Recognition has both a normative and a psychologicaldimension. Arguably, if you recognize another person with regard to acertain feature, as an autonomous agent, for example, you do not onlyadmit that she has this feature but you embrace a positive attitudetowards her for having this feature. Such recognition implies that youbear obligations to treat her in a certain way, that is, you recognizea specific normative status of the other person, e.g., as a free andequal person. But recognition does not only matter normatively. It isalso of psychological importance. Most theories of recognition assumethat in order to develop a practical identity, persons fundamentallydepend on the feedback of other subjects (and of society as awhole). According to this view, those who fail to experience adequaterecognition, i.e., those who are depicted by the surrounding others orthe societal norms and values in a one-sided or negative way, willfind it much harder to embrace themselves and their projects asvaluable. Misrecognition thereby hinders or destroys persons’successful relationship to their selves. It has been poignantlydescribed how the victims of racism and colonialism have sufferedsevere psychological harm by being demeaned as inferior humans (Fanon1952). Thus, recognition constitutes a “vital human need”(Taylor 1992, 26).

Recognition theory is thought to be especially well-equipped toilluminate the psychological mechanisms of social and politicalresistance. As experiences of misrecognition violate the identity ofsubjects, the affected are supposed to be particularly motivated toresist, that is, to engage in a “struggle for recognition.”Therefore, at least since the 1990s, theories of recognition haveenjoyed a lively academic as well as public interest. They promise toilluminate a variety of new social movements—be it thestruggles of ethnic or religious minorities, of gays and lesbians or ofpeople with disabilities. None of these groups primarily fight for amore favorable distribution of goods. Rather, they struggle for anaffirmation of their particular identity and are thus thoughtto be engaged in a new form of politics, sometimes labeled“politics of difference” or “identitypolitics.” However, many accounts want to ascribe a much morefundamental role to the concept of recognition—covering themorality of human relationships in its entirety. From this more generalperspective, also earlier campaigns for equal rights—be it byworkers, women or African Americans—should be understood as“struggles for recognition.” To frame these politicalmovements in terms of recognition highlights the relational characterof morality—and justice: Justice is not primarily concernedwith how many goods a person should have but rather with what kind ofstanding vis-à-vis other persons she deserves (Young 1990).

This entry will first discuss some controversies surrounding thevery concept of recognition (1) before reviewing four dimensions ofwhat is recognized (bywhom and onwhatgrounds) that have been highlighted by different theories ofrecognition (2). However, even in light of these differentiations someauthors have expressed the fear that concentrating on the issue ofrecognition might supplant the central problem of (re)distribution onthe political agenda (3). Finally, the often rather sanguinedescriptions of recognition and its potential for emancipation (4)have been fundamentally challenged: The concern is that because theneed for recognition renders persons utterly dependent on thedominating societal norms it may undermine the identity of any critic. Thus, some worry that struggles for recognition may lead toconformism and a strengthening of ideological formations (5).

• 1. Analyzing the Concept of Recognition
  • 1.1 Recognition and its Neighboring Concepts
  • 1.2 Possible Subjects and Objects of Recognition
• 2. Four Forms of Recognition
  • 2.1 Elementary Recognition
  • 2.2 Respect
  • 2.3 Esteem
  • 2.4 Love and Friendship
• 3. Recognition and Redistribution
• 4. Recognition and Emancipation
• 5. Recognition as Ideology?
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Analyzing the Concept of Recognition

Recognition presupposes a subject of recognition (the recognizer) andan object (the recognized). Before asking what kind of subjects andobjects of recognition are possible (1.2) this entry discusses themeaning of “recognition” and how it differs fromneighboring concepts such as “identification” and“acknowledgment” (1.1).

1.1 Recognition and its Neighboring Concepts

Paul Ricoeur has distinguished as many as 23 different usages of thenotion “to recognize” (Ricoeur 2005, 5–16) grouping themunder three main categories, namely recognition as identification,recognizing oneself and mutual recognition. Many authors havechallenged Ricoeur’s view by proposing a distinction betweenrecognition (of oneself as well as of others) and“identification”: Whereas we identify anX as anX withoutnecessarily affirming it as (and because of)X, recognition requires apositive evaluation ofX. The term “acknowledgment” whichsome authors use interchangeably with recognition (Appiah 1992, 149) isalso contested. Whereas some have argued that we acknowledge thevalidity of certain insights, values and norms(Ikäheimo/Laitinen 2007, 34–37), others continue to use the term“acknowledgment” with regard to persons but intend it todenote something less ambitious than the wholesale affirmation of theirspecific identity (Cavell 1969; Markell 2003). However, it is themeaning of mutual recognition that lies at the heart of thecontemporary discussion.

