Samuel Clarke

First published Sat Apr 5, 2003; substantive revision Mon Jul 29, 2024

Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) was the most influential Britishmetaphysician and philosophical theologian in the generation betweenLocke and Berkeley, and only Shaftesbury rivals him in ethics. In allthree areas he was critical of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Toland.

Clarke defended natural religion against the view that natureconstitutes a self-sufficient system, and he defended revealedreligion against deism. Deeply influenced by Newton, Clarke wascritical of Descartes’s metaphysics of space and body because ofthe experimental evidence for Newtonian doctrines of space and bodyand because he believed Descartes’s identifying body withextension and removing final causes from nature had furtheredirreligion and led to Spinozism. Through his association with Newton,Clarke was a leading voice on the interpretation and implications ofNewton’s project. Newton himself seemed to endorse publicly thefundamentals of Clarke’s interpretation in the revisions to thePrincipia and by letting Clarke respond to Leibniz’scharges against the low state of philosophy in England.

In what follows, we use “W” as an abbreviation to citepassages from the four-volumeThe Works, edited posthumouslyby Benjamin Hoadly. Two recent editions of Clarke’s major worksare more widely available and thus cited here as well: “D”for passages inA Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of Godand Other Writings in Vailati (1998), and “CC” forpassages inThe Correspondence of Samuel Clarke and AnthonyCollins (Uzgalis (ed.) 2011). References to the Leibniz-Clarkecorrespondence (available in many print and online editions) includethe letter and section number preceded by an “L” forLeibniz and “C” for Clarke (e.g., L 1.4 refers toLeibniz’s first letter, section four). For accompanying materialcontained in Gregory Brown’s new editionTheLeibniz-Caroline-Clarke Correspondence (2023), references include“LCC” followed by the number assigned by Gregory Brown(e.g., LCC 95 refers to Caroline’s letter to Leibniz that isdated to December 1715, which accompanied Clarke’s secondlatter); “Brown 2023” refers to his introduction.

1. Life and Works

1.1 Biography

Samuel Clarke was born on October 11, 1675, in Norwich, England toEdward Clarke (a cloth merchant, alderman, and representative inParliament) and Hannah, daughter of Samuel Parmenter, a merchant(Hoadly 1730, i). He took his B.A. degree at Cambridge in 1695 bydefending Newton’s views, which were not yet widely accepted.His oral defense “suprized the Whole Audience, both for theAccuracy of Knowledge, and Clearness of Expression, that appearedthrough the Whole” (Hoadly 1730, iii-iv). His tutor, Sir JohnEllis, a Cartesian, apparently encouraged Clarke to provide a newannotated Latin translation of Rohault’sTreatise ofPhysics. The 1697 translation included Clarke’s Newtoniannotes that criticized Rohault’s Cartesian text. Theedition’s success rapidly expanded the understanding ofNewtonian physics, and later editions became the standard physicstextbook in England and the American colonies, creating a“Trojan horse horse for Newton’s physics”(Schüller 2023, 6). In that same year, Clarke befriended WilliamWhiston, who probably introduced Clarke into the Newtonian circle.These early years show Clarke’s interest in theology as well; hepublishedThree practical essays on baptism, confirmation, andrepentance (1699),A Paraphrase on the Four Evangelists(1701–1702), andSome Reflections on that Part of a Bookcalled Amyntor (1699), a response to John Toland’s critiqueof the New Testament canon. These all demonstrate Clarke’s earlyinterest in “primitive Christianity” (Christianity aspracticed and believed in its first two hundred years), which would becentral to his theological vision and would lead to the confrontationsover the doctrine of the trinity in the 1710s.

The middle years of his career mark his greatest philosophicalcontributions, beginning with the Boyle lectures that he delivered in1704 and 1705. The first, an attempt to prove the existence of God,along with all divine attributes, was published asA Demonstrationof the Being and Attributes of God (1705) and the second, acontinuation intended to establish all fundamental moral truths andmost religious doctrine, asA discourse concerning theunchangeable obligations of natural religion, and the truth andcertainty of the Christian revelation (1706). They both wentthrough many editions and were often published together. Theselectures, established by Robert Boyle to promote natural religionbased on the latest scientific developments, were closely watched, andClarke became one of the most well known philosophers in England. TheBoyle lectures, especially Clarke’s, were crucial to spreadingNewton’s views. As Margaret Jacob (1977, 2) has convincinglyargued, “Without these sermons, Newton’s system of theworld would have remained relatively unknown, and possibly evenfeared, by an educated and literate public on both sides of theChannel which could not have begun to understand the mathematicalintricacies of thePrincipia.”

Clarke’s association with Newton became official when hetranslated theOpticks into Latin in 1706. In the meantime,he had been introduced to Queen Anne, who made him one of herchaplains in 1706, and three years later he was elevated to therectory of St. James’s, Westminster. After the Hanoverianaccession, Clarke developed a close relationship with Caroline ofAnsbach, the Princess of Wales and future queen. His prominence as aphilosopher drew him into a series of very public exchanges ofletters. The most notable of these were the letters to Anthony Collins(1707–1708) and the letters to Leibniz (1715–1716) (seebelow).

In the later years of his life, Clarke published popular works oftheology, notable translations of Caesar, and a royally appointedtranslation of theIliad. Each of his major publications wentthrough multiple editions, often with substantial revision. He died in1729 after a very short illness, consistent with a stroke (Sykes 1729,10). He was survived by his wife Katherine and five of his sevenchildren. Clarke was described as polite, vivacious with his friends,and fond of playing cards.

1.2 Authorship in the Correspondence with Leibniz

Before Caroline of Ansbach became the Princess of Wales, she wastutored by Leibniz. Leibniz did not join her in England, and theycorresponded across the channel. In one of these letters he attackedprominent views in England that Leibniz considered dangerous tonatural religion. After mentioning materialism and Lockean doubtsabout the soul, Leibniz chastises Newton twice. (Newton and Leibnizhad sparred earlier over the priority of discovery of the calculus.)Clarke, who with Newton was attending Caroline’s court, came toNewton’s defense, but not to Locke’s defense, because,according to Caroline, “Neither Dr. Clarke nor Newton wants toprofess to be of Mr. Locke’s sect” (LCC 89). A series offive letters passed through Caroline between Leibniz and Clarke over awide range of issues. Caroline is significant not only for hercontributions to framing the debate for each correspondent but also asan important context for understanding the letters (Meli 1999).Leibniz tries to maintain Caroline’s commitment to his system,perhaps even by framing issues in ways “Caroline could beexpected to understand and care about” (Brown 2023, lxvii),while Newton and the more sociable Clarke try to convert her witharguments and experimental demonstrations in person. She continued tochallenge Clarke and pledge loyalty to Leibniz until his death, butstarting around the time of the third letter, it seems that Clarke hadwon her over at least to the existence of the vacuum, which would bedifficult to maintain without accepting the rest of theClarkean-Newtonian picture (LCC 119; Brown 2004, 93–98).

Today the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence is Clarke’s most oftenread work. Until the new edition by Gregory Brown (2023), it wasusually published without the accompanying letters to and fromCaroline. There has long been a dispute over Newton’s role inthe authorship of the letters. Leibniz suspected and Carolineconfirmed that Clarke’s letters “are not written withoutthe advice of Chevalier Newton” (LCC 95; Alexander 1956, 189 and193; Brewster 1855, 287–288). Since then, scholarly opinion hasranged from Newton’s ghostwriting all the letters himself(Koyré and Cohen 1961, 560ff) to Clarke writing the letters andmerely showing them to Newton to make sure there was no disagreementover the scientific information (Vailati 1997, 4–5). This pointis not easily decidable, in part because Newton and Clarke wereneighbors and thus almost no correspondence survives between them,presumably since they would meet in person. Contentious debates inNewton scholarship over issues like whether he thought gravity was aproperty of matter and whether he accepted action at a distance (e.g.,Brown 2016, Henry 2020) means it is difficult to determine when theviews in the correspondence align with Newton’s views. Currentopinion has shifted toward attributing most of the philosophicalarguments in the correspondence to Clarke, a move sparked by areappraisal in recent years of Clarke’s philosophicalability.

In reading the letters to Leibniz, it is helpful to remember that theviews defended might not belong only to Clarke or only to Newton, soattribution to a single figure might be misguided. What we have mightbe the intersection of their views, or they might be views that Newtonheld privately but did not yet want to avow publicly, or they might bea mixture of some of Clarke’s views and some of Newton’sviews. In some cases, we can see connections to other publications byNewton and Clarke. For instance, space as asensorium (organof sensation) of God, which Leibniz ridiculed in his first letter toCaroline, appeared first in Newton’sPrincipia andOpticks and not in Clarke’s other works. (Clarke triesto argue that Newton does not believe that space is thesensorium of God, but Koyré and Cohen [1961,563–566] argue that Newton did believe it and tried to disguiseor soften the view in publication.) Clarke defends atomism in theletters to Leibniz, but in his other works he claims that all matteris infinitely divisible, which suggests he was accomodatingNewton’s view. On the other hand, there are many arguments basedon the principle of sufficient reason, which is fundamental toClarke’s philosophy and which he employed in his Boyle lecturestwelve years earlier, but does not play an explicit role inNewton’s publications. Other cases are more difficult to connectto Newton’s and Clarke’s other works, such as the famouspassage in which space is called “an immediate and necessaryconsequence of the existence of God,” since“consequence” is not a term otherwise used by eitherClarke or Newton on this issue.

2. Major Themes in Clarke

Three major themes run through all of Clarke’s philosophicalworks: Newtonianism, anti-naturalism, and rationalism.

