Max Horkheimer (1895–1973) was a leader of the “FrankfurtSchool,” a group of philosophers and social scientistsassociated with theInstitut für Sozialforschung(Institute of Social Research) in Frankfurt am Main. Horkheimer wasthe director of the Institute and Professor of Social Philosophy atthe University of Frankfurt from 1930–1933, and again from1949–1958. In between those periods he would lead the Institutein exile, primarily in America. As a philosopher he is best known(especially in the Anglophone world), for his work during the 1940s,includingDialectic of Enlightenment, which was co-authoredwith Theodor Adorno. While deservedly influential,Dialectic ofEnlightenment (and other works from that period) should not beseparated from the context of Horkheimer’s work as a whole.Especially important in this regard are the writings from the 1930s,which were largely responsible for developing the epistemological andmethodological orientation of Frankfurt School critical theory. Thiswork both influenced his contemporaries (including Adorno and HerbertMarcuse) and has had an enduring influence on critical theory’slater practitioners (including Jürgen Habermas, and theInstitute’s current director Axel Honneth).

• 1. Biography
• 2. Materialism and The Early Program of the Institute of Social Research
  • 2.1. Suffering and the Desire for Happiness
  • 2.2 Reason and Emancipation
  • 2.3 Critiques of Metaphysics and Science
  • 2.4 The Epistemology and Methodology of Interdisciplinary Research
• 3. “Traditional and Critical Theory”: Summation and Dissolution of the Early Program
• 4. The Critique of Reason and the Domination of Nature
  • 4.1 The Critique of Instrumental Reason
  • 4.2 The Domination of Outer and Inner Nature
  • 4.3 Sources of Emancipation
• 5. Late Work
• Bibliography
  • Primary Sources
  • Secondary and Other Sources
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Biography

Max Horkheimer was born into a conservative Jewish family on February14, 1895, the only son of Moritz and Babette Horkheimer. A successfuland respected businessman who owned several textile factories in theZuffenhausen district of Stuttgart (where Max was born), MoritzHorkheimer expected his son to follow in his footsteps. Thus Max wastaken out of school in 1910 to work in the family business, where heeventually became a junior manager. During this period he would begintwo relationships that would last for the rest of his life. First, hemet Friedrich Pollock, who would later become a close academiccolleague, and who would remain Max’s closest friend. He alsomet Rose Riekher, who was his father’s personal secretary. Eightyears Max’s senior, a gentile, and of an economically lowerclass, Riekher (whom Max called “Maidon”) was notconsidered a suitable match by Moritz Horkheimer. Despite this, Maxand Maidon would marry in 1926 and remain together until her death in1969 (Wiggershaus 1994, p. 41–44).

In the spring of 1919, after failing an army physical, Horkheimerbegan studies at the University of Munich, and transferred to theUniversity of Frankfurt a semester later. At Frankfurt he studiedpsychology and philosophy, the latter with the neo-Kantian philosopherHans Cornelius. He also spent a year, on Cornelius’srecommendation, studying in Freiburg with Edmund Husserl. After anabortive attempt at writing a dissertation on gestalt psychology,Horkheimer, with Cornelius’s direction, completed his doctoratein philosophy with a dissertation titledThe Antinomy ofTeleological Judgment. Upon completion of the degree he wasoffered an assistantship under Cornelius, and thus definitively setoff on an academic career rather than continuing in his father’sbusiness. In 1925 Horkheimer completed his Habilitation with a worktitledKant’s Critique of Judgment as a Link betweenTheoretical and Practical Philosophy, and took a position asPrivatdozent, or lecturer, at Frankfurt. During this time hewould lecture extensively on 18th and 19th Century philosophy, withhis research interests moving more in line with Marxian themes(Wiggershaus 1994, p. 44–47).

The most important moments of Horkheimer’s early academic careerwould come in 1930. In July he was appointed Professor of SocialPhilosophy at Frankfurt, and in October made the director of theInstitut für Sozialforschung (Institute of SocialResearch). The Institute began as a Marxist study group started byFelix Weil, a one-time student of political science at Frankfurt whoused his inheritance to fund an institution that would support hisleftist academic aims. Along with Pollock (who also completed adoctorate in Frankfurt, writing on Marx), Horkheimer became acquaintedwith Weil, and took part in the activities of the Institute from thebeginning. The Institute formally opened in 1924 under the directionof the Austrian Marxist scholar Carl Grünberg, who became illquickly after taking the post. While Pollock was more closelyassociated with the Institute during the Grünberg period, hesupported his friend for the directorship (on the early history of theInstitute, see Jay 1996, ch. 1). On January 24, 1931, Horkheimerdelivered his inaugural lecture for the chair of social philosophy anddirectorship of the Institute, titled “The Present Situation ofSocial Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for SocialResearch.” This lecture, and several essays written byHorkheimer in the early 1930s, would develop a conception ofinterdisciplinary social research that was meant to guide theactivities of the institute during Horkheimer’s tenure asdirector.

This program was obstructed from the very beginning bysocial-political unrest. In the time between Horkheimer’s beingnamed Professor of Social Philosophy and director of the Institute in1930, the Nazis became the second largest party in the Reichstag. Inthe midst of the violence surrounding the Nazis’ rise,Horkheimer and his associates began to prepare for the possibility ofmoving the Institute out of Germany. Shortly after Hitler was namedChancellor in 1933, the Institute in Frankfurt was closed and itsbuilding seized by the Gestapo. Horkheimer was also relieved of hisprofessorship and directorship in early 1933, and relocated to Geneva,where the Institute had opened a satellite office. In 1934 Horkheimermoved to New York, where one of Pollock’s assistants had beennegotiating an agreement for the Institute with the department ofsociology at Columbia University. In July of 1934 Horkheimer acceptedan offer from Columbia to relocate the Institute to one of theirbuildings. Having received American citizenship in 1940, Horkheimerwould continue to live and work largely in New York until 1941, whenhe moved to the Los Angeles area (for a thorough history of thedevelopment of Horkheimer’s thought up to this point, seeAbromeit 2011). With the Institute splintering between New York andCalifornia, Horkheimer concentrated his energies on his own work,including the collaborative efforts with Theodor Adorno that producedDialectic of Enlightenment.

With the end of WWII, Horkheimer gradually considered moving back toGermany. In April 1948, he returned to Europe for the first time, tolecture in various cities, including as a visiting professor inFrankfurt. His full return to Germany would follow shortly, and inJuly 1949 he was restored to his professorship at the University ofFrankfurt. The following year the Institute would return as well.After returning, Horkheimer would focus on administrative work,reestablishing the Institute and serving two terms as UniversityRector in the early 1950s. In 1953 he was awarded the Goethe Plaque ofthe City of Frankfurt, and would later be named honorary citizen ofFrankfurt for life. His academic activities also continued throughoutthe 1950s, and included a period during which he served as a regularvisiting professor at the University of Chicago. His work would slow,however, once he retired in 1958 to the Swiss town of Montagnola. MaxHorkheimer passed away on July 7, 1973, at the age of 78.

