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1. Architecture In Ancient and Early Modern Thought

Just as the history of philosophical aesthetics subsequent to Platoand Aristotle and prior to Baumgarten represents a relatively thincanon, a similar judgment applies to philosophical explorations of thenature and fundamental concepts of architecture. Indeed, as Plato andAristotle have little to say on the topic, the pre-Baumgartencatalogue of philosophical accounts of architecture is even moreslender.

Of Plato’s brief pronouncements on the topic, perhaps bestknown is his exoneration of architecture as it promotes the socialgood and as a non-mimetic, hence non-deceptive, artform (as contrastswith sculpture). He further characterizes architecture and alliedenterprises (Philebus 56b-c) as progressing through exactmeasurement—comparing favorably with music, which relies in itsdevelopment on iterative experience. Plato also locates the kind ofknowledge architecture represents in the domain of thepraktikê(πρακτική, knowing how), asaligned withtechnê (τέχνη, thepractical arts) and in contrast withgnostikê(γνωστικη, experientiallyknowing that) orepistêmê(ἐπιστήμη, by way of theory orreason knowing that). Such practical knowledge is delivered not asjudgments (as with mathematics) but as instructions or commands, inthe manner of managerial knowledge (The Statesman260a-b). Beyond these fleeting remarks, a Platonist legacy inarchitectural thought may be located in the influence of idealism. AsMitrovic (2011) suggests, Greek, Roman, and Renaissance interest inoptical correction reflects concerns about bringing perceptions ofconcretely realized structures in line with corresponding idealarchitectural “forms”, or about departures fromproportions of works described by such forms. In contemporaryphilosophy of architecture, Platonism is mooted in the question as towhether,per an abstractist thesis, such ideal objects arethe uniquely actual, or (more modestly) most real, architecturalobjects.

Aristotle joins Plato in largely speaking of architecture not as acentral topic of interest but in order to make a point. Thus,Aristotle presents the four causes drawing on the example of causalroles in the architecture of a temple (Physics 2.3). Forexample, the architect’s idea of the temple, as realized throughcraftsmanship of the workers whom the architect commands, representsthe efficient cause of the temple—whereas the architect’svision of or plan for the temple (not necessarily realized) providesthe formal cause. Elsewhere, pursuing a holist picture of biologicalexplorations as the “total form” of animals, Aristotledraws a comparison with “the true object of architecture”,which he notes is “…not bricks, mortar, or timber, butthe house” (Parts of Animals, Book I).

In like fashion, there are short, instrumental references toarchitects or architecture in Plotinus, Augustine, Thomas of Aquinas,Descartes, and others still. One hallmark of most such references is afocus on architecture as craft, trade, or skill, rather in the mannerthat Plato—or, for that matter, Vitruvius—saw thediscipline. Against this background, Francis Bacon offers an earlyentry in addressing architectural matters in exceptionallynon-instrumental fashion. He opens his brief essay “OfBuilding” (Essays, or Counsels Civil and Moral) with apronouncement still prized by modern-day architectural functionalists:“Houses are built to live in, and not to look on”. Thatsaid, visual aspects are not forgotten and he reminds us of theimperative for order and symmetry: “Therefore let use bepreferred before uniformity, except where both may be had”(1625: XLV, 257). Utility, however, remains the focal point of thisessay, relative to calculating the site for a princely house, andmaking accommodations in fine house design to meet weather conditions,circulatory needs, and like parameters.

2. German Enlightenment: Wolff, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer

A greater awareness of architecture as an artform—and thus, agreater philosophical focus—commences with Batteux’sinclusion of architecture among the arts (1746). However, even asindependent of the birth of modern aesthetics, Wolff offers an accountthat, like Bacon’s, focuses on architecture more in the mannerof acraft orscientific discipline (Buchenau 2013;Guyer 2007/2014). In Baconian fashion, Wolff exalts thecraftsman’s maker’s knowledge (“historicalknowledge”, for Wolff), where experimentation contributes to abroader understanding of phenomena and method (1746). Inthis spirit, Wolff counts architecture among the empirical arts ofinvention (ars inveniendi), along with physics and medicine,wherein we arrive at new truths as based on available truths(1751). Looking at architecture in disciplinary terms, he countsit as a branch of applied mathematics, with systematized rules thatgovern real-world phenomena. One hallmark of Wolff’s account isseeing architecture fundamentally as an undertaking, and derivativelyas a product. Architecture is “…the science of creating abuilding in such a way that it conforms with the architect’smain intentions” (1750–57).

