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Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872–1970) was a Britishphilosopher, logician, essayist and social critic best known for hiswork in mathematical logic and analytic philosophy. His mostinfluential contributions include his championing of logicism (theview that mathematics is in some important sense reducible to logic),his refining ofGottlob Frege’s predicate calculus (which still forms the basis of most contemporarysystems of logic), his theories ofdefinite descriptions,logical atomism andlogical types, and his theory ofneutral monism (the view that the world consists of just one type of substance whichis neither exclusively mental nor exclusively physical).

Together withG.E. Moore, Russell is generally recognized as one of the founders of modernanalytic philosophy. His famousparadox,theory of types and work withA.N. Whitehead onPrincipia Mathematica invigorated the study of logic throughout the twentieth century(Schilpp 1944, xiii; Wilczek 2010, 74). In the public mind, he wasfamous as much for his evangelical atheism as for his contributions totechnical philosophy.

Over the course of a long career, Russell also made importantcontributions to a broad range of other subjects, includingethics, politics, educational theory and religious studies, cheerfullyignoring Hooke’s admonition to the Royal Society against“meddling with Divinity, Metaphysics, Moralls, Politicks,Grammar, Rhetorick, or Logick” (Kreisel 1973, 24). Generationsof general readers have also benefited from his popular writings on awide variety of topics in both the humanities and the naturalsciences. LikeVoltaire, to whom he has been compared (Times of London 1970, 12), he wrotewith style and wit and had enormous influence.

After a life marked by controversy – including dismissals fromboth Trinity College, Cambridge and City College, New York –Russell was awarded the Order of Merit in 1949 and the Nobel Prize forLiterature in 1950. Noted also for his many spirited anti-nuclearprotests and for his campaign against western involvement in theVietnam War, Russell remained a prominent public figure until hisdeath at the age of 97.

Interested readers may listen totwo sound clips of Russell speaking.

• 1. Russell’s Chronology
• 2. Russell’s Work in Logic
• 3. Russell’s Work in Analytic Philosophy
• 4. Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions
• 5. Russell’s Theory of Neutral Monism
• 6. Russell’s Atheism
• 7. Russell’s Social and Political Philosophy
• 8. Contemporary Russell Scholarship
• Bibliography
  • Primary Literature
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Russell’s Chronology

A short chronology of the major events in Russell’s life is asfollows:

Attempts to sum up Russell’s life have been numerous. One of themore famous comes from the Oxford philosopherA.J. Ayer. As Ayer writes, “The popular conception of a philosopher as onewho combines universal learning with the direction of human conductwas more nearly satisfied by Bertrand Russell than by any otherphilosopher of our time” (1972a, 127). Another telling commentcomes from the Harvard philosopherW.V. Quine: “I think many of us were drawn to our profession byRussell’s books. He wrote a spectrum of books for a graduatedpublic, layman to specialist. We were beguiled by the wit and a senseof new-found clarity with respect to central traits of reality”(1966c, 657).

Despite such comments, perhaps the most memorable encapsulation ofRussell’s life and work comes from Russell himself. As Russelltells us,

Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed mylife: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearablepity for the suffering of mankind. These passions, like great winds,have blown me hither and thither, in a wayward course, over a greatocean of anguish, reaching to the very verge of despair.

I have sought love, first, because it brings ecstasy – ecstasyso great that I would often have sacrificed all the rest of life for afew hours of this joy. I have sought it, next, because it relievesloneliness – that terrible loneliness in which one shiveringconsciousness looks over the rim of the world into the coldunfathomable lifeless abyss. I have sought it finally, because in theunion of love I have seen, in a mystic miniature, the prefiguringvision of the heaven that saints and poets have imagined. This is whatI sought, and though it might seem too good for human life, this iswhat – at last – I have found.

With equal passion I have sought knowledge. I have wished tounderstand the hearts of men. I have wished to know why the starsshine. And I have tried to apprehend the Pythagorean power by whichnumber holds sway above the flux. A little of this, but not much, Ihave achieved.

Love and knowledge, so far as they were possible, led upward towardthe heavens. But always pity brought me back to earth. Echoes of criesof pain reverberate in my heart. Children in famine, victims torturedby oppressors, helpless old people a hated burden to their sons, andthe whole world of loneliness, poverty, and pain make a mockery ofwhat human life should be. I long to alleviate this evil, but Icannot, and I too suffer.

This has been my life. I have found it worth living, and would gladlylive it again if the chance were offered me. (1967, 3–4)

By any standard, Russell led an enormously full life. In addition tohis ground-breaking intellectual work in logic and analyticphilosophy, he involved himself for much of his life in politics. Asearly as 1904 he spoke out frequently in favour of internationalismand in 1907 he ran unsuccessfully for Parliament. Although he stood asan independent, he endorsed the full 1907 Liberal platform. He alsoadvocated extending the franchise to women, provided that such aradical political change could be introduced through constitutionallyrecognized means (Wood 1957, 71). Three years later he published hisAnti-Suffragist Anxieties (1910).

