“Divine hiddenness”, as the phrase suggests, refers, mostfundamentally, to the hiddenness of God, i.e., the alleged fact thatGod is hidden, absent, or silent. In religious literature, there is along history of expressions of annoyance, anxiety, and despair overdivine hiddenness, so understood. For example, ancient Hebrew textslament God’s failure to show up in experience or to show properregard for God’s people or some particular person, and twoChristian Gospels portray Jesus, in his cry of dereliction on thecross, as experiencing abandonment by God, whom he regarded as“Abba, Father”, an experience shared by many mystics,saints, and ordinary folk of all theistic traditions, described at itsworst as “the dark night of the soul”. Understood in thisway, divine hiddenness poses an existential problem for those who havesuch experiences.

However, “divine hiddenness” refers to something else inrecent philosophical literature, especially since the publication ofJ.L. Schellenberg’s landmark book,Divine Hiddenness andHuman Reason (1993). In this context, it refers to alleged factsabout the absence of belief in God’s existence, on the basis of whichone might think there is no God. For example, Schellenberg arguesthat, since there are nonbelievers who are capable of a personalrelationship with God and who do not resist it, there is no perfectlyloving God, while Stephen Maitzen argues that naturalism betterexplains the “demographics” of nonbelief than theism andJason Marsh argues that naturalism better explains “naturalnonbelief” than theism. Understood in this way, divinehiddenness constitutes putative evidence for atheism.

Although some of the recent philosophical literature addresses theproblem understood in the first way (e.g., DeWeese-Boyd 2016; Garcia2002; Nagasawa 2015), this entry focuses on divine hiddennessunderstood in the second way. The first section discusses therelationships between nonbelief and another source of alleged evidencefor atheism: evil. The second section states and defends the argumentfrom nonresistant nonbelief. The third section sketches attempts toexplain nonresistant nonbelief from a theistic perspective. The fourthsection states other responses to the argument from nonresistantnonbelief. The fifth section discusses the argument from thedemographics of nonbelief and the sixth section discusses the argumentfrom natural nonbelief.

• 1. Relationships between nonbelief and evil
• 2. The argument from nonresistant nonbelief
• 3. Attempts to explain nonresistant nonbelief theistically
• 4. Other assessments of the argument from nonresistant nonbelief
• 5. The argument from the demographics of nonbelief
• 6. The argument from natural nonbelief
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Relationships between nonbelief and evil

Several relationships between nonbelief and evil appear when we viewthem as providing evidence for atheism.

(A) It is customary to distinguish “logical”(“deductive”) arguments from evil from“evidential” (“inductive”,“abductive”, “probabilistic”) arguments fromevil. There are different ways to draw that distinction. On one way(Howard-Snyder 1996c), a logical argument from evil affirms of someknown fact about evil that it is incompatible with theism (e.g.,Mackie 1955; Schellenberg 2007a), while an evidential argument fromevil does not—either because it affirms that the fact inquestion, although incompatible with theism, is not known but onlyreasonably believed to be the case (e.g., Rowe 1979), or because itaffirms that the fact in question, though known, is more unlikely ontheism than on some competing hypothesis (e.g., Draper 1989; Oppy2013). Likewise for nonbelief. A logical argument from nonbeliefaffirms of some known fact about nonbelief that it is incompatiblewith the existence of God (Drange 1998), while an evidential argumentfrom nonbelief does not—either because it affirms that the factin question, although incompatible with theism, is not known but onlyreasonably believed (Schellenberg 1993, 2015), or because it affirmsthat the fact in question, though known, is more unlikely on theismthan on some competing hypothesis (Maitzen 2006; Marsh 2013; Andersonand Russell forthcoming).

(B) It is a matter of dispute whether nonbelief provides evidence foratheism independently of evil. Those in favor of independence inviteus to imagine a world with no pain, suffering, or moralvice/wrongdoing. No one in such a world would appeal to evil asevidence for atheism, but someone might appeal to nonbelief asevidence for atheism (van Inwagen 2002, 2008; Schellenberg 2010a).Those in favor of dependence tend to define “evil” morebroadly. For example, they might say that evils are just bad states ofaffairs, whether pain, suffering, or moral vice/wrongdoing, on the onehand, or nonbelief, on the other hand (Kvanvig 2002; Evans 2010).Alternatively, they might argue in an Augustinian spirit that, sinceevil just is a lack of a good that should exist, and since belief inGod’s existence is a good that should exist, nonbelief is anevil. One can also affirm that nonbelief is evidence for atheism inthe absence of evil while still thinking that the evidential value ofnonbelief in this world must account for its interaction with theexistence of suffering (Anderson and Russell forthcoming). Indeed, onemight argue that the interaction is this: if God has a reason to allowevil, then God has a reason to allow something to act as a defeaterfor belief in God’s existence (Dumsday 2016).

(C) Even if nonbelief provides evidence for atheism independently ofevil, critical responses to arguments from nonbelief and evil shareimportant similarities. For example, just as some critics try toexplain why God permits evil, so some critics try to explain why Godpermits nonbelief. Moreover, just as some critics argue that we are inno position to say that there are no unknown reasons for God to permitevil, so some critics argue that we are in no position to say thatthere are no unknown reasons for God to permit nonbelief. Furthermore,just as some critics deny the relevant facts about evil, so somecritics deny the relevant facts about nonbelief. In addition, just assome people say evil provides evidence against theism only if weconceive of God in certain ways, and so we should conceive of Goddifferently, so some people say that nonbelief provides evidenceagainst theism only if we conceive of God in certain ways, and so weshould conceive of God differently. Finally, just as some people grantthat evil gives atheism some weight and yet insist that other thingsgive theism much more weight, so some people grant that nonbeliefgives atheism some weight and yet insist that other things give theismmuch more weight.

