Normativism in the theory of meaning and content is the view thatlinguistic meaning and/or intentional content are essentiallynormative. As both normativity and its essentiality to meaning/contentcan be interpreted in a number of different ways, there is now a wholefamily of views laying claim to the slogan “meaning/content isnormative”.

In this essay, we discuss a number of central normativist theses, andwe begin by identifying different versions of meaning normativism,presenting the arguments that have been put forth for and againstthem. We then continue by discussing content normativism, providing anoverview of the contemporary debate. Both debates are very muchon-going and at this point there is little consensus as to whethernormativism holds for either meaning or content. Since the firstpublication of this essay much of the debate has focused on two of itscentral issues: First, it has been debated whether meaning normativismcan be derived from the fact that meaningful expressions necessarilyhave correctness conditions. This is the argument we labeled“the simple argument” and in section 2.1.1 we discusscontributions to the debate. Second, the nature of rule-guidance hasbeen much discussed, in particular relating to content normativism,and new proposals have been made as to how it is to be understood. Wediscuss this in sections 2.2 and 3.2. Finally, the debate surroundingnormativity has also evolved into a discussion about the normativityof rationality and around the question of whether or not logic setsthe standards for how we ought to reason. Though in this entry we willprimarily devote our attention to the meaning and content, we willalso make reference to related issues concerning the normativity ofrationality.

• 1. Interpretations of the Normativity Thesis
  • 1.1 Metaphysical Questions
  • 1.2 Varieties of Normativity
• 2. Meaning
  • 2.1 Meaning Engendered Normativity
    • 2.1.1 The Simple Argument
    • 2.1.2 Using an Expression in Accordance with its Meaning
    • 2.1.3 Alternative Arguments
  • 2.2 Meaning Determining Normativity
    • 2.2.1 Meaning Determining Rules or Norms
    • 2.2.3 Guidance by Meaning Determining Rules
    • 2.2.4 Primitive Normativity
• 3. Content
  • 3.1 Content Engendered Normativity
    • 3.1.1 The Argument from Belief
    • 3.1.2 Use in Keeping with Content
  • 3.2 Content Determining Normativity
• 4. Concluding Remarks: Normativism and Naturalism
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Interpretations of the Normativity Thesis

1.1 Metaphysical Questions

Normativism is a claim about thenature of meaning/content.According to normativism, there cannot be meaning/content withoutnorms, where the impossibility is metaphysical, conceptual, or both. Afirst question thus is: which is prior—norms ormeanings/contents?

Read metaphysically, the question is: Are certain norms valid, or inforce,because certain things such as linguistic expressionsand intentional states have certain meanings/contents? Or do suchthings have meaning/contentbecause some norms are in force?We shall distinguish between meaning/content“engendered” (ME/CE) normativity andmeaning/contentdetermining (MD/CD) normativity (cf.Glüer & Wikforss 2009). MD/CD norms are such that theymetaphysically determine, ground, or constitute meaning/content; here,the norms are prior. ME/CE normativity is normativity engendered by,or consequent upon, meaning/content, regardless of how the latter is determined.^[1]

MD/CD normativism aims at answering “foundational”questions and providing metaphysical explanation: In virtue of what dolinguistic expressions/intentional states have meaning/content?Metaphysical explanation of \(X\) by means of \(Y\) requires that\(X\) at leastsupervenes upon \(Y\).^[2] Supervenience relations involve three elements: a set of superveniententities \(S_E\), a set of entities forming the supervenience base\(S_B\), and a principle according to which what is in \(S_B\)determines what is in \(S_E\) (a function from \(S_B\) to \(S_E)\).Whether supervenience suffices for metaphysical explanation or not, anexplanation will therefore not be complete unless the principle ofdetermination is specified.^[3] When it comes to meaning, this is arguably one of the most importantlessons of Wittgenstein’s so-called rule-followingconsiderations; as long as only the supervenience base is specified,its elements can be mapped onto meanings in any old way, thus leavingmeaning completely indeterminate (cf. Pagin 2002, Glüer 2018).^[4]

1.2 Varieties of Normativity

Normativism claims that nothing can have meaning/content unless normsof a certain kind are valid, or in force.^[5] A second basic question thus is: what kind of norm would that be?

The most basic distinction relevant here is that betweennorms foraction andnorms of being.^[6] Norms of being are often associated with evaluations; they tell usthat a certain state of affairsought to obtain, i.e., isvaluable or good in a certain sense. Norms for action, on the otherhand, tell uswhat to do. Both can either beprimafacie (orpro tanto) or categorical (cf. Ross 1930[1987]).Prima facie norms or evaluations can be overriddenor outweighed (by other norms, obligations or evaluations),categorical ones cannot. Both norms of action and values can also becategorized by provenance: There are the norms of morals, etiquette,and prudence, the laws of the state, and the rules of games.Analogously, values of different kinds can be distinguished. Thenormativity of meaning/content typically is construed in terms ofnorms for action.

Concerning norms for action, we can distinguish between instrumentaland non-instrumental norms. An instrumental norm tells us what to doin order to reach a certain goal, where the relation between means andend is contingent. Its normative force for an agent is contingent uponthe agent’s goals. An example would be:

(D)

If you want to make the hut habitable, you ought to heat it (vonWright 1963: 10).

Among non-instrumental norms we can further distinguish betweenprescriptions and other norms for action, and thirdly betweenconstitutive and non-constitutive rules or norms.^[7]

Prescriptions can typically be formulated in deontic vocabulary, i.e.,in terms of what is prescribed, forbidden, or allowed/proscribed.^[8] They can be conditional (CP) or unconditional (P). For conditionalprescriptions, we can distinguish between those where the deonticoperator (“ought”, “should”) takes wide scopeover the conditional \((\CP_w )\), and those where it takes narrowscope \((\CP_n )\):

(P)

You ought to do \(X\).

\((\CP_w )\)

You ought to (if \(C\) then do \(X)\).

\((\CP_n )\)

If \(C\), you ought to (do \(X)\).

The main difference between \((\CP_w )\) and \((\CP_n )\) is that on\((\CP_w )\), there are two ways of discharging your obligation: bydoing \(X\) or by making it the case that \(C\) is not fulfilled. Notso on \((\CP_n )\): once \(C\) is fulfilled, you must do \(X\). Onlyon \((\CP_n )\), that is, can the consequent be detached.

For prescriptions, two principles are usually taken to holdintuitively. These are the principle thatought impliescan, and the principle thatought implies thepossibility of violation. Both principles are somewhat controversial,but have initial plausibility as there would not seem to be much pointto prescribing, forbidding, or allowing impossible things (cf.Williamson 2000: 241).

Many norms or rules concern types of action or activities that existindependently of them. Constitutive rules or norms, by contrast, insome sense “create” the very actions or activities theyregulate. Rules of games are prime examples. According to Midgley(1959) and Searle (1969; 33ff), constitutive rules typically, andnaturally, can be put into the following form:

(CR)

In \(C\), doing \(X\) counts as doing \(Y\).

According to this suggestion, constitutive rules tell us that, in acertain context \(C\) (for instance, a game of soccer), an action oftype \(Y\) (for instance, scoring a goal) can be performed by means ofperforming an action of a different type \(X\) (for instance, kickingthe ball into a netted box). According to Searle, constitutive rulesplay an important role in social ontology: “institutionalfacts” (facts concerning social statuses such as being money,having meaning, or being an assertion) can be explained in terms ofcollective acceptance of rules of this kind (cf. Searle 1995, 2010).Other accounts of social institutions in terms of rules constitutiveof social statuses have stressed the normative consequences of havinga such a status (cf., e.g., Ransdell 1971, Hindriks 2009).

Despite its predominance in the literature, the characterization ofconstitutive rules by means of forms like(CR) is too narrow, however. There are prescriptions that are constitutiveof certain games—for instance, that spearing is forbidden isconstitutive of ice-hockey—and these do not naturally fit the(CR) form. It is better to characterize a set of rules or norms asconstitutive of a certain type of action/activity \(A\) iff \(A\)cannot be performed, or engaged in, unless these norms are in force(cf. Pagin 1987; Glüer & Pagin 1998; Kaluziński 2018;Reiland 2020; García-Carpintero 2022).^[9]

With these distinctions in place, we can proceed to mapping thedebates concerning the normativity of meaning/content. Given that thenorms in question are supposed to be essential to meaning/content, wecan already now see that what we are looking for are non-instrumentalnorms of purely semantic provenance. MD/CD norms will moreover have tobe of the constitutive kind.

2. Meaning

We have distinguished two ways in which normativism about meaning canbe understood: ME normativism and MD normativism. The differencebetween the two, again, is that the MD normativist is committed to themetaphysical priority of norms, since the norms are said to determinemeaning, while the ME normativist remains neutral on the issue ofmeaning determination. Both versions of meaning normativism, however,claim that the following is both necessary, and essential to, anexpression \(e\)’s having meaning (for a speaker, or group ofspeakers, \(S\) at a time \(t)\):

(M)

\(e\) means \(M\) for \(S\) at \(t\) only if a norm for \(e\) isin force for \(S\) at \(t\).

Historically, MD normativism is associated with Wittgenstein (inparticular the “Middle Period” writings) and the traditionof appealing to linguistic conventions, prominent in the 1950s and1960s (in the writings of Grice, Lewis, Searle, and Strawson forinstance). ME normativism appeared on the philosophical scene morerecently, and is associated with Saul Kripke’s book onWittgenstein’s rule-following considerations (Kripke 1982). Inthe book Kripke presents us with a meaning skeptic who challenges thevery idea that there are facts in virtue of which our terms have ameaning. Kripke’s skeptic puts down certain constraints on therange of facts that could serve to determine meaning, among these thatthe essentially normative character of meaning has to be respected.The meaning determining fact, Kripke argues, must be such that itfollows from it how the termought to be applied (1982: 11).Equipped with this normativity constraint the skeptic goes on to argueagainst all theories that fail to accommodate the required normativedimension of meaning, in particular dispositionalist theoriesaccording to which meaning is determined by the speaker’sdispositions to apply her terms (1982: 22–37).

Kripke’s discussion reignited interest in the question of therelation between meaning and rules, and resulted in an enormousliterature both on the skeptical argument and the very idea thatmeaning is essentially normative. Much of that discussion has beencarried out without reference to the earlier debate on meaning andconventions, but attempts have also been made to relate the twodebates. In what follows we shall first discuss ME normativism, wherethe discussion following Kripke’s book plays a central role, andthen MD normativism.

