Girolamo [Geronimo] Cardano

First published Tue Apr 23, 2013; substantive revision Sat Oct 7, 2023

In addition to being one of the most original and talented physicians,mathematicians and astrologers of his time, Girolamo Cardano (b. 1501,Pavia, d. 1576, Rome) occupies an important place in the history ofRenaissance philosophy. His contributions range from a comprehensiveaccount of order in all its various meanings (natural, human, anddivine) to epistemological and methodological directions concerningthe progress of knowledge, from an elaborate theory of the immortalityof the soul to a sophisticated analysis of the role of practicalwisdom (prudentia) in such diverse human activities asmedicine and political action.

1. Life and Philosophical Works

Girolamo Cardano was born in Pavia in 1501 from Fazio and ChiaraMicheri. Chiara delivered her baby in Pavia, in the house of familyfriends, and not in Milan, to defuse a possible scandal concerning theillegitimate birth. Fazio would marry Chiara and recognize Girolamoonly later in 1524, just before his death. After a difficultchildhood, saddened by frequent illnesses and the harsh upbringing byhis overbearing father, Cardano enrolled at the University of Pavia tostudy medicine in 1520 against his father’s wish. Fazio(1445–1524), a jurist and an accomplished practitioner ofmathematics and natural philosophy (in 1480 he had published anedition of John Peckham’sPerspectiva communis(“General Optics”), written around 1265), wanted his sonto undertake studies of law, but Girolamo felt more attracted tophilosophy and science. When, due to the ongoing war between Franceand Spain, the authorities in Pavia were forced to close theuniversity, Cardano resumed his studies at the University of Padua,where he graduated in medicine in 1526. For about six years, hepractised as a physician in Saccolungo, a village close to Padua,where he met and married Lucia Bandareni (1531). Three children wereborn from this marriage: Giovanni Battista (1534), Chiara (1537) andAldo (1543). In the meantime, Cardano had been trying several times tobecome a member of the College of Physicians in Milan, but hisapplications had always been turned down, adding to his professionalfrustration and disappointment. Rejections notwithstanding, he movedback to Milan with his family in 1532. He divided his time betweenpractising medicine in Gallarate, a town nearby Milan, and teachingmathematics in the Piattine schools of Milan, a charitable institutionfounded by the nobleman Tommaso Piatti in 1501 to improve knowledge ofGreek, logic, astronomy, and mathematics among Milanese students froma poor background. Fazio, too, had previously taught in this school.In the meantime, his reputation as a successful practitioner inmedicine began to spread among the important families of Milan. In1539 his application to become a member of the College of Physicianswas finally accepted. Discontinuously, from 1543 to 1551, he taughtmedicine at the University of Pavia, until 1552, when he went toScotland to treat the Archbishop of Edinburgh, John Hamilton, who wassuffering from a particularly severe form of asthma. Back to Milan in1553, he resumed teaching in Pavia in 1559. In 1560 his son GiovanniBattista was executed charged with the murder of his wife, BrandonaSeroni, whom, against his father’s will, he had married in 1557.This tragic event represented a turning point in Cardano’s lifeand intellectual career. In 1562, he decided to leave Pavia, whoseacademic environment had become increasingly hostile, to teachmedicine in Bologna. As a result of mounting suspicions that he wasactively spreading heretical views, he was arrested on 6 October 1570and remained in prison until 22 December of the same year. In February1571, before the Sacred Congregation led by Antonio Baldinucci,Cardano was required to acknowledge and reject his serious crimesagainst the faith (abiura de vehementi), having been declared“vehemently suspect of heresy.” He solemnly swore that hewould no longer teach and publish books until his death. In 1571 hewent to Rome to serve as personal physician to Pope Pius V and thenPope Gregory XIII. After having been admitted to the College ofPhysicians in 1575, he died in Rome, on 20 September 1576, devotinghis last energies (from September 1575 to May 1576) to write hisautobiography,De vita propria, published posthumously byGabriel Naudé in 1643.

Cardano wrote and published a vast amount of works, in the mostdisparate fields of knowledge, especially medicine, mathematics,astrology and natural history. His strictly philosophical treatisesinclude:De arcanis aeternitatis (“The Mysteries ofEternity”, began at the end of the 1530s and published partiallyin the posthumousOpera omnia in 1663);Deconsolatione (“On Consolation”, 1543);Desapientia (“On Wisdom”, 1544);De animiimmortalitate (“On the Immortality of the Soul”,1545);De subtilitate (“On Subtlety”, 1550, 1554,1560), and its twin bookDe rerum varietate (“On theVariety of Things”, 1557);Theonoston (“DivineKnowledge”, written in the middle of 1550s and publishedposthumously in 1617 and 1663);De utilitate ex adversiscapienda (“On Gaining Advantage from Misfortunes”,1561);Encomium Neronis (“Praise of Nero”);Dialectica (“Dialectic”),De uno(“On the One”),Tetim seu de humana conditione(“Tetim, or On the Human Condition”),De minimis etpropinquis (“On Those Things which are Smallest and Closestto Hand”),De summo bono (“On the HighestGood”),Guglielmus,sive de morte(“William, or On Death”), andSomniorumSynesiorum,omnis generis insomnia explicantes, libriIV (“Four Books of Synesian Dreams, Explaining Dreams ofEvery Kind”), all published in 1562;Antigorgias dialogus sive derecta vivendi ratione (“Anti-Gorgias, or On the Right Wayto Live”),Hyperchen (“Being”) andDeSocratis studio (“On the Earnestness of Socrates”),published in 1566;Proxeneta seu de prudentia civili(“The Mediator, or Civic Prudence”, published posthumouslyin 1627 and 1663);Paralipomena (“Supplements”,begun in 1561 and published posthumously in 1663). Other works werepublished posthumously in theOpera omnia edited by theFrench physician Charles Spon (1609–1684) in 1666:Hymnusseu canticum ad Deum (“A Hymn, or a Canticle toGod”);Mnemosynon (“Memorial”);Normavitae consarcinata (“A Patched-Up Rule of Life”);De optimo vitae genere (“On the Noblest Kind ofLife”);Dialogus Hieronymi Cardani et Facii Cardani ipsiuspatris (“Dialogue between Girolamo Cardano and His FatherFazio”);De natura liber unicus (“A Single Bookon Nature”).

Generally speaking, Cardano’s philosophy is heavily influencedby characteristic trends of late scholastic Aristotelianism, with astrong penchant for Averroist interpretations. Cardano shows a greatinterest in Averroes’ opinion that one intellect would performintellective functions for all human beings. However, he tends toprovide a historicized version of this radical view, in that he looksat the one intellect as the varying amount of learning accumulated bymankind throughout the centuries rather than simply justifying it froma purely epistemological point of view (seen as the one intellectivepower that actualizes the life and knowledge of the sublunary world asa whole). Cardano’s philosophy also displays clear traces ofPlatonic influences, absorbed through the reading of MarsilioFicino’s recent translations and commentaries, especiallyPlotinus and Iamblichus. Together with his impressive knowledge ofastrological and medical literature, both scholasticism and Platonismgive a characteristically vitalistic slant to his cosmological views.Cardano’s philosophy has often been described as suggestive andrich in original intuitions, but cluttered and inconsistent as awhole. In fact, his philosophical work is yet another example, commonduring the Renaissance, of how different philosophical traditions(including not only Aristotelianism and Platonism, but alsoEpicureanism and Stoicism, and not only Graeco-Roman, but alsoChristian and Arabic views) could converge into one composite butcoherent picture. Throughout his life, from his early endeavours inthe 1540s (De animi immortalitate) to the last philosophicalattempt (Dialogus Hieronymi Cardani et Facii Cardani andDe propria vita), Cardano demonstrated a distinctivecommitment to a certain number of philosophical issues: therelationship between oneness and multiplicity, with the notablecorollaries dealing with order and disorder, determinism and chance,life and decay; the view of the intellect as the ultimate principle ofreality and knowledge; a general theory of celestial heat, describedas the main formative agent in nature; the interplay of nature and thesoul in the organization of the universe; a general doctrine of theimmortality of the soul, seen as the foundation of both cognitiveclarity and moral certitude. As a whole, the originality ofCardano’s eclecticism lies in the unique way in which hecharacterizes the interdependence of life, knowledge and matter, inwhich a pronounced sense of reality and truth is constantly beingquestioned and jeopardized by a realistic view of human nature,mercilessly presented as prone to fear, delusion and deceit.

2. Life, Knowledge, and Nature

Cardano’s cosmological views belong to a long-established systemof astro-biological doctrines whose origins go back to Aristotelianphysics, Hippocratic vitalism, and fundamental assumptions underlyingthe tradition of astrological and meteorological learning, reshapedthrough a series of Hebrew and Arabic mediations. His account of thesupralunary world combines elements from Neoplatonic philosophy andChristian theology. In line with many of his contemporaries, Cardanomaintains that there is a clear division between the supralunary andsublunary world. The life of the universe is the result of varyingdegrees of celestial energy overflowing from the One, i.e., God. FromGod to matter, cohorts of the most disparate souls mediate betweenthese two extremes. From a material point of view, the connectiveelement between heaven and earth is celestial heat. The principalconstituents of the sublunary world are matter (earth, water and air),celestial heat, and a wide variety of souls (spanning from demonicminds to substantial forms understood as specific principles oflife).