(D) We can see another connection between arguments from evil andnonbelief by way of one of William Rowe’s evidential argumentsfrom evil. Obviously enough, there is horrific suffering in the world;but, says Rowe, God exists only if there is a reason for God to permitsuch suffering. However, since there is no reason that we know of,it’s reasonable to infer that there is no reason, period (Rowe1979). Thus, it’s reasonable to infer that God does not exist.Some critics question the reasonableness of Rowe’s inferencefrom “there is no reason we know of” to “there is noreason, period”, on the grounds that it assumes that we are in agood position to tell whether there is a reason, an assumption theyregard as dubious since it would not be the least bit surprising ifthere were a reason that was accessible to God but not to us. Thesecritics are too quick, however. For we must distinguish two ways inwhich we might be in a good position to tell whether something exists.The first way is direct: we are in a position to see or mentallyapprehend it for ourselves. The second way is indirect: although weare not in a good position to see or mentally apprehend it forourselves, we are in a good position to see or apprehend somethingelse and, seeing or apprehending that other thing, we are in a goodposition to infer reasonably that the first thing exists. The criticsare too quick because they ignore the second, indirect way in which wemight be in a good position to tell whether something exists. This iswhere nonbelief might come into play. For one might argue that ifGod’s reasons for permitting a person to undergo horrificsuffering were inaccessible to them, then God would make it clear tothem that there is such a reason through clear assurances ofGod’s love and care, clear enough so that they are in a goodposition to believe that God has a reason to permit their suffering.But many people who suffer do not believe that God has a reason topermit their suffering, not least because they do not believe that Godexists. So it is that nonbelief arguably vindicates Rowe’sassumption and inference (Bergmann 2001; Howard-Snyder 1992, 1996b;Rowe 2001; Trakakis 2007b).

(E) An additional connection between evil and nonbelief consists intrying to use various theistically friendly explanations of the factsabout evil to address concerns regarding the facts about nonbeliefand, conversely, trying to use various theistically friendlyexplanations of the facts about nonbelief to address concernsregarding the facts about evil. For example, one might argue that justas deep responsibility for each other’s wellbeing explainsGod’s permission of some sin and suffering, so it explainsGod’s permission of some nonbelief (Swinburne 1998). Or,alternatively, if there is a good reason for God to permit nonbelief,then God also has good reason not to intervene systematically toprevent or undo the consequences of wrongdoing (for if God did sointervene, God’s existence would be clear enough to preventnonbelief), and so God has some reason to permit some of the sufferingthat is a natural consequence of wrongdoing (Dumsday 2015c).

(F) Just as we must distinguish evil providing an argumentative basisfor atheism from evil providing a non-argumentative basis for atheism,so we must distinguish nonbelief providing an argumentative basis foratheism from nonbelief providing a non-argumentative basis foratheism. In the case of evil, this might work by“seeing right there in the evil that the world wasGodless or that the evil was so repugnant as to be irredeemable”(Gellman 2013: 11). Likewise, in the case of nonbelief, this mightwork by seeing right there in the nonresistant nonbeliever that theworld was Godless or that the nonresistant nonbelief was so repugnantas to be divinely impermissible.

2. The argument from nonresistant nonbelief

More than anyone else, Schellenberg has shaped the contemporary debate over arguments from nonbelief. The main argument from his 1993 book can be stated as follows:

• (1) There arepeople who are capable of relating personally to God but who, throughno fault of their own, fail to believe.
• (2) If thereis a personal God who is unsurpassably great, then there are no suchpeople.
• (3) So, thereis no such God (from 1 and 2).

For the defense of premise (2), Schellenberg’s reasoningprovides the following subargument:

• (2a) If thereis a personal God who is unsurpassably great, then there is a personalGod who is unsurpassably loving.
• (2b) If thereis a personal God who is unsurpassably loving, then for any humanpersonH and any timet, ifH is att capable of relating personally to God,H has itwithinH’s power att to do so (i.e., will doso, just by choosing), unlessH is culpably in a contraryposition att.
• (2c) For anyhuman personH and any timet,H has itwithinH’s power att to relate personally toGod only ifH att believes that God exists.
• (2d) So, ifthere is a personal God who is unsurpassably great, then for any humanpersonH and any timet, ifH is att capable of relating personally to God,H att believes that God exists, unlessH is culpably ina contrary position att (from 2a through 2c).

(2d) is tantamount to premise(2) of the main argument.

In his post-1993 writings, Schellenberg clarifies that he means hisclaims about God, love, and relationship to be necessary truths.Moreover, the main argument of his 2007a replaces talk of“culpability” with talk of “resistance”.(“I now see this focus on culpability and inculpability as amistake”; 2015a: 54.) And he emphasizes “meaningfulconscious relationship”. Finally, his 2015a and 2015b focus onthe “openness” of “a perfectly loving God” to“positively meaningful” and “reciprocal consciousrelationship”. Thus, the latest version of the argument(slightly condensed):

• (4)Necessarily, if God exists, then God perfectly loves such finitepersons as there may be.
• (5)Necessarily, if God perfectly loves such finite persons as there maybe, then, for any capable finite personS and timet, God is att open to being in a positivelymeaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship withS att.
• (6)Necessarily, if for any capable finite personS and time t,God is att open to being in a positively meaningful andreciprocal conscious relationship withS att, then,for any capable finite personS and timet, it isnot the case thatS is att nonresistantly in astate of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that Godexists.
• (7) There isat least one capable finite personS and timet suchthatS is or was att nonresistantly in a state ofnonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists.
• (8) So, it isnot the case that God exists. (from 4 through 7)

We turn now to Schellenberg’s defense of his premises.

Schellenberg argues for premise(4) on the basis of what he callsultimism, the proposition thatthere is a reality that is ultimate in three ways. Ametaphysically ultimate reality, he says,

is something whose existence is the ultimate or most fundamental factabout the nature of things, in terms of which any other fact aboutwhat things exist and how they exist would have to be explained in acomprehensive and correct account.

Anaxiologically ultimate reality “embod[ies] thedeepest possible value”, and “would have to be thegreatest possible reality”. Asoteriologically ultimatereality is a reality in relation to which “the deepest orultimate human good can be attained” (2015a: 19–21). Theidea of apersonal reality that is triply ultimate—thatis, the idea of God in western philosophy, says Schellenberg—isthe idea of thegreatest possible person; and, all else beingequal, a person perfect in love would be an “improvement”over a person that was not perfect in love (2015a: 89–103;Schellenberg 2005d).

As for premise(5), suppose God perfectly loves Anna. That love would minimally involvebenevolence, caring for Anna’s well-being. But it would alsoinvolve aiming “at relationship—a conscious and reciprocalrelationship that is positively meaningful, allowing for a deepsharing” between them. Moreover, it would involve valuing thatrelationship for its own sake, and not merely for the sake ofsomething else. Furthermore, it would never cease, and so God wouldalways value, seek, desire, promote, or preserve personal relationshipwith Anna, although God would not force himself on her. At the veryleast, says Schellenberg, all this requires that God will always beopen to personal relationship with her (2015b:17–22).