Mutuality has always served as the explanatory and normative core ofthe concept of recognition. Most theories draw on Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel whowas, in turn, heavily influenced by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (for theircommon roots in Jean-Jacques Rousseau see Neuhouser 2008). According toFichte we become conscious of our own autonomy by being challenged—or as Fichte would characterize it: “called upon”—by the actions of another subject. Only by understanding thatthe other’s actions are intentional can we also grasp our ownactions and utterances as expressions of an intentional self. Thisthought is most famously expressed in Hegel’sPhenomenologyof Spirit where this interpersonal encounter logically culminatesin a struggle of life and death (see esp. Kojève 1947 whosereading strongly influenced Jean-Paul Sartre and Jacques Lacan; alsothe contributions in O’Neill 1996). Within thePhenomenology this idea is first and foremost a thesis abouthow we can gain self-consciousness as autonomous agents,namely only by interacting with other autonomous subjects (see in moredetail 2.1 below). However, this idea also leads Hegel to consider theimportance of differing forms of mutual recognition. Already in hisearly writings in the JenaRealphilosophie of 1805/06 Hegelexpands the Fichtean motif by referring to the Hobbesian idea of afundamental struggle—albeit not of self-interest but ofrecognition. In Hegel’s story of the state of nature socialrelationships are a (perhaps forgotten) given: A person who attacksyour property does not primarily want to gain material goods. Rather,she wishes to remind you, the first possessor, that she is a personwith moral standing as well who has been neglected by the act of first acquisition (Siep 1979, 39; Honneth 1992, 44–45). As becomesespecially clear in thePhenomenology: By fighting against theother the subject wants to affirm her own freedom by proving that hernormative status is of more importance to her than any of her (animal)desires, including—at an extreme—her desire to live.However, such fighting, expressive of autonomy, must lead to an impasseas it cannot achieve mutual recognition: either one of the subjectsdies or subjects herself as a slave to the other, the superior master,and thus fails to express her autonomy. Furthermore, in this case themaster does not receive adequate recognition either, because therecognizer has proven to be a “mere” slave who does notcount as an autonomous and competent judge. Thus, adequate recognitioncan only be achieved within an institutionalized order ofrights that secures genuinely mutual recognition (Williams 1997,59–68). Hegel develops this latter thought most systematically in hismaturePhilosophy of Right. Here, the relationships andimplicit norms of the three spheres of, first, love within the family,second, contractual respect within civil society and, third, solidaritywithin the state are supposed to be necessary in order to actualizeindividual autonomy, but not in the sense of mere“negative” but of “social” freedom. Thesespheres allow the subjects to feel at home within (or“reconciled” with) the ethical life of their community(which is organized as a state) because it provides the subjects withthe meanings necessary for a fulfilling individual life that they canembrace (see also 2.3 below).

1.2 Possible Subjects and Objects of Recognition

It has been argued that focusing on the idea of mutuality may limitthe scope of recognition too much. Rather, we should distinguishbetween a narrow understanding of recognition based on the feature ofmutuality and a wide understanding grounded in the idea of adequateregard (Laitinen 2010). The latter reading emphasizes that by affirminga valuable feature of any entity (i.e., also of animals and eveninanimate nature, not only of persons) we properly‘recognize’ it regardless of whether the recognized objectrealizes this fact (or is even able to do so). Thus, the wideunderstanding allows for many objects of recognition that cannotthemselves be subjects of recognition. However, so far this constitutesa minority position.

By contrast, because most theorists of recognition argue thatrecognition is a genuinely interpersonal endeavor, they conclude thatonly subjects of recognition can be proper objects of recognition.At its margins, this narrow understanding of mutual recognition betweenpersons raises the question from which point onward children can startto be subjects of recognition (and whether at least some animals canqualify as such). Most theories of recognition—drawing, forexample, on psychoanalytic object-relations theory (see in more detail2.4 below)—speak of recognition in the context of therelationship between parents and babies. This suggests, of course, thathuman babies face the surrounding world differently than even the mostdeveloped animals do (see in more detail 2.1 below).

When it comes to the question of collective agents, there is stillconsiderable uncertainty within the literature. In the following, thisentry distinguishes between (i) groups, (ii) corporations or states and(iii) institutions more generally. (i) Most authors readily grant that(at least certain) groups of persons may be the subject and object of(mis)recognition because a group can share collective intentions aswell as certain features for which it can be misrecognized (especiallyif these features constitute the group’s self-understanding).(ii) It is more contested whether more complex collective actors suchas corporations or states—to the extent they are thought tohave a legal personality—can be regarded as subjects andobjects of recognition in the proper sense (see for the latter Rawls1999, 34–35). For example, there is dissent about whether theacts of the “collective actor” are rather to be understoodas resulting from the mere aggregation of individual intentions, thus signifyingindividual acts of (mis)recognition, or whether they display genuinely autonomous collective intentions. Philip Pettit argues for the latter position by pointing out that in order to act reliably (internally and externally) a collective agent’s decisions have to display a certain coherence over time, which is achieved by procedures (Pettit 2007, 180). Recently, there have been attemptsto introduce the notion of recognition into the field of InternationalRelations, beyond the common usage of a legal recognition of states.Often enough, it is argued, the (violent) behavior of states cannot bereductively understood as a merely instrumental striving for ever morepower but should (at least also) be perceived as a struggle forrecognition (see the contributions in Lindemann/Ringmar 2011, O’Neill/Smith 2012, part III, and Daase et al. 2015). Certainly, citizens frequently speak as if their state was disrespected by another state but itremains to be seen whether these citizens are in fact merely indignantabout their government being disrespected, some public official or they themselvesas members of the state (in more detail Iser 2015, 30–34). (iii) Finally,what about institutions more generally? A lot depends on one’sdefinition of institutions, which can be part of a state (for example,a state’s constitution) or transcend state borders (as theinstitution of the free global market). Institutions cannot as easilybe described as collective actors. Still, given that they are humanproducts, there is broad agreement that an institution (say, aconstitution) can disrespect persons because institutions, besideseffectively regulating behavior, always express—as well asreinforce—underlying attitudes of those who designed or keep onreproducing them. In distinguishing between a civilized society whereindividuals do not humiliate each other and a decent society where atleast the institutions do not do so, Avishai Margalit (1996, 1–2)explicitly affirms this point. Furthermore, political resistance as amoral endeavor would prove to be unintelligible if we did not assumethat political institutions (and not only the agents acting withinthem) could be subjects of misrecognition. But can institutionsthemselves be disrespected? Institutions can certainly be disregardedbut it may be argued that institutions (similar to values and norms)are either “acknowledged” or not whereas it is only personsor groups subject to these institutions who can be properly“(mis)recognized” as only here (mis)recognition hasconsequences for the object’s self-conception.