Wolff, rare among philosophers, looks to Vitruvius and thesubsequent tradition as a source of architecturalprinciples—which, in particular, identify Greek architecture asa model. While Wolff endorses the full Vitruvian triad as imperatives,he emphasizes a linkage between two principles in particular:structural soundness must be tied to beauty, and visible to thespectator. Also in line with Vitruvian thought, Wolff proposes that,to attain the sort of harmony that yields architectural perfection,architects deploy special disciplinary knowledge developed out ofexperience with construction. This knowledge comprises rules forpromoting “coherence” in design and meeting thestructure’s use as intended by the architect(1750–57).

When Batteux (1746) suggests that architecture belongs to thefamily of artforms, he present this designation with utility still thedriving force—proposing that while architecture flourishes outof necessity, it is taste that perfects its art. This epigram hints ata key theme of Kant’s account. Success in architectural designconsists in attaining beauty of form in light of functionality or, inKantian terms, an adherent (non-free) beauty in buildings as definedby realization of their intended goal-state (Critique of the Powerof Judgment, 1790). Guyer (2011) sees an echo of theVitruvian premium on utility and firmity; Wolff’s theory ofperfections also seems close to hand. A second theme, as Guyer notes,is Kant’s emphasis—as a piece of his cognitivism—onthe expressive capacity of architecture relative to aesthetic,idealized notions of function, structure, and physicalforces. Specifically, architecture expresses aesthetic ideas throughforms, materials, and use of space; the range of ideas that can beexpressed is constrained by the fit of the architectural object to itsintended use (1790).

Kant’s legacy in architectural thought is diverse, extendingbeyond his brief remarks on architecture or even his aesthetics.Guyer suggests that Kant provides a starting point for allexpressivist theories of architecture. Mitrovic (2011) proposes that,via his notion of disinterested judgment (not focused onarchitecture), Kant sets the stage for subsequent formalistclaims—like those of Geoffrey Scott (1914/1924)—that (a)aesthetic judgments of form across persons should yield similarjudgments and (b) aesthetic judgments are best understood as divorcedfrom associations with a work’s meaning or any connectedconcepts. Scruton (1979/2013), though not a formalist, proposes acontemplative model of architectural experience that also builds on aKantian cognitive engagement with the aesthetic that—indisinterested fashion—does not rely on architecture’spractical aspects. More broadly, phenomenological approaches(Heidegger, Gadamer, Harries) suggest that architecture—asanalogous with a Kantian conceptual framework—structures ourexperience of the world around us.

Hegel (1826) happily embraces Kant’s categorization ofarchitecture as art and is especially enthusiastic about itsexpressive nature. Architecture for Hegel is primary among the arts inexpressing cognitive content generally—the AbsoluteSpirit—as an aspect of organizing the natural environment. Atthe same time, architecture, along with art as a whole, fails toexpress the Absolute Spirit as well as religion or philosophy, whichfeature greater linguistic capacity and are not weighted down with anunavoidable symbolism. This is true even of the Gothic, which Hegeltakes as an ultimate (if qualified) success in the history ofarchitecture for its metaphorical communication of spirit. As withhistory in general, Hegel offers a progressive account ofarchitectural history, wherein successive stages (the“Symbolic”, Classical, and Romantic periods) bring anincreasing freedom among architectural objects from symbolism andpurpose, and enhanced expression of the Absolute Spirit. Thisprogressive view of history and the vision of a collective historicalforce strongly influence a common strain of architectural theory,wherein design reflects the spirit of the times. This theme ispervasive in twentieth century architectural advocacy andhistoriography (Watkin 1984/2001).