With the outbreak of World War I, Russell became involved in anti-waractivities and in 1916 he was fined 100 pounds for authoring ananti-war pamphlet. Because of his conviction, he was dismissed fromhis post at Trinity College, Cambridge (Hardy 1942). Two years later,he was convicted a second time, this time for suggesting that Americantroops might be used to intimidate strikers in Britain (Clark 1975,337–339). The result was five months in Brixton Prison asprisoner No. 2917. In 1922 and 1923 Russell ran twice more forParliament, again unsuccessfully, and together with his second wife,Dora, he founded an experimental school that they operated during thelate 1920s and early 1930s (Russell 1926; Park 1963). Perhaps notsurprisingly, some of Russell’s more radical activities –including his advocacy of post-Victorian sexual norms – werelinked in many people’s minds to his atheism, made famous inpart by his 1948 BBC debate with the Jesuit philosopher FrederickCopleston over the existence of God (Leal and Marraud 2022).

Although Russell became the third Earl Russell upon the death of hisbrother in 1931, Russell’s radicalism continued to make him acontroversial figure well through middle-age. While teaching at UCLAin the United States in the late 1930s, he was offered a teachingappointment at City College, New York. The appointment was revokedfollowing a series of protests and a 1940 judicial decision whichfound him morally unfit to teach at the College (Dewey and Kallen1941; Irvine 1996; Weidlich 2000). The legal decision had been basedpartly on Russell’s atheism and partly on his fame as anadvocate of free love and open marriages.

In 1954, Russell delivered his famous “Man’s Peril”broadcast on the BBC, condemning the Bikini H-bomb tests. A yearlater, he and Albert Einstein released the Russell-Einstein Manifestocalling for the curtailment of nuclear weapons. In 1957, he became aprime organizer of the first Pugwash Conference, which broughttogether a large number of scientists concerned about the nuclearissue. He became founding president of the Campaign for NuclearDisarmament in 1958 and Honorary President of the Committee of 100 in1960.

In 1961, Russell was once again imprisoned, this time for a week inconnection with anti-nuclear protests. The media coverage surroundinghis conviction only served to enhance Russell’s reputation andto further inspire the many idealistic youth who were sympathetic tohis anti-war and anti-nuclear message. Beginning in 1963, he beganwork on a variety of additional issues, including lobbying on behalfof political prisoners under the auspices of the Bertrand RussellPeace Foundation.

Throughout much of his life, Russell saw himself primarily as a writerrather than as a philosopher, listing “Author” as hisprofession on his passport. As he says in hisAutobiography,“I resolved not to adopt a profession, but to devote myself towriting” (1967, 125). Upon being awarded the Nobel Prize forLiterature in 1950, Russell used his acceptance speech once again toemphasize themes relating to his social activism.

Over the years, Russell has served as the subject of numerous creativeworks, including T.S. Eliot’s “Mr Apollinax” (1917),D.H. Lawrence’s “The Blind Man” (1920), AldousHuxley’sChrome Yellow (1921), Bruce Duffy’sThe World as I Found It (1987) and the graphic novel byApostolos Doxiadis and Christos Papadimitriou,Logicomix: An EpicSearch for Truth (2009).

Readers wanting additional information about Russell’s life areencouraged to consult Russell’s five autobiographical volumes:Portraits from Memory and other Essays (A1956b),MyPhilosophical Development (1959) andThe Autobiography ofBertrand Russell (3 volumes, 1967, 1968, 1969). In addition, JohnSlater’s accessibleBertrand Russell (1994) gives ashort but informative introduction to Russell’s life, work andinfluence. More detailed sources of biographical information includeRonald Clark’s authoritativeThe Life of BertrandRussell (1975), Ray Monk’s two volumes,BertrandRussell: The Spirit of Solitude (1996) andBertrand Russell:The Ghost of Madness (2000), and the first volume of AndrewIrvine’sBertrand Russell: Critical Assessments(1999).

For a chronology of Russell’s major publications, readers areencouraged to consult thePrimary Literature section of the Bibliography below. For a complete, descriptivebibliography, seeA Bibliography of Bertrand Russell (3volumes, 1994), by Kenneth Blackwell and Harry Ruja. A less detailedlist appears in Paul Arthur Schilpp,The Philosophy of BertrandRussell (1944).

For a detailed bibliography of the secondary literature surroundingRussell up to the close of the twentieth century, see Andrew Irvine,Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments, Volume 1 (1999). Fora list of new and forthcoming books relating to Russell, see theForthcoming Books page at the Bertrand Russell Archives.

2. Russell’s Work in Logic

Russell’s main contributions to logic and the foundations ofmathematics include his discovery ofRussell’s paradox, also known as the Russell-Zermelo paradox (Linsky 2013), hisdevelopment (together with Whitehead) of thetheory of types, his championing of logicism (the view that mathematics is, in somesignificant sense, reducible to formal logic), his impressivelygeneral theory of logical relations, and his formalization of themathematics of quantity and of the real numbers. Much of this workemerged as a result of Russell’s desire to refine GottlobFrege’s revolutionary predicate calculus (a logic displayingvalid inferences among statements in which properties are predicatedof objects) and then to apply it to mathematical contexts. As EdwardZalta notes, Frege’s new logic introduced a formal mechanism forregimenting reasoning, one that “took functions to be more basicthan relations” (Zalta2024). The result was a formal language and theory of inference of immensenew power.

