Epictetus

First published Tue Dec 23, 2008; substantive revision Wed Jul 16, 2025

A Greek philosopher of 1^st and early 2^ndcenturies C.E., and an exponent of Stoic ethics notable for theconsistency and power of his ethical thought and for effective methodsof teaching. Epictetus’s chief concerns are with integrity,self-management, and personal freedom, which he advocates by demandingof his students a thorough examination of two central ideas, thecapacity he terms ‘volition’ (prohairesis) andthe correct use of impressions (chrēsis tōnphantasiōn), Heartfelt and satirical by turns, Epictetus hashad significant influence on the popular moralistic tradition, but heis more than a moralizer; his lucid resystematization and challengingapplication of Stoic ethics qualify him as an important philosopher inhis own right.

1. Life and Works

Born sometime in the 50s C.E. in Hierapolis, a Greek city of AsiaMinor, Epictetus spent a portion of his life as the slave ofEpaphroditus, an important administrator in the court of Nero. Thedate at which he came to Rome is unknown, but it must have been eitherprior to 68, at which time Epaphroditus fled the capital, or after theaccession of Domitian in 81, under whom Epaphroditus was allowed toreturn and perhaps to resume his position. The circumstances ofEpictetus’s education are likewise unknown, except that hestudied for a time under Musonius Rufus, a Roman senator and Stoicphilosopher who taught intermittently at Rome. Eventually receivinghis freedom, he began lecturing on his own account but was forced toleave the city, presumably by the edict of Domitian (in 89) banningphilosophers from the Italian peninsula. He then established his ownschool at Nicopolis, an important communications hub andadministrative center in Epirus, on the Adriatic coast of northwestGreece, and remained there teaching and lecturing until his deatharound 135. The teaching represented in theDiscourses isthat of his later career, around the year 108 by Millar’s (1965)dating, at which time he walked with a limp attributed variously toarthritis or to physical abuse during his time of slavery. Epictetusnever married, but for reasons of benevolence he late in life adopteda child whose parents could not provide for its maintenance.

The major compilation of Epictetus’s teaching is the workstandardly referred to in English as theDiscourses; it wasvariously titled in antiquity. The work we have is in four books, orvolumes, but the original work comprised eight or more books.According to their preface, theDiscourses are not thewriting of Epictetus but are ghostwritten by the essayist andhistoriographer Arrian of Nicomedia in an effort to convey thepersonal impact of his instruction. Although we lack independent meansof verification, we have reason to be confident that the works we haverepresent Epictetus’s thought rather than Arrian’s own:first, because the language employed iskoinē or commonGreek rather than the sophisticated literary language ofArrian’s other writings; and second because the brusque,elliptical manner of expression, the precise philosophical vocabulary,and the intellectual rigor of the content are quite different fromwhat Arrian produces elsewhere. A few scholars, including especiallyDobbin (1998), argue that Epictetus must have composed them himself,the role of Arrian being merely to preserve a mild fiction oforality.

The shorterEncheiridion (titled in English eitherManual orHandbook) is a brief abridgment of theDiscourses. As such it offers a much attenuated account whichis of little independent value for the understanding ofEpictetus’s thought and which at some points gives a misleadingimpression of his philosophical motivations. There are also somequotations by other ancient authors from theDiscourses asthey knew them. A few of these fragments, notably those numbered bySchenkl 8, 9, and 14, are useful supplements to our knowledge ofEpictetus.

The standard Greek edition of all the above works is by Schenkl(1916); there is also a valuable Loeb edition by Oldfather (2 volumes,1926–28), and, for theDiscourses, an edition bySouilhé (4 vols., 1948–65) which includes a Frenchtranslation. Complete English translations include, besides Oldfather,Waterfield (2022) and Hard (1995). The latter, which occasionallyquoted here, is a revision of the classic translation by ElizabethCarter (1759). Dobbin (2008) is a somewhat abridged version with anexcellent brief introduction and notes. Dobbin (1998) provides a moreextensive general introduction and notes to accompany a translation ofDiscourses Book I. For a reliable overview ofEpictetus’s main ideas with observations on many specificpoints, the first port of call is Long (2002). The more detailedtreatments by Bonhöffer (1890 and 1894), though superseded bymore recent studies on many points, retain considerable value.

The so-called “Golden Sayings” is a later compendium ofaphorisms drawn from theDiscourses andEncheiridion.

2. Antecedents

The essentials of Epictetus’s thought derive from the early orfoundational period of Stoicism, from the third-century writings ofZeno of Citium, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. Treatises he mentions bytitle include Chrysippus’On Choice, On Impulse, andOn the Possibles, and he also mentions reading in works byZeno, Cleanthes, and the second-century Stoics Antipater andArchedemus. Extant reports and fragments of these and other Stoicworks are congruent at many points with what we find in him.