2.1 Meaning Engendered Normativity

It is clear that the type of normativity Kripke has in mind is MEnormativity; i.e., the claim is that meaning statements such as“expression \(e\) means \(M\) for \(S\)” have normativeconsequences. Moreover, it is clear that the relevant normativity isthat of prescriptivity, concerning what \(S\) ought to do.^[10] As noted above, arguments in support of the thesis that meaning isessentially normative need to be based onsemanticpremises—the normativity in question cannot derive from externalsources. In the case of ME normativity, the arguments may be more orless direct, depending on more or less substantial assumptions aboutmeaning. On one end of the spectrum are arguments that turn on theidea that there are direct conceptual entailments from meaningstatements to normative consequences; on the other end are argumentsthat depend on substantial theoretical assumptions about meaning. Inthe debate, direct arguments have played a prominent role since thesefit the idea, implicit in Kripke, that the claim that meaning isnormative provides a pre-theoretical constraint on any acceptabletheory of meaning; one that has to be accepted independently ofone’s specific semantic theory. Let us begin with the most wellknown direct argument in support of ME normativity, what we call“the simple argument”.

2.1.1 The Simple Argument

The classic defense of ME normativity can be found in Paul Boghossian(1989a). According to Boghossian the normativity of meaning derivesfrom the fact that meaningful expressions have correctness conditions.If “green” meansgreen, Boghossian argues, itfollows immediately that “green” applies correctly only togreen objects, and this, in turn, has immediate normative consequencesfor how a speaker \(S\) should apply “green”:

The fact that the expression means something implies, that is, a wholeset ofnormative truths about my behavior with thatexpression: namely, that my use is correct in application to certainobjects and not in application to others. (1989a: 513; see alsoBlackburn 1984: 281; Miller 1998: 198; Whiting 2007 and 2009.)

The strategy, therefore, is to move from (CM), to a normativeconclusion, \((\ME_1)\):

(CM)

For any speaker \(S\), and any time \(t\): if “green”meansgreen for \(S\) at \(t\), then it is correct for \(S\)to apply “green” to an object \(x\) iff \(x\) is green at\(t\).

\((\ME_1)\)

For any speaker \(S\), and any time \(t\): if “green”meansgreen for \(S\) at \(t\), then \(S\) ought to apply“green” to an object \(x\) iff \(x\) is green at\(t\).

(CM) can hardly be challenged: Meaningful expressions have semanticcorrectness conditions. Of course, there is some controversy as to howthese correctness conditions are to be construed, whether the basicnotion of semantic correctness is that of truth or warrantedassertability, for instance. However, it cannot be questioned thatsome notion of semantic correctness is required. This, indeed, seemsto be part of the very concept of meaning. If, therefore, the notionof semantic correctness is an essentially normative notion, we wouldhave a very direct argument in support of ME normativity, based simplyon conceptual entailments. Before discussing the argument, let us makesome preliminary remarks concerning\((\ME_1)\).

First, what is it to apply an expression? It should be clear that therelevant notion of application is that ofpredication. Forinstance, we apply a predicate such as “green” when we useit in an assertion, to predicate a property of an object \(x\). In thecase of singular terms, similarly, what is of relevance is referential use.^[11] The notion of application, hence, is more narrow than that ofuse, since we use our terms in a wide variety of ways that donot include the expression of judgments, as when we ask a question ormake a hypothetical statement (see Millar 2004: 162; Reilandforthcominga).

Second, how should the deontic operator in\((\ME_1)\) be construed? Since \((\ME_1)\) involves an embedded conditional, wemay in fact distinguish between three readings, a narrow scopereading, an intermediate and a wide scope reading:

\((\ME_{1}')\)

If “green” meansgreen for \(S\) at \(t\),then (\(S\) ought to (apply “green” to \(x)\) iff \(x\) isgreen).

\((\ME_{1}'')\)

If “green” meansgreen for \(S\) at \(t\),then (\(S\) ought to (apply “green” to \(x\) iff \(x\) isgreen)).

\((\ME_{1}''')\)

\(S\) ought to (if “green” meansgreen for\(S\) at \(t\), apply “green” to \(x\) iff \(x\) isgreen).

In the debate, all three construals can be found. Thus, it has beensuggested that the intermediate scope interpretation best captures theintuition that if \(S\) meansgreen by “green”she is thereby obligated to use the term in certain ways (undercertain conditions), without (as on the narrow scope reading) implyingthat the obligation is conditional on \(x\) being green (Hattiangadi2006: 225, fn 4). Another issue concerns the possibility of detaching.Some favor the narrow scope reading, since it allows one to detach the“ought”, and supports the intuition that the semanticobligation can only be discharged one way: in this case, by applying“green” to green objects (Bykvist & Hattiangadi 2007:283). Others prefer the wide scope reading, precisely because it doesnot allow one to detach “ought” and hence implies a moredisjunctive obligation: \(S\) ought either to apply“green” to green objects, or not meangreen by“green” (Gampel 1997: 228; Millar 2004:168–169).

A related question is whether\((\ME_1)\) clashes with the widely endorsed principle thatoughtimpliescan. As it stands, \((\ME_1)\) can be read asimplying that \(S\) has an obligation to apply “green” toall green objects, an obligation that cannot possibly be fulfilled(Hattiangadi 2007: 180). One response to this is to endorse the widescope reading,\((\ME_1 ''')\), since it allows the subject to discharge her obligation by notmeaninggreen by “green”—something thatdoes seem to be in her power. Another response consists in removingthe biconditional in \((\ME_1)\), replacing it with a weaker principle(Whiting 2007: 137):

\((\ME_2)\)

For any speaker \(S\), and any time \(t\): if “green”meansgreen for \(S\) at \(t\), then \(S\) ought to apply“green” to an object \(x\) only if \(x\) is green at\(t\).

The question has been raised, however, whether \((\ME_2)\) issufficiently strong to support ME normativity. The trouble is that\((\ME_2)\) does not seem to place any normative constraints on thesubject’s behavior. If \(x\) is green, it no longer follows that\(S\) ought to apply “green” to \(x\), whereas if \(x\) isnot green it just follows that it is not the case that \(S\) ought toapply “green” to \(x\). The latter, it has been stressed,is distinct from the claim that \(S\) ought not to apply“green” to \(x\)—for instance, it is compatible withit being permissible to apply “green” to \(x\) (Bykvist& Hattiangadi 2007: 280). This means that \((\ME_2)\) fails tosupport the claim that when \(S\) applies a term in a way that issemantically incorrect, then she has done what she ought not do:“semantically incorrect” and “ought not” thuscome apart.

In response it has been suggested that “ought” in (ME1) isreplaced by a “may”. This allows the normativist to retainthe biconditional and yet avoid the troubles caused by the principlethatought impliescan: That an action is correctimplies only that onemay do it, not that one isobligated to do it, and there is no principle thatought impliescan. If “green” is true ofgreen objects only then \(S\) may apply “green” to anobject if and only if it is green, and this is not in conflict withthe fact that the subject is not able to apply “green” toevery green object there is (Whiting 2009: 544 and 2010: 216; Peregrin2012: 88).

There is therefore some initial unclarity as to precisely whichprescription is supposed to follow directly from(CM). A more fundamental question is whether the strategy of the simpleargument can succeed in the first place. Opponents of ME normativitydo not challenge (CM) which, again, seems trivially true. Rather, theydeny that (CM) has normative consequences just by itself. The crucialclaim here is that “correct” can be used both normativelyand non-normatively (cf. Glüer 2001; Glüer & Wikforss2009: 36; 2015a). If that is true, the simple argument won’t gothrough: Rather, an additional premise will be required to the effectthat “correct” in (CM) is used normatively. And whether ornot that premise can be supplied, the argument won’t be direct anymore.^[12]

Anti-normativists usually go further and claim that the way“correct” is used in(CM) in fact is non-normative. What the appeal to correctness conditionsgives us, it is claimed, is only a way of categorizing applications of“green” into two basic kinds (the true and the false, forinstance), and this does not in itself entail that one ought to applythe term in any particular way. The notion of semantic correctness isnon-normative in just this sense: That an application of \(e\) iscorrect, does not entail that it ought to be made, and, conversely,incorrect applications do not immediately imply that \(S\) hasviolated any semantic prescription. If “green” meansgreen then \(S\) applying it to a red object implies that herstatement is false, but it does not thereby follow that she has failedto do what she ought, semantically, to do (Fodor 1990; Horwich 1995;Glüer 1999b; 2001; Wikforss 2001; Dretske 2000; Hattiangadi 2006; 2009a).^[13][14]

Proponents of the direct argument respond by insisting that the notionof semantic correctness is a normative notion. To many, this seems asimple conceptual truth holding for the notion of correctness ingeneral, and therefore also for that of semantic correctness (Gibbard2005: 358; Whiting 2007: 135 and 2009: 538).^[15] Normativists also appeal to ordinary usage here, suggesting that“correct” is normally used normatively and shouldtherefore be interpreted that way in semantics as well (Whiting 2009:538; Peregrin 2012: 84). That hasn’t convinced anti-normativistswho point out that dictionaries such as Merriam-Webster’scommonly list normative and non-normative usages for the adjective“correct” (Glüer & Wikforss 2015a).^[16]

Normativists have also argued that even if the basic semantic conceptitself wasn’t normative, the notion of semantic correctnessstill would or could be. Semantic correctness, it is argued, is notsimply the same as, for instance, truth. Normativists here appeal to adistinction stressed by Rosen (2001: 620) between correctness and the“correctness making feature”, the (non-normative) propertysomething must have in order to count as correct. According to Rosen,correctness is a higher-order property. To say that something iscorrect is not just to say that the correctness making features are inplace (as when someone plays the notes of the Moonlight Sonata) but tomake the higher-order claim that the action (the piano performance)possesses the feature that makes for correctness in acts of that kind(the act of playing the Moonlight Sonata). Similarly, it is argued, tosay that applying “green” to a green object is correct, isto say that the application has a certain non-normative property (theexpression applies truly) but it is also to make the higher-orderstatement that the application possesses the feature that makes itcorrect in a normative sense. Even if the basic word-world relation isnon-normative, therefore, it does not follow that the property ofcorrectness does not have a normative dimension (Speaks 2009: 408;Whiting 2009: 540; Fennell 2013: 58–59). It is difficult to see,however, how something like “the correctness makingfeature” could strictly speaking be a second-order property(i.e., a property of a property). It is one and the same object thatboth has the correctness making feature and is correct, after all.Rather, Rosen-style correctness is a first-order, second-levelproperty (to use the terminology of Russell’s ramified theory oftypes). More importantly, even if that is the best way to construe theintuitive general notion of correctness, all this means is that itmight be possible to provide arguments for the claim that the notionof semantic correctness is normative even if we agree that the basicsemantic concept itself is not normative. But the basicanti-normativist challenge applies to Rosen-style correctness just asto any other construal of the intuitive, general notion ofcorrectness: Since “correct” can be used normatively andnon-normatively, there is no simple, direct implication fromcorrectness to normativity (cf. Glüer & Wikforss 2009: 37,fn. 10; 2015a).