2. Four Forms of Recognition

We can differentiate the concept of recognition accordingto the kind of features a person is recognizedfor. Most agree that only in a formal sense is recognition a vital humanneed or an anthropological constant. New demands of recognition alwaysowe themselves to the historically established and changing ideas ofwhat kind of recognition we deserve. This is illustrated by the ratherrecent historical development in which the premodern concept of honor(which was assigned to persons as members of a group within ahierarchical social structure) was divided into two parts: first, intothe modern notion of equal respect awarded to all agents capable ofautonomy and, second, into the idea of esteem due to one’sachievements. Whereas the former now guarantees a basic level ofrecognition for everyone, the latter creates a hitherto unknowninsecurity with regard to the question of what kind of recognition onedeserves (Taylor 1992, 34–35); an insecurity which, according to someauthors, has led to the growing importance of intimate love andfriendship within the private sphere.

Kantians—and liberals more generally—usually concentrateon the first dimension of the modern recognition order, i.e., onrespect for the equal dignity of autonomous beings. Hegelian theoriesof recognition, by contrast, embrace a more encompassing view ofrecognition attempting to cover all spheres of recognition withinmodernity. Thus, in his classical text on the topic, “ThePolitics of Recognition,” Charles Taylor distinguishes threeforms of recognition (Taylor 1992). Whereas a “politics ofuniversalism” aims at the equal recognition of all persons intheir common humanity, a “politics of difference”—asonly one dimension of a politics of recognition (Blum 1998; Thompson2006, 7–8)—emphasizes the uniqueness of specific (andespecially cultural) features (Taylor 1992, 37) often associated withcommunitarianism. Finally, Taylor thematizes the recognition ofconcrete individuality in contexts of loving care that are of utmostimportance to subjects (Taylor 1992, 37). It is these three dimensionsof the modern recognition order—which reach back to Hegel’streatment of the subject—that have been primarily analyzed inthe discussion (Ikäheimo 2002). They have even been interpretedas genealogically distinct stages along which individual persons gainself-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Honneth 1992, ch. 5).However, some have argued that a much more fundamental form of“elementary” recognition (2.1) is underlying these modernspheres of respect (2.2), esteem (2.3) as well as love and friendship(2.4).

2.1 Elementary Recognition

Hegel’s famous idea that we gain self-consciousness onlythrough a process of mutual recognition (see 1.1 above) has been takenup by some neo-Hegelian philosophers of mind. They make thesocio-ontological claim that the world is always cooperatively(re)constructed by human agents (see Pinkard 1994, Pippin 2008, alsothe contributions in Ikäheimo/Laitinen 2011). Only mutualrecognition that grants others the status of an epistemic authorityallows us to construct a normative space of reasons: I know that thetruth of my judgment depends on you being able to share it (Brandom1994). Thus, such accounts try to explain how reason can enter theworld in the first place—and therefore this kind of elementaryrecognition does not seem to depend on values or norms but rather be asource thereof. As early as the 1960s and 1970s, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas similarly developed their respective variantsof discourse ethics stressing that the proper use of language alreadypresupposes a certain form of recognition of all other speakers asequally authoritative (see on both Habermas 1991, ch. 2, for a critique of this argument Wellmer 1986, 108–111, for a good introduction Baynes 2015). However, human beings never create their worldor the reasons they use from scratch. Rather, they are embedded inholistic webs of meanings which they jointly reproduce (andmay hereby also redo). Theories of recognition hereby providethe ground for a critique of atomistic views of subjectivity(especially in Taylor 1989, part I).

Some have even argued that only empathy with other persons allows usto take over their perspective (Cavell 1969) which, again, seems to bea prerequisite for sharing their evaluative reasons: recognition isprimary to cognition (Honneth 2005, 40–44). These ideas have gainedadditional currency through psychological findings suggesting that thechild’s brain can only develop cognitively if she is ableto be emotionally attached to her primary care-givers. Only by beinginterested in sharing experiences with other autonomous beings does thechild gain access to the world of meaning (Tomasello 1999, Hobson2002).

In this vein it has been argued that people come to recognize othersas persons very early on. Already the baby learns to recognize herattachment figures as intelligible beings, i.e., as meaning-conferringand autonomous. Quite automatically, so the argument goes, the childthen later perceives all other humans as humans. Onlyafterwards the subject may become blind to this “antecedentrecognition” (Honneth 2005, 58). Such “forgetfulness ofrecognition” is supposedly caused either by reifying socialpractices which prompt individuals to perceive subjects merely asobjects or by ideological belief systems that depict some human beingsas non- or sub-human (Honneth 2005, 59–60).

In sum, this elementary form shows that recognition is not onlyneeded for the creation and preservation of a subject’s identity,but that it also denotes a basic normative attitude. Brandom emphasizesthat—besides constituting self-consciousness as an“essentially, and not just accidentally, […]social achievement […]—recognition is anormative attitude. To recognize someone is to take her to bethe subject of normative statuses, that is, of commitments andentitlements, as capable of undertaking responsibilities and exercisingauthority” (Brandom 2007, 136, emphasis in original). Whereas Brandom concentrates onrather basic normative ascriptions, all phenomena of recognition can bedescribed as inherently normative. In particular, there is one specificform of recognition in modernity that seems to flow quite naturallyfrom our basic capacity of recognizing each other in the elementaryform sketched so far, namely equal respect.

2.2 Respect

Ever since the idea of universal human rights has been establishedin modernity, assigning equal dignity or respect is commonly thought tobe the central dimension of recognition. Nearly every moral philosopherwriting today accepts this (Kantian) idea, even if not all embrace itin the terminology of recognition. One of the authors who explicitlydoes so is Thomas Scanlon. According to him, respect expresses thefoundation of morality as such, because the “contractualist idealof acting in accord with principles that others (similarly motivated)could not reasonably reject is meant to characterize the relations withothers the value and appeal of which underlies our reasons to do whatmorality requires. This relation […] might be called a relationof mutual recognition. Standing in this relation to others is appealingin itself—worth seeking for its own sake” (Scanlon 1998,162). For Scanlon, therefore, moral blame is especially relevant because it signifies a disturbance of this basic relationship(Scanlon 2008, cf. Wallace 2012). What is valued here, again, isautonomous agency, the capacity to respond to reasons.

