Ibn Sina’s Metaphysics

First published Wed Dec 2, 2015; substantive revision Thu Mar 26, 2020

For Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) metaphysics is ascience(ʿilm), i.e., a perfectly rationally establisheddiscipline that allows human reason to achieve an authenticunderstanding of the inner structure of the world. Metaphysics is thescience ofbeing qua being and therefore the science thatexplainsevery being. In his interpretation, Avicenna fusesthe Aristotelian tradition, which he intends to renew (Gutas 2014),with the Neo-Platonic idea of emanation, on which he builds hissystem: metaphysics thus includes theology, cosmology and angelology,and provides a foundation for physics, psychology, prophetology andeschatology. Indeed, metaphysics even demonstrates “theprinciples of the particular sciences” that investigate“the states of particular existent things”(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 2, 14, 18–15, 7) and aresubordinate to it (Bertolacci 2006: Ch. 7). So metaphysics is“first” and “at the head” of all sciences(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 3, 18, 14–17; Houser 1999;Lizzini 2005) and is universal not only because it concerns beingqua being (instead of just some aspects of it), but alsobecause it comprehends reality—and the system of knowledge thisimplies—as a whole (instead of just some portions of it).

In this article, which has reference mainly, but not exclusively, totheIlāhiyyāt ofKitābal-Šifāʾ (known in English as theMetaphysics of theBook of the Healing or of theBook of the Cure), I shall start—after introducingAvicenna’s sources—with a brief discussion of the statusof metaphysics as a science, and then illustrate Avicenna’sanalysis of existence and the theology that arises from it. ThereafterI shall focus on Avicenna’s theory of emanation, highlightingits essential aspects.

1. Metaphysics: sources and importance

Avicenna reads his main reference—Aristotle’sMetaphysics—in the light of two interrelatedtraditions: that of the Late Ancient commentators (e.g., Alexander ofAphrodisias, Themistius, Ammonius of Hermias) and that of theNeo-Platonic writings known in the Arabic world—the so-calledPlotiniana andProcliana arabica^[1]—part of which were ascribed to Aristotle himself. He consequentlyreinterprets Aristotle’sMetaphysics and gives anoriginal structure to his own text (Bertolacci 2006: Ch. 5; Menn 2013).^[2] The Arabic-Islamic traditions of philosophy and theology(Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, al-Fārābī, theKalām) are also essential to understanding Avicenna’smetaphysics: not only does Avicenna’s terminology often dependon his predecessors, but also some of the solutions he adopts are theresult of the ongoing discussion about their positions. Yet Avicennasurpasses both his sources and his interlocutors. From a theoreticalpoint of view, his metaphysics is, in fact, incredibly rich andrefined. Many issues—such as being and universality, theGod-world relationship, the problem of evil—receive a quiteoriginal treatment in Avicenna’s system. This clearly explainsthe paramount importance Avicenna’s metaphysics has for thehistory of philosophy, in both the West and the East. Indeed, thanksto the Toledo Latin version of theIlāhiyyāt ofKitāb al-Šifāʾ (Liber dephilosophia prima sive scientia divina), every Latin medievalphilosopher from the late 12^th century onwards encounteredone or more of Avicenna’s interpretations (Hasse and Bertolacci2011; Bertolacci 2013). In the East (and especially in the Persianarea), Avicenna’s metaphysics not only profoundly influencedphilosophy and theology, but also founded a centuries-old traditionwhich can be considered still extant (Endress 2006; Michot 1993;Wisnovsky 2004, 2011, 2014).

2. Metaphysics Between Ontology and Theology

2.1 Ontology and Theology

Avicenna’s definition of metaphysics as a science is rooted in apremise he elaborates on the basis of Aristotle (Post.Analytics I.10, 76b11–22) and al-Fārābī(On the aims of the Metaphysics^[3]): a science must have a subject-matter (upokeimenon:mawḍūʿ) and an object of research(zetoumenon:maṭlūb;mabḥūṯ ʿan-hu). The former is assumedto be existent (it is a starting-point); the existence of the latterhas to be established, which is the purpose(ġaraḍ) of the science or the aim towards whichthe science is oriented (maqṣūd). From thisdistinction a fundamental duality emerges: by virtue of itssubject-matter (the existent and its properties), metaphysics isconcerned with being and is ontology, whereas from the point of viewof the question which it must answer, metaphysics establishes(iṯbāt) the existence of the First Principle andis theology.^[4] So Avicenna retains the theological conception that al-Kindīhighlighted (and Aristotle himself suggested);^[5] at the same time, he develops the line al-Fārābīinitiated by positing being—and not God—as the focus ofmetaphysics as a universal science (Bertolacci 2006: Ch. 2–3;Menn 2013). He thus gives his own solution to a traditional question(how should Aristotle’s metaphysics be defined?): metaphysicsfits the definition given in Gamma 1, 1003a20–26, as the scienceof beingqua being or, literally, of the existentqua existent:al-mawǧūd bi-mā huwamawǧūd (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 1, 9, 8; 2,13, 12–13). It is only in terms of the question it must answer(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 1, 5, 13–7, 2; 9, 6–10;3, 19, 5–8; 21, 1–8; 23, 1–9), that the science ofmetaphysics is “divine” (al-ʿilmal-ilāhī; cf. Aristotle’sMetaphysicsA.2, 982b28–983a11; E.1, 1026a16–21) or “of thedivine things” (ʿilm al-ilāhiyyāt; cf.Metaph., 1026a13–16), as the title of the metaphysicalsections of Avicenna’s philosophicalsummaeindicate.

2.2 The Meaning of the Dual Definition

Avicenna’s dual characterization of metaphysics results in aprofound connection between theology and ontology. Inasmuch as Itexists, the First Principle partially coincides with thesubject-matter of metaphysics, so that theology is included inontology: the existence of God ispart of existence(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 2, 14, 4–10: the Principle isthe Principle of part of being). The dual definition of metaphysicsreflects a twofold way of considering existence or being itself: whenit is taken as set apart from any condition, and hence taken to beabsolute, being is the subject-matter of metaphysical investigation.On the contrary, when it is identified as the being of the Principle,it is necessarily defined as uncaused. In fact, the definition ofmetaphysics as a science and its twofold denomination derive from alogical-predicative distinction: being is eithernot on conditionof (min ġayr šarṭ)—and is hencean undetermined common being—or ison condition of notand requires that (non-relational) predications be excluded. In moretechnical terms (analogous distinctions define quiddity and genus inIlāhiyyāt,V,1 and V,3) being is eithernot onthe condition of adding a determination (lābi-šarṭi al-ziyāda)—and can therefore beunconditionally predicated of everything—or ison thecondition of not adding a composition (maʿašarṭi lā ziyādati tarkīb;Ilāhiyyāt, I, 2, 13, 8–13; VIII, 4, 347,10–16; Porro 2011b; Lizzini 2013). In the latter case, beingconstitutes the divine being which is the research object ofmetaphysics, i.e., the answer to the questions: does an uncausedprinciple exist? And if so, what are its properties?

2.3 The Theological Vocation of Metaphysics: The First Principle as Absolute Cause

According to Avicenna, metaphysics—and no otherscience—can (and must) establish the existence of a Firstabsolute Principle. Physics, which deals with bodies and theirmovement, can explain no more than motion (its result is, in fact, aPrime Mover) and, unable to answer the fundamental ontologicalquestion about the origin of the world’sbeing, itsimply anticipates the idea of the Principle that metaphysicsdemonstrates (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 1, 6, 17–7, 6;I,2,14–end).

From this perspective, Avicenna is not Aristotelian: metaphysics mustexplain the transition from non-being to being, an atemporaltransition which does not exclude eternity from what is caused to be.His idea is entirely consistent with Greco-Arabic Neo-Platonism: boththepseudo-Theology of Aristotle (a re-elaboration ofEnneads IV-VI) and theBook of the pure Good (areworking of Proclus’Elements of Theology) insist onan originated being. At the same time, Avicenna includes in his systemthe Aristotelian conception of a world eternally in movement: hencethe notions of matter, form, potency and act are elaborated so as toanswer the question of the origin of the world’s eternalexistence. In keeping with Proclus (and against JohnPhiloponus’s position: Davidison 1987; Chase 2012; McGinnis2012, 2013), Avicenna considers the world to be“instaured” or absolutely created (mubdaʿ)and at the same time establishes that it is eternal and eternally inmotion, as Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics teach. Hetherefore posits a Principle of the world’s existence(wuǧūd) that does not correspond to the primeunmoved mover (cf.Commentaire Lambda: 7–12;Taʿlīqāt, 62, 14–19; Janssens 2003).Indeed, according to Avicenna, in metaphysics the efficient cause is acause of existence (Ilāhiyyāt, VI, 1, 257,13–16). It is only in this sense that metaphysicians conceivethe Principle as an agent. At the same time, since It is first andperfect (Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 4, 343, 12–15;VIII, 7, 368, 2–3; 369, 4–5; in some passages Avicennaeven accepts the Neo-Platonic idea of the Principle above perfection:fawqa al-tamām:Ilāhiyyāt, IV, 3,186, 15; 188, 5–15; VIII, 6, 355, 9–10), the Principlemust also be a final cause (Wisnovsky 2003a: 180–195). The ideaof aim must then be (aporetically) shifted from the level of movementto that of being: the final cause is not a cause of movement but thesame efficient cause that makes things exist(mūǧid). The First Principle is therefore a causein every respect (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 1, 4, 14–17;VIII, 3). The prime unmoved mover—which is, in fact, the firstcaused Intelligence—justifies the movement of the world, butrefers in its turn to the Principle, which is absolutely First(McGinnis 2010a: 151; cf.Physics of “TheHealing” IV, 15).