In line with the principles of Greek ontology (and showing an evidentinterest in the Renaissance recovery of Parmenides’ philosophy),Cardano maintains that nothing comes out of nothing; rather, allthings derive from something, and this something cannot be infinite(Hyperchen, OO, I, 284b;De natura, OO, II, 284a).Aristotle called this something “hyle or prime matter,”but Cardano prefers to discard this notion of an intermediate entitybetween being and non being, replacing it with the view of theelements (earth, water and air) as the material starting point andcelestial heat as the efficient active principle, “for otherwisethe elements would be completely redundant if there were primematter” (De natura, OO, II, 284b). The elements, whichrepresent the first level of organization in matter, are three (andnot four as demanded by Aristotelian and scholastic physics): earth,water and air (De arcanis aeternitatis, OO, X, 9a). As forfire, Cardano considers this to be a product of celestial heat, whichis one of the various streams of vital energy flowing from thesupralunary sources of life and knowledge and which pervade theuniverse as one living organism. Innate heat of a celestial origin isthe active element that mediates between the state of utter immobilitywhich characterizes intelligible substances and the incessant mobilitythat defines the life of material beings. Through an exercise inintrospective analysis, Cardano enumerates three principles thatregulate both our inner life and the life of all created things: one“is moved and does not move, resulting from the heavyelements;” another “moves, and it is not moved, that is,the soul;” the third, finally, “is moved by thesoul” and moves the body, i.e., the innate heat(Theonoston, OO, II, 304b). To the question of whether thesoul can be identified with celestial heat, Cardano replies that,unlike the latter, the former is incorporeal, does not occupy anyplace and therefore is never in motion. Also, that which is in motiondoes not have that level of self-stability that is necessary for abeing to be able to perceive (sentire) or to think(intelligere) (Theonoston, OO, II, 304b).

In Cardano’s metaphysics, matter and form are complementary, inthat in nature there cannot be matter without form, and forms arealways with a body. Forms represent the primordial stage in theprocess through which the created universe becomes one living being.The difference between souls and forms is that souls, albeit involvedin the animation of bodies, remain nevertheless unaffected bycorporeal reality. Up on a higher level, minds are souls that arecompletely independent of matter, bodies and motion. However, evenwithin the ontological sphere of the minds, there are varying degreesof embodiment. While the highest celestial intelligences are whollyseparated from the material cosmos, demonic substances, albeitincorporeal, can affect the corporeal world through forces(vires) and influences (influxus) of various kind.One of these is “that force which is connected to demons,regardless of whether this power is corporeal and depends on humours,or it is incorporeal.” Cardano maintains that it is throughforces of this nature that “the parts of the universe arearoused by demons, stars or some other hidden cause”(Paralipomena, in OO, X, 446b–447a. See alsoDesubtilitate, OO, III, 670a). The principle that in a way collectsand administers all these currents of celestial energy is the soul ofthe world (anima mundi). In Cardano’s system ofastro-biological determinism, the universal soul keeps the wholecosmos together and performs paramount operations in accordance withthe original plan devised by God and implemented by the planetaryintelligences, for “all things are influenced by the higherheaven and are moved at the command of the soul of the world.”The soul of the world, which “cannot be understood withoutGod,” directs the work of nature, and, “in the process ofgenerating things, produces supercelestial lives andmultiplicity” (De arcanis aeternitatis, OO, X, 6a). Inthe sublunary world, the major operations of life and generation areperformed by nature, understood as a source of teleological activitysupervised by the intellect and the soul of the world (Desubtilitate, OO, III, 360a; ed. Nenci, 63). The complexrelationship between soul and nature, and the role played by celestialforces, is a crucial point in Cardano’s philosophy (OnCardano’s cosmological views, see Ingegno 1980, 1–78,209–271; Maclean 1984; Grafton 1999).

Regarding the hierarchical arrangement of the ontological principles,there is a certain oscillation in the way Cardano distributes themalong the various degrees of being, but by and large we can say thatGod understood as the One represents the ultimate source of order andactivity in the universe, and all the rest emanates from it in theform of increasingly more plural and less integrated entities, fromintellects to souls, from the soul of the world to individual souls,from the soul to nature, from celestial to earthly animals, from formsto scattered matter. InDe arcanis aeternitatis, Cardanolists fourteen genera of beings, a number that, in his opinion,“matches the structure of the universe:” three elements(earth, water, air), celestial heat, stones, plants, living creaturesgenerated from putrescent matter (animantia ex putredine),quadrupeds, birds, fish, reptiles, human beings, demons, and God(De arcanis aeternitatis, OO, X, 8b).

Higher animals are divided into four main classes: quadrupeds, birds,fish and reptiles. In the diagram he attaches to his discussion,“the nature of the animals is connected to the human one only inone point,” which is located in the area corresponding to thequadrupeds. See Figure 1:

Figure 1.

However, the margin of interaction between human beings and the restof living creatures is ampler. In keeping with a number of Renaissancephilosophers, Cardano maintains that man is at the centre of micro-and macro-cosmic exchanges within the universe: “since the humancircle corresponds to each single part of the whole domain of livingbeings, all the properties and natures that can be found in livingbeings will also be present in human beings” (De arcanisaeternitatis, OO, X, 8a). InParalipomena, Cardanodefines the human species as an amalgam of forms (tota humanaspecies congeries quaedam est), a “mass” that is inconstant evolution (succrescitat que decrescit):

this excellent human matter conceals the forms of all animals: theforms of the ox (although they do not feed on hay); of the snake (butthey do not kill with their bite); of the lion (but they have noclaw). By all means, the characteristics of the soul are exactly thesame (perhaps even worse); however, since these animal forms[concealed in the human nature] lack their corresponding bodilyorgans, they do not really seem to be the same (Paralipomena,OO, X, 446a).

Human nature includes all the forms of nonhuman nature, but they liedormant, as it were, in a state of virtual energy. Cardano always paysspecial attention to those aspects of human nature that seem toindicate a close link with animals and lower forms of life.Unsurprisingly, comparative analyses between humans and animals aboundin his works. Among the questions dealing with the relationshipsbetween human and nonhuman animals, Cardano is particularly interestedin exploring whether reason is an exclusive prerogative of humanbeings or it should rather be seen as the result of biologicaldevelopment (De natura, OO, II, 283b–284a).

Above nonhuman and human animals, Cardano posits a universe teemingwith the most diverse kinds of incorporeal minds. He acknowledges thatto count the number of celestial substances populating the supralunaryworld would go way beyond the power of reason; and yet Denis thePseudo-Areopagite, “relying on Platonic arguments and thevisions of St Paul” divided them into nine orders. Within theseorders Cardano identifies “seven natures.” The firstnature is “the infinite, or God,” eternal in itself. Thesecond nature is “the soul of all things or lives,” whichrepresents the first breaking up of the original unity; then comes thealready mentioned soul of the world, whose loss of ontological unityand independence begins to manifest itself, being “one principleresulting out of many and eternal ones because of somethingelse’s intervention.” The fourth nature is the soul whichmoves the universe, theprimum movens, not eternal in itself,but through eternal temporal succession. The fifth nature, the soulsof the various planets, derives from the combined action of thisprimary mover and the soul of the world. Various orders of soulsemanates from the fifth nature: “heroic” souls, minds thatare capable of having sense perceptions (mentes sensiles) andthe soul that presides over all sentient lives (communissensilis). This last type of soul divides itself not only intoindividual beings, but also into parts, “for everything isalive.” The next nature, therefore, the sixth one – the“common and vital soul” (anima communis atquevitalis) – belongs to plants, lower animals and theelements. The last order is “the soul conceived inmatter,” which “Plato called idea,” and Cardanosimply characterizes as “life.” Relying on later Platonicauthors, from Iamblichus to Denis the Pseudo-Areopagite, Cardanodescribes the universe as one single entity, seamlessly interrelatedthroughout its vital expanse, placed between the two extremes of God,absolute eternity and unity, and matter, the domain of absolutetransience and multiplicity (De arcanis aeternitatis, OO, X,6ab).

3. The Soul and the Order of Nature

One of the most complex questions in Cardano’s philosophy as awhole concerns the relationship between nature and the soul. This is apoint where Cardano’s multiple allegiances (scholasticAristotelianism, Plotinian Platonism, medicine and astrology) come tothe fore. Inevitably, it is also an area where not a few frictionsamong different traditions come to the fore. Among Cardano’sdesiderata there was the plan to devote a specific philosophicaltreatise to the notion of nature. It is an unfinished work that in alllikelihood he sketched at the beginning of the 1560s,De naturaliber unicus. It can be seen as part of a series of treatisesdevoted to the exploration of the most recondite aspects of thenatural, supernatural and moral worlds (De libris propriis,OO, I, 119; ed. Maclean, 293).De natura demonstratesCardano’s lifelong engagement with notions of naturalism,universal animation, and teleology. The discussion is opaque at timesbecause of the topic’s difficulty, the characteristic obscurityof Cardano’s disjointed and elliptical writing, and theprecarious condition of the text, left unfinished, with several gapsand marks of typographical sloppiness (typos, mistakes, and missingwords). On the other hand, being a monographic treatment of themeaning of nature, the treatise holds great significance, all the moreso because, as Cardano explains, the investigation of nature(inquisitio naturae) sheds light on the very origin ofthings, including human beings (De natura, OO, II, 283a). Inthis sense, fragmentary as it may be, Cardano’sDenatura is an attempt to outline the ultimate principles ofreality (on the relationship between natural and supernaturalphenomena in Cardano, see Siraisi 1997, 149–173).