This notion of openness with those who arecapable ofit—that is, with those who possess the cognitive and affectiveproperties required to participate in a personal relationship, which,in the case of God, would involve such things as a capacity to feelthe presence of God, recognizing it as such; a capacity to exhibitattitudes of trust, gratitude, and obedience to God, and so on (2015b:21n15)—is crucial. Schellenberg writes:

If one is always open in the sense I intend then, even if one does notactively seek or promote personal relationship with another personcapable of participating in such relationship…, one makes surethat there is nothing one ever does (in a broad sense includingomissions) that would have the result of making such relationshipunavailable to the other, preventing her from being able torelate personally to one, even should she then try. So for God toalways be open to personal relationship with a relevantly capablecreated person such as Anna in a manner expressing unsurpassable loveis for God to ensure that there is never somethingGod doesthat prevents her from being able, just by trying, to participate inpersonal relationship with God…. Anna may not want relationshipor even to be reminded of her religious options, and so may throughresistance of God, which would have to involve self-deception, herselfproduce a situation in which she is unable to relate personally toGod, just like that, without first undoing the behaviour that led toit. But unless Anna is resistant in this way at a time, she will findit possible to participate in personal relationship with God, and todo so then. Never will she find the door to such relationship closed.This, at the very minimum, is required if God unsurpassably loves Annain a manner aimed at personal relationship with her. (2015b: 21,substituting “Anna” for “P”)

Expanding on what he means by “resistance of God”,Schellenberg tells us that if we think

first about love and then about openness and then about what it wouldtake for God to allow someone not to be in a position to participatein a personal relationship with the divine, we will see that a sort offree resistance sufficient to make it the case that we ourselves haveshut the door to any relationship with God that might be on offerwould be required. To trade in one metaphor for another, if God isopen to personal relationship then the divine light will remain onunless we close our eyes…. We might imagine a resister wantingto do her own thing without considering God’s view of thematter, or wanting to do something she regards as in fact contrary tothe values cultivated in a relationship with God. But it would alsoinvolveactions or omissions (at least mental ones) insupport of such desire…. Here we might imagine carelessinvestigation of one sort or another in relation to the existence ofGod, or someone deliberately consorting with people who carelesslyfail to believe in God and avoiding those who believe, or just overtime mentally drifting, with her own acquiescence, away from any placewhere she could convincingly be met by evidence of God. (2015:55–56)

Of course, there are many other ways in which one might “shutthe door” or “close one’s eyes” and, as aresult, lack belief in God’s existence.

As for(6), by Schellenberg’s lights, Anna could not even begin to be in apositively meaningful, personal relationship with God unless shebelieved that God exists. Why? Because

a personal relationship is a conscious, reciprocal relationship, and aconscious relationship is a relationship one recognizes oneself to bein. Given these facts, one clearly cannot even get started in apersonal relationship withoutbelieving that the other partyexists. Now belief, as most contemporary philosophers wouldagree, is involuntary in the sense that one cannot choose to believesomething at a time just by trying to. So by God’s not revealingGod’s existence, God is doing something that makes it impossiblefor Anna to participate in personal relationship with God at therelevant time just by trying, and this, according to our definition ofopenness, is precisely what is involved in God’s not being opento having such a relationship with Anna then. (2015b: 23, substituting“God” and “Anna” for “B”and “A”)

The upshot is that, if God is open to being in a positivelymeaningful, reciprocal, and conscious relationship with Anna, then, atany time that she is capable of such a relationship, Anna will believethat God exists—unless she has done something that results inher being resistant to such a relationship at that time.

Although Schellenberg emphasizes the point that perfect love seeksrelationships for their own sake, and not merely for the sake ofsomething else, there are additional benefits one should bear in mindthat may be jeopardized by divine hiddenness. For consider thebenefits to Anna if she were in a positively meaningful, explicit,reciprocal conscious relationship with God, even if just one that wasdevelopmentally in its infancy. First, there would be moral benefits,e.g., she would be able to draw on the resources of that relationshipto overcome flaws in her character, and so she would be more likely toemulate the self-giving love with which she was loved, and thus morelikely to flourish as a finite person. Second, there would beexperiential benefits. She would be, e.g., more likely to experiencepeace and joy stemming from her belief that she is properly related toher Maker, and security in believing that, ultimately, all shall bewell even if she suffers in the meantime; and she would have theprofound pleasure of God’s loving presence. As a consequence ofthese moral and experiential benefits, Anna’s relationships withothers would likely improve (Schellenberg 1993: 19ff).

As for the empirical premise—(7), and the earlier(1)—Schellenberg generalizes from (a) honest seekers of the truth who remain agnosticsand atheists, including those whose search leads them to convert tonontheistic religions, (b) members of cultures that lack the idea of apersonal God altogether, e.g., the Chinese in the period from thebeginning of their history until the Christian Middle Ages, (c)hunter-gatherers prior to recorded history, and (d) those who havelost their theistic faith, and who would like nothing more than toregain it. Furthermore, Schellenberg appeals to increased secularity,especially in Western cultures: what is the probability thatall of the hundreds of millions of nonbelievers in thesecular West are, at the dawn of their capacity to relate personallywith God, resistant? Vanishingly small (2015: 76ff; 2007a: 205,228ff).

3. Attempts to explain nonresistant nonbelief theistically

It follows from Schellenberg’s premises(4)–(6) that, necessarily, if God exists, then, for any capable finite personS and timet, it is not the case thatS isatt nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation tothe proposition that God exists. In short, God’s existenceentails there’s never any nonresistant nonbelief. To assess thisimplication we must assess the premises from which it follows. In thissection, we focus on premise(5) and a particular kind of assessment, something analogous to theodicyin the literature on the problem of evil. To help us keep our focus,suppose we grant premises(4) and(6). Moreover, since we want to assess premise(5) from as sympathetic a position as we can, suppose we grantSchellenberg’s claim that one isopen to a positivelymeaningful, reciprocal, and conscious relationship with another, in amanner consistent with perfect love, only if one never does anything(by commission or omission) that would result in the other beingprevented from participating in that relationship, just by trying.Given these suppositions, we might wonder whether it is possible thatGod perfectly loves such finite persons as there may be and yet, forat least some of them, God does something (by commission or omission)that results in them lacking belief in God’sexistence—even though they have the capacity for a positivelymeaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship with God and they arenot in a state of resistance to God. In particular, we might wonderwhether there are anyreasons for a perfectly loving God todo something (by commission or omission) that would result innonresistant nonbelief in persons who are capable of relatingpersonally with God in this way.