2. Materialism and The Early Program of the Institute of Social Research

The theoretical viewpoint that oriented the work of the Institute ofSocial Research, most famously known as “critical theory,”was largely developed by Horkheimer in various writings in the 1930s(most of which were published in the Institute’s journal, theZeitschrift für Sozialforschung).^[1] In the earliest works Horkheimer used the term“materialism,” rather than critical theory, to name hisphilosophical viewpoint. Though his early texts do not directlymention Marx as much as one might expect (perhaps for reasons ofpolitical expediency), it is clear that this theory draws greatinspiration from Marxian thought (see Borman 2017 for furtherdiscussion of Horkheimer’s early materialism and its connectionto Marx). Horkheimer’s materialism is not systematicallypresented in those early essays; rather the epistemological,methodological, and moral concepts that were to orient the work of theInstitute are developed through a variety of texts. What follows is anattempt at a reconstruction of Horkheimer’s program for theInstitute, which draws on elements from various essays of the early1930s.

One can begin to piece together Horkheimer’s materialist methodby examining the 1931 inaugural address. There he presents most of themain themes of his early philosophy in the context of describing whatthe Institute was to accomplish under his leadership. As he notes atthe beginning, social philosophy must interpret the various phenomenaassociated with human social life. But along with this fairly obviouspoint, he asserts that “social philosophy is confronted with theyearning for a new interpretation of a life trapped in its individualstriving for happiness” (p. 7). This introduces perhaps the mostfundamental element of Horkheimer’s view. Social philosophy mustconnect with the practical aim of alleviating suffering. But it is,after all, still a theoretical enterprise, and he would emphasize thatthe work of the Institute would amount to “a reformulation...ofthe old question concerning the connection of particular existence anduniversal Reason” (pp. 11–12). Along with the emphasis onsuffering, the proper interpretation of reason would play a crucialrole in Horkheimer’s thought.

Early in the inaugural address he lays out a quick, and critical,history of modern German social philosophy that fixes on Hegel.Hegelian social philosophy is criticized for“transfiguring” oppression; individual human experience,with all its suffering, is given sense insofar as it is fit within arational, overarching conception of the movement of the “eternallife of Spirit” (pp. 4–5). Horkheimer rejects this kind ofmetaphysical view because it seeks to cover over the reality of humansuffering. But he is not unreservedly critical of metaphysics. Aftercriticizing Hegelian social philosophy, he notes that in reactioncertain strands of social research eschewed philosophy entirely. Thisleads to Horkheimer’s criticism of the excessive specializationof the (in this case social) sciences. Due to this specialization,scientific researchers omit any broader examination of the socialroots, and social meaning, from their inquiry. At least metaphysicalthinking recognizes the need to present a comprehensive view that canmake sense of the social whole. The twin critiques of metaphysics andscience provide a space for Horkheimer to present his own view. Theaim of materialist social research is to combine specific empiricalstudies with more comprehensive theorizing, and thus overcome theseproblems. Horkheimer finishes by noting that this research will beaimed at the elucidation of the links between economic structure,psychology, and culture, such that the work of various socialscientists and theorists can be brought together to forge anempirically informed picture of society that might replace suchprevious metaphysical categories as Universal Reason or Spirit.

Thus construed, we can use the themes presented in the inauguraladdress as a guide for the further examination of Horkheimer’searly thought. Four elements become key: the emphasis on suffering andhappiness, the role rationality plays in emancipatory movements, thecombined critiques of metaphysics and positivism, and the methodologyof interdisciplinary social research. Each of these four is examinedin more depth in the four subsections below.

2.1. Suffering and the Desire for Happiness

As noted, the rejection of Hegelian social philosophy in the inaugurallecture is tied to a broader rejection of metaphysics, which will bediscussed in more detail in §2.2. At the root of the rejection of“transfiguration,” however, is a very basic point. Nosocial philosophy that denies the singular import of suffering, andthe corresponding desire to overcome that suffering, can properlygrasp human social reality. Thus, in the 1933 essay “Materialismand Metaphysics” Horkheimer writes that “man’sstriving for happiness is to be recognized as a natural fact requiringno justification” (p. 44). Prior to any critique of metaphysics,materialism rests on the basic recognition of suffering and the desirefor happiness. Suffering and happiness are in some sense“properly basic”; their significance is evident, in noneed of justification, and foundational to materialist socialtheory.

The talk of both “suffering” and “happiness”suggests that Horkheimer oscillated between pessimistic and optimisticrenderings of this foundational idea. The pessimistic side of thisview, with its conception of human life as shared suffering, waspresent in Horkheimer’s thought from very early in his life. Inthe novellas and diary entries written from 1914–1918 and laterpublished asAus der Pubertät (From Puberty),this pessimism is prominent (see Schmidt 1993, 25–26). This isin part due to the early influence of Schopenhauer’s“metaphysical pessimism” on Horkheimer’s thought,and Horkheimer himself would emphasize that Schopenhauer was his firstphilosophical role model (Horkheimer 1968, p. ix). It is noteworthy(especially given the link here to Horkheimer’s critique ofmetaphysics), that for Schopenhauer this “metaphysical”view is tied to the concrete need to interpret the world in a way thatcan help humans understand and deal with their suffering (on thispoint, and Horkheimer’s relation to Schopenhauer’s thoughtin general, see Schmidt 1993). Metaphysical or not, this view is basedon the notion that life is marked by pain. The optimistic renderingcomes to the fore in the above quote from “Materialism andMetaphysics” insofar as the desire for happiness is emphasized.But the optimism should not be overestimated, because happiness isconstrued in a solely negative manner. The oppressed are motivated notby some positive conception of happiness, but by the hope of freedomfrom suffering. This individual desire for happiness can furthermanifest itself as the moral sentiment of compassion, wherein wedesire the happiness of others (Horkheimer 1933b, pp. 34–35).^[2] The desire to overcome one’s own suffering, combined with thefeeling of compassion, should help motivate the oppressed to jointogether to work for positive social change. But even this optimisticnote is tinged with a pessimistic note, as “the aim of a futurehappy life for all” arises only “out of the privation ofthe present” (Horkheimer 1933b p. 34); it is the existence ofcurrent shared suffering that could lead to revolutionary socialchange.

Along with Schopenhauer, Horkheimer’s thoughts on suffering owea great deal to Freud. The notion that human beings have an innerdrive to overcome suffering is taken from Freud’s early libidotheory (see Held 1980, pp. 43–44 and 197–198).Horkheimer’s most direct analysis of Freud in the 1930s is foundin “Egoism and Freedom Movements” (especially pp.103–106), and the Freudian conception of inner drives willfurther mark Horkheimer’s later work, as will be shown in§4.2 below. In the 1930s Horkheimer was also influenced by ErichFromm, who was a member of the Institute at the time; for example,shortly after the claim in “Materialism and Metaphysics”that the desire for happiness is a natural fact, Fromm’s work isreferenced. It is noteworthy in this regard that Fromm’s workfrom this period aimed to broadly draw together Freudian and Marxianviews. This connection can be seen in the link between the desire forhappiness and emancipation, as discussed in the next section.

2.2 Reason and Emancipation

When focusing on the affective nature of suffering, happiness, andcompassion in Horkheimer’s view, one might get the sense that heis relying on a sort of emotivism that shuns reason. But there is astrongly rationalistic strand present in Horkheimer’s early workthat is tied directly to his views on positive social change. In fact,he describes suffering as resulting from a lack of rational socialorganization, and proposes that any attempt to improve society mustinvolve making it in some way more rational. This view is in turn tiedto the broadly Marxian element in Horkheimer’s early work, ascapitalism is criticized for creating the irrational social conditionsthat lead to suffering.

