Moral arguments for God’s existence form a diverse family ofarguments that reason from some feature of morality or the moral lifeto the existence of God, usually understood as a morally good creatorof the universe. Moral arguments are both important and interesting.They are interesting because evaluating their soundness requiresattention to practically every important philosophical issue dealtwith in metaethics. They are important because of their prominence inpopular apologetic arguments for religious belief. Evidence for thiscan be found in the amazing popularity of C. S. Lewis’sMereChristianity (1952), which is almost certainly the best-sellingbook of apologetics in the twentieth century, and which begins with amoral argument for God’s existence. Many ordinary people regardreligion as in some way providing a basis or foundation for morality.This fact might seem to favor religious arguments for morality ratherthan moral arguments for religious belief, but if someone believesthat morality is in some way “objective” or“real,” and that this moral reality requires explanation,moral arguments for God’s reality naturally suggest themselves.The apparent connection between morality and religion appears to manypeople to support the claim that moral truths require a religiousfoundation, or can best be explained by God’s existence, or somequalities or actions of God.

After some general comments about theistic arguments and a briefhistory of moral arguments, this essay will discuss several differentforms of the moral argument. A major distinction is that between moralarguments that are theoretical in nature and practical or pragmaticarguments. The former are best thought of as arguments that begin withalleged moral facts and argue that God is necessary to explain thosefacts, or at least that God provides a better explanation of them thansecular accounts can offer. The latter typically begin with claimsabout some good or end that morality requires and argue that this endis not attainable unless God exists. Whether this distinction is hardand fast will be one of the questions to be discussed, as some arguethat practical arguments by themselves cannot be the basis of rationalbelief. To meet such concerns practical arguments may have to includea theoretical dimension as well.

• 1. The Goals of Theistic Arguments
• 2. History of Moral Arguments for God’s Existence
• 3. Theoretical Moral Arguments for God’s Existence and Divine Command Theories of Moral Obligation
• 4. Arguments from Moral Knowledge or Awareness
• 5. Arguments from Human Dignity or Worth
• 6. Practical Moral Arguments for Belief in God
• 7. Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Goals of Theistic Arguments

Before attempting to explain and assess moral arguments for theexistence of God, it would be helpful to have some perspective on thegoals of arguments for God’s existence. (We shall genericallyterm arguments for God’s existence “theisticarguments.”) Of course views about this are diverse, but mostcontemporary proponents of such arguments do not see theisticarguments as attempted “proofs,” in the sense that theyare supposed to provide valid arguments with premises that noreasonable person could deny. Such a standard of achievement wouldclearly be setting the bar for success very high, and proponents oftheistic arguments rightly note that philosophical arguments forinteresting conclusions in any field outside of formal logic hardlyever reach such a standard.

More reasonable questions to ask about theistic arguments would seemto be the following: Are there valid arguments for the conclusion thatGod exists that have premises that are known or reasonably believed bysome people? Are the premises of such arguments more reasonable thantheir denials, at least for some reasonable people? Arguments thatmeet these standards could have value in making belief in Godreasonable for some people, or even giving some people knowledge ofGod’s existence, even if it turns out that some of the premisesof the arguments can be reasonably denied by other people, and thusthat the arguments fail as proofs.

A major issue that cannot be settled here concerns the question ofwhere the burden of proof lies with respect to theistic arguments.Many secular philosophers follow Antony Flew (1976) in holding thatthere is a “presumption of atheism.” On this view,believing in God is like believing in the Loch Ness Monster orleprechauns, something that reasonable people do not do withoutsufficient evidence. If such evidence is lacking, the proper stance isatheism rather than agnosticism.

This “presumption of atheism” has been challenged in anumber of ways. Alvin Plantinga (2000) has argued that reasonablebelief in God does not have to be based on propositional evidence, butcan be “properly basic.” On this view, reasonable beliefin God can be the outcome of a basic faculty (calledthesensus divinitatis by theologian John Calvin)and thus needs no support from arguments at all. In response somewould argue that even if theistic belief is not grounded inpropositional evidence, it still might require non-propositionalevidence (such as experience), so it is not clear thatPlantinga’s view by itself removes the burden of proofchallenge.

A second way to challenge the presumption of atheism is to question animplicit assumption made by those who defend such a presumption, whichis that belief in God is epistemologically more risky than unbelief.The assumption might be defended in the following way: One might thinkthat theists and atheists share a belief in many entities: atoms,middle-sized physical objects, animals, and stars, for example.Someone, however, who believes in leprechauns or sea monsters inaddition to these commonly accepted objects thereby incurs a burden ofproof. Such a person believes in “one additional thing”and thus seems to incur additional epistemological risk. One mightthink that belief in God is relevantly like belief in a leprechaun orsea monster, and thus that the theist also bears an additional burdenof proof. Without good evidence in favor of belief in God the safeoption is to refrain from belief.

However, the theist may hold that this account does not accuratelyrepresent the situation. Instead, the theist may argue that the debatebetween atheism and theism is not simply an argument about whether“one more thing” exists in the world. In fact, God is notto be understood as an entity in the world at all; any such entitywould by definition not be God. The debate is rather a debate aboutthe character of the universe. The theist believes that every objectin the natural world exists because God creates and conserves thatobject; every finite thing has the character of being dependent onGod. The atheist denies this and affirms that the basic entities inthe natural world have the character of existing “on theirown.”

If this is the right way to think about the debate, then it is notobvious that atheism is safer than theism. The debate is not about theexistence of one object, but the character of the universe as a whole.Both parties are making claims about the character of everything inthe natural world, and both claims seem risky. This point isespecially important in dealing with moral arguments for theism, sinceone of the questions raised by such arguments is the adequacy of anaturalistic worldview in explaining morality. Such accounts need toexplain without watering the categories of morality down or otherwisedomesticating them and thereby depriving them of their mostinteresting features. Evidentialists may properly ask about theevidence for theism, but it also seems proper to ask about theevidence for atheism if the atheist is committed to a rival metaphysicsuch as naturalism.

2. History of Moral Arguments for God’s Existence

Something that resembles a moral argument for God’s existence,or at least an argument from value, can be found in the fourth ofThomas Aquinas’s “Five Ways” (Aquinas1265–1274, I, 1, 3). Aquinas there begins with the claim thatamong beings who possess such qualities as “good, true, andnoble” there are gradations. Presumably he means that somethings that are good are better than other good things; perhaps somenoble people are nobler than others who are noble. In effect Aquinasis claiming that when we “grade” things in this way weare, at least implicitly, comparing them to some absolute standard.Aquinas believes this standard cannot be merely “ideal” or“hypothetical,” and thus this gradation is only possibleif there is some being which has this quality to a“maximum” extent: “so that there is something whichis truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatestin truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. Ii.”Aquinas goes on to affirm that this being which provides the standardis also the cause or explanation of the existence of these qualities,and such a cause must be God. Obviously, this argument draws deeply onPlatonic and Aristotelian assumptions that are no longer widely heldby philosophers. For the argument to be plausible today, suchassumptions would have to be defended, or else the argumentreformulated in a way that frees it from its original metaphysicalhome.

