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1. Such an argument is based on two premises. The first premise is aplausible version of the principle ofthe diffusiveness ofpower which implies that for any agent, \(A\), and for anystates of affairs \(p \amp q\), if \(A\) bringsabout \(p\), \(q\) obtains, and \(q\) is not within thepower of any agent other than \(A\), then \(A\) brings about\((p \amp q)\). The second premise is that possibly [(anon-omnipotent agent brings it about that a snowflake falls) & (noomnipotent agent ever exists) & (it is not within the power of anyagent other than \(A\) to bring it about that no omnipotent agentever exists)]. It is plausible that this conjunction is possibleprovided that an accidentally omnipotent agent is possible.

2. In (D2), ‘\(n\)’ ranges over all naturalnumbers, and \(t_1 \ldots t_n\) arenonoverlapping. In addition, it is assumed for the purposes of(D2) that either it is possible for time to have no beginning,or it is possible for time to have no end (or both).

3. It should be noted that in (C), ‘\(n\)’ ranges overreal numbers, and \(p\) is not itself equivalent to a state ofaffairs of the form ‘in \(n\) minutes, \(r\)’,where \(n\) is not equal to zero.

4. A complex state of affairs is one which is either constructible outof other states of affairs by use of the logical apparatus offirst-order logic enriched with whatever modalities one chooses toemploy, or else analyzable (in the sense of a philosophical analysis)into a state of affairs which is so constructible. Therefore, apart of a complex state of affairs, \(s\), is one ofthose states of affairs out of which \(s\), or an analysis of\(s\), is constructed. The relevant notion of apart inthis context is that of a logical part, as opposed to a spatial partor a temporal part.

5. Note that if \(W\) and \(W^*\) sharing the same history upto \(t\) implies that \(W\) and \(W^*\) share the samenatural laws up to \(t\), then in \(W\) there is nosufficient causal condition for Oscar becoming omnipotent at\(t\). However, the libertarianism of Flint and Freddosopresupposes that some events, i.e., all free decisions, lack asufficient causal condition, and there seems to be no good reason todeny the possibility of events that have no sufficient causalcondition, especially in the light of current understandings ofquantum mechanics.

6. There are variations on (e) that may provide additionalcounter-examples to Flint and Freddoso’s account of omnipotence.For instance, consider the following possible state of affairs:

(e*)

A snowflake falls & \({\sim}\)(Oscar brings about something atsome time during his life).

Suppose that Oscar is a contingently existing omnipotent agent. It canbe argued that although it is impossible for Oscar to bring about(e*), it is possible that a non-omnipotent agent other than Oscarbrings about (e*) by bringing aboutboth of its conjuncts,even when Oscar is omnipotent. Arguably, a non-omnipotent agent ofthis sort could accomplish this by causing a snowflake to fall anddestroying Oscar before he brings about something. It can be arguedthat such a case provides a counter-example to Flint andFreddoso’s account of omnipotence similar to the one based on(e).

7. Pike argues that divine omnipotence and perfect goodness areincompatible. For a discussion of the compatibility of divineomnipotence and perfect goodness, see Hoffman 1979.

8. Whether divine moral perfection should be understood as perfectgoodness, perfect virtue, or an optimal combination of goodness andvirtue, depends upon whether the correct theory of morality isconsequentialist, deontological, ormixed (that is, a mixtureof core elements of consequentialist and deontological moraltheories). To preserve our neutrality on this controversial questionin this context, in the main text we use expressions such as‘best possible world’ and ‘maximally good possibleworld’ to refer toeither a possible world ofunsurpassable goodness, a possible world governed by a being ofunsurpassable virtue, or a possible world with an optimal balance ofgoodness and virtuous governance.

9. Although from what we have said about the restrictions that anycoherent account of God’s power must place on this power, abetter term for God’s power than ‘omnipotence’ wouldbe ‘maxipotence’. Compare Morriston, 2001. Morristondefends the claim that omnipotence and necessary moral perfection areincompatible, and suggests that a maximally great being need not beomnipotent.

10. Plantinga 1974. This work is an influential free will defense oftheism against the problem of evil. A number of philosophers haveargued against some of the presuppositions of Plantinga’s view,and in particular, against the acceptance of so-called counterfactualsof freedom.