Russell discovered the paradox that bears his name in 1901, whileworking on hisPrinciples of Mathematics (1903). The paradoxarises in connection with the set of all sets that are not members ofthemselves. Such a set, if it exists, will be a member of itself ifand only if it is not a member of itself. In his 1901 draft of thePrinciples of Mathematics, Russell summarizes the problem asfollows:

[S]ome predicates can be predicated of themselves. Consider now those… of which this is not the case. … [T]here is nopredicate which attaches to all of them and to no other terms. Forthis predicate will either be predicable or not predicable of itself.If it is predicable of itself, it is one of those referents byrelation to which it was defined, and therefore, in virtue of theirdefinition, it is not predicable of itself. Conversely, if it is notpredicable of itself, then again it is one of the said referents, ofall of which (by hypothesis) it is predicable, and therefore again itis predicable of itself. This is a contradiction. (CP, Vol. 3, 195)

The paradox is significant since, using classical logic, all sentencesare entailed by a contradiction. Russell’s discovery thusprompted a large amount of work in logic, set theory, and thephilosophy and foundations of mathematics.

Russell’s response to theparadox came between 1903 and 1908 with the development of histheory of types. It was clear to Russell that some form of restriction needed to beplaced on the original comprehension (or abstraction) axiom ofnaïve set theory, the axiom that formalizes the intuition thatany coherent condition (or property) can be used to determine a set.Russell’s basic idea was that reference to sets such as theso-called Russell set (the set of all sets that are not members ofthemselves) could be avoided by arranging all sentences into ahierarchy, beginning with sentences about individuals at the lowestlevel, sentences about sets of individuals at the next lowest level,sentences about sets of sets of individuals at the next lowest level,and so on. Using a vicious circle principle similar to that adopted bythe mathematician Henri Poincaré, together with his so-called“no class” theory of classes (in which class terms gainmeaning only when situated in the appropriate context), Russell wasable to explain why the unrestricted comprehension axiom fails:propositional functions, such as the function “\(x\) is a set”, may not be appliedto themselves since self-application would involve a vicious circle.As a result, all objects for which a given condition (or predicate)holds must be at the same level or of the same “type”.Sentences about these objects will then always be higher in thehierarchy than the objects themselves.

Although first introduced in 1903, the theory of types was furtherdeveloped by Russell in his 1908 article “Mathematical Logic asBased on the Theory of Types” and in the three-volume work heco-authored withAlfred North Whitehead,Principia Mathematica (1910, 1912, 1913). The theory thus admits of twoversions, the “simple theory” of 1903 and the“ramified theory” of 1908. Both versions of the theorycame under attack: the simple theory for being too weak, the ramifiedtheory for being too strong. For some, it was important that anyproposed solution be comprehensive enough to resolve all knownparadoxes at once. For others, it was important that any proposedsolution not disallow those parts of classical mathematics thatremained consistent, even though they appeared to violate the viciouscircle principle. (For discussion of related paradoxes, see Chapter 2of the Introduction to Whitehead and Russell (1910), as well as theentry onparadoxes and contemporary logic in this encyclopedia.)

Russell himself had recognized several of these same concerns as earlyas 1903, noting that it was unlikely that any single solution wouldresolve all the known paradoxes. Together with Whitehead, he was alsoable to introduce a new axiom, the axiom of reducibility, whichlessened the vicious circle principle’s scope of application andso resolved many of the most worrisome aspects of type theory. Evenso, critics claimed that the axiom was simply too ad hoc to bejustified philosophically. (For additional discussion see Linsky 1990,Linsky 2002 and Wahl 2011.)

Of equal significance during this period was Russell’s defenseof logicism, the theory that mathematics is in some important sensereducible to logic. First defended in his 1901 article “RecentWork on the Principles of Mathematics”, and later in greaterdetail in hisPrinciples of Mathematics and inPrincipiaMathematica, Russell’s logicism consisted of two maintheses. The first was that all mathematical truths can be translatedinto logical truths or, in other words, that the vocabulary ofmathematics constitutes a proper subset of the vocabulary of logic.The second was that all mathematical proofs can be recast as logicalproofs or, in other words, that the theorems of mathematics constitutea proper subset of the theorems of logic. As Russell summarizes,“The fact that all Mathematics is Symbolic Logic is one of thegreatest discoveries of our age; and when this fact has beenestablished, the remainder of the principles of mathematics consistsin the analysis of Symbolic Logic itself” (1903, 5).