This strand in the debate might seem to suggest that behind thediscussion of the simple argument lies nothing but a basic clash ofintuitions. The anti-normativist denies what the normativistasserts—that the concept of semantic correctness is anessentially normative concept. A possible conclusion, therefore, isthat the normativist and the anti-normativist operate with differentconcepts of semantic correctness. This raises the question, however,whether there is nevertheless co-extensionality between the twoconcepts. As long as(CM) is the common starting point this would seem to be the case; anysorting effected by the normative distinction between correctness andincorrectness will coincide with the sorting effected by thenon-normative distinction. If so, it would seem that further argumentsare required to resolve the dispute, beyond the appeal to intuitions:The normativist would have to provide some reasons why thenon-normativist notion of correctness is not a notion of semanticcorrectness. This poses a special challenge to normativists who appealto Rosen’s distinction and grant that the basic semanticrelation is non-normative: If this relation is non-normative then thequestion is not whether the concept of semantic correctnesscould be given a normative construal but whether semanticsneeds such a construal (Glüer & Wikforss 2015a).

Another strand in the discussion of the simple argument concerns thestatus of the relevant semantic obligations. Here it is oftenemphasized that semantic obligations are merelyprima facieand may be overridden by other obligations, such as the obligation (ina certain context) to tell a lie. It is therefore not an objection toME normativity that there are situations in which “green”meansgreen for \(S\), without it being the case that \(S\)ought to apply “green” to green objects only (Whiting2007: 139 and 2009: 546).

This appeal toprima facie obligations has been challenged.What is distinctive of aprima facie obligation, as opposedto a mere instrumental means-end imperative, is that it cannot beoverridden by mere desires. However, it is argued, if \(S\) has nodesire to speak the truth, then \(S\) has no obligation to apply“green” to green objects. For instance, if neither \(S\),nor her audience, care whether \(S\) tells the truth, then there is noobligation to apply “green” correctly. Hence,(CM) does not even yieldprima facie obligations (Hattiangadi2006: 232 and 2007:189). In response, the normativists suggest that insuch a situation the speaker’s use would nevertheless besemantically incorrect and involve a violation of her semanticobligations. The violation would not be very serious, but it wouldstill be a violation (Whiting 2007: 139). This has been challenged,too. Verheggen, for instance, argues that Whiting’s attempt toback this up by the possibility of criticising a speaker whomisapplies an expression out of mere desire is not convincing. Afterall, the speaker acts as she does precisely because of what she meansby the expression—therefore, there is no semantic reason tocriticize her (Verheggen 2011: 562).

Nevertheless, it would be hasty to conclude that nothing butinstrumental norms can be derived from meaning facts in conjunctionwith desires. As noted above, it is clear that an appeal to merelyinstrumental norms, or means-ends norms, fails to support the ideathat meaning is essentially normative. Although facts aboutcorrectness conditions may play a role in the generation ofinstrumental norms such as “If you wish to communicate with easeyou ought to apply ‘green’ to \(x\) if and only if \(x\)is green”, the ought in question derives from the agent’sdesires and intentions (given certain empirical facts, regularities,or laws), not from the correctness conditions themselves. Indeed, verymany facts can play a role in the generation of instrumental normswithout thereby being intrinsically normative—for instance,given the laws of nature, facts about the weather, taken together withfacts about my desires, have implications for how I should dress(Coates 1986; Bilgrami 1993; Glüer 2001; Wikforss 2001;Hattiangadi 2006, 2009b). Not allhypothetical norms areinstrumental, or based on contingent means-ends relations, however. Anexample would be the following: If you want to castle in chess, youshould (or indeed: must) move your king and one of your rooks in acertain way. Similarly, it has been suggested that there is animportant difference between hypothetical norms involving ordinarynon-normative facts (such as facts about the weather) and normsinvolving meaning facts: Since meaning facts areconstitutedby correctness conditions, meaning factsalways dictate how Ishould behave when I intend to produce a meaningful utterance. Eventhoughwhat they dictate depends on my particular desires inthe situation, the factthat they dictate something does notdepend on any desire—in contrast to the dictates derivable fromweather facts (Verheggen 2011: 563). One might wonder, though, whetherthe cases ultimately really are disanalogous: Just as one might notcare whether one gets wet or stays dry, it might seem, one might justnot care whether what one says is semantically correct or not—docorrectness conditions really dictate anything if all I want to do issay something meaningful?^[17]

It is worth, in this context, to comment on the relation betweenKripke’s normativity constraint and the so called “problemof error”. As noted above, Kripke takes his normativityconstraint to rule out dispositionalist accounts of meaning. Althoughhe formulates his objection to dispositionalism in various ways (1982:29–37), in the debate the main focus has been on the questionwhether the dispositionalist can account for the possibility ofmistake or error. For an expression meaninggreen, forinstance, it is just as much a platitude that mistaken or erroneousapplication is (in principle) possible as that the expression hascorrectness conditions. The question, then, is the following: Ifmeaning is determined by how \(S\) is disposed to use her term, thenhow could she use the term incorrectly? It has been argued that shecouldn’t—rather, every apparent error would just indicatea difference in meaning (Boghossian 1989a: 537–540).^[18] It is much disputed whether the dispositionalist can solve thisproblem. It should be noted, however, that the problem of error doesnot seem to have much to do with semantic normativity (Fodor 1990:135–136; Bilgrami 1992; Wikforss 2001: 208; Hattiangadi 2006:229; 2007: 186). The error objection does not turn on the fact thatthe dispositionalist cannot allow for semantic oughts but, rather, onthe fact that we must not construe the relation between the meaningdetermining facts and meaning in such a way that mistake is ruledout.

Of course, even provided with a solution to the problem of errordispositionalism might come to grief with Kripke’s skeptic.Solving the problem of error requires showing that there is aplausible principle \(P\) assigning meanings to expressions on thebasis of the speaker’s dispositions to use them, a principleunderwriting plausible ascriptions of error. On a quite plausibleinterpretation of the skeptic’s main strategy—i.e., thatof “quussing” candidate facts—this strategy is asapplicable here as elsewhere. If, for instance, \(P\) assignsaddition to “plus” on the basis of disposition\(D\), the skeptic will want to know why this is the rightprinciple—as opposed to some other principle \(P'\) assigningquaddition to “plus” on the basis of \(D\). Asthe mere fact of the speaker’s having \(D\) does nothing todetermine which of these principles is the right one, dispositionalfacts are as quussable as any of the other candidates—and thisremains the case even if your dispositionalism comes with a plausibleprinciple of meaning determination (cf. Pagin 2002: 160f).^[19]

2.1.2 Using an Expression in Accordance with its Meaning

An alternative to the simple argument is to suggest that there is afurther notion of semantic correctness, one that is not co-extensionalwith that of(CM) but that is both essential to meaning and normative. Thus, it hasbeen claimed that there is a crucial ambiguity in the notion ofcorrect use (Millar 2004: 160). On the one hand, there is the notionof semantic correctness as in (CM); on the other hand there is thenotion of correct use as in “using an expression in accordancewith its meaning”. That the two do not coincide is clear fromthe fact that one may use an expression in accordance with itsmeaning, and yet make a false statement, as when one has a falsebelief about the world (McGinn 1984; Millar 2002; 2004: 160–175;Moore 1954/1955: 308; Sellars 1956: 166; Buleandra 2008: 180; Fennell2013: 69, Reiland forthcominga). We must distinguish empiricalmistakes fromlinguistic mistakes, it is argued, and it isessential that we are able to allow for both. Moreover, it is said,this further notion of semantic correctness is an essentiallynormative notion, one that has implications for what \(S\) ought to door is obligated to do: if “green” meansgreen for\(S\), then \(S\) ought to use “green” in accordance withits meaning. (This idea, too, goes back to Kripke who, at points,speaks of what I should do, if my use of the term is to be “inaccordance with how it was meant” (1982: 30, 37).)

How is the notion of “using an expression in accordance with itsmeaning” to be construed? According to one proposal, it concernswhich expressions are “appropriate” or“suitable” for expressing a certain belief. The notion of“suitability”, in turn, is derived from the ordinarysemantic correctness conditions taken together with what I intend toexpress by my expressions: If “green” applies correctlyonly to green objects, and I mean to express my belief that \(x\) isgreen, then I ought to use the term “green” and not, say,“red”. This allows for the possibility that my use iscorrect in the sense of(CM), and yet linguistically incorrect (if \(x\) is red and I use the term“red” to express my belief that \(x\) is green); and, viceversa, that my use is incorrect in the sense of (CM), butlinguistically correct (if \(x\) is red and I use the term“green” to express my belief that \(x\) is green) (McGinn1984: 60; Millar 2004: 162–163). Hence, in the place of (CM) wehave:

(CM*)

For any speaker \(S\), and any time \(t\): if “green”meansgreen for \(S\) at \(t\), then it is correct for \(S\)at \(t\) to apply “green” to an object \(x\) iff \(S\)intends to express the belief that \(x\) is green at \(t\).^[20]

Possible misuses are said to include both performance errors (such asslips of the tongue) and so-called meaning errors (as when the speakerthinks “arcane” meansancient) (Millar 2004:163).

This raises the question of what motivates this further notion ofcorrectness. While it is a platitude that meaningful expressions havesemantic correctness conditions, it is not a platitude that anexpression is meaningful only if there are these further correctnessconditions. If “green” meansgreen for \(S\), and\(S\) uses “red” to express her belief that \(x\) isgreen, she may fail in her communicative intentions (although notnecessarily, consider the use of irony and metaphor), but does itfollow that she has used her expressions incorrectly in a semanticallyrelevant sense? The added notion of correctness, it may therefore beargued, simply does no semantic work. This concern has been raised bysome normativists as well. For instance, Whiting (2016) argues that itis a mistake to try to defend normativism on these grounds, and thatthe normativist should stick to the orthodox interpretation that takesas its starting point(CM).