Most discussions in moral and political philosophy can be seen asdisputes over what it means to recognize the other as equal, i.e., whatproper respect demands. Such respect (for the humanity in each person)has to be distinguished from a common usage in which“respect” denotes something quite different, namely acertain respect for the (moral) qualities of a particularperson’s character or conduct (for example, in Rawls 1971, §67; Sennett 2003). It has been proposed that the former should betermed “recognition respect” whereas the latter should belabeled “appraisal respect” (Darwall 1977). Appraisalrespect resembles esteem (see 2.3 below) in that particular propertiesof a person are valued—and not so much the general fact thatsheis a person capable of autonomous agency. In thefollowing, the term “respect” will be used to denote theattitude of “recognition respect” with regard to the equalmoral standing of persons and their demands.

As we face a continuum from severe degradation to phenomena of whichit is hotly contested whether they are disrespectful, quite a fewtheories of recognition have focused on the negative experiences ofclear disrespect. In fact, the normative expectation of beingtreated with respect is most obvious when we look at extreme forms ofhumiliation in which specific (groups of) humans are symbolically andconsequently also materially excluded from humanity, are treated likeanimals or mere objects. In response to such extreme forms ofhumiliation, Margalit has concluded that our primary political aimshould be to strive for a decent society instead of a fully just one(Margalit 1996, 271–291) and there has been some discussion aboutwhether recognition theory has a natural affinity with minimal ornegative theories of morality (Allen 2001).

Being faced with extreme humiliation, the interplay betweennormative and psychological aspects becomes especially salient. Even ifthe victims know that their degradation is unjustified, they cannot butfeel humiliated all the same. Any trust in being able to control theirlives is stripped away from them. In the course of mistreatment,torture and rape the perpetrators do not only intentionally inflictpain and injury on their victims but also deride the agency of thelatter. This combination undermines basic self- and world-trust (Scarry1985; Rorty 1989, ch. 7–9; Margalit 1996, 115–119, 145).

However, even less extreme forms of mistreating persons manifestdisrespect. In these cases it is not necessarily denied that thoseunder discussion are humans, but rather that they have equal moraland/or legal standing. Instead of being approached as adults, women andpeople of different color, for instance, were, for the most part ofhistory, treated like children. They were regarded as“second-class citizens” (Taylor 1992, 37) not capable ofresponsibly reproducing and shaping the social norms of theircommunities. Only equal positive rights institutionalize recognition ina publicly manifest way and thus make it easier for the individual todevelop self-respect (Feinberg 1970, 251–253), “perhaps the mostimportant primary good” (Rawls 1971, § 67).

Nonetheless, there is a certain tension between recognizing somebody asa legal rights holder and the idea of a full-fledged recognition order.The very idea of subjective rights allows persons to step out of allinterpersonal relations and insist on their “right”whatever reasons might be raised against that by others (Menke 2009).Yet, in granting every subject the right to use their powers of reasonsas they see fit, law recognizes their autonomous agency. It herebytakes into account the fact of reasonable pluralism. Although peoplemight disagree with each other, toleration of the other’sdissenting opinion is then supposed to be grounded in equal respect(see Forst 2013) and not only a way of grudgingly settling for amodus vivendi. Nonetheless, theorists of recognition (withinthe Hegelian tradition) have warned that concentrating entirely onnegative liberty without considering the wider social context in whichsuch liberty is embedded and on which it depends might lead to socialpathologies (Honneth 2014, ch. 4). With this warning they joincommunitarian voices. Thus, one necessary step is to secure thelegitimacy of the legal order by ascribing equal democratic rights toall citizens. This recognizes them as being able to orient themselvestoward the common good (and not only to their self-interest).

2.3 Esteem

The major emancipatory movements of the last two centuries—for instance the women’s or the civil rights movements in the US—fought for equal respect and rights. In contrast, in many ofthe contemporary social struggles persons or groups demand recognitionof specific (e.g., cultural or religious) aspects of their identitieswhich are neglected or demeaned by the dominant value and norm systemof their society. It is these phenomena which have helped popularizethe notions of a “politics of recognition” or“identity politics.” However, it is contested why thesedifferences should matter normatively: Do we owe such recognition tothe affected as subjects withequal moral status (a) orbecause we should esteem theirspecific properties as valuable(b)?

(a) The first reading, which claims that we owe this kind ofrecognition to all subjects as equally entitled, allows only for acontext-sensitive form of respect. By pointing to differencesdisregarded so far one hopes to show that the allegedly“neutral” state (or society) is by no means neutral, butrather based on a partial (for example, male-dominated, white,heterosexual) interpretation of citizenship or just on an arbitraryprivileging of specific groups. Hereby all members are discriminatedwho do not fit the hegemonic understanding (already Taylor 1992, 42).If one tries to cancel out these disadvantages by taking into accountthe differences, e.g., by means of affirmative action intended toremove injustices, this serves the higher-ranking goal of treatingpersons in all their particularity as of equal status (Benhabib 1992).In order to arrive at such context-sensitive laws and regulations onehas to more fully include the affected groups into the process ofdemocratic decision-making, for example, through a vitalized publicsphere and formal hearings (Habermas 1994). Additionally, it has beenproposed that (formerly) oppressed groups should have a veto right withregard to all those questions that particularly affect them (Young1990, 183–191).