LikeGottlob Frege, Russell’s basic idea for defending logicism was that in somecontexts numbers may be identified with classes of classes and thatnumber-theoretic statements may be explained in terms of quantifiersand identity. Thus the number 1 can be identified with the class ofall unit classes, the number 2 with the class of all two-memberedclasses, and so on. Statements such as “There are at least twobooks” would be recast as statements such as “There is abook, \(x\), and there is a book, \(y\), and \(x\) is not identical to\(y\)”. Statements such as “There are exactly twobooks” would be recast as “There is a book, \(x\), andthere is a book, \(y\), and \(x\) is not identical to \(y\), and ifthere is a book, \(z\), then \(z\) is identical to either \(x\) or\(y\)”. Number-theoretic operations may then be explained interms of set-theoretic operations such as intersection, union anddifference. InPrincipia Mathematica, Whitehead and Russellwere able to provide many detailed derivations of major theorems inset theory, finite and transfinite arithmetic, and elementary measuretheory. They were also able to develop a sophisticated theory oflogical relations and a unique method of founding the real numbers.Even so, the issue of whether set theory itself can be said to havebeen successfully reduced to logic remained controversial. A fourthvolume on geometry was planned but never completed.

Russell’s most important writings relating to these topicsinclude not only hisPrinciples of Mathematics (1903),“Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types”(1908), and (with Whitehead)Principia Mathematica (1910,1912, 1913), but also his earlierEssay on the Foundations ofGeometry (1897) and hisIntroduction to MathematicalPhilosophy (1919a), the last of which was written while Russellwas serving time in Brixton Prison as a result of his anti-waractivities. Coincidentally, it was at roughly this same time thatLudwig Wittgenstein, Russell’s most famous pupil, was completing hisTractatusLogico-Philosophicus (1921) while being detained as a prisoner ofwar at Monte Cassino in Italy during World War I.

Anyone needing assistance in deciphering the symbolism found in themore technical of Russell’s writings is encouraged to consulttheNotation inPrincipia Mathematica entry in this encyclopedia.

3. Russell’s Work in Analytic Philosophy

In much the same way that Russell used logic in an attempt to clarifyissues in the foundations of mathematics, he also used logic in anattempt to clarify issues in philosophy. As one of the founders ofanalytic philosophy, Russell made significant contributions to a widevariety of areas, includingmetaphysics,epistemology,ethics and political theory. His advances in logic and metaphysics also hadsignificant influence on Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap and theVienna Circle.

According to Russell, it is the philosopher’s job to discover alogically ideal language – a language capable of describing theworld in such a way that we will not be misled by the accidental,imprecise, surface structure of natural language. As Russell writes,“Ordinary language is totally unsuited for expressing whatphysics really asserts, since the words of everyday life are notsufficiently abstract. Only mathematics and mathematical logic can sayas little as the physicist means to say” (1931, 82). Just asatomic facts (the associations of properties and relations withindividuals) combine to form molecular facts in the world itself, sucha language will allow for the description of these facts using logicalconnectives such as “and” and “or”. Inaddition to the existence of atomic and molecular facts, Russell alsoheld that general facts (facts about “all” of something)are needed to complete our picture of the world. Famously, hevacillated on whether negative facts are also required (1918,1919).

The reason Russell believes many ordinarily accepted statements areopen to doubt is that they appear to refer to entities that may beknown only through inference. Thus, underlying Russell’s variousprojects was not only his use of logical analysis, but also hislong-standing aim of discovering whether, and to what extent,knowledge is possible. “There is one great question”, hewrites in 1911. “Can human beingsknow anything, and ifso, what and how? This question is really the most essentiallyphilosophical of all questions” (Slater 1994, 67).

Motivating this question was the traditional problem of the externalworld. If our knowledge of the external world comes through inferencesto the best explanation, and if such inferences are always fallible,what guarantee do we have that our beliefs are true? Russell’sresponse to this question during the early years of the twentiethcentury was partly metaphysical and partly epistemological. On themetaphysical side, Russell developed his influential theory oflogical atomism, in which the world is said to consist of a complex of logical atoms(such as “little patches of colour”) together with theirproperties and relations. (The theory was crucial for influencingWittgenstein’s theory of the same name.) Together these atoms and their properties form thefacts which, in turn, combine to form logically complex objects. Whatwe normally take to be inferred entities (for example, enduringphysical objects) are then understood aslogical constructions formed from the immediately given entities of sensation, viz.,“sensibilia”.

On the epistemological side, Russell argues that it is also importantto show how each questionable entity may be reduced to, or defined interms of, other entities whose existence is more certain. For example,on this view, a physical object that normally might be thought to beknown only through inference may be defined instead

as a certain series of appearances, connected with each other bycontinuity and by certain causal laws. … More generally, a‘thing’ will be defined as a certain series of aspects,namely those which would commonly be said to beof the thing.To say that a certain aspect is an aspectof a certain thingwill merely mean that it is one of those which, taken serially,are the thing. (1914a, 106–107)

The reason we are able to do this, says Russell, is that

our world is not wholly a matter of inference. There are things thatwe know without asking the opinion of men of science. If you are toohot or too cold, you can be perfectly aware of this fact withoutasking the physicist what heat and cold consist of. … We maygive the name ‘data’ to all the things of which we areaware without inference. (1959, 23)

We can then use these data (or “sensibilia” or “sense data”) with which we are directly acquainted to construct the relevantobjects of knowledge. Similarly, numbers may be reduced to collectionsof classes; points and instants may be reduced to ordered classes ofvolumes and events; and classes themselves may be reduced topropositional functions.