2.4 Univocacy of Being and Ontological Distinction

The dual definition (and notion) of both being and metaphysics revealsthe nuanced univocacy or univocity that rules both Avicenna’sontology and his theology. If the uncaused Principle is itselfpart of being, then It is the principle of onlypartof being: of being insofar as it is caused, and not of all being or ofbeing as such. Indeed, if the Principle were the principle of allbeing, it would, paradoxically, be Its own principle (while the“First” can be defined only as the being that Itself hasno principle at all; the whole as such has no principle:Ilāhiyyāt, I, 2, 14, 1–16,20). Insofar as Itis existent, the Principle is thus existent just as the world is.Hence the ontological distinction between the uncaused Principle andIts effect does not lie in existence as such, but in one of its modes:the uncaused Principle isnecessary as regards existence,while everything else is alwayspossible as regardsexistence: i.e., it exists insofar as it is necessitated andtherefore necessary by virtue of something other. As a consequence,the existence of things that are in themselves possible is alwaysconceived asrelated to a (possible)essence, whilethe being of the Principle is purely and necessarily existence:despite a certain unavoidable ambiguity in Avicenna’s language(see e.g.,Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 7, 363, 1–2;Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 5, 349, 11: “the reality ofthe First”), the Necessarily Existent has no essence or noquiddity that differs from existence (anniyya:Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 4, 344, 10–11; 346,8–12; cf. Macierowski 1988) and is in that respect beyondessence. The first attribute of the Principle is “that It is andthat It is existent” (inn wa-mawǧūd;Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 7, 367, 12–13): existence isnot what It “has”: It simply is.

This nuanced univocacy of being has been variously determined:scholars have adopted locutions likeper prius andperposterius (Menn 2013: 163–167 onCategories, I,2), “ambiguity of being’s univocity” (Druart 2014),“modulated univocity” (Treiger 2012) and gradualpredication or predication according to an arrangement:“gradueller oder ordnungsbezogenerPrädikationsmodus” (Koutzarova 2009: 211–258) oreven “analogy” (De Haan 2015). Certainly Avicennaattributes existence both to the Principle and to things; he ascribesto existence differences in worth (Categories 10–11;Bertolacci 2011: 43–44)—there is in fact an evidenthierarchy governing necessity and possibility (seeSection 4.4); he modulates existence according to the absolute or relativenecessity it expresses, clearly excludes the possibility thatexistence is a genus or that it is predicated equally(bi-l-tasāwī) of what is beneath it, openly speaksabout its anteriority and posteriority within the same pattern ofreference to be found in Aristotle (health:Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 34, 15–35, 2; other passagessuggest a different analogy; Menn 2013) and clearly establishes thestarting-point of theology in the analysis of the existent. Existenceas such has no graduations but has modes or statutes(Ilāhiyyāt, VI, 3, 276,12–14) and hierarchyis ascribed to reality (Ilāhiyyāt, VI, 3,277,7–278,8). The necessary cause is more worthy of reality thanthe effect: the essence of the cause is not necessary in relation tothe effect, whereas the essence of the effect is necessary only inrelation to the cause.

3. Essence and Existence

3.1 The Existent as Primary

The first step in the analysis of the existent (al-mawǧūd)^[6] is to acknowledge its absolute priority: the existent as such isindefinable (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 29, 5–31,9; cf.I, 2, 13, 8–13): everything implies the notion of the existentand cannot exist outside of it. In fact, whereas a definition servesto answer the question about the quiddity (māhiyya: whatis it:mā huwa?) of a thing, the existent as such cannothave a quiddity (one cannot investigate itsmāhiyya:Ilāhiyyāt, I, 2,13, 8–13).^[7] In order to ask what a thing is, one cannot avoid referring to being,which is exactly what allows us to conceive all things, whether theyare sensible, imaginary or intelligible, as existent. According toAvicenna’s formula, which had a great impact on Thomas Aquinas(and on medieval Western philosophy in general), the existentis—together with the thing, the necessary and the one—oneof the “intentions” (maʿānī;intentiones) that are “imprinted in the soul in a primaryway” (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 29, 5–6; 30,3–4).

The primacy of being (everything that is conceived of“is”) leads to an often unseen consequence: everythingthat is conceived of or simply mentally representedexistsand hence hasat least a mental existence (which means eitherintellectual or imaginary or estimative). Indeed, the existent as suchis immaterial and only non-existence in the absolute sense does(obviously) not exist, since it cannot be either conceived ordiscussed (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 32, 6–16).Non-existent things are only relatively non-existent: resurrection,e.g., and possible and imaginary entities exist at least in the mind(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 33, 12–34, 9; cf. Arist.,Metaph., 1006b10). Impossible things seem to be non-existentinsofar as they are not properly conceived (intellectual existence isdistinct from imaginative existence: Michot 1987; Black 1997,1999).

Together with the distinction between mental and external existence(or existence in concrete individuals:fīl-ʿayān) Avicenna posits a distinction between thebeing of the thing and itsexistence. Clearly, then,the fundamental and primary character of being does not implysimplicity: toexist meansto be a given entity inthe world or—as Avicenna also uses it—a“thing” (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5). Theexistence of something must thus be distinguished from its being whatit is.

InIlāhiyyāt, I, 5 Avicenna summarizes the meaningsof the termmawǧūd (“existent”) and ofthe locutions that are related to it: “thing” (šayʾ),^[8] but also “what” (mā), “that”(allaḏī), “what is given” or“realized” (al-muḥaṣṣal) and“what is affirmed” or “established”(al-muṯbat). On the one hand, there are the existentand the thing as first notions: both indicate being as what cannot beknown through anything other than itself, so that knowledge is builton it. On the other, there is what the word “thing” mayalso indicate in every language: “the reality whereby everything (amr) is what it is”(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 31, 5–6; cf. VI, 5, 292,1–5).

3.2 The Distinction Between Essence and Existence

So the analysis of being reveals two meanings of existence: the firstaffirms or establishes theexistence of something; the secondexpresses, without affirming its existence, thereality byvirtue of whichsomething is what it is, namely, its essence.The first is what Avicenna calls “the existence related to thefact that [something] is established” (al-wuǧūdal-iṯbātī), the second identifies the“particular” or “proper existence” of thething (al-wuǧūd al-ḫāṣṣ). Asregards the latter, one is either not required to know whether thething is or is not existent or else one ignores the whole question. Inthe first sense, then, the “existent” (or“existing”) thing stands for “what isestablished” (al-muṯbat) or“realized” (al-muḥaṣṣal) andaffirms that somethingexists; in the second sense, which isexpressed by “proper existence”, what is referred to isthe “reality” (al-ḥaqīqa),“nature” (al-ṭabīʿa),“essence” (al-ḏāt) or—accordingto Avicenna’s technical terminology—“quiddity”(māhiyya) or “thingness”(šayʾiyya) of the thing. Here no existential judgmentis implied (one does not know if the thing exists); what is expressedis an intentional note, independent of its existence, whichnecessarily accompanies it (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 31,1–9).

The background of this distinction is Aristotelian. In a very broadsense its origin can be discovered in Aristotle’sPosteriorAnalytics (II Β 92b10)—where the question that asks“if a thing exists” is separate from the one thatasks“what a thing is”—in theMetaphysics (Δ V.5, 1015a20–b15; 7,1017a7–b10; but also Ε and Z)—where the variousmeanings of “being” are differentiated and the question ofessence (ousia, to ti en einai) is posed—and inDeinterpretatione 11 21a25–8; Lizzini 2003; Menn 2013).Moreover, although original in its development Avicenna’sdistinction uses terms and concepts that can be found in both thephilosophical and the theological traditions of classical Islam: inal-Fārābī’sBook of Letters (K.al-Ḥurūf; cf. Menn 2008), in Yaḥyā ibnʿAdī’s discussion of natures (Rashed 2004; Benevich2018 and 2019; Janos 2020) and also in the distinctions ofMuʿtazilite Kalām, in which a “thing” wasconceived of as separate from existence (Jolivet 1984; Wisnovsky2003a).