(b) In contrast, the second reading claims that we should valueparticularityin itself. Such a politics of difference is notconcerned with (context-sensitive) respect, but with the esteem forspecific characteristics or entire identities of individuals and—often enough—groups.

However, the idea of group identities has been hotly contested:Whereas some groups indeed want to (re)affirm their particularidentity, the criticism has been voiced that such a homogenous readingof identity fails to take proper account of intersecting axes ofidentification (being a black, lesbian woman, for instance). Thefailure to admit of such heterogeneity has been suspected oflegitimizing internal oppression within minority groups. According to somescholars, all identities have to be deconstructed. Again others haveheld onto the idea of group identities for political reasons (demandingsecure exit-options for individual members) or have favored rainbowcoalitions. In this context, it is also controversial whether culturesshould be valued in themselves or only in their value for individualsand whether such cultural protection necessitates group rights (Kymlicka 1989, Taylor1992, Habermas 1994, Laden/Owen 2007, Patten 2014). Finally, thereseems to be an aporia as the alleged solution to equally value andpromote all cultures may be no solution at all: Arguably, to esteemsomething without accurate knowledge or against one’s ownconvictions is no real esteem but rather manifests an additionalinsult. Therefore, Taylor urges us to be “merely” maximallyopen towards the alien culture and to be led by the principle thattraditions with a long history most certainly contain somethingvaluable (Taylor 1992, 68–71).

There is another group of scholars which has argued that esteemshould not be awarded to groups but to individuals—and not forthe latter’s wholesale identities but only for specific features.Yet, in light of the value pluralism so characteristic of modernsocieties, it remains unclear who could function as an impartial judgewhen it comes to determining what is (more) valuable and what is not.Every decision seems to run the danger of merely expressing arepressive majority opinion. Therefore, according to some accounts,esteem should play no role in public politics whatsoever: it issufficient for individuals to be respected by all and to be esteemed byonly some significant others, for example, by their family, friends orfellow members of voluntary associations (Rawls 1971, § 67;Habermas 1994, 129).

Yet, an opposing camp claims that simply neglecting thedimension of esteem does not do justice to our everyday experiences: Weare not only injured by humiliating behavior, but also if strangersinsult us (either in the sense of not recognizingspecificfeatures of ourselves or actively devaluing them). After all, we have aneed to be esteemed by society “as such” in order to beable to appear in public without shame. Bourdieu’s social theory,for example, points to the pervasiveness of evaluative patterns anddistinctions even in modern society, determining social status andclass (Bourdieu 1984). In order to solve the dilemma of having tocreate an impartial value horizon for modern societies, in recent yearssome authors have proposed to focus on the notion of“achievement.” The latter is supposed to be a sufficientlyformal reference point for esteeming persons. “Achievement”is not only of great significance within capitalistic societies butremains open for historically and interculturally different ideas ofwhat kind of achievement should count as relevant (Honneth 1992, 126;2003a, 140–142; Margalit 1996, 46–47). It is supposed to allow forindividual particularity (one’s own achievement) but still to retaina common reference point (the contribution to the common good, howeverthat may be defined). From this perspective, mass unemployment, forinstance, is a social pathology because it denies this form of esteemto large parts of the population. This could only be counteracted byacknowledging activities outside of the labor market as achievements sothat every citizen has the chance to see herself as a person whocontributes to the flourishing of her society. Additionally, itconstitutes an injustice if activities are devalued for arbitraryreasons (e.g., if specific jobs lose their status just because theratio of women holding them increases, see Honneth 2003a, 153, or ifwomen earn less than men for doing the same job).

Two sorts of arguments have been leveled against this idea offocusing on achievement. First, some have argued that it is impossibleto find culturally neutral criteria of merit (Young 1990, 200–206). For instance, the market is not interested so much in capacities or skills, but merely in outputs demanded by others regardless of the skills involved (see Schmidt am Busch 2011, 46–47). But some will argue that the market is thus not tracking the relevant feature. If it is true that the very definition of achievement or merit will remain essentially contested, the problem that was supposed to be solved onlyreappears again: we can only expect such recognition from those whoshare with us the same standards of achievement. Second, even if the citizenry could come up with a convincing standard,there remains a “recognition gap”: not all, perhaps noteven the central features that render us valuable in our own eyes canbe understood as “achievements” in the sense ofcontributing to the common good (Iser 2008, 193).

Nonetheless, by highlighting the human dependency on evaluativehorizons of esteem, many theories of recognition share importantcharacteristics with communitarian approaches. The idea of a common,more substantial “ethical life” is especially important forthose who think that we can only flourish if we live inmeaning-bestowing relationships of mutual recognition. In suchrelationships people are supposed to experience the needs, desires andgoals of their alter ego not so much as limitations but rather asfurtherances of their own “social” freedom (in this veinTaylor 1992, 33–34; Neuhouser 2000, esp. ch. 1; Pippin 2008, ch. 7;Honneth 2014, chs. 3 and 6, Honneth 2015, esp. ch. I). The individual can only experience her deedsas really hers in living and acting in concert with others and feelingat home in the society’s institutions. Here recognition is notonly a precondition for valuing one’s own (perhaps stillindividual) projects but is itself an integral part of (essentiallysocial) endeavors. According to this picture, we face a lack of freedomwhere such relationships of mutual recognition are not fully realized.Thus, these accounts follow Hegel in generalizing experiences drawnfrom the intimate sphere of loving relationships.

2.4 Love and Friendship

Relationships of loving care are deemed important withinpsychologically oriented recognition theories (Benjamin 1988, Honneth1992) because such emotionally fulfilling interactions are supposed todisplay the first form of recognition humans experience. Theunconditional care by a parent provides the baby with the feeling ofsecurity and of being loved, and thus of being worthy of love. This world-and self-trust is taken to later enable the child to value her ownprojects and align the role standards that grow increasingly morecomplicated in the course of her development and to critically questionthem (Mead 1934, Habermas 1988). Most of those who endorse therelevance of love also stress the importance of the affectivedimension for all subsequent forms of recognition (Honneth 2014, ch. 6.1).