2.1 Newtonianism and Anti-Naturalism

There is a widespread agreement that Newton influenced Clarke. Newtonwas thirty years Clarke’s senior, and their relationship(post-1704) might best be thought of as a mentorship. Newton andClarke likely held similar views about God’s role in the world,but Newton was hesitant to state these positions publicly, and he mayhave used the Boyle lectures to promote these views (Force 1984;522–526). Many have thought he supported Clarke’sinterpretations and theological defenses (Jacob 1976; 242). In privatecorrespondence, such as the letters to Bentley of December 10, 1692,and January 17, 1693, he entertains views similar to those that Clarkewould later proclaim. Whiston (1728) reports that when Newton wasasked why he did not publicly announce them, Newton “saw thoseConsequences; but thought it better to let his Readers draw them firstof themselves.” It is also possible that Clarke influencedNewton. In the “General Scholium” of the 1713 edition ofthePrincipia, Newton endorsed views and arguments about thenature of God that had been previously published by Clarke (Stewart1996; Snobelen 2001, 14–18).

On scientific, philosophical, and theological grounds, Clarke believedNewtonian natural philosophy to be superior to all alternatives, andNewton’s natural philosophy provide a basis for Clarke’sreligious and social views (Stewart 1981). Clarke saw inNewtonian’s natural philosophy a world that could only exist bya free act of God. Matter is dispersed sparingly throughout emptyspace, gravity is universal to matter but not inherent in it, and theuniverse is ordered according to rules that are neither absolutelynecessary nor chaotic. Clarke concluded that the laws of nature do notdescribe the powers of matter, which is just dead mass constantlypushed around, but modalities of operation of the divine power. Theoccasionalists also denied that matter had the power to move itselfand that the only thing with such power is God, but Clarke appeals toboth divine and human immaterial souls to explain motion. Thus, natureis not a self-sufficient system; without direct and constant divineintervention, planets would fly away from their orbits and atoms wouldbreak into their components. The naturalist attempt to describe theworld solely by the arrangement and matter in motion is doomed to failon scientific and metaphysical grounds and must give way to a worldwith an active God. This is why “the foundations of naturalreligion had never been so deeply and firmly laid, as in themathematical and experimental philosophy of that great man”(W4.582). Clarke did not provide the only major interpretation andexplication of Newton’s natural philosophy, but it was aninfluential one (Yenter 2023).

2.2 Rationalism

Clarke adopted some form of rationalism in metaphysics, ethics, andtheology.

TheDemonstration makes great use of the principle ofsufficient reason (PSR), which motivates the cosmological argument,and he explicitly and repeatedly avows it in the correspondence withLeibniz (C 3.2, W 4.606). The PSR was used both in Clarke’spositive metaphysical arguments and was assumed in his argumentsagainst other philosophers, especially Spinoza, whom he chastises forfailing to explain the diversity of things that exist (Yenter 2014).The PSR is not mentioned in the correspondence with Collins, but hethere adopts principles that can be derived from it. Clarke’sunderstanding of the principle of sufficient reason differs notablyfrom Leibniz’s understanding, with whom it is more frequentlyassociated. This was a major point of contention in theircorrespondence. Clarke asserts that the sufficient reason whysomething exists as it does may be due to the “mere Will”of God and nothing more (C 3.2, W 4.606–607; C 5.124–130,W 4.700). This involves two claims. First, in cases of completeindifference (such as God choosing where to place the world in theinfinite expanse of absolute space), God is capable of acting even ifthere is no reason to prefer one option over another. Second, a freewill is able to refrain from acting on what reason presents to it asbest to do. As a consequence of these, Clarke denies the identity ofindiscernibles. This is significant for Clarke’s defense ofNewton, because if space is real and absolute, then the identity ofindiscernibles must be false because regions of space areindiscernible with respect to their intrinsic and (prior to thecreation of the world) their extrinsic properties. Clarke may alsohave felt the need to accommodate indiscernible atoms, which Newtonseemed to allow.

Because Clarke denies the identity of indiscernibles and affirmslibertarianism (but see Section 3.2 below), Leibniz claims that Clarkegrants the principle of sufficient reason “only in Words, and inreality denies it. Which shews that he does not fully perceive theStrength of it” (L 3.2, W 4.601). In response, Clarke arguesthat if Leibniz is right then a free agent would be merely passivebecause determined to do what reason presents, but a “passiveagent” is a contradiction since the concept of agency includesthe concept of activity. Leibniz was never satisfied withClarke’s position and by the fifth letter he was more explicitthan previously that the principle of sufficient reason and theprinciple of the identity of indiscernibles are not independent butthe latter is derived from the former (L 5.21), and, in the fifthletter’s cover letter to Caroline, Leibniz asserts, “If[Clarke] does not entirely accept the received great principle thatnothing happens without there being a sufficient reason why it happensthus rather than otherwise, I could not help doubting his sincerity,and if he grants it then farewell to the philosophy of MonsieurNewton” (quoted in Khamara 2006, 4).

Ethical truths are discoverable through reason and correspond tonecessary and eternal relations among things in the world. He alsocalls ethical truths “truths of reason.” His theology issometimes described as rationalist because through reason one candiscover the many truths contained in natural religion and that thecorrect Christian doctrines are not mysterious, norself-contradictory, and nearly all can be comprehended by humanbeings. However, against the Deists, who generally expected allnecessary moral and religious truths to be discoverable by reason,Clarke asserted that revealed religion (also called specialrevelation) provided information necessary for salvation (W2.666–667). While special revelation involved “supplyingthe deficiencies” of “right reason,” it could notcontradict reason (W 2.669).

3. Metaphysics

3.1 Absolute and Infinite Space and Time

According to Clarke, the ideas of space and time are the two“first and most obvious simple Ideas, that every man has in hismind” (D 114, W 2.752). Drawing on an argument from Newton(1726, 410), he argued that while matter can be thought of asnon-existing, space exists necessarily because “to suppose anypart of space removed, is to suppose it removed from and out ofitself: and to suppose the whole to be taken away, is supposing it tobe taken away from itself, that is, to be taken away while it stillremains: which is a contradiction in terms” (D 13, W 2.528).Space is not an aggregate of its parts but an essential wholepreceding all it parts.

Absolute space was allegedly required for Newtonian physics. Space isnot the mere absence of matter but is that in which things are. Allfinite beings occupy an absolute position in space and time that wemay or may not be able to establish because we have no direct accessto absolute space and time. Although space is not sensible, Clarkerejected its identification with nothingness, since space hasproperties: quantity and dimension, and perhaps homogeneity,immutability, continuity, and the ability to contain matter. EdmundLaw (1758, 10) objects that this makes no more sense than saying thatdarkness has qualities because it has the property of receivinglight.

Because our ideas are always finite, infinite space must exist outsideof us (Watts 1733, 4). Clarke believed that space is necessarilyinfinite because “to set bounds to space, is to suppose itbounded by something which itself takes up space” or else that“it is bounded by nothing, and then the idea of that nothingwill still be space,” and both suppositions are contradictory (D115, W 2.753). Clarke apparently thought that what has a boundary mustbe bounded by something else. If so, the argument was not well takenbecause a sphere, for example, has a boundary which stems from its ownnature, not by the presence of something external bounding it (Vailati2006, 111). One possible solution is to appeal to space’speculiar nature as a property of an infinite God, which would requirethat it be boundless in virtue of God’s possible activity beingboundless (W 1.47), but this might reverse the proper order ofexplanation or beg the question. (For more on the relationship of Godto space, see Section 4.2 below.) He also argues that becauseexistence or being is a perfection, existing in more places is agreater perfection, so God (as the most perfect being) must exist inall places (W 1.46–47). Clarke could also appeal to the PSR (anyfinite limit would be arbitrary, and thus in violation of the PSR);however, Leibniz employs a similar argument against empty space, sosuch a move could be counterproductive for Clarke (LCC 117b).

3.2 Free Will

Clarke attached great importance to the issue of free will, and he mayhave introduced the modern philosophical meaning of the term“agency” (Schneewind 1997, 313). His philosophicalwritings have traditionally been read as defending a libertarian powerof self-determination, in contrast with the compatibilist theories ofhis opponents, who included Leibniz, Anthony Collins, and JonathanEdwards. The traditional reading, with responses, is described in whatfollows, with a discussion of alternative readings at the end of thissubsection.

Clarke’s primary defense of libertarian freedom begins withdistinguishing the will and the judgment. In order to will, one musthave a judgment about what to do and the power to choose in accordancewith that judgment. This power to choose is provided by the will. Thewill is not to be identified with the last judgment of theunderstanding nor is it a volition caused by a judgment. Those (likeHobbes) who thought so were guilty of basic philosophical errors. Ifthey maintained that the content of the evaluative proposition iseither identical with the volition or causes it, then they wereconfusing the “moral motive” with the “physicalefficient,” the physical efficient being the element of thecause that provides the active power (D 73, W 2.565). Because themoral motive is simply an abstract object (a proposition) and abstractobjects are causally inert, the moral motive cannot cause anything. Onthe other hand, if one maintained that, not the evaluativeproposition, but one’s perceiving, judging or otherwisebelieving it is the cause (or a partial cause) of volition, then onefalls foul of a basic causal principle: what is passive cannot causeanything active. Against Descartes, Clarke insisted that judging,i.e., assenting to what appears true and dissenting from what appearsfalse, is not an action but a passion. So there is no causal linkbetween evaluation and volition, or, as Clarke put it, between“approbation and action” (D 126, W 4.714). In general,there is no causal link between previous non-volitional mental states,all of which are passive, and any volition (Vailati 1997,82–84).

Jonathan Edwards (1754, 222–223) argued that Clarke wascommitted to an infinite regress of volitions. Because each volitionis active, it must be caused by something active; but every otherpurported motivation is passive, so each volition is caused by aprevious volition, and so onad infinitum. However, Clarkedid not believe that each volition was caused by a previous volition,but rather each volition is caused by the will itself. This raises adifferent problem, noticed by Leibniz: because the conditions for thewill choosing in accordance with the judgment are exactly the same aswhen it refrains from choosing, there is no explanation for why itdoes one rather than the other, in violation of the principle ofsufficient reason (L 4.1, W 4.612; L 5.14, W4.634). Clarke neverprovided a response to this charge that satisfied Leibniz; hisstrongest response was his claim that denying this account of the willwould lead to accepting passive agency, which is a contradiction.

