The notions of mental representation and intentionality areintrinsically related in contemporary philosophy of mind, since it isusually thought that a mental state has content or is about somethingother than itself due to its representational nature. These notionshave a parallel history in medieval philosophy as well and are nowwell studied, at least up to Buridan (see, for example, in Knudsen1982, Tweedale 1990, Pasnau 1997, Perler 2001, Perler 2002, King 2007,Lagerlund 2007a, Black 2010, Amerini 2011, and Klima 2015).

One reason for the interest in intentionality and representation inmedieval philosophy is that it has been widely recognized that FranzBrentano was reviving a scholastic notion when he introducedintentionality as “the mark of the mental” (Brentano1874). But Brentano never used the terminology of representation toexplicate intentionality. This was done much later, inpost-Wittgensteinian philosophy of mind. In later medieval philosophy,it was, however, standard to explain the content of a thought byreferring to its representational nature.

There are a variety of theories of mental representation in medievalphilosophy, which were intensely discussed from the twelfth century upto the time of Descartes. This article will briefly trace the historyof the terminology and also give a brief outline of the main theoriesdeveloped during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

• 1. The Ancient Background and the Formation of the Concept
• 2. Thomas Aquinas and Formal Sameness
• 3. Peter Olivi and the Rejection of Formal Sameness
• 4. Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Mental Content
• 6. William Ockham and Mental Language
• 5. John Buridan and Vague Concepts
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Ancient Background and the Formation of the Concept

The English words ‘representation’ and ‘torepresent’ derive via Old French from the Latin words‘repraesentatio’ and ‘repraesentare,’ butthese are by no means commonly used words in classical Latin. In lateancient thought it is foremost Quintilian and Tertullian that uses theterms in a philosophically interesting way. It was not until thetwelfth century Latin translation of Avicenna’sDeanima that these terms became frequently used in connection withcognition and the mind or the intellective soul (see Lagerlund2007b).

The Latin translators of Avicenna rendered several related terms inArabic all related to cognition and the internal senses with the Latin‘repraesentatio’. In doing so they, intentionally or not,formed the concept of representations in the soul. Representation inthe Latin translation of Avicenna is associated with all fivefaculties. Forms received through the common sense and stored in thephantasia are called representations. The imaginative or cogitativefaculty combines and divides representations collected in thephantasia to make new representations, which might not have any realobject corresponding to them. The senses apprehend the sensible formsof the objects perceived and the estimative faculty apprehends the‘intentio’ or ‘ma’na’ of the perceivedobject. Representations in the imagination are also the basis forintellectual activity, according to this view of cognition:

In the intellect, the form of animal is of the sort that agrees withone and the same definition of many particular [things]. Thus, oneform in the intellect will be related to many things, and it is inthis respect that it is universal, because it is one intention in theintellect … which is evident since, of those [things]represented by the form in the imagination, the intellect hasplundered the intention of its accidents [and] acquired the form inthe intellect. (Liber de philosophia prima sive scientiadivina V, cap. 1, p. 237)

Avicenna here describes the process of abstraction, or how therepresentation in the imagination of particular things becomesuniversal in the intellect. The universal forms are abstracted fromrepresentations in the imagination and flow from the active intellectinto the passive. Note, however, that the terminology ofrepresentation is never used in relation to the intellect. It isalways the internal senses that represent in Avicenna and not theintellect or the external senses (see Lagerlund 2007b, for a table ofthe whole range of terms translated by ‘representation’ inAvicenna’s works.)

One of the reasons ‘representation’ is only used for theinternal senses is that representations are thought of as images. Thenotion of linguistic representations or representations as signs isnot present in Avicenna’s work or any other work of the time. Itseems instead to derive from logic. Early logic works like GarlandusCompotista’sDialectica (17) and Abelard’sDialectica (II, 188) discussed a distinction between aword’s signification by imposition and representation. Adenominative term such as ‘white’ signifies by impositiona substance that is white, but it signifies by representation thewhiteness inhering in the substance. The white thing stands in for oris an instantiation of whiteness; white is re-presented in the object.Garlandus mentions the example of a traveler(‘viator’) who can be said to represent a road(‘via’). The term ‘traveler’signifies by imposition the human being who is a traveler, but alsorepresents the road the traveler travels on. It is exactly this usageof representation applied to mental signs that becomes important withOckham and Buridan.