3.3 The Composition of Essence and Existence

If distinguishing between two areas of being—i.e., existence,which can be either mental or real, and the proper existence of thething, i.e., its essence, quiddity, thingness (seeIlāhiyyāt I, 5 and VI, 2)—can be read aslogical, its value is ontological, since the composition which isrecognized in things concerns their being. Indeed, not only must theconceptual constituents that define the being of something bedistinguished from the affirmation of its existence (as ingnoseology), but also the very essence of something must bemetaphysically distinguished from its existence. Essence is not, so tospeak, “ontologically neutral”. The essence or thingnessof which Avicenna speaks is not simply the essence of the thingconsidered as such, regardless of its existence, but the thingness andhence the thing that, considered as such and regardless of itsexistence, reveals exactly the character or modality that its ownexistence has. If the analysis of a thing, i.e., of its quiddity orproper existence, does not inform me of its existence (by knowing whata thing is, I do not necessarily knowif it is), this isbecause a thing is in itself only possible: it can be either existentor non-existent, and since it isin itself possibly existent,it isin itself non-existent. On the contrary, if theanalysis of a thing—i.e., of its quiddity or properexistence—were to inform me positively of its existence (byknowing what a thing is, I also knowthat it is), this wouldbe because a thing is in itself necessarily existent and therefore initself existent (Lizzini 2003). Paradoxically, however, in the lattercase, the “thing” in question is only necessary existence,it has no quiddity (or no quiddity beyond its existence) and is not,properly speaking, a “thing” (Bertolacci 2012a): in thiscase, in fact, what is revealed is the existence of the NecessaryPrinciple, which is pure existenceon condition of not andcan therefore be conceived beyond essence and thingness.

The core of the distinction is that what is necessarily existent ispurely existence (but not undetermined common existence) and is indeedthe Necessarily Existent Principle. Conversely, everything that doesnot exist necessarily and therefore has a possible relation toexistence issomething that is possible, so that in order toexist it always and necessarily refers to a cause that makes it exist:a cause that justifies the fact that instead of being possible(mumkin) and therefore not already assigned to existence, thething is qualified as existent. Non-determination to existence leadsto non-existence (ʿadam, lays, laysa) and this is infact what pertains to the thing in itself. Existence—or moreprecisely a determination of its relation to existence—pertainsto the thing because of something else (the cause). In this respect,non-determination coincides with possibility, whereas determinationcoincides with necessityper aliud. In ontology, the logicalnotions of the possible and the necessary become the duo of what is“necessary in itself” and what is “necessary byvirtue of another” (Naǧāt: 547–549;Lizzini 2011: 116–132).

The distinction between (or relation or composition of) quiddity andexistence is a fundamental issue of Avicenna’s ontology. Thisholds too for the modal concepts that connote it in as much thatquiddity could be said to refer to possibility, whereas existencewould be necessity. Although problematic (especially as regards mentalexistence), it allows Avicenna to give an account of the so-called“ontological difference” between the uncaused Principleand the caused world: the First Principle is absolutely necessary andsimply coincides with, or more exactly,is Its own existence:“that is” expresses a primary attribute of the Principle(all others are relations, either positive or negative:Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 7, 367, 13–15; cf. 4, 343,13–344, 5; 5, 354, 12–14), whereas in everything elsethere is a duality. In everything the distinction betweenwhat the thing is andthe fact that it is isinevitable. Existence can consequently be said to be external toessence, so that an existing thing, whose essence or quiddity ispossible, can be said to becomposed of essence andexistence. Conversely, in that which is in itself necessary there isno need for such a composition (there is no essence: no beingsomething, but only being). Necessity is an affirmation or moreprecisely a confirmation of existence (taʾakkudal-wuǧūd:Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 36,4–5). The idea of a distinction/composition thus has a precisetheological function: not only does it distinguish everything from theNecessary Principle (everything except the Principle istwofold:Ilāhiyyāt, I, 7, 47,18–19); it also reveals the divine creative act: everythingexcept the Principlereceives (orobtains) existence(Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 3, 342, 10;Taʿlīqāt, 175, 10–176, 7). Thedistinction also explains the derivation of celestial souls and bodiesfrom supernal intelligences: in this respect emanation is nothing butthe exposition of the dialectic between necessary existence andpossible essence, which together constitute the intelligences’being. This same distinction between a possible essence and itsnecessary existence can, finally, explain any causal relationship: acause is ultimately nothing but that which allows the transition fromthe possible to the necessary, or that which makes possibility inclinetowards necessity. Certainly, a cause may, in its turn, be possibleand so refer to a further cause, but every causal chain leads back tothe First Cause, which is in Itself necessary and one(Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 1–3).

3.4 Quiddity and Mental Existence

Nevertheless, composition is not the result of an addition. Thequiddity or essence of a thing is not in its turn a“thing” with its own mental existence so that, once addedto (real) existence, it could become a real thing (Lizzini 2014). Thiswould not only lead to infinite division (in the quiddity one wouldagain distinguish quiddity from existence), but also—as Avicennanotes—to Platonism (Ilāhiyyāt, V, 1, 204,4–5; cf. VII, 2–3; Marmura 2006; Porro 2002, 2011a). Buthere lies the problem: the distinction between essence and existencecannot obviously lead to the conclusion that essence is simplynon-existent (no affirmative statement about the absolutelynon-existent is possible:Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 32,12–13; cf. 15–16). What Avicenna states by distinguishingquiddity and existence in what exists either in the mind or in realityis that quiddity does not coincide with the existence of the thing:neither with its mental existence, which is related but does notcorrespond to universality, nor with its concrete existence(fī l-ʿayān), which implies individuality. Onthis point there are two fundamental if problematic sections ofIlāhiyyāt (V 1–2) where Avicenna outlines theso-called theory of the “indifference of essence”: initself quiddity is only quiddity (equinity is only equinity:fa-l-farasiyya fī nafsi-hā farasiyya faqaṭor, according to the celebrated Latin formula,equinitas ergo inse est equinitas tantum). The same logical consideration(iʿtibār) that Avicenna applies to the existence ofGod and existence in general serves here to explain the separation ofquiddity from existence: the animal that isnot on conditionof something other is the animal in its reality or quiddity; itcan exist either in the mind or in the concrete world butonly if it is accompanied by some fulfilled conditions; the animalon condition of not (i.e., of not being accompanied by anyother), is the abstract form that results from a mental consideration(Ilāhiyyāt, V, 1, 203, 15–204, 13). Indeed,when it is considered eitherin intellectu orin re,quiddity is accompanied by existence and by the quantitativedetermination that belongs to it: it is then either universal orparticular, althoughin itself it is neither universal norparticular and is nothing but quiddity. When it is considered with aquantitative determination, quiddity is thus no longer considered asit isin itself (Alexander of Aphrodisias’Quaestiones I.3 and I.11 have been indicated as the source ofthis distinction: Menn 2013; cf. de Libera 1999; Benevich 2019). Everyintention (maʿnā), that of universality—whichis the inherent non-impossibility of a multiple predication(Ilāhiyyāt, V, 1, 195, 4–196, 3)—andthose of particularity or unity, accompanies quiddity in existence(mental or real); in Avicenna’s technical terminology they areattributes (ṣifāt) or necessary concomitants(lawāzim) of the quiddity of the thing, not identicalwith it. Quiddity (e.g., equinity) is not the universal (of horse):

the universal (al-kullī) insofar as it is universal, isone thing, but insofar as it is something accompanied by universality,it is another thing. (Ilāhiyyāt, V, 1, 196, 6;Marmura 1992, slightly modified; see alsoThe Metaphysics of theHealing, 149)

The indifference of quiddity to any kind of determination trulyestablishes the correspondence between reality and knowledge: it isexactly because quiddity is in itself neither real (i.e. extra-mental)nor mental that it can be present both in reality and in the mind,accompanied by the determinations of either individuality oruniversality: in concrete reality there is x in its particularexistence, while in the mind there is x with its possible multiplepredication. In this respect, theconsideration of quiddityin itself—which corresponds to the thing in itself as expressedby its definition—transcends both levels of existence (externaland mental) and in one passage is equated to the “divineexistence” (wuǧūd ilāhī) ofsomething that depends on God’s providence(Ilāhiyyāt, V, 1, 204, 16–205, 4; for thepossible reference to Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’sdiscussion of Alexander’s essentialism, see Rashed 2004; Menn2013; Benevich 2018, 2019; cf. Black 1999). Quiddity is in fact the‘reality’ of the thing and is always identical to itself(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 31,2–9, 36,4–6).Recently scholars have analyzed the question of the reality and thebeing of quiddity from both a logical (Benevich 2018) and anontological perspective, highlighting the point that the discussion ofthe universals plays a crucial role in understanding Avicenna’stheory of quiddity in itself (Janos 2020; cf. de Libera 1999; Marmura1992). The crux of the matter lies in the notion of mental existence.Clearly throughconsideration one ascribes properties toquiddity and in that respect quiddity is existent or realised (seee.g.Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 32,12). Consideration(iʿtibār) should therefore be conceived as grantingakind of existence, although not as a composition of essenceandexistence (for the mereological interpretations of quiddity, seeDeHaan 2014 ; Benevich 2018 ; Janos 2020).