Probably the most influential versions of the moral argument forbelief in God can be traced to Kant (1788 [1956]), who famously arguedthat the theoretical arguments for God’s existence wereunsuccessful, but presented a rational argument for belief in God as a“postulate of practical reason.” Kant held that arational, moral being must necessarily will “the highestgood,” which consists of a world in which people are bothmorally good and happy, and in which moral virtue is the condition forhappiness. The latter condition implies that this end must be soughtsolely by moral action. However, Kant held that a person cannotrationally will such an end without believing that moral actions cansuccessfully achieve such an end, and this requires a belief that thecausal structure of nature is conducive to the achievement of this endby moral means. This is equivalent to belief in God, a moral being whois ultimately responsible for the character of the natural world.Kant’s arguments will be discussed later in this article.

Kant-inspired arguments were prominent in the nineteenth century, andcontinued to be important right up to the middle of the twentiethcentury. Such arguments can be found, for example, in W. R. Sorley(1918), Hastings Rashdall (1920), and A. E. Taylor (1945/1930).Although Henry Sidgwick was not himself a proponent of a moralargument for God’s existence, some have argued that his thoughtpresents the materials for such an argument (see Walls and Baggett2011). In the nineteenth century John Henry Newman (1870) also madegood use of a moral argument in his case for belief in God, developingwhat could be called an argument from conscience.

Besides those luminaries from the history of the moral argument,several other figures made contributions of various sorts to thediscussion, including Arthur Balfour (1915), Andrew SethPringle-Pattison (1920), Clement Webb (2012), W. G. de Burgh (1938),W. R. Matthews (1921), Austin Farrer (2012), and H. P. Owen (1965). Achronicle of much of this history was published by Walls and Baggett(2019). Recovering such history is a helpful antidote to theahistorical character of much contemporary analytic philosophy.

In recent philosophy there has been a revival of divine commandmetaethical theories, which has in turn led to new versions of themoral argument found in such thinkers as Robert Adams (1987), JohnHare (1996), and C. Stephen Evans (2010). Work on divine commandtheory, both in favor and against, has experienced a recent resurgenceof interest. This work has encompassed both motivations for andformulations of divine command theory, as well as extensive discussionof both old and new objections to it.

However, it is important to see that there are versions of the moralargument for God’s existence that are completely independent ofsuch a divine command theory, and this possibility can be seen inarguments developed by Angus Ritchie (2012) and Mark Linville (2009).Perhaps the most extensive and developed account of a moral argumentfor God’s existence in recent philosophy is found in DavidBaggett and Jerry L. Walls (2016). This book examines a comprehensivecumulative form of moral argument and extensively explores underlyingissues. It goes without saying that these renewed arguments haveengendered new criticisms as well. Theoretical moral arguments forGod’s existence can be understood as variations on the followingtemplate:

1. There are objectivemoral facts.
2. God provides the bestexplanation of the existence of objective moral facts.
3. Therefore, (probably)God exists.

As we shall see, there are a variety of features of morality that canbe appealed to in the first steps of the arguments, as well as avariety of ways in which God might be thought to provide anexplanation of those features in the second steps. The use of thesomewhat vague phrase “objective moral facts” is intendedto allow for this variety in Premise 1. The similarly vague notion ofGod providing the best explanation of such facts allows for thevariety of ways moral features may depend on God—divine commandsone salient option among them. Both types of premises are obviouslyopen to challenge. For example, the first premise of such an argumentcan be challenged by popular metaethical views that see morality as“subjective,” or “expressive,” rather thansomething that consists of objective facts. Moral skeptics and“error theorists” also challenge the first premise. Thesecond premise can be challenged on the basis of rival explanations ofthe features of morality, explanations that do not require God.Arguments about the second premise then may require comparison betweentheistic explanations of morality and these rival views, with anattentive eye on the relevant evidence in need of explanation.

It is easy to see then that the proponent of a moral argument has acomplex task: She must defend the reality and objectivity of thefeature of morality appealed to, but also defend the claim that thisfeature can be best explained by God. The second part of the task mayrequire not only demonstrating the strengths of a theisticexplanation, but pointing out weaknesses in rival secular explanationsas well. Both parts of the task are essential, but it is worth notingthat the two components cannot be accomplished simultaneously. Thetheist must defend the reality of morality against subjectivists,constructivists, and “moral nihilists.” Assuming that thistask has been carried out, the theist must then try to show thatmorality thus understood requires or at least is most plausiblyunderstood by a theistic explanation.

It is interesting to observe, however, that with respect to both partsof the task, the theist may enlist non-theists as allies. The theistmay well make common cause with ethical naturalists as well as ethicalnon-naturalists in defending moral realism against“projective” theories such as expressivism. However, thetheist may also enlist the support of error theorists such as J. L.Mackie (1977), and moral nihilists such as Friedrich Nietzsche (1887)in arguing that God is necessary for objective morality. Nietzsche,for example, explicitly holds that God does not exist, but also claimsthat God’s non-existence undermines the reality of traditionalwestern morality. The fact that theists can enlist such unlikelyallies does not mean the moral argument for God’s existence issound, but it does suggest that the argument is not obviouslyquestion-begging, since both premises are sometimes accepted by(different) non-believers.

3. Theoretical Moral Arguments for God’s Existence and Divine Command Theories of Moral Obligation

One easily understandable version of a theistic moral argument relieson an analogy between human laws promulgated by nation-states andmoral laws. Sovereign states enact laws that make certain actsforbidden or required. If I am a U. S. citizen, and I earn more than asmall amount of money I am obligated to file an income tax return eachyear. I am also forbidden, because of the laws that hold in the UnitedStates, to discriminate in hiring on the basis of sex, age, or race.Many people believe that there are moral laws that bind individuals inthe same way that political laws do. I am obligated by a moralprinciple not to lie to others, and I am similarly obligated to keeppromises that I have made. (Both legal and moral laws may beunderstood as holdingprima facie, so that in somesituations a person must violate one law in order to obey a moreimportant one.)