Cardano’s notion of order has strong Platonic overtones. Unityis a mark of perfection, for all things rejoice in unity and they arein a better condition when they reach that level of unity thatactualizes their potential nature. Unity gives structure and purposeto all the elements that make up the system of nature: “orderand fate, since they are one, and exist with respect to the One, aregood; disorder and luck are bad, for they do not strive towardsunity” (De uno, OO, I, 277b; ed. GarcíaValverde, 4). As an expression of unity and goodness, order is sopervasive that in fact accounts for even the most haphazard anddisorderly aspects of reality. Cardano maintains that multiplicity anddiversity can always be brought back to potentially ordered series ofindividual elements (multitudo ordinata) (De uno,OO, I, 281ab; ed. García Valverde, 24;De natura, OO,II, 283a). What we perceive as beauty (decus) and elegance(ornamentum) in nature is not due to scattered variety(multitudo), but to a principle of ordered unity, “theone in the many,” which produces feelings of harmony andsymmetry in us (De uno, OO, 280a; ed. García Valverde,20). The same principle of order and unity applies to knowledge: wecan say that we really know something when we manage to relate all theaspects and properties of this thing to one cause. According toCardano, Plotinus followed the same approach in moral philosophy, forhe described his notion of happiness as a return to the One (Deuno, OO, I, 281b; ed. García Valverde, 24).

Among the sources of unity and order in the universe, souls play amost significant role. As we have seen in the previous section, soulsare at the center of Cardano’s cosmos. Being immaterial, theyare “a unitary principle that is not continuous, nor contiguous,but exists of its own, not in a place, nor in a time.” Unlikelife (vita), which is diffused everywhere and thereforecannot be said to be a realprincipium, souls have no spatialand temporal limitation and are nowhere (nullibi) to be foundbecause of their incorporeal nature (De uno, OO, I, 279a;García Valverde, 12). While souls are one and individualeverywhere (“our soul is no less here than in the sky, no lessin Italy than in India”), bodies are different and manifolddepending on material circumstances and vital urges, for“division of bodies is determined by the needs of life(vitae commodum)” (Paralipomenon, OO, X,446a). Given the central role assigned to the soul, in all its forms,Cardano’s philosophy of nature is inevitably exposed to chargesof animism and anthropomorphism. The issue is accentuated by the factthat the human being represents for Cardano a model of rationality andteleological activity.

For Cardano, human souls are individual principles of self-awareness.Selfhood is the principal argument in favour of their immortality.However, in defending the immortal character of human souls, Cardanoalso relies on proofs of a more pragmatic and theological nature. Hopein “the immortality of the soul” was implanted in humanbeings by God, therefore it cannot be considered as a deludedexpectation. In common people God instilled this hope “throughreligions (leges),” in wise people, “through thehidden truths (arcana) of philosophy.” However, whenGod provided human beings with hope for immortal life, He decided togive them a feeble certainty, always in need of confirmation. Thereason, according to Cardano, is that a firm belief in the immortalityof the soul would have created too wide a gap between humans andanimals, while leading man into arrogant delusions of grandeur. Therehas always been and – “as long as there is a world”– there always will be an alternation (vicissitudo) ofconfirmations and doubts concerning the immortality of the soul. It isa “vicissitude” of hopes and despair that is part of theprovidential regime of the world established by God (De utilitateex adversis capienda, OO, II, 26a). Hope in the immortality ofthe soul is also a fundamental postulate in Cardano’s moralphilosophy. As we will see in the next section, Cardano maintains thattrue inner tranquillity depends, among other things, on virtue,wisdom, and “hope in the gods.” Otherwise, what is passedoff as tranquillity is in fact mere harshness and stiffness(duritia) (Theonoston, OO, II, 303b, 305b, 308a,312a).

4. Moral Philosophy: The Two Levels of Wisdom

The One (God), the ordered variety of nature (multitudoordinata), and the soul represent the main ontologicalcoordinates in Cardano’s view of the cosmos. The universe isorganized according to a plurality of orders, arranged alonghierarchical levels, but harmoniously attuned to each other. It is notcorrect, in Cardano’s opinion, to say that everything is for thesake of everything else (non omnia propter omnia), but ratherthat everything is for the sake of one thing (omnia propterunum). This means that the One toward which everything elseconverges includes many orders, “different among eachother.” Nature, art and chance produce a variety of causalsequences that often intersect and are more or less perfect dependingon the extent to which the end to be actualized prevails overrefractory matter. With respect to natural causes, some are universal,others specific. Among the universal causes of action, the mostimportant are the stars, which act over the sublunary world throughinfluences conveyed by light, heat and motion (De uno, OO, I,279, 281; ed. García Valverde, 12, 26). More specific andindividual sources of natural agency are demonic and human minds,which add to the complexity of moral and political action.

At its deepest, the principle of unity and order coincides with God.God is infinite, necessary, wholly undivided, therefore individual. Inkeeping with the principles of theological Trinitarianism, God isdescribed by Cardano in terms of power (potestas), mind(mens), and love (amor), and these attributes arenot “three gods, as Plotinus thinks,” but original divineattributes. The natural world is a constant reminder that God’s“threefold and undivided life” flows into each singlething, down to the smallest beings (ad minima usque) (Dearcanis aeternitatis, OO, X, 6a). However, for all the layers andmediations that characterize Cardano’s universe, the distancebetween human beings and God remains unbridgeable. Man cannotreconcile the finite with the infinite, for “no finite thing canbe transformed into an infinite nature.” Cardano rules out that“this life of ours can get close to that which truly is,”for there is no proportion and no resemblance between the two levelsof being. Echoing Cusanian motifs, he argues that “everythingthat is understood by a finite being is finite, for the act ofunderstanding (comprehensio) occurs through some proportion;but there is no proportion between the infinite and the finite.”Likewise, our eyes cannot grasp the direct light (lux) of thesun, but only a glimpse of its brightness (lumen) (Dearcanis aeternitatis, OO, X, 4b–5a). Such a powerful andall-encompassing view of divine and natural order, in which thepresence of latent Platonic and Averroist motifs contributes tostrengthen the cogent organization of the whole universe, hasinevitable repercussions concerning the meaning of moral action.During his life, Cardano devoted a considerable number of works toethical inquiries, surveying almost every aspect in the field:theoretical ethics, applied ethics, prudential behaviour, consolation,education, and the role of rhetoric. However, his most importantcontribution to moral philosophy consists in his attempt to redefinethe relationship between the universal scope of practical reason andthe need for human beings to apply moral laws to the concretecircumstances of their life. This characteristic tension betweenknowledge and application is particularly evident in two works:Theonoston (which Cardano began to write around 1555) andDe utilitate ex adversis capienda (published in 1561).

Cardano presentsDe utilitate andTheonoston ascomplementary treatises aimed at implementing two different approachesin moral philosophy, the former based on the ordinary circumstances ofhuman life (humanitus), the latter assuming the existence ofsupernatural conditions such as immortal individual souls and theeffects of divine providence (divinitus). They outline twodifferent paths towards the achievement of the same end: lastinghappiness. While the ethical program devised inDe utilitateis designed to face situations of obvious emergency (quae oculisipsis subjacent) concerning human affairs (humanae res),Theonoston provides an account of the immortality of the soul(enarratio immortalitatis animi) that has momentous ethicalconsequences (De utilitate, OO, II, 8, 39a;Theonoston, OO, II, 299b). The same duplicity of levels isevident in the way Cardano examines the notion of“tranquillity,” which represents the highest point inone’s virtuous behaviour: one type of tranquillity is premisedon the attainment of a certain level of “honorable and moderatepleasure,” the other secures a decent degree of happiness“even in the greatest calamities” (Theonoston,OO, II, 310b). Here it is worth pointing out that Cardano’spragmatic approach to questions of moral philosophy works on bothlevels, the rational and the empirical. In the final analysis,tranquillity is for Cardano the most useful thing that may happen to ahuman being, for it provides inner joy, long life, and a more robustkind of wisdom.