There are many cases of this type to wonder about. Here are two.First, imagine someone who has always lacked belief and who has alwayslacked the capacity to relate personally with God but who is,nonetheless, nonresistant to God. Such a person might be a child whois at the dawn of her capacity to relate personally with God. Mightthere be good enough reason, consistent with perfect love, for God todo something (by commission or omission) that results in her beingprevented from belief, even as she transitions to being capable ofrelating personally with God while remaining nonresistant? Second,imagine a man who has had the capacity to relate personally with Godfor some time, and who was once a fulfilled nonresistant believer butwho, for one reason or another, is now in a state of resistantnonbelief. Many a university student might satisfy this description,among others. Might there be good enough reason, consistent withperfect love, for God to do something (by commission or omission) thatresults in that man being prevented from belief in God’sexistence even as, later in life, he transitions back to beingnonresistant?

Affirmative answers to these questions involve reasons for thinking itwould be better if they remained nonbelievers, at least for a time,despite their transitions. For example, what if the child never everexercised any influence over whether she was nonresistant to God?Perhaps, in that case, it would be better—for her, and for God,and for their forthcoming relationship—if she were first to ownher good disposition toward God through choices in the face ofcontrary inclinations, so that, among other things, her loving andobeying God was of her own accord when she came to believe. Or perhapsher non-resistance to God is grounded in improper motives, e.g., fearof punishment, a desire for parental approval or social acceptance,and the like, and so God gives her the opportunity to change hermotives so that, upon coming to believe, her love and obedience aremore properly motivated (Howard-Snyder 1996a, 2015; cf. Schellenberg2017a). Or perhaps her moral autonomy, freedom, or moral developmentwould be objectionably thwarted or reduced if God were to bring her tobelief at this time (Hick 1966; Murray 2002; Paytas 2017, 2019;Swinburne 1979). Or perhaps, despite her non-resistance, if she cameto belief now instead of later, the passion and intensity of herdesire for God would be significantly less than it otherwise would be.Or perhaps she is disposed, upon coming to believe now, to think shehas arrived at a proper understanding of God, and she would becomecomplacent or relate to God at a superficial level. (Kierkegaard 1844:28–29, 33–35; cf. Schellenberg 1993: 160ff). Or perhapscertain intellectual temptations would be lost on her if she were tobelieve now, and so she would not have the opportunity to respond tothem virtuously (Butler 1736: part 2, chapter 6; cf. Schellenberg1993: 168ff). Or perhaps upon coming to believe now, she would beresentful or envious of God’s glory and greatness (Dumsday2012a). Or what if the university student, despite his forthcomingreturn to non-resistance, was disposed to relate to God inpresumptuous or arrogant ways upon regaining belief, and not with duecontrition and humility, both of which are essential to a properrelationship with God? Or what if he was disposed to be significantlyless apt to recognize the wretchedness of living life on his own,without God, if he were to regain belief now instead of later? (Pascal1670, Fragments 234, 378, 427, 446, 449; cf. Schellenberg 1993:136ff). Or what if God does not bring him to belief because he isill-disposed to the sort of moral transformation God intends for him,or he’s into having a relationship with God just for thepleasure and titillation of it? (Dumsday 2014b; Moser 2002, 2008b) Orwhat if God does not bring him to belief because, as a general policy,God permits some people in positions like his to continue in nonbeliefin order to increase diverse expressions of religious imagination,creativity, and devotion, or in order to increase opportunities forpeople to pursue knowledge of important matters together, evenknowledge as important as knowledge of God, or in order to promoteassisting each other in starting personal relationships with God(Dumsday 2010b; Schellenberg 1993: 181ff; Swinburne 1998); or because,under present circumstances, bringing all non-resistant believers tobelief would force the truth of theism on the resistant (Dumsday2016a)? And there are other explanations offered as well.

Several points have emerged in the literature with respect toassessing these reasons or explanations.

First, it’s doubtful that any single one of them offers a totalexplanation of nonresistant nonbelief. Different kinds of nonresistantnonbelievers, given the rest of their psychology, might call fordifferent explanations. Moreover, each of these explanations, takenalone, might fail to provide a total explanation of any particularkind or instance of nonresistant nonbelief, and yet each of them mightprovide a partial explanation and, taken together with others, add upto a total explanation. At least this is a possibility that must notbe overlooked. Thus, if we are to reject these explanations, andothers that might be proffered, we must claim that they fail,collectively as well as individually, to account for why God mightpermit nonresistant nonbelief.

Second, in light of the foregoing point, even if there are somenonresistant nonbelievers, it may well be quite difficult to discernwhether they possess or fail to possess those motivations, attitudes,and dispositions that allegedly explain their nonbelief in atheistically friendly fashion. If the difficulty is severe enough,then it might be that no one—whether theists, atheists,agnostics, or what-have-you—is well-positioned to say that thereare some nonresistant nonbelievers.

Of course—and this is the third point—we might well arguethat these explanations provide no good reason, individually orcollectively, for God to permit nonresistant nonbelief. That’sbecause the good states of affairs to which they appeal can beaccommodated within a developing, positively meaningful, reciprocal,and conscious relationship with God, or because the benefits of such arelationship with God exceed the goods to which these explanationsappeal, or because, more generally, this sort of relationship with Godis the greatest good and so God wouldn’t pursue lesser goods atits expense (Bozzo 2019; Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002a; Schellenberg1993, 1996, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2015a, 2017a; McBrayer and Swenson2012; Teeninga 2017, 2019, 2020; Trakakis 2007a).

Fourth, one might worry that the whole enterprise of providing atheistically friendly explanation of nonresistant nonbelief ismisguided. After all, if God exists, why didn’t God create aworld in which there never was or ever will be any nonresistantnonbelief? Why would God create or permit resisters and nonbelieversin the first place? Surely he could have created persons who neverresisted and always believed.

4. Other assessments of the argument from nonresistant nonbelief

Even if no theistically friendly explanation of nonresistant nonbeliefwe know of completely satisfies us, we might yet wonder aboutSchellenberg’s premise(4): necessarily, if God exists, then God perfectly loves such finitepersons as there may be.