We know how human laws come into existence. They are enacted bylegislatures (or absolute monarchs in some countries) who have theauthority to pass such laws. How then should the existence of morallaws be explained? It seems plausible to many to hold that they mustbe similarly grounded in some appropriate authority, and the or best candidate to fulfill this role is God. Some philosophershave dismissed an argument of this type as “crude,”presumably because its force is so obvious that no specialphilosophical training is necessary to understand it and see itsappeal. The fact that one can understand the argument without much inthe way of philosophical skill is not necessarily a defect, however.If one supposes that there is a God, and that God wants humans to knowhim and relate to him, one would expect God to make his reality knownto humans in very obvious ways (See Evans 2010). After all, critics oftheistic belief, such as J. L. Schellenberg (1993), have argued thatthe fact that God’s reality is not obvious to those who wouldlike to believe in God is a grave problem. If an awareness of moralobligations is in fact an awareness of God’s commands or divinelaws, then the ordinary person who is aware of moral obligations doeshave a kind of awareness of God. Of course such a person might beaware of God’s laws without realizing that they are God’slaws; she might be aware of God’s commands without being awareof them under that description. The religious apologist might viewsuch a person as already having a kind ofdere awareness of God, because a moral obligation is simply anexpression of God’s will (or God’s command or motivation,preference or desire).

How can such an awareness be converted into full-fledged belief inGod? One way of doing this would be to help the person gain the skillsneeded torecognize moral laws as what they are, asdivine commands or divine laws. If moral laws are experienced, thenmoral experience could be viewed as a kind of religious experience orat least a proto-religious experience. Perhaps someone who hasexperience of God in this way does not need a moral argument (or anykind of argument) to have a reasonable belief in God. This may be oneinstance of the kind of case that Alvin Plantinga (2000) and the“Reformed epistemologists” have in mind when they claimthat belief in God can be “properly basic.” It is worthnoting then that there could be such a thing as knowledge of God thatis rooted in moral experience without that knowledge being the resultof a moralargument.

Even if that is the case, however, a moral argument could still play avaluable role. Such an argument might be one way of helping anindividual understand that moral obligations are in fact divinecommands or laws. Even if it were true that some ordinary people mightknow that God exists without argument, an argument could be helpful indefending the claimthat this is the case. A personmight conceivably need an argument for the second-levelclaimthat the person knows God withoutargument.

In any case a divine command metaethical theory provides the materialfor such an argument. The revival of divine command theories (DCT) ofmoral obligation is due mainly to the work of Philip Quinn (1979/1978)and Robert Adams (1999). Adams’ version of a DCT has beenparticularly influential and is well-suited for the defense of theclaim that moral knowledge can provide knowledge of God. Adams’version of a DCT is an account ofmoralobligations and it must be distinguished frommore general “voluntarist” views of ethics that try totreat other moral properties (such as the good) as dependent onGod’s will. As explained below, by limiting the theory toobligations, Adams avoids the standard“Euthyphro” objection, which claims that divinecommand views reduce ethics to arbitrariness.

Adams’ account of moral obligations as divine commands rests ona more general social theory of obligations. There are of course manytypes of obligations: legal obligations, financial obligations,obligations of etiquette, and obligations that hold in virtue ofbelonging to some club or association, to name just a few. Clearlythese obligations are distinct from moral obligations, since in somecases moral obligations can conflict with these other kinds. What isdistinctive about obligations in general? They are not reduciblesimply to normative claims about what a person has a good reason todo.

J. S. Mill (1874, 164–165) argued that we can explain normativeprinciples without making any reference to God. He contends that the“feeling of obligation” stems from “something thatthe internal conscience bears witness to in its own nature,” andthus the moral law, unlike human laws, “does not originate inthe will of a legislator or legislature external to the mind.”Doubtless Mill had in mind here such normative logical principles as“it is wrong to believebothp andnot-p at the sametime.” Mill argues that such normative principles hold withoutany requirement for an “authority” to be their ground, andhe thinks this is plausible for the case of moral principles as well.Mill’s view is plausible at least for some normative principles,though some theists have argued that metaphysical naturalists havedifficulty in explaining any kind of normativity (see Devine 1989,88–89). However, even if Mill is correct about normativity ingeneral, it does not follow that his view is correct for moralobligations, which have a special character. An obligation has aspecial kind of force; we should care about complying with it, andviolations of obligations appropriately incur blame (Adams 1999, 235).If I make a logical mistake, I may feel silly or stupid orembarrassed, but I have no reason to feel guilty, unless the mistakereflects some carelessness on my part that itself constitutes aviolation of a moral obligation. Adams argues that “facts ofobligation are constituted by broadly social requirements.”(ibid, 233) For example, the social role of parenting is partlyconstituted by the obligations one assumes by becoming a parent, andthe social role of citizen is partly constituted by the obligations toobey the laws of the country in which one is a citizen.

All obligations are then constituted by social requirements, accordingto Adams. However, not all obligations constituted by socialrequirements are moral obligations. What social relation could be thebasis of moral obligations? Adams argues that not just any humansocial relation will possess the requisite authority:“Amorally valid obligation obviously willnot be constituted by just any demand sponsored by a system of socialrelationships that one in fact values. Some such demands have no moralforce, and some social systems are downright evil.” (ibid, 242)If a good and loving God exists and has created all humans, then thesocial relation humans have to God has the right features to explainmoral obligations. For if moral obligations stem from God’srequirements, they will be objective, but they will also bemotivating, since a relation to God would clearly be a great good thathumans would have reason to value. Since a proper relation to God isarguably more important than any other social relation, we can alsounderstand why moral obligations trump other kinds of obligations. Onthis view we can also explain why moral obligations have atranscendent character, which is important because “a genuinelymoral conception of obligation must have resources for moral criticismof social systems and their demands.” (ibid, 242–243)

Notice that the DCT Adams defends in his later work is ontologicalrather than semantic: it is a claim that moral obligations are in factidentical with divine commands, not a claim that “moralobligations” has the same meaning as “divinecommands.” On his account, applying the work of direct referencetheorists like Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke to the arena of ethics,the meaning of “moral obligation” is fixed by the rolethis concept plays in our language. That role includes such facts asthese: Moral obligations must be motivating and objective. They alsomust provide a basis for critical evaluation of other types ofobligations, and they must be such that someone who violates a moralobligation is appropriately subject to blame. Adams argues that it isdivine commands that best satisfy these desiderata. God’sexistence thus provides the best explanation of moral obligations. Ifmoral obligations are identical with divine commands (or perhaps ifthey are grounded in or caused to exist by divine commands) anargument for God’s existence from such obligations can easily beconstructed:

1. There are objectivemoral obligations.
2. If there are objectivemoral obligations, there is a God who explains these obligations.
3. There is a God.