4.1 Divine Providence, Immortality of the Soul, and the Highest Good

Despite the emphasis he places on the benefits of prudent action,Cardano believes that real, lasting happiness can be possible only ifwe demonstrate in a persuasive way that the human soul is immortal andthat God intervenes actively in the human world, sanctioning aprovidential regime of the world. Two principles, more than any other,underlie Cardano’s moral philosophy: that the human soul isimmortal, and that universal order, being a direct emanation of theOne, governs all aspects of reality. Everything that happens has beenplanned by God, and all that God has established can only be good.Regarding the immortality of the soul, Cardano maintains that, inorder to lead a meaningful existence and act accordingly, people needto know whether there is life after death and whether the nature oftheir afterlife will depend on the way they behaved in this world. Inhis opinion, Aristotle and the Stoics took the value of virtue forgranted. In actual life, human beings will never be persuaded thatvirtue should be pursued for its own sake, unless they are convincedthat their soul is immortal (De utilitate, OO, II, 3). Inthis sense, Cardano defends the immortality of the soul on strongpragmatic grounds. Referring to Seneca’s renowned instructionson how to cope with the thought of death, he points out thatmeditating about death while maintaining that the soul is mortal issimply absurd. In his eyes, Seneca is a bad rhetorician and anEpicurean in disguise, who exhorts us to die serenely while claimingthat there is nothing after death (De utilitate, OO, II, 10a;see Giglioni 2012, 187).

As we have seen while examining his natural philosophy,Cardano’s moral views assign a central role to the soul:“The soul is the most important thing we own; everything refersto it, for riches, honors, and health are nothing without a soundsoul” (De utilitate, OO, II, 10a). Mentalself-awareness, in particular, is the principal argument through whichCardano advocates the immortality of the soul, for a human being isthe same thing as his mind (homo animus est) (Deutilitate, OO, II, 12; on Cardano’s notion of the mind, seeGiglioni 2005–2007; García Valverde 2013). The sameemphasis on mental awareness can be found in Cardano’s moralinvestigations, for in his opinion human beings cannot understand whatthe ends of their actions are if they lack a clear knowledge ofthemselves (De utilitate, OO, II, 2). The highest good forthem can only lie in those attributes and activities that are part oftheir minds (quae animo coniuncta sunt) (Deutilitate, OO, II, 27a). In this sense, the relationship betweentranquillity and awareness is biunique: human beings can be peacefulonly when they know what the highest good is and know that they haveattained it (Theonoston, OO, II, 303b). According to theHermit’s definition of tranquillity inTheonoston,tranquillitas coincides withsecuritas, that is, acondition of unbreakable inner peace, free from cares and anxiety, andit is a level of wisdom that would even suit God. In this respect,true tranquillity for human beings coincides with their being“assimilated” to God, so that, when this condition ofserenity is reached, nothing is any longer felt as lacking in meaningand substance. This level of happiness is a “kind ofpleasure” that derives from the awareness of “being in thepossession of goods” (Theonoston, OO, II, 302a;Deoptimo vitae genere, OO, I, 488b). Intellectual pleasure shouldnever be amonstrum, that is to say, a hybrid creatureresulting from combining the goods of reason with those of the bodyand external luck (Theonoston, OO, II, 313b–314a).

By doing so, Cardano provides a definition of happiness which isinclusive of both knowledge and pleasure. Happiness consists in a“perception of pleasure” that is great (magna),full (plena), pure (pura), untroubled(secura), and safe (tuta) (De utilitate,OO, II, 37b;Theonoston, OO, II, 305b;De librispropriis, OO, I, 76b; ed. Maclean, 212–213). InTheonoston, happiness is said to coincide with a kind ofinner composure understood not in terms of lack of sensibility(indolentia), but as a condition of mental vigour stemmingfrom the contemplation of the true nature of things. If tranquillityconsisted in mere refractoriness to unsettling experiences, theimpassive state of a stone should then be viewed as the best condition(Theonoston, OO, II, 299b, 305b, 313b). By contrast, ethicalpeace rests on a state of cognitive tension and focus. In ways thatremind us of the sea and the air, undisturbed calm (tranquillaquies) is always accompanied by a current of “lightmotion,” i.e., a state of balance between opposite conditions“which does not unsettle, but delights us.”Cardano’stranquillitas is therefore not the same asabsolute rest: “in its state of highest tranquillity, our soulis as it were tremulous and breathing” (Theonoston, OO,II, 300a, 305b). The incessant vitality of our being demonstrates that“the matter we are made of, being of a celestial origin,produced and entwined with motion, does not enjoy rest, but thrives onmotion,” a motion that, in the final analysis, is no bodilyactivity, but an expression of knowledge and intellect(Theonoston, OO, II, 304a). True tranquillity results from acondition of inviolable self-fulfilment (securitas) based onresources that are in our power (in nostra potestate esse).Cardano is not convinced by the Senecan view of tranquillity as abalanced active life (vita actuosa), or by Socrates’skind of ‘engaged’ tranquillity; in both cases, theirbehaviour is for Cardano symptomatic of ambition rather than being theindication of a truly committed philosophical life(Theonoston, OO, II, 306b). Finally, Cardano rejects theideals of tranquillity championed by Plutarch, Antoninus and Cicero,viewed as models of ethical escapism devised by men who in their lifenever managed to reach a condition of stable serenity(Theonoston, OO, II, 305a).

In outlining his views about the nature of the good, Cardano isfollowing a deliberately eclectic approach. He combines the Stoicconception of virtue with Epicurus’ emphasis on indifference(indolentia), Aristotle’s notion of virtuous life withAverroes’ characterization of happiness as the highest level ofknowledge accessible to human beings. He justifies his eclecticposition by arguing that philosophers who were so clever in theirfields are likely to have come up with closely related ideas and thattherefore “two or more of their opinions can converge intoone” (De utilitate, OO, II, 24b). From Socrates, forinstance, Cardano draws the principle that only wise people can betruly happy because virtue lies in knowledge (De utilitate,OO, II, 90b). From medical authors, he borrows the view that pleasurealways follows release from a condition of tension or pain (Deutilitate, OO, II, 28a). Following traditional argumentativepatterns in moral philosophy, Cardano distinguishes among goods of themind (virtues), goods of the body (health, longevity), and goods offortune. Among the goods of fortune, Cardano lists finding the rightwife, a lasting fame, and a painless death (De utilitate, OO,II, 19b). Goods of the body, such as enjoying good health andfollowing a healthy regimen, are also part of one’s happiness(De utilitate, OO, II, 19a; on Cardano’s notion ofhealth, see Siraisi, 70–90).

Strictly speaking, goods and ills are values. As such, they transcendthe level of nature and therefore cannot be treated as if they werenatural or against nature: “Goods and ills reside in the soul;faculties and defects in the body; helps and impediments in fortuneand its occurrences” (Theonoston, OO, II, 314b). Ingeneral terms, Cardano defines the good as “what is longed forby the majority of human beings,” such as health, wealth,friends, glory, offspring and wisdom. In a more specific sense(simpliciter), good is what is everlasting(perpetuum), safe (securum), and unchangeable(immutabile) (De utilitate, OO, II, 23ab). In orderto achieve a stable condition of inner peace people need to commit toa good that cannot be taken away from them. Ultimately, since only Godhas all the requisites to be this kind of imperishable good, the moregenuine meaning of good is that which brings us closer to God or makeus similar to Him (Theonoston, OO, II, 307b–308a,313b). The difference between human beings and God is that in God thegood (bonum) coincides entirely with self-preservation(vita incolumis), whereas in human beings these twoconditions are generally separate. Human beings need to take care oftheir life and aim at a life that is marked by reason. There cannot beany discourse on happiness where the primary requisites for life arelacking (due to mental illness or death) (Theonoston, OO, II,309b).

Goods of the mind are virtues. By virtue, Cardano means the principlethat teaches human beings to behave in the best way towards God,animals and our fellow human beings. Hence the key virtues are senseof duty (pietas), compassion (humanitas), andkindness (benignitas) (Theonoston, OO, II, 312ab).Given their importance, virtues are among the foundations of humanaction: “by its nature, virtue is eternal and a divine good inus; all the rest rots in time and depends on circumstances”(De utilitate, OO, II, 21a. See ibid., 38b) . Emanating fromthe innermost part of our rational soul, virtues have the power toretroact on our mind, thus fortifying and safeguarding its faculties.The most prophylactic among virtues are fortitude, prudence andmoderation, and they result from the combined actions of nature, habitand reason, establishing a delicate balance between control of naturalimpulses (impetus naturae), education, and the process ofdecision making.

As already said, Cardano’s moral philosophy rests on a series ofinterrelated principles which also play a key foundational role innatural philosophy: that the soul is immortal; that incorporeal livesare everlasting; and that mental awareness is the definingcharacteristic of the soul. Since the intellect is the only thing thathumans can boast about themselves as being truly immortal,intellectual self-knowledge is regarded by Cardano as the highest goodthat a human being may ever attain. Inevitably, this assumptionre-proposes the Averroist conundrum about whether the mind belongs tohumankind as a whole or it informs the life and knowledge of eachindividual human being. Cardano seems to suggest that the mindtranscends individual human beings ([mens] superior esthomini), for happiness coincides with eternal life: “he whodoes not live long cannot be happy for long” (Deutilitate, OO, II, 23ab; on Averroism in Cardano, seeGarcía Valverde 2013). There cannot be happiness in human lifeif there is no afterlife for the soul. On this point, Cardano followsSt Paul’s argument in his Letter to the Romans (8:20–22):

If our soul did not survive death, we would be much unhappier thananimals are. For, besides the fact that no animal, apart from thehuman being, knows that it is going to die, all non human animals(bruta) enjoy some happiness for the very fact that theyexist, since they live as if they were to live forever, and thereforethey participate in eternal bliss. Only human beings are separatedfrom eternity, even in their thought, for not only do they know thatthey can die, but they also are aware that they will inevitably die,and die within a pre-established time (De utilitate, OO, II,24a).