It is with these kinds of examples in mind that Russell suggests weadopt what he calls “the supreme maxim in scientificphilosophizing”, namely the principle that “Wheneverpossible, logical constructions”, or as he also sometimes putsit, “logical fictions”, are “to be substituted forinferred entities” (1914c, 155; cf. 1914a, 107, and 1924, 326).Anything that resists construction in this sense may be said to be anontological atom. Such objects are atomic, both in the sense that theyfail to be composed of individual, substantial parts, and in the sensethat they exist independently of one another. Their correspondingpropositions are also atomic, both in the sense that they contain noother propositions as parts, and in the sense that the members of anypair of true atomic propositions will be logically independent of oneanother. Russell believes that formal logic, if carefully developed,will mirror precisely, not only the various relations between all suchpropositions, but their various internal structures as well.

It is in this context that Russell introduces his famous distinctionbetween two kinds of knowledge of truths: that which is direct,intuitive, certain and infallible, and that which is indirect,derivative, uncertain and open to error (1905, 41f; 1911; 1912; and1914b). To be justified, every indirect knowledge claim must becapable of being derived from more fundamental, direct or intuitiveknowledge claims. The kinds of truths that are capable of being knowndirectly include truths about immediate facts of sensation and truthsof logic. Examples are discussed inThe Problems ofPhilosophy (1912a) where Russell states that propositions withthe highest degree of self-evidence (what he here calls“intuitive knowledge”) include “those which merelystate what is given in sense, and also certain abstract logical andarithmetical principles, and (though with less certainty) some ethicalpropositions” (1912a, 109).

Eventually, Russell supplemented this distinction between direct andindirect knowledge of truths with his equally famous distinctionbetween knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. AsRussell explains, “I say that I am acquainted with an objectwhen I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I amdirectly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitiverelation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutesjudgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation” (1911,209). Russell introduced the distinction in a paper delivered to theCambridge Moral Sciences Club, in part in response to a talk given tothe same society by Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones a few monthsearlier. Later, he clarifies his point by adding that acquaintanceinvolves, not knowledge of truths, but knowledge of things (1912a,44). Thus, while intuitive knowledge and derivative knowledge bothinvolve knowledge of propositions (or truths), knowledge byacquaintance and knowledge by description both involve knowledge ofthings (or objects). This distinction is slightly complicated by thefact that, even though knowledge by description is in part based uponknowledge of truths, it is still knowledge of things, and not oftruths. (I am grateful to Russell Wahl for reminding me of thispoint.) Since it is things with which we have direct acquaintance thatare the least questionable members of our ontology, it is theseobjects upon which Russell ultimately bases his epistemology.

Also relevant was Russell’s reliance upon his so-calledregressive method (Irvine 1989; Mayo-Wilson 2011) and his eventualabandoning of foundationalism in favour of a more recognizablycoherentist approach to knowledge (Irvine 2004). As Russell puts it,even in logic and mathematics

We tend to believe the premises because we can see that theirconsequences are true, instead of believing the consequences becausewe know the premises to be true. But the inferring of premises fromconsequences is the essence of induction; thus the method ininvestigating the principles of mathematics is really an inductivemethod, and is substantially the same as the method of discoveringgeneral laws in any other science. (1907, 273–274)

Russell’s contributions to metaphysics and epistemology are alsounified by his views concerning the centrality of scientific knowledgeand the importance of there being an underlying methodology common tophilosophy and science. In the case of philosophy, this methodologyexpresses itself through Russell’s use of logical analysis(Hager 1994; Irvine 2004). In fact, Russell often claims that he hasmore confidence in his methodology than in any particularphilosophical conclusion.

This broad conception of philosophy arose in part from Russell’sidealist origins (Hylton 1990a; Griffin 1991). This is so, even thoughRussell tells us that his one, true revolution in philosophy came as aresult of his break from idealism. Russell saw that the idealistdoctrine of internal relations led to a series of contradictions whenworking with the kinds of asymmetrical (and other) relations necessaryfor mathematics. As he reports,

It was towards the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against bothKant and Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in hisfootsteps. … [Our rebellion centred upon] the doctrine thatfact is in general independent of experience. Although we were inagreement, I think that we differed as to what most interested us inour new philosophy. I think that Moore was most concerned with therejection of idealism, while I was most interested in the rejection ofmonism. (1959, 54)

The two ideas were closely connected through the so-called doctrine ofinternal relations. In contrast to this doctrine, Russell proposed hisown new doctrine ofexternal relations:

The doctrine of internal relations held that every relation betweentwo terms expresses, primarily, intrinsic properties of the two termsand, in ultimate analysis, a property of the whole which the twocompose. With some relations this view is plausible. Take, forexample, love or hate. If A loves B, this relation exemplifies itselfand may be said to consist in certain states of mind of A. Even anatheist must admit that a man can love God. It follows that love ofGod is a state of the man who feels it, and not properly a relationalfact. But the relations that interested me were of a more abstractsort. Suppose that A and B are events, and A is earlier than B. I donot think that this implies anything in A in virtue of which,independently of B, it must have a character which we inaccuratelyexpress by mentioning B. Leibniz gives an extreme example. He saysthat, if a man living in Europe has a wife in India and the wife dieswithout his knowing it, the man undergoes an intrinsic change at themoment of her death. (1959, 54–55)

