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1. For more detail about the distinctions, see Ichikawa and Jenkins2017: 116.

2. Hazlett takes this to motivate divorcing semantic considerationsabout the verb “to know” from knowledge, the state oftraditional epistemic interest. Though he thinks “to know”is not a factive verb, even Hazlett accepts that knowledge itself is astate that can only obtain if its content is true (Hazlett 2010).

3. On the distinction between outright belief and less committalnotions, see e.g. Fantl & McGrath 2009: 141, Nagel 2010:413–4, Williamson 2005: 108, Clarke 2013, Gibbons 2013: 201,Jackson 2020, and Schulz 2021.

4. On the distinction between justified beliefs and justifying beliefs,see Alston 1991: 71. For an opposing view, see Almeder 1999: 90 and123.

5. On “warranted”, see especially Plantinga 1993 and Wright2004. On the relationship between “rational” and“justified”, see Siscoe 2021 and the citationstherein.

6. See Feldman & Conee 1985 and Conee & Feldman 2004 for ageneral presentation of their “evidentialist” view; seeFeldman & Conee 2001 for a distinctive focus on their internalism.For criticisms of evidentialism, see DeRose 2000, Plantinga 1996:358–361, and the essays of Dougherty 2011; for criticisms ofinternalism more generally, see Goldman 1999 & 2009.

7. This is a simplified statement of reliabilism; a more precise onedistinguishes conditionally reliable mechanisms (like inference) fromunconditionally reliable ones (like perception). See Goldman 1979.

8. Finer distinctions are sometimes drawn; for example, one mightconsiderex ante justification (in a position to have ajustified belief) as distinct from both doxastic (having a justifiedbelief) and propositional (having sufficient reason to believe)justification. For one such motivation, see Ichikawa & Jarvis2013: 162–4. For another example, Lowy 1978 articulates a notionofpersonal justification that is importantly distinct fromdoxastic justification.

9. This talk of “sufficient reason” is intended to beconsistent with the idea that in some cases, no reasons are needed tosuffice for propositional justification—that some justificationcomes “for free”, not dependent on the possession of anyreasons at all. See e.g., Lyons 2009, Wright 2004. In such cases, thenull set of reasons constitutes “sufficient” reason.

10. Russell’s focus in this discussion is on the nature of belief,not the analysis of knowledge. He also does not highlight the role ofthe justification condition in his case.

11. See, e.g., Armstrong 1973: 152 and Clark 1963. For furtherreferences, see Shope 1983: 24. This monograph provides acomprehensive discussion of the Gettier literature up to 1980. For ashorter helpful discussion of the Gettier problem, see the Appendix inPollock 1986.

12. This case is similar to Chisholm’s (1989) “sheep on ahill” case.

13. More sophisticated articulations of a sensitivity condition willrelativize it to bases or methods. See Nozick 1981: 179, Williamson2000: 152, Ichikawa 2011: 302. The argument against sensitivity givenin the main text should apply equally well to these subtlerformulations.

14. Note that a sensitivity condition, being only a necessary conditionon knowledge, does not itself imply the nonskeptical claim. A skepticcould commit to a sensitivity condition without admitting abominableconjunctions.

15. See Williamson 2000: ch. 7 for a more detailed discussion.

16. See especially Roush 2005, 2012 for a defense of a subtle sensitivitycondition. Ichikawa 2011 gives a version of a sensitivity conditiondesigned to avoid the commitment to abominable conjunctions.

17. This is one of several formulations of safety Sosa offers.

18. Ichikawa (2011) offers a semantics for counterfactuals in which,pace Sosa, sensitivity and safetyareequivalent.

19. SupposeS truly believes thatP. On Lewis’sview, to evaluate the subjunctive conditional, “ifSwere to believe thatP, it would not be false thatP,” we examine all the nearest worlds in whichSbelievesP. The actual world is the unique nearest suchworld, andPis (by stipulation) not false in that world, sothe conditional is true.

20. See e.g., Goldman 1967, 1976; Armstrong 1973; Dretske 1981. See alsoSturgeon 1993. Kornblith (2008, 7) suggests that the decline inattention for such views is attributable to Goldman’s (1979)shift from his previous position to one in which knowledge requiresjustification, where the latter is understood as reliability, butquestions the motivation for Goldman’s move.

21. For examples of reliabilist approaches to knowledge, see: Armstrong1973, Dretske 1981, and Nozick 1981.

22. Note that process reliabilism is an example of a view that requires a“causal condition” in a weaker sense: features of theprocess that caused the belief are important for justification. As theterm is used here, “causal theories” require a causalconnection between the belief and the truth of the propositionbelieved.

23. Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya articulated an early versionof the causal theory in the 14^th century CE (Phillips &Ramanuja Tatacharya 2004).

24. Dretske’s own information-theoretic account of knowledge, givenin ch. 4 of his 1981 book, is more complicated than SimpleK-Reliabilism. Dretske claims (1981: 97) that his view avoids Gettierproblems, but this is controversial. For some discussion of whatDretske would say about the barn facades case, see Dretske 2005: 24,note 4.

25. For an example of a reliability condition amended with an eye towardthe Gettier problem, see Goldman 1976 and Goldman 1986:46–7.

26. Sturgeon (1993) made a similar observation, pointing out that anynon-conclusive justification will permit Gettier cases. He endorsed anexternalist conception of justification that entailed truth, defendinga simpler “JB” theory of knowledge.

27. Whether it also entails the third will depend on one’sparticular theory of justification. Alternatively, another analysis inthis spirit, following the lead of the views discussed in§6, could simply omit the justification condition.

28. On such “evidential luck,” see Unger 1968:159 orPritchard 2005: 136–7.

29. For more on distinct notions of epistemic luck, see Pritchard 2005,Steglich-Petersen 2010, and McKinnon 2013.

30. Sosa (2007) characterized the relevant skill in reliabilistic terms;a belief is adroit if and only if it is produced by a mechanism thattends to produce true, rather than false, beliefs. But the AAA model,and the corresponding account of knowledge, does not obviously dependon this reliabilism. One could characterize skill differently andstill define knowledge in terms of skill as Sosa does.

31. This is how Sosa characterizes a particular kind of knowledge, whichhe calls “animal knowledge”, distinguishing another, moreambitious state of “reflective knowledge”. See Sosa 2007:24.

32. Millar seems to be defending one or both of these strategies inPritchard, Millar, & Haddock 2010: 129–30. Greco (2009)seems to be defending the first.

33. Sutton (2007) and Bird (2007) each offer an approach to justificationgiven in terms of knowledge.

34. In favor of something like the knowledge-first stance, see Williamson2000, Nagel 2013, Miracchi 2015, and Ichikawa 2017-a; against, seeMcGlynn 2014 and many of the essays in Greenough & Pritchard2009.

35. The term “pragmatic encroachment” was first used by JonKvanvig on the Certain Doubts weblog on June 12, 2004.

36. Owens (2000) gives an early defense of pragmatic encroachment; seehis 2000: 29 et seq. Note that talk of “sameness of epistemicposition” must be understood carefully. There is a sense inwhichknowing that P is part of one’s epistemicposition; when we say that Sandra and Daniel are in the same epistemicposition, this cannot be the sense that we intend. One might—andsome epistemologists do—say that Sandra and Daniel have the same(or equivalent) evidence. This will suffice only if pragmaticencroachment does not extend to evidence as well; it will not if, forexample, Williamson (2000) is right that a subject’s evidenceconsists in one’s knowledge, or if Stanley (2005: 124) is rightthat encroachment extends to all interesting epistemic notions.