Following the idea that recognition should always affirm certainaspects of the other person, there has been some controversy about whatexactly we recognize in other persons when we love them or regard themas friends. After all, we seem to embrace them in their entire (andchanging) personality and could not just replace them with others whomay have similar characteristics. Whereas some think that we stillrespond to some valuable trait, namely the autonomous core of the lovedone’s personality (Velleman 1999, 366–374), others think that therelationship itself creates a value that is worth caring for (Frankfurt2004).

Furthermore, as love embraces the entirepersonality of individuals it has been proposed that it is thisexperience, anchored in early childhood, that provides subjects with apermanent motivational resource for demanding recognition for ever moreaspects of their identity, and thus for further moral progress. Thismay, of course, in its extreme form of desiring to be recognized in allone’s features by all persons be a mere utopia (along these linesHonneth 2002, 504). Theories such as those of Emmanuel Lévinas(1961, section III) or Jacques Derrida (1990, 959) depict concreteothers as demanding an infinite sensibility and care toward them.Although we often have to relativize these “demands” inlight of competing claims of others and for reasons ofoverdemandingness (Forst 2011, 36–37), these theories generally pointto the possibility of having to redraw the boundaries between differentspheres of recognition. This could, for example, lead to a revisedunderstanding of solidarity being not only a task of families or closefriends but of entire societies, namely in the form of a welfarestate.

Although politics might not be directly responsible forthis form of recognizing concrete individuality, there are neverthelessindirect possibilities to protect and to shape its basic conditions. Bymeans of effective law enforcement politics assures the individual thatthe trust (in one’s environment as well as one’s own body),acquired in intimate relations since childhood (see Taylor 1992, 36–37),is not forcibly destroyed from the outside, e.g., by maltreatment,torture or rape (some, as Owen 2007, 308, even mention naturaldisasters although these catastrophes do not damage interpersonaltrust). Additionally, some of the social conditions that make it morechallenging to succeed in intimate relations can be improvedpolitically. This is, for example, valid for inflexible or very longworking hours for parents and bad child care offers, for demands ofhigh mobility which endanger intimate relationships, or for thecultural patterns that devalue reciprocity between partners, e.g., byfavoring negligence and recklessness as “masculine.”

3. Recognition and Redistribution

Despite the differentiation of these four dimensions of recognition,in the middle of the 1990s, Nancy Fraser (but also Rorty 1999) voicedthe concern that, at least in the political context of the US, theincreasingly influential “identity politics” threatened toreplace the issue of redistribution on the political agenda. Sheinsisted—against Taylor and Honneth—that onlyrecognition and redistribution taken together would allow forthe right kind of justice, namely the ideal of “participatoryparity” that guarantees each subject an equal participation inpublic life. While redistribution secures the objective condition ofsuch an ideal, recognition safeguards its intersubjective condition(Fraser 2003a, 36). Fraser tries to illustrate the independency ofrecognition and redistribution by way of two examples: Whereas homosexualssuffer primarily from culturally discriminating practices ofhumiliation, workers are first and foremost the victims of economicexploitation. Though homosexuals also have to struggle with economicdisadvantages and the achievements of the workers have beenideologically demeaned as less valuable, the real cause of theinjustice in the former case lies within the cultural sphere whereas inthe latter it lies within the economic sphere (Fraser 1996, ch. 1;2003a, 50–54). Thus, Fraser categorizes different forms of injusticeaccording to their socioeconomic roots. Her main point is, nonetheless,that in most cases of injustice we are dealing with a combination ofcultural disrespect and economic exploitation. As especially fittingexamples Fraser refers to groups categorized along the lines of genderor race. Thus, women and people of different color suffer not onlyfrom a discriminating status order, but also from an economy which isbased on encoding unpaid housework and badly paid labor as female aswell as auxiliary and superfluous work as colored. Only atwo-dimensional theory such as the one she suggests can—according to Fraser—pay proper attention to practical conflictsbetween policies of redistribution and recognition. On the one hand, ifone redistributes without considering the relations of recognitioninvolved, the receivers might be stigmatized as “socialparasites,” and thus disrespected. On the other hand, generallylegitimate policies of recognition may lead to normatively undesirableside-effects by dramatically worsening the economic position of theaffected persons, as measures against reification through prostitutionand pornography might very well do when they render those engaged inthese lines of work unemployed (Fraser 2003a, 65; see for a thoroughdiscussion the contributions in Olsen 2008).

In light of this criticism, Axel Honneth has insisted that theconcept of recognition can be applied to questions of distributivejustice, but that it is important to properly differentiate between thedimensions of respect and esteem: First, our understanding of what weowe to others on account of their equal status as autonomous personshas itself been historically extended and now entails social rights.Accordingly, the affected persons can at least claimqua equalcitizens—and thus in the name of a politics of respect—that amount of basic goods that is necessary for enabling them toeffectively use their legal entitlements. Secondly, they can refer tothe criterion of achievement which is supposed to be constitutive ofcapitalism—as an (also) cultural entity—in order todemand a more adequate remuneration of their work (Honneth 2003a,151–154; see 2.3 above). Only if one understands redistribution in thisway, that is, as a problem of recognition, can one—according toHonneth—explain why the affected experience outrage: namelybecause they deem their identity to be threatened by a perceivedinjustice. What counts as an injustice, therefore, depends on ourreasonable expectations of recognition: Justice and recognitionmutually illuminate each other.