On the one hand, we might wonder whether, if God exists, God perfectlylovesanyone. In this connection, some critics have pointedout that many “classical theists” affirm a conception ofGod according to which God is transcendent, ineffable, and/orextracategorical, and so beyond all human comprehension, and soneither personal nor non-personal, and so neither loving nornon-loving (Rea 2015; Ross 2002; Trakakis 2015; Wojtysiak 2021). It iscertainly less than clear whether a conscious, reciprocal personalrelationship with the God of apophaticism is possible and, even if itis possible, whether it would count as “meaningful” in Schellenberg’ssense (Howard-Snyder 2017a, 2017b; Rea 2016, 2018). Moreover, even ifthere is a personal God, God might be indifferent to finite createdpersons, and so not love them—an implication of some versions ofDeism.

On the other hand, we might wonder whether, even if God is perfect inlove, God would perfectly love such finite persons as there may be.For, in light of an idea suggested as worthy of consideration by HudHudson in private correspondence,

to love perfectly is for one’s love to be in the rightproportion to the object of one’s love, everythingconsidered—loving to the degree that matches the degree ofworthiness to be loved.

Therefore, even if God is perfectly loving, it does not follow thatGod loves such finite persons as there may be since they may havepolluted themselves, rendered themselves utterly unlovable; “andit is, of course, no symptom of a disordered love to fail to love theunlovable”.

One might also wonder about premise(5): necessarily, if God perfectly loves such finite persons as there maybe, then, for any capable finite personS and timet, God is att open to being in a positivelymeaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship withS att. Whether this is true might depend on what sort of love isperfect, whether it is more like that of a mother for her child, or agrandparent for her distant descendants, or a benevolentreconstructive surgeon for her patient (Cuneo 2013; McGinnis 2015; Rea2015; Schellenberg 2013). One might argue that premise(5) is true only if perfect love is like the first, but wonder whatfollows if it is like the second or third. In this connection, imaginethat what it is for God to perfectly love us is for God to provide forour greatest good, and suppose that our greatest good consists in ourbeing virtuous, caring for our environment and other creatures. Inthat case, it is not at all clear that openness to a personalrelationship of the sort Schellenberg imagines is necessary. So longas God has made our flourishing achievable, that is all thatGod’s perfect love should lead us to expect. In a similar vein,one might argue that “God loves every human but loves some morethan others,” and so “God would not seek the same for eachperson as lovers do not act impartially between those most loved andothers whom they love,” and so a “variable divinelove” does not require “that God would always be open to apersonal relationship with every person” (Jordan 2021; seeSchellenberg 2021b for criticism).

Furthermore, one might call into question why God’s love shouldbe our only guide as to whether God would be open to a positivelymeaningful, reciprocal, conscious relationship. God’stranscendence (Rea 2016, 2018) and/or personality (Rea 2012, 2018; forcritique, see Parker 2012, Schellenberg 2017a) might jointlydetermine, along with God’s perfect love, the extent to whichGod is thus open.

Suppose we grant Schellenberg’s understanding of openness torelationship as well as his premise(6), and suppose we concede that no theistically friendly explanation ofnonresistant nonbelief we know of is wholly satisfactory, eitherindividually or collectively. Even so, we might wonder whether weshould infer that a perfectly loving God would not permit nonresistantnonbelief. After all, an open-minded and intellectually humbleinquirer will want to satisfy her natural curiosity about whether sheis in a position to tell whether there are any reasons for God topermit nonresistant nonbelief that, although inaccessible to her,would be accessible to God. For suppose that she were to discoverthat, even if there is no good basis for thinking there is a God, andeven if she does not know of any wholly satisfactory reason for God topermit nonresistant nonbelief, she should be in doubt about whethershe is in a position to tell whether there are any unknown reasons. Inthat case, we would expect her open-mindedness and intellectualhumility to lead her to refrain from accepting that a perfectly lovingGod would not permit nonresistant nonbelief and, in refraining fromaccepting this, she would refrain from accepting premise(5).

This assessment of the argument from nonbelief has its parallel in theproblem of evil literature where it is (badly) named “skepticaltheism”. It has been explicitly used in relation to the argumentfrom nonbelief in Howard-Snyder 2015 and McBrayer and Swenson 2012.For criticism, see Schellenberg 2007a, 2015b. Whether this assessmentleads to objectionable skepticism elsewhere is a matter of ongoingdebate. For discussion as it relates to the argument from evil, seeDougherty 2014; Dougherty and McBrayer 2014; Howard-Snyder 2009;McBrayer 2010; McBrayer and Howard-Snyder 2013; and Trakakis2007b.

Even if we accept premises(4) and(5), we might yet wonder about Schellenberg’s premise(6), the claim that God’s openness to a personal relationship withcapable nonresistant persons entails that such persons will believethat God exists. Schellenberg argues that a person cannot even“get started” in a personalrelationship—specifically, a conscious, reciprocal, positivelymeaningful relationship with another person—without believingthat the other person exists. “After all,” he says,“a personal relationship is a conscious, reciprocalrelationship, and a conscious relationship is a relationship onerecognizes oneself to be in,” and so “one clearly cannoteven get started in a personal relationship without believing that theother party exists” (Schellenberg 2021a, 64).

One might wonder, however, whether one could bring to one’sconscious awareness a relationship that one is inwithoutbelieving the proposition thatthe other personexists, for two reasons. First, perhaps one could bring toone’s conscious awareness a relationship that one is in whilebeing in a kind of psychological state toward the proposition that theother person exists other than propositional belief, e.g., credence,confidence, acceptance, propositional trust, propositional hope, orbeliefless assuming, as well as non-doxastic faith. Second, perhapsone could bring to one’s conscious awareness a relationship thatone is in while believing a proposition that is “thinner”than the “thick” proposition thatthe other personexists, e.g., the proposition thatthe other person probablyexists, or the proposition thatit’s more likely thannot that the other person exists, or the proposition thatitslikely enough that the other person exists to act on it. Andthere are other options for believing “thinner”propositions as well. (For more on these optional psychologicalstates, see Alston 1996; Audi 2011; Buchak 2018; Cohen 1992;Howard-Snyder 2013, 2016; Howard-Snyder and McKaughan 2022; McKaughan2013; McKaughan and Howard-Snyder forthcoming; Poston and Dougherty2007; Schellenberg 2011, 2014; Weidner 2018.) Thus, perhaps one might“get started” in a personal relationship with God—aconscious, reciprocal, positively meaningful personal loverelationship with God—without believing that God exists,provided that, e.g., one has non-doxastic faith that God exists and/orone believes that it’s likely enough that God exists to act onit. Indeed, one may well wonder whether propositional belief that Godexists would be all that important to God since so many people lacksuch belief (van Inwagen 2002; Megill and Linford 2017).