3.5 Ontology and Henology (Being and Oneness)

Clearly then, not only Avicenna’s ontology but also his henologyshould be understood in the light of the distinction between being andthing: the existent and the one are both primary indefinable concepts(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 30, 3–4) and necessaryconcomitants of a thing (if a thing is, it is one), but being a thingis different from existing and being one:in itself thequiddity of a thing is neither existent nor one. Indeed, even unity isan attribute or a concomitant added to quiddity as it exists(Ilāhiyyāt, V, 1, 200, 13–201, 3; 201,8–13). So, while for Aristotle “being” and“one” are coextensive—being one is aper seattribute of being—(they are not identical in meaning, althoughAristotle presents this possibility:Metaph. 1003b25), forAvicenna being and one areper se attributes of a thing, sothat being and one are coextensive, although not identical in meaning,and this is so whenever we can speak of a “thing” (Druart2001; Wisnovsky 2003a, esp. 158–60) i.e., always excepting thePrinciple. Consequently there is the difficulty of conceiving“one” as both univocal and transcendental: being and beingone coincide only because they are both said of every category and donot indicate a substance (Ilāhiyyāt, III, 2, 103,7–9). Unity—which is an accident in the category ofquantity—is indivisibility; it is said in terms of priority andposteriority—with a certain ambiguity or modulation(bi-l-taškīk)—of several things(Ilāhiyyāt, III, 2, 97, 4–5; 99, 13–14;but cf.Averroes on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,39–42; Menn 2013) and cannot coincide with being becauseotherwise multiplicity could notbe (unity andmultiplicity—which derives from unity—cannot be opposite:Ilāhiyyāt, III, 3, 104, 6–7; 6, 129,11–130, 7).

4. Modality and Existence

4.1 Possibility and Necessity

The so-called distinction between essence and existence reveals anunavoidable modal characterization of being. The starting-point ofAvicenna’s metaphysics is the existent, but the analysisAvicenna applies to it (seeIlāhiyyāt, I, 6) doesnot concern what exists insofar as it is existent (the existent isindefinable:Ilāhiyyāt, I, 2, 13, 8–13), butinstead concerns the modality that explains therelation thatwhat exists has to its own existence: an existent can be eithernecessary in itself (ḍarūrī;wāǧib: it is then also necessarily one) or possible(mumkin) in itself (this is the case of every existent withthe exception of the First Principle:Ilāhiyyāt, I,6, 37, 7–10). These distinctions thus reveal the inner complexof relations that explain existence: not only are the notions ofexistent and thing primary, but so are those of unity, necessityand—to some extent—possibility(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 29, 5–6; 30, 3–4; 35,3–4; 36, 4–5). If, on the one hand, the primacy of thesenotions ultimately leads to positing the transcendentals (de Libera1994; Aertsen 2008; Bertolacci 2008a; Koutzarova 2009), on the otherhand they reveal that, in the world, being is alwaysthe being ofsomething, so that the notions of existence (unity andnecessity), although separate from that of the thing, can never beisolated from the thing or from the relation that it has to existenceitself. A crucial point is that the division between necessity andpossibility regardssomething that exists. Avicenna speaks,in fact, precisely of what is “necessarily existent” or ofwhat is “necessary as far as existence is concerned”(al-wāǧib al-wuǧūd), and of what is“possibly existent” or “possible as far as existenceis concerned” (al-mumkin al-wuǧūd). What isconsidered is the quiddity (māhiyya) or essence(ḏāt) of what exists: the modality of existencedepends, in fact, not on existence (which would be impossible), but onessence (although in the case of the Principle there is no essencedifferent from its own existence; seeSection 2.4).

Necessity (by virtue of another or in itself) defines the ways inwhich anexistent exists: if an existent is necessary byvirtue of another and therefore in itself possible, it establishes arelation ‘of being caused’ with something other thanitself (its cause): it is precisely this relation that explains itsexistence. If an existent is necessary in itself, there is no causalrelation at all (no cause). In this respect, possibility and necessityin existence are to be identified with the notion of need, dependenceor link (the former) and with its negation (the latter;Ilāhiyyāt I, 6). Consequently, what is possible isalways and inevitably an effect and answers the question why, whilewhat exists necessarily does not refer to any cause and has no“why” (Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 4, 348,5–6; cf.VIII, 1, 327, 12–329,4). The Necessary Existenthas no cause (cf.Taʿlīqāt, 80, 24–81,2). It has relations in so far as it is existent(Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 3, 343, 16–344, 5; cf.Lizzini 2013).

4.2 The Existence of the Necessary Principle

“Considered in themselves” (iḏāuʿtubira bi-ḏāti-hi), the things that find placein existence (al-umūr allatī tadḫulu fīl-wuǧūd) are subject to “two divisions in theintellect”: they are either “not necessarilyexistent”, and therefore possible, or “necessarilyexistent” (inherently impossible things do not exist and areexcluded from the analysis:Ilāhiyyāt, I, 6, 37,6–10).

On this basis, Avicenna deduces the properties of what is in itselfnecessarily existent. The first is being uncaused. It is in fact“evident” (ẓāhir:Ilāhiyyāt, I, 6, 38, 1) that the necessary has nocause: to have a cause means to exist by virtue of something else, andwhat exists by virtue of itself cannot exist by virtue of another, norcan it exist by virtue of itself and at the same time not exist byvirtue of itself. The second property is uniqueness: the necessary hasno “homologue”: there is nothing that—even ifequivalent to it as regards its definition—could exist togetherwith it and thus occupy the same rank of existence, without beingeither its cause or its effect. Two necessary beings would in facteither both be caused (and therefore both non-necessary), or refer toa cause that would make only one of them exist; but in the lattercase, they could no longer be defined as equivalent or homologous(mutakāfī al-wuǧūd): one would bepossible and caused, while the other—in the absence of anotherexternal cause—would be its cause (Ilāhiyyāt,I, 6, 39, 17–42, 7). Indeed, as shown by the discussion of therelations between form and matter (Ilāhiyyāt II,4), and also soul and body (see the psychological part of theBookof the Healing, theKitāb al-nafs;Avicenna’s De anima, V, 4), the co-existence of twothings always implies the action of a cause that makes them exist(Lizzini 2004).

Other properties (seeIlāhiyyāt, I, 7) areattributable to a being necessary in itself: unity, simplicity andthen non-relativity, immutability, non-multiplicity andnon-association with anything other than itself (these properties,among others, are discussed in terms of negativeattributes—ṣifāt—of the Principle inIlāhiyyāt VIII (4, 347, 10–348, 6; 5, 354,9–14). The various and complex justifications Avicenna uses inthis respect are all reducible—as he himself observes(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 7, 46, 4–5)—to a singlegeneral line of argumentation, which shows that two supposed necessarybeings could not be distinguished one from the other: if they were tobe distinguished by virtue of an essential property, they would beessentially different and therefore both not necessarily existent inthemselves; if they were to be distinguished by virtue of anaccidental property, they would imply the existence of an externalcause and would be equally—each of them—not necessary(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 7, 43, 4–46, 5; 46,6–47, 5).

The Necessarily Existent is therefore absolutely one, indivisible andunique (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 7, 47, 6–9; cf. VIII,4, 5) and the properties of the possible are deducible as opposite tothese (e contrario) (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 7, 47,10–19): the possible is caused and twofold(Ilāhiyyāt, I, 7, 47, 18–19); in itself itdoes not exist and therefore always receives existence from somethingelse. The hypothesis of a possible existent thing, which can bothexist and not exist, leads necessarily to positing a cause that makesit necessary (by virtue of another). If the possible were not renderednecessary by its cause, but—given the cause and its relationshipto it—were still possible, it would be continuously in a statein which it could exist and not exist. But since it exists (theanalysis concerns existing things), its relation to the cause must benecessary. Analogously, if the cause were in its turn possible, itwould refer to a further cause that would explain the existence ofboth the caused thing and its cause. If even this further cause werepossible, it would perforce have recourse to a third one, and so on.One could not proceedad infinitum (as an Aristotelian,Avicenna accepts only a potentially infinite series of causes) andcould consequently not explain the actual existence of a thing: thething would still be possible and therefore non-existent.