Clarke’s analysis of agency supports divine freedom (Rowe 2004,Sangiacomo 2018), but divine freedom raises new problems for Clarke.For one, human and divine freedom are perhaps in tension withGod’s knowledge of future events. Against the claim that divineforeknowledge is incompatible with free will, Clarke argued thatbecause knowledge does not affect the thing known, our free choicesare unaffected by divine omniscience (D 75–78, W2.566–568). A second problem is that God always does what isbest, so God cannot refrain from acting on his judgment of what isbest, and thus acts necessarily, which Clarke claims is acontradiction (D 83–86, W 571–573). Clarke could rely,again, on the passivity of judgment (or the difference betweenphysical causes and moral reasons) to block the move that God’sjudgment determines God’s choice. Thus, even though we havecomplete certainty that God always does what is best, it does notfollow that God doing the best is necessitated by God’s judgmentof what is right to do. This response is nested in Clarke’sofficial response, which is to distinguish God’s metaphysicalattributes from his moral attributes. Because God’s will is notdetermined by God’s knowing that an action is the best, ourcertainty that God will do what is best is due to our confidence in“the unalterableRectitude of his Will” and not anecessity of his nature (D 86–87, W 573). In other words, it isa moral necessity and not a metaphysical necessity.[1] A third and related problem is that when God created the world, hedid what was best to do, but had a choice among an infinite number ofequally best ways of creating the world because he could place theworld anywhere in space and could create it at any time. Thus, it doesnot follow from God’s perfect judgment combined with hisinfinite power to create that God should create the world in aparticular way. Leibniz claims this is incompatible with the PSR andthat he has “reduced Clarke to absurdity” (LCC 154), butClarke denies there is any problem (C 4.18–20, W 4.626).

Despite the traditional reading, which dates to Clarke’s ownlifetime, there are solid reasons for rejecting the view that Clarkewas a libertarian. The first reason comes from his various definitionsof liberty and freedom. Clarke provides at least four definitions, twoof which occur in the sermon “Of the Liberty of MoralAgents.” Here he claims that the “True liberty of aRational and Moral Agent” is “being able to followright Reason only, without Hindrance or Restraint” (W1.219). Also in that sermon, Clarke calls acting as one pleases, whichhumans and non-human animals have, “merephysical ornatural liberty” (W 1.218). These two definition ofliberty are compatibilist. Elsewhere, he argues that human freedomrequires a self-determining will that could freely assent or refrainfrom assenting to the mind’s judgments; this is a freedom ofchoosing and not a freedom of acting, such that a prisoner in chains“who chooses or endeavors to move out of his place is therein asmuch a free agent as he that actually moves out of his place” (D75, W 2.566). Clarke also entertains a fourth notion: freedom is“a principle of acting, or power of beginning motion, which isthe idea of liberty” (D 54, W 2.553; see also D 125, W 2.714).The ability to begin motion marks freedom as a power only held bynon-material agents, because matter has no power of self-motion. Thisfourth definition is probably the most important of the three toClarke’s project (Harris 2005, 46–61; Greenberg 2013,249–251). Clarke does not explicitly reconcile thesecompatibilist (first, second) and incompatibilist (third, arguablyfourth) definitions. One way to do so is to make the libertarian powerof self-determination a necessary condition for the compatibilistunderstanding of freedom as following reason without restraint.

Two recent dissenters to the traditional reading have drawn onClarke’s discussion of divine freedom. Lukas Wolf (2022) arguesthat Clarke rejects divine voluntarism, and it is certainly true thatClarke denies the view in ethics that moral obligations depend on thewill of God (W 2.576). Clarke and Leibniz are both intellectualists,according to Wolf, with the important differences between them beingwhether a sufficientreason is also a sufficientcause and whether the principle of the best (withoutexception God does what is the wisest and the maximally good) isderived from the PSR (Wolf 2022, 8–10). Clarke denies both;Leibniz affirms both. While Wolf does not claim Clarke is acompatibilist, his approach leaves this possibility available. JuliaJorati (2021) argues that Clarke and Leibniz agree on most mattersregarding freedom, and it is only equipose cases where they disagreeabout whether a perfectly good, perfectly free being would be able toact. Jorati’s argument relies heavily on the claim that Clarkeis committed to the moral necessity of God’s doing what is best;because this is a kind of necessity, she claims, Clarke, like Leibniz,is an agent-causal compatibilist. This requires reading Clarke’snotion of moral necessity as having the same modal status as logical,metaphysical, and physical necessity (although allowing for freedomwhere those three do not) and rejecting the views that moral necessityis a psychological category of certainty or that it is equivalent towhat is typically called moral certainty (Jorati 2021, 177–178,189–190, 199). Such a reading has to contend with passages suchas the following, where Clarke seems to deny that moral necessity isnecessity in any literal sense: “And is it not evident, that theNecessity by which God is Omnipresent or Omniscient, and the Necessityby which he keeps his Promise, are things that have no Similitude butin Name ; the one being natural and literal, the other merelyfigurative and moral?” (D 126, W 2.714). Jorati’s responsehas two bases: that we need to explain the certainty of a perfectbeing’s actions, and that Clarke only rules out beingexternally determined (Jorati 2021, 185).

Whether Clarke was a libertarian or a voluntarist, there is nearuniversal agreement that he accepted agent causation. Showing theconsistency of agent causation with his other views is central to asatisfying interpretation of Clarke’s metaphysics, ethics, andtheology (e.g., Rowe 2004, 23–35; Sangiacomo 2018).

3.3 Matter and the Laws of Nature

Clarke steadfastly maintained that matter does not have an essential,accidental, or super-added power of self-motion. “All thingsdone in the world, are done either immediately by God himself, or bycreated intelligent beings: matter being evidently not at all capableof any laws or powers whatsoever” (D 149, W 2.698).Consequently, the so called “effects of the natural powers ofmatter, and laws of motion; of gravitation, attraction, or thelike” properly speaking are but the “effects ofGod’s acting upon matter continually and every moment, eitherimmediately by himself, or mediately by some created intelligentbeings” (Ibid.). Thus, the course of nature is “nothingelse but the will of God producing certain effects in a continued,regular, constant and uniform manner which…being in everymoment perfectly arbitrary, is as easy to be altered at any time, asto be preserved” (Ibid). The laws of nature are thus notabsolutely necessary but only morally necessary, continuing as they doonly because of the unchanging will of God.

With regard to the much contested interpretation of Newton on gravity,he declares that Newton “does not mean to say that attraction isthe cause of bodies coming together; but by attraction he means toexpress the effect” (Kassler 2014; 145–146). Leibniz, inhis correspondence with Clarke, argues that Newton is committed togravity as force, suggesting two importantly different readings ofNewton (Janiak 2007). While Newton would not speculate publicly onmetaphysical matters, Clarke argued that this effect could not be thework of a body. Rather, God and designated (subordinate, intelligent,immaterial) agents act throughout the world by being present wherethey act, which is the explanation for gravity and all other movementsof matter (Brown 2016, 42ff).^[2]

The claim that matter has not even an accidental power of self-motionwas central to Clarke’s attempt to exhibit the manifest activityof God and to refute Spinozism (Schliesser 2012, 443–449). Theclaim was radical for the time and elicited many responses. Collins,in a letter to John Trenchard, was angered and unimpressed byClarke’s arguments, which was a common reaction for the growingnumber of freethinkers (Jacob 1977; 20). Andrew Baxter (1733, with animportant appendix added in 1750) would later extend Clarke’sarguments against self-motion, showing that they apply to ether aswell as matter, at a time when ether theories had gained popularity asinterpretations of Newton and as hypotheses for explaininggravity.

Despite his insistence on God’s continual activity in the world,Clarke was not an occasionalist. Unlike the occasionalists, Clarkedoes not claim that God is the real cause of interactions betweenfinite minds and matter, only between bodies. Furthermore, matter hasa single “Negative Power” of staying at rest orcontinuing in motion (W 2.697; Winkler 1989). Although this positionbecame common in England and Scotland in the eighteenth century, thereis no widely accepted term for this view, which has been called“body-body occasionalism” (Ablondi 2013), “partialoccasionalism” (Sangiacomo 2018), and“semi-occasionalism” (Yenter 2022).

3.4 Consciousness, the Soul, and Personal Identity

Henry Dodwell publicly defended the view that the soul is naturallymortal but is made immortal by God only at a baptism performed bysomeone properly ordained. Clarke wrote an open letter defending thesoul’s “natural” immortality. Furthermore, all soulssurvive bodily death, the soul remains in a state of (literal ormetaphorical) sleep until the final judgment, the souls of those notadmitted to heaven are destroyed at the final judgment, and there isno hell of eternal suffering.^[3]

Employing what Kant (1781, A351) dubbed the “Achillesargument,” Clarke claims that the essential unity ofconsciousness is incompatible with the divisibility and composabilityof matter.^[4] The soul cannot be material, because what is material is divisible,and what is divisible cannot be the source of the unity ofconsciousness. (He assumes throughout that if the soul is immaterialthen it is immortal.) If consciousness were a property of matter, thenthe consciousness must be distributed among the various componentparts, rendering each part conscious. Clarke’s argument rests ontwo principles. The Homogeneity Principle says that “a power canreally inhere in a composite only if it is of the same kind as thepowers of the parts” (Vailati 1993, 395). Strictly, theHomogeneity Principle only applies to the first category of qualities(Rozemond 2009, 180). The Composition Principle says that “theproperties of the parts will sum to the same properties of the whole(and that the properties of the whole can be divided into theparts)” (Uzgalis 2011, 23). William Uzgalis finds versions ofthe Homogeneity Principle in Cudworth and Bayle, and in all threecases it is used to argue that thought or consciousness cannot arisefrom motion or figure because they are not of the same kind. A lessoften discussed variation on Clarke’s core argument (but seeRozemond 2003, 182ff) is that “figure, divisibility, mobilityand other such like qualities of matter” cannot produceconscious thought (a real power) because they are “not real,proper, distinct, and positive powers, but only negative qualities,deficiencies, and imperfections,” which appeals to the principlethat there can be no perfection or power in the effect that is not inthe cause (D 41, W 2.545).