Further pressure has been put on premise (6). Some have recently urgedthat non-propositional knowledge of persons is strongly differentiablefrom propositional knowledge about those persons, perhaps not evenrequiring the belief that they exist (Benton 2018; Stump 2018, 2021).If that’s possible, then, perhaps, persons capable of aconscious, reciprocal, positively meaningful personal relationshipwith God can have such a relationship without believing that Godexists. (For critique, see Sweet 2022.)

Some have also recently urged against premise (6) the followingargument. It is possible for God to be in a conscious, reciprocal,positively meaningful personal relationship with created persons in asui generis fashion, specifically, in an “imagingrelationship” (Yadav 2020). An imaging relationship is one inwhich God creates persons in God’s image—i.e., persons“who, like God, are constituted as minds and wills, and like Godare capable of employing mind and will to serve the best interests ofcreation” (76)—and then invites them, through the beautyand goodness of creation, to image God well instead of badly, which,among other things, involves them doing well as cultivators andnurturers of, carers-for, and delighters in creation, and themenjoying “a kind of communion with God, a kind of intimatesharing in the divine mind and will, so that [they] may come to findGod uniquely formed within [their] own individual personhood”(77). And, closer inspection reveals that it is possible for createdpersons to be in a (de re) conscious, reciprocal, positivelymeaningful personal love relationship of this sort with God, and yetnot be (de dicto) conscious that God exists, i.e., and yet bea nonbeliever or even a disbeliever (78–81). And so it ispossible for created persons to be in a conscious, reciprocal,positively meaningful personal relationship with God and yet notbelieve that God exists.

Just for the sake of argument, suppose that psychological states otherthan the propositional belief that God exists can suffice as whatevercognitive requirement for “getting started” in a personal relationshipwith God involves. We might yet wonder whether those other states areas good as belief that God exists as a cognitive foundation for apersonal relationship with God; and, if they are not, we might wellquestion why a perfectly loving God provides less than the best onthis score. Furthermore, even if a perfectly loving God might permitless than the best on this score, perhaps we have just as good areason to think that there are nonresistant people who are in none ofthe optional psychological states who are capable of relatingpersonally with God as we do to think that there are nonresistantnonbelievers who are capable of relating personally with God—inwhich case we can modify the latest version of his argument to absorbthe force of the point (Schellenberg 2007b, 2015b, 2021a).

Last but not least, we might wonder about premise(7): are there really any nonresistant nonbelievers with a capacity torelate personally with God? Some suggest that, if there are, therearen’t many; after all, everyone has good Pascalian reason tobelieve that God exists (Jackson 2016). Others say that everyone atleast implicitly believes in God, although not under the name“God” or under a description they might recognize asbelonging to God (Wainwright 2002). Further, many religions hold thatsome kind of basic knowledge of God is universal but can besuppressed, sometimes called the “natural knowledge ofGod” (Green 2013). Paul’s letter to the Romans claims that“since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualitieshave been clearly seen”. Calvin famously posits that there is asensus divinitatis that provides us with at least a basicsense of the divine. According to Jonathan Edwards, there is“sufficient light for the knowledge of God”, hence,nonbelievers must fail to believe “divine things” owing to“a dreadful stupidity of mind, occasioning a sottishinsensibility of their truth and importance” (quoted inWainwright 2002). This insensibility consists in a “proneness toidolatry” and a “disregard of eternalthings”—dispositions to ignore familiar and obviousconsiderations, to be swayed by ridicule and deference to people inauthority, to be prejudiced against religion, and so on, which impairthe God-given ability to reason properly about God. People bring suchimpairments on themselves (Azadegan 2013a; Henry 2001, 2008; Lehe2004; Moroney 2000). Of course, one might argue that non-resistantnon-believers do not bring such impairments on themselves; rather,they suffer from a “significant disability,” i.e.,“spiritual autism,” that prevents them from experiencingGod personally, and so prevents them from belief in God’sexistence (McFall 2016). Whether such a metaphor is apt or helpful,though, depends in part on important questions in the philosophy ofdisability, and one ought to be very careful not to misrepresent orinstrumentalize autistic persons.

However, if we deny the existence of nonresistant nonbelievers, wemust square our denial with the evidence marshalled on behalf of theirexistence (Schellenberg 2005c). Furthermore, some forms of resistantnon-belief should be deeply concerning for the theist, such aspsychological resistance provoked by religious trauma andinterpersonal hurts generally (Green 2015; Rea 2018; Panchuk 2018).Whether because of suffering or hiddenness, the mere fact thatnonbelief is resistant is not necessarily a boon to the theist.

5. The argument from the demographics of nonbelief

According to Maitzen (2006),

Contemporary demographic data illustrate the lopsided distribution oftheistic belief. The populace of Saudi Arabia is at least 95 percentMuslim and therefore at least 95 percent theistic, while the populaceof Thailand is 95 percent Buddhist and therefore at most 5 percenttheistic…. If those data are even roughly accurate, thedistribution of theistic belief is at least highly uneven betweenthose two countries, and they are hardly unique in this respect.(179–180)

Other countries and geographic regions display an uneven distributionof belief and nonbelief, even though it is not as stark as it is inThailand and Saudi Arabia (Pew 2012). According to Maitzen, even if wegrant, just for the sake of argument, the success of some of thetheistically friendly explanations of nonbelief in individuals, noneof them explain the “geographic patchiness” of nonbelief.That’s because those explanations invoke motivations, attitudes,and dispositions that “do not cluster by country or culture soas to show up twenty times more often in Thailand than in SaudiArabia” (Maitzen 2006: 184). After all, it’s not as thoughthe Thai are twenty times more likely than the Saudis to be resistantto belief in God’s existence, or in need of prompting torecognize the wretchedness of life without God, or in need of the sortof risk that’s required of a passionate faith in God; it’snot as though the Thai are twenty times more likely than the Saudis,upon coming to believe in God’s existence, to be coerced intolove, trust, and obedience, or disposed to act out of improper motiveslike fear of punishment, or be presumptuous in their relationship withGod, and so on (2006: 180–185). Indeed, even if we grant, justfor the sake of argument again, that there is great value in adiversity of belief and nonbelief in God’s existence,

why doesn’t this valuable diversity flourish within the culturesof Saudi Arabia and Thailand? Naturalistic explanations, includingcultural and political explanations offered by social science, have aneasier time of it,

compared to theistic explanations since, on naturalism,

the patchiness of theistic belief has everything to do with thenotoriously haphazard play of human culture and politics and nothingto do with God: the messy, uneven data have messy, uneven causes.(2006: 183)

Moreover, it seems implausible that God would be selective in the wayGod related to different people groups, as though God tookconsiderably more pains to make sure that those in the Middle East,rather than Thailand or China or India, came to belief. One wouldantecedently expect that God would have the motivation and wherewithalto treat all people equally on this score, which is hard to squarewith God’s love and justice. So it is that the demographics ofnonbelief are better explained naturalistically than theistically, andso those demographics constitute evidence for atheism (cf. Zagzebski1994).