In the literature, the most common route to the conclusion that weneed some such further notion of semantic correctness goes viaassumptions about the nature ofunderstanding (Wright 1980:20; McDowell 1984; McGinn 1984:109; Kot̓átko 1998; Millar2004; Buleandra 2008; Fennell 2012). Understanding the meaning of aterm, it is argued, involves using it in accordance with its meaningand, moreover, feeling obligated to thus using it. To learn themeaning of an expression, McDowell writes for instance,

is to acquire an understanding that obliges us subsequently …to judge and speak in certain determinate ways, on pain of failure toobey the dictates of the meaning we have grasped. (1984: 45)

This motivates the appeal to further correctness conditions, it isheld, since a speaker may fully understand a term while using it in afalse judgment and, conversely, use the term in a true judgment whilefailing to understand the term properly.

The route via understanding depends on assumptions about the nature oflinguistic understanding that may be challenged. Thus, TimothyWilliamson has argued that there are no understanding-assent links ofthe relevant sort, thereby rejecting the assumption that understandingthe meaning of an expression \(e\) involves using \(e\) in certainways (Williamson 2007). However, even if this assumption is accepted,it is a further supposition that this brings with it any semanticobligations. First, it might be held that the link betweenunderstanding and use is constitutive, and that all that follows if\(S\) fails to use e in accordance with a certain meaning \(M\), isthat e does not mean \(M\). For instance, if a speaker (regularly)uses “arcane” in accordance with the standard meaning of“ancient”, then “arcane” meansancient and notarcane.^[21] Second, as in the case of the simple argument, it could be arguedthat the appearance of an ought here derives from added normativeprinciples, such as instrumental norms concerning the ease ofcommunication, or pragmatic norms regulating speech acts.^[22]

In response it has been suggested that the relevant normativeconsequences should not be understood in terms of obligations but,rather, in terms of commitments. This is the line taken by Alan Millar(2002 and 2004). Meaning statements, such as“‘Green’ meansgreen”, Millar argues,are true in virtue of there being a rule-governed practice. If \(S\)uses “green” to mean green, therefore, she becomes aparticipant in this practice and incurs a commitment to use the termaccordingly. To be properly committed, Millar suggests, \(S\) has tobe disposed to adjust her use if she discovers that it is not inkeeping with the meaning of the expression (as when \(S\) uses“arcane” to meanancient). The commitment is notdependent on one’s desire to communicate, or on the intention tospeak the truth, but merely on \(S\) participating in the practice ofusing “green” with a certain meaning. However, Millarstresses, it does not follow that she ought to use her expressions acertain way, since it does not follow that she ought to participate inthe practice—there may be reasons to withdraw from the practiceinstead. Hence, one may participate in a practice without it followingthat one ought to “carry out the performances associated withone’s role” (Millar 2004: 173).^[23]

This proposal illustrates how ME normativity might be derived from MDnormativity: Meaning statements have normative consequences, accordingto Millar, because meaning is determined by the speaker followingcertain rules. Metaphysically the rules come first and make meaningpossible. Before turning to a discussion of MD normativity, let usbriefly consider some other arguments put forth in support of MEnormativity.

2.1.3 Alternative Arguments

The arguments above are all attempts to show that meaning statementshave normative implications. An alternative strategy is to suggestthat meaning statements simplyare prescriptions. When westate “‘Green’ meansgreen” we mayappear to be making a descriptive statement whereas, in fact, we areprescribing how “green” ought to be used (Gauker2007, 2011; Lance & O’Leary Hawthorne 1997; Peregrin 2012:96; Gibbard 2012). This proposal can either be construed as a claimabout the semanticcontent of meaning statements, or as aclaim about the typicaluse of meaning statements. Thus, astatement may be used prescriptively, while having a descriptive,factual content (“In this classroom we raise our hands beforespeaking”).

If the suggestion is that meaning statements have a prescriptivecontent it would provide another very direct argument in support of MEnormativity, one that does not have to proceed via the controversialclaim that the notion of semantic correctness is an essentiallynormative notion. This is an advantage over the simple argument.However, there are also disadvantages. For instance, the questionarises whether the claim that meaning statements lack descriptivecontent can accommodate the role of such statements in inferentialcontexts (see Gauker 2007: 194–195 for a discussion). Anotherquestion concerns the implications from “ought”-statementsto meaning statements. According to the simple argument,“‘Green’ ought to be applied to \(x\) if and only if\(x\) is green” follows immediately from“‘Green’ meansgreen”. According tothis argument the converse also holds: “‘Green’meansgreen” follows directly from“‘Green’ ought to be applied to \(x\) if and only if\(x\) is green” (cf. Gibbard 2012: 12 and 113–115). Thelatter has been questioned on the grounds that even if it is true that“green” ought to be applied this way, the“ought” in question may not have anything to do withsemantics but, say, with religious practices (Byrne 2002: 207).

These difficulties are avoided if, instead, meaning statements aresimply construed as having a prescriptive use (while having adescriptive content). On either construal, however, the questionarises why we should believe that meaning statements are prescriptive.One suggestion is that the prescriptive function of meaning statementsfollows from their role in coordinating our linguistic use (Gauker2007 and 2012: 279). Meaning statements are proposals about how termsought to be used, and as such they serve to determine meaningand remove an otherwise irresolvable indeterminacy (see also Gibbard2012: 109–112). As a result, “we all think of meanings asstandards that we are obliged to conform to” (Gauker 2007: 185).This defense of the normativity thesis therefore turns oncontroversial issues concerning indeterminacy. Another proposal shunsthe metaphysical questions concerning the nature of meaning andappeals to thefunction of meaning statements in ourpractices (Lance & O’Leary Hawthorne 1997). Instead ofasking for the facts that constitute meaning, it is argued, we shouldconsider the role of meaning statements in our socio-linguisticpractices. It then emerges that such statements serve the regulativefunction of licensing and censoring certain uses. It should be notedthat unless this proposal about the function of meaning statements issaid to havesome metaphysical implications concerning thenature of meaning, it will fall short of supporting the claim thatmeaning is essentially normative.^[24][25]

In addition, there are a variety of other arguments in support of MEnormativity. One such argument grants that correctness conditions arenot themselves normative, but suggests that we derive the normativityof meaning from the idea that we ought to speak the truth (Ebbs 1997;Haugeland 1998: Soames 1997: 221, 224). As noted above, this onlysucceeds if the obligation in question can be said to derive purelyfrom semantic sources. The question, then, is whether there is anyreason to suppose that we have a semantic obligation to speak thetruth. The impression that there is, it has been suggested, is aresult of a conflation of semantics and pragmatics. Thus, it iscommonly held that there are rules of assertion, and some of these aresuch that they are violated when the speaker makes a false judgment.For instance, it has been proposed that there is a “knowledgerule”: “One must: assert \(p\) only if one knows\(p\)” (Williamson 2000: 242). However, opponents of MEnormativity stress, these are pragmatic rules, regulating theperformance of speech acts, not semantic ones. If such rules areessential for the possibility of assertion, then assertion isessentially normative, but it does not follow that meaning is(Glüer & Wikforss 2009: 37–38; Speaks 2009). Fordiscussion of the claim that assertion is normative, see the entry onassertion, for a suggestion as to how to connect norms of assertion to themeanings of sentences by means of the Alstonian idea of meanings asspeech-act-potentials (Alston 2000), see García-Carpintero2012, 2021.

Another set of arguments reject the focus on correctness conditionsand appeal to other aspects of Kripke’s normativity objection todispositionalist theories. For instance, it has been suggested thatthe claim that meaning is essentially normative is primarily a claimabout the justificatory role of meaning. Facts about meaning are,essentially, such that they are able to justify \(S\)‘s use ofher terms, able to guide \(S\)‘s usage. In this sense, meaningfacts are like prescriptive rules, such as the rules ofetiquette—it is of their essence that they guide action or givedirections. The reason dispositionalism fails, then, is not that thedispositionalist cannot account for error, but that facts about what Iam disposed to do are not essentially capable of justifying (Gampel1997: 225–231; Zalabardo 1997: 480–483; Kusch 2006:50–94).

Whether this argument succeeds depends on whether it can be shown thatthe role of meaning in motivating action is equivalent to that ofprescriptions. Thus, the fact that “green” meansgreen may of course guide the speaker’s actions in thesense that any facts do so—i.e., if \(S\) believes that“green” meansgreen. To show that meaning factsplay a normatively guiding role, therefore, it does not suffice toappeal to the idea that meaning facts play a role in motivatingaction; it also has to be shown that the motivating role is that of aprescription rather than a belief (seesection 2.2 below).^[26]

In the discussion of ME normativity so far it is assumed that therelevant norms are norms for action, prescriptions for thespeaker’s use of her expressions. This, again, is how Kripkediscusses the topic and how those writing on Kripke tend to construethe relevant normativity. However, as far as ME normativity goes,normative consequences might also be construed axiologically. Thus, itmight be argued that semantically correct applications, by themselves,arevaluable. This, too, would show that meaning is anessentially normative notion, although in a different sense than thestandard one. And in this case too, the crucial question would bewhether the step from(CM) to normative consequences can be motivated. Does sorting\(S\)’s applications into the semantically correct and thesemantically incorrect ones, by itself imply that actions of one orthe other of these kinds are valuable (Glüer 2001: 60–61)?^[27]

Another option would be to construe the rules or norms of meaning asconstitutive ones (cf.section 1.2 above). Rules of meaning, the idea would be, are rules for the use ofexpressions that determine the meaning of these expressions. Appealingto constitutive rules thus would mean accepting what we call MDnormativism: It would mean accepting that expressions have meaningbecause there are rules or norms in force for their use.

2.2 Meaning Determining Normativity

Meaning determining normativism (MD normativism) is the claim thatmeaning is essentially such that it is (at least partially) determinedby norms. This is a claim in the metaphysics of meaning, moreprecisely, in “foundational semantics” (Stalnaker 1997:535). It is an answer to the questionin virtue of whatlinguistic expressions have their meanings: Linguistic expressionscannot have meanings without norms, and the norms come first in theorder of metaphysical determination or explanation. Normative facts,if you will, (at least partially) “ground” meaning facts.^[28][29] Strong versions of MD normativism hold thatMD norms also determinewhich meanings the expressionsgoverned by them have.