Anthony Collins publicly responded to Clarke to defend the positionthat consciousness can be an emergent property of matter, opening thedoor for a materialist theory of mind. Central to Collins’sresponse is that there are properties held by material compositions,such as the smell of a rose, that are not held by any part, perhapsdue to the organization of those compositions (Uzgalis 2021,269–270). In reply, loosely following Locke’sdistinctions, Clarke argues that there are three kinds of properties:those that inhere in the substance (real properties), those that arecommonly but improperly believed to reside in the substance (secondaryqualities, such as the smell of a rose), and “merelyabstract names to express theeffects” of materialsubstances or systems, which includes magnetism and gravity (CC56–58). Consciousness falls in the first category, but, unlikethe other members of that category such as magnitude and figure, itdoes not divide or sum. Lukas Wolf (2019) has shown importantsimilarities between Clarke’s arguments against gravity aspossibly super-added to matter and against consciousness, freedom, andself-motion as possibly emergent properties.

The enduring soul serves as Clarke’s explanation for personalidentity. Collins, following Locke, argued for a memory theory ofpersonal identity. Clarke responded that God could put oneperson’s memories into multiple people; they would be distinctpeople but each would be identical to the original person, so identityis not transitive. Although Clarke’s argument became popular inthe eighteenth century (Barresi and Martin 2004, 33–49), itseems to have been forgotten then reintroduced in the 1950s (Uzgalis33, citing Flew 1951, Prior 1957, and Williams 1957). Collins pointedout that Clarke’s theory faces an unpleasant dilemma, in thateither animals (who do exhibit self-motion) do not think or haveexperiences (implausible) or God has to deal with an animal’ssoul (in animal heaven or annihilation) (Garrett 2013, 181). Leibnizalso raised this challenge in a 1715 letter to Caroline (LCC 91).

Clarke’s claim that the unity of consciousness is incompatiblewith divisible matter is complicated by his apparent belief that soulsare extended, a view defended in the previous generation by HenryMore. At least, Clarke refused to rule out the possibility that soulsare extended because “as the parts of space or expansion itselfcan demonstrably be proved to beabsolutely indiscerptible[indivisible], so it ought not to be reckoned an insuperabledifficulty to imagine that allimmaterial thinking substances(upon supposition that expansion is not excluded out of their idea)may be so likewise” (CC 62, W 3.763). The issue, as Clarke triesto frame it, is not that consciousness is incompatible with extensionbut that it is incompatible with anything divisible into parts.Because, following Newton, Clarke denies that space is actuallydivisible into parts, it cannot be ruled out that the soul isextended. His acceptance of the principle that there is no action at adistance and of the claim that immaterial beings (both finite and God)act in space perhaps push him to accept that the soul is extended. Ifso, he does not explain whether the soul occupies the same space asthe whole body, the brain, or some part of the brain or how souls movefrom place to place if not affected by bodies. Richard Price andJoseph Priestley both read Clarke as accepting extended souls, as hadLeibniz (LCC 91). Priestley objects that souls must therefore haveshape (which he takes to be implausible) and must interpenetrateGod’s spiritual substance (which he takes to be impossible, asin the impossible case of colocated physical substances) (Price andPriestley 1777, 58–62).

4. Philosophical Theology

This section reviews Clarke’s key arguments in philosophy ofreligion and philosophical theology. The topic of divine freedom wascovered in the earlier section on free will, as well as in the entryondivine freedom. Clarke also wrote on topics such as divine attributes, baptism, thehistoricity of disputed New Testament writings, and the veracity ofvarious Christian doctrines, which are not discussed here.

4.1 ArgumentA Priori

Clarke thought highly of the argument from design, which he thoughtwere widely accessible and easily grasped. However, due to the rise ofatheistic systems of philosophy, he thought it was necessary to givean argument that would satisfy his fellow metaphysicians. Clarkewrites that his argument for the being and attributes of God was done“partly by metaphysical Reasoning, and partly from theDiscoveries (principally those that have been lately made) in NaturalPhilosophy” (W 2.581). His argument, which was known inClarke’s time as “the argumenta priori,”occupies most ofA Demonstration of the Being and Attributes ofGod, Clarke’s first set of Boyle Lectures.^[5] The argument is typically classified today as cosmological, but itshould not be confused with thekalam cosmological argument(which takes as a premise that the world has a finite history).Clarke’s version belongs to the tradition of modal cosmologicalarguments that employ the principle of sufficient reason to argue froma contingent series of causes to a necessary being. The main lines ofClarke’s “argumenta priori” are as follows.^[6]

Something now exists, so something always was, otherwise nothing wouldexist now because it is impossible for something to be produced bynothing (D 8, W 2.524).^[7] What has existed from eternity can only be an independent being (onehaving in itself the reason of its existence) or an infinite series ofdependent beings (wherein each being depends on other beings in theseries). However, such an infinite series cannot be what has existedfrom eternity because by hypothesis it can have no external cause, andno internal cause (no dependent being in the series) can cause thewhole series. Hence, an independent being exists. A frequent objectionto this argument is that the demand for an explanation is satisfiedwhen it is conceded that each being in the series has a cause (Rowe1971, 56–57). The series is not a new entity to be explained, sothere is no reason to appeal to an eternal, independent being.Furthermore, if the series is not dependent, then it is notcontingent, and if it is not contingent, then it is necessary. Clarkefinds this option unacceptable, as have many since (including Rowe1973, 57–59, and van Inwagen 2014, 159–182), andClarke’s appeal to God’s will to maintain the contingencyof the created world has been challenged, especially by Leibniz (see3.2, above).

This independent being is “self-existent, that is, necessarilyexisting” (D 12, W 2.527), a conclusion he also reaches byarguing that space and time cannot be conceived not to exist and theyare obviously not self-existent, so the substance on which theydepend, God, must exist necessarily as well (D 13, W 2.527–528).For Clarke a “necessary being” is a being whosenon-existence is impossible (either because it is an independent beingor because it is necessarily dependent on an independent being), and a“self-existent being” is a being whose non-existence isimpossible because the necessity of its existence is to be found inits own nature. Once these two are distinguished, however, Clarke isopen to the criticism that he cannot rule out the existence of twoself-existent beings (as he attempts in the seventh proposition)because there may be two beings who are self-existent even though onlyone self-existent being is required to explain the existence of theworld (Law 1758, 21). Anthony Atkey (1725, 3–14) provided avariation on this objection in correspondence. He alleges that Clarkeillegitimately moves from the existence of at least one“necessary being” to the existence of no more than one“self-existent being.” Clarke concludes thatthereexists only one self-existent being, but he has at best shownthat we cannothave the idea of two self-existent beings.Atkey’s objection is about the relationship of the conceivableto the possible. Clarke’s response (Atkey 1725, 17–19) isthat we have clear ideas in this case, so our ideas can guide us inthe nature of things (conceivability entails possibility in the caseof clear ideas), but he does not give any reason why we should thinkour ideas are clear in this case. This problem is exacerbated by hisdenial that we have adequate ideas of the essences of substances,including God. If we do not have adequate ideas of any substances(including the divine being) then how could we have a clear idea ofGod? Roger North had previously raised a similar worry about Clarkeneeding to show that “natural things accord with ourideas,” but Clarke’s response has not survived (NC133).

If successful, Clarke’s argumenta priori establishesall the metaphysical attributes of God (independence, eternality,immutability, infinitude, omnipresence) by examining the nature ofnecessity and positing the contingency of the world. To reach thepersonal and moral attributes of God, it is necessary to draw uponfurther features of the world and arguea posteriori (D 38, W2.543). Clarke attempted a variety of arguments to establish that Godis an agent (that is, that God is not only intelligent but has a willthat is free in a libertarian sense). First, one real feature of theworld is that there are intelligent beings in it. Intelligence, beinga perfection, must exist to at least as great a degree in the cause asin the effect (an instance of Clarke’s applying a causal versionof the PSR). So God must be intelligent (D38–39, W 4.543).Second, this intelligence can be established from the order and beautyof the world, so a teleological argument can reach this conclusion aswell. Third, Clarke claimed that “intelligence without liberty… is really (in respect of any power, excellence, orperfection) no intelligence at all,” so therefore God must be anagent. Fourth, anyone positing a God without freedom (Clarkespecifically mentions Spinoza) is positing a contradiction and hasfailed to explain the source of activity in the world (D 46–47,W 4.548–549). Finally, the necessitarian (like Spinoza) isforced to deny a number of (to Clarke) obvious points, including thatthings could be different than they are, that there are final causesin the universe, and that there are a variety of finite things in theuniverse (Yenter 2014). With God’s intelligence and agency inplace, he sketches how God’s wisdom, goodness, justice, andother moral perfections can be established.

4.2 God, Space, and Time

Clarke accepted the traditional Christian beliefs that God is eternaland omnipresent, and he attempted to explain what those claims mean.Four central tenets of Clarke’s position are unpacked below.

God is able to act at all times and in all places because heis substantially present in all times and in all places. Todeny this would entail accepting action at a distance, which Clarke,like most of his contemporaries (including Leibniz: see LCC 72), foundmysterious or impossible (Brown 2016).

God’s substantial presence entails that the Scholastic viewof divine eternity and immensity is false. Clarke rejected theview of God as substantially removed from space and time. Divineeternity involves both necessary existence and infinite durationwhich, however, could not be identified with the traditional notion ofthe eternal present (nunc stans) according to which Godexists in an unchanging permanent present without any successiveduration. He considered such a view unintelligible at best andcontradictory at worst (CC 107, W 3.794). The attribution ofsuccessive duration to God might suggest that God, like us, is in timebut, unlike us, does not change. However, this was not Clarke’sview. In his exchanges with Butler he clarifies that God is nottechnically in space and time, because God is prior (in the order ofnature) to time whereas things in time are metaphysically subsequentto the existence of time. Moreover, he attributed distinct andsuccessive thoughts to God; otherwise God could not “vary hiswill, nor diversify his works, nor act successively, nor govern theworld, nor indeed have any power to will or do anything at all”(W 3.897). Hence, God is immutable with respect to his will only inthe sense that he does not change his mind.