2. Thomas Aquinas and Formal Sameness

The most influential theory of thought in the thirteenth century goesback to Aristotle and has its foremost medieval defender in ThomasAquinas. It rests on viewing mental representations or intelligiblespecies, as Aquinas calls them, as sameness of form. The explanationfor why thoughts are about something, exhibit intentionality, orrepresent is that the form of the object thought about is in the mindof the thinker. According to a popular metaphor, thinking something,on this view, is being the object thought about in the sense that theintellect becomes the object or takes on its form.

Following Aristotle inDe anima III.4, Aquinas argues, thatthe mind or the intellective part of the soul has no nature or ratherit is nothing before it thinks of something. The active intellectabstracts the intelligible species from the sensitive species in theinternal senses and places it in the potential intellect. Aquinas ishere very close to the view we saw Avicenna defend above. The speciesactualizes the potential intellect as a form actualizes a potency. Theintelligible species in the potential intellect constitutes thethought. The intellect is immaterial, according to Aquinas, and sincehe also famously thinks that matter is the principle of individuation,the intelligible species in the potential intellect is not individual,but universal. This is why Aquinas holds that a thought is alwaysuniversal.

There are many problems associated with this view of mentalrepresentation. A famous problem is: why are the daffodils outside mysoul not about my thought of the daffodils? The forms inside andoutside my mind are the same, suggesting that mental representation issymmetrical. Aquinas has a famous answer to this problem, which isthat the daffodils in the garden are not about my thought because ofthe mode of the form’s presence in them. The forms in thedaffodils are really or naturally present whereas in my mind theuniversal form is spiritually or intentionally present.

The distinction between forms being really/naturally orspiritually/intentionally present is central to Aquinas’s theoryof cognition. A form may be present somewhere without literally makingwhatever substance it informs into something else. Colors in the air,for example, do not make the air really colored: we see colors in theobjects around us but not in the intervening air, although they mustbe there spiritually if sensation is to be a causal process. Thismeans, of course, that the air must somehow contain the color, whichentails that intentionality is not a mark of the mental for Aquinas.The air is not in itself a mind (for discussion, see Pasnau 1997,Chap. 2, and for a completely different take see Brower andBrower-Toland 2008).

3. Peter Olivi and the Rejection of Formal Sameness

One of the first to criticize the species theory of cognition, in thelate thirteenth century, was Peter Olivi. He argued, contrary toAristotle and Aquinas, that the mind is active in its cognition of theworld; it attends to the object, and it is this move on his part thatputs the species theory of cognition in a completely different light.In fact, there seems little point in postulating a species throughwhich the object is cognized. He argues:

Third, because the attention will tend toward the species either insuch a way that it would not pass beyond so as to attend to theobject, or in such a way that it would pass beyond. If in the firstway, then the thing will not be seen in itself but only its image willbe seen as if it were the thing itself. That is the role of a memoryspecies, not a visual one. If in the second way, then after theinspection of the species it will inspect the object in itself. Inthis way it will cognize the object in two ways, first through thespecies and second in itself. It will indeed be like when someone seesan intervening space and then beyond that sees the fixed object.(Peter John Olivi,Quaestiones in secundum librumSententiarum, III, q. 74, 123.)

In this passage, it seems clear that for Olivi the species is a thingin itself and that there really are three things involved in thecognition of an object: the object, the species, and the cognizer. Thespecies is on his view a representation, namely a thing that stands infor the object in the mind. The main problem he sees with the theoryis hence epistemological. How can we be sure we are cognizing theobject and not the species (see Toivanen 2009, Chap. 4 and Adriaenssen2011). Olivi hence argues that this third representing thing is notneeded and that the mind can attend to the object directly. Ockham islater on in the early fourteenth century to repeat a similar argumentagainst the species theory.

Both Olivi and Ockham seem to take it for granted that species arerepresentations and hence a thing added to the object and thecognizer. There were, however, two versions of the species theory ofcognition in the thirteenth century. The most influential one wasforemost associated with Roger Bacon. According to him, species arerepresentations, that is, real extended images like objectsrepresenting the thing cognized to the cognizer. The other version ofthe theory was defended by Aquinas. According to him, species were notrepresentations but the forms themselves of the objects cognized undera different mode of being. The species were not real but spiritual andas such there are no physical change of for example the eye in avisual perception; only a spiritual one.

Olivi’s objection mentioned above does not apply toAquinas’ theory since species are not real representations onthat view. Olivi himself seems aware of this, however, and says thatif the species has spiritual being, then they cannot: “truly andnaturally flow from a natural, corporeal form, [and] not really andtruly inform a natural body, e.g. the air or the eye.”(Sententiarum II, q. 73, 87.) On Aquinas’ theory thespecies cannot affect the sense organ and cause a cognition, he seemsto think. The species cannot hence fulfill the role they are supposedto play in a theory of cognition or a theory of vision.