Like Hegel, Schopenhauer (1818/1844 [WWR]) ratesarchitecture by its expressive capacities; however, he reaches theopposite conclusion, ranking architecture among the lowest ofartforms—as against music, his benchmark standard. Architecturereveals ideas of natural and formal qualities found in the work; theseare primarily the “dullest visibilities of the Will”, suchas the gravity, rigidity, and other properties of stone (World asWill and Representation (WWR) I) but include ideas oflight, as well. Like all arts, architecture features “aestheticmaterial”, or a theme for artistic content; in the case ofarchitecture this theme is the conflict between (a) gravity, thetendency of the building’s mass to pull downward, and (b)rigidity, the capacity of the building’s structure and parts toprevent collapse (WWR I). The central aesthetic challenge ofarchitecture, correspondingly, is artistic communication of these(lowly) forces—also referred to as “load” and“support” (WWR II)—in varied forms oftension. Taking this challenge as the primary driver in structuraldesign, Schopenhauer takes aim at a standard view in architecturaltheory, the claim—in Vitruvius and elsewhere—that theclassical column is proportional to natural forms (the human form, inthe Vitruvian instance). The column designhas to beload-bearing, Schopenhauer notes. So to look to a natural forms originof its proportions is to suggest, oddly, that load-bearing is merely ahappy coincidence with the accident of proportion fitting to that ofthe human body (or, alternatively, a tree trunk) (WWR II;Korab-Karpowicz 2012; Schwarzer, 1996). The proposal thatarchitecture communicates its structural features echoes Kant’sexpansive expressivism and, as Guyer (2011) notes, anticipates Ruskinand modernist views.

3. The Science of Aesthetics and Einfühlung Traditions

Over the latter half of the nineteenth century, the science ofaesthetics (Kunstwissenschaft) movement advanced the proposalthat art and its qualities—especially beauty—are subjectto scientific analysis on par with the natural or formal sciences.Among putative reasons for this proposal, we find the suggestions thatbeauty and such qualities are phenomena which, like those of physicsor chemistry, may be measured, explained, predicted, and subject tonormative characterization. Some talk of science seems to have beenfaçon de parler, as exemplified by Henry NobleDay’sThe Science of Aesthetics, or the nature, kinds, laws,and uses of Beauty (1872/1888), which traces aesthetics as ascience back to Baumgarten and the origin of the term aesthetics, andenunciates a variety of putative “laws” governing thearts. Science and its laws are taken here more as metaphor thanliteral practice. For architecture, Day suggested special laws,including aLaw of the Idea in Architecture: the idea ofshelter is the fundamental architectural idea. On the whole, though,the science of aesthetics movement encouraged an earnest scientificfocus on art—independent of traditional aesthetics—inexperimental psychology and among theEinfühlung(empathy) theorists.

Helmholtz is primarily responsible for crafting akunstphysiologie encompassing studies of measured sensationand perception as a physiological approach to aesthetics (Hatfield1993). His concerns regarding art included cognitive facets ofaesthetics—in physiological and psychological studies ofsensation as relate to music and painting—and cognitive functionin art as compared with science. Other early experimentalists includedWundt’s spatial perception studies, suggesting the importance ofactive attention (Outlines of Psychology, 1896/1907);and Fechner’s comparative measures of preferences acrosspersons, which he takes to yield universally valid, if modest, claimsabout aesthetic choice. Fechner’s most famous study ofpreferences (1876) appears to bolster a long-standing claim ofarchitectural theorists since Vitruvius: given a set of rectangles ofvarious dimensions, he found, respondents tend to find most pleasingthose whose proportions conform to the “golden section”(1:1.618), and find most displeasing long and narrow rectangles. (Thestudy has been widely repeated—with mixed results.)