God is not identical to space or time; although necessary, theydepend for their existence upon God. Clarke’s earliestreported philosophical idea, years before he read Newton, is that Godcannot destroy space (Whiston 1730, 22–23). A common worry aboutabsolute space in the eighteenth century was that if space isinfinite, necessary, and indestructible then either God is not theonly infinite, necessary, and independent being or God is identical tospace, both of which were theologically unorthodox. Clarke’sposition in theDemonstration, the letters to Butler, and theletter to an anonymous author (almost certainly Daniel Waterland) isthat space and time are divine attributes or properties, a view he mayhave found in Henry More (Thomas 2015, 18). Because they depend on theonly self-subsisting being, they are not independent beings (D122–123, W 4.758). He told Leibniz that immensity and eternalityare “an immediate and necessary consequence” ofGod’s existence, without supplying any further argument orexplaining the relationship between “consequence,”“mode,” “attribute,” and“property.” Many have understood Clarke to mean that Godis literally dimensional. Clarke’s early critic Anthony Collins(1713, 47–48) read him this way. Emily Thomas (2018,172–176) has shown that Clarke’s views undergo a changeafter 1719; from this point on Clarke is careful to say that immensityand eternality are “modes of existence” rather thanattributes. Modes of existence can be ascribed to Godand toGod’s attributes, whereas an attribute cannot be ascribed to anyother attribute. So God is eternaland God’sintelligence is eternal; therefore eternality is a mode of existence.God is intelligent, but God’s will is not intelligent;therefore, intelligence is an attribute. Gregory Brown (2023,xcii–xciv) attributes Clarke’s 1719 change to Newton desiring toclarify his views after Clarke’s possibly inconsistentdiscussion in the letters to Leibniz.

God’s immensity and eternality are consistent withGod’s unity. As Leibniz and Waterland noted, theidentification of divine immensity with space endangers the simplicityof the divine being because space has parts, albeit not separableones. The objection, though formidable, was not new; Bayle in theDictionnaire (entry “Leucippus,” remark G) hadchided the Newtonians for identifying space with divine immensity inorder to solve the ontological problem created by the positing of aninfinite space because it leads to the destruction of divinesimplicity and to various absurdities. As a further point, Waterlandsuggests that since Clarke accepts that nothing with parts can be thesubject of consciousness, God’s immensity also undermines divineintelligence and consciousness. Clarke offered two responses. Firstly,not everything extended has parts. Space is extended, but (as Newtonhad claimed) its “parts” cannot be moved, so they are nottruly parts. Secondly, Clarke claimed parity between spatial andtemporal extendedness: because the former is compatible with thesimplicity of what “stretches” temporally, the latter iscompatible with the simplicity of what stretches spatially. But theparity between space and time, were it to be granted, rather thanshowing that spatial extendedness is not detrimental to athing’s simplicity because temporal extendedness is not, couldbe taken to show that the latter is detrimental to a thing’ssimplicity because the former is.

4.3 Trinitarian Views

In his lifetime, Clarke was infamous for his view of the trinity, andhe sparked a vociferous debate (Ferguson 1974, 59–149;Pfizenmaier 1997, 179–216). Clarke was not officially censured(but nearly so), but it surely prevented his rising to higher clericaloffice. Clarke’s writings on the trinity are relevant forunderstanding his other metaphysical positions, especially hisidentification of “person” with intelligent, acting agentrather than with a particular substance, which has not beensufficiently reconciled with his account of personal identity asexplained by an immaterial soul.

In Christian theology, God is represented as tripartite—threepersons but one God. In the 1662Book of Common Prayer, inuse in England during Clarke’s lifetime, one of the liturgiesdraws from the Athanasian Creed, which includes the followingdiscussion of the Trinity: “For there is one Person of theFather, another of the Son: and another of the Holy Ghost. But theGodhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is allone… So the Father is God, the Son is God : and the Holy Ghostis God. And yet they are not three Gods: but one God.” In hisposition as a cleric, Clarke was required to subscribe to thisformulation. In 1712, against the advice of his friends, he publishedThe Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, in which he divergedfrom what his opponents considered the plain sense of thisformulation.The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity begins bycollecting all the passages of the New Testament that relate to theTrinity. It then sets out a series of 55 propositions regarding theTrinity, each supported by references to the texts collected in thefirst section and writings from the early Christian church. Thebiblical texts do not primarily discuss God’s metaphysicalattributes, according to Clarke, but ascribe dominion to God (W 4.150;Snobelen 2004, 265–275). The third section relates thesepropositions to the Anglican liturgy. This approach reflectsClarke’s general expectation that the correct theologicaldoctrines are found in the Bible, are endorsed by the early church,and are compatible with reason. Through hundreds of years of what heconsidered bad metaphysics, the correct and intelligible doctrine ofthe trinity had become obscured, and Clarke hoped to return to apre-Athanasian understanding of the trinity.

Clarke’s position inThe Scripture-Doctrine of theTrinity was labeled by his opponents as “Arian,”“Socinian,” and “Sabellian.” Although theywere commonly used as abusive terms for anyone holding non-traditionalor anti-trinitarian views, they also have more precise meanings. AnArian holds that the Son (the second person of the Trinity) is divinebut not eternal; he was created by God the Father out of nothingbefore the beginning of the world. A Socinian holds that the Son ismerely human and was created at or after the conception of Jesus. ASabellian holds that the Son is a mode of God. In the precise use ofthe terms, Clarke is none of these. Unlike the Arians, Clarke affirmedthat the Son is co-eternal with the Father and not created (W 4.141).(Pfizenmaier 1997 provides further textual and historical argumentsthat Clarke should not be classified as an Arian.) From this it alsofollows that,contra the Socinians, the Son existed beforethe conception of Jesus. Unlike the Sabellians, Clarke denied that theSon was a mode of the Father. (This would have been very problematicgiven that he sometimes claimed that space is a mode of God.)Clarke’s claimed ignorance about substance made him reluctant todeclare that the Father and the Son were the same divine substance,but the Son is endowed by the Father with all of the power andauthority of the Father. He also called the manner of the Son’sgeneration from the father “ineffable.” So while Clarkedenied that the trinity was a “mystery,” he did believethat the manner in which the Father’s power is communicated tothe Son is “after a manner to us unknown” (Proposition 35;4.159).

Clarke affirms that each member of the trinity is a person, but onlythe Father is self-existent, which means that the Father by essence(rather than by “office”) has a property that the Son doesnot. His views are best described as subordinationist, but he couldalso be called a unitarian, in at least some senses of the term (Tuggy2014; 204–205).^[8]

4.4 Miracles

Like many associated with the Royal Society, Clarke thought thatmiracles could be used as evidence for the claim that Christianity isthe true religion. However, given that matter is inactive, God isactively involved in all interactions between bodies. What then couldseparate out a particular action of God as miraculous? According toClarke, a miracle is a “work effected in a mannerunusual, or different from the common and regular Method ofProvidence, by the interposition either of God himself, or of someIntelligent Agent superior to Man, for the Proof or Evidence of someparticular Doctrine, or in attestation to the Authority of someparticular Person” (W 2.701). This became a point of controversyin the letters that passed between Clarke and Leibniz (L3.13–116, W 4.605). One focus of the debate is which would begreater: a world so perfectly crafted that God does not need tointervene to keep it running (Leibniz), or a world so dependent on Godthat one cannot understand the world without recognizing its continualdependence on the operations of God (Clarke). A second focus of thedebate is the proper understanding of a miracle: something thatexceeds the natural power of created things (Leibniz), or somethingthat seems different from our human expectation of how things operate(Clarke).

Clarke maintains that miracles are miraculous only from a humanperspective and that God and other immaterial agents actively andcontinuously work in the physical world because matter is completelypassive. Because God’s wisdom and goodness are unchanging, ifGod chooses to act differently in the world at a certain time (e.g.,by changing the laws of motion), it is only because it was always goodto do so and was part of God’s plan from eternity. Because itrequires no more power for God to do the miraculous-to-us as to do thenatural-to-us, neither one is “with Respect toGod,more or lessNatural orSupernatural than theother.” From our perspective, God is changing the order ofthings; from God’s perspective, everything is equally part ofGod’s design. A miracle, then, is only a miracle “withRegard toour Conceptions” (C2.6–12, W4.598–601). In his final letter Clarke elaborates on this,suggesting that we call the sun stopping in the sky miraculous onlybecause it is unusual; if it was always at the same point in the sky,then that would be natural, and its motion miraculous. Similarly,raising a dead body from the ground is miraculous only because Goddoes not usually act that way (C5.107–109, W 4.693; C3.17, W4.611–612). Unusualness is a necessary but not sufficientcondition for being a miracle (C4.43, W 4.629–630), but Clarkenowhere says what else is required.

Leibniz attacks Clarke’s position from multiple angles.Leibniz’s first letter accuses Newton of making an imperfectmachine that requires tuning to keep it running, like a watch thatrequires winding, which is unfitting a perfect God. In Newton’sworld, miracles are required “in order to supply the Wants ofNature” (L1.4, W 4.588). Clarke responds that there is adisanalogy between the watch and the world. The watch requires windingbecause a human watchmaker can only compose parts and put them inmotion, whereas God is both the creator and preserver of forces andpowers. On the offensive, Clarke charges those who deny God’sconstant involvement in the world to be allowing a mechanical world, aworld of “Materialism andFate,” whereGod is not needed at all (C1.4, W 4.590). In response, Leibniz makesthe interesting objection that either Clarke is explaining naturalthings by the supernatural, which is absurd, or else God is a part ofnature (specifically, the soul of the world) (L2.12, W 4.596;L4.110–11, W 4.666). Leibniz also charges that Clarke cannotexplain the difference between natural and supernatural action.“But it isregular, (says the Author,) it isconstant, and consequentlynatural. I answer; itcannot be regular, without being reasonable; nor natural, unless itcan be explained by the Natures of creatures” (L5.121, W4.668–669). Regularities require explanations, and to be naturalthese explanations must come from the natures of the creatures. TheClarkean picture, in which matter is completely passive, is incapableof explaining the regularities exhibited in the interaction ofmaterial bodies in terms of those bodies. Whereas Clarke saw this asthe pinnacle of what natural philosophy contributes to naturaltheology, Leibniz saw it as a failure to exhibit a fully rationalworld suited to being created by a perfectly good God.