The arguments ofIlāhiyyāt I, 6–7—whichare in part both reminiscent of and influential for those of theKalām (Rudolph 1997; Alper 2004)—could be interpreted as anontological proof of God’s existence (Hourani 1972; Morewedge1979; Marmura 1980; Davidson 1987), especially when seen in relationto an earlier passage ofIlāhiyyāt I, whereAvicenna attributes to metaphysics the power to establish theexistence (iṯbāt) of God without recourse to sensedata (Ilāhiyyāt I, 3, 21). Undeniably, Avicennaoffers here a description of the status of necessary existence and adeduction of its properties.

4.3 The Results of the Analysis

In sum, the analysis of the thinkability of existence demonstratesthat:

existence and necessity are related or even coincident: everyexistent is necessary, eitherper se orper aliud;
by virtue of this correlation existents are divided into twogeneral categories: those that, considered in themselves require no(causal) connection with anything other than themselves, and thosethat, as they do need a (causal) link with something other, are not(in themselves) necessary;
independence and dependence on some other correspond respectivelyto the necessity and non-necessity of “being” or theexistent;
everything that is not necessary in itself and is not madenecessary by something other, is possible as regards both existenceand non-existence: as such, without a necessitating cause it does notexist; the possible is thus exactly what must establish a causalrelation as regards its own existence, which ultimately leads us backto a necessary and absolute cause;
the ontological field of what is in itself necessary cancomprehend only one being, simple and absolutely one and unique: theintellect can conceive of only one being whose existence is unrelatedto a cause, while it conceives of things as multiple only by virtue ofa relation or a connection to a cause;^[9]
the relationship between two things always implies a causalrelation (of two separate things, either one is the cause of theother, or both are caused by a third entity), which clearly shows theneed of a vertical causality (from a superior to an inferior level ofbeing).

This general law governs Avicenna’s emanative theory: it isalways a third and superior cause that accounts for two apparentlycorrelated existing elements (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 7, 39,16–42).

4.4 The Kinds of Status of Existence

The significance of these determinations becomes clear if oneconsiders the other kinds of status (aḥkām:literally “judgments, statutes, precepts”) Avicennaassigns to existence in addition to necessity and possibility (whichinIlāhiyyāt I, 1, 7, 16–19 are said to beamong the proper accidents of being), namelypriority andposteriority, on the one hand, andrichness andpoverty (orindigence), on the other(Ilāhiyyāt, VI, 3, 276, 13–277, 3).^[10] These determinations explain the distinction between essence andexistence (or “proper” and “affirmative”existence) and are, in turn, clarified by the notions of“nexus” and “need”. Indeed, what is necessaryin itself is ontologically and axiologicallyprior to thepossible because it is independent, whereas the possible isposterior precisely because it depends on a cause. Insofar asit is autonomous, the necessary is alsorich, while thepossible, which is posterior and secondary, is needy, poor orindigent. The necessary is “rich” because it isindependent of any thing; the possible is “poor” becauseit cannot exist without something else (i.e., without the cause). Froma theoretical point of view, these determinations immediately refer toa causal relation that is either negated (by what is prior, rich andnecessary) or affirmed (by what is posterior, poor and possible). Inother words, the determinations Avicenna calls the kinds of status ofexistence serve to establish a clear distinction between a kind ofexistence (i.e., one existent) that is necessarily uncaused and a kindof existence (i.e., of existent things) that is necessarily caused.^[11] It is in fact in the light of the relationship between the absolutePrinciple and the world that they reveal their true significance. Theyhave an absolute or a relative meaning according to the causalrelation to which they refer. If the causal relation is relative andconsequently concerns secondary causes, these determinations arerelative, so that the cause is said to be necessary, prior and richonly with respect to its effect, not in itself. If the relation isabsolute (if it refers to the First Cause), they are absolute: in thiscase, the cause is necessary, prior and rich in itself.

5. Causality and Cosmology

5.1 The Causal Relationship

The causal chain is the key idea of the argument by means of whichAvicenna, inIlāhiyyāt VIII, 1–3, posits aFirst Cause, in accordance with—at least partly—acosmological scheme. Indeed, according to some scholars, this is theonly place to track down a demonstration of the existence of thePrinciple in theMetaphysics of theBook of theHealing (Bertolacci 2007; De Haan 2016). As an Aristotelian,Avicenna establishes formal, material, efficient and final causes.Consequently, in order to demonstrate the existence of a Firstabsolute Principle, he must show not only that “for every causalorder there is a first principle” (Ilāhiyyāt,VIII, 1, 327, 9) but also that causal chains are all based on the sameFirst Principle. The demonstration of the finiteness of the agentcauses, from which every other series derives is an exemplar andserves as a general proof. Avicenna deduces the finiteness of allseries (Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 1, 329, 5–9) fromthe finiteness of an unqualified causal series: thus all series referto a First Principle that is both an agent (ʿillafāʿiliyya) and a final or completive (ʿillatamāmiyya) cause (Ilāhiyyāt VIII,1–3; Wisnovsky 2003a).

This argument has a general premise: “the cause of the existenceof a thing exists along with it” (Ilāhiyyāt,VI, 2, 1, 264–265, 5; VIII, 1, 327, 11); its structure is takendirectly, and almostverbatim, from Aristotle. The causalchain is composed—as inMetaph., α, 2, 994 a1–19—of three elements: the cause(al-ʿilla), and then the effect (or what is caused:al-maʿlūl) and the intermediary or medium(al-mutawassiṭ), which both have a“relationship” to the cause “that consists in beingcaused” (nisba maʿlūlyya; seesection 4.1). In a nutshell, the argument is simple: the existence of an effect(which is the cause of nothing) cannot be explained without evoking aFirst Cause; a cause that is cause and effect at the same time andtherefore a medium, would in turn refer to a cause: therefore, nomatter how many intermediate terms it includes, the series must alwaysimply an absolutely First Cause: a cause that is a cause for eachelement of the series and exists together with them.

Defining the series on the basis of three elements (each with its ownproperty: ḫāṣṣiyya), allows Avicennato include the possibility of a multiplicity of intermediate terms(Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 1, 327, 12–328, 3). In aseries, in fact, the first term—the absolute cause—has theproperty of being the cause of all that is other than itself; howeverthe middle term, which is a cause for one part of the series and aneffect for the other, may repeat this relation in a multiplicity ifnot in an infinity of elements (in an eternal succession of causalrelations); the effect that is simply caused, finally, has theproperty of being the cause of nothing. This proves to be the patternof a causal series as such; and this is so not only because any serieshas its own first principle, but also because every causal series andthen every causal relation finally refers to a Principle that providesits foundation by transcending it: every causal series implies a Firstabsolute cause by which each of its elements is caused(Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 1, 328, 4–329, 4). A causalchain without aprimum is therefore impossible; if it isposited, this occurs “only through language”(bi-l-lisān;lingua tantum). The true causalseries (i.e., the causes that always existalong with theireffects) are themselves always finite (on infinity, see McGinnis2010b).

5.2 The Causal Chain

These ideas—the series, its vertical pattern, the distinctionbetween internal and external causes and a transcendent principle ofthe series—are also elaborated in theKitābal-Išārāt (see IV, 9–15; IV, 1–8 forits premises)—Remarks and Admonitions orPointers—as the title of the work is known in English—, a work of extreme importance for the Eastern philosophicaltradition. TheIšārāt argument has beendefined asa priori or ontological (Mayer 2001; cf. Marmura1980). It originates from the general consideration of “everyexistent”: once examined in their essence (minḥayṯu dāti-hi), or in isolation, withoutanything other than themselves, all existents either necessarily haveor do not have existence in themselves: that which exists in itself isreal or true (al-ḥaqq), it necessarily exists(al-wāǧib al-wuǧūd) and always subsists(al-qayyūm: an Islamic theological term); that whichdoes not have existence in itself is always in need of a connection tosomething other, namely a condition (šarṭ) thatwill accompany it, both when it is conceived as existent and whenconceived as non-existent. Thus, conceiving a causal chain meanspositing the existence of something that is prior and external to it.If the connection of the possible with something other than itselfwere continuously repeated,ad infinitum, each unit in thechain would be possible in itself, and the collection(ǧumla) that the units constitute would also, in itself,be unnecessary. In order to devise a collection of things, possible inthemselves but existing, one must conceive of a collection renderednecessary by virtue of something external to it. The propensity toexist, which is necessity, is ascribed to the units of a collection,and hence to the collection itself, by something that, transcendingit, is necessary in itself.

