010 argues, here too there is a tension betweenjustice and reconciliation. Principles of restitution are generallytaken to be backward-looking, in the sense that the past action ofwrongful taking itself provides sufficient grounds for making thevictims whole. Bringing in the rhetoric of reconciliation suggestsinstead that the reason for the transfer of goods is to secure betterfuture relations among wrongdoers and victims. McGary argues that thisforward-looking goal of reconciliation can insultingly suggest that aconcern for corrective justice is an insufficient reason to compensatethe victim--that justice for these victims is only worth securing whenit is also in the interest of the wrongdoers.

For many other theorists, especially those writing about transitionalcontexts, justice is assumed to be ‘retributive justice’(see the entry onretributive justice). The core claim of retributivists is that perpetrators of wrongdoingdeserve to suffer a proportional punishment. Justice is a matter ofholding wrongdoers accountable by giving them the negative treatmentthey deserve.

Against this background, one view is that reconciliation andretributive justice are in tension with one another. Whereasretributive justice focuses on delivering a punishment that fits thepast crime, reconciliation is concerned with bringing about futuregood relations. The conflict between justice and reconciliation isvisible when individuals or communities choose non-punitive responsesin hopes of securing peace. According to one view, insofar astransitional societies do not punish wrongdoers, they promotereconciliation at a significant moral cost: they sacrifice justice.Authors debate whether this sacrifice may be all-things-consideredmorally justified, given the exigencies of transitional societies(Mendez 1997, Dwyer 1999, Greenawalt 2000).

Another way of framing the relationship between retributive justiceand reconciliation is to see doing justice, conceptualized aspunishment, as contributing to reconciliation (Verdeja 2009, C. Murphy2010). From this perspective, retributive justice and reconciliationare not fundamentally or necessarily in conflict. Justice may even bea precondition for reconciliation in cases where allowing impunity forserious wrongdoing would fuel resentment and undermine trust ininstitutions. Even if individual wrongdoers are further alienated bypunitive measures, holding them accountable may be productive of abroader reconciliation among victims and other members of thecommunity, as well as among future generations.

Instead of conceptualizing the relationship between justice andreconciliation through the processes that promote each value, adifferent set of views consider instead the core moral concernsconstitutive of each value. According to some scholars, reconciliationand justice are compatible, though distinct, moral values, and avariety of processes can respond to the moral concerns each valuetakes up (Allen 1999, Allais 2012). That is, responses to wrongdoingcan be just and conducive to reconciliation in different degrees.Responses to wrongdoing may promote some aspects of justice (such asdemands for recognition of victims and accountability forperpetrators), but not others. For example, this view can accommodatethe claim, made during the South African TRC, that wrongdoers are heldaccountable when they are required to undergo the shaming experienceof testifying publicly to their crimes (Final Report, 1998, vol. 1,ch. 1, para 35). Similarly, they may foster some dimensions ofreconciliation (such as epistemic or attitudinal changes), but notothers.

A final view is that reconciliationis (part or all of)justice (Llewellyn and Howse 1999, Philpott 2012). Theorists who adoptthis position regard it as a mistake to equate justice withretributive justice. In the view of advocates of restorative justice,justice is fundamentally about repairing damaged relationships.Chairman Rev. Desmond Tutu famously responds to the criticism of theTRC’s decision not to pursue retributive justice by saying,“We believe, however, that there is another kind of justice– a restorative justice which is concerned not so much withpunishment as with correcting imbalances, restoring brokenrelationships – with healing, harmony and reconciliation”(Final Report, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, para. 36). It is difficult toprovide a definitive account of restorative justice. However, theemphasis is on achieving a morally appropriate state of relations,where victims’ needs for recognition, security and reparationsare given special emphasis (Kiss 2000, Walker 2006). Thus, to promotereconciliation is to promote justice. Insofar as holding wrongdoersaccountable through punishment helps restore morally appropriateattitudes, norms and interactions among the victim, the wrongdoer, andthe community, punishment is compatible with restorative justice.However, retribution is not valued for its own sake.

5. Conclusion

This entry has explored the various ways that the repair ofrelationships is conceptualized in the literature, and the processesthat are claimed to foster such repair. One lingering questionremains: what value is there in the pursuit of relational repair? Thesection on justice suggests two, not incompatible, answers. Theprocess of repairing relationships is most obviously valuable andimportant because of the other goods it enables individuals andcommunities to achieve. In the political context, the cessation ofviolence, the prevention of future violence, and the attainment ofdemocracy are some values that may be promoted. In more interpersonalcontexts, the benefits of relational repair include the avoidance offurther harms to one’s interests, including the psychologicalburden of resentment, or the goods that continued interaction bring,such as material profit through ongoing trade. But in addition tothese sorts of instrumental value, one might also argue thatreconciliation is valuable for its own sake. Insofar as a relationshipis intrinsically valuable or morally appropriate, the repair of arelation that has been ruptured acquires derivative intrinsic value.Insofar as wrongdoing violates and damages the relationship that oughtto exist between two morally motivated parties (namely, a relationshipof mutual respect and a reasonable degree of trust in theother’s ability and willingness to abide by appropriate norms ofbehavior), reconciliation sets things to right.

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