This argument is stated in a deductive form, but it can easily bereworded as a probabilistic “argument to the bestexplanation,” as follows:

1. There are objectivemoral obligations.
2. God provides the bestexplanation of the existence of moral obligations.
3. Probably, Godexists.

Obviously, those who do not find a DCT convincing will not think thisargument from moral obligation has force. However, Adams anticipatesand gives a forceful answer to one common criticism of a DCT. It isoften argued that a DCT must fail because of a dilemma parallel to onederived from Plato’sEuthyphro. The dilemmafor a DCT can be derived from the following question: Assuming thatGod commands what is right, does he command what is right because itis right (assuming that “right” here means “morallyrequired” and not just “morally permissible.”)? Ifthe proponent of a DCT answers affirmatively, then it appears thequality of rightness must hold antecedently to and thus independentlyof God’s commands. If, however, the proponent denies that Godcommands what is right because it is right, then God’s commandsappear arbitrary. Adams’ version of a DCT evades this dilemma byinvoking the good/right distinction and holding that God isessentially good and that his commands are necessarily aimed at thegood. This allows Adams to claim that God’s commands makeactions obligatory (or forbidden), while denying that the commands arearbitrary in any problematic sense.

Although Adams’ version of a DCT successfully meets this“Euthyphro” objection, there are otherpowerful criticisms that have been mounted against this metaethicaltheory in the literature. These objections can be found in thewritings of Wes Morriston (2009, 2016), Erik Wielenberg (2005,especially part 3, 2014, and chapter 2, 2020), Oppy (2014,especially ch. 3), and Nicholas Wolterstorff (2007), among others.Besides arbitrariness, objections raised against DCT include autonomyobjections, a variety of epistemic objections, a psychopathyobjection, supervenience objections, prior obligations objection, andother Euthyphro objections, which include grounding, vacuity, andcounterpossible objections.

Wielenberg explicitly defends as an alternative to divine commandmetaethics a view he calls “godless normative realism.”This is essentially the view that moral truths are basic orfundamental in character, not derived from natural facts or any morefundamental metaphysical facts. It thus seems similar to the viewoften called “ethical non-naturalism.” This view certainlyprovides a significant alternative to divine command metaethics.However, it is worth noting that some of the criticisms thatmetaphysical naturalists have against theistic metaethics may apply toWielenberg’s view as well. Specifically, philosophers such as J.L. Mackie (1977) find non-natural ethical qualities of any kind“queer” since they are so unlike the realities discoveredby science. The “brute moral facts” posited by Wielenbergas necessary truths seem vulnerable to this same criticism. In fact,the criticism may be sharper against Wielenberg’s view thanagainst theistic views, since ethical truths may appear less odd in auniverse that is ultimately grounded in a person. Responses to theobjections of Wielenberg, Morriston, and others have also been given(see Evans 2013, Baggett and Walls, 2011, 2016, Flannagan, 2017,2021a, 2021, Pruss, 2009, Davis and Franks, 2015). Clearly the versionof a moral argument for God’s existence that rests on divinecommand theory will only be judged powerful by those who find a DCTplausible, and that will certainly be a minority of philosophers.(Although it is worth noting that no single metaethical theory seemsto enjoy widespread support among philosophers, so a DCT is not alonein being a minority view.) Nevertheless, those who do find a DCTpowerful will also see moral obligations as providing strong evidencefor God’s reality.

4. Arguments from Moral Knowledge or Awareness

A variety of arguments have been developed that God is necessary toexplain human awareness of moral truth (or moral knowledge, if onebelieves that this moral awareness amounts to knowledge). RichardSwinburne (2004, 218), for example, argues that there is no“great probability that moral awareness will occur in a Godlessuniverse.” On Swinburne’s view, moral truths are eithernecessary truths or contingent truths that are grounded in necessarytruths. For example, it is obviously contingent that “It iswrong to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima,” since it iscontingent that there exists a city such as Hiroshima. But one mighthold that this proposition is true (assuming it is) because of someother truth such as “It is wrong intentionally to kill innocenthumans” which does hold universally and is necessarily true.Swinburne does not think that an argument to God’s existencefrom moral facts as such is powerful, increasing the likelihood oftheism only a little. However, the fact that we humans are aware ofmoral facts is itself surprising and calls for an explanation.

It may be true that creatures who belong to groups that behavealtruistically will have some survival advantage over groups that lacksuch a trait. However, moral beliefs are not required in order toproduce such behavior, since it is clear that “there are manyspecies of animals that are naturally inclined to help others of theirspecies, and yet do not have moral beliefs.” (Swinburne 2004,217) If God exists, he has “significant reason to bring aboutconscious beings with moral awareness,” since his intendedpurpose for humans includes making it possible for them freely tochoose good over evil, since this will make it possible for them todevelop a relation to God. Swinburne does not think that this argumentprovides very strong evidence for God’s existence by itself, butrather that it provides some inductive support for belief in God. Itis one of several phenomena which seem more probable in a theisticuniverse than in a godless universe. As we consider more and more suchphenomena, it will be increasingly improbable that “theywillall occur.” (ibid, 218) All of theseinductive arguments together may then provide substantial support fortheistic belief, even if no one of them by itself would be sufficientfor rational belief by demonstrating that theism is likely true.

Swinburne’s version of the argument is quite brief andundeveloped, but some claims that could be used to support a moredeveloped version of the argument (one that will be described below)can be found in a well-known and much cited article by Sharon Street(2006). Street’s argument, as the title implies, is in no wayintended to support a moral argument for theism. To the contrary, herpurpose is to defend anti-realist metaethical theories against realisttheories that view moral truth as “stance-independent” ofhuman attitudes and emotions. Street presents the moral realist with adilemma posed by the question as to how our human evaluative beliefsare related to human evolution. It is clear, she believes, thatevolution has strongly shaped our evaluative attitudes. The questionconcerns how those attitudes are related to the objective evaluativetruths accepted by the realist. If the realist holds that there is norelation between such truths and our evaluative attitudes, then thisimplies that “most of our evaluative judgments are off track dueto the distorting influence of Darwinian processes.” The otheralternative for the realist is to claim that there is a relationship,and thus that is not an accident or miracle that our evaluativebeliefs track the objective truths. However, this view, Street claims,is scientifically implausible. Street argues therefore that anevolutionary story about how we came to make the moral judgments wemake undermines confidence in the objective truth of those judgments.Street’s argument is of course controversial and thinkers suchas Erik Wielenberg (2014) have argued against evolutionary debunkingarguments. Still, many regard such arguments as problematic for thosewho want to defend moral realism, particularly when developed as a“global” argument (Kahane, 2010).