Initial motivation for MD normativism is furnished by the arbitrary,contingent, and “man-made” nature of the connectionbetween linguistic expressions and their meanings. Observed byphilosophers since ancient times, the nature of this connectionsuggests that it might be established byconvention. Butplausible as such conventionalism might seem, earlier discussions haveshown it to be quite controversial (cf. Davidson 1984a; Dummett 1986).If conventions are to play a role in an informative account ofmeaning, we cannot simply claim that it, for instance, is a conventionof English that “green” means green. Rather, the relevantconventions would need to be specified in non-semantic terms (cf.Davidson 1984a; Glüer 2013).

Moreover, the relation between conventionalism and MD normativism iscomplicated. On David Lewis’s influential account, for instance,a convention is a regularity in the behavior of a community which isarbitrary but perpetuates itself because it serves

some sort of common purpose. Past conformity breeds future conformitybecause it gives one a reason to go on conforming. (Lewis 1975: 4)

Arguably, a Lewisian convention is not normative; it does, forinstance, not seem to require any prescription to conform being inforce in the community. Yet another question concerns the requirementof regularity. Even if regularity of use were required for meaning(Davidson famously disputed this; cf. Davidson 1984a; 1986b), suchregularity might not need to be due to either norm or convention. Arelevant observation here is that people, upon reflection, usually canprovide at least rough formulations of the rules or conventions theyare following and cite them as reasons for their actions. But when itcomes to the semantic rules of natural language, this is far frombeing the case; the question would be why.

The connection between meaning anduse provides anotherstarting point for MD normativism, the thought being that it is nothow we aredisposed to use an expression that determines itsmeaning, but how we aresupposed to use it (cf. Glock 2000;Brandom 1994: 159). The most common form of MD normativism thus holdsthat the meanings of linguistic expressions are (at least partially)determined byrules for their use. At a minimum, such MDnormativism claims that the following is an essential truth aboutmeaning, or more precisely about a linguistic expression \(e\)’shaving a meaning \(M\) (for a speaker, or group of speakers, \(S\) ata time \(t)\):

\((\MD_R)\)

\(e\) means \(M\) for \(S\) at \(t\) only if there is a rule \(R\)for the use of \(e\) in force for \(S\) at \(t\).^[30]

This idea was famously formulated by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who wrote inhis so-called “Middle Period”:

[W]ithout these rules the word has as yet no meaning; and if we changethe rules, it now has another meaning (or none), and in that case wemay just as well change the word, too. (PG 133)

It is quite plausible to read Wittgenstein as here espousing a strongversion of MD normativism.

\((\MD_R)\) is compatible with claiming that meaning issolely a matter of the norms or rules governing the use oflinguistic expressions, no matter how they areactually used(e.g., Hlobil 2015), but MD normativism can take less radical forms,too. One might for instance think that speakers’ dispositions touse expressions do play a role in meaning determination, but arguethat only a certain kind of disposition is relevant, a kind that canonly be specified by means of its normative properties. In this vein,Wedgwood argues more generally that it is only “rational”dispositions that determine intentional content (where rationality istaken to be a normative property; cf. Wedgwood 2007: 167ff; 2009).Normative teleosemantics can be construed as making a similar move:Here, it is those dispositions realizing the biological function ofthe mechanism of using an expression that determine meaning (wherebiological functions are taken to be something normative; cf. Millikan1990, Neander 1995).

One might also think that meaning is determined on a non-normativebasis, but by a normative principle. Davidson (1970) famously used theclaim that meaning and intentional content are determined by the“principle of charity” to argue for a kind ofnon-reductive naturalism. According to Davidson, speakers essentiallyare by and large rational and beliefs by their nature“veridical”, i.e., by and large true (Davidson 1986a).According to the principle of charity, the best interpretation of aspeaker \(S\) therefore optimises overall coherence, or rationality,and truth across \(S\)’s utterances, propositional attitudes,and intentional actions (e.g., Davidson 1973, 1974, 1991; see alsoGlüer 2011: ch. 3). Because of its appeal to rationality, theprinciple of charity has been interpreted as a normative principle,and Davidson as a normativist (see for instance, McDowell 1984;Hornsby 1997: 87; Gampel 1997; Hurley 1998: 5; Glock 2000; Jackman2004 [Other Internet Resources]; Wedgwood 2007: 161ff; Kriegel 2010; Liebesman 2018). This iscontroversial, however; it has been argued that its constitutive rolein fact prevents the principle of charity from being normative: Itdetermines what meaningful utterances (contentful mental states)are, not how anythingshould be or what anyoneshould do (cf. Glüer 2001; Wikforss 2001; Schroeder2003; Engel 2007: 187ff; for a different argument, see Bilgrami 1992:102ff.). Quite independently, the claim that rationality isessentially normative is of course itself controversial (cf.Schnädelbach 1990; Kolodny 2005; Broome 2007; Glüer &Wikforss 2013a, 2018).

Other influential ideas behind MD normativism includeWittgenstein-inspired skepticism towards meanings as “Platonicentities”; in this tradition, meanings and concepts themselvesare construed as products of our norms or conventions (cf. forinstance, Baker & Hacker 1985: 269ff). Another idea derives frommeaning’s psychological role: It has been argued that, sincecompetent speakers are guided in their use of expressions by theknowledge of their meanings, a knowledge that is general in form, suchguidance must be construed as guidance by rules (cf., for instance,Boghossian 2008: 489).

In the next two sections we shall look a little closer at\((\MD_R)\).

2.2.1 Meaning Determining Rules or Norms

Assume that meaning is determined by rules. How exactly does thiswork? What kind of rule could do this job? What does it mean for suchrules to be “in force” for a speaker or group of speakers,and in what relation do such rules stand to the actual use of theexpressions they govern?

Quite clearly, meaning determining rules would beconstitutiverules (seesection 1.2 above). Typically, they are taken to determine not onlythatexpressions have meaning, but alsowhich meanings they have.A rule \(R\) governing the use of an expression \(e\), the thought is,divides possible uses of \(e\) into those thataccord with Rand those that donot. On the assumption that the former arethesemantically correct uses of \(e, \ R\) thus endows \(e\)with semantic correctness conditions, i.e., meaning. Ideas like thisare drawn on by a great number of philosophers, including Wittgensteinscholars such as Baker and Hacker or Glock, as well as philosopherssuch as von Wright, Sellars, and Searle.

Still, the question is how this exactly works. Constitutive rules“create” new kinds of action. Actions of these kinds aresuch that they cannot be performed if the rules are not in force.Searle suggested that such rules typically can be brought into thefollowing form:

(CR)

In \(C\), doing \(X\) counts as doing \(Y\).

He also suggested that meaning is determined by such rules (1969:42ff). But it is not easy to see how rules of form(CR) would endow expressions with semantic correctness conditions (cf.Glüer & Pagin 1998).^[31]

It might be more promising to allow meaning determining rules to beprescriptions (or proscriptions), endowing expressions with meaningsby distinguishing between semantically correct (pre- or proscribed)and incorrect (forbidden) uses. They would be constitutive in thesense of its being impossible to meaningfully use the expressions theygovern without their being in force for the speaker (cf. Glüer& Pagin 1998; Kiesselbach 2014; Hlobil 2015; Reilandforthcominga).

What, then, does it mean for a meaning determining rule \(R\) to be inforce for a speaker \(S\)’s use of an expression \(e\) (at atime \(t)\)? Broadly, there are three main options for the MDnormativist. According to the first, using \(e\) (at \(t)\) has to bemotivated by or tofollow \(R\) in the sense ofattempting to do what is in accordance with \(R\). On the secondconstrual, \(S\) has toaccept R in some sense not requiring(all) particular uses of \(e\) to be motivated by \(R\). Both of thesewould plausibly seem to require \(S\) to have certain intentionalstates. But, third, \(R\)’s being in force for \(S\) could alsobe construed as independent of any of \(S\)’s intentional states(with respect to \(R)\).

The laws of the state, for instance, would seem to fall into the thirdcategory; they are in force even for those individual citizens who donot accept them. Analogously, one might claim meaning determiningrules to be in force in a speech community quite independently of any(or even all) of its member’s acceptance of, or attitudestowards, them. Construing MD (or CD) normativism along these lines hasrecently gained some proponents (e.g., Tracy 2020; Hlobil 2015). Manygames are in the second category; they are such that even thoughparticipation requires players to accept their rules, participantsnevertheless can intentionally violate these very rules within thegame. For instance, intentional spearing does occur in ice hockeygames, and will be punished precisely because the rule againstspearing is in force even for players who spear intentionally. Again,in semantics the situation might seem analogous: Speakers canintentionally say semantically incorrect things without theirexpressions losing or changing their meanings (cf. Railton 2000;Glüer & Pagin 1998; Glüer 1999b; 2001; Wikforss 2001,Kiesselbach 2014, Reiland 2020; forthcomingb).^[32]

The most common and traditional idea, however, is that expressions“get” their meanings by speakers’ following therules for their use (see, for instance, Baker & Hacker 1985:154ff; Glock 1996a: 323ff); speaking meaningfully is conceived of as aform ofrule-guided action. Let’s call this form of MDnormativism “guidance normativism”.^[33]

A crucial question for guidance normativism concerns the distinctionbetweenrule guided andmerely regular behavior. AsQuine classically noted, on pain of vicious regress, meaningdetermining rules or conventions cannot be explicitly and deliberatelyadopted; they must somehow be “implicit” in the behaviorof speakers. But then, Quine argued, we risk depriving the notion of alinguistic rule “of any explanatory force and reducing it to anidle label” (Quine 1935 [1976: 106]). We shall look at thisissue in the next section.