4.5 Revelation and the Four Categories of Deism

Clarke was confident in the prospects of general revelation; humanreason is capable of discovering the existence and attributes of Godby reasoning from the evidence of nature. Many theological and ethicaltruths (e.g., there is a God, God is to be worshiped, it is good to bejust and righteous) are plainly understandable to everyone, and if oneis mistaken in these matters “’tis not by hisUnderstanding, but by hisWill that he isdeceived.” Yet it is very common to oppose these truths; themost common causes are “apresumptuous Ignorance, whichdespises Knowledge”; carelessness, which leads toblindly following local customs; prejudice, which is relyingimplicitly on others and traditions rather than an examination of theevidence; and vice, a willful opposition to the truth due to the loveof wickedness, debauchery, and power (W 2.147–160). The reasoneddefense of natural religion, although perhaps unable to sway theprejudiced, was central to Clarke’s project. He even suggeststhat Christianity presupposes natural religion (LCC 813, W 4.582).

Clarke thought deists could be convinced to abandon their positionbecause deism is unstable. In Clarke’s taxonomy, there are fourcategories of deists (W 2.600ff). The first group say they believe in“an Eternal, Infinite, Independent, Intelligent Being”that made the world, but this God is not involved in the governing ofthe world nor does God care for what happens in it. In response,Clarke argues (1) that the best science of the day has shown that thenature of matter is insufficient to ground the laws by which matteracts and thus requires the continuous dependence upon its Creator and(2) a God that isn’t concerned for what happens in the worldmust be lacking in knowledge of what is happening, power to affectwhat is happening, ability to act in the world, or wisdom to know thatintervention is needed, and thus is not the God that the deist claimedto accept. The second group accept providential action in the world,but deny that God has moral attributes; ethics is a matter of humanconstruction. Clarke claims they fail to see (1) that ethics is amatter of eternal, fixed relations and (2) that to deny the moralattributes of God entails the denial of either God’s wisdom orpower. The third group affirm God’s moral attributes, but theydeny the immortality of the human soul and that moral terms applyunivocally between God and humans, which in practice leads to thedenial of a future state after death. Clarke claims that this explodesall the attributes of God so that we no longer know what we are sayingwhen we talk about God. Finally, some deists hold the correcttheological and ethical doctrines, but claim that they know thissolely on the basis of general revelation and thus have no need of aspecial, Christian revelation. Clarke suspects that this fourthcategory of deists no longer exist in lands where Christianity hasreached.

5. Ethics

Although some of his sermons contain interesting analyses ofindividual virtues, the most sustained exposition of Clarke’sdeontological, rationalist ethics is contained in his second set ofBoyle Lectures,A Discourse Concerning the Unalterable Obligationsof Natural Religion. Clarke begins by stating that clearly thereare different relations among persons and that from these relationsthere arises a “fitness” or “unfitness” ofbehavior among persons. So, for example, given the relation ofinfinite disproportion between humans and God, it is fit that wehonor, worship, and imitate God. These facts can be rationallyapprehended by anyone with a sound mind, although in some cases we maybe at a loss in clearly demarcating right from wrong. Being groundedin necessary relations, ethical truths are universal and necessary. Assuch, they are independent of any will, divine or human, and of anycalculation of punishment or reward.

In somewhat more detail, the central tenets of Clarke’s ethicsare elucidated in the subordinate components of the first propositionofA Discourse.

There are eternal and necessary differences (or“reasons”) of things, from which “necessarily arisesanagreement ordisagreement of some things withothers, or afitness orunfitness of the applicationof different things or different relations one to another” (W2.608).
God wills to act according to these eternal reasons of things (W2.612).
All rational creatures should choose to act according to theeternal rule of reason (by which Clarke seems to mean these eternalrelations) (W 2.612), and the human mind “naturally andnecessarily Assents to the eternal Law of Righteousness” (W2.616).
This eternal law is classified into piety (duty toward God),righteousness (duty to other human persons), and sobriety (duty tooneself) (W 2.618).
This law is temporally and logically prior to and independent ofhuman interaction (W 2.624).
This law is also logically prior to and independent of the will ofGod (W 2.626).
The obligation to follow this law is “antecedent to allConsideration of any particular private and personal Reward orPunishment” (W 2.627).

From (3) and in clarification of sobriety and piety in (4), Clarkeargues the ideal created moral agent is one who acts within the scopeof what God, with full authority and compatibly with reason, hascommanded. For instance, we ought to preserve our own being becauseGod has created us and sustains us and only God ought to remove usfrom the world (Heydt 2018, 135). Regarding (4), Clarke argues thatduties toward others are governed by equity, which demands that onedeal with other persons as one can reasonably expect others to dealwith one (W 2.619), and by love, which demands that one further thewell-being happiness of all persons (W 2.621). Duties towards oneselfdemand that one preserve one’s physical health, mentalfaculties, and spiritual well-being so as to be able to performone’s duties (W 2.623). Clarke uses (5) as an opportunity todevelop a series of interesting attacks on Hobbes’ account ofpolitical and moral obligation. Among his many criticisms, he arguesthat a social contract cannot be obligatory unless there were alreadyan obligation to obey contracts; if a contract benefits the communitythen there are real benefits prior to the contract so the contractdoes not generate benefits and harms; it is a contradiction foreveryone to have a right to the same thing in the state of nature; andif power is to be obeyed then an all-powerful devil should be obeyed,which is absurd (W 2.609–616, 631–638). In clarificationof (6), Clarke adds that, because God always does what is just andgood, God’s commands align with the eternal law (W 2.637), andthat, because God wants to make us happy and good, God promotes thegoodness and welfare of the whole of creation, including us (W 2.640).While the law is antecedent to considerations of reward and punishment(7), God’s justice ensures the proper rewards and punishmentsfor following the law (W 2.641). These sanctions are not uniformlypresent in this life, so the reward and punishment must at leastpartly occur in the next life. Moreover, human depravity makes theprospect of future sanctions a necessary incentive for properbehavior. God might also ensure that our acting from the best reasonsdoes not have overall much worse consequences (Schneewind 1997,317).

Clarke’s theory has been criticized on several grounds,especially on the meaning and sufficiency of (1). He never adequatelyexplained the nature of the relations among persons that groundmorality. For instance, his explanation for why it is“fit” to honor, worship, obey, and imitate God is that“God is infinitely superior toMen” (W2.608). If the infinite superiority is in reference to power or being,it is not obviously to the point; if it is an expression of an ethicalrelation, the argument is circular. Additionally, it is unclear whatin the “Nature and Reason of Things” is necessary. Is itthat good is necessarily not evil? (This is trivial and unhelpful.) Isit that one thing cannot be both good from one perspective and evilfrom another? (In which case, Clarke is offering a response to Hobbesor maybe Spinoza, but he doesn’t provide a substantialalternative.) Is it that whatever is good is necessarily good? (Inwhich case, he is perhaps restating his opposition to divine commandtheory, but again not in a way that makes clear his alternative.) Isit something else? Clarke’s position is not clear, but he doesseem to affirm each of these interpretations at different times.Frances Hutcheson argued that to make sense of Clarke’s theoryof fitness, one needed to supplement it with Hutcheson’s ownmoral sense theory (Boeker 2022, 154–157). Similarly, Hume(1739, 3.1.1.3–7) charged theories like Clarke’s withmotivational impotence because the perception of “fitness”cannot, by itself, move the will. However, Clarke denied thatevaluation causes motivation, although he clearly thought thatevaluation provides the agent, who ultimately causes the volition,with reasons for action. A further structural problem is that Clarkeslides between (1) the claim that ethical truths are relations betweenmind-independent objects in the world and (2) the claim that they aregrounded in the nature of rationality itself, apparently withoutdistinguishing the two positions. Relatedly, there is an interpretivequestion about whether Clarke is ontologically committed to theexistence of mind-independent values that are not reducible toanything in the world (Kelly 2002, Sheridan 2007, Boeker 2022).

6. Influence and Reception

Clarke’s influence on his contemporaries and the generation thatfollowed was immense. As the translator of the standard textbook inphysics in England in the early eighteenth century,^[9] as the defender of Newton’s natural philosophy in thecorrespondence with Leibniz, as the translator of Newton’sOpticks into Latin, and as a recognized close friend ofNewton, Clarke was perhaps the most significant spokesperson for theNewtonian natural philosophy, and a primary interpreter of itsimplications for metaphysics, philosophy of science, and theology. Inparticular, his use of the passivity and scarcity of matter in hisargument for the existence of God was noted by his contemporariesinternationally.

Clarke’s influence was greatest in England and Scotland, whereall of his works were widely read. Daniel Waterland was his sharpestcontemporary critic, but the two remained friendly throughout(Ferguson 1976, 217). A. A. Sykes and John Jackson were Clarke’smost forceful defenders in the 1710s and 1720s. Clarke often madesuggestions to Jackson about how best to defend his views (Ferguson1976, 218–219). Among those sympathetic to Clarke’smethodology and positions in the next two generations, Andrew Baxterwas the most polemical, John Stewart the most irritating to Hume,Richard Price the most similar, and Thomas Reid the most well knowntoday. Clarke’s ethics (with some metaphysical support) weredefended by William Wollaston and Catharine Trotter Cockburn (seeThomas 2017, 210ff; Boeker 2022), criticized and supplemented byJoseph Butler (Yajima 2024), and attacked by David Hume (see Greenberg2013, 251ff). There has been comparatively little work on Clarke andBerkeley, but see Schliesser 2020 on the role of order, structure, andparts in nature.