It may still be the case that he accepts influence from other currentsin philosophy, or that he develops some ideas on his own. The clearestinstance of such influence concerns Plato, for Epictetus draws muchinspiration from the Socrates depicted in Plato’s shorterdialogues. Comparisons can be drawn especially to the Socrates ofPlato’sGorgias, with his fondness for argumentativegive and take, his willingness to challenge the hearer’spresuppositions, and his optimism about what can be achieved throughvalues clarification. TheTheaetetus may also have beeninfluential on Epictetus’s thinking about contemplation and therelation of human to divine; see Bénatouïl 2013. Epictetusalso knows the Master Argument from Megarian philosophy(3^rd c. BCE) and even names Diodorus and Panthoides,although this knowledge might easily have been drawn from Stoictreatises on logic (2.19.1–11; see further Barnes 1997 ch. 3 andCrivelli in Scaltsas and Mason 2007).

An argument has sometimes been made for Aristotelian influence,primarily because Epictetus’s favored termprohairesis(see section 4.3 below) is prominent inNicomachean Ethics3.1–5 as a quasi-technical term (there usually translated“choice” or “decision”). In particular, Dobbin(1991) has suggested that Epictetus’s use of this term reflectsthe influence of the early Aristotle commentaries (1^st c.BCE-1^st c. CE), none of which has survived for ourinspection. But neither Aristotle nor any author in the Aristoteliantradition is ever mentioned in theDiscourses. It is betterto make the provisional assumption that his interest in volitionderives, like other main elements of his philosophy, from the earlyStoa, though with greater emphasis. Although the termprohairesis is only barely attested in surviving accounts ofearly Stoic philosophy, there is some evidence to suggest that it didplay a significant role; see Graver 2003.

Epictetus never refers by name to the second century BCE StoicsPanaetius and Posidonius, and although he has something in common withPanaetius’s reported interest in practical ethics and role-basedresponsibilities, the evidence hardly suffices for an influence claim.References to other philosophers or schools are only in passing. He isimpressed with Cynicism, but sees it as a vocation to itinerantteaching and bare-bones living rather than as a body of doctrine(3.22). Epicureanism he identifies with the pleasure principle andaccordingly despises (3.7).

3. Preliminaries to interpretation

Any effort to come to grips with Epictetus’s thought mustproceed from an awareness of his chosen objectives. The philosopher wemeet in theDiscourses seeks above all to foster ethicaldevelopment in others, keeping his personal intellectual satisfactionstrictly subordinate. Consequently we possess no point-by-pointexposition of his views. The themes he regards as most difficult forstudents to internalize appear repeatedly and are developed andexpanded in many different ways. Other issues he either treatssporadically—even if passing references suggest he has knowledgeof them—or omits altogether, if he regards them as inessentialto moral development. His apparent inclination to hold back some ofhis thinking, as well as the incomplete condition in which theDiscourses have been transmitted to us, make it quite unsafeto draw any assumption about his views from silences or gaps in theaccount we have. On the other hand, the recursive manner ofpresentation makes it unlikely that the non-extant volumes broachedany entirely new themes.

Interpreters must be careful not to prejudge the question ofEpictetus’s relation to earlier Greek philosophy. While it isevident that his principal contentions are substantially related toearlier philosophical developments, claims concerning his relation tothe earlier Stoics, or possible philosophical innovations or shifts ofemphasis, must be governed by a healthy respect for the fragmentarynature of our sources. We possess no record of the oral teaching thattook place in the Hellenistic Stoa that is comparable in scope to his.Where corroborating evidence exists in literary or doxographicalworks, we are justified in describing his views as reformulations ofthe Stoic tradition; otherwise the question of continuity shouldgenerally be left open.

4. Main contentions

4.1. Rationality

The linchpin of Epictetus’s entire philosophy is his account ofwhat it is to be a human being; that is, to be a rational mortalcreature. “Rational” as a descriptive term means thathuman beings have the capacity to “use impressions” in areflective manner. Animals, like humans, use their impressions of theworld in that their behavior is guided by what they perceive theircircumstances to be. But human beings also examine the content oftheir impressions to determine whether they are true or false; we havethe faculty of “assent” (1.6.12–22).