Street’s argument has also been challenged by such critics asRuss Shafer-Landau (2012). However, her argument, and similararguments, have been acknowledged by some moral realists, such asDavid Enoch (2011) and Erik Wielenberg (2014) to pose a significantproblem for their view. Enoch, for example, even though he offers aresponse to Street’s argument, evidently has some worries aboutthe strength of his reply. Wielenberg, to avoid the criticism that ina non-theistic universe it would be extremely lucky if evolutionselected for belief in objectively true moral values, proposes thatthe natural laws that produce this result may be metaphysicallynecessary, and thus there is no element of luck. However, manyphilosophers will see this view of natural laws as paying a heavyprice to avoid theism. It might appear that Street is arguingstraightforwardly that evolutionary theory makes it improbable thathumans would have objective moral knowledge. However, it is notevolution by itself that predicts the improbability of objective moralknowledge, but the conjunction of evolution and metaphysicalnaturalism. A good deal of the force of Street’s argument stemsfrom the assumption that naturalism is true, and therefore that theevolutionary process is one that is unguided. Since it is notevolution by itself that poses a challenge to moral realism but theconjunction of evolution and metaphysical naturalism, then rejectingnaturalism provides one way for the moral realist to solve theproblem. It does appear that in a naturalistic universe we wouldexpect a process of Darwinian evolution to select for a propensity formoral judgments that track survival and not objective moral truths.Mark Linville (2009, 391–446) has developed a detailed argumentfor the claim that it is difficult for metaphysical naturalists todevelop a plausible evolutionary story as to how our moral judgmentscould have epistemological warrant. However, if we suppose that theevolutionary process has been guided by God, who has as one of hisgoals the creation of morally significant human creatures capable ofenjoying a relation with God, then it would not seem at all accidentalor even unlikely that God would ensure that humans have value beliefsthat are largely correct.

Some philosophers believe that the randomness of Darwinian naturalselection rules out the possibility of any kind of divine guidancebeing exercised through such a process. Some thinkers, including bothsome atheists and some proponents of what is called “creationscience,” believe that evolution and God are rivals, mutuallyexclusive hypotheses about the origins of the natural world. What canbe explained scientifically needs no religious explanation. However,this is far from obviously true; in fact, if theism is true it isclearly false. From a theistic perspective to think that God andscience provide competing explanations fails to grasp the relationshipbetween God and the natural world by conceiving of God as one morecause within that natural world. If God exists at all, God is not anentity within the natural world, but the creator of that naturalworld, with all of its causal processes. If God exists, God is thereason why there is a natural world and the reason for the existenceof the causal processes of the natural world. In principle, therefore,a natural explanation can never preclude a theistic explanation. Any argument that natural explanations preclude or are in tension withtheistic explanations will in fact be theological in character, sincethey will be grounded in assumptions about the kind of world God wouldcreate.

But what about the randomness that is a crucial part of the Darwinianstory? The atheist might claim that because evolutionary theory positsthat the process by which plants and animals have evolved is one thatinvolves random genetic mutations, it cannot be guided, and thus Godcannot have used evolutionary means to achieve his ends. However, thisargument fails. It depends on an equivocation in what is meant by“random.” When scientists claim that genetic mutations arerandom, they do not mean that they are uncaused, or even that they areunpredictable from the point of view of biochemistry, but only thatthe mutations do not happen in response to the adaptational needs ofthe organism. It is entirely possible for a natural process to includerandomness in that sense, even if the whole natural order is itselfcreated and sustained by God. The sense of “randomness”required for evolutionary theory does not imply that the evolutionaryprocess must be unguided. A God who is responsible for the laws ofnature and the initial conditions that shape the evolutionary processcould certainly ensure that the process achieved certain ends.

Like the other moral arguments for God’s existence, the argumentfrom moral knowledge can easily be stated in a propositional form, andI believe Swinburne is right to hold that the argument is bestconstrued as a probabilistic argument that appeals to God as providinga better explanation of moral knowledge than is possible in anaturalistic universe.

1. Humans possessobjective moral knowledge.
2. Probably, if God doesnot exist, humans would not possess objective moral knowledge.
3. Probably, Godexists.

There is a kind of argument from moral knowledge also implicit inAngus Ritchie’s bookFrom Morality toMetaphysics: The Theistic Implications of our EthicalCommitments (2012). Ritchie presses a kind ofdilemma on non-theistic accounts of morality. Subjectivist theoriessuch as expressivism can certainly make sense of the fact that we makethe ethical judgments we do, but they empty morality of its objectiveauthority. Objectivist theories that take morality seriously, however,have difficulty explaining our capacity to make true moral judgments,unless the process by which humans came to hold these capacities isone that is controlled by a being such as God.

The moral argument from knowledge will not be convincing to anyone whois committed to any form of expressivism or other non-objectivemetaethical theory, and clearly many philosophers find such viewsattractive. And there will surely be many philosophers who will judgethat if moral objectivism implies theism or requires theism to beplausible, this is areductio of objectivist views.Furthermore, non-theistic moral philosophers, whether naturalists ornon-naturalists, have stories to tell about how moral knowledge mightbe possible. Nevertheless, there are real questions about theplausibility of these stories, and thus, some of those convinced thatmoral realism is true may judge that moral knowledge provides somesupport for theistic belief.

5. Arguments from Human Dignity or Worth

Many philosophers find Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy stilloffers a fruitful approach to ethics. Of the various forms of the“categorical imperative” that Kant offers, the formulathat regards human beings as “ends in themselves” isespecially attractive: “Act in such a way that you always treathumanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other,never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end”(Kant 1785 [1964], 96). Many contemporary moral philosophersinfluenced by Kant, such as Christine Korsgaard (1996), see Kant asoffering a “constructivist” metaethical position.Constructivism is supposed to offer a “third way” betweenmoral realism and subjectivist views of morality. Like subjectivists,constructivists want to see morality as a human creation. However,like moral realists constructivists want to see moral questions ashaving objective answers. Constructivism is an attempt to develop anobjective morality that is free of the metaphysical commitments ofmoral realism.

It is, however, controversial whether Kant himself was aconstructivist in this sense. One reason to question whether this isthe right way to read Kant follows from the fact that Kant himself didnot see morality as free from metaphysical commitments. For example,Kant thought that it would be impossible for someone who believed thatmechanistic determinism was the literal truth about himself to believethat he was a moral agent, since morality requires an autonomy that isincompatible with determinism. To see myself as a creature who has thekind of value Kant calls “dignity” I must not see myselfmerely as a machine-like product of the physical environment. HenceKant thought that it was crucial for morality that his CriticalPhilosophy had shown that the deterministic perspective on humans issimply part of the “phenomenal world” that is the objectof scientific knowledge, not the “noumenal reality” thatit would be if some kind of scientific realism were the truemetaphysical view. When we do science we see ourselves as determined,but science tells us only how the world appears, not how it really is.Recognizing this fact suggests that when Kant posits that humans havethis intrinsic value he calls dignity, he is not“constructing” the value humans have, but recognizing thevalue beings of a certain kind must have. Humans can only have thiskind of value if they are a particular kind of creature. Whether Kanthimself was a moral realist or not, there are certainly elements inhis philosophy that push in a realist direction.