2.2.3 Guidance by Meaning Determining Rules

It is quite natural to think that behavior guided by an (implicit orexplicit) rule \(R\) is behavior that can beexplained bymeans of \(R\). More precisely, many philosophers think, theexplanation needs to be areasons-explanation. Therefore, thethought is, there is an “intentional condition” onrule-guidance, requiring, for instance, intentions to follow \(R\)(e.g., Baker & Hacker 1985: 155; Glock 1996a: 325), or some otherstate of accepting or internalizing \(R\) (Boghossian 2008).^[34]

If there is an intentional condition, even guidance by implicit ruleswould seem to require prior mental states with intentional content. Amuch-discussed question is whether this leads back into viciousregress. This question would seem to arise not only for those whothink that thought depends on language, or that thought and languageare interdependent, but also for any kind of guidance normativismabout mental content (cf. Boghossian 1989a; 2008). For instance, ifhaving a contentful intentional state is itself a matter of beingguided by a content determining rule, then another intentional stateis required for having the first one, and so onad infinitum.^[35] It has therefore been argued that according to Wittgenstein theremust be a basic form of rule following that is not subject to anyintentional condition, but “blind” (Wright 2007; see alsoGarcía-Carpintero 2012). Alternatively, it has been argued thattherefore the late Wittgenstein did not conceive of meaningful use oflanguage as rule guided anymore (Glüer & Wikforss 2010a).Boghossian (2008: 493f) provides an independent, general argumentagainst an intentional condition on rule guidance. He argues that therelevant intentional state would be a state with general(prescriptive) content, and that acting under particular circumstanceson an intentional state with general content always involves some sortof inference. Inference itself, however, essentially involvesfollowing a rule, and thus a regress—reminiscent of thatfamiliar from Lewis Carroll (1895)—ensues. In response, theassumption that inference is essentially rule guided has beenquestioned (cf. Glüer & Wikforss 2010a). Miller (2015) offersa different response; he contends that Wittgensteinian“blindness” does not amount to giving up on theintentional condition, but to denying that application of a generalrule to a particular case involves inference. Blind rule-following,Miller suggests, is to be construed in terms of a causal connectionbetween rule-acceptance and application, where the former causes thelatter “in the right kind of way” (2015: 411ff).^[36]

Together with the observation recorded earlier—that speakers donot usually seem to be able to formulate semantic rules or to citethem as reasons—some philosophers have looked for alternativeways of understanding the explanatory power of meaning determiningrules, for instance in terms of evolution. Ideas here range from usingevolutionary explanation as a mere analogy (as in Sellars 1954 orSearle 1995)^[37] to normative construals of the idea of a biological function innormative teleosemantics (cf., e.g., Jarvis 2012), possibly incombination with computational ideas about sub-personal rule followingat the level of mental representation (cf. Jacob 2005: 200f;García-Carpintero 2012; for some critical discussion Boghossian2008). There is a worry, though, that the basic question recurs: Whatdistinguishes a sub-personal regularity from a performance governed bya sub-personal rule?^[38]

2.2.4 Primitive Normativity

Ginsborg (2011a,b; 2012; 2018a,b; 2020; forthcoming) suggests that thenormativity of meaning can be defended by interpreting the relevant“ought” and distinguishing normativity and regularity in away that is quite radically different from the dominant view in mostof the normativity debates, i.e., by referring to a “primitiveought”. This speaks to the primitively normative attitudesspeakers must have towards their own uses of linguistic expressions.For starters, having primitively normative attitudes does not requireprior grasp of rules, concepts, or meanings. Moreover, the normsspeakers need to be primitively conscious of do not guide or justifythem in their use of expressions (Ginsborg 2011b: 170).^[39] And finally, the primitive “ought” relevant to meaningcannot be explicated in terms of, or equated with, truth—to beprimitively correct is more fundamental than being semanticallycorrect: Primitive normativity is not required to determine what issemantically correct (and incorrect), but rather to “distinguishthe production of a term from mere noise” (Ginsborg 2012: 132,quoting Blackburn 1984: 281), or, more generally, to determine whichbehaviour is “subject to normative evaluation at all”(2011a: 243, fn. 21).^[40]

Primitive normativity thus is what distinguishes the behaviour of thespeaker who uses her terms withunderstanding from that ofthe parrot, or automaton. Using a term with understanding requiresmore than just being disposed to use it a certain way, Ginsborgargues; it requires understandingthat it has a certainmeaning. If a speaker for instance uses “slab” tomeanslab, she needs to grasp or recognize that it meansslab (2012: 135). Ginsborg’s ambition is precisely toprovide necessary and sufficient conditions for what it is to havethis understanding.

The account of meaning determination she arrives at has twocomponents. Since one of them is a requirement of primitivenormativity, primitive normativity qualifies as a (new) kind ofmeaning determining normativity. In rough outline, the account lookslike this:

(G)

As used by a speaker \(S\), an expression \(e\) has a particularmeaning \(M\) iff

i.

\(S\) is disposed to use \(e\) in a certain way, and

ii.

\(S\) is disposed to adopt the attitude oftaking-to-be-appropriate to the set of uses to which she is disposed(cf. 2011a: 244f; 2012: 138).

If \(e\) has meaning, the first disposition suffices to determinewhich meaning it has. But \(e\) has meaning only if the seconddisposition is in place. Moreover, if both conditions are fulfilled,having the primitively normative attitude of taking the use one isdisposed to make of \(e\) amounts to understanding that \(e\) means\(M\).

These conditions are not only necessary, but sufficient for meaning,Ginsborg argues, because they allow us “to make sense of a givenresponse being correct or incorrect” (2011a: 245), wherecorrectness now issemantic correctness. Once theseconditions are fulfilled, a particular use of \(e\) might not only besuch that you “did not do what you were disposed to do, but alsodid not do what you were disposed to regard as appropriate”(2011a: 245). This, Ginsborg submits, is enough to make such a use of\(e\) into a mistake. Once these conditions are fulfilled, that is,the uses you are disposed to make of \(e\) “can retrospectivelybe identified as the extension of [\(e\)]” (2012: 138). Andthen, your primitively normative attitude amounts to understandingthat \(e\) means what it does.

Though Ginsborg’s proposal is very interesting, and indeedrather different from more established interpretations of thenormativity of meaning, it has not gone unchallenged. Miller (2019)and Sultanescu (2021) both raise worries about Ginsborg’s replyto the skeptic. Miller (2019) argues against Ginsborg’s defenceof reductive dispositionalism against Kripke’sWittgenstein’s “finitude” objection. Sultanescu(2021) points out that Ginsborg’s dispositionalism fails becauseit faces an unsolvable dilemma when it comes to the two constraintsimposed by Kripke’s skeptic, i.e., that

the correctness of a particular use [of \(e\)] be constitutedindependently of the individual’s perspective on it,

and that

the individual have a perspective on the use [of \(e\)], on pain ofrendering the use an instance of arbitrary behaviour.

Sultanescu points out that Ginsborg’s dispositionalism is ableto meet the second constraint, but not the first. After proposingamends to Ginsborg’s proposal in order to make room for thefirst constraint, Sultanescu points out that now, under this newinterpretation, Ginsborg fails to meet the skeptic’s secondconstraint.

Miller (2019) and Sorgiovanni (2018) also raise concerns about theviability of Ginsborg’s “primitive” rule-following.In particular, Miller (2019) points out that her argument for whyrules do not guide agents, is based on the (mistaken, and disproven byWittgenstein himself) assumption that being guided by a rulenecessarily requires interpreting that rule (2019: 746).^[41] What’s more, Miller takes issue with her primitive normativityby claiming that the attitude of“taking-to-be-appropriate” cannot really be made sense ofunless we expect the speaker to already take e “to have ameaning or to be governed by a standard of correctness”.Finally, Miller (2019: 755–757) and Verheggen (2015) argue thatwe have little reason to prefer Ginsborg’s partial reductionismover both non-reductionism and reductionism as Ginsborg’sproposal seems to face the same challenges raised against those twoopposing views.

3. Content

In the normativity debate the main focus has been on meaning: This istrue of the Kripke discussion as well as of earlier discussionsconcerning the rulishness of language. However, parallel claims havealso been made about mental content and recently the thesis thatcontent is essentially normative has come into focus (McDowell &Pettit 1986, Brandom 1994, Engel 2000, Boghossian 2003, Gibbard 2003,Millar 2004, Jarvis 2012, Hlobil 2015, Miller 2015, Tracy 2020, Green 2021).^[42]

Content normativism claims that the following is both necessary, andessential to, a mental state \(M\)‘s having a content \(p\):

(C)

\(M\) has content \(p\) only if there is a rule, or system ofrules, \(R\) in force for \(M.\)^[43]

The relevant notion of content is that of propositional content,something that can be judged, and the norms in question govern the“use” of concepts. We intend the talk of propositions andconcepts in this context to be uncontentious, and not depend on anyspecific construals of these notions. A proposition, simply, isanything that has truth conditions essentially; it is whatever thepropositional attitudes are attitudes towards. And talking of“concepts” should not be understood as implying acommitment to either structured contents or to a language-like,syntactically structured medium of representation. In this sense, aconcept is “used” whenever a subject has an intentionalmental state.^[44]

As in the case of meaning, we distinguish between CE normativity,which is neutral on the question how content is determined, and CDnormativity which takes the norms to be metaphysically primary. Weshall begin by discussing CE normativity.

3.1 Content Engendered Normativity

According to CE normativity statements of the form “mental state\(M\) has content \(p\)” have normative consequences. The normsare typically construed as norms of action, most commonly asprescriptions, but could also be construed axiologically. That is, theclaim need not be that the relevant norms guide our use of concepts,but could just be that it is a property essential to their havingcontent that certain mental states (true beliefs, for instance) arevaluable.

As in the case of meaning, we may distinguish between more or lessdirect arguments. One way to provide a direct argument for CEnormativity would be to proceed from the notion of correctnessconditions, in analogy with the simple argument (Boghossian 2003: 85).Just as meaningful expressions have correctness conditionsessentially, along the lines of(CM), so do concepts: The conceptgreen, for instance, applies toan object \(x\) if and only if \(x\) is green. However, unlike in thecase of (CM), the application relation here is just that between aconcept and the objects that “fall under” it. Fornormativity to enter some connection has to be made with the subjectwho employs the concepts, with her mental states.

The standard normativist strategy consists in appealing to the use ofconcepts in propositional attitudes, and to derive the normativity ofcontent from that of the propositional attitudes. We shall considertwo such common arguments: one that goes via the nature of belief, andone that goes via ideas about concept grasp.

3.1.1 The Argument from Belief

The argument from belief proceeds in two steps: It is argued, first,that belief is essentially normative, and second, that there is anessential connection between belief and content such that if belief isessentially normative it follows that content is, too. Our mainconcern here is not with the normativity of belief, but some commentsconcerning the first step are required.