Olivi does not straight our reject all species, however, since hethinks memory utilizes species. These species are representations andthey are constructed by us. He explains it in the followingpassage:

Cognitive acts are effected by the [cognitive] power — not,however, through its nude essence. Rather, in all [cognitive acts] anactual attention, actually terminated upon the object, isrequired…. And therefore, when the exterior thingin-and-of-itself (per se) is not placed before the attention, theremust be a memorative species placed before it in lieu of the object,which [the species] is not the origin of the cognitive act, exceptinsofar as it serves as a term for or representative of the object.(Sententiarum II, q. 74, 113.)

This is the most common usage of species after Olivi, that is, thatspecies are representative (see Adriaenssen 2017).

4. Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Mental Content

For various reasons, the late thirteenth century saw an increasedinterest in epistemology. One reason for this was the development ofnew theories of mental representations and intentionality. Some ofthese developments were due to problematic features of, on the onehand, Aquinas’s view of mental representation and on the other,of Henry of Ghent’s interpretation of Augustine’s view ofdivine cognition. Aquinas seems to have held that the intelligiblespecies is supposed to play a dual role both as a universal common toall of us thinking it and as my individual thought. It is hard to seehow such a view can be maintained without the introduction of somekind of distinction. Henry on the other hand reinterpretsAugustine’s doctrine of divine ideas and introduces adistinction between the ideas and the divine nature. The ideas arepossibilia or the natures of possible things to be created (de Rijk2005: 81–84).

Both of these views contribute to the introduction of a distinctionbetween the vehicle and the content of a representation. Thedistinction developed by Henry in relation to the divine nature wasalmost immediately taken up into the debates about human cognition. Itwas applied to Aquinas’s theory of mental representation, takingit a step further by introducing a distinction between the thingrepresenting and the thing represented.

John Duns Scotus was instrumental in adapting this view to humancognition. Scotus’s implemented Henry’s distinction andtreated the thing that does the representing as a mental act orconcept, which ontologically speaking is an accident of the mind, andthe thing represented as the form of the object thought about. Scotusclaimed that the accident or mental act is subjectively in the soul,whereas the object being represented is present objectively, or hasobjective being in the mind. He also said that the object exists asrepresented to express the content side of the mental representation(Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 382) Scouts can through thisdistinction also maintain that all spiritual change supervenes on areal change (see Cross 2014).

Scotus thus had a clear way of expressing what Brentano later calledintentionality, that is, the way the object of thought exists in themind. It has objective existence in the mind on his view, which latercame to be regarded as the mark of the mental (see Normore 1986;Pasnau 2003; King 2007; Cross 2014). Although the advantages of thisapproach over Aquinas’s are clear, problems remains concerningthe ontological status of these mental contents. The medieval debatehere is famous and features a wide variety of opinions (for a survey,see Tachau 1988). Scotus himself says that thought objects have adiminished kind of being, which is supposed to be a state between realbeing and no being at all. Although first accepting a similar view,Ockham would later subject this view to much criticism.

6. William Ockham and Mental Language

The theory of mental language in the fourteenth century was foremostdeveloped by William Ockham. It rests on a theory of mentalrepresentation that combined the notions of cause and signification. Aconcept or a mental term on this view represents because it is causedefficiently by a thing in the world. It signifies that thing alsobecause of the causal relation between them. On Ockham’s view, amental representation or concept is caused by an intuitive cognition.He explains:

Intuitive cognition is the proper cognition of a singular not becauseof its greater likeness to one thing more than another but because itis naturally caused by one thing and not by another; nor can it becaused by another. If you object that it can be caused by God alone, Ireply that this is true: such a visual apprehension is always apt tobe caused by one created object and not by another; and if it iscaused naturally, it is caused by one thing and not by another, and itis not able to be caused by another. (Quodlibeta Septem 1.13)

According to Ockham’s metaphysics there are only individuals inthe world so that when an individual causes a concept to exist in themind, it causes an individual concept and hence a singular conceptionof itself. Nothing else can cause that concept (except perhaps God).The singular concept functions as the word of the object that causedit in our language of thought. It is an atomic constituent that canthen be combined to form more complex concepts or sentences in thelanguage.

Ockham’s notion of concept acquisition and mental representationis developed as part of a very sophisticated theory of thoughtinvolving not only a theory of signification, but also a whole rangeof logico-semantic properties such as connotation and supposition. Itexplains how concepts, which in turn are the direct objects of beliefand knowledge, are assembled into mental sentences describing theworld (for the details, see Panaccio 2004).