If the claim that human persons have a kind of intrinsic dignity orworth is a true objective principle and if it provides a keyfoundational principle of morality, it is well worth asking what kindsof metaphysical implications the claim might have. This is thequestion that Mark Linville (2009, 417–446) pursues in thesecond moral argument he develops. Linville begins by noting that onecould hardly hold that “human persons have intrinsicdignity” could be true if human persons do not exist. Clearly,some metaphysical positions do include a denial of the existence ofhuman persons, such as forms of Absolute Monism which hold that onlyone Absolute Reality exists. However, it also seems to be the casethat some forms of Scientific Naturalism are committed to the denialof “persons as substantive selves that essentiallypossess a first-person point of view” (See Dennett 2006, 107).Daniel Dennett, for example, holds that persons will not be part ofthe ultimately true scientific account of things. Dennett holds thatto think of humans as persons is simply to adopt a certain“stance” toward them that he calls the “intentionalstance,” but it is clear that the kind of picture of humans weget when we think of them in this way does not correspond with theirintrinsic metaphysical properties. It is not clear how systems towardswhich we adopt an “intentional stance” could be trulyautonomous and thus have the kind of value Kant believes human personshave.

The argument from human dignity could be put into propositional formas follows:

1. Human persons have aspecial kind of intrinsic value that we call dignity.
2. The only (or best)explanation of the fact that humans possess dignity is that they arecreated by a supremely good God in God’s own image.
3. Probably there is asupremely good God.

A naturalist may want to challenge premise (2) by finding some otherstrategy to explain human dignity. Michael Martin (2002), for example,has tried to suggest that moral judgments can be analyzed as thefeelings of approval or disapproval of a perfectly impartial andinformed observer. Linville (2009) objects that it is not clear howthe feelings of such an observer could constitute the intrinsic worthof a person, since one would think that intrinsic properties would benon-relational and mind-independent. In any case, Linville notes thata “Euthyphro” problem lurks for such an ideal observertheory, since one would think that such an observer would judge aperson to be intrinsically valuable because the person has intrinsicvalue.

Another strategy that is pursued by constructivists such as Korsgaardis to link the value ascribed to humans to the capacity for rationalreflection. The idea is that insofar as I am committed to rationalreflection, I must value myself as having this capacity, andconsistently value others who have it as well. A similar strategy isfound in Wielenberg’s form of ethical non-naturalism, sinceWielenberg argues that it is necessarily true that any being withcertain reflective capacities will have moral rights (Wielenberg,2014, chapter 4). It is far from clear that human rationality providesan adequate ground for moral rights, however. Many people believe thatyoung infants and people suffering from dementia still have thisintrinsic dignity, but in both cases there is no capacity for rationalreflection.

Some support for this criticism of the attempt to see reason as thebasis of the value of humans can be found in NicholasWolterstorff’s recent work on justice (2007, especially Ch. 8).Wolterstorff in this work defends the claim that there are naturalhuman rights, and that violating such rights is one way of actingunjustly towards a person. Why do humans have such rights?Wolterstorff says these rights are grounded in the basic worth ordignity that humans possess. When I seek to torture or kill aninnocent human I am failing to respect this worth. If one asks why weshould think humans possess such worth, Wolterstorff argues that thebelief that humans have this quality was not only historicallyproduced by Jewish and Christian conceptions of the human person, buteven now cannot be defended apart from such a conception. Inparticular, he argues that attempts to argue that our worth stems fromsome excellence we possess such as reason will not explain the worthof infants or those with severe brain injuries or dementia.

Does a theistic worldview fare better in explaining the special valueof human dignity? In a theistic universe God is himself seen as thesupreme good. Indeed, theistic Platonists usually identify God withthe Good. If God is himself a person, then this seems to be acommitment to the idea that personhood itself is something that mustbe intrinsically good. If human persons are made in God’s image,as both Judaism and Christianity affirm, then it would seem to followthat humans do have a kind of intrinsic value, just by way of beingthe kind of creatures they are.

This argument will of course be found unconvincing to many. Some willdeny premise (1), either because they reject moral realism as ametaethical stance, or because they reject the normative claim thathumans have any kind of special value or dignity. (Maybe they willeven think that such a claim is a form of “speciesism.”).Others will find premise (2) suspect. They may be inclined to agreethat human persons have a special dignity, but hold that the source ofthat dignity can be found in such human qualities as rationality. Withrespect to the status of infants and those suffering from dementia,the critic might bite the bullet and just accept the fact that humandignity does not extend to them, or else argue that the fact thatinfants and those suffering mental breakdown are part of a specieswhose members typically possess rationality merits them a specialrespect, even if they lack this quality as individuals. Others willfind premise (2) doubtful because they find the theistic explanationof dignity unclear. Another alternative is to seek a Constructivistaccount of dignity, perhaps regarding the special status of humans assomething we humans decide to extend to each other. Perhaps thestrongest non-theistic alternative would be some form of ethicalnon-naturalism, in which one simply affirms that the claim thatpersons have a special dignity is ana priori truthrequiring no explanation. In effect this is a decision for anon-theistic form of Platonism.

The proponent of the argument may well agree that claims about thespecial status of humans are truea priori, andthus also opt for some form of Platonism. However, the proponent ofthe argument will point out that some necessary truths can beexplained by other necessary truths. The theist believes that thesetruths about the special status of humans tell us something about thekind of universe humans find themselves in. To say that humans arecreated by God is to say that personhood is not an ephemeral oraccidental feature of the universe, because at bottom reality itselfis personal (Mavrodes 1986).

6. Practical Moral Arguments for Belief in God

As already noted, the most famous and perhaps most influential versionof a moral argument for belief in God is found in Immanuel Kant(1788). Kant himself insisted that his argument was not a theoreticalargument, but an argument grounded in practical reason. The conclusionof the argument is not “God exists” or “God probablyexists” but “I (as a rational, moral agent) ought tobelieve that God exists.” We shall, however, see that there aresome reasons to doubt that practical arguments can be neatly separatedfrom theoretical arguments.