By way of reply, Marsh (2008) draws on Molinism in order to displayhow the demographics of nonbelief might be more likely on theism thanMaitzen suggests. According to Molinism, God knows what free creatureswould freely do in counterfactual situations, and God uses thisinformation in the way God governs the universe. So, suppose that Godknew that (i) there is a group of personsP

that are such that, no matter what creative act God had performed, ifPs had existed,Ps would have freely rejected God intheir earthly lives

had they believed, and “those genuinely deprived of theopportunity to believe in God in this world” belong to thatgroup (2008: 467). Furthermore, since God knows that

these individuals wouldn’t come to love Him short of somethinglike a beatific vision, God sequesters them in order to secure theireventual conversion,

in an afterlife. God’s decision to sequester them “largelycashes out in terms of the geographic circumstances in which they areplaced”, and keeps them “innocent for a later time, whenthey will be in a position truly to love God” upon coming tobelief (2008: 468). Finally, suppose that, given the counterfactualprofiles of each individual essence, there is no better distributionof belief and nonbelief than the actual one. In this theisticallyfriendly hypothesis, the demographics of nonbelief are at least asexpectable on theism as naturalism. Likewise for a Calvinistexplanation:

Determinism is true and souls may be divided into two kinds, the Electand the Non-Elect. The Elects’ souls are born into societalsituations in which they are determined to come to theantemortem beliefs necessary for salvation; the non-Elects’ areborn into societal situations in which they’re not, indeedthey’re determined to fail to come to these beliefs. (Mawson2012: 191–192)

Many theists will find Molinist and Calvinist explanations unappealingsince they depend on middle knowledge and double predestinationrespectively. But another difficulty is that the strategy appears, atleast at first glance, more than a little bit offensive. One of thegreat triumphs of modern ethics is the widespread acknowledgement ofthe moral reprehensibility of considering some people groups inferiorto others. Postulating that non-theistic populations are comprised ofpeople who wouldn’t respond appropriately to God no matter what,in this life, seems to flout this insight; and postulating thatnon-theistic populations are comprised of people who are elect toeternal damnation might be seen in the same light. (For furtherdiscussion, see Maitzen 2008; Mawson 2009, 2012.)

Mawson 2012 argues that, on theism, the demographics of nonbelief areexpectable, given either of two auxiliary hypotheses. First, supposeGod wants everyone to believe, but God wants much more everyone tobelieve without God’s having to interfere with the freedom ofpeople. Of course, one of the things that people can use their freedomto do is either to spread theistic belief or to restrict the spread oftheistic belief. Given that people’s receptivity to theisticbelief is dependent on the culture in which they are brought up and soforth, we’d expect to find that belief and nonbelief aredistributed unevenly. Second, what if God wants more than anythingeveryone to believe, say, because it is necessary for salvation? Inthat case, we must ask what “deadline” God has set forsatisfying that desire. Mawson writes:

There are two plausible suggestions for “deadlines” forGod: either that he has set for each individual his or her owndeadline and set it as the moment of his or her death, or that he hasset us collectively one and the same deadline, the Eschaton/LastJudgment. (2012: 194)

If God’s “deadline” is the Last Judgment, then, onceagain, it’s not the least bit surprising that, sincepeople’s receptivity to theistic belief is dependent on theculture in which they are brought up and so forth, belief andnonbelief are distributed unevenly. Oddly enough, Mawson does notmention a third deadline, the one that Schellenberg has been on aboutfor nearly three decades: the dawn of an individual’s capacityto relate personally with God. If that were God’s“deadline”, would we still expect the uneven distributionof belief and nonbelief we find across the globe?

Baker-Hytch (2016) argues that the uneven distribution of belief andnonbelief is about as likely on theism as on naturalism since (i) theprobability of that distribution on what we know about “mutualepistemic dependence” is high, (ii) the probability of what weknow about mutual epistemic dependence on “inclusivetheism”—the view that the eternal destiny of human beingsisnot determined by what they believe at their naturaldeaths—is about the same as it is on naturalism, and (iii) theprobability of inclusive theism on theism is much higher than isnon-inclusive theism. See Talbot 2014 for a Christian defense of(iii).

To say that we aremutually epistemically dependent is to saythat we are

cognitively constituted in such a way that it is a practical necessitythat we rely upon testimony for much of what we know about the worldand in such a way, moreover, that we are liable to be significantlyinfluenced by what those around us believe, particularly when it comesto matters that aren’t readily susceptible to empiricalinvestigation, including religious matters. (Baker-Hytch 2016: 376)

Mutual epistemic dependence, so understood, says Baker-Hytch, is aconsequence of, among other things, “two types of cognitive biasthat play a significant role in determining how plausible we will tendto find a given item of testimony”:context biases,such as conformity, prestige, and similarity biases, which togethermake it much more likely that we accept the testimony of those wepersonally trust and respect in our communities, andcontentbiases, stemming from the dominance of intuitive processing overreflective processing and the attractiveness of “minimallycounterintuitive” ideas, especially religious ones, which aremore likely to spread via testimony (Barrett 2011: 52–72;Kahneman 2013; Boyer 2001: 87–100). Thus, given mutual epistemicdependence, we would expect to see considerable divergence in thecontent of religious beliefs and clustering of those beliefs alonggeographic and cultural lines. So, (i) seems supported.

In defense of (ii), Baker-Hytch argues that mutual epistemicdependence provides a balance between competing goods such as (a)exercising interpersonal trust and being invulnerable to deception,(b) sharing responsibility for one another’s acquisition ofepistemic goods and practicing epistemic self-reliance, and (c) havingopportunities to acquire, practice, and perfect the intellectualvirtues and freedom from intellectual obstacles and challenges. Sincemutual epistemic dependence provides a balance between goods such asthese, he claims it wouldn’t be surprising if God were to bringit about; indeed, mutual epistemic dependence seems roughly as likelyon inclusive theism as it is on naturalism.