Cardano’s reflections on mental happiness, assimilation to God,and universal intelligibility should be read against the background ofcontemporary discussions about the Averroist notion of intellectualbeatitude. There is no doubt that, when Cardano characterizes thehighest good as the union of the soul with God, his definition is fullof Aristotelian and Averroistic resonances. Thesummum bonum,he argues inDe utilitate ex adversis capienda, is “tobe assimilated to the highest good,” i.e., God. Unlike otherkinds of love, love of God is “honest” and“safe,” for its object never deserts the seeking soul(De utilitate, OO, II, 6, 25a. 500a;De sapientia,OO, I, 500–501; ed. Bracali, 30–36). Elsewhere,Cardano’s definition ofsummum bonum is suppler andimplies such components as wisdom (sapientia), virtue(especially fortitude and prudence), and progeny: wisdom isdistinctively human; expressions of fortitude and prudence can also beseen in several animals; to have children, finally, is a prerogativethat belongs to almost all living beings. It is a sort of pyramidalmodel of virtue, with fertility at the basis and wisdom at the top(only very few people can reach wisdom) (De utilitate, OO,II, 25b;Theonoston, OO, II, 302b; on Cardano’s viewson virtue, see Ingegno 1980, 318–76).

4.2 Prudence and Practical Wisdom

The characteristic oscillation between intellectual good andprosperous life is particularly evident inDe utilitate exadversis capienda. This work is meant to provide directions onhow to overcome difficult situations and lead a reasonably serene liferelying only on the material conditions of one’s existence andon the information that one can get from sensible experience. Contraryto the approach followed inTheonoston, inDeutilitate Cardano focuses on the kind of happiness that one canreach in this life, advancing the hypothesis – to be understoodin an experimental sense – that there is no survival of the soul(etiam sublata immortalitate) (De utilitate, II, 5).In this case, the moral actor is confronted not so much with the goodsattainable by the mind as with the ills that the mind needs totransform into opportunities for inner exercise or practical gain.Cardano divides ills (mala) into external and internal. Theyboth can be measured according to the impact they have on our lives(magnitudo) and the level of constraint they impose on ouractions (necessitas). External ills depend on the variablearrangement of external events (fortunae arbitrium) and onthe shifting states of the body. Although, properly speaking, the bodyis “no part of ourselves,” nevertheless, it communicateswith our mind. Internal ills are all those passions that can be hardlyeradicated from our soul, such as madness, anger, fear, and envy.Since they are located within the soul (animus), it isexceedingly difficult to turn them into something useful andproductive unless we undergo a radical transformation of our self(De utilitate, OO, II, 11b–12a, 13b).

Cardano claims that there can be five kinds of responses to calamitiesin one’s life. The first two are “paradoxical” andhave nothing relevant to say about possible applications to thepractical aspects of one’s life. These are the Christian and theStoic responses: adversities are either good in themselves, or theyhave absolutely no incidence in someone’s happiness. Theremaining three kinds of response are of a “pragmatic”nature, for they appeal to the human senses and have possible socialoutcomes. First, they teach us how to avoid misfortunes or mitigatethe impact they have on our life; second, in case they happen, theydirect our attention to ways of coping with misfortunes or escapedangerous consequences; third, they tell us how to gain “somegood” out of “any kind of ill” (Deutilitate, OO, II, 10b, 27b, 39a). For Cardano, this ethicalprogram in three stages is an approach that suits people involved inthe many activities of civic life and helps meet their socialcommitments. The distinctive trait of prudent people is their abilityto turn difficulties into opportunities of knowledge and moralbetterment (De utilitate, OO, II, 11a). Regarding the“paradoxical” attitudes to calamities displayed by Stoicand Christian sages, Cardano thinks that there is a great differencebetween the situation in which the wise man is deemed capable of“bearing calamities with fortitude” (the Stoic approach)and that in which he is supposed to look at them as part of“one’s goods” (the Christian attitude). Even moredifferent, however, is to interpret calamities as useful andproductive means of experience, as suggested by Cardano. Otherwise, topraise the ills of life remains a futile rhetorical exercise, and forthis reason Cardano does not hesitate to place Erasmus’Lausstultitiae (“Praise of Folly”) in this category ofedifying but useless rhetoric. With the exception of irreparablelosses, which can only be assuaged by resorting to a whole range ofconsolatory techniques, Cardano maintains that any other ill canalways be turned into something useful and therefore no consolation isneeded. To sum up, he identifies different levels – rhetorical,cognitive, and pragmatic – within the domain of moralphilosophy: “To praise adversities is the eloquentrhetorician’s task; to bear them with fortitude belongs to agenerous soul or a person who knows divine truths; to draw usefulinstruction from them is the mark of a prudent man” (Deutilitate, OO, II, 11a).

As in the case of intellectual happiness, relief from emergencies ispredicated on knowledge. Cardano characterizes his method(ratio) for avoiding misfortunes and preparing againstcalamities as based on a particular kind of knowledge(scientia) – both useful and necessary – which“teaches us to recognize and obtain known goods, and once theyare obtained, it tells us how to use them and how to protect us withthem against ills” (De utilitate, OO, II, 17a). Theambivalent role ofanimus in Cardano’s moral philosophyis particularly evident in his directions on how to draw profit frommisfortunes, for both misery and happiness depend on awareness(“the fact that we know our condition”) (Deutilitate, OO, II, 88b). Our thinking activity is a key elementin turning adversities into opportunities of growth in self-awareness.Any philosophical discussion of ethical matters presupposes that theethical subject is aware of his or her happiness or unhappiness:“the mind (animus) alone is the one who is happy orunhappy.” We have previously noted how closely Cardano’snotion of thesummum bonum is connected to the principle ofsoul’s awareness. In the same way, all forms of external goods(riches, physical beauty, health, friends, offspring, country, honors)are no part of happiness unless they are related to the mind(quatenus ad animum referuntur).

The principal resources through which human beings may learn to drawadvantages from adversities are fortitude, prudence, worldly knowledge(rerum experientia), and all sorts of helps(auxilia), such as material means, friends, authority, bodilystrength and practical experience (exercitatio) (Deutilitate, OO, II, 12a). Among the resources provided by reason,Cardano shares with Seneca the belief that meditating aboutone’s death (meditatio mortis) can trigger active andpointed responses to everyday problems: “although death is anecessary event, nevertheless, it contains in an eminent way, so tosay, all the reasons that sadden our life.” Thinking aboutdeath, regardless of whether people may be sure that they are going tosurvive after death, “can dissolve almost any form ofsorrow” (De utilitate, OO, II, 17b). When methodicallystructured, far from producing anxiety, the thought of death and ofthe transient nature of all human affairs injects a sense of purposeand order into our existence, making us gradually adjusted to auniverse in a constant flux. Cardano’s method of drawing profitfrom adversities is based on the general principle that everything innature is subject to incessant change: “I usually compare humanaffairs, this whole sublunary frame (machina sublunaris) andall that happens in it to a mass of wax in which, while it iscompressed, protrusions become cavities and cavities protrude, allforms change, and now they change into similar ones, now intodissimilar ones, into charming or foul, horrible and pleasantones.” The principle of the unremitting transformation ofreality (vicissitudo rerum) is therefore the ontologicalrationale behind our belief that ills can be turned into goods (Deutilitate, OO, II, 14b). Closely related to this principle isCardano’s striking assumption that, when considered from thepoint of view of happiness, all things are on a par (omniaaequalia sunt): “God levelled the conditions not only forall human beings, but also for all things which are under thesky” (De utilitate, OO, II, 18a, 24b).

It is while examining the essence of humane misfortune that Cardanoreaches the important conclusion that loss and want are the ultimatecauses of one’s hardships. The ability to anticipate and feel inadvance the effect of losing something or someone (sensusamissionis) can therefore prepare us to face calamities in ourlife (De utilitate, OO, II, 7). While Cardano insists thatexperience of adversities in life (sensus calamitatum)provides people with a richer sense of their happiness, however, he isalso well aware that there are limits in the human ability to processmisfortunes into material for inner transformation (Deutilitate, OO, II, 38b). Material destitution is certainly one ofthese limits. Among the circumstances that affect our perception ofwant, penury prevents us from focusing on the improvement of ourknowledge and level of awareness. When in his division of the goods(of the mind, of the body and of fortune) Cardano describes materialmeans as a pre-condition for the exercise of virtue and happiness, hetakes special care in specifying that the ethical inconvenience inbeing poor does not lie in not having access to the advantages ofmaterial prosperity, but in the inability to work towards one’sown happiness: “if someone does not have the means to raise hischildren, to look for wisdom or to practice justice, he will certainlybe unhappy, not because he is poor, but because he cannot practice theworks of happiness” (De utilitate, OO, II, 26a). Mentalpain is another situation in which human ability to turn misfortunesinto positive experiences is tested to the limit. The way Cardanoinsists on the severe reality of mental pain (molestia animi,dolor animi) is one of the most characteristic aspects of hismoral philosophy: “No disease, if there is not fear of death,can equal mental pain (dolor animi)” (Deutilitate, OO, II, 18a).