Thus Avicenna arrives at the idea of an absolute cause which is thecause of all things: the series, its units and the relations that bindthem to one another. One might posit the existence of something thatcauses some units and not others, but this would certainly not be theabsolute cause, which is a cause that cannot be caused in any way. Itis an extreme (ṭaraf) and therefore neither anintermediate element nor an effect. So, every chain (silsila)needs a cause external to it: an extreme—the Necessary ExistentPrinciple—which is not caused and therefore gives a foundationto the causal chain without being part of it. Indeed, in theIlāhiyyāt ofKitābal-Šifā Avicenna explicitly states that the flow ofbeing is “distinct” (mubāyin) from thePrinciple (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 4, 403, 13).

5.3 Absolute creation

According to Avicenna the only way to conceive creation rationally isto conceive it as an ontological derivation outside of time. Hence theAristotelian model of eternity must be elaborated: the world can beboth eternal and created. It can, in fact, be continuously(dāʾiman) brought into existence, without anyinterruption or temporal precedence (it is possible and made eternallynecessaryper aliud by its cause). In this manner Avicennanot only develops Proclus’ idea of an eternal effect, but alsointegrates the theological concern for an absolute creation: indeed,he intends to ascribe to the divine action the same absoluteness thatthe idea of creation out of nothing is thought to imply. Using aterminology already applied by al-Kindī and distinctlyreminiscent of Neo-Platonic texts (Janssens 1997), Avicenna statesthat the philosophers understand “creation”(ibdāʿ) as an act of bringing into existence thatdoes not suppose a world preceded by non-existence (which would meanthat creation was placed in time), but nonetheless absolutely excludesthat same possibility of non-existence (Marmura 1984; Janssens 1987;Lizzini 2011):

This is the meaning that philosophers(al-ḥukamāʾ) term “instauration”(ibdāʿ): it is to make the thing be(taʾyīs al-šayʾ) after an absolutenon-being (baʿda lays muṭlaq). In fact, it belongsto the effect in itself to benon-being (lays),while because of its cause it belongs to it to be “being”(ays). And what belongs to the thing in itself is prior inthe mind (ḏihn)—as regards essence, not asregards time—to that whichis because of somethingother than itself. Here then each caused [thing] “is”(ays) after “not being” (lays),according to a posteriority in essence (Ilāhiyyāt,VI, 2, 266, 12–15).

It is precisely on the basis of the problematic identification ofpossibility and non-existence (herelays elsewhere alsoʿadam:Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 3, 342,6–343, 6) that Avicenna shapes his idea of the divine flow inopposition to the theological conception of creation in time: for himnon-existence is what the possible in itself deserves. Reworking theAristotelian ideas of anteriority and agent causality, he ascribes tothe creation by the First Principle (with the consequent non-existenceof the effect) not a temporal but an essential anteriority (Marmura1984). A non-existence that is prior in time would refute theabsoluteness of creation because it would, contradictorily, positnon-existence. Moreover, this would explain a relativecreation—a “certain causing to be”(taʾyīs mā)—but not an absoluteinstauration. The principle according to which Avicenna excludes timein the instaurative act of the First Principle is the same one thatleads him to exclude any mediation: in order to be truly andabsolutely that which makes things existent, the First Principle mustperform an act that is free of any mediation; as Avicenna states intheKitāb al-Išārāt (Dunyā, IIIvol., 95), creation is not conceivable in terms of time because a timebefore the creative act of God would end up being an intermediatebetween the First Principle and the world:

Instauration (ibdāʿ) [signifies that] from thething [is derived] existence for [something] other than it, whichdepends on it alone, without an intermediary [such as] matter, or aninstrument or a time. On the contrary, what is preceded by a temporalnon-existence does not do without an intermediary. Instauration is ofa higher rank than generation (takwīn) and than bringing[the thing] into being in time (iḥdāt).

The action of the First Cause must therefore be conceived as exemptfrom any mediation. Nothing (neither a matter, nor an act of will, noreven time) can be inserted between the Principle and Its effect (seealsoḤudūd: 42–43). An image often occurs inAvicenna’s writings: the causality of the First Principle issimilar to that of the hand that moves the key in the lock of a door:the movement of the hand and that of the key—respectively thecause and the effect—are simultaneous, and yet one is prior tothe other. Priority is essential, not temporal(Ilāhiyyāt, IV, 1, 165).

5.4 Emanation: Celestial Intelligences, Souls and Bodies

Avicenna explains the creation of the world with an idea he adoptedfrom Arabic Neo-Platonic writings: emanation, in Arabicfayḍ (literally “flow”; cf. the Latinfluxus; Hasnawi 1990), which, like the Greekaporrein originally indicated the flow of water from asource. By virtue of an act of thought which is outside time andtotally auto-reflective—the First Principle is Itselfintelligence, as well as subject and object of intellection:ʿaql, ʿāqil andmaʿqūl(Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 6, 357, 3–12; cf. Arist.,Metaph., XII (Λ) 7, 9)—a thinking entity isderived from the First Principle: an intellect or intelligence(ʿaql) which is both the objectification of theintellection of the Principle and an active subject of thought. To theextent that is possible for a caused entity (which is in itselfrelative), this first emanated intelligence is “one”(“from the one, insofar as it is one, comes only one”:ex uno non fit nisi unum;Ilāhiyyāt, IX,4, 405, 13–14; cf. IX, 5, 411, 1, 5–6;Išārāt, III, ed. Dunyā, 95–102;cf.Taʿlīqāt, 97, 12–13). Nevertheless,unlike the Principle, which is absolutely simple, this first causedintelligence is already a complex existence. The reason for itsexistence lies in fact not only in itself—as in the case of theFirst Principle—but in itself (in its possibility) and in theFirst Principle’s act of thinking, which makes it necessary:this first created intelligence is therefore twofold.

Indeed the intrinsic duality of the first caused intelligence exhibitsboth the structure of the universe (Ilāhiyyāt, I,7, 47, 18–19) and, at the same time, the reason the universeunfolds: if the First Principle’s thought can only be simple andauto-reflective, that of the first caused intelligence is already acomplex thought. This first caused intelligence has not only twopossible objects of thought (its Principle and itself); it also has athought of itself, which is in turn complex: it reflects the dualityof its own being, in which essence and existence (and thereforepossibility and necessity) are to be distinguished. Hence the firstcaused intelligence thinks of the First Principle and then proceeds inits auto-intellection according to a descent which, as in a mirror,reflects (thus showing it in reverse), the ontological order ofcausality: the intelligence thinks first of all of its existence oractualization (its necessityper aliud) and then recognizesits potential foundation (its essence as possible). The effect of thisarticulation is consequently triple (“from every intelligencethree things follow”:Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 4, 40611–15):

from the act by which the first caused intelligence thinks of theFirst Principle and aims at it, a further intelligence originates;from the act by which it thinks of itself and aims at itself, twoentities originate:
a soul, which is an intelligence bound to a body and which is, insome texts, equated to the practical intellect(Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 2, 387, 4–7); and
the celestial body to which this intelligence is bound.

Clearly, the consequence of the immediacy of the divine act is thenecessity of the series: only one caused element can derive directlyfrom the absolutely unique Principle. Multiplicity is produced bymediation and the product of divine causality is divided between whatis created directly (and is necessarily one) and what is created byway of mediation. With his emanative doctrine, Avicenna thus maintainsthe idea of the absolute causation of being and simultaneouslyestablishes two distinct kinds of effects: those that correspond tothe intermediate (mutawassiṭ), which is caused withoutmediation, and those that are like the last caused thing(maʿlūl), which is caused by virtue of theintermediate and is only an effect. In Avicenna’s emanativescheme, the first effects correspond to the celestial entities (and,strictly speaking, only to the first one, which is caused or“instaured” or absolutely created: al-mubdaʿal-awwal); the following ones are, roughly speaking, all theeffects (and, strictly speaking, the sublunary effects).