Against Fechner, Volkelt (1905) complained that the artificiallaboratory environment contorts our aesthetic preferences. Inparticular, we do not exhibitempathy with simple aestheticstimuli, as we do with complex, whole artworks. Volkelt and felloweinfühlung theorists promoted understanding of empathicexperience of perceptual objects as an alternate psychologicalapproach to cognition and appreciation of art and architecture. Asconcerns architecture in particular, Wölfflin (1886)proposes that we grasp the nature and psychological function ofarchitectural objects and their elements through an empathicrelationship—seeing oneself in the form—as undergirded byphysiological and formalist features of experience. Formal modes ofarchitecture—horizontality, verticality,proportionality—and the expressive nature of ornament are alikethe products of our physical and sensory capacities. Göller(1887; Mallgrave 2005) uses the projective character ofeinfühlung theory to develop an account of architecturalstyle, starting with the proposal that architecture aloneamong the arts features “visible pure form”, or form whichis constitutive of objects in the medium and which (inclusive oflines, light, and shade) lacks representational or necessarilyhistorical content. Sets of architectural forms collectivelyconstitutestyles—which meet common physiologicalstandardsand feature temporally and culturally localcharacter—upon which architects draw. The greater thecommonality of such forms and our mental images of them, the greaterthe pleasure we associate with them, until a saturation point(representing overuse) after which our pleasure diminishesgreatly. Architects may recoup the ability to arouse pleasure throughexploration of new forms. Into the twentieth century,einfühlung theory continued to gain adherents amongEuropean and American architects and critics, including Scott, in hisArchitecture of Humanism (1914/1924); Richard Neutra (Lavin2004); and the Serbian architect Milutin Borisavljevic (1923, 1954),who in a second career pursued an experimental science of architecturefocused on Fechner-style perception studiesand empathicreception.

4. Continental Traditions

Continental traditions dominate the history of twentieth centuryphilosophy of architecture, relative to philosophical output andinfluence on architectural theory. To a limited extent, thosetraditions have even influenced architectural practice. The primarymovement in this regard is phenomenology; hermeneutics andpost-structuralism play lesser roles.

Phenomenology. In response to the rise of scientificpsychology (of experimental or other variants), early phenomenologistscast doubt on whether we experience the world and its objects inobjective fashion. Instead, they proposed that wecharacterize—in as intersubjectively meaningful fashion aspossible—first-person experience. Given the centrality ofexperience to architectural judgment and the role of architecture inphysically shaping people’s experiences, it was perhapsunsurprising that phenomenologists took an interest inarchitecture.

A first step in that direction was the proposal of Merleau-Ponty(1945) that our existence in the world is best understood throughways it is shaped by bodily experience of our surroundings. Thatbodily experience is relative to what appears in our visual field, toour tactile and kinesthetic engagement (hence to our position andmotion), and to who we are as individuals and group members.Phenomenologists and others (J. Robinson 2012) offer an architecturalapplication: our experience of the built environment shapes ourappreciation of, and abilities to negotiate, our surroundings. If so,then merelylooking at architectural objects is woefullyinadequate to the task of judging their value or utility; physicalexperience emerges as the defining feature of understanding anarchitectural object, and that feature shapes (orshouldshape) architectural creation.

Two principal paths of exploration are open to the architecturalphenomenologist. First, an account is sought as to how design of thebuilt environment influences experience, perception, feeling, orbehavior. Thus, one’s experience of architectureengros is analyzed in the manner of a classic phenomenologicalaccount of, say, one’s experience of coloren gros(Mitias 1999b). Thelocus classicus for this approach isHeidegger (1951), who proposes that the act of building astructure has the central end of creating “place” byconnecting spaces in or around the built structure. Further, and asadvanced through such acts of connection, creating “place”also requires development of human relationships to one’ssurrounding spaces—what Heidegger refers to as“dwelling”. The proposal that the built environmentstructures the identity of a given place—hence our experiencethereof—enjoys wide appreciation in architectural circles,following its embrace in popular accounts by Rasmussen (1959) andNorberg-Schulz (1980). More recently, Harries (1997) has proposed, asa counterweight to “sense of place”, that the communalresponsibilities of architecture demand a phenomenological grasp of a“sense of space” in which we freely move about. Thestructure of our experience in architecture, in short, is not just ofpersonal but as well public and collective character.

Phenomenological analysis of architecture faces a range ofpotential problems. For one, there are limits to what our experienceof architectural objects can tell us about them. A broader grasp ofarchitectural objects should engage whatever counts as objective factsabout those objects. For another, even short of objectivity, thevariety of our architectural first-person experiences may not allowenduring, cross-cultural, or even cross-person experiential access toa given object, its context, and or relations—or how the objectstructures spatial or other experience. This leaves phenomenologicalanalysis overly context-bound. Finally, if we can make significantaesthetic choices regarding architectural objects with no variedeffect on a person’s experiences, then phenomenological analysishas limited value for the aesthetics of architecture.