Assent is regulated by our awareness of logical consistency orcontradiction between the proposition under consideration and beliefsthat we already hold: when we are not aware of any contradiction, weassent readily, but when we perceive a conflict we are stronglyconstrained to reject one or the other of the conflicting views(2.26.3). Thus Medea kills her children because she believes it is toher advantage to do so; if someone were to show her clearly that sheis deceived in this belief, she would not do it (1.28.8). Our hatredof being deceived, our inability to accept as true what we clearly seeto be false, is for Epictetus the most basic fact about human beingsand the most promising (1.28.1–5).

4.2. Kinship with god

Epictetus situates the rationality of the human being within amaximally rational universe. His confidence in the fundamentalorderliness of all things is expressed in frequent references to Zeusor “the god” as the designer and administrator of theuniverse. There seems to be no question of competition with any otherdeities or powers. Epictetus does sometimes speak, conventionally fora Greek, of “gods” in the plural, but Zeus remainsunquestionably supreme: he enjoys having some company, just as we do(3.13.4), but does not require assistance and cannot be opposed.

Immanent rather than transcendent, Zeus inheres in, and may indeed beidentified with, the natural order. As such he is in theory fullyaccessible to human comprehension in the same way as all objects andevents are accessible to our comprehension. With effort, rationalbeings can come to understand Zeus as a person, a rational being withthoughts and intentions like ours. That recognition inspires awe andgratitude, a “hymn of praise” that it is our duty to offerin each occasion of life (1.16.19).

God is the creator of humankind as of all else, and his attitudetoward us is one of complete benevolence. It is by his gift that weare rational beings, and our rational nature qualifies us as hiskindred. More: our minds are actually fragments of Zeus’s mind,“parts and offshoots of his own being” (1.14.6,2.8.10–12). When we make choices on our own account, we exercisethe very same power as governs the universe. Hence it can be said thatZeus has ceded to us a portion of his governance (1.1.12).

4.3. Volition

It is, again, the capacity for choice that makes us accountable forour own actions and states. Epictetus is particularly fond ofexploring the implications of this essentially Stoic conception. Instudying his usage it is helpful to remember that his favored termprohairesis refers more often to the capacity for choice thanit does to particular acts of choosing. The word is variouslytranslated; the rendering “volition” is adopted here as inLong 2002.

Volition, Epictetus argues, is “by nature unimpeded”(1.17.21), and it is for this reason that freedom is for him aninalienable characteristic of the human being. The very notion of acapacity to make one’s own decisions implies as a matter oflogical necessity that those decisions are free of externalcompulsion; otherwise they would not be decisions. But humans do havesuch a capacity and are thus profoundly different from even the higheranimals, which deal with impressions merely in an unreflective way(2.8).

It is the volition that is the real person, the true self of theindividual. Our convictions, attitudes, intentions and actions aretruly ours in a way that nothing else is; they are determined solelyby our use of impressions and are thus internal to the sphere ofvolition. The appearance and comfort of one’s body, one’spossessions, one’s relationships with other people, the successor failure of one’s projects, and one’s power andreputation in the world are all merely contingent facts about aperson, features of our experience rather than characteristics of theself. These things are all “externals”; that is, thingsexternal to the sphere of volition.

4.4. Value

This distinction between what is internal to the sphere of volitionand what is external to it is the foundation of Epictetus’ssystem of value. What is ultimately worth having, the “good ofhumankind,” consists in “a certain disposition ofone’s volition” (1.8.16). More explicitly, thisdisposition is the condition of virtue, the proper expression of ourrational nature, in which we not only act correctly and on the basisof knowledge, but also recognize our kinship to god and witness withjoy god’s orderly management of the universe.

We are not wrong to believe that whatever is good is advantageous tous and worthy of unconditional pursuit, for this is just the“preconception” (prolēpsis) of good whichall human beings possess (1.22). But we err in applying thatpreconception to particular cases, for we frequently assume thatexternal objects have unconditional value. In reality, the variouscircumstances of our lives are merely what the volition has to workwith and cannot in themselves be either good or bad. “Thematerials of action are indifferent, but the use we make of them isnot indifferent” (2.5.1).

Admittedly some external things are more natural to us than others,just as it is natural for a foot, considered solely for itself, to beclean rather than muddy. But this is only when we consider ourselvesin isolation rather than as parts of a larger whole. As Chrysippussays, the foot if it had a mind would welcome becoming muddy for thesake of the whole (2.6.11). Even one’s own death is of noparticular concern if that is what the orderly workings of theuniverse require.

This does not mean that one should be heedless of externals.“Externals must be used with care, because their usage is not anindifferent matter, yet at the same time with composure andtranquility, because the material being used is indifferent”(2.5.6). One can recognize that a thing is without ultimate value andstill act vigorously in pursuit of it, when doing so is in accordancewith one’s rational character. Epictetus offers the analogy ofball players who recognize that the ball they are running after is ofno value in itself, and yet exert their full energy to catch itbecause of the value they set on playing the game properly (2.5).