This pattern also explains the relations among the different causalseries: as is the case in the Neo-Platonic tradition Avicenna dividesthe four Aristotelian causes into internal and external as regards thething of which they are causes (Jolivet 1991; Bertolacci 2002;Wisnovsky 2003b); thus he inserts them in a hierarchy(cause-intermediate-caused) that places the intermediate term abovethe last effect, but below the absolute cause. In the sublunary world,for example, the form is part of the cause of matter and is superiorto it, because it is an intermediate in the causal relation that bindsmatter (the last caused thing) to the intelligence—thedatorformarum— from which both form and matter result(Ilāhiyyāt, II, 4, 87, 13–89, 15; VI, 1, 259,7–10). Moreover, the effects that are caused without mediationare absolutely created (or “instaured”) and immaterial andconsequently defined only by the ontological composition of thepossibility of their essence and the necessity of their existence;those that are caused by virtue of a mediation are defined by virtueof their ontological composition (possibility and necessity; existencedistinct from essence), but also by virtue of the composition that isconsequent to the mediation: they are material entities, composed ofmatter and form. In this sense the whole of the cosmos is explained:the intelligences (al-ʿuqūl) that are causeddirectly by the Necessarily Existent (properly speaking only the firstof them); the entities originated by virtue of the intellection of thefirst intelligences: the souls (al-nufūs) and theheavenly bodies (al-aǧrām al-samāwiyya). Bothof these have an influence on the sublunary world and—like thecelestial intelligences—are sometimes called“angels” in religious terms (Ilāhiyyāt,X, 1); they are followed by the world of simple effects: the beings ofthe sublunary world.

Indeed the intellectual process is welded to cosmology (in which thePtolemaic system is painstakingly harmonized with Aristotle’sMetaphysics, Book Λ andDe Caelo). The wholeof the heavens is explained in terms of emanation or flow. In sometexts, Avicenna mentions “ten intelligences after theFirst” (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 3, 401, 9–12):the Heavens—the outermost orb, and the orb of the fixed stars,and then Saturn, and so on, up to and including, according to thetraditional scheme, the animated spheres of Jupiter, Mars, the Sun,Venus, Mercury and the Moon—are bound to the intelligences. Theearth is at the center. Theology, metaphysics, cosmology and(celestial) noetic seem fused with one another.

The noetic process also explains the multiplicity of intelligibles:the Aristotelian idea of the First Principle asnoesisnoeseos is interpreted by means of Themistius’ idea of Itsknowing all things through Itself (Ilāhiyyāt, VIII,6, 359, 15–360, 10;Commentaire Lambda: 13; Pines 1987;Bertolacci 2006), but in the Principle’s thinking the multipleis intellected as a “whole” and “at once” andappears to be reduced to something unique (tooneintelligible). Thus, its order (tartīb), the syllogisticconcatenation of intellection that corresponds to reality, is aconsequent of divine intellection and is in a sense relocated from thethought of the First Principle to that of its immediate effects(Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 7, 362, 17–366).

5.5 Celestial Movement

The explanation of celestial movement elaborates and alters some ofAristotle’s (and al-Fārābī’s) ideas.Intelligences and souls together explain—as remote and proximatecauses respectively—the motion of the spheres, as they are atthe root of the influence (taʾaṯṯur) thespheres have on the sublunary world. Metaphysics explainscosmology—to which it is linked—but also adopts its data.Thus the circular movement of the spheres is explained by Avicenna notdirectly by means of nature—celestial bodies always leave thespot they have just attained only to return to occupy it again later,whereas through natural movement a body should come to rest in itslocus naturalis—but by means of a principle which isboth intellectual and psychic (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 2,382, 8–383, 13): the motion of the spheres is a reflection ofthe love and desire (ʿišq andtašawwuq;Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 2, 387,1–392, 3), common to both intelligences and souls, to resembletheir principle (to realize theirassimilation—tašabbuh—to it). It isbecause of this desired resemblance that celestial bodies actualize,by occupying all their possible positions in turn, the onlypotentiality they have (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 2, 389,13–390, 8; Hasnawi 1984; Janos 2011). In other words, celestialsouls continuously move the bodies to which they are bound in order torealize this resemblance: each time they have before them therepresentation of a point they must reach by virtue of whichimperfection will, however briefly, be eliminated; in a way that is inpart irrational, each time every soul chooses one point rather thananother (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 2, 383, 10–11).

The movement of the spheres is thus explained by combining nature,soul and intelligence. Indeed, the soul follows nature(Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 2, 383, 7–13; in a sense,since it is not opposed to the potentiality of the body, celestialmotion could be defined as natural), but is also thought and will.Only an intellectual discursive will, which is capable of a particularintellection, can explain the celestial movement by which the body isalways located in a particularly determined position: the soulconceives and therefore elects and desires a movement whose status (toleave a point in order to return to it and then leave it again as in acycle) is rightly expressed by a paradox: celestial movement is“persistence itself” (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 3,398, 2–7). In fact, intelligences guarantee the infinity ofmotion because their thought is oriented towards the Principle; everyintelligence moves because it looks to the Principle as to its objectof love and assimilation and consequently receives from It an infinitelight (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 2, 389, 10–13),while—as we have observed (seeSection 2.3)—the First Principle is not a direct but a transcendent principle ofmotion: it is the ultimate horizon to which the intelligences lookwith their desire for resemblance.

6. Conclusion

6.1 The Ethical Dimension

The attribution of intellection and hence awareness to the NecessarilyExistent (Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 7, 368, 6;Taʿlīqāt, 50, 23–52) allows Avicenna toconnote the divine act in an ethical sense: according to Avicenna theflow explains the procession of being from the Principle—alsocalled the Pure Good (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 3, 394,4)—in different terms from those used of natural necessity(which is explicitly rejected together with its typical image oflight:Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 7, 363, 10–13). Theatemporal act “at one blow” (dufʿatanwāḥidatan) of divine intellection—according tothe formula already present in thepseudo-Theology ofAristotle—is interpreted as an act of will(irāda) and love (ʿišq). The FirstNecessarily Existent “creates” the world, because, havingintellection of Itself, It comprehends, intends, wants and loves Itsown intellection and the consequences that this entails(Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 7, 363, 14–17; 366,8–17;Commentaire Lambda: 15, 23–24). Will andlove—which Avicenna includes among the attributes of thePrinciple (Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 7, 366, 6–8; 370,7)—explain the flow revealing its ethical dimension(Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 7, 367, 7–11). The flow isthe good (ḫayr) and generosity (ǧūd)and gives the world, or lets it acquire the good: indeed, the flow isgood for the world, as it is generosity in itself (Lizzini 2005). Evenevil (defined as non-existence or privation) is an object of divinewill: it is willed accidentally, i.e., insofar as it is a necessaryconsequent of the good (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 6; Steel2002). Will is also ascribed to the First Principle in terms oflogical possibility: the Principle always wills (there is no timelag), but It could nevertheless have not willed to create(Ilāhiyyāt, IV, 2, 172, 13–173, 12). The veryrejection of the temporal dimension which would allow an authenticconception ofcreatio ex nihilo, is also the condition of atrue conception of the divine will, a will that coincides totally withthe being of the Principle and aims at a good inherent in It, fromwhich the good of the world follows as a consequence. The flow isindeed a communication or donation of existence: it explains thenecessityper aliud of possible essences and, as a donation,connotes, in an ethical sense, the divine act (Lizzini 2011). At thesame time, the definition of absolute good as the full realization ofpossibility is the very basis on which Avicenna ascribes an ethicaldimension to the action of the First Principle; and this comes notwithout difficulty: it entails the First Principle’s having tocreate the world, because the realization of possibilities would begood (Lizzini 2014).

6.2 The Sublunary World: Matter and Evil

Without Avicenna’s attempting to provide a philosophical reasonfor it (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 4, 407, 4–8;Išārāt, ed. Dunyā, III, 228–230),the last intelligence does not lead to a further intelligence butinstead looks after the sublunary world and human beings. Indeed, thelast intelligence provides forms for the sublunary world.Called—with an expression that was to be in great favor in theLatin medieval world (which came to know it also throughal-Ghazālī) “bestower” or “giver offorms” (dator formarum; Arabic:wāhibal-ṣuwar; but, for Avicenna, this name can be applied toall intelligences:Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 5, 411; 413), thelast Intelligence or Agent Intellect (al-ʿaqlal-faʿʿāl) represents the principle of thephysical constitution of the world as well as the founding principleof human intellection (which at least in some texts Avicenna explainsthrough the idea of donation). In general terms, the sublunary worldis explained by means of the metaphysical structures used byAristotle: matter and form, potentiality and act. These structures arenevertheless sustained by the emanative pattern which explains theworld not only as regards its origin, but also as regards its“life”: generations and natural transformations areconceived as the result of a process by which matter becomesspecifically prepared to receive the gift of forms from above. So tothe active donation of forms by the Agent Intellect, Avicenna adds theinfluence of the spheres, the mutual interactions of the sublunaryelements as preparatory causes and the reception of matter. Thedynamic ideas of potency and act are thus elaborated and complicated:the idea of potency—quwwa—to which Avicenna addsthose of preparation (istiʿdād) and specific orproper preparation (istiʿdādḫāṣṣ)—is interpreted in the light ofemanation: the potency of matter is reception in time and is in factpossibility in time. In the temporal dimension of the sublunaryworld—where what becomes is something after not having been it,possibility requires a substratum (matter) and becomes materialpotency: it thus explains a non-eternal thing, which is brought intoexistence “after being non-existent”(Ilāhiyyāt, IV, 2, 181, 7–12).