In promoting (whenever possible) the value of happiness in allcircumstances of human life, Cardano does not intend to humour anyhuman tendency to self-delusion. On the contrary, he sees his effortto dispel false beliefs and to curb proclivities to self-deception ashis main contribution to moral philosophy, for there is no greatermerit than “to free mankind from false opinions” (Deutilitate, OO, II, 26a). Indeed, sometimes he goes so far as tocriticize Averroes’ notion of mental happiness as a form ofentertaining false hopes (in this case, the hope to achieveintellectual bliss). Cardano thinks that the principal task of a moralphilosopher should be that of freeing the mind from misapprehensionsand prejudices: “There are many people who prefer to be happy ina mistaken way rather than acknowledge the reality of their affairsand their condition” (De utilitate, OO, II, 24b). Asalready said, mentalsecuritas cannot be premised on forms ofself-distraction and self-delusion, which turn our mind away from thecauses of our discontent. A good physician would never try to assuagethe pain of the patient by recommending him to buy “paintingsand precious stones” (Theonoston, OO, II, 307a).Cardano’s method of drawing profit from adversities is thereforean attempt to promote endurance while insisting on a courageousacceptance of the human condition.

The clash between appearance and reality, which represents thehallmark of Cardano’s ontology and theory of knowledge, hastherefore its obvious counterpart in his moral philosophy, where heoften associates human misery with unrealistic ambitions triggered byhuman desires: “Since human nature is driven to the infinite byappetites, it can never be satisfied, for it cannot contain theinfinite, indeed, not even a great part of what it desires.”Therefore, he who is not capable of restraining his own appetites, behe the greatest of the kings, will certainly be the unhappiest person(De utilitate, OO, II, 5;De sapientia, OO, I, 532a,544b–545a; ed. Bracali, 135, 174–175). To fight ourpropensity to cherish illusory dreams of happiness (somniumumbrae andumbra somnii), Cardano recommends us tobecome more aware of the precarious nature of the human condition(humana fragilitas) and to increase our level ofself-mastery. The combined action of self-knowledge (nosce teipsum) and self-control (impera te ipsum) contributes tonarrow the otherwise unmanageable scope of our desires(Theonoston, OO, II, 310b;De consolatione, OO, I,615a;De utilitate, OO, II, 89b-90a). Self-awareness andself-control contribute to create positive habits (mores) outof actions and passions. Unlike nonhuman animals (belluae),human beings are capable of disciplining themselves (imperaresibiipsis) and to shape their nature (et naturam et moressibi formare) (Paralipomena, OO, X, 448a). They modifytheir behavior through thought (cogitatio), language(sermo), and action (actio). Actions are primarilydirected to what is useful for us and are ruled by the criterion ofinterest (utile), by pleasure, nature, and habit. Thoughtconcentrates on what is either useful or harmful for us. Languageadjusts our actions and thought to the variable circumstances thatpresent themselves from time to time (De utilitate, OO, II,19a, 20b;De minimis, I, 693a). Once we manage to strike abalance between the scope of our desires and the reality in which welive, two things become most necessary (maxime necessaria):to obtain what we wish to have (habere quod velis) and toknow how to use what we have (his quae habes uti commodescire) (De utilitate, OO, II, 1). To facilitate thistask, Cardano distinguishes between disciplines in which thetheoretical aspect is more prevalent (such as geometry and theology),disciplines which are characterized by a balanced interplay of theory(scientia) and practice (usus), such as medicine andlaw, and finally disciplines in which practice (exercitatio)is essential, like moral philosophy. Cardano enumerates fiverequisites that define the nature of an accomplished action (in termsof attaining the right means for the right end (adeptio),readiness of execution (promptitudo), and completion(perfectio)). These requisites are nature, art, diligence,practice, and familiarity with the experts in the field (Deutilitate, OO, II, 1–2;De sapientia, OO, I, 494b;ed. Bracali, 15).

5. Divination, Fate, and the Roman Inquisition

Among the most difficult periods of Cardano’s tumultuous lifewas his imprisonment and trial by the Inquisition. The episode isimportant for a number of reasons. The Roman Inquisition had taken itsmodern form as a Counter-Reformation apparatus for doctrinal purity in1542. Cardano was arguably the most significant Catholic intellectualtargeted until Giordano Bruno in the 1590s and Galileo in theseventeenth century. His ordeal, then, is a key moment in the historyof early modern censorship. Beyond that, censor reports reveal anumber of themes central to Cardano’s divinatory andastrological thought, even if they distort his actual views. Suchthemes are essential to the whole of his philosophy and to anunderstanding of his general reception as one of the most influentialastrologers of his time.

The Inquisition began to investigate Cardano in the spring and summerof 1570. On 6 October of that year, he was arrested and imprisoned bythe Inquisitor of Bologna, where he lived and was a professor ofmedicine at the city’s university. Among the documents preservedin the Inquisition archives is Cardano’s desperate plea forrelease from prison, addressed to the dean of the Inquisition in Rome:“Today is the forty-third day in prison […] I eat almostnothing because eating would drive me mad, not eating would drive meto death, which I consider the lesser evil” (Baldini and Spruit,t. II, 1075). In December, he was transferred to house arrest, and,shortly thereafter, in February 1571, the Roman authorities renderedtheir judgment: he would abjure not as a formal heretic, but rather asvehemently suspected of heresy. Roughly sixty years later, Galileowould be forced to do the same. Unlike Galileo, Cardano was releasedfrom house arrest soon after his abjuration, but he did not escapewithout consequences, having lost his professorship due to pressurefrom the Inquisition on the Bolognese government. In October, herelocated to Rome. The following year, his non-medical works wereforbidden by the Index of Prohibited Books. Censors both of theInquisition and the Index continued to produce reports on hispublished writings until at least the 1590s, a testament to theenduring interest for him on the Italian peninsula well into theseventeenth century. Physicians, lawyers, ecclesiastics, and otherinterested parties, frequently sought permission from the Church toread his banned works (Marcus 2020, 160–163).

Given Cardano’s heterodox views, the general freedom with whichhe expressed himself, and his devotion to astrology, it is perhapssurprising that he was not targeted earlier in his career. There islittle doubt that his patrons and renown had provided some protection.The Inquisitor of Bologna, notable for his zealous prosecution ofheretics, even expressed a measure of concern about dealing with anauthor of Cardano’s celebrity. Yet it also seems that Cardano,despite his international fame, lived a somewhat solitary life inBologna, bereft of protectors capable of shielding him from localmachinations (Regier 2019). Larger forces were also at work. With theconclusion of the Council of Trent (1545–1563), the Church hadbecome ever more intolerant of heterodox philosophies. Until theInquisition’s archives were opened up in the 1990s, theconsensus among historians had been that Cardano had offended theChurch by printing a horoscope of Christ in his commentary onPtolemy’sTetrabiblos. The archival documents provide afuller story. It was not Christ’s horoscope that led directly toCardano’s trial but rather hisDe rerum varietate(1557), an encyclopedic treatise of natural history. Nevertheless,astrology was at the center of the Inquisition’s case from thebeginning. For the Inquisition to launch an investigation, an initialaccusation was needed, and here it had come in the form of a letterfrom the Inquisitor of Como. A focal point of the letter’sattention was a chapter of theDe rerum varietate devoted tothe effects of the celestial bodies. According to the Inquisitor,Cardano “exaggerates” the influence of celestial bodiesand denies the possibility of God acting directly on sublunar nature.He also, says the Inquisitor, holds the martyrs of the Church to benothing more than madmen, driven to extreme and foolish religiousbehavior by celestial influence. The Inquisitor also lists, rathervaguely, other offenses: contempt of clergy, denial of miracles anddemons, and teaching of divinatory superstitions (Baldini and Spruit,t. II, 1042–1043). This cluster of accusations, with astrologyat the center, would prove to be the basis for subsequent censorshipof Cardano. At the heart of censorial concerns was the accusation thathe naturalized what the Church believed outside the realm of nature:God and providence, free will, and miracles. Hence, Cardano was nottargeted as an astrologerper se, but rather as anastrologizing philosopher in the vein of Pietro Pomponazzi(1462–1525). Censors seemed ready to impute to him theskepticism of miracles associated with Pomponazzi, and especially thelatter’s embrace of determinism. Pomponazzi had laid out thepossibility in hisDe fato, de libero arbitrio, praedestinatione,providentia Dei (1567) that free will was philosophicallyuntenable, that it could not be reconciled with God’s natureunless we limited divine omnipotence and omniscience, and that itcould not be reconciled with the Aristotelian causality.