Another important social consideration for hiddenness arguments ingeneral has to do with “defeated evidence” (cf. Anderson2017). Suppose that God provides sufficient evidence for one tobelieve that God exists but because we are a social species, anotherperson says or does something that causes one to think differentlyabout one’s evidence. Suppose, for instance, that one isprovided with a misleading rebutting or undercutting defeater forevidence that would otherwise be sufficient to believe that Godexists. One’s evidence could be defeated by encounteringapparent peers with very different experiences and perspectives on theworld, and there is a significant overlap between divine hiddennessand the epistemology of disagreement (cf Matheson 2018). It is alsopossible, however, for one’s evidence to be defeated by theapparent consensus of those one interacts with. All other things beingequal, it is usually not rational to believe differently than amajority and especially a super-majority (cf. List 2014). It is atleast a question worth asking whether we should expect God not just toprovide evidence of God’s existence but to defeat each defeaterwe acquire through interacting with one another. If it is possible forGod to have a reason to allow us to be exposed to unchecked defeaters,it may be that there are broader social networks in which defeatersaggregate or are easier to acquire and that God may have reason not toforbid them.

6. The argument from natural nonbelief

Marsh (2013) focuses on natural nonbelief in God’s existence,

“natural” in the sense of being built into the physical orbiological structure of the world, and being generally outside thescope of human agency and control. (2013: 355)

The cognitive science of religion, combined with ethnographic data forpre-industrial cultures (Barrett 2007; Bloom 2009; Stark 2007), showthat

early humans, including many anatomically and behaviorally modernhumans, originally lacked a concept of God and were religiouslyrestricted to concepts of limited, and sometimes mean, supernaturalagents. As a result, many [such humans] failed to believe in God oranything like God. The nonbelief in question was both naturallyoccurring and nonresistant. (Marsh 2013: 359)

The “millions and millions” of instances of natural,nonresistant nonbelief in early humans is much more surprising ontheism than on naturalism, since it is very surprising that “thehuman mind would be naturally so insensitive to the truth aboutreligion” “given that a perfect God would desire to enterinto a divine-human relationship with early humans”, whereas“[g]iven naturalism’s commitment to indifference aboutwhether early humans would be theists”, it’s much lesssurprising.

Matters get only worse when one adds that (i) Darwinianevolution—“the claim that natural selection, working onrandom mutation, is the driving force behind much, if not most,evolutionary change” (351)—helps to explain naturalnonbelief in early humans and (ii) Darwinian evolution is much morelikely on naturalism than theism. As for (i),

there are three basic ways of thinking about religion and naturalselection. Religion might be an evolutionary byproduct stemming frommental architecture and capacities that evolved for nonreligiouspurposes (Barrett 2004); or religion might be adaptive, and soselected for directly (Norenzayan and Shariff 2007); or religion mightstart out as a byproduct of evolved capacities and later be co-optedfor adaptive purposes (Powell and Clarke 2012). No matter which optionone favors, the point is that serious religious diversity and earlynonbelief in a theistic or theistic-like God is to be expected. (Marsh2013: 361)

As for (ii), “Darwinism starts out more likely on naturalismthan on theism” because “Darwinism is highly optional ontheism”, as evidenced by the fact that “an omnipotent Godwould have many non-Darwinian ways to create minds, bodies, and soulsand would not be limited to Darwinian or even physicalconstraints”, whereas on naturalism, “the options fordeveloping life are much more constrained, especially in the relevanttime frame” (360–61).

So it is, says Marsh, that natural, nonresistant nonbelief in earlyhumans constitutes evidence for naturalism over theism and, whencombined with Darwinian evolution, that evidential force increasessubstantially.

Evaluating the argument from natural nonbelief interacts with thecognitive science of religion and the question of what thedemographics of belief, nonbelief, and the capacity for beliefactually are.

Some have taken the cognitive science of religion to have providedempirical support for the universality of, if not theism, then atleast religious impulses friendly to theism (cf. Barrett 2004; Clarkand Barrett 2011). One might think the surprisingness of discoveringtheistically friendly religious impulses outweighs the contingentrelationship of evolution and theism to which Marsh points since ourexpectations are not what is probabilistically relevant, but ratherthe comparative likelihoods of the rival hypotheses conditioned on theevidence (Anderson 2021).

Others have taken the cognitive science of religion to have debunkedor “explained away” religious belief. For example, it isless clear in the case of religion than in other areas what the“Milvian Bridge” is that connects fitness to truth(Wilkins & Griffiths 2012). An evolutionary byproduct is, bydefinition, selected for reasons independent of its function, andadaptionist accounts of religion do not typically reference truth asthe value in virtue of which religion may be adaptive. To whateverextent that it is plausible that evolutionary explanations such asthose from the cognitive science of religion successfully undercutreligious belief, this only adds greater force to Marsh’sargument as one should find it surprising indeed that God would chooseto use an epistemic method susceptible to debunking.

It is possible to have a more mixed perspective on the evidence fromthe cognitive science of religion. For instance, one might argue thatthe cognitive science of religion provides the atheist“intellectual aid and comfort”, even though it does littleto decide the God debate in favor of the atheist, and yet provides thetheist, at best, with a reason to endorse certain theses in reformedepistemology (Penner 2018).

Few philosophers, however, have been willing to take a firm stance onthe capacities, beliefs, and practices of hominids that predate ourown species or even pre-Holocenehomo sapiens which leaves afair bit of putative natural nonbelief unaccounted for. However, onemight argue that “the earthly careers of early humans form asubplot in a much larger human story that constitutes a life ofchoiceworthy meaning for them whether they had the conceptualresources to grasp that reality or not” (Vandergriff 2016, 36).Whether or not one finds such a line persuasive may hinge on keyconsiderations from the discussion of Schellenberg’s argument,namely, whether or not one thinks God could create such choiceworthylives without this subplot, and whether the kind of meaningfulrelationship one should expect God to be invested in could possiblylack “the conceptual resources to grasp that reality.”

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Hud Hudson, J.L. Schellenberg, Edward Wierenga, and EdwardZalta for their comments. This publication was made possible throughthe support of a grant from the Templeton Religion Trust.