This is the type of doctrine Russell opposed, especially with respectto the asymmetrical relations necessary for mathematics. For example,consider two numbers, one of which is found earlier than the other ina given series:

If A is earlier than B, then B is not earlier than A. If you try toexpress the relation of A to B by means of adjectives of A and B, youwill have to make the attempt by means of dates. You may say that thedate of A is a property of A and the date of B is a property of B, butthat will not help you because you will have to go on to say that thedate of A is earlier than the date of B, so that you will have foundno escape from the relation. If you adopt the plan of regarding therelation as a property of the whole composed of A and B, you are in astill worse predicament, for in that whole A and B have no order andtherefore you cannot distinguish between “A is earlier thanB” and “B is earlier than A”. As asymmetricalrelations are essential in most parts of mathematics, this doctrinewas important. (1959, 55)

Thus, by the end of 1898 Russell had abandoned the idealism that hehad been encouraged to adopt as a student at Cambridge, along with hisoriginal Kantian methodology (Griffin 2022). In its place he adopted anew, pluralisticrealism. As a result, he soon became famous as an advocate of “the newrealism” and of his “new philosophy of logic”,emphasizing as he did the importance of modern logic for philosophicalanalysis. The underlying themes of this revolution includedRussell’s belief in pluralism, his emphasis on anti-psychologismand his belief in the importance of science. Each of these themesremained central to his philosophy for the remainder of his life(Hager 1994; Weitz 1944).

Russell’s most important writings relating to these topicsinclude “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge byDescription” (1911),The Problems of Philosophy(1912a),Our Knowledge of the External World (1914a),“On the Nature of Acquaintance” (1914b, published morecompletely inCollected Papers, Volume 7), “ThePhilosophy of Logical Atomism” (1918, 1919), “LogicalAtomism” (1924),The Analysis of Mind (1921),TheAnalysis of Matter (1927a),Human Knowledge: Its Scope andLimits (1948), andTheory of Knowledge (CP, Volume7).

4. Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions

Russell’s philosophical method has at its core the making andtesting of hypotheses through the weighing of evidence. HenceRussell’s comment that he wished to emphasize the“scientific method” in philosophy. His method alsorequires the rigorous analysis of problematic propositions using themachinery of first-order logic. It was Russell’s belief that byusing the new logic of his day, philosophers would be able to exhibitthe underlying “logical form” of natural-languagestatements. Discovering a statement’s logical form, in turn,would help resolve various problems of reference associated with theambiguity and vagueness of natural language.

Since the introduction of the modern predicate calculus, it has beencommon to use three separate logical notations (“\(Px\)”,“\(x = y\)”, and “\(\exists x\)”) to representthree separate senses of the natural-language word “is”:theis of predication, e.g. “Cicero is wise”; theis of identity, e.g. “Cicero is Tully”; and theis of existence, e.g. “Cicero is”. It wasRussell’s suggestion that, just as we use logic to make clearthese distinctions, we can also use logic to discover otherontologically significant distinctions, distinctions that should bereflected in the analysis we give of each sentence’s logicalform.

Russell’s view (at least during the early part of the twentiethcentury) was that the subject matter of philosophy is thendistinguished from that of the sciences only by the generality anda prioricity of philosophical statements, not by theunderlying methodology of the discipline. In philosophy, just as inmathematics, Russell believed that it was by applying logicalmachinery and insights that advances in analysis would be made.

Russell’s most famous example of his new “analyticmethod” concerns so-called denoting phrases, phrases thatinclude bothdefinite descriptions and proper names. LikeAlexius Meinong, Russell had initially adopted the view that every denoting phrase(for example, “Scott”, “the author ofWaverley”, “the number two”, “thegolden mountain”) denoted, or referred to, an existing entity.On this view, even fictional and imaginary entities had to be real inorder to serve as truth-makers for true sentences such as“Unicorns have exactly one horn”. By the time his landmarkarticle, “On Denoting”, appeared in 1905, Russell hadmodified his extreme realism, substituting in its place the view thatdenoting phrases need not possess a theoretical unity. As Russell putsit, the assumption that every denoting phrase must refer to anexisting entity was the type of assumption that exhibited “afailure of that feeling for reality which ought to be preserved evenin the most abstract studies” (1919a, 165).

While logically proper names (words such as “this” or“that” which refer to sensations of which an agent isimmediately aware) do have referents associated with them, descriptivephrases (such as “the largest number less than pi”) shouldbe viewed merely as collections of quantifiers (such as“all” and “some”) andpropositional functions (such as “\(x\) is a number”). As such, they are not tobe viewed as referring terms but, rather, as “incompletesymbols”. In other words, they are to be viewed as symbols thattake on meaning within appropriate contexts, but that remainmeaningless in isolation.