While censor reports highlight themes in Cardano’s thought thatwere important at least to a subset of readers, they are of courseneither balanced nor accurate portrayals (for more on Cardano’strial and censorship, see Valente 2003 and 2017; Regier 2019 and2021). We might say that his works on divination endorse the consensusopinion among Christian astrologers, both medieval and Renaissance,that celestial bodies act as instruments of providence, but thathumans can resist natural forces up to a point. He is something of amoderate libertarian: free will exists, but it operates within a fieldof natural, social, and providential constraints. Following a longtradition with its origin in Boethius, he seems to recognize a finedistinction between providence and fate: providence is the universalorder experienced in the timeless present of God’s mind, whilefate is the manifestation of that order in the universe itself (Dearcanis aeternitatis, OO, X, 43a;Paralipomenon, OO, X,468b). Early in his career, he wrote a treatise specifically devotedto fate,De fato, which was subsequently lost, likelydestroyed by Cardano himself due to fears of the Inquisition (Cardano2004a, 53). We can, however, consultDe fato’s table ofcontents, which survives in editions ofDe libris propriis(De libris propriis, OO, I, 62a-63b and 99a-100a; Cardano2004, 174–177 and 236–239). These chapter headings raisemore questions than they answer, however. Cardano built a sweepingargument, it seems, in favor of an all-encompassing fate that subsumedeven accidental events. And, like Pomponazzi, he was ready to justifysuch a conception of fate as a dual consequence of God’s natureand the nature of causality. At the same time, however, he devoted achapter to the “utility” of free will.

How exactly free will was grounded in the lostDe fatoremains a mystery, as does Cardano’s reference to its utility.His writings on divination can help to answer the question, sincethere he endeavors at moments to clarify the relationship between fateand free will. Indeed, an entire section of theDe fato wasto deal with divination, whose viability, according to a chapterheading, was based on the orderly unfolding of fate. In his commentaryon Ptolemy’sTetrabiblos, as in theTetrabiblos itself, medicine serves as the paradigm case fordivination. InTetrabiblos I.3, Ptolemy compares astrology tomedicine: a physician identifies the course that nature will take ifleft alone and then employs counteracting forces to bring aboutanother outcome; the astrologer does much the same. Commenting on thissection, Cardano agrees with the Arabic mathematician and astrologerAli ibn Ridwan (“Haly” in Latin) that Ptolemy here“demonstrated maximum wisdom in things divine and human”(De astrorum iudiciis, OO, V, 112a). What Cardano means isthat astrology can estimate the force of future conditions, and so candetermine which events can be deflected (declinari possint)and which will take place due to the divinely instituted“necessity of fate” (fatali necessitate) (Deastrorum iudiciis, OO, V, 112b). He has in mind inflection pointsin the providential design of history—wars, great defeats andvictories, catastrophes, and political transformations. Yet even underthese circumstances, we are not completely powerless. Cardano turns tothe analogy of shipwreck to make his point: “It is as if aperson found himself in the sea during a tempest, and although heforesaw the danger he could not avoid it. The person skilled inswimming through heavy currents or practiced in handling the dangerwill be saved, while another hardly so. The divine can be consideredsimilarly, because it is entirely necessary, and because whatever isaccomplished by the divine mind cannot be escaped” (Deastrorum iudiciis, OO, V, 112b). Prognostication in this sensealways implies an estimation of forces, followed by a consideration ofthe appropriate response. Cardano proffers a two-tiered astrologicalsystem where princes of the world are more subject to astrologicaleffects than their subjects; through astrological changes, the divinecan effectively seize the hearts of kings and steer history to itsdetermined end. This is not to say that the individual outside theranks of power never experiences moments of unavoidable fate. InDe libris propriis, Cardano reflects on the signs thatforetold his eldest son’s execution, signs whose meaning onlybecame clear when it was too late. Cardano asks himself why thesesigns presented themselves when they were to be of no use. Heconcludes that they function as Christian consolation, as proof ofGod’s existence, providential design, and so of the justice thatreveals itself in the unfolding of history (De librispropriis, OO, I, 98a-b; Maclean 2004, 234-235).

Across a spectrum of works, Cardano depicts the course of a human lifeas the result of a dynamic between outward and inward inclinations,and the knowledge and force that we can muster to counter orcomplement them. Yet we are not dealing with a pure form of naturalismhere. The divine and supernatural, as Cardano understands them, areconstantly speaking about the future to humans through intermediaries,through nature itself (Regier 2023). In his monumental treatise ondream interpretation,Somniorum Synesiorum libri IV orDesomniis, he describes a universe where providential knowledge isrelayed from God to the celestial intelligences, then to humans. Hewrites that when we sleep, we enter into a communion with God’smind, such that the future is entirely presented to our souls, but werarely perceive the information due to the effects of bodilyimbalance, daily worries, and general overstimulation. We are likedogs given food by their master; we are oblivious to the preparationthat went into it, to its significance (De somniis, OO, V,672a; Cardano 2021a, 515). The framework here is generallyNeoplatonic: the soul has tremendous access to knowledge that standsabove the sensory realm, yet it is too bogged down by incorporealthings—indeed, one of the intellectual benefits of melancholy,to which Cardano assigns a variety of powerful effects, is that it candistance the mind from daily and corporeal cares. As for the nature ofdreams, the celestial influence uses our memories as if they werestones in a mosaic, assembling these memories into a composite withmeaning; for this reason, dreams are usually cryptic (Desomniis, OO, V, 598b; Cardano 2021a, 43).

Except in very rare cases (e.g., the dreams of perfect clarity thatCardano callsidola), the future must be deciphered withimperfect results. The underlying cause is the nature of the infinite.Sciences that concern the future, he writes, all run up against thesame problem, the “infinite nature itself of things, that is, ofthe soul and of what is seen; for the things that are seen and thatcan be seen are infinite. How then can the infinite be contained inbooks, however long and numerous?” (De somniis, OO, V,671a; Cardano 2021a, 513). He warns his readers against philosopherslike Cicero who prefer clarity to nuance. Clarity is a rhetoricalcheat; only the greatest of philosophers appreciate infinity andrecognize that clarity is the nemesis of accuracy. This discussion ismeant to explain the difficulty of dream interpretation, but it couldbe extended to any other discipline. Knowledge and ignorance interactat the level of the cosmos, insofar as created beings cannot fullyunderstand the providential knowledge that flows through them andmanifests in their actions. Galen, says Cardano, does not know how hemoves his finger back and forth, despite all his anatomical knowledge,but he can do it anyway because of the natural framework divinelyestablished. The celestial intelligences possess detailed knowledge oftheir influence over the sublunar world, yet they neither understandhow they received this knowledge from God, nor do they know how theyreally move that world any more than Galen knows how he moves hisfinger (De somniis, OO, V, 671b-672a; Cardano 2021a, 515).Nature, in this way, is infused with knowledge—knowledge of allthat has and will happen; yet even at the highest ontological level,such knowledge is accompanied by the ignorance of created beings inrelation to divine understanding.

1953,Book on Games of Chance, trans. Sydney Henry Gould,in Oystein Ore, Cardano: The Gambling Scholar, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 182–241.
1973,Writings on Music, ed. and trans. Clement A.Miller, Rome: American Institute of Musicology.
1982,Della mia vita, ed. and trans. Alfonso Ingegno,Milan: Serra e Riva.
1990,L’oroscopo di Cristo, ed. and trans. ArmandoTorno, Milan: Philobiblon.
1992,Sul sonno e sul sognare, eds. Mauro Mancia andAgnese Grieco, trans. Silvia Montiglio and Agnese Grieco, Venice:Marsilio.
1998,Aforismi astrologici, ed. Giuseppe Bezza, trans.Renzo de Martino, Milano: Xenia.
1999,Pronostico generale dil nobile messer Hieronymo Cardanophysico milanese, ed. Germana Ernst, in Girolamo Cardano: Leopere, le fonti, la vita, eds. Marialuisa Baldi and Guido Canziani,Milan: Angeli, 461–475.
2001,Il prosseneta, ovvero della prudenza politica, ed.and trans. Piero Cigada, Milan: Mondadori.
2002 [1930],The Book of My Life, trans. Jean Stoner andintro. Anthony Grafton, New York: ‎ NYRB Classics.
2003,Metoposcopia: manuale per la lettura della fronte:interpretazione dei caratteri in base alle linee frontali e ai neiillustrato con ottocento immagini, con le corrispondenzeastrologico-planetarie, ed. and trans. Arecchi Albert, Milan:Mimesis.
2004a,De libris propriis: The editions of 1544, 1550, 1557,1562, with supplementary material, ed. Ian Maclean, Milan:FrancoAngeli.
2004b,De subtilitate, Tomo I, Libri I-VII, ed. ElioNenci, Milan: FrancoAngeli.
2005,Come si interpretano gli oroscopi, ed. and trans.Ornella Pompeo Faracovi, Pisa and Rome: Istituti Editoriali ePoligrafici Internazionali.
2006a,De immortalitate animorum, ed. José ManuelGarcía Valverde, Milan: FrancoAngeli.
2006b,Liber de ludo aleae, ed. Massimo Tamborini, Milan:FrancoAngeli.
2008a,De Sapientia libri quinque, ed. Marco Bracali,Florence: Olschki.
2008b,Somniorum Synesiorum libri quatuor. Les quatres livresdes songes de Synesios, 2 vols., ed. and trans. Jean-YvesBoriaud, Florence: Olschki.
2008c,Elogio di Nerone, ed. and trans. Marco Di Branco,Rome: Salerno.
2008d,De utilitate ex adversibus capienda praefatio, ed.Raffaele Passarella, Milan: Angeli.
2009,De Uno. Sobre lo uno, ed. and trans. JoséManuel García Valverde, Florence: Olschki.
2011a,Artis magnae sive de regulis algebraicis liberunus, ed. Massimo Tamborini, Milan: Angeli.
2011b,Guglielmo: Dialogo sulla morte, ed. JoséManuel García Valverde, trans. Paolo Raimondi Turin:Aragno.
2013,The De Subtilitate of Girolamo Cardano, 2 vols.,trans. John M. Forrester with intro. John Henry Tempe: Arizona Centerfor Medieval and Renaissance Studies.
2014,Carcer, eds. Marialuisa Baldi, Guido Canziani,Eugenio Di Rienzo, Florence: Olschki.
2017,Il libro dei segreti, ed. Davide Giavina, Milan:Mimesis.
2019a,De consolatione, ed. Marialuisa Baldi, Florence:Olschki.
2019b,Le Livre de ma vie / De Vita propria, ed. andtrans. Jean-Yves Boriaud, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
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2021b,Sulla consolazione, trans. Marialuisa Baldi,Florence: Olschki.