To a large extent, this problem of irrationality is described as asocial coordination problem. Insofar as it is individual human beingswho suffer, and who desire happiness, individual welfare is a crucialmatter. This is made clear by the critique of Hegelian“transfiguration,” which is problematic partly because itsubsumes individual suffering and happiness within the absolute. Atthe same time, individual welfare is still dependent upon a broadersocial basis, so the life of society as a whole is pertinent to thesearch for happiness. But capitalism has created a situation whereinpeople are made to focus on their own individual welfare, withoutconsidering anything other than “the conservation andmultiplication of their own property” (1933b, p. 19). Socialneeds are thus handled through various disorganized activities focusedon individual needs, which in turn inadequately deals with the socialbasis of individual welfare, thus detracting from individual welfare.This kind of critique is found in some form in many ofHorkheimer’s early essays (see, for example, 1934c, pp.247–250 and 1935b, pp. 162–170).

Such an argument is made particularly clearly in “Materialismand Morality,” where Horkheimer discusses idealist, andpredominantly Kantian, conceptions of morality. One main thread of therather intricate argument made there is that there is a tension inKant’s view, insofar as he places a radical emphasis on theindividual will, but also makes that will beholden to the universallaw described in terms of the kingdom of ends. This tension supposedlycomes from the bourgeois socio-economic context in which Kantlived:

The categorical imperative holds up a “universal naturallaw,” the law of human society, as a standard of comparison tothis [bourgeois] natural law of individuals. This would be meaninglessif particular interests and the needs of the general publicintersected not just haphazardly but of necessity. That this does notoccur, however, is the inadequacy of the bourgeois economic form:there exists no rational connection between the free competition ofindividuals as what mediates and the existence of the entire societyas what is mediated...This irrationality expresses itself in thesuffering of the majority of human beings...This problem, which onlysociety itself could rationally solve through the systematicincorporation of each member into a consciously directed laborprocess, manifests itself in the bourgeois epoch as a conflict in theinner life of its subjects. (pp. 19–20)

This passage makes it clear that the coordination problems associatedwith the “bourgeois epoch” (i.e. the capitalist period)are problems of irrationality. Furthermore, it makes clear that thesolution to these problems is to be found in the formation of a morerational social order, which is described in terms of a socialistplanned economy. This point, then, provides the space where Horkheimercan link his own materialist theory, and the work of the Institute, tothe broadly Marxian aim of emancipation through overcoming thecapitalist order. Because “the wretchedness of our own time isconnected with the structure of society” (1933b, 24) a socialtheory that could make that structure’s irrationality explicitcould help overcome that wretchedness. Furthermore, that irrationalityneeds to be made explicit to the classes who suffer the most from it,so they can take proper action. So Horkheimer’s view connectsgenerally to the Marxian view of the proletariat as a critical forcein history, but unlike (on certain interpretations, at least) Marx, hedoes not see history as necessarily moving the proletariat to“critical consciousness” because of the irrationalityinherent in capitalist socio-economic arrangements. Rather, varioussocial and economic forces keep the proletariat from recognizing itspotential; for example there is a split between the unemployed, whosuffer most from capitalism but are disorganized, and the workers whocan be organized, but fear losing their jobs (Horkheimer 1934a,61–65). The proletariat requires the help of the theorist. Thattheorist must engage in a special kind of activity, however, which (asthe next section will show) must steer clear of two opposingerrors.

2.3 Critiques of Metaphysics and Science

One can get a sense of what Horkheimer means when criticizingmetaphysics by looking at “Materialism and Metaphysics.”There metaphysics is described in relation to Wilhelm Dilthey’sdoctrine of “world views.” For Dilthey, human beingsengage in metaphysics in an attempt to explain the enigmatic elementsof human life. In this attempt, certain characteristics of experienceare emphasized and developed into coherent world views that haveputatively universal validity, and describe the significance of theworld and human life (pp. 10–17). So “metaphysics,”in this sense, amounts to a kind of intellectualized, theoreticallyelaborated attempt at turning partial, finite experiences into acomprehensive view of nature and human experience.

For Horkheimer, theories of this type are in part problematic because“knowledge of the infinite must itself be infinite”(Horkheimer 1933a, p. 27). But human beings are only capable of finiteknowledge, and can only pay attention to changing historicalconditions. If insights into the absolute are impossible, there is noknown ultimate order of things that grounds all other forms ofknowledge. Along these lines Horkheimer criticized Max Scheler’smetaphysical anthropology for holding that all human works andachievements could be described in terms of some basic structure ofhuman nature (Horkheimer 1935b, p. 153). Rather than pursuing aninterest in understanding human existence, Horkheimer argues,metaphysics obscures the proper understanding of human life. Many ofHorkheimer’s early essays aim to show how the works of variousphilosophers, past and present, are troubled in this way. For example,along with the criticism of Dilthey in “Materialism andMetaphysics” and the criticism of Scheler in “Remarks onPhilosophical Anthropology,” there are (among others) critiquesof this type that attack Kant in “Materialism andMorality,” and Henri Bergson in “On Bergson’sMetaphysics of Time.”

In each case, however, Horkheimer was not solely critical, and thereis a positive element that Horkheimer finds in metaphysics that servesas a transition to his critique of science. For example, in the 1932essay “Notes on Science and the Crisis,” he applauds“postwar metaphysics, especially that of Max Scheler” fordeveloping “a method less hindered by conventional narrowness ofoutlook” (p.6). Similarly, in the 1934 essay “TheRationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy,” Horkheimeragrees with Dilthey and Bergson (and also Nietzsche, all three underthe aegis ofLebensphilosophie) insofar as they critiquescientism and formalistic rationalism. Metaphysics is, in general,right to try to engage in some form of synoptic theorizing, althoughit takes it too far. But the opposite extreme, of which Scheler,Dilthey, and Bergson are critical, fits with Horkheimer’sconception of the state of the sciences.

The critique of the sciences developed in the early texts moves alongtwo lines. First, the sciences are criticized for being overlyspecialized. For example, in the inaugural address Horkheimercomplains of “chaotic specialization” (p. 9). The dangerof focusing on technical minutiae is that researchers become insulatedfrom one another, and lose the ability to use one another’sresources. The result is a lack of unification and overall direction.Just as he favors a planned economy, Horkheimer wants the“setting of tasks” in scientific research to be broughtunder rational control, so empirical researchers can work togethertoward broader ends. Second, as noted in “Notes on Science andthe Crisis,” science “has no realistic grasp of thatcomprehensive relationship upon which its own existence and thedirection of its work depends, namely, society” (p. 8). Allhuman work, be it in the sciences or anything else, depends on abroader context which supports it, and the activities that areassociated with the social interests prevalent at any given timeaffect the direction of scientific research. There is no “viewfrom nowhere” from which empirical research begins, but onlysocially situated standpoints. Horkheimer expands on this point toargue that when empirical research misses its social roots, it alsomisses the effects the “direction of its work” might haveon society. Science has a responsibility to society that can only befilled if its various research efforts are knit together within a morecomprehensive framework that takes society and its improvement as itsobject.