However, Fraser has responded by arguing that most problemsassociated with global injustice are not primarily due tomisrecognition but rather stem from systemic features of capitalism,such as when multinational enterprises relocate factories and lay offworkers in order to maximize profits and share-holder interests (Fraser2003b, 214–215, see for Honneth’s reply Honneth 2003b, 248–249). Subsequently, there has been quite some debate withregard to what extent and how fruitfully global capitalism can beexplained and criticized in terms of recognition—and what rolefunctional imperatives play within such an account (see, for example,the contributions in Schmidt am Busch/Zurn 2010, 241–318, Honneth 2014, ch. 6.2, Honneth 2015, ch. III, Jütten 2015).

4. Recognition and Emancipation

Struggles for recognition are supposed to effect moral progress toward ever morejust or fulfilling relations of recognition. Sometimes such struggles are fought by violentmeans, which raises challenging questions of when such revolutions might be justifiable (Iser 2017, Bazargan 2018) and who can be targeted. But much more frequently, such struggles proceed in non-violent forms. Just think of the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King in the US or the Indian liberation movement under MahatmaGandhi. Therefore, some authors,especially those interested in social criticism, have proposed to userecognition as a new paradigm for Critical Theory (Honneth 1992, seealso Iser 2008, Deranty 2009, Zurn 2015). Such a “critical theory ofrecognition” is supposed to evaluate whether societies providetheir citizens with the necessary “primary good” of socialrecognition.

Because some theories of recognition are not only concerned withquestions of justice but also with a formal theory of the good lifedesigned to illuminate the social conditions of individual flourishing(or negatively, of social pathologies) this has sparked the critiquethat such approaches are too “sectarian” (Fraser 2003a, 30;similar Zurn 2000, 121): Any reference to thetelos of a goodlife (or the specific idea of individuality or authenticity) proves tobe a non-starter (or just eurocentric). In reply, proponents of such abroader account of social philosophy have insisted that the emphasis ona society that recognizes as many features of individuals as possible,hereby promoting their autonomy, does not prescribe how to live. Itonly spells out the intersubjective conditions which provide everybodywith the chance to live the life they want to lead (be it autonomouslychosen or not), namely in a social environment where this life iseither adequately recognized or at least not looked upon derogatively(Honneth 2003a, 177).

Some authors have emphasized that speaking of recognition as a vitalhuman need cannot mean that every struggle for recognition is (equally)justified (Alexander/Pia Lara 1996). We still require criteria todistinguish between legitimate and illegitimate struggles. Certainly,those who fight for more recognition think that they deserve it. Butobviously their belief can be false if the claims are unjustified orexaggerated. As all instances of legitimate criticism remind us:Neither every negative description of a person(’s self-image) norevery challenge of her current status position—as hurtful assuch “challenges” might be for the affected person—is necessarily a form of misrecognition. Quite to the contrary, only bybeing subject to well-meaning criticism can we improve ourselves.

Therefore, those who defend a primarily normative account ofrecognition (and humiliation) distance themselves from what theyperceive as the problems of overly psychological approaches. On the onehand, they claim, due to adapted preferences persons might not even(emotionally) register when they are in fact treated disrespectfully.On the other hand, persons might feel slighted because they holdutterly unreasonable views in the first place, e.g., if Nazis thinkthat they ought to be treated as super-humans or if a mediocre painterexpects others to view him as a genius (Margalit 1996, 9; Fraser 2003a,37–42; Iser 2008, 216–221).

But how do we come by the normative criteria of adequaterecognition? Whereas Kantian contractualists ask themselves whichstandards are acceptable to all (in a hypothetical choice situation),most theorists of recognition follow a more Hegelian route. They arguethat the social practices of recognition in which subjects live alreadyprovide them with all the normative resources needed to criticize andtranscend these practices. Thus, Hegelian theories of recognition inall their variations choose an interpretative or—perhaps moreadequately—reconstructive path: Because we are socialized intoa specific recognition order we also internalize (via the exchange withand through the “view” of others) a given space of(historical) reasons that shapes our practical identity and ournormative expectations springing from this identity. This is alsosupposed to explain the close connection between the normative and thepsychological dimension of recognition: On account of ourintersubjectively acquired identity we have a psychological need to berecognized as having the normative status we deem to deserve.Consequently, because it is a normatively structured need to thedisappointment of which we usually react with indignation, itsappropriateness can always be questioned by reference to the reasonsavailable to us (Iser 2008, 173).

One way to make progress then is to criticize problematic ways ofthinking of and relating to others’ characteristics by pointingto already established principles of recognition. This would, forexample, entail arguing for women’s rights on the basis of theidea of equal dignity of all “men” or for higher wages forworkers by reference to already established notions of desert. Thus,it is always possible to bring to bear aspects which were disregardedup to now by referring to the “surplus validity” of analready established abstract principle of recognition (Honneth 2003a,186). According to this view, moral progress takes place by way of alaborious sorting out of reasons that are shown to be implausible.However, this still leaves open the question of how radical such acritique can be, i.e., whether it can only proceed in acontext-dependent and piecemeal way or whether the very logic ofrecognition provides us with more abstract criteria of progress, suchas egalitarian inclusion and the recognition of ever more aspects ofindividuals that fosters their autonomy (Honneth 2003a,184–185).

Sometimes such critical reflections on one’s society aretriggered by emotional impulses. Thus, the psychoanalytic traditionrefers to suppressed, but unconsciously still effective drives orexperiences. These approaches always search, albeit in a speculativemanner, for a motive people may have to transcend the given recognitionorder. These drives or experiences may be described, following Freud,as libidinous energies or rather as the positively connotatedrecollection of a state of infant omnipotence (Whitebook 1996). Inrecent times, object relations theory has been used to highlight thetraumatically experienced end of an original symbiosis (between a babyand her primary care-giver) which we supposedly strive to regainthroughout our entire life (Benjamin 1988).