According to the most common proposal, the normativity of beliefderives from the connection between belief and truth. The proposal isnot merely that beliefs, essentially, have contents that are true orfalse, but that beliefs, by their very nature, generate a normativerequirement that establishes that they are correct or incorrect as aresult of their content being true or false. Such a requirement isdistinctive of belief and provides a “decisive reason” forhaving or not having a particular belief (Wedgwood, 2002: 268. Seealso Velleman 2000; Engel 2001, 2013; Noordhof 2021; Wedgwood 2007,2013; Boghossian 2003; Gibbard 2003, 2005, 2012; Shah 2003; Speaks2009; Nolfi 2015; Fassio 2016).

In response, it has been argued that what is essential to belief ismerely that beliefs have contents that are true or false, not that oneought to believe a content if and only if it is true. The appearanceof normativity, it is suggested, derives from other sources. Forinstance, as epistemic agents, we seek truth. And having true beliefsis essential to fulfilling our goals. This just shows that truebeliefs have an instrumental value, and fails to support thenormativity of belief thesis. Moreover, it is argued, even if it isclaimed that truth has a non-instrumental value, the value in questionis derived from moral or other values, not from the nature of beliefas such (Papineau & Tanney 1999, 2013; Dretske 2000; Davidson2001a; Horwich 2013; Bergamaschi Ganapini 2021).

Questions have also been raised concerning how the norm of belief isto be understood. With respect to meaning the question arose whether\((\ME_1)\) violates the principle thatought impliescan. Inthe case of belief, a similar worry arises if the norm of belief isformulated in a parallel fashion, by proceeding from the correctnessconditions of beliefs to normative consequences:

(CB)

The belief that \(p\) is correct if and only if \(p\).

\((\NB_1)\)

\( S\) ought to believe that \(p\) if and only if \(p\).

The trouble is that\((\NB_1)\) implies that \(S\) ought to believe everything that is true, animpossible task. This difficulty, it has been argued, is not solved byappealing to a wide-scope reading of “ought” since thereare values of \(p\) that are such that \(S\) could neither bring itabout that \(p\) is false, nor bring it about that she believes \(p\)(Bykvist & Hattiangadi 2007: 284).^[45] The most common reaction, instead, is to weaken the norm (Boghossian2003: 37):

\((\NB_2)\)

\( S\) ought to believe that \(p\) only if \(p\).

This norm does not imply that \(S\) ought to believe everything thatis true, and hence does not put impossible demands on \(S\). However,as noted in the discussion of\((\ME_1)\) above, the question arises whether \((\NB_2)\) suffices to provideany real constraints on \(S\)‘s belief formation. If \(p\) istrue it does not follow that \(S\) ought to believe \(p\), and if\(p\) is false it merely follows that it is not the case that \(S\)ought to believe \(p\)—not that \(S\) ought not to believe \(p\)(Bykvist & Hattiangadi 2007: 280).^[46] In response, normativists have made the same move as in the case ofmeaning, and suggested that the “ought” in\((\NB_1)\) is replaced with a “may” (Whiting 2010: 216–217;2013: 125). It has been objected that this is too weak since itundermines the fundamental role of the norm of truth when it comes toexplaining other evidential and inferential norms (Bykvist &Hattiangadi 2013: 113–114) and to accounting for some keyfeature of doxastic deliberation (Sullivan-Bissett & Noordhof 2020).^[47]

Adopting a different tack the normativist could say that the relevantnorms should be understood in terms of the “telos” ofbelief: Just as a map is a map (giving a correct or incorrect pictureof the world) only insofar as it is designed to represent the world,and in this sense ought to represent the world correctly, so a beliefcan be said to be correct or incorrect only insofar as representingthe world belongs to its telos, to what it ought to do. Since thistype of “ought” applies to the representing objects (suchas maps or beliefs) and not to agents, it is argued, they are notaction-guiding and the principle thatought impliescan does not apply (Jarvis 2012).^[48]

Another set of questions concerns the fact that\((\NB_1)\) is an objective norm.^[49] Unlike a subjective norm, such as “\(S\) ought to believe that\(p\) only if \(S\) has evidence for \(p\)”, \((\NB_1)\) doesnot engage with \(S\)‘s reasons, her beliefs and desires, andthis raises the question of how \((\NB_1)\) can serve to guide ourbelief formation. Objective norms can guide only via our beliefs, andit has been argued that this raises two worries for \((\NB_1\)). Inorder to be guided by \((\NB_1\)), \(S\) would have to have a beliefabout whether \(p\) is true. This means, first, that in order to beguided by \((\NB_1\)) the subject would already have had to form abelief as to whether \(p\) and hence the guidance comes too late; and,second, that whatever conclusion the subject comes to as to whether\(p\), the norm tells her to hold that very belief (if she forms thebelief that \(p\) the norm gives her a reason to believe \(p\) and ifshe forms the belief that not-\(p\) the norm gives her a reason tobelieve not-\(p\)) (Glüer & Wikforss 2009: 44).^[50] It is therefore disputed whether \((\NB_1)\) can be said to be a normof belief, regulating our belief formation.^[51]

Another key challenge to the idea that belief is essentially normativeis that belief seems to be subject to multiple normative standards. Inaddition to the idea that one should only believe what is true orfollow the evidence, there are now also several arguments for theclaim that at times pragmatic and moral norms govern belief as welland these may be normatively heavier than any epistemic norm at play(Marušić 2011; Reisner 2018; Basu 201; Leary 2017; Rinard2019) . If so, then there are no essential or constitutive normativerequirements for belief: though there might be distinctive correctnessconditions for belief (as in CB) these do not appear to be genuinelynormative or do not seem to explain what “one just plainought” to believe such and such (Maguire & Woods 2020;Bergamaschi Ganapini 2021).

Finally, assuming that beliefis intrinsically normative,however, the decisive question is whether this has any implicationsfor content. Why should the fact that belief is normative imply thatcontent is? Indeed, it has been suggested that the opposite is truesince if belief is normative the appearance of normativity of contentcan simply be explained by appealing to the normativity of belief(Speaks 2009: 409). According to Boghossian, the normativity ofcontent derives from the fact that there is a constitutive connectionbetween the notion of content and the notion of belief (Boghossian2003). This is so, he argues, since we could not grasp the notion ofcontent without first grasping the role contents play in belief.Moreover, Boghossian argues, although contents play a role in otherattitudes as well, there are reasons to think that the concept ofbelief is conceptually primary: For instance, \(S\) could not have theconcept of desire without first having the concept of belief (2003:42–43). If so, the normativity of belief supports CEnormativity.

The claim that the concept of belief is primary to that of desire canbe questioned. Thus, there is empirical evidence from developmentalpsychology that children acquire the concept of desire prior toacquiring that of belief (Wellman 1993). It has also been argued thatbelief and desire are conceptually interdependent (Miller 2008). Moreimportantly, even if it can be shown that the concept of belief isprimary to that of desire, and of the other propositional attitudes,the question arises whether indeed one could not grasp the concept ofcontent without grasping that of belief.Prima facie,grasping the concept of a propositional attitude such as belief israther distinct from grasping the concept of content, since itinvolves the idea of taking up an attitude towards content.^[52] Moreover, Boghossian is committed to the strong claim that opponentsof content normativity fail to grasp the concept of content (or,alternatively, that they operate with a different concept).

An alternative strategy would be to avoid the appeal to conceptualentailments and argue that there is a metaphysical connection betweenmental content and belief such that if belief is essentiallynormative, content is. Such an argument may be more or less direct,going via more or less contentious assumptions about mental content.^[53]

For instance, versions of conceptual role semantics imply that thereis an essential link between mental content and belief as do versionsof informational theories of content (Dretske 1981; Fodor 1990),although the latter are typically coupled with a non-normativistaccount of belief. Another line of reasoning appeals to the idea thatthere is a constitutive connection between grasping a concept,understanding a content, and using it in the propositionalattitudes.

3.1.2 Use in Keeping with Content

To possess a concept, it is sometimes suggested, is to have thecapacity to use the concept in various propositional attitudes. Sinceit is essential to the propositional attitudes that they stand incertain rational interconnections with one another, it is argued, thisessential normativity transfers to concepts and contents. Possessing aconcept, grasping it, incurs a commitment to use the concept “inkeeping with its content”, in the various propositionalattitudes. If the speaker fails to do so, she hasmisused theconcept in question (Millar 2004; McDowell & Pettit 1986; Gibbard2012: chapter 6).

This argument runs parallel to the argument from understanding insupport of ME normativity (section 2.1.2). Even if that argument is accepted, however, the question ariseswhether it can be applied to concepts and content, since the notion offailing to use a concept in “keeping with its content”appears more problematic than the notion of failing to use a word inaccordance with its meaning (McGinn 1984: 146–147; Millar 2004:180–181). It is relatively unproblematic to speak ofunderstanding the meaning of an expression (or misunderstanding it),but in the case of concepts there is nothing corresponding to theexpression. To “understand” a concept is simply to possessit, to use it in thoughts. Hence there seems to be little or no roomfor the idea that \(S\) misunderstands a concept either. If \(S\)reasons as if she possesses the conceptancient rather thanthe conceptarcane, it would seem to follow not that there isany misuse of concepts but that she has another concept.

One strategy is to distinguish between possession conditions andattribution conditions (Peacocke 1992: 27–33). This separatesthe conditions that determine \(S\)’s concepts from conditionsfor the attribution of the concept to \(S\). As a consequence, thereis a potential gap between how \(S\) uses the concept, her grasp ofit, and how it should be used if she were to use it in keeping withits content. To illustrate the distinction, it is common to appeal toTyler Burge’s discussion of how social factors, under certainconditions, serve to determine content (Burge 1979; Peacocke 1992: 29;Millar 2004: 181–188). Burge gives an account of conceptattribution that goes via word meaning. To be attributed the conceptarcane, on this view, it suffices that \(S\) uses theexpression “arcane” by and large correctly, “inkeeping with its content”—if she is committed to hercommunity practice of using the corresponding expression“arcane”. What determines her concept, thus, is not merelyfacts about her use and dispositions to stand corrected, but factsabout the use of the term in the wider practice. It follows thatspeakers typically have an incomplete grasp of the concepts they thinkwith and, as a result, tend to misuse these concepts.