This is largely repeated in other works that criticize“positivism.” The fact that the Frankfurt School mounted astrong critique of positivism is quite well known, in part because ofthe so-called “Positivismusstreit” of the 1960s,and Horkheimer also uses the term frequently, especially in his laterworks. The critiques of science and positivism make the same basic points.^[3] Consider the critique of logical positivism in the 1937 essay“The Latest Attack on Metaphysics.” There Horkheimerargues that insofar as logical empiricism “holds only to whatis, to the guarantee of facts” (pp. 133–134), it tries toinsulate the individual sciences from broader interpretation. Thuspositivism disconnects science from society and robs it of itsemancipatory possibilities, because brute facts can only grasp thepresent, and the possibility for changing the status quo in the futureis lost.

The crucial point to note is that the critiques of metaphysics andscience work together, and are meant to open up a space between thetwo where materialist social research should operate. Philosophymaintains metaphysics’ goal of producing a synoptic view ofhuman life, but it does so in a merely provisional way, which is opento empirical research that genuinely follows the contours of history.Science, on the other hand, maintains its rigorous empirical methods,but must open itself up to the role it plays in the broader socialframework. In the inaugural address, Horkheimer thus claims that theremust be a “continuous, dialectical penetration and developmentof philosophical theory and specialized scientific practice” (p.9).

2.4 The Epistemology and Methodology of Interdisciplinary Research

Horkheimer’s conception of interdisciplinary social research isrooted in, broadly construed, both empiricist and realist views.Horkheimer speaks often of such research as aiming at“facts,” as seen in §2.1 when he refers to the desirefor happiness as a natural fact. This connects to a kind of realismseen most directly in the 1935 essay “On the Problem ofTruth.” “Materialism” he tells us, “insiststhat objective reality is not identical with man’sthought,” and truth is determined by the “relation of thepropositions to reality” (pp. 189, 194). But this realism has tobe qualified; materialism is distinguished from idealism through theappeal to an objective reality outside of our thinking, but it isfurther separated from metaphysical realism by its recognition thatour knowing is historically bounded. Along these lines, Horkheimeradmits to holding to a correspondence theory of truth, but notesthat:

This correspondence is neither a simple datum [nor] an immediatefact...Rather, it is always established by real events and humanactivity. Already in the investigation and determination of facts, andeven more in the verification of theories, a role is played by thedirection of attention, the refinement of methods, the categoricalstructure of the subject matter—in short, by human activitycorresponding to the given social period. (p. 190)

Here we find Horkheimer’s epistemological considerations echoinghis critique of science. Presumably the “real events and humanactivity” that grasp objective truth involve empirical research.But because (as discussed in the critique of science) empiricalresearch is always tied to a social context, one must see that thetruths it reveals are conditioned by the “human activitycorresponding to the given social period.” Knowledge is alwaysaffected by the historical changes in our methods noted. But more thantheoretical or methodological changes that shift scientific theories,Horkheimer sees knowledge as being marked by our practical interests.This is why a strong metaphysical conception of reality is unavailableto us; all thinking is marked by practical and theoretical intereststhat are partial and subject to historical change.

But this point cannot be taken too far; truth is neither whollydetermined by our practical interests nor by theory-dependentconditions of verification. When it is claimed that truth is dependenton the “relation of propositions to reality,” Horkheimermeans both of those to be given equal weight. While the weight put on“propositions” (or better, human conceptual activity)removes the possibility of a metaphysical theory of reality, it doesnot remove reality. But because all inquiry into truth is historicallyand socially mediated, it is constantly open to adjustment. Thispoints out why the “continuous, dialectical penetration”of philosophy and science spoken of in the inaugural address isnecessary. Objective truths have to be grasped empirically, and thework of the specialized sciences is thus necessary to determine thetruth of the current state of society. But “truth isadvanced” only when “human beings who possess it stand byit unbendingly, apply it and carry it through, act according to it,and bring it to power against the resistance of reactionary, narrow,one-sided points of view” (Horkheimer 1935a, p. 4). Thisrequires that empirical research be saved from “chaoticspecialization,” and interpreted through an adequate theoreticalframework. It is noteworthy in this regard that toward the end of theinaugural lecture, Horkheimer states that it is appropriate for thehead of the Institute to also hold a chair in social philosophy, aswas not the case with his predecessor who worked in the“specific discipline” of political economy. ForHorkheimer, it was properly the job of the philosopher to plan out andguide the interdisciplinary work of the Institute.

Historical exigencies kept the Institute’s early researchersfrom implementing this program. They did press on with their empiricaland theoretical efforts during the time of upheaval in the 1930s,producing various small studies in theZeitschrift fürSozialforschung, and the largerStudies on Authority and theFamily. It is clearly the case, however, that there were manydifficulties in carrying out the empirical research that was used inthose studies (see the historical discussion of this period inWiggershaus 1994, 149–156). Even if we set aside the historicaldifficulties that beset the Institute during this time, there is stillreason to question whether Horkheimer’s interdisciplinaryprogram could have been carried out successfully. One might doubt, forexample, that the philosophers who formed the core of the FrankfurtSchool, including Horkheimer himself, were actually open enough to thesciences. Jay 1996 (pp. 130–131), Wiggershaus 1994 (p. 151), andWolin 1992 (pp. 56–58), argue that they were not, such thattheir theoretical works (especially inStudies on Authority andthe Family) were not really integrated with the empiricalstudies. Perhaps more damningly, Bonß 1993 argues that thisfailure comes from faults internal to Horkheimer’smethodological and epistemological considerations such that “theinterdisciplinary claim amounts to no more than an external formulafor integration” (p. 118). This seems fair insofar as Horkheimerspent a great deal of energy claiming that empirical and theoreticalresearch should be combined, and explaining why they should becombined, but did very little to explainhow they would be socombined. It remains to be shown if one might reactivateHorkheimer’s intentions while providing a better explanation ofhow such integrated research might actually work. Clearly, however,Horkheimer would come to gradually doubt the efficacy of such aprogram; one can begin to trace out this shift by examining the 1937essay “Traditional and Critical Theory” (this separationof the 1937 essay from the earlier “materialist” worksroughly follows arguments in Dubiel 1985).

3. “Traditional and Critical Theory”: Summation and Dissolution of the Early Program

To an extent, Horkheimer’s materialist theory is encapsulated inhis most famous and widely-read essay from the 1930s,“Traditional and Critical Theory.” The essay is oftenreferred to as being “programmatic,” highlighting thenotion that it summarizes the philosophical and methodological viewsthat were meant to guide the work of the Institute (see, for example,Schmidt 1993, p. 34, and Ingram 1990, p. 108). This is not wrong, butcan be misleading if overemphasized. At the same time as it summarizesthe earlier work, “Traditional and Critical Theory”evinces a transition to Horkheimer’s later critiques of reasonand enlightenment (a similar point is made in Benhabib 1986, pp.149–163). The most obvious change occurs in the name Horkheimergives to his favored view, as he shifts from “materialism”to “critical theory.” But the changes are more thancosmetic. For example, the critique of “traditionaltheory” subtly shifts the terms of the critiques of metaphysicsand positivism. Also, the role of the theorist vis-a-vis societychanges. In part, this prefigures later views.