Secondary Literature

Additional bibliographic information about studies on Cardano can befound in Schütze 1998.

Baldi, Marialuisa and Guido Canziani (eds.), 1999.GirolamoCardano: Le opere, le fonti, la vita, Milan: FrancoAngeli.
–––, 2003,Cardano e la tradizione deisaperi, Milan: FrancoAngeli.
Baldini, Ugo and Leen Spruit (eds.), 2009,Catholic Church andModern Science: Documents from the Archives of the Roman Congregationsof the Holy Office and the Index, Vol. I:Sixteenth-CenturyDocuments, 2 volumes, Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana.
Bianchi, Lorenzo, 2008, “Machiavelli e Cardano. Note sunaturalismo e fortuna,” inDopo Machiavelli /Après Machiavel, eds. Lorenzo Bianchi and AlbertoPostigliola, Naples: Liguori, 53–74.
–––, 2013, “Inganni e impostura traCardano e Naudé,” inI castelli di Yale online,1: 25–47. doi:10.15160/2282-5460/528
Boriaud, Jean-Yves (ed.), 2012,La pensée scientifiquede Cardan, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Casali, Elide, 2013, “Il Pronostico del 1534 di GirolamoCardano. L’esemplare della Collezione Campi,”Bruniana& Campanelliana, 19(2): 571–575.
Corrias, Anna, 2018, “When the Eyes Are Shut: The StrangeCase of Girolamo Cardano’sIdolum inSomniorumSynesiorum Libri IIII,”Journal of the History ofIdeas, 79: 179–197.
Couzinet, Marie-Dominique, 2001, “La variétédans la philosophie de la nature: Cardan, Bodin,” inLavarietasà la Renaissance, ed. Dominique deCourcelles, Paris: École des Chartes, 105–117.
Di Rienzo, Eugenio, 1987, “Dal principato civile allatirannide: IlNeronis encomium di Gerolamo Cardano,”Studi storici, 28: 157–82.
Ernst, Germana, 2001, “Veritatis amor dulcissimus:Aspects of Cardano’s Astrology,” inSecrets of Nature:Astrology and Alchemy in Early Modern Europe, eds. William R.Newman and Anthony Grafton, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,39–68.
García Valverde, José Manuel, 2013,“Averroistic Themes in Girolamo Cardano’sDeImmortalitate Animorum,” inRenaissance Averroism andIts Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe, eds.Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni, Dordrecht: Springer,145–71.
Giglioni, Guido, 2005–2007, “Mens in GirolamoCardano,” inPer una storia del concetto di mente, ed.Eugenio Canone, 2 volumes, Florence: Olschki, II: 83–122.
–––, 2008, “‘Bolognan Boys AreBeautiful, Tasteful, and Mostly Fine Musicians’: Cardano on MaleSame-Sex Love and Music,” inThe Sciences of Homosexualityin Early Modern Europe, eds. Kenneth Borris and George Rousseau,New York: Routledge, 201–20.
–––, 2009, “Nature and Demons: GirolamoCardano Interpreter of Pietro d’Abano,” inContinuities and Disruptions between the Middle Ages and theRenaissance, eds. Charles Burnett, José Meirinhos, andJacqueline Hamesse, Louvain-la Neuve: Brepols, 89–112.
–––, 2012, “The Many Rhetorical Personaeof an Early Modern Physician: Girolamo Cardano on Truth andPersuasion,” inRhetoric and Medicine in Early ModernEurope, eds. Stephen Pender and Nancy S. Struever, Burlington,VT: Ashgate, 173–93.
–––, 2013, “Girolamo Cardano: UniversityStudent and Professor,”Renaissance Studies, 27(4):517–532.
–––, 2014, “Humans, Elephants, Diamondsand Gold: Patterns of Intentional Design in Girolamo Cardano’sNatural Philosophy,”Gesnerus, 71: 237–247.
–––, 2015, “Scaliger versus Cardano versusScaliger,” inForms of Conflict and Rivalries in RenaissanceEurope, eds. David A. Lines, Marc Laureys and Jill Kraye, Bonn:Bonn University Press, 109–130.
Gliozzi, Giuliano, 1976, “Cardano, Gerolamo,” inDizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Rome: Istituto dellaEnciclopedia Italiana, 1960-, XIX, 758b–63b.
Grafton, Anthony, 1999,Cardano’s Cosmos: The Worlds andWorks of a Renaissance Astrologer, Cambridge, MA, and London:Harvard University Press.
Ingegno, Alfonso, 1980,Saggio sulla filosofia diCardano, Florence: La Nuova Italia.
Keßler, Eckhard (ed.), 1994,Girolamo Cardano:Philosoph, Naturforscher, Arzt, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Maclean, Ian, 1984, “The Interpretation of Natural Signs:Cardano’sDe subtilitate Versus Scaliger’sExercitationes,” inOccult and ScientificMentalities in the Renaissance, ed. Brian Vickers, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 231–52.
–––, 2007, “Girolamo Cardano: the LastYears of a Polymath,”Renaissance Studies, 21:587–607.
–––, 2008, “Cardano’s EclecticPsychology and its Critique by Julius Caesar Scaliger,”Vivarium, 46: 392–417.
Marcus, Hannah, 2020,Forbidden Knowledge: Medicine, Science,and Censorship in Early Modern Italy, Chicago: University ofChicago Press.
Martin, Craig, 2022, “Girolamo Cardano’sMeteorological Predictions: Hippocratism, Weather Signs, Winds, andthe Limits of Astrology,”Perspectives on Science,30(5): 851–873.
Ore, Øystein, 1953,Cardano: The Gambling Scholar,Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pompeo Faracovi, Ornella, 2012, “Girolamo Cardano e ilritorno a Tolomeo,”Il linguaggio dei cieli. Astri e simbolinel Rinascimento, Roma: Carocci, 125–138.
Prins, Jacomien, 2018, “Girolamo Cardano and Julius CaesarScaliger in Debate about Nature’s Musical Secrets,”Journal of the History of Ideas, 8(2): 169–189.
–––, 2022, “Cardano and Scaliger in Debateon the Revival of Ancient Music,”Journal ofMusicology, 39: 109–132.
Regier, Jonathan, 2019, “Reading Cardano with the RomanInquisition: Astrology, Celestial Physics and the Force ofHeresy,”Isis, 110: 661–679.
–––, 2021, “A Hot Mess: Girolamo Cardano,the Inquisition and the Soul,”HOPOS, 11:547–563.
–––, 2023, “Shadows of the Thrown Spear:Girolamo Cardano on Anxiety, Dreams, and the Divine in Nature,”Early Science and Medicine, 28: 95–119.
Sakamoto, Kuni, 2016,Julius Caesar Scaliger, RenaissanceReformer of Aristotelianism: A Study of His ExotericaeExercitationes, Leiden: Brill.
Schütze, Ingo, 1998, “Bibliografia degli studi suGirolamo Cardano dal 1850 al 1995,”Bruniana &Campanelliana, 4(2): 449–467.
–––, 2000,Die Naturalphilosophie inGirolamo Cardanos De subtilitate, Munich: Fink.
Siraisi, Nancy G., 1997,The Clock and the Mirror: GirolamoCardano and Renaissance Medicine, Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress.
Valente, Michaela, 2003, “‘Correzionid’autore’ e censure dell’opera di Cardano,” inCardano e la tradizione dei saperi, eds. Baldi and Canziani,Milan: FrancoAngeli, 437–456.
–––, 2017, “Facing the Roman Inquisition:Cardano and Della Porta,”Bruniana & Campanelliana,23: 533–540.

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