4.5. Emotional adjustment

The revaluation of external objects brings with it a tremendous senseof confidence and inner peace. Grief, fear, envy, desire, and everyform of anxiety, result from the incorrect supposition that happinessis to be found outside oneself (2.16, 3.13.10, etc.). Like earlierStoics, Epictetus rejects the supposition that such emotions areimposed on us by circumstances or internal forces and are largelybeyond our control. Our feelings, as well as our behavior, are anexpression of what seems right to us, conditioned by our judgments ofvalue (1.11.28–33). If we correct our judgments, our feelingswill be corrected as well. (See Long 2006, 377–394.)

The analysis is applicable also to feelings like anger and betrayalwhich relate to the conduct of other people. The choices made byothers are of ethical significance only for the agents themselves; toanyone else they are externals and so of no consequence. One shouldnot, then, be angry at Medea for her bad decision. Pity would bebetter than that, though the really proper response, if one has theopportunity, would be to help her to see her mistake (1.28).

Epictetus’s conception of emotional adjustment is not that oneshould be “unfeeling like a statue” (3.2.4). Even thewisest person may tremble or grow pale at some sudden danger, thoughwithout false assent (fragment 9). More importantly, there areaffective responses it is right to have. “It is fitting to beelated at the good”; that is, at the goods of soul (2.11.22;3.7.7), and one should also experience the aversive feeling he calls“caution” (eulabeia, 2.1.1–7) whenconsidering potential bad choices. Gratitude toward god is alsoaffective in nature (2.23). In addition, it is appropriate during theperiod of ethical training to experience the pain of remorse as astimulus to ethical development (3.23.30–38; see Kamtekar(1998).

4.6. Appropriate other-concern

In our relations with other people we are to be governed by theattitudes Epictetus calls “modesty” (aidōs)and “love of humanity” (philanthrōpia).Modesty consists in an awareness of the perspective of others and areadiness to curtail one’s own unseemly behavior; love ofhumanity is a willingness to exert oneself on others’ behalf.The latter extends especially toward those with whom we are associatedby our particular role in life: toward children if one is a parent,toward husband or wife if one is married, and so on (2.10, 2.22.20).While our best service to others is in helping them develop their ownrational nature, it is also entirely appropriate that we should act tofurther the interests of those to whom we are connected by birth orsituation.

Epictetus does not believe that there is any conflict betweenother-regarding behavior and appropriate self-concern. We arenaturally oriented toward our own well-being, but acting for our ownsake often entails contributing to the common good (1.19.11–14). Moreparticularly, the preservation of our relationships(scheseis) belongs to our own good, though only insofar as itis possible to preserve them by right behavior. If maintaining aconnection to a family member requires giving up external possessions,one can do so without hesitation, since one is not thereby sacrificingsuch real goods as modesty and fidelity. See 3.3.5–10, with Magrin(2018) and Johnson (2014).

It is a misconception to suppose that proper affection for friends andfamily members necessarily leaves us vulnerable to debilitatingemotions when their welfare is threatened. Just as one can be fond ofa crystal goblet and yet not be upset when it breaks, having realizedall along that it was a fragile thing, so we should love our children,siblings, and friends while also reminding ourselves of theirmortality (3.24). The primary relationship is with god; our humanrelationships should never give us reason to reproach god but shouldenable us to rejoice in the natural order. Concern for others, andenjoyment of their company, is indeed part of human nature (3.13.5);whereas irresponsible behavior driven by emotion is not. The parentwho remains at the bedside of a desperately sick child behaves more,not less, naturally than the one who runs away to weep (1.11).

4.7. Self-cultivation and autonomy

Achieving the correct disposition of one’s capacity for choicerequires more than inclination. The learner must also undertake anextensive program of self-examination and correction of views. Whileethical development is made easier by the direct instruction andself-help techniques a teacher like Epictetus himself might provide,it is also possible without such aid. It is indeed a capabilityinherent in human nature, for the faculty that perceives and correctserrors of judgment is the reasoning faculty itself. Through reason, wemay learn to avoid precipitancy in pursue our ends “withreservation” (Encheiridion 2), mindful that god may notbring them to fruition; and to avoid precipitancy in action andassent. It is even possible to alter such emotional dispositions astimorousness or quickness of temper, through repeated practice ingiving more appropriate responses (2.16, 2.18).