The titular forms of theorizing correspond (as noted at the beginningof the 1937 “Postscript,” p. 244) to those found inDescartes’Discourse on Method and Marx’scritique of political economy, respectively. So the overarching pointof the essay can be summarized fairly succinctly; it describes a formof “traditional” theory that follows Descartes’methodology, examines the weaknesses of such theory, and then opposesto traditional theory a superior Marxian “critical”theory. The critique of traditional theory largely follows the earliercritique of the sciences and positivism, and in this sense is asummation. Again, the fact that the sciences do not recognize theirpresence in a broader social framework is emphasized. Traditionaltheory misses the fact that that “bringing hypotheses to bear onfacts is an activity that goes on, ultimately, not in thesavant’s head but in industry” (p. 196).“Savant” is the derisive term Horkheimer uses throughoutthe text to refer to the traditional theorist, and the savant does notrecognize that the economic (and thus currently capitalist) structureof society shapes scientific work. The savant further misses thesuffering caused by that social structure, and the fact that scienceis complicit in this oppression. Critical theorizing, on the otherhand, is “a human activity which has society itself for itsobject” (p. 206); it overcomes the blindness of the savant byopenly and purposely examining the way in which theory is immersed ina particular historical and social setting, and it seeks to critiquethat social setting for emancipatory effect. This relies on a form ofimmanent critique, tied to the suffering of the oppressed; thetheorist must seize on the meaning of the experience of the oppressedand develop it into a coherent critique of existing society. To thisend Horkheimer notes that if the critical theorist’s“presentation of societal contradictions is not merely anexpression of the concrete historical situation but also a forcewithin it to stimulate change, then [the critical theorist’s]real function emerges” (p. 215).

This general symmetry with the earlier program belies certainimportant changes to the theory, however. The very beginning of thetext, which discusses traditional theory, shows a subtle shift fromthe earlier work. Traditional theory is first linked with the naturalsciences, for which “theory” involves a set of logicallylinked propositions that are consonant with empirical facts. Thelogical coherence of such a set of propositions is then emphasized,and connected to Descartes’ method. Horkheimer goes on tosuggest that such a conception of theory has an inherent tendency tomove toward “a purely mathematical system of symbols.”Formal logic and reasoning thus become a main target of criticism.This is not a radical departure from Horkheimer’s earliercritique of science, since, for example, in “Notes on Scienceand the Crisis,” he objects to the rigid, mechanistic characterof the scientific method. But the earlier texts focus more on aproblem that is external to the sciences. There is no coherent“setting of tasks” prior to the engagement in empiricalresearch, and the results of empirical research are not knit into abroader theory that can have emancipatory intent. The earlier essayslargely ask for the sciences to go about their normal business withinan interdisciplinary setting that would correct these problems. In“Traditional and Critical Theory,” on the other hand, thecritique strikes more directly at the formalism inherent in thesciences’ own methodology, such that the problem is internal tothe sciences. This provides one clear transitional point, insofar asformalism will be a primary object of critique in Horkheimer’swritings from the 1940s.

Another interesting shift is that the critique of metaphysics largelyfalls out of the picture. For some commentators, metaphysics isfolded, along with science, into traditional theory (see Brunkhorst1993, 74). But this does not seem entirely correct, because in themidst of criticizing positivism, Horkheimer notes that there is,“lurking” in positivism’s emphasis on facts,“something like a reaction against the alliance of metaphysicsand oppression” (p. 232). This claim harkens back to thenotion, described in places like “Materialism andMetaphysics,” that scientific attention to facts, when properlyconstrued within materialist research, can keep philosophy fromoverlooking actual human suffering. But such references are few, andHorkheimer does shift the discussion of science in such a way that ittakes over parts of his earlier critique of metaphysics. For example,he criticizes the sciences, in a manner that is not common in earlieressays, for the way they subsume facts under universal concepts (pp.224–226). This critique of universal concepts is tied to thecritique of formalism; Horkheimer finds fault in the fact that thesciences relate facts to concepts in terms of the “relation ofclasses to instances” which can be “accomplished by asimple deduction” (p.225). Critical theory is then contrastedwith this overly simplified universal-particular relation insofar asit constantly reexamines the relation of facts to universal concepts,and sees them as fitting together in a dynamic relationship that mustbe carefully charted. The implication is that logical formalism leadsthe sciences to form static universals into which all particulars canbe neatly placed. Since the sciences are attending to facts inengaging in such an operation, the critique does not exactly match upwith the criticism that metaphysics turns a blind eye to the world.But as those facts are misconstrued through formalism, the upshot ofthe critique is the same; actual social existence has not beenadequately incorporated into theory because of the creation of a falseuniversal. This formalism is contrasted with the fact that criticaltheory is “the unfolding of a single existential judgment”(p. 227). Displaying the contradictions inherent in capitalistsociety, and fixing on possibilities for emancipatory change, does notinvolve the scientific subsumption of facts within a logically orderedconceptual system. It rather involves unfolding and elaborating on aninsight that one initially acquires simply by existing in (with“existing in” taken in the robust sense of living andacting in) that society.

The way this point is construed displays the most crucial differencebetween “Traditional and Critical Theory” and itsantecedents. Horkheimer’s attitude toward the possibility ofsocial change is less optimistic, and the critical theorist isdescribed as having a somewhat antagonistic relationship with theoppressed. This fits with a general shift in the FrankfurtSchool’s work from the 1930s to the 1940s corresponding to alack of faith in the possibility of emancipatory social change. In his1937 essay “Philosophy and Critical Theory,” (which hewrote largely as a response to and counterpart with “Traditionaland Critical Theory”) Herbert Marcuse rhetorically asks whathappens “if the development outlined by the theory does notoccur? What if the forces that were to bring about the transformationare suppressed and appear to be defeated?” (Marcuse 1937, 63)“Traditional and Critical Theory” is worried preciselywith these questions. For a variety of reasons, including obvioussocial and political exigencies, Horkheimer and his associates wouldbecome less and less confident that the oppressed classes could becomea force for change. Horkheimer clearly did not believe that compassionand the desire to overcome suffering could, on their own, motivatesocial change. Consider the assertion in “Traditional andCritical Theory” that while the oppressed strive for happinessthey do not know how to achieve it, so the theorist must step in andhelp the oppressed come to critical consciousness. “Even thesituation of the proletariat is…no guarantee of correctknowledge” (pp. 211–215); the significance of suffering isnot always evident to those who experience it, and it is the job ofthe social theorist to elaborate on this significance in such a waythat it can have practical effect. “Traditional and CriticalTheory” holds out the hope that this task is possible, but it isnoteworthy that the critical theorist is described as being set overagainst the oppressed, as “it is the task of the criticaltheoretician to reduce the tension between his own insight andoppressed humanity in whose service he thinks” (p. 221).

Horkheimer would become less and less confident that the tension couldbe so reduced. He also ominously notes that while the “commodityeconomy” might at first usher in a period of progress,“after an enormous extension of human control over nature, itfinally hinders further development and drives humanity into a newbarbarism” (p. 227). This passage states the main themes thatwould dominate Horkheimer’s work in the 1940s, which would bemarked by an increasing pessimism in the ability of rational,theoretical activity to halt that drive toward barbarism.