But regardless of the way subjects reach the conviction that theymust claim recognition for new, so far neglected or—even worse—demeaned aspects of their identity, the following question mustbe asked: From where do they gain the mental strength to at leasttemporarily withstand the disrespect or indifference of (at least manyof) their surrounding others? The assumption that without recognitionby all others it is inevitable that we suffer psychological breakdownis much too strong. In spite of disrespect, the capacity foragency which is necessary for resistance may spring from threemotivational sources. First, the oppressed subjects can, under certaincircumstances, still draw upon the assurance that they acquired in a(more or less) happy childhood. Secondly, social movements ofresistance often create enough motivational energy by recognizing eachother within these movements, e.g., within the civil rights movement.As a consequence, the disrespect shown by the rest of society at leastweighs less heavily. Finally, the idea that members of a better societyin the future, though merely imagined, would one day grant the desiredrecognition, might function as a third source of the mental strengthneeded to endure (Mead 1934, 199).

5. Recognition as Ideology?

Some authors are not very optimistic about the prospects ofemancipation through struggles of recognition. If our expectations ofbeing recognized asX are always contingent upon the social andhistorical context we live in, how is moral and political progresspossible at all? Is it—in view of our basic dependency on theview of others—not more likely that our striving forrecognition leads to uncritical conformity instead of an emancipatorystruggle for recognition? It is just this suspicion which is expressedby the French Marxist Louis Althusser. He regards recognitionasthe central ideological mechanism by which the stateconfronts its citizens with the choice between obedience and the lossof social existence (Althusser 1970, 174–176). Hereby, Althusserfollows a specifically French tradition that does not primarilyconceptualize recognition as the condition of intersubjective freedom,but as a source of estrangement: Already inRousseau’sSecond Discourse on Inequality (Rousseau1755) individuals lose themselves in vain pretense, because theyinauthentically attempt to please others (for a more positive readingsee Neuhouser 2008). Finally, in the work of Jean-Paul Sartreindividuals are reified by every kind of recognition because even theaffirmation of others freezes the subjects in their present state,hereby denying their potential for change, i.e., their freedom (Sartre1943, esp. 347–361). According to this tradition, we do not sufferprimarily from the fact that we are not recognized, but rather fromthe fact that we are held captive within a specific pattern ofsocially mandated recognition (Bedorf 2010). Struggles for recognitiononly entangle us ever deeper in a wrong dependency on power relationsthe workings of which we fail to adequately grasp. Whereasleft-Hegelian approaches are designed to positively overcomeideological recognition orders for the purposes of social progress(Honneth 2004), post-structuralists maintain that one should not askwhich features of one’s identity should be recognized. In doingso we only remain caught within the old (ideological) categories andare forced to define clear-cut identities. Rather, one shouldquestion struggles for recognition as to whether and to what extentthey increase spaces of freedom to think and act differently (Tully2000, 469). Such work, often inspired by Michel Foucault, has alsopointed to the motivational problem of all resistance to theestablished recognition order: How can you reject exactly thosecategories that constitute your identity? Does social criticism notnecessary imply self-denial? Judith Butler has tried to circumventthis alleged paradox by pointing out that norms never remain valid bythemselves but need constant reaffirmation. This process hereby opensup possibilities of—at least slightly—“reconfiguring” the dominant norms and changingone’s own identity (Butler 1997a, ch. 3; 1997b, 13, 40–41). Someauthors even want to replace a politics of recognition with a politicsof acknowledgment: an acknowledgment that we can never be sure aboutthe changing identities (and thus normative claims) of others but haveto remain open to new and unpredictable developments (Markell 2003,180). In a similar vein, feminist thinkers have claimed that theentire idea of being recognized in one’s given identity makes itimpossible for us to gain an adequate understanding of how power andagency not simply react to such an identity but rather create it as an“embodied” identity in the first place (McNay 2008, 162–197). Finally, the idea that struggles for recognition cannot only lead to further progress, but should be grounded in a belief that modernity is already the result of such progress, has been criticized for its affinity to colonial forms of thought (Allen 2016, cf. Forst 2019).

Even those who think that one can—at least conceptually—conceive of non-ideological forms of recognition have startedto pay more attention to the ways in which relationships of recognitionare always also relationships of power (see the contributions in vanden Brink/Owen 2007). This becomes especially urgent if one realizes,as already indicated above, that values and norms—beingproducts of human thought and attitudes—can express disrespecteven if those who follow them are not really aware of this. Subjectsmay attempt to convey recognition within a framework that is itselfdisrespectful. For example, a lord in the 18^th century whotreated his maid according to the accepted norms of that time—for example, by treating her as if she was invisible—may nothave (intentionally) disrespected her with regard to the socially validsystem of norms and values. Thus, he might have been considered a“decent” lord according to prevailing standards (whereasother lords might have been described as “cruel”, etc.).However, at least some probably want to say that this lord—inanother sense—did not adequately respect his maid (and thattherefore the social changes since then manifest moral progress).Nonetheless, some authors regard even ideological recognition (asbeing, for example, a dutiful maid) as something positive insofar as itstrengthens the subject’s sense of worth and is clearly superiorto acts of misrecognition (Honneth 2004, 323–347). Yet, others maymourn such ideological recognition for the incapacitating effects onthe recognized subjects’ will to resist. Recently, these controversies have been taken up in a fruitful dialogue between these two traditions (Bankovsky/Le Goff 2013, Honneth/Rancière 2017, Honneth 2018, esp. 211–235).

However, even if attitudes and acts of recognition are a much moreambivalent blessing than might have been presumed at first sight,recognition theory does not only illuminate the complexity of ournormative thinking but also provides a strong argument that suchnormative considerations are an ineradicable part of our social world.The concept of recognition therefore also serves an importantexplanatory function.

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