Clarke profoundly influenced philosophers in the eighteenth centurythat had interests in the intersection of theology and philosophy,particularly on the freedom of the will and the relationship betweenGod, space, and matter. Jonathan Edwards singled out Clarke as a majoropponent in hisFreedom of the Will, where Edwards runstogether libertarianism with Arminian theology (which requires that afree choice of the will is necessary for receiving God’s savinggrace). That same libertarianism made Clarke popular among the GermanPietists. Among them, Crusius is the most notable, both for his workand for his importance to Kant, and the Leibniz-Clarke correspondenceis a likely source for Kant’s discussions of space and time.(See the entry onKant’s Views on Space and Time.) Voltaire (1752) declared, “Among these philosophers [the lastgeneration of British philosophers], Clarke is perhaps altogether theclearest, the most profound, the most methodical, and the strongest ofall those who have spoken of the Supreme Being.” Voltaire as ayoung man was particularly impressed with Clarke; later in life, heseems to have been less convinced by Clarke’s argument for theexistence of God. Recent work has shown Clarke’s influence onEmilie du Châtelet’s theory of freedom, although whethershe was influenced by theDemonstration or only thecorrespondence with Leibniz and whether she was a libertarian aredisputed (Hutton, 2012, Jorati 2019, Wells 2021). InEmile,Rousseau refers to “the illustrious Clarke enlightening theworld, proclaiming at last the Being of beings and the Dispenser ofthings,” but whether Rousseau was steadfastly sympathetic toClarke’s system is in doubt (Attfield 2004, 433–434).

In hisDialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume has Demearecite the argumenta priori and both Cleanthes and Philooffer critiques. Clarke is cited by name inTreatise 1.3.3and is a likely object of the arguments against ethical rationalism inTreatise 3.1. InA Letter from a Gentleman (1745),Hume (or possibly Kames; the authorship is disputed) admits thatClarke’s argumenta priori is undermined by the claimsof theTreatise. Russell (1997 and 2008) has proposed thatClarke is a major target of Hume’sTreatise, and thatHume’s opposition to natural theology as defended by Clarke is auniting theme of theTreatise. Recent work on Mary Shepherdengages Hume on the points in metaphysics and ethics on which he ismost critical of Clarke (e.g., Bolton 2019, Landy 2020).

In 1778, Richard Price could still write on behalf of many that“Dr. Clarke is, without all doubt, the best and ablest of allwriters, on the subjects of the Immateriality and Natural Immortalityof the Soul, and also on Liberty and Necessity,” but by thenineteenth century interest in and appreciation of Clarke haddwindled. Samuel Coleridge (1854, 405) considered him“over-rated,” and Leslie Stephen (1881, 119) claimed thatto nineteenth-century eyes, Clarke “appears to be a second-rateadvocate of opinions interesting only in the mouths of greater men whowere their first and ablest advocates.” Henry Sidgwick (1886,175–180), despite his criticisms, is a nineteenth-centuryexception in holding Clarke in high regard.

In the last few decades, a renewed interest in Clarke’s argumenta priori, a rediscovery of Newton’s unpublishedwritings and subsequent study of his associates, and a greaterappreciation for Clarke’s historical importance to ethics,metaphysics, and more have philosophers reading Clarke again, and theestimation of his philosophical acuity has increased.

Bibliography

Primary Literature

W	Clarke, S., 1738,The Works, B. Hoadly (ed.), London;reprint New York: Garland Publishing Co, 2002.
D	Clarke, S., 1705,A Demonstration of the Being andAttributes of God And Other Writings, E. Vailati (ed.),Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
CC	Clarke, S., and Collins, A., 1707–1708,TheCorrespondence of Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins, W. Uzgalis(ed.), Buffalo, NY: Broadview Press, 2011.
L,C	Leibniz, G.W., and Clarke, S., 1715–1716,TheLeibniz–Clarke Correspondence, H. G. Alexander (ed.),Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1956.
LCC	Leibniz, G.W., Clarke, S., and Caroline of Ansbach,1710–1718,The Leibniz–Caroline–ClarkeCorrespondence, G. Brown (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,2023.
NC	North, R. and Clarke, S., 1704–1713,Seeking Truth:Roger North’s Notes on Newton and Correspondence with Clarke, c.1704–1713, J. C. Kassler (ed.), Farnham: Ashgate Press,2014.

Secondary Literature

Biography

Brewster, D., 1855,Memoirs of the Life, Writings, andDiscoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, 2 vols, Edinburgh: ThomasConstable & Co. [Second volumeavailable online.]
Ferguson, J. P., 1976,An Eighteenth Century Heretic. DrSamuel Clarke, Kineton, UK: Roundwood Press.
Hoadly, B. (ed.), 1730,Sermons on Several Subjects by SamuelClarke, D.D., London: W. Botham. [Available online.]
Stephen, L., 1881, “Clarke and Wollaston,”AHistory of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 volumes,2nd edition, London: Smith, Elder, & Co. [Available online.]
Stephen, L., and Lee, S., (eds.), 1882,Dictionary of NationalBiography, London; reprinted by London: Oxford University Press,1949–50,sub voce.
Sykes, A., 1729, “The Elogium of the late truly Learned,Reverend and Pious Samuel Clarke, D.D.,” W. Whiston (ed.),Historical Memoirs of the Life of Dr. Samuel Clarke, 3rdedition, London, 1748. [Available online.]
Whiston, W., 1728,A Collection of Authentick Records,London. [Available online.]
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Metaphysics and Correspondence

Attfield, R., 1977, “Clarke, Collins and Compounds,”Journal of the History of Philosophy, 15: 45–54.
Brown, G., 2004, “Leibniz’s Endgame and the Ladies ofthe Courts,”Journal of the History of Ideas, 65 (1):75–100.
–––, 2016, “Did Samuel Clarke ReallyDisavow Action at a Distance in His Correspondence with Leibniz?:Newton, Clarke, and Bentley on Gravitation and Action at aDistance,”Studies in History and Philosophy of Science60: 38–47.
Garrett, A., 2013, “Mind and Matter,”The OxfordHandbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, J. A.Harris (ed.), 171–193.
Greenberg, S., 2013, “Liberty and Necessity,”TheOxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century,J. A. Harris (ed.), 171–193.
Harris, J., 2005,Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free WillDebate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy, Oxford:Clarendon Press.
Henry, J., 2020, “Primary and Secondary Causation in SamuelClarke’s and Isaac Newton’s Theories of Gravity,”Isis, 111 (3): 542–561.
Janiak, A., 2007, “Newton and the Reality of Force,”Journal of the History of Philosophy, 45 (1):127–147.
Khamara, E., 2006,Space, Time, and Theology in theLeibniz-Newton Controversy, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Koyré, A., and Cohen, I. B., “The Case of the MissingTanquam: Leibniz, Newton & Clarke,”Isis52 (4): 555–566.
O’Higgins, J., (ed.), 1976,Determinism and Freewill:Anthony Collins’ “A Philosophical Inquiry concerning HumanLiberty,” The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
Pfizenmaier, T. C., 1997,The Trinitarian Theology of Dr.Samuel Clarke (1675–1729): Context, Sources, andControversy, Leiden: Brill.
Price, R., and Priestley, J., 1778,A Free Discussion of theDoctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, London: J.Johnson. [Available online.]
Rowe, W. L., 1971, “The Cosmological Argument,”Noûs, 5 (1): 49–61.
–––, 1973,Philosophy of Religion, NewYork: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
–––, 1987, “Causality and Free Will in theControversy Between Collins and Clarke,”The Journal of theHistory of Philosophy, 25: 51–67.
Rozemond, M., 2003, “Descartes, Mind-Body Union, andHolenmerism,”Philosophical Topics, 31 (1–2):343–367.
–––, 2008, “The Achilles Argument and theNature of Matter in the Clarke-Collins Correspondence,”TheAchilles of Rationalist Psychology, T. Lennon & R. Stainton(eds.), 159–175.
–––, 2009, “Can Matter Think? TheMind-Body Problem in the Clarke-Collins Correspondence,”Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind, J. Miller (ed.),171–192.
Sangiacomo, A., 2018, “Samuel Clarke on Agent Causation,Voluntarism, and Occasionalism,”Science in Context, 31(4): 421–456.
Schliesser, E., 2012, “Newton and Spinoza: On Motion andMatter (And God, Of Course),”The Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, 50: 436–458.
–––, 2013, “Newton and Newtonianism inEighteenth-Century British Thought,”The Oxford Handbook ofBritish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, J. A. Harris (ed.),New York: Oxford University Press, 41–64.
Thiel, U., 2011,The Early Modern Subject, New York:Oxford University Press.
Thomas, E., 2018,Absolute Time: Rifts in Early Modern BritishMetaphysics, New York: Oxford University Press.
Tuggy, D., 2014, “Divine Deception and Monotheism,”Journal of Analytic Theology, 2: 186–209.
Uzgalis, W., 2018, “Minds and Persons in the Clarke CollinsCorrespondence,”Philosophy of Mind in the Early Modern andModern Ages, R. Copenhaver (ed.), London: Routledge,266–283.
Vailati, E., 1993, “Clarke’s ExtendedSoul,”Journal of the History of Philosophy, 28:213–28.
–––, 1997,Leibniz and Clarke: A Study oftheir Correspondence, New York: Oxford University Press.
Wigelsworth, J. R., 2009,Deism in Enlightenment England:Theology, Politics, and Newtonian Public Science, Manchester:Manchester University Press.
Wolf, L., 2019, “Clarke’s Rejection of SuperaddedGravity in the Clarke-Collins Correspondence,”History ofPhilosophy Quarterly, 36 (3): 237–255.
–––, 2022, “Was Clarke aVoluntarist?”Journal of Modern Philosophy, 4 (1): 6.doi:10.25894/jmp.2051
Yenter, T., 2014, “Clarke Against Spinoza on the ManifestDiversity of the World,”British Journal for the History ofPhilosophy, 22: 260–280.
–––, 2022, “What Hume Didn’t Noticeabout Divine Causation,”Philosophical Essays on DivineCausation, G. Ganssle (ed.), New York: Routledge,158–173.