An anomalous but significant work in the phenomenological traditionis Ingarden (1962), in which he extends to architecture histheory of art objects as “purely intentional”, or emergingas the product of consciousness. For Ingarden, architectural objects,like other art objects, require that architect and spectator constructaesthetic qualities of the object to give it its identity as anarchitectural object, in addition to recognizing the constituentcollections of constituent materials and parts. Their “doublyfounded” character acknowledges each object’s objective,material base. Architectural objects are also, to a degree, culturallybound and socially determined: we see a building as an architecturalobject of a particular kind (e.g., church) because we are aware thatit is has been dedicated as such by design and in accordance withsocial and cultural standards and expectations. As architecturalobjects ofthat kind, they arepartly sociallyconstructed.

Ingarden’s focus on the creative act of consciousness issuggestive of a second principal path for architecturalphenomenologists: seeking an account as to how experience, perception,feeling, or behavior may influence design of the builtenvironment. Variants on this path are also available to social andenvironmental psychologists as well as practicing architects (Holl,Pallasmaa, and Pérez-Gómez 1994).

Hermeneutics. In contrast to Ingarden’s notion thatintentions are constitutive of architectural objects, Gadamer(1960) suggests that ourappreciation of them relies onaccess to intentions. Following his general hermeneutics, the key toan architectural object’s meaning is original design intent. Thearchitect as creator shapes a world for us as the structure’susers, and our appreciation of that world requires our entry into, andmovement through, it. As typical of his emphasis on value-ladenness,Gadamer takes as central to an architectural object that it has someform of significance for its environment. Shaping the environment isnormatively part of a design solution to core architectural problemsof function and context. For a building to even count as anarchitectural object it needs to address its context.

Post-Structuralism. Some architectural theory of the latetwentieth century embraced one or another form of post-structuralistContinental thought—one central claim of which is that texts andother cultural artifacts have meanings and references beyond theirprima facie content. Moreover, meanings and references aretypically taken as fixed not by their creators but according tobackground contexts and political agendas. In this vein, Foucault(1975) has been taken to suggest two claims aboutarchitecture. First, architecture can be an instrument of power andsuppression—as in the design of prisons, a premier example beingBentham’s Panopticon (1787). Second, while architecturerepresents a means of exercising social control, architects themselvesare not,qua individuals, capable of exercising such controlalone and are instead part of a larger network and infrastructurededicated to the maintenance and exercise of power.

5. The Analytic Tradition: Goodman, Scruton, and Beyond

There is perhaps no precise birth moment of analyticaesthetics’ engagement with architecture. There are earlystarts. Langer (1953) weaves architecture into her broader theory ofsymbolic form; to accommodate architecture as an expressive, abstractart, despite its representational moments, she highlights its capacityto shape space in virtue of relations among constituent forms and so(abstractly) express motion or feeling. Beardsley (1958/1981) offers abrief attempt to account for architecture in his ontology of artifactsand productions—plans representing the former, built structuresthe latter.

Two entries from Goodman signal more dedicated attention. Thefirst, perhaps more significant, is hisLanguages of Art(1968) account of architecture’s ontological classification bydint of the nature of its notational systems (see chapter 4). In asecond look at language-like phenomena (1985), Goodman proposes thatarchitectural objects function symbolically in three ways: (1)denotation, or picking out a relevantly similarfeature—generally, a shape—to which the spectator will belikely to have a present notion; (2)exemplification, or(literal) highlighting in design of a broader feature of the builtstructure; and (3)expression, or metaphoricalexemplification of a feature which, while perhaps broadlycharacteristic of the built structure, is not literally so. The firstmode is a standard sort of denotation; the latter two aren’tclearly denotation at all, except in Goodman’s broad symbolicfunctioning sense. So we may ask if there are specificallylanguage-like phenomena going on in such cases. A furtherquestion, from an empirical standpoint, is whether we could test forGoodmanian denotation as might characterize, among architecturalobjects, successful symbolic functioning across persons.