Kant’s version of the argument can be stated in different ways,but perhaps the following captures one plausible interpretation of theargument. Morality is grounded in pure practical reason, and the moralagent must act on the basis of maxims that can be rationally endorsedas universal principles. Moral actions are thus not determined byresults or consequences but by the maxims on which they are based.However, all actions, including moral actions, necessarily aim atends. Kant argues that the end that moral actions aim at is the“highest good,” which is a world in which both moralvirtue and happiness are maximized, with happiness contingent onvirtue. For Kant “ought implies can,” and so if I have anobligation to seek the highest good, then I must believe that it ispossible to achieve such an end. However, I must seek the highest goodonly by acting in accordance with morality; no shortcuts to happinessare permissible. This seems to require that I believe that acting inaccordance with morality will be causally efficacious in achieving thehighest good. However, it is reasonable to believe that moral actionswill be causally efficacious in this way only if the laws of causalityare set up in such a way that these laws are conducive to the efficacyof moral action. Certainly both parts of the highest good seemdifficult to achieve. We humans have weaknesses in our character thatappear difficult if not impossible to overcome by our own efforts.Furthermore, as creatures we have subjective needs that must besatisfied if we are happy, but we have little empirical reason tothink that these needs will be satisfied by moral actions even if wesucceeded in becoming virtuous. If a person believes that the naturalworld is simply a non-moral machine with no moral purposiveness thenthat person would have no reason to believe that moral action couldsucceed because there is noa priori reason tothink moral action will achieve the highest good and little empiricalreason to believe this either. Kant thus concludes that a moral agentmust “postulate” the existence of God as a rationalpresupposition of the moral life.

One problem with this argument is that many will deny that moralityrequires us to seek the highest good in Kant’s sense. Even ifthe Kantian highest good seems reasonable as an ideal, some willobject that we have no obligation to achieve such a state, but merelyto work towards realizing the closest approximation to such a statethat is possible (See Adams 1987, 152). Without divine assistance,perhaps perfect virtue is unachievable, but in that case we cannot beobliged to realize such a state if there is no God. Perhaps we cannothope that happiness will be properly proportioned to virtue in theactual world if God does not exist, but then our obligation can onlybe to realize as much happiness as can be attained through moralmeans. Kant would doubtless reject this criticism, since on his viewthe ends of morality are given directly to pure practicalreasona priori, and we are not at liberty toadjust those ends on the basis of empirical beliefs. However, fewcontemporary philosophers would share Kant’s confident view ofreason here, and thus to many the criticism has force. Even Kantadmits at one point that full-fledged belief in God is not rationallynecessary, since one could conceivably seek the highest good if onemerely believes that God’s existence is possible (Kant,1781–1787, 651).

Another way of interpreting Kant’s argument puts more stress onthe connection between an individual’s desire for happiness andthe obligation to do what is morally right. Morality requires me tosacrifice my personal happiness if that is necessary to do what isright. Yet it is a psychological fact that humans necessarily desiretheir own happiness. In such a state it looks as if human moral agentswill be torn by what Henry Sidgwick called the “dualism of thepractical reason” (1884, 401). Reason both requires humans toseek their own happiness and to sacrifice it. Sidgwick himself notedthat only if there is a God can we hope that this dualism will beresolved, so that those who seek to act morally will in the long runalso be acting so as to advance their own happiness and well-being.(Interestingly, Sidgwick himself does not endorse this argument, buthe clearly sees this problem as part of the appeal of theism.) Acontemporary argument similar to this one has been developed by C.Stephen Layman (2002).

The critic of this form of the Kantian argument may reply that Kantianmorality sees duty as something that must be done regardless of theconsequences, and thus a truly moral person cannot make his or hercommitment to morality contingent on the achievement of happiness.From a Kantian point of view, this reply seems right; Kantunequivocally affirms that moral actions must be done for the sake ofduty and not from any desire for personal reward. Nevertheless,especially for any philosopher willing to endorse any form ofeudaimonism, seeing myself as inevitably sacrificing what I cannothelp but desire for the sake of duty does seem problematic. As JohnHare affirms, “If we are to endorse wholeheartedly the long-termshape of our lives, we have to see this shape as consistent with ourhappiness” (1996, 88).

The critic may reply to this by simply accepting the lamentable factthat there is something tragic or even absurd about the humancondition. The world may not be the world we wish it was, but thatdoes not give us any reason to believe it is different from what itis. If there is a tension between the demands of morality andself-interest, then this may simply be a brute fact that must befaced.

This reply raises an issue for all forms of practical or pragmaticarguments for belief. Many philosophers insist that rational beliefmust be grounded solely in theoretical evidence. The fact that itwould be better for me to believe p does not in itself give me anyreason to believe p. This criticism is aimed not merely at Kant, butat other practical moral arguments. For example, Robert Adams arguesthat if humans believe there is no moral order to the universe, thenthey will become demoralized in their pursuit of morality, which ismorally undesirable (1987, 151). The atheist might concede thatatheism is (somewhat) demoralizing, but deny that this provides anyreason to believe there is a moral order to the universe. Similarly,Linda Zagzebski (1987) argues that morality will not be a rationalenterprise unless good actions increase the amount of good in theworld. However, given that moral actions often involve the sacrificeof happiness, there is no reason to believe moral action will increasethe good unless there is a power transcendent of human activityworking on the side of the good. Here the atheist may claim that moralaction does increase the good because such actions always increasegood character. However, even if that reply fails the atheist mayagain simply admit that there may be something tragic or absurd aboutthe human condition, and the fact that we may wish things weredifferent is not a reason to believe that they are. So the problemmust be faced: Are practical arguments merely rationalizedwish-fulfillment?

The theist might respond to this kind of worry in several ways. Thefirst thing to be said is that the fact that a naturalistic view ofthe universe implies that the universe must be tragic or absurd, ifcorrect, would itself be an important and interesting conclusion.However, apart from this, it makes a great deal of difference how oneconstrues what we might call the background epistemic situation. Ifone believes that our theoretical evidence favors atheism, then itseems plausible to hold that one ought to maintain a naturalisticview, even if it is practically undesirable that the world have such acharacter. In that case a practical argument for religious beliefcould be judged a form of wish-fulfillment. However, this does notseem to be the way those who support such a practical argument see thesituation. Kant affirms that the limits of reason establishedinThe Critique of Pure Reason would silence allobjections to morality and religion “in Socratic fashion,namely, by the clearest proof of the ignorance of theobjectors.” (1781, 1787, 30. See also 530–531) In fact,the situation actually favors theism, since Kant holds thattheoretical reason sees value in the concept of God as a regulativeideal, even though God’s existence cannot be theoreticallyaffirmed as knowledge. If we appeal to God’s will to explainwhat happens in the natural order, we undermine both science andreligion, since in that case we would no longer seek empiricalevidence for causality and we would make God into a finite object inthe natural world (1781, 1787, 562–563). However, as aregulative ideal, the concept of God is one that theoretical reasonfinds useful: “The assumption of a supreme intelligence, as theone and only cause of the universe, though in the idea alone, cantherefore always benefit reason and can never injure it” (1781,1787, 560). There is a sense in which theoretical reason itselfinclines towards affirmation of God, because it must assume thatreality is rationally knowable: “If one wishes to achievesystematic knowledge of the world, he ought to regard it as if it werecreated by a supreme reason.” (Kant 1786, 298) Althoughtheoretical reason cannot affirm the existence of God, it finds ituseful to think of the natural world as having the kinds ofcharacteristics it would have if God did exist. Thus, if rationalgrounds for belief in God come from practical reason, theoreticalreason will raise no objections.