6.3 Concluding Remarks

Hence, through the concept of emanation, Avicenna explains theGod-world relationship and, more generally, efficient causality. Thecausality of motion (taḥrīk) and of influence(taʾaṯṯur) are both added to and subsumedunder the causality of emanation, which is sustained by the ideas ofboth donation and reception. With his metaphysics Avicenna provides afoundation for every level of his theory: physics and then psychology,gnoseology or epistemology, prophecy (Ilāhiyyāt, X,2–3) and even eschatology (Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 7;Michot 1986) find their ultimate explanation in the metaphysicalconcept of the flow of forms. Consequently, if theIlāhiyyāt of theKitābal-Šifāʾ and the metaphysical parts of the othersummae (Salvation, Remarks, Science, Guidance)together with theKitāb al-Taʿlīqāt(The Book of Notes) and other writings like theKitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād (The Book ofProvenance and Destination), are essential to the study ofmetaphysics, it is no exaggeration to state that every work Avicennadevoted to philosophy can be relevant to the understanding of hismetaphysical ideas and that metaphysical works clarify the other partsof Avicenna’s system: metaphysics is omni-comprehensive.

Bibliography

Roman ciphers after the title (e.g.,Ilāhiyyāt)indicate the treatise/book; Arabic ciphers indicate thesection/chapter, then the pages and finally the lines:

soIlāhiyyāt I, 4, 26, 6–10 means:Ilāhiyyāt, treatise, I, section 4, page 26, lines6–10.
Taʿlīqāt, 62, 14–19 means: page 62,lines 14–19.
Išārāt, III, ed. Dunyā,95–102 means: part III, pages 95–102.

Editions and translations of Avicenna’s metaphysical texts

K. al-Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt: IbnSînâ,K. al-Šifāʾ.Al-Ilāhiyyāt (Al-Shifāʾ. LaMétaphysique), t. I, traités I–V, éd.par G.C. Anawati / S. Zayed, révision et introduction par I.Madkour. t. II, traités VI–X, texte établi etédité par M.Y. Mousa / S. Dunyā / S. Zayed, revu etprécédé d’une introduction par le dr. I.Madkour, à l’occasion du millenaire d’Avicenne, LeCaire: Ministère de la Culture et de l’Orientation, 1960[Iranian reprint, 1404 h./1984–85].
Al-Ilāhiyyāt min Kitābal-Šifāʾ, [ed. by], H.al-Āmūlī, Maktab al-Iʾlāmal-Islāmī, Qum: Markaz al-Našr, 1418 H.q./1376 H.š [1997–8].
Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, 1.[livres I–IV]. 2. [livres V–X ]. 3. [Lexiques].Édition critique de la traduction latinemédiévale par S.Van Riet, introduction doctrinale par G.Verbeke, Louvain—Leiden: Peeters—Brill, 1977, 1980,1983.
The Metaphysics of “The Healing”. A parallelEnglish-Arabic text translated, introduced, and annotated by M.E.Marmura, Brigham Young University Press, Provo, Utah 2005.
La Métaphysique du Shifāʾ, 1 [Livres 1à V ] et 2 [Livres de VI à X], traductionfrançaise du texte arabe de l’édition du Caire,introduction, notes et commentaires par G.C. Anawati, Paris: Vrin,1978, 1985 (2).
Metafisica. La scienza delle cose divine dal Libro dellaguarigione (Kitāb al-Šifāʾ), Testo arabo afronte, testo latino in nota. Traduzione dall’arabo,introduzioni, note e apparati di O. Lizzini. Prefazione e curaeditoriale di P. Porro, Milano: Bompiani, 2006² (I ed.2002).
[Le cose divine]Libro della guarigione. Le cosedivine, a cura di A. Bertolacci, Torino: Utet, 2007.
[Naǧāt/Salvation]K.al-Naǧāt min al-ġaraq fī baḥral-ḍalālāt (Salvation of the Immersion in the Sea ofErrors), [ed. and introduction by] M. Dānišpazūh(Daneshpazhuh), Tehran: Dānišga (Daneshga) Tehran,1985/1405.
[Išārāt]K.al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt li-AbīʿAlī ibn Sīnā maʿa šarḥNaṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, edited byS. Dunyā, al-Qāhira [Cairo]: Dār al-Maʿārif,1957, IV voll.
[Remarks]Ibn Sina’s Remarks and Admonitions:Physics and Metaphysics. An Analysis and Annotated Translation,New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.
Livre des directives et remarques (Kitābal-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt). Traduction avecintroduction et notes par A.M. Goichon, Paris: Vrin, 1951 [reprintParis: Vrin—Unesco, 1999].
K. al-Taʿlīqāt, A.Badawī,al-Qāhira: al-hayʾa l-miṣriyyaal-ʿāmma li-l-kitāb, 1973.
K. al-Taʿlīqāt, edited with Introductionand notes by S.H. Mousavian, Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy,2013.
K. al-Hidāya, M. ʿAbduh (ed.),Maṭbaʿ al-Qāhira: al-Qāhiraal-ḥadītha, 1974².
K. al-Mabdaʾ wa al-Maʿād, A.Nūrānī, Muʾassasa Matalʿat Daneshga McGīl, Tehran 1342h/1984.
Livre de la Genèse et du Retour, Traductionfrançaise intégrale par Y. Michot, Oxford 2002.http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/sina/works/AN195.pdf.
[Science]Le livre de Science: I (Logique,Métaphysique), II (Science naturelle,Mathématiques), trad. par M. Achena et H. Massé,Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1955–1958 [2. éd. revue etcorrigée 1986].
The “Metaphysica” of Avicenna (IbnSīnā): A Critical Translation-Commentary and Analysis of theFundamental Arguments in Avicenna’s “Metaphysica” inthe “Dānish Nāma-i ʿalāʾi” (TheBook of Scientific Knowledge), P. Morewedge (ed.), London:Routledge and Kegan, 1973.
Liber de anima, 1. [livres I–III]. 2. [livresIV–V]. Édition critique de la traduction latinemédiévale par S.Van Riet, introduction sur la doctrinepsychologique d’Avicenne par G. Verbeke, Louvain—Leiden:Peeters—Brill, 1972, 1968.
[Avicenna’s De anima]Avicenna’s DeAnima.Being the Psychological Part of K.al-Shifāʾ, F. Rahman (ed.), London—NewYork—Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959.
Epistola sulla vita futura, [ed. by] F. Lucchetta [ArabicText, Italian translation and notes], Padova: Antenore, 1969.

Other cited sources

[Commentaire Lambda] Avicenne,Commentaire sur leLivre Lambda de la Métaphysique d’Aristote (Ch.6–10), éd. critique, traduction et notes par M. Geoffroy,J. Janssens, and M. Sebti, Paris: Vrin 2014.
[Physics of “The Healing”]–––,The Physics of “The Healing”(Books I & II): A parallel English-Arabic text, Jon McGinnis(ed. and trans.), Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press,2010.
[Ḥudūd] –––,Kitābal-Ḥudūd: Le livre des définitions, (Kitābal-Ḥudūd), édité, traduit etannoté par A.M. Goichon, Le Caire: Institut Françaisd’Archéologie Orientale, 1963.
[Gohlman 1974] –––,The Life of IbnSīnā: A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation,W.E. Gohlman, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974.
[Averroes on Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”]Averroes,Averroes on Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”:An Annotated Translation of the So-called “Epitome”,by R. D. Arnzen, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010.
[Badawi]Arīsṭū ʿinda al-ʿArab(Aristoteles apud Arabes). Dirāsāt wa-nuṣūṣġayr manšūra, A. Badawi (ed.),al-Qāhira:Maṭbaʿa Miṣr, 1947. Reprinted al-Kuwayt: Wikālatal-maṭbūʿāt, 1978.
Pormann, P. and P. Adamson (eds.),The Philosophical Works byal-Kindī, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012.
[Dieterici 1890] al-Fārābī,Maqāla fīaġrāḍ al-ḥakīm fī kulli maqālatinmin al-kitāb al-mawsūm bi-l-ḥurūf, F.Dieterici (ed.),(Alfarabis philosophische Abhandlungen),Leiden 1890.

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