Ethics, Religion, and the Boyle Lectures

Atkey, A., 1725,Letters Written, in MDCCXXV, to the Rev. Dr.Samuel Clarke, relating to an argument advanced by the Doctor, in hisDemonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, in proof of theUnity of the Deity: with the Doctor’s Answers, London:Daniel Browne, 1745.
Boeker, R., 2022, “Hutcheson and his Critics and Opponentson the Moral Sense,”Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 20(2): 143–161.
Dahm, J. J., 1970, “Science and Apologetics in the EarlyBoyle Lectures,”Church History, 39 (2):172–186.
Force, J. E., 1984, “Hume and the Relation of Science toReligion among Certain Members of the Royal Society,”Journal of the History of Ideas, 45 (4): 517–536.
–––, 1996, “Samuel Clarke’s FourCategories of Deism, Isaac Newton, and the Bible,”Scepticism in the History of Philosophy, R. Popkin (ed.),Dordrecht: Kluwer, 53–74.
Jacob, M. C., 1976,The Newtonians and the English Revolution:1689–1720, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
–––, 1977, “Newtonianism and the Originsof the Enlightenment: A Reassessment,”Eighteenth CenturyStudies, 11 (1): 1–25.
Kelly, E., 2002, “Moral Agency and Free Choice:Clarke’s Unlikely Success against Hume,”Archiv furGeschichte der Philosophie, 84 (3): 297–318.
Khamara, E. J., 1992, “Hume Versus Clarke on theCosmological Argument,”The Philosophical Quarterly,42: 34–55.
Le Rossignol, J. E., 1892,The Ethical Philosophy of SamuelClarke, Leipzig.
MacIntosh, J. J., 1997, “The Argument from the Need forSimilar or ‘Higher’ Qualities: Cudworth, Locke, and Clarkeon God’s Existence,”Enlightenment and Dissent,16: 29–59.
Radcliffe, E.S., 2019, “Ruly and Unruly Passions: EarlyModern Perspectives,”Royal Institute of PhilosophySupplement, 85: 21–38.
Rowe, W. R., 1997, “Clarke and Leibniz on Divine Perfectionand Freedom,”Enlightenment and Dissent, 16:60–82.
Schneewind, J. B., 1997,The Invention of Autonomy: A Historyof Modern Moral Philosophy, New York: Cambridge UniversityPress.
Sheridan, P., 2007, “The Metaphysical Morality of FrancisHutcheson: A Consideration of Hutcheson’s Critique of MoralFitness Theory,”Sophia, 46 (3): 263–75.
Sidgwick, H., 1886,Outlines of the History of Ethics,London: Macmillan and Co.
Snobelen, S., 2001, “‘God of Gods, and Lord ofLords:’ The Theology of Isaac Newton’s General Scholium tothePrincipia,”Osiris, 16:169–208.
–––, 2004, “Socinianism and Newtonianism:The Case of Samuel Clarke,”Fausto Sozzini e la Filosofia inEuropa, M. Priarolo and M. E. Scribano (eds.), Accademia SeneseDegli Intronat.
Stewart, L., 1981, “Samuel Clarke, Newtonianism and theFactions of Post-Revolutionary England,”Journal of theHistory of Ideas, 42: 53–71.
–––, 1996, “Seeing through the Scholium:Religion and Reading Newton in the Eighteenth Century,”History of Science, 34 (2): 123–165.
Thomas, D. O., 1997, “Reason and Revelation in SamuelClarke’s Epistemology of Morals,”Enlightenment andDissent, 16: 114–135.
Young, J. O., 2023, “Catharine Trotter Cockburn on MoralKnowledge,”Journal of the History of Women Philosophers andScientists, 2 (1–2): 46–67.
Zebrowski, M. K., 1997, “’Commanded of God, Because‘tis Holy and Good’: The Christian Platonism and NaturalLaw of Samuel Clarke,”Enlightenment and Dissent, 16:3–28.

Influence and Reception

Ablondi, F., 2013, “Newtonian Vs. Newtonian: Baxter andMaclaurin on the Inactivity of Matter,”The Journal ofScottish Philosophy, 11 (1): 15–23.
Attfield, R., 2004, “Rousseau, Clarke, Butler and Critiquesof Deism,”British Journal for the History ofPhilosophy, 12 (3): 429–443.
Barresi, J., and Martin, R., 2004,Naturalization of the Soul:Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century, New York:Routledge.
Baxter, A., 1733,An Enquiry into the Nature of the HumanSoul, London: James Bettenham.
Coleridge, S. T., 1854, “Notes on Waterland’sVindication of Christ’s Divinity,”The Complete Worksof Samuel Taylor Coleridge, volume 5, New York: Harper andBrothers Press.
Edwards, J., 1754,Freedom of the Will, P. Ramsey (ed.),New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957. [Available online]
Ferguson, J. P., 1974,The Philosophy of Dr Samuel Clarke andIts Critics, New York: Vantage Press.
Flew, A., 1951, “Locke and the Problem of PersonalIdentity,”Philosophy, 26: 359–383.
Hume, D., 1739,A Treatise of Human Nature, London: JohnNoonan. [Available online]
–––, 1745,A Letter from a Gentleman to HisFriend in Edinburgh, Edinburgh.
Hutton, S., 2012, “Between Newton and Leibniz: Emilie duChâtelet and Samuel Clarke,” R. Hagengruber (ed.)Emilie du Châtelet between Leibniz and Newton,Dordrecht: Springer, 77–95.
Jorati, J.,“Du Châtelet on Freedom, Self-Motion, andMoral Necessity,”Journal of the History of Philosophy,57 (2): 255–280.
Kant, I., 1781/1787,Critique of Pure Reason, P. Guyerand A. W. Wood (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1998.
Landy, D., 2020, “Shepherd on Hume’s Argument for thePossibility of Uncaused Existence,”Journal of ModernPhilosophy, 2 (1). doi:10.25894/jmp.2131
Law, E., 1758,Collected Works of Edmund Law, 5 vols., V.Nuovo (ed.), Chippenham: Thoemmes, 1997.
Meli, D. B., 1999, “Caroline, Leibniz, and Clarke,”Journal of the History of Ideas, 60 (3): 469–486.
Newton, I., 1726,The Principia: Mathematical Principles ofNatural Philosophy, I. B. Cohen and A. Whitman (trans. and eds.),Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999.
Prior, A., 1957, “Opposite Number,”Review ofMetaphysics, 11: 196–201.
Rousseau, J., 1762,Emile or On Education, A. Bloom (ed.and trans.), New York: Basic Books, 1997.
Russell, P., 1997, “Clarke’s ‘AlmightySpace’ and Hume’sTreatise,”Enlightenment and Dissent, 16: 83–113.
–––, 2008,The Riddle of Hume’sTreatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion, New York:Oxford University Press.
Schliesser, E., 2020, “Does Berkeley’s ImmaterialismSupport Toland’s Spinozism? The Posidonian Argument and theEleventh Objection,”Royal Institute of PhilosophySupplement, 88: 33–71.
Schüller, V., 2023, “Samuel Clarke’s Annotationsin Jacques Rohault’sTraité de Physique, and HowThey Contributed to Popularising Newton’s Physics,” W.Lefèvre (ed.),Between Leibniz, Newton, and Kant:Philosophy and Science in the Eighteenth Century, Dordrecht:Springer Verlag, 139–156.
Shepherd, M., 1824,An Essay upon the Relation of Cause andEffect, London: T. Hookham.
Stewart, J., 1754, “Some Remarks on the Laws of Motion, andtheInertia of Matter,”Essays and Observations,Physical and Literary, Edinburgh: G. Hamilton and J.Balfour.
Thomas, E., 2017, “Creation, Divine Freedom, and CatherineCockburn: An Intellectualist on Possible Worlds and ContingentLaws,”Women and Liberty, 1600–1800: PhilosophicalEssays, J. Broad and K. Detlefsen (eds.), New York: OxfordUniversity Press.
Tull Baker, J., 1932, “Space, Time, and God: A Chapter inEighteenth Century English Philosophy,”The PhilosophicalReview, 41 (6): 577–593.
Voltaire, 1752, “Plato,”PhilosophicalDictionary, W. F. Fleming (trans.), New York: E. R. Dumont,1901.
Watts, I., 1733,Philosophical Essays on VariousSubjects, 2nd edition, London: Richard Ford.
Wells, A., 2022, “Du Châtelet’sLibertarianism,”History of Philosophy Quarterly, 38(3): 219–241.
Williams, B., 1957, “Personal Identity andIndividuation,”Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, 57: 229–252.
Winkler, K., 1989, “Our Modern Metaphysicians,”British Society for the History of Philosophy Newsletter, 4:35–40.
Yajima, N., 2024, “Formation of Butler’s MoralTheology as a Foundation of Commercial Society,”JosephButler: A Preacher for Eighteenth-Century Commercial Society, D.Arie, M. Okubo, and N. Yajima (eds), Singapore: Springer Nature,25–40.
Yenter, T., 2023, “The Metaphysical Implications ofNewtonianism,”Scottish Philosophy in the EighteenthCentury, Volume II: Method, Metaphysics, Mind, Language, A.Garrett and J. Harris (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,108–143.
Yolton, J. W., 1983,Thinking Matter: Materialism inEighteenth-Century Britain, Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress.

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Google Books has digitized versions ofVolume 2 (including theDemonstration) andVolume 4 (including the correspondence with Leibniz) of the definitive 1738edition of theWorks, edited by Hoadly.
The Internet Archive has many digitized editions of variousworks by Clarke and his contemporaries.
Samuel Clarke in theEarly Modern Philosophy Texts, prepared by Jonathan Bennett and Peter Millican, contains the textsofA Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, thecorrespondence with Butler, and the correspondence with Leibniz, inheavily edited versions prepared for students.
Samuel Clarke, catalog of the Galileo Project, maintained by Albert Van Helden.

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