For Kant the argument from practical reason for belief in God is not aform of wish-fulfillment because its ground is not an arbitrary desireor wish but “a real need associated with reason” (Kant,1786, 296). Human beings are not purely theoretical spectators of theuniverse, but agents. It is not always rational or even possible torefrain from action, and yet action presupposes beliefs about the waythings are (For a good interpretation and defense of this view of Kanton the relation between action and belief, see Wood 1970,17–25). Thus, in some cases suspension of judgment is notpossible. The critic may object that a person may act as if p weretrue without believing p. However, it is not clear that this advice todistinguish action on the basis of p and belief that p can always befollowed. For one thing, it seems empirically the case that one way ofacquiring belief that p is simply to begin to act as if p were true.Hence, to begin to act as if p were true is at least to embark upon acourse of action that makes belief in p more likely. Second, there maywell be a sense of “belief” in which “acting as if pwere true” is sufficient to constitute belief. This is obviouslythe case on pragmatist accounts of belief. But even those who reject ageneral pragmatic account of belief may well find something like thisappealing with respect to religious belief. Many religious believershold that the best way to measure a person’s religious faith isin terms of the person’s actions. Thus, a person who is willingto act on the basis of a religious conception, especially if thoseactions are risky or costly, is truly a religious believer, even ifthat person is filled with doubt and anxiety. Such a person might wellbe construed as more truly a believer than a person who smugly“assents” to religious doctrines but is unwilling to acton them.

Perhaps the right way to think of practical moral arguments is not tosee them as justifying belief without evidence, but as shifting theamount of evidence seen as necessary. This is the lesson some woulddraw from the phenomenon of “pragmatic encroachment” thathas been much discussed in recent epistemology. Here is an example ofpragmatic encroachment:

You: I am about to replace the ceiling fan in the kitchen.
Spouse: Did you turn off the main electrical power to the house?
You: Yes.
Spouse: If you forgot you could electrocute yourself.
You: I better go back and check.
(See McBrayer 2014, Rizzieri 2013).

A plausible interpretation of this scenario is that ordinarily claimssuch as the one I made, based on memory, are justified, and count asknowledge. However, in this situation, the stakes are raised becausemy life is at risk, and my knowledge is lost because the pragmaticsituation has “encroached” on the normal truth-orientedconditions for knowledge. Pragmatic encroachment is controversial andthe idea of such encroachment is rejected by some epistemologists.However, defenders hold that it is reasonable to consider thepragmatic stakes in considering evidence for a belief that underliessignificant action (see Fantl and McGrath 2007). If this is correct,then it seems reasonable to consider the pragmatic situation indetermining how much evidence is sufficient to justify religiousbeliefs. In theory the adjustment could go in either direction,depending on what costs are associated with a mistake and on whichside those costs lie.

In any case it is not clear that practical moral arguments can alwaysbe clearly distinguished from theoretical moral arguments. The reasonthis is so is that in many cases the practical situation describedseems itself to be or involve a kind of evidence for the truth of thebelief being justified. Take, for example, Kant’s classicargument. One thing Kant’s argument does is call to ourattention that it would be enormously odd to believe that human beingsare moral creatures subject to an objective moral law, but also tobelieve that the universe that humans inhabit is indifferent tomorality. In other words, the existence of human persons understood asmoral beings can itself be understood as a piece of evidence about thecharacter of the universe humans find themselves in. Peter Byrne(2013, 1998) has criticized practical arguments on the grounds thatthey presuppose something like the following proposition: “Theworld is likely to be organized so as to meet our deepest humanneeds.” Byrne objects that this premise is likely to be false ifthere is no God and thus arguments that assume it appear circular.However, it is not clear that only those who already believe in Godwill find this premise attractive. The reason for this is that humansare themselves part of the natural universe, and it seems a desirablefeature of a metaphysical view that it explain (rather than explainaway) features of human existence that seem real and important.

It seems likely therefore that any appeal to a practical argument willinclude some theoretical component as well, even if that component isnot always made explicit. Nevertheless, this does not mean thatpractical arguments do not have some important and distinctivefeatures. For Kant it was important that religious beliefs stem frompractical reason. For if religious belief were grounded solely intheoretical reason, then such belief would have to conform to“extrinsic and arbitrary legislation.” (Kant 1790, 131)Kant thinks such a religion would be one grounded in “fear andsubmission,” and thus it is good that religious belief ismotivated mainly by a free moral act by which the “final end ofour being” is presented to us. (1790, 159) For any practicalargument makes religious belief existential; the issue is not merelywhat I believe to be true about the universe but how I shall live mylife in that universe.

7. Conclusion

It seems clear that no version of the moral argument constitutes a“proof” of God’s existence. Each version containspremises that many reasonable thinkers reject. However, this does notmean the arguments have no force. One might think of each version ofthe argument as attempting to spell out the “cost” ofrejecting the conclusion. Some philosophers will certainly be willingto pay the cost, and indeed have independent reasons for doing so.However, it would certainly be interesting and important if one becameconvinced that atheism required one to reject moral realismaltogether, or to embrace an implausible account of how moralknowledge is acquired. For those who think that some version orversions of the arguments have force, the cumulative case for theisticbelief may be raised by such arguments.

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Other Internet Resources

• Byrne, Peter, “Moral Arguments for the Existence ofGod”,Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/moral-arguments-god/>. [This was the previous entry on moral arguments for the existence ofGod in theStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — seetheversion history.]
• Divine Command Theory, entry by Michael Austin, in the Internet Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy.

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Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Trent Dougherty and Mark Linville forreading a draft of this essay and making many usefulsuggestions. Matthew Wilson also deserves thanks for tracking manybibliographical references and page numbers.