Our ability to improve our own dispositions also provides the implicitanswer to any question that might be asked about human autonomy in aZeus-governed universe. Since for Epictetus action is determined bycharacter (what seems right to an individual; 1.2) and not byspontaneous impulses, some readers might be inclined to object thatthis autonomy is only of a limited kind, for a person’scharacter must itself have been assigned to him by Zeus, through thecircumstances of his birth and education. Epictetus would reply thatautonomy is guaranteed not by the absence of antecedent causes but bythe very nature of the reasoning faculty. Specific skills likehorsemanship make judgments about their own subject matter; thereasoning faculty judges other things and also its own priorjudgments. When it performs this function well, the inheritedcharacter will improve over time; otherwise it will deteriorate.

4.8. Mind and body

Zeus’s power is limited in that he cannot do what it islogically impossible to do. He could not cause a person to be bornbefore his parents (1.12.28–29), and he could not have madevolition execute any choices but its own (1.1.23, 1.17.27). For thesame kind of reason, he could not, for all his benevolence, cause aperson’s body to be unimpeded in the way volition is unimpeded(4.1.100). Our bodies do not in fact belong to us, since we cannotalways decide what will happen to them. There is therefore a clearcontrast in status between body and mind or soul. Epictetus repeatedlyuses language belittling the body or representing it as a mereinstrument of the mind: it is “pathetic little flesh,”“cleverly molded clay,” a “little donkey”(1.1.10, 1.3.5, 4.1.79). At least once he speaks of the body andpossessions together as “fetters” upon the mind (1.9.11),language that recalls the image in Plato’sPhaedo82d-83b of the body as prison house.

Like other Stoics, Epictetus regards the mind not as a separateincorporeal entity but as consisting ofpneuma(“breath” or “spirit”), a material substancewith certain remarkable powers. Thus he explains the faculty of visionby the activity ofpneuma infused by god into the eyes, aswell as by the energy and tensility of the air through which thingsare seen (2.23.3–4). In an especially striking analogy in3.3.20–22, he compares the mind to a vessel of water and mentalimpressions to rays of light entering the water. When the water isdisturbed, the ray of light appears to move, but in fact does not; andlikewise when a person experiences vertigo, it seems as if the skillsand virtues are disrupted, but in fact the disruption is only in thesubstrate.

5. Educational method

Epictetus draws a sharp distinction between book learning, i.e.mastering the content of particular treatises, and what may be callededucation for living, in which one acquires the attitudes and habitsthat enable correct behavior. The latter is of paramount importance;the former may be of instrumental value but if overemphasized mayprove a hindrance to ethical development.

The program of study offered in the school at Nicopolis included thereading of philosophical treatises by Stoic authors of the Hellenisticperiod, for instance the workOn Impulse by Chrysippus(1.4.14) and the logical writings of Archedemus (1.10.8). Frequentreferences to formal logical schemata suggest that these, too, weretaught, as they had been in the curriculum of Musonius Rufus,Epictetus’s own teacher at Rome (1.7.32; cf. 1.7.5–12).Finally, there is some evidence for instruction in what the ancientscalled physics (philosophy of nature); for this, see 1.6.19–22with Magrin (2012).

Education for living is primarily self-education, a function of thatcapacity for self-correction which is inherent in our rational nature.Epictetus rejects the way of thinking that says moral improvement isachievable only by divine assistance.

Have you not hands, fool? Has not god made them for you? Sit down nowand pray your nose may not run! Wipe it, rather, and do not blame god.(2.16.11)

The example of Socrates serves to remind the hearer that intellectualindependence remains the primary objective. For while Socrates teachesothers, he is himself untaught or rather self-taught; his unshakeablecomprehension of ethical issues has been attained through rigorousapplication of methods anyone might use. Admittedly, Socrates wasexceptionally gifted, and yet his achievement is what all are born forand can at least hope to match (1.2.33–37).

Direct coaching by a philosophical teacher may nonetheless be ofassistance to persons seeking to correct their own dispositions.Epictetus explains the process inDiscourses 3.2. Above all,one must attend to “desire and aversion”: one must correctone’s emotional responses by pondering questions of value andindifference, for desire or fear of objects outside one’s owncontrol results in a host of strong emotions that make one“incapable of listening to reason” while experiencingthem. Further, one must study “the impulse to act and not toact,” for vigorous action may be part of proper relations to thegods, to family members, and to the state, and those actions should beorderly and well-considered. Finally, one must attend to one’sown reasoning processes, to “freedom from deception and hastyjudgment and in general whatever is concerned with assent.” Thislast entails some study of logic, to prevent the conclusions reachedin the two principal areas of study from being dislodged “evenin dreams or drunkenness or melancholy.”