4. The Critique of Reason and the Domination of Nature

In the late 1930s, Horkheimer described all of his efforts as workingtoward a project on dialectical logic (Wiggershaus 1994, 177). This“dialectics project” would, through many twists and turns,develop into ideas presented primarily in two books published in 1947.Horkheimer was the sole author ofEclipse of Reason, whichappeared originally in English. The book incorporates and expands on aseries of lectures delivered at Columbia University in 1944, and, asHorkheimer writes in its preface, presents “in epitome someaspects” of his work with Adorno from that time (p. vi). Thatwork with Adorno would also produceDialectic ofEnlightenment, a collaborative text that was first published in1947, after having been distributed as a limited edition typescript in1944. It would become the most famous work of the “firstgeneration” of the Frankfurt School, and is surely the work mostcommonly associated with Horkheimer’s name.^[4] The rest of this section will review the major themes ofHorkheimer’s work from the 1940s, considering bothDialecticof Enlightenment andEclipse of Reason together.

4.1 The Critique of Instrumental Reason

It is noteworthy that the text ofEclipse would eventually bepublished in German as “Zur Kritik der instrumentellenVernunft” (“On the Critique of InstrumentalReason”). BothEclipse andDialectic arenuanced texts that present a number of themes, but if there is oneoverarching theme to the work from the 40s it is, as that German titlesuggests, the critical description of how reason collapses intoirrationality through its emphasis on instrumental concerns. What isat stake here is made most clear by the first chapter ofEclipse, which is straightforwardly titled “Means andEnds.” Instrumental reason is interested only in determining themeans to a goal, without reasoning about ends in themselves. InDialectic, the Enlightenment is largely equated with theadvance of instrumental reason, and through instrumental reason,Enlightenment turns against itself. This is noted in the verybeginning of the text: “Enlightenment, understood in the widestsense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating humanbeings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the whollyenlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity”(p.1).

While the strong emphasis on instrumental reason’s domination ofnature (which will be more fully discussed in §4.2) is new to thework of the 1940s, it picks up on themes present in Horkheimer’searlier work. A prominent component (particularly inDialectic) of the critique of instrumental reason is acritique of formalistic rationality, which evokes the criticism of theCartesian mathematical method in “Traditional and CriticalTheory.” On the face of it, one might question the necessarylink between “formal” and “instrumental.” ButHorkheimer and Adorno equate formalism with the drive to make naturecalculable, and calculability is assimilated to usefulness. Thusformalistic reason becomes a species instrumental reason. Alongsimilar lines, the critique of positivism is repeated inEclipse (pp. 40–62). All parts of nature that cannot becalculated and formalized fall out of the Enlightenment’sscientific picture of the world. This scientific picture is furtherreproduced through activities which seek to dominate nature, thusinstrumental-scientific activity creates a reality to fit thispicture. The inexorable drive of instrumental reason causes thisdistorted picture to be seen as the only true picture of the world(Horkheimer 1947a p. 33).

Moreover, all elements of society, not just scientific research, aretouched by the progress of instrumental rationality. Motivated byself-preservation, people seek protection from various powerful groups(sometimes called “rackets,” see Schmid Noerr 2002, andStirk 1992 ch. 6). Instrumental rationality causes society to fragmentinto these various competing cliques. But this fragmentation isattended by cultural homogenization, as displayed by the chapter inDialectic titled “The Culture Industry: Enlightenmentas Mass Deception.” The general thrust of that chapter is thatinstrumental rationality has assimilated culture to an industrialmodel, which leads to a leveling and homogenizing of that culture. Atpoints, this homogenizing move is described as though it isnecessarily all-encompassing, as when the authors write that“anyone who resists can survive only by being incorporated. Onceregistered as diverging from the culture industry, they belong to itas the land reformer does to capitalism” (p. 104).

Eclipse also presents a slightly different view ofinstrumental reason, which is equated with “subjectivereason,” and contrasted with “objective reason.”^[5] At the beginning of “Means and Ends,” Horkheimer notesthat “the average man will say that reasonable things are thingsthat are obviously useful,” and then notes that it is through“classification, inference, and deduction…the abstractfunctioning of the thinking mechanism,” that one is to determinewhat is thus reasonable (p. 3). Usefulness is further equated withwhatever works in favor of one’s self-preservation. This is whyinstrumental reason is subjective reason; it is thought oriented tothe subject’s preservation. Objective reason (which Horkheimerlargely associates with history’s great metaphysical systemsfrom Plato to German Idealism), on the other hand, seeks to root truthand meaning, which should be the proper ends of thought, within somecomprehensive totality. Objective reason is interested in ends, whilesubjective reason is interested only in means. Subjective reason thusfalls into incoherence, because as the drive toward self-preservationbecomes more and more all encompassing, any real conception of thesignificance of what is to be preserved is lost. Subjectivity is sooriented toward self-preservation that the drive towardself-preservation is the only end left. An interesting comparison canbe drawn here with the earlier critique of capitalist socialarrangements discussed in §2.2 above. There the similar point ismade that the drive to fulfill self interests is ultimately selfdefeating. But there is a crucial difference; in the works from the1930s this is clearly said to be the fault of irrationality, and it issupposed that more rational social arrangements could overcome theproblem. In the works from the 1940s, rationality itself isimpugned.

This description of subjective reason thus displays one way in whichreason works against itself, and so falls into irrationality. A morefamous way that this movement is displayed is through one of theprimary themes ofDialectic, viz. that “myth is alreadyenlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology” (p.xviii). Myth is already enlightenment insofar as myths are already anattempt to control nature; “myth sought to report, to name, totell of origins, but therefore also to narrate, record, explain”(p. 5). The interpretation of theOdyssey in Excursus Iserves as a concrete example of this point. In general, theOdyssey maps out and rationally orders ancient myths, andshows how humanity, in the person of Odysseus, goes about submittingthe mythological to rational control (pp. 35–40). Just as mythprefigured enlightenment, enlightenment in turn becomes myth insofaras our abstract categories become reified, leveling their relation tonature and thus making them untrue. This is the case, for example,with the formalistic scientific picture of the world mentioned above;“the mythical scientific respect of peoples for the givenreality, which they themselves constantly create, finally becomesitself a positive fact, a fortress before which even the revolutionaryimagination feels shamed as utopianism” (p. 33).

4.2 The Domination of Outer and Inner Nature

Instrumental rationality necessarily involves the domination ofnature. Taken in its most straightforward sense, this point has becomesomething of a commonplace. As the sciences developed during theenlightenment period (and earlier, insofar as myth was alreadyenlightenment), technology also developed, at the service ofself-preservation. Technology involves making over nature for humanpurposes. This movement ends up thwarting human preservation, however,insofar as the destruction of nature involves the destruction ofhumanity. This now fairly common line of critique is complicated inHorkheimer’s work from the 1940s, however, because instrumentalrationality’s distortion of “outer nature” (naturetaken in the most straightforward sense), is directly tied to therepression of “inner nature.”