Leaving aside the controversial question of whether we can separatepossession conditions of concepts from attribution conditions, itmight be asked whether Burge’s social externalism can beemployed to support CE normativity. Burge’s argument depends onthe (empirical) assumption that the individual is committed to thecommunity practice (Burge 1979: 94–95, 101–102; Millar2004: 182). But if the normativity in question is made conditional onthe individual’s commitment to the community, it does not followthat content is essentially normative. After all, an individual who isnot thus committed would still have concepts. (Equally, in the case ofthe experts, the suggested normative dimension would seem to dropout.) What would be required, rather, is an argument to the effectthat the concept expressed is necessarily determined by the communitypractice, independently of \(S\)‘s commitments.

Arguments from concept grasp, again, typically appeal to the idea thatthere are rationality constraints on concept attributions. As noted inthe discussion of ME normativity, the question has been raised whetherthe idea that there are such constraints coheres with normativism. Ithas been suggested that this question is particularly pressing in thecase of content. When it comes to meaning, there is the option ofattributing meaning errors and explaining the error by appealing tothe subject’s mistakenconception of the meaning of anexpression, thereby rationalizing her reasoning and actions. In thecase of concepts, this option is not available, since the error issaid to occur at the level of content. It would either have to beargued that the error can be rationalized some other way, or the claimthat there are rationality constraints on content attributions wouldhave to be rejected (see Brown 2004, Wikforss 2015 and 2017).

3.2 Content Determining Normativity

Like MD normativism, CD normativism is a foundational claim:Intentional content is (at least partially) metaphysically determinedby rules or norms, content facts are, if you will, (at leastpartially) “grounded” by normative facts. Since therelevant norms or rules govern intentional mental states, the CDnormativist typically tries to find a particular kind of stateplausibly subject to rules or norms that by the same token (at leastpartially) determine contents for states of this kind. As truth andinference are intimately connected with both content and belief, thedebate focuses on norms forbelief.

Besidestruth norms like(\(\NB_1)\) and \((\NB_2)\) above, two further kinds of candidate norms of beliefhave been discussed:knowledge norms, and norms ofrationality, justification, or inference.^[54] CD normativism then is the claim that beliefs cannot have contentunless rules or norms of at least one of these kinds are in force forthem. Strong versions of CD normativism hold that CD norms alsodetermine which contents beliefs have. And again, being in force canroughly be interpreted in three ways: As requiring the subject tofollow the relevant rule or norm \(R\), toaccept\(R\) in a sense not requiring (general) following, or asindependent of the subject’s attitudes and intentional statestowards \(R\) (see above,section 2.2.1).

As in the case of meaning, CD normativism most often is a form ofguidance normativism construing belief formation as anessentially rule-guided activity. Those inspired by pragmatism and/orWittgensteinian anti-platonism might also think of the relevant rulesas “of our own making” (Baker & Hacker 1985; Brandom1994). A fairly common idea is that believers follow basic, objectivenorms such as truth or knowledge normsby means of beingguided by subjective ones such as the rules of rationality (Boghossian2003), but others take subjective rules as basic,^[55] or argue that the nature of belief is given by subjective andobjective norms in combination (Wedgwood 2007: 162).

Unsurprisingly, norms or rules for (rational)reasoningreceive a lot of attention. Prime examples are inference rules such asmodus ponens or the law of non-contradiction. Purely formalrules would arguably be too weak for the purposes of strong CDnormativism; normative inferentialists such as Brandom (1994; 2000) orPeregrin (2008) therefore include norms governing material implicationamong the content determining rules. In general, principles governingepistemic rationality (as, for instance, formalized in Bayesianepistemology) are further examples, and for those who hold that therecan be good practical reasons for belief, principles of practicalreasoning are also relevant.^[56]

As we have already seen insection 2.2 above, regress worries arise if CD normativism takes the form ofguidance normativism. Here, a pragmatic conception of rule guidancesuch as Brandom’s normative version of inferentialism (Brandom1994) might help. To avoid regresses, Brandom takes norms implicitly“instituted” by our practices to be basic and proposes apragmatic phenomenalism about such norms. Objective“deontic statuses” are to be explained in terms of ournormative attitudes. Something’sbeing correct, thatis, is to be explained in terms of the attitude oftaking it to becorrect, making the norms in question “in some sensecreatures of ours” (1994: 626); yet, the goal is to secure andexplain the “objectivity of concepts” (1994: xvii).^[57] As attitudes of taking something to be correct can themselves becorrect or incorrect,being correct ultimately has to beexplained in terms ofbeing correctly taken to be correct. Inthis sense, the normativity is irreducible—it is “normsall the way down” (1994: 44; 625).

Questions that have been raised for pragmatic phenomenalism includewhether it in fact can account for contents the truth of which isindependent of our attitudes. Because it explains normative statusesby means of further normative statuses, pragmatic phenomenalism mightnot be able to tell us anything informative about how we make or“institute” the basic norms implicit in our practices (cf.Rosen 2001, Hattiangadi 2003) or to account for the difference betweeninstituting and merely being in accordance with a norm. Yet anotherregress worry has also been raised: if for any normative status to beinstituted by an implicit norm a further normative status alreadyneeds to be so instituted, an infinite regress of (implicit) normsmight ensue despite the pragmatist nature of the proposal (cf.Hattiangadi 2007: 197; Glüer & Wikforss 2009: 60ff). Thisregress might not be vicious if the project is interpreted as anexpressivist one, however.

Even if guidance normativism would inescapably lead to some form ofregress, one might still hold on to the claim that there arecontentful intentional states only if for instance the rules ofrationality are in force for them. As we noted already in the previousversion of this entry, such force might require acceptance, but not(general) guidance, or it might be completely independent of theattitudes of thinkers. Highlighting both these options, it hasrecently been argued that guidance normativism is unnecessarilydemanding.

For one thing, even if the relevant rules require some sort ofacceptance to be in force, not every performance governed by themneeds to actually be guided by them (cf. Hlobil 2015; Tracy 2020).Plausible as this might initially seem, especially when thinking alongthe lines of the game analogy, a general observation of this kind doesnot yet substantiate the claim that an account of constitutiverules’ being in force that implements this possibility would beapplicable to CD rules or norms.^[58] Moreover, it should be noted that for CD rules or norms, making thismove might not just amount to acknowledging that not every instance ofbelief formation has to be rule-guided. If the move is to stop anintentional condition on rule-following from giving rise to a regress,we might end up having to say that every instance of rule-guidedbelief formationrequires the unguided formation of at leastone other belief or intentional state. For every rule that is followed(on a particular occasion), that is, there is another that governs,butcannot guide, the formation of a further intentionalstate of the rule-follower (on that occasion).^[59] This is at least a surprising situation to end up in for a defenderof the view that belief is essentially governed by rules that canguide belief formation.^[60] CD normativism might thus prove viable only if the force of therelevant rules or norms can plausibly be construed in completeindependence of the attitudes of the thinkers.

4. Concluding Remarks: Normativism and Naturalism

The idea that the normative in some sense is not part of nature goesback at least to Kant (see, for instance,Critique of PureReason [1781 [A 547]]). Already Hume (in theTreatise[1739–1740]) argued against the metaethical naturalist thatought cannot be derived fromis—to try to doso would be to commit a so-called “naturalistic fallacy”.With the “open question argument”, Moore (inPrincipiaEthica [1903]) added a weapon to the anti-naturalist’sarsenal also against giving naturalistic accounts of moralevaluations: According to the open question argument, there is nonaturalistic (set of) concept(s) analytically equivalent to the moralconcept of goodness, since no matter what naturalistic definition isgiven, the question whether all and only things satisfying it are goodstill makes sense. Much of recent normativism about meaning/contentcontinues in this anti-naturalist tradition; many normativists aboutmeaning/content hold that the essential normativity of meaning/contentmakes at least (fully) reductive naturalism untenable.

Many have construed Kripke’s Wittgenstein as saying exactlythat: it is part of his skeptical campaign against semantic facts ingeneral that such facts cannot be reduced to whatever precisely isallowed in a naturalistic supervenience base for meaning/content. Anargument for this could take a weaker, intensionalist, and a stronger,extensionalist, form (cf. Boghossian 1989a: 532ff). The strongerargument concludes that no reductive naturalist account ofmeaning/content will be extensionally correct: For anymeaning/concept, such an account will either include objects in itsextension that, intuitively, do not belong there, or exclude objectsfrom its extension that, intuitively, do belong there, or both. As wesaw above (section 2.2.1), this “problem of error” is a problem for manynaturalistic accounts of meaning/content, but as such it does not yethave anything to do with normativity. To that, the normativist couldrespond that it is precisely because of their essential normativitythat no naturalistic account of meaning/content can be extensionallycorrect. The weaker argument grants extensional correctness, butargues that no naturalistic reduction will get the intension of thenotion of meaning/content right; it will inevitably miss the normativecharacter of what is semantically correct, its deontic or axiologiccharacteristics.

Despite the normativists’ argument, it seems fair to say that atthis point in time, the case from normativism against reductivenaturalism about meaning/content has not yet been fully made. To maketheir case, the semantic normativist could resort to adopting ametaethical approach: arguments in the tradition of Hume and Mooremight well be adaptable to their case (cf. Miller 1998, 188ff;Hattiangadi 2007, 38ff; Gibbard 2012; Zalabardo 2012). As Hattiangadiargues, though, the semantic normativist’s case ends up beinghostage to whatever controversial assumptions these arguments rely on(motivational internalism, for instance, might be such an issue), thusremoving normativism further from being the pre-theoretical constrainton acceptable accounts of meaning/content that Kripke’s skepticmeant it to be. What’s more, one might worry that the topic of“reduction” is itself more nuanced than the normativistmakes it to be. As we have seen insection 2.2, it is still possible to argue that some (set of) dispositions mightplay a role in meaning-determination. Alternatively, it is possible toendorse partially reductive accounts construing meaning/content asdetermined by a dispositional and a non-semantic, but normative,component.

Furthermore, even if normativism about meaning/content might exclude(fully) reductive naturalism about meaning/content, it should be notedthat adopting normativism would not seem to be the only option for theanti-reductivist (cf. Mulligan 1999: 136f; Glüer & Wikforss2009: 63ff). What the normativist construes as norms or rules ofmeaning/content, principles such as(CM) or inferential rules such as modus ponens, might also be construed ina very different way: As, or in analogy with what Frege called“laws of truth” (Frege 1918 [1986: 30]). In the same vein,Husserl called the “laws of logic” “ideal”(Husserl 1913: 56)). These “laws” are neitherprescriptions for thinking, nor nomological generalities of ourpsychology. Their “validity” or necessity issuigeneris; if anything, it is what we might today call metaphysical.^[61]

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