These three topics have usually been regarded as the foundation ofEpictetus’s educational system (although this view has recentlybeen questioned; see Sellars in in Aubert-Baillot et al. 2022).Pace Hadot (1978)), they are not to be identified with thethree divisions of philosophical discourse discussed by the earlyStoics (viz. physics, ethics, and logic; Diogenes Laertius7.39–40). As presented in 3.2, the schema seems intendedprimarily to deemphasize the role of logic; that is, of the sterileconundrums and oversubtle analyses enjoyed by some ofEpictetus’s contemporaries. As Barnes (1997) has shown, however,Epictetus is not at all averse to the study of logic provided it isgiven its proper supporting role. Learning of this kind may beinstrumental in developing one’s intellectual acumen, just asthe weights used by athletes in their training serve to develop themuscles (1.4.13; 1.17).

The actual process of self-improvement is initially a matter ofconsciously slowing down one’s thought processes to allow forreflection prior to assent. “Impression, wait for me a little.Let me see what you are, and what you represent” (2.18.24). Asthe habit of screening impressions becomes established, correctresponses will begin to come automatically. Yet constant vigilance isstill required, to guard against backsliding (4.3). One can never relysolely on habituation.

More specific therapeutic techniques may also be of use to the onemaking ethical progress. Epictetus recommends that pupils refrain fromusing the terms “good” and “bad,” not becausethose terms have no application in human life, but because they aretoo easily misapplied. Thus one should “suppress” desireand aversion, and use only plain, emotionally unadorned impulse andcounter-impulse (Encheiridion 2). To combat some individualbad habit, one should practice the opposite behavior: for instance, ifone is quick tempered, one should accustom oneself to bearing insultswith patience (3.12.6–12). Regular self-examination atbedtime—a practice borrowed from the Pythagoreantradition—will enable one to correct errors before they becomeingrained (3.10.1).

Occasionally Epictetus offers pre-professional advice to pupils whointend to pursue a teaching career of their own. He chastises theteacher who assigns a technical treatise in logic without providingany preliminary training or assessing the pupil’s capabilities(1.23.13). InDiscourses 3.23.33 he distinguishes three“modes” or “characters” of philosophicaldiscourse. The “protreptic” mode is that which convinceshearers, singly or in groups, to care about philosophical study as ameans toward personal ethical development. The “elenctic”mode, named from the Socraticelenchos, is moreconfrontational and is aimed at removing false convictions, while the“instructional” mode imparts sound doctrines. As Long(2002) has noted, the three modes are associated respectively withDiogenes the Cynic, with Socrates, and with Zeno of Citium, thefounder of the Stoic school (3.21.19; cf. 2.12.5).

6. Influence

Though much cultivated in person by the nobles of local Greek cities(as Brunt 1997 describes), Epictetus exerted far more influencethrough the written works produced by Arrian. The emperor MarcusAurelius was never in fact his pupil, but was so deeply impressed withwhat he had read as to consider himself a follower of the freedmanphilosopher. In the early third century Origen remarks on thepopularity of Epictetus with his own contemporaries, which he finds torival that of Plato (Contra Celsum 6.2). Whether Origen washimself much influenced by Epictetus’s version of Stoicism isanother matter, for Origen had studied the writings of Chrysippus onhis own account and the strands cannot easily be separated. Moredemonstrable is the homage paid to Epictetus by Simplicius, thesixth-century Aristotle commentator, who composed a long philosophicalcommentary on theEncheiridion combining Stoic elements withhis own Neoplatonism.

TheEncheiridion was translated into Latin by Poliziano in1497 and during the subsequent two centuries became exceptionallypopular in Europe. Spanneut (1972) traces its use in monasteries insuperficially Christianized form. Seventeenth-century intellectualslike Guillaume du Vair, Justus Lipsius, and Thomas Gataker generallyfound Epictetus’s Stoicism to be fully compatible withChristianity; see the discussion in Brooke (2006). Pascal reactedagainst this perception; he admired Epictetus as a moralist butregarded it as sheer arrogance to believe that the human psyche ispart of the divine and can be perfected by one’s own efforts.Descartes adopted a recognizably Epictetan value system as part of hispersonal ethics. An engagingly satirical portrayal of the potentialimpact of Epictetus’s philosophy in contemporary American lifemay be found in Tom Wolfe’s 1998 novelA Man inFull.