The concept of “inner nature” is tied to the Freudianlibido theory already mentioned in §2.1 above. Our inner life ismost immediately, or “naturally,” marked by variousdrives, particularly the desire for pleasure (which would be akin tothe desire for happiness discussed above). On the Freudian view egodevelopment involves the suppression of these various drives (alongthese lines Horkheimer directly mentions Freud inEclipse indiscussing the way the child relates to the superego which embodiesthe principles of father-figures; see p. 75). While the development ofthe ego is necessary, undue repression of our inner drives leads topathological results. In Excursus II ofDialectic, thisrepression of inner nature is related to Kant’s moral theory,insofar as it specifies that the will should follow reason againstinclination. This complete denial of inclination by calculating reasonfinds its fullest expression (in an ironic suggestion that wouldsurely horrify Kant) in the writings of the Marquis de Sade. Pleasure,in Sade’s orgies, is submitted to rigorous order, such that therationalized pursuit of pleasure takes precedence over pleasure itself(pp. 66–69). And importantly in this case it is not only theinner desires that are subjugated; others people are subjugated in theprocess of subjugating pleasure to organization. This is one instanceof Horkheimer and Adorno’s broader claim that the domination ofnature leads to the domination of human beings.

The same points are made inEclipse in the chapter “TheRevolt of Nature,” where the domination of inner nature isdescribed as following necessarily from the domination of outernature. Instrumental reason leads us to dominate outer nature bytaking outer nature to be meaningless apart from the way it cansatisfy the prerogatives of our self-preservation. But this furtherrequires that our desires must be construed in such a way that theycan provide a clear guide for the technological and industrialactivity that makes use of outer nature. In this case,“domination becomes ‘internalized’ fordomination’s sake. What is usually indicated as a goal—thehappiness of the individual, health, wealth—gains itssignificance exclusively from its functional potentiality” (p.64). Lohmann 1993 suggestively sums up Horkheimer’s point byreferring to the domination of outer and inner nature as a process of“desubstantialization” (p. 392). This connects clearlywith the contrast between objective and subjective reason discussedabove. Nature loses its objective meaning, or in this sense, its own“substance”; not only in the case of outer nature, butalso in the case of inner nature, because of the functionalization ofour desires and drives.Eclipse construes this in terms of aloss of autonomy, which would involve our creatively developing drivesand desires into ideal ends that could orient the ways we act on ourenvironments (see, for example, 66). This can make sense of thesomewhat unique interpretation inDialectic of Odysseustelling the cyclops that he is “Nobody” (p. 53). As wereduce our inner nature to instrumental functions, we lose any strongsense of self, and thus lack the inner substance in a manner thatmakes us, metaphorically, into nobodies.

4.3 Sources of Emancipation

The upshot of these views seems to be that reason is self-destructivein a way that limits the very possibility of a rational critique ofreason. It is fairly common to interpret the work from the 1940s asbeing so totalizing in its critique that it closes all avenues forfinding in reason the possibility for any emancipatory critique ofsociety (Habermas is the most famous exponent of such a critique, seefor example his 1984, pp. 366–399). One can certainly find muchpessimistic rhetoric in bothDialectic andEclipsethat supports such a notion. But there are also elements of the textthat hint at the possibility for positive social change, such that theemancipatory aim of earlier critical theory is not entirely lost.

The emancipatory aim is not lost, but it is perhaps obscured. In thefirst essay ofDialectic, it is noted that “a truepraxis capable of overturning the status quo depends on theory’srefusal to yield to the oblivion in which society allows thought toossify” (p. 33). That “theory” and“thought” are so emphasized is important. Relatedly,Horkheimer disavows, in the preface toEclipse, the idea heshould present a program of action, because “action foraction’s sake is in no way superior to thought forthought’s sake, and is perhaps even inferior to it” (p.vi). This does not necessarily separate thought from action, ofcourse, and the quote fromDialectic speaks of a “truepraxis.” But genuinely emancipatory action is said to depend oncorrecting problems of thought first, such that Horkheimer wouldstress thought for thought’s sake. Correcting these problemswould require freeing reason from instrumentality, which would meaneschewing formalism. But this does not mean eschewing reason, if therecan be a kind of knowing that uses rational concepts while at the sametime moving beyond the static form of concepts associated withscientific thinking. Such a view is closely associated withAdorno’s later work (see the entry in this encyclopedia onAdorno, Zuidervaart 2008). It is sometimes argued that the unusualliterary style ofDialectic itself is meant to exemplify suchan attempt at escaping the ossification of thought (for aninterpretation that generally takes such a view, see Honneth 2007).Along somewhat similar lines, modern art might have emancipatorypotential, in its ability to express something of the current state ofsociety through means other than formal reasoning. This is, again, aview that is commonly associated with Adorno’s thought. ButHorkheimer also presents such a view, especially in his 1941 essay“Art and Mass Culture.” There culture is criticized in amanner similar to the discussion of the culture industry inDialectic, and a largely pessimistic picture of therestrictive and homogenizing role of contemporary mass culture ispresented. But Horkheimer does note that some art can break free ofthis and still help the human being “conceive of a worlddifferent from that in which he lives.” Such works (Horkheimermentions Joyce’s literature and Picasso’sGuernica) can do so only negatively, however, by displayingthe difference between the human being and his or her “barbaroussurrounding” (p. 278; on Horkheimer’s views on art see Jay1993). In the case both of non-ossifying thought and modern art, theemancipatory potential is found only in traces, presented in anesoteric and perhaps abstruse manner. Such a conception of“emancipation” now seems to be somewhat separated from theexperience of the proletariat, and is possibly evidence of elitism(see Heller 2002). Whatever one makes of these criticisms, it is clearthat Horkheimer was less than sanguine regarding the possibility ofpositive social change.

Horkheimer does suggest another avenue for emancipatory social change,however. He notes inEclipse that “there are someforces of resistance left within man,” and that “thespirit of humanity is still alive, if not in the individual as amember of social groups, at least in the individual as far as he isleft alone” (p. 95). Unsurprisingly given the tone of the textas a whole, much of what follows that passage discusses the difficultyof separating oneself from the homogenizing forces of society. ButHorkheimer does suggest that it is possible to engage in a kind ofnon-conformism (without much of a description of what it would belike), which comes through the “spontaneity of the individualsubject” (p. 99). The emphasis on individual action is tempered,however, through the emphasizing of a point that brings the latterparts ofEclipse back to one of Horkheimer’s earliestviews; solidarity can be formed through the experience of sharedsuffering, and philosophy should “translate what [those whosuffer in the face of oppression] have done into language that will beheard” (p.109). How this happens is unclear, as is theconnection between individual acts of non-conformism and solidarity.One might also doubt the reliance on the power of the compassion. Fora thorough discussion ofEclipse that examines thesepotential problems, see Lohmann 1993. Whatever one makes of thesepoints, it is clear that this emphasis on suffering is the thread thatties all of the periods of Horkheimer’s work together, as itwould continue to be present in Horkheimer’s last works.

5. Late Work

With his return to Frankfurt the year after the publication of bothEclipse of Reason andDialectic of Enlightenment,Horkheimer’s academic production would largely consist of essaysand lectures. He also left a number of unpublished texts from theperiod, including a set of notes and aphorisms published shortly afterhis death (along with a set of aphorisms from the early 30s titledDämmerung) under the nameNotizen 1950 bis1969. There is no real systematic unity to these writings(Habermas 1993, p. 51 even refers to them as “shot through withcontradictions”), but there are common themes that can beexplored.