5. John Buridan and Vague Concepts

Ockham and John Buridan’s accounts of thought are on the onehand very similar, but on the other hand there are fundamentaldifferences between them. This is particularly true about their viewof mental representation. A case in point is their views of singularthought. They both start out from the same idea, that is, thatthinking something singular is having a singular concept in mind, butthey disagree fundamentally on what a singular concept looks like and,foremost, on how it manages to latch onto the world. On Ockham’saccount a concept is singular because its cause is proper, as he callsit, and proper causes are necessarily tied to one object. But onBuridan’s account, a singular concept is singular because of itssemantic complexity (see Klima 2001: xxxviii–xlii and 2009:40–56). It has a descriptive content that enables it to narrowdown its signification. However, Buridan retains Ockham’s view forsome terms (for the significance of this difference from Ockham, seeKlima 2009: 69–89).

Buridan thinks that we always in the first instance cognize orconceive of something as singular. There are, however, two kinds ofsingular concepts, namely, vague and determinate singular concepts.There are also two ways a singular concept or mental term can beacquired. The vague terms are acquired through perception and involvesa direct acquaintance with the perceived object. Buridan describes howwe see something approaching from a distance and cognize it as‘this thing’, then as ‘this body’, then as‘this animal’, then as ‘this donkey’, andfinally as ‘Brunellus.’ (For more on this and itssignificance see Normore 2007, Black 2011, Lagerlund 2006, andLagerlund 2014.) These demonstratives describe circumstances in whichwe cognize something singularly, and they come together under adescription of a singular thing, which we impose on it ourselves orhave learned the name of, in this case, ‘Brunellus.’ Thevague singular term is a name for a circumstance in which we cognize anon-determinate singular thing as something, for example, anindividual thing, body, donkey, etc. There is, however, another way asingular can be formed and that is by imposing or associating it witha name of some descriptions or properties that we never have had acorresponding vague singular cognition of, since we have no actualacquaintance with the thing through sense perception. These aresingular terms like ‘Socrates’ or ‘Plato.’They have never directly existed before our senses and intellect. Weonly know them through descriptions. Buridan explains the differenceinSummulae de Dialectica 8.2.1 (BuridanSD, 633):

Another reason is that things cannot be cognized as singular unlessthey are cognized as something in the prospect of the cognizer.Therefore, if I did not perceive Socrates, you cannot tell me what Ishould understand by ‘Socrates,’ except by using commonterms, the aggregate of which can just as well apply to something elseas to Socrates. So, should another thing be created similar toSocrates in all of its external features [circumstantiis], this[aggregate] would no longer be the definition of‘Socrates’, for it would not be proper to it, norconvertible with it.

As explained above, only terms that derive from actual sensecognitions (what he here calls cognition in ‘the prospect’) areproperly singular. They have an element that fixes them to the thingcognized.

He seems to think that all proper singular terms are collections ofdescriptions of a thing under a name. This goes for singulars that Iam acquainted with as well as singulars I have no sense acquaintancewith. Assume that I have the concept ‘Brunellus’ in mymental language, which I have formed through vague singulars, that is,through circumstances in which I have perceived him as this or that.These vague singulars express the demonstrative aspect of myexperience of Brunellus. They come together under the singular term‘Brunellus’ with all the things I ‘know’ abouthim. I have no such demonstrative element in my singular terms of‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato,’ since they have neverand cannot exist in a direct sense cognition. In that respect, thereis nothing part of such singular terms that discriminate them fromother term than the sum of descriptions I have sorted under theseterms. They will, to use Saul Kripke’s terminology, neverrigidly pick out what they signify. ‘Brunellus’ on theother hand will, because of the demonstrative element derived from myactual interactions with him. (For a slightly different take on this preserving the rigid designation of terms like 'Socrates' or 'Plato' see Klima 2009, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.)

Buridan is defending an internalist semantics for singular terms. Itis not internalist because of the two different kinds of singularterms or that they both are collections of descriptions andcircumstances in which we have interacted with something, but insteadbecause the imposition of these terms describes a process that iscompletely internal to the agent. It is up to us to sort names withdescriptions and circumstances and, hence, impose certain names onthese descriptions and circumstances. Give this, two speakers of thesame language could have the same name for an individual and even beusing it for the same individual despite the fact that the names theyuse have different content or meaning because they have differentdescriptions in mind during the conversation. Meaning is, hence, inthe head for Buridan. A position quite different from Ockham (for moreon this see Panaccio 2017 and Lagerlund 2024).

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