Bibliography

Texts and Translations

Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano Digestae (Greek text),H. Schenkl (ed.), Leipzig: Teubner, 2^nd ed., 1916.
All the works of Epictetus, translated by ElizabethCarter, Dublin: Hulton Bradley, 1759 (= Carter 1759). [Scan available at archive.org.]
Epictetus: The Discourses as reported by Arrian, the Manual,and Fragments, translated by W.A. Oldfather, 2 vols., LoebClassical Library, London and Cambridge, MA.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1925–1928.
The Discourses of Epictetus, revised translation by RobinHard, with an introduction by Christopher Gill, London: Everyman, 1995(= Hard 1995).
Epictète: Entretiens, J. Souilhé (trans.),4 vols., Paris: Budé, 1948–65.
Epictetus: Discourses and Selected Writings, translatedby R. Dobbin, New York: Penguin, 2008 (= Dobbin 2008).
Epictetus: Discourses Book 1, translated and with anintroduction and commentary by R. Dobbin, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1998 (= Dobbin 1998).
Epictetus: The Complete Works, edited and translated withintroduction and notes by Robin Waterfield, Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 2022 (= Waterfield 2022).
Epictetus: The Enchiridion, translated by T.W. Higginson,with an introduction by Albert Salomon, New York: Bobbs-Merrill,1948.
The Handbook of Epictetus, translated by N.P. White,Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983.

General

Fuentes González, P. P., 2000,“Épictète,”Dictionaire des philosophesantiques vol. 3, 106–151.
Hershbell, J.P., 1989, “The Stoicism of Epictetus:Twentieth-Century Perspectives,”Aufstieg und Niedergang derRömischen Welt, vol. 2.36.3, Berlin: W. De Gruyter,2148–2163.
Long, A.A., 2002,Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide toLife, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Spanneut, M., 1962, “Epiktet,” in T. Klauser (ed.),Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum (Volume V),Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 599–681.
Stephens, W.O., 2007,Epictetus and Happiness as Freedom,London: Continuum.

Life and Times

Brunt, P. A., 1977, “From Epictetus to Arrian,”Athenaeum, 55: 19–48.
Gangloff, A., 2022, “À L’extérieur de la Citadelle: Le Monded’Épictète (Entretiens, livre III),” in Aubert-Baillot,Guyomarc’h, Pià Comella and Cusset 2022.
Millar, Fergus, 1965, “Epictetus and the ImperialCourt,”Journal of Roman Studies, 55:141–48.
Stadter, P. A., 1980,Arrian of Nicomedia, Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press.
Starr, C., 1949, “Epictetus and the Tyrant,”Classical Philology, 44: 20–29.
Wirth, T., 1967, “Arrians Erinnerungen an Epiktet,”Museum Helveticum, 24: 149–89, 197–216.