One can, for instance, trace out Horkheimer’s late views on thetasks of critical theory. In a remark inNotizen from1957–1958 titled “Critical Theory,” he pursues theidea mentioned in the preface toEclipse that philosophy neednot be immediately related to practical action. Philosophy“holds up a mirror to the world” but “it is noimperative” (p. 148). It is as though Horkheimer wants to guardagainst a caricature of his earlier views as blindly equating theoryand practice. But there is also a very pessimistic note sounded whenHorkheimer says that philosophy “has replaced theology but foundno new heaven to which it might point, not even a heaven onearth” (p. 148). Horkheimer touches on these same themes in his1956 conversations with Adorno in which they preliminarily discussedproducing a new (never finished) joint work. In the transcripts ofthose conversations (which were published in 1989 as a part ofHorkheimer’s collected works with the title“Diskussion über Theorie und Praxis”) onefinds Horkheimer continually stressing the importance of linkingtheory to practice without reducing the former to the latter. Andwhile he does at points seem to hold out a vague hope for such acombination of theory and practice, he also pessimistically claimsthat “it is easy to believe that the whole of world history isjust a fly caught in the flames” (p.39). Because of thispessimism, critical theory takes on a primarily negative task. Inanother note from a collection dated 1966–1969 titled “OnCritical Theory” he continues with the idea that no positiveconception of the good can be formed, but “if one wishes todefine the good as the attempt to abolish evil,” such a view canbe formed, and “this is the teaching of Critical Theory”(p. 237).

The negative conception of critical theory is closely related to therenewed interest Horkheimer showed in Schopenhauer in his last works.Schopenhauer is said, in the 1961 essay “SchopenhauerToday,” to be “the teacher for modern times” (p.81). This is in part because Schopenhauer’s work grasps the needto focus on the suffering of the present as it is, without covering itover with a false philosophical conception of the good. To a certainextent this repeats the earlier emphasis on suffering and rejection ofmetaphysics. But these points work in a much more pessimisticdirection, because, “according to Schopenhauer, philosophy doesnot set up any practical aims” (p. 80). It rather focuses oncorrectly grasping suffering. Schopenhauerian pessimism also connectswith an interest in negative theology in Horkheimer’s late work.In 1935, he would write that the religious belief in another world ofperfect justice, when uncoupled from “the inhibiting religiousform” amounted to a positive force for social change (Horkheimer1935c, p. 131). In his late writings this combination of criticism oforganized religion and respect for the desire for the “whollyother” would be further developed (see Siebert 1976). Inreligious beliefs, if not in organized religion, Horkheimer would finda desire for a better world that never forgets the suffering of thisworld (see, for instance, Horkheimer 1963).

The overall tenor of Horkheimer’s last writings has led some tocriticize him for falling into a backhanded form of conservatism (see,for example, Bronner 1994, pp. 88–92). This criticism makes somesense, especially when one considers the political climate of the late1960s that served as a backdrop for his latest work. It is pertinent,along these lines, that he was generally opposed to the radicalstudent movements, and he supported (with much qualification) theVietnam War as an attempt to halt the totalitarian movement of ChineseCommunism (on these points see Stirk 1992, 178–181). ButHorkheimer did not give up on the possibility of radical actionentirely. For example,Notizen ends on something of apositive note by ( in the note “For Nonconformism”)holding out hope that the “critical analysis ofdemagogues” might aid the practical work of those who areattempting to create non-conformist collectives that work againstcurrent society. But the primary possibility for hope discussed inHorkheimer’s later work is compassion, as seen at the end of the1961 essay “The German Jews”:

The decisive point—and the real task of education without whichneither the Jewish nor the Christian nor the German cause ishelped—is that men should become sensitive not to injusticeagainst the Jews but to any and all persecution, and that something inthem should rebel when any individual is not treated as a rationalbeing. (p. 118)

In a way, this passage sums up the aim of all of Horkheimer’swork, early to late. The task of education, and the task of thecritical theorist, is to foster such compassionate sensitivity toinjustice.

Bibliography

A partial bibliography, written in English, of Horkheimer’sworks can be found in S. Benhabib, W. Bonß, and J. McCole(eds.),On Max Horkheimer: New Perspectives, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 1993. An extensive bibliography of primary and secondarysources, written in German, can be found inMax HorkheimerGesammelte Schriften, Band 19: Nachträge, Verzeichnisse, undRegister, A Schmidt and G. Schmid Noerr (eds.), Frankfurt amMain: Fischer, 1996.

Primary Sources

References in the text above are to the English translations, whereavailable. Horkheimer’s works can be found in variouscollections in German, but there is one primary collected edition:

• Max Horkheimer Gesammelte Schriften, 19 volumes, ASchmidt and G. Schmid Noerr, (eds.), Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.

Below are the bibliographical entries for the cited Englishtranslations, listed by original publication date:

• 1931, “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and theTasks of an Institute for Social Research,” inBetweenPhilosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings, G.Hunter, M. Kramer and J. Torpey, (trans.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1993, pp. 1–14.
• 1932, “Notes on Science and the Crisis,” inCritical Theory: Selected Essays, M. O’Connell (ed.),New York: Continuum Press, 1999, pp. 3–9.
• 1933a, “Materialism and Metaphysics,” inCriticalTheory: Selected Essays, pp. 10–46.
• 1933b, “Materialism and Morality,” inBetweenPhilosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings, pp.15–47.
• 1934a,Dämmerung, partially translated as“Dawn: Notes 1926–1931,” inDawn and Decline:Notes 1926–1931 & 1950–1969, M. Shaw, (trans.),New York: Seabury Press, 1978, pp. 15–112.
• 1934b, “On Bergson’s Metaphysics of Time,”Radical Philosophy, P. Thomas and S. Martin, (trans.),131(May/June 2005): pp. 9–19.
• 1934c, “The Rationalism Debate in ContemporaryPhilosophy,” inBetween Philosophy and Social Science:Selected Early Writings, pp. 217–264.
• 1935a, “On the Problem of Truth,” inBetweenPhilosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings, pp.177–215.
• 1935b, “Remarks on Philosophical Anthropology,” inBetween Philosophy and Social Science: Selected EarlyWritings, pp. 151–175.
• 1935c, “Thoughts on Religion,” inCritical Theory:Selected Essays, pp. 129–131.
• 1936, “Egoism and Freedom Movements: On the Anthropology ofthe Bourgeois Era,” inBetween Philosophy and SocialScience: Selected Early Writings, pp. 49–110.
• 1937a, “The Latest Attack on Metaphysics,”Critical Theory: Selected Essays, pp. 132–187.
• 1937b, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” inCritical Theory: Selected Essays, pp. 188–243.
• 1937c, “Postscript,” inCritical Theory: SelectedEssays, pp. 24–252.
• 1941, “Art and Mass Culture,” inCritical Theory:Selected Essays, pp. 273–290.
• 1947a, with T. Adorno,Dialectic of Enlightenment:Philosophical Fragments, E. Jephcott, (trans.), G. Schmid Noerr,(ed.), Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.
• 1947b,Eclipse of Reason, London: Continuum Press,2004.
• 1961a, “Schopenhauer Today,” inCritique ofInstrumental Reason: Lectures and Essays Since the End of WWII,M. O’Connell, (trans.), New York: Seabury Press, 1974, pp.63–83.
• 1961b, “The German Jews,” inCritique ofInstrumental Reason: Lectures and Essays Since the End of WWII,pp. 101–118.
• 1963, “Theism and Atheism,” inCritique ofInstrumental Reason: Lectures and Essays Since the End of WWII,pp. 34–50.
• 1968, “Preface,” inCritical Theory: SelectedEssays, pp. v–x
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