The most significant entry in philosophy ofarchitecture—certainly within the analytic tradition butconceivably as a whole—is Scruton’s sprawling, fecundAesthetics of Architecture (1979/2013). As in his broaderaesthetics, Scruton highlights the central role of the imagination inperception and, as joined with our reasoning, in aestheticjudgment. In loosely Kantian fashion, he proposes that our capacity tocreate and see architectural beauty through aesthetic judgment isintegral to the practical reasoning employed in architecture and inrelated applied or decorative arts. Architectural beauty, followingAlberti (1485),consists in harmony (concinnitas) in composition of parts(which Alberti defines formally relative to number, position, and“outline”). An architectural object succeedsaesthetically, then, when its parts form a harmonious whole—andwe gauge such success through imaginatively perceiving as much.

As informed by the imagination, architectural judgment issues inthe exercise of taste—a critical discrimination to which weattach aspirations of objectivity—deployed to identify the“appropriate” in style, scale, or arrangement.Appropriateness—another notion borrowed fromAlberti—consists in the ways an architectural objects’constituent parts present, visually, a kind of mutually supportivewarrant. This, for Scruton, is what it means for parts to beproportional (compare Suppes 1991; De Clercq 2009; Matravers1999).

If the exercise of taste indicates values embedded in or pertinentto our experience of architecture, an extension into the moral spheredemands that we cherish and seek to promote beauty and other aestheticvalues not merely for ourselves but as well for others. Thus(following Kant further), our embrace of aesthetic values is bound upwith our enriching relations with others; in an architectural contextthis means that our aesthetic sensibilities should be oriented towardscreating inviting built environments. Here and in a subsequent polemic(1994) Scruton, on behalf of classical architecture and in oppositionto modern architecture (and successor movements and styles),challenges stylistic or critical commitments that do not embrace ascentral the production of beauty, harmony, and“appropriateness”.

Recent Developments. Newer work in philosophy ofarchitecture reflects greater awareness of, and interaction with,contributions of architects and architectural theorists. It alsoreflects the emergence of architecture as a discrete focus ofaesthetics and other art-centered investigations, with connections toyet other areas in philosophy. Development as a subdomain is marked bykeen interest in defining bounds of architectural practice andcreation.

For Graham (2012), the central problem of architectural aestheticsis to account for architectural meaning and value while embracing asynthesis ofartistic value andutility(“engineering”) value. This integration is characteristicof the way architects see their task and the way we engage witharchitectural objects. Graham proposes that our optimal engagementwith architecture consists in “appropriation” rather thansimple appreciation; we imagine our use of the built structure givenits aesthetic and other merits.

Beyond the core foci of aesthetics, contemporary philosophy ofarchitecture touches on issues raised by aesthetics of the everyday(see discussion of functional beauty,Philosophy of Architecture: §5.2) and philosophy of the environment. In this last regard, environmental aesthetics (Carlson1999, 2000; Parsons 2008; Berleant 2007) offers a range of insightsinto architecture, together with the urban context, considered as thebuilt environment. For one, we may take aestheticappreciation to be at least partially consistent across kinds ofenvironments, whether built or otherwise. Then a correspondingaesthetic criterion for what counts as architecture—not hitchedto high art—licenses an inclusivist or expansive picture of whatobjects are architectural. For another, environmental aestheticsrecognizes the possibility of engaged and disinterested experience andappreciation. By contrast, in architectural aesthetics, the defaultmode of experience and appreciation is an engaged stance, as aconsequence of the premium on functionality in architecture. Yet therealso may be a disinterested mode of appreciation, augmented withdistance (personal, cultural, or otherwise) from functionality of thearchitectural object. Similarly, our appreciation of the builtenvironment is, like that of environments more generally, informed byconsiderations of both cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions. Inkeeping with the intentional character of the built environment, thebase case may well be that our appreciation of built structures isadvanced by knowledge of, for example, what purpose they serve.However, we also appreciate built structures further through immersiveand tactile experience of them.