Philosophy

Algra, K., et al., 1999,The Cambridge History of HellenisticPhilosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Asmis, E., 2001. “Choice in Epictetus’ philosophy,” inAntiquity and humanity: essays on ancient religion and philosophypresented to Hans Dieter Betz on his 70th birthday, A. Collinsand M. Mitchell (eds.), Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 385–412.
Aubert-Baillot, S., Guyomarc’h, G., Pià Comella, J.and Cusset, C., eds., 2022,Lectures du livre III des « Entretiens » d’Épictète.Aitia vol. 12. Lyon: ENS Éd.
Barnes, J., 1997,Logic and the Imperial Stoa, Leiden:Brill.
Bénatouïl, T., 2013, “Theôria andscholê in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius: Platonic,Stoic or Socratic?,” inPlato and the Stoics, A.G. Long(ed.), Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 147–173.
Billerbeck, M., 1978,Epiktet: von Kynismus, Leiden:Brill.
Bonhöffer, Adolf, 1890,Epiktet und die Stoa,Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke.
–––, 1894,The Ethics of the StoicEpictetus, W.O. Stephens (trans.), New York: Peter Lang,1996.
Boter, G., 2022 “The Role of Anger in Epictetus’ PhilosophicalTeaching,” inEmotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature andBeyond : Studies in Honour of Irene De Jong, M. de Bakker, B. vanden Berg, J. Klooster (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 619–632.
Braicovich, R.S., 2012, “Critical Assent, Intellectualismand Repetition in Epictetus,”Apeiron, 45:314–337.
Brennan, T., 2005,The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, andFate, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cooper, J. M., 2004, “Stoic Autonomy,” in J. Cooper(ed.),Knowledge, Nature and the Good: Essays on AncientPhilosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
De Lacy, P., 1979, “The Four Stoic Personae,”Illinois Classical Studies, 3: 163–172.
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D’Jeranian, O., 2023.L’apprentissage de laResponsabilité: Essai sur le stoïcismed’Epictète. Paris: Vrin, 2023.
Dobbin, R., 1991,“Προαίρεσιςin Epictetus,”Ancient Philosophy, 11:111–135.
Döring, K., 1979,Exemplum Socratis, Wiesbaden: F.Steiner.
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Graver, M., 2003, “Not Even Zeus: A Discussion of A.A. Long,Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life,” OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy, 24: 343–359.
–––, 2007,Stoicism and Emotion,Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gretenkord, J.C., 1981,Der Freiheitsbegriff Epiktets,Bochum: Brockmeyer.
Hadot, P., 1978, “Un clé des Pensées deMarc-Aurèle: les trois topoi philosophiques selonÉpictète,”Les Étudesphilosophiques, 33: 65–83.
Hershbell, J.P., 1993, “Epictetus and Chrysippus,”Illinois Classical Studies, 18: 139–146.
Hijmans, B. L., 1959,AΣΚΗΣΙΣ: Notes onEpictetus’ educational system, Assen: Van Gorcum.
Jagu, A., 1946,Épictète et Platon, Paris:J. Vrin.
Johnson, B.E., 2014,The Role Ethics of Epictetus: Stoicism inOrdinary Life, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.
Kamtekar, R., 1998, “Aidôs inEpictetus,”Classical Philology, 93:136–160.
Klein, Jacob, 2021, “Desire and Impulse in Epictetus and theOlder Stoics,”Archiv für Geschichte derPhilosophie, 103(2): 221–251.
Long, A.A., 2006,From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies inHellenistic and Roman Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
–––, 1996,Stoic Studies, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1986,Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics,Epicureans, Sceptics, Los Angeles: Scribner’s.
Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley (eds.), 1987,The HellenisticPhilosophers, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
Magrin, S., 2018, “Nature and Utopia in Epictetus’Theory ofOikeiōsis,”Phronesis, 63:293–350.
Pohlenz, M., 1948–9,Die Stoa: Geschichte einergeistigen Bewegung, Gōttingen: Vandenhōck &Ruprecht.
Salles, R. 2007, “Epictetus on Moral Responsibility forPrecipitate Action,” inAkrasia in Greek Philosophy: FromSocrates to Plotinus, C. Bobonich and P. Destrée (eds.),Leiden: Brill, 249–263.
–––, 2020, “Epictetus on What is in OurPower: Modal versus Epistemic Conceptions,” inFate,Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in theEarly Imperial Age, R. Brouwer and E. Vimercati (eds.), Leiden:Brill, 49–63.
Sandbach, F.H., 1989.The Stoics, Indianapolis: Hackett,2^nd edition.
Scaltsas, Theodore and Andrew S. Mason (eds.), 2007,ThePhilosophy of Epictetus, Oxford, New York: Oxford UniversityPress.
Schofield, Malcolm, 2004, “Epictetus: Socratic, Cynic,Stoic,”Philosophical Quarterly, 54:448–456.
Sellars, J., 2003,The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Natureand Function of Philosophy, Burlington VT: Ashgate.
Sorabji, R., 2000,Emotion and Peace of Mind: The StoicLegacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stephens, W.O., 1996, “Epictetus on How the Stoic SageLoves,”Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 14:193–210.
Tremblay, Michael, 2019, “Digestion and Moral Progress inEpictetus,”Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 13:100–119.
Tremblay, Michael, 2020, “Akrasia in Epictetus: A Comparisonwith Aristotle,”Apeiron, 53: 397–417.
Xenakis, J., 1969,Epictetus: Philosopher-Therapist, TheHague: E.J. Brill.

Reception and Influence

Boter, G., 1999,The Encheiridion of Epictetus and its ThreeChristian Adaptations, Leiden, Boston: Brill.
Brennan, T. and C. Brittain (trans.), 2002,Simplicius: OnEpictetus’ Handbook 1–26, Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress.
––– (trans.), 2002,Simplicius: OnEpictetus’ Handbook 27–53, Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress.
Brooke, C., 2006, “How the Stoics Became Atheists,”Historical Journal, 49: 387–402.
Jagu, A., 1989, “La morale d’Épictète etle christianisme,” in W. Haase and H. Temporini (eds.),Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt, Volume2.36.3, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2164–2100.
MacMillan, D.J. (ed.), 1979,The Stoic Strain in AmericanLiterature, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Spanneut, M., 1972, “Épictète Chez lesMoines,”Mélanges de Science Religieuse, 29:49–57.
Stadter, P. A., 1980,Arrian of Nicomedia, Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press.
Stanton, G.R., 1968, “The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetusand Marcus Aurelius,”Phronesis, 13: 183–95.
Strange, S. and J. Zupko (eds.), 2004,Stoicism: Traditionsand Transformations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wright, Gillian, 2007, “Women Reading Epictetus,”Women’s Writing, 14(2): 321–37.

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Epictetus, entry at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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