Put another way, it was Russell’s insight that some phrases maycontribute to the meaning (or reference) of a sentence withoutthemselves being meaningful. As he explains,

If “the author ofWaverley” meant anything otherthan “Scott”, “Scott is the author ofWaverley” would be false, which it is not. If“the author ofWaverley” meant“Scott”, “Scott is the author ofWaverley” would be a tautology, which it is not.Therefore, “the author ofWaverley” means neither“Scott” nor anything else – i.e. “the authorofWaverley” means nothing, Q.E.D. (1959, 85)

If Russell is correct, it follows that in a sentence such as

(1)

The present King of France is bald,

the definite description “The present King of France”plays a role quite different from the role a proper name such as“Scott” plays in the sentence

(2)

Scott is bald.

Letting \(K\) abbreviate the predicate “is a present King ofFrance” and \(B\) abbreviate the predicate “isbald”, Russell assigns sentence (1) the logical form

(1′)

There is an \(x\) such that

1. \(Kx\),
2. for any \(y\), if \(Ky\) then \(y=x\), and
3. \(Bx\).

Alternatively, in the notation of the predicate calculus, we write

(1″)

\(\exists x[(Kx \amp \forall y(Ky \rightarrow y=x)) \ampBx]\).

In contrast, by allowing \(s\) to abbreviate the name“Scott”, Russell assigns sentence (2) the very differentlogical form

(2′)

\(Bs\).

This distinction between logical forms allows Russell to explain threeimportant puzzles.

The first concerns the operation of the Law of Excluded Middle and howthis law relates to denoting terms. According to one reading of theLaw of Excluded Middle, it must be the case that either “Thepresent King of France is bald” is true or “The presentKing of France is not bald” is true. But if so, both sentencesappear to entail the existence of a present King of France, clearly anundesirable result given that France is a republic (and so has noking). Russell’s analysis shows how this conclusion can beavoided. By appealing to analysis (1″), it follows that there isa way to deny (1) without being committed to the existence of apresent King of France, namely by changing the scope of the negationoperator and thereby accepting that “It is not the case thatthere exists a present King of France who is bald” is true.

The second puzzle concerns the Law of Identity as it operates in(so-called) opaque contexts. Even though “Scott is the author ofWaverley” is true, it does not follow that the tworeferring terms “Scott” and “the author ofWaverley” need be interchangeable in every situation.Thus, although “George IV wanted to know whether Scott was theauthor ofWaverley” is true, “George IV wanted toknow whether Scott was Scott” is, presumably, false.

Russell’s distinction between the logical forms associated withthe use of proper names and definite descriptions again shows why thisis so. To see this, we once again let \(s\) abbreviate the name“Scott”. We also let \(w\) abbreviate“Waverley” and \(A\) abbreviate the two-placepredicate “is the author of”. It then follows that thesentence

(3)

\(s=s\)

is not at all equivalent to the sentence

(4)

\(\exists x[(Axw \amp \forall y(Ayw \rightarrow y=x)) \amp x=s]\).

Sentence (3), for example, is a necessary truth, while sentence (4) isnot.

The third puzzle relates to true negative existential claims, such asthe claim “The golden mountain does not exist”. Here, onceagain, by treating definite descriptions as having a logical formdistinct from that of proper names, Russell is able to give an accountof how a speaker may be committed to the truth of a negativeexistential without also being committed to the belief that thesubject term has reference. That is, the claim that Scott does notexist is not true since

(5)

\(\neg\exists x(x=s)\)

is self-contradictory. (For Russell, since all names refer and wordsthat fail to refer are at mostpotential names, there mustexist at least one thing that is identical to \(s\), since it is alogical truth that \(s\) is identical to itself.)

In contrast, the claim that a golden mountain does not exist may betrue since, assuming that \(G\) abbreviates the predicate “isgolden” and \(M\) abbreviates the predicate “is amountain”, there is nothing contradictory about

(6)

\(\neg\exists x(Gx \amp Mx)\).

Russell’s most important writings relating to his theory ofdescriptions include not only “On Denoting” (1905), butalsoThe Principles of Mathematics (1903),PrincipiaMathematica (1910) andIntroduction to MathematicalPhilosophy (1919). (See too Kaplan 1970, Kroon 2009, Stevens 2011and Pollock 2022.)

5. Russell’s Theory of Neutral Monism

Yet another of Russell’s contributions is his defence ofneutral monism, the view that the world consists of just one type of substance whichis neither exclusively mental nor exclusively physical. Like idealism(the view that nothing exists but the mental) and physicalism (theview that nothing exists but the physical), neutral monism rejectsdualism (the view that there exist distinct mental and physicalsubstances). However, unlike both idealism and physicalism, neutralmonism holds that this single existing substance may be viewed in somecontexts as being mental and in others as being physical. As Russellputs it,

“Neutral monism” – as opposed to idealistic monismand materialistic monism – is the theory that the thingscommonly regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded asphysical do not differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessedby the one set and not by the other, but differ only in respect ofarrangement and context. (CP, Vol. 7, 15)

To help understand this general suggestion, Russell introduces hisanalogy of a postal directory:

The theory may be illustrated by comparison with a postal directory,in which the same names come twice over, once in alphabetical and oncein geographical order; we may compare the alphabetical order to themental, and the geographical order to the physical. The affinities ofa given thing are quite different in the two orders, and its causesand effects obey different laws. Two objects may be connected in themental world by the association of ideas, and in the physical world bythe law of gravitation. … Just as every man in the directoryhas two kinds of neighbours, namely alphabetical neighbours andgeographical neighbours, so every object will lie at the intersectionof two causal series with different laws, namely the mental series andthe physical series. ‘Thoughts’ are not different insubstance from ‘things’; the stream of my thoughts is astream of things, namely of the things which I should commonly be saidto be thinking of; what leads to its being called a stream of thoughtsis merely that the laws of succession are different from the physicallaws. (CP, Vol. 7, 15)

In other words, when viewed as being mental, a thought or idea mayhave associated with it other thoughts or ideas that seem related eventhough, when viewed as being physical, they have very little incommon. As Russell explains, “In my mind, Caesar may call upCharlemagne, whereas in the physical world the two were widelysundered” (CP, Vol. 7, 15). Even so, it is a mistake, on thisview, to postulate two distinct types of thing (the idea of Caesar andthe man Caesar) that are composed of two distinct kinds of substance(the mental and the physical). Instead, “The whole duality ofmind and matter, according to this theory, is a mistake; there is onlyone kind of stuff out of which the world is made, and this stuff iscalled mental in one arrangement, physical in the other” (CP,Vol. 7, 15).

Russell began shifting to this view after hearing Wittgenstein’scriticism of his 1913Theory of Knowledge manuscript. Thecriticism led to Russell’s acceptance of the view “thatWilliam James had been right” to deny the relational characterof sensations and that the idea of mental sense-data ultimately wouldhave to be abandoned (1959, 134). In place of the term“sense-data”, Russell introduced the term “eventparticulars” to refer to the basic building blocks found innature that result in both physical events and mental sensations.Predecessors to this idea appear in the work of Ernst Mach and WilliamJames under a variety of names, including “realisticempiricism”, “radical empiricism” and“empirio-criticism”. (See Lockwood 1981, Tully 1993 andespecially Banks 2014.)

Central to Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s 1913manuscript was Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment,the theory that judgment is a non-binary relation between a judgingsubject and a variety of objects, properties and relations. The theorystands in contrast to a dual-relation theory of judgment, a theoryasserting that judgment is a two-place relation between a subject anda proposition. If the dual-relation theory is correct, Russell’sjudging that five plus seven equals twelve will be represented by

Judges(Russell, that five plus seven equals twelve).

If the multiple-relation theory is correct, Russell’s judgingthat five plus seven equals twelve will be represented by

Judges(Russell, 5, plus, 7, equals, 12).

Russell abandoned his acceptance of the dual-relation theory in 1910in favour of the multiple-relation theory.

As Wittgenstein records in hisTractatus, the objection wasthat “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition,‘\(A\) makes the judgement \(p\)’, must show that it isimpossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’stheory does not satisfy this requirement.)” (5.5422). Today,debate continues over exactly how this comment should be interpreted(Carey 2007; Lebens 2017). Intuitively the objection might be put asfollows: judgments concern the truth or falsehood of propositions (orperhaps sentences); but if this is correct, a judgment needs to be adual relation between a judging subject and a proposition (orsentence); a plurality of objects together with a relation is not onething but many, so unlike a proposition it has no unity; so even ifthe plurality is ordered, it will fail to stand in a single relationto a subject; it follows that no relation between a judging subjectand a plurality can be a relation of judgment. This objection, orsomething like it, appears to have led to Russell’s abandonmentof his manuscript. It also appears to have played a role in thedevelopment of Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language (seeWittgenstein).

Russell seems to have first coined the phrase “neutralmonism” in his 1914Monist article, “On theNature of Acquaintance”, while criticizing James’ view. In1919, he changed his position and accepted neutral-monism in hisarticle, “On Propositions”. Decades later, in 1964, heremarked that “I am not conscious of any serious change in myphilosophy since I adopted neutral monism” (Eames 1967, 511).Even so, over the next several decades Russell continued to do a largeamount of original work, authoring such books asThe Analysis ofMind (1921),The Analysis of Matter (1927a),AnInquiry into Meaning and Truth (1940) andHuman Knowledge:Its Scope and Limits (1948).

As Erik Banks points out, Russell understood neutral monism to behelpful in two respects. First, it would help “explain therelation of sensations to the physical world in which sensationsnaturally occur as physical phenomenawithout contradictingthe results of physics”. Second, it would “articulate ascientific realism based upon the event particular and perspectivalrelations and obtaining objects like extended atoms, bodies, andphysical space and time from events and relations of some kind”(2014, 135). In this respect, Russell’s adoption of neutralmonism exhibited “a realistic and naturalistic bent ... morecontinuous with science” and more in line with Whitehead’sprocess view than Wittgenstein’s growing “linguisticanti-naturalism” (2014, 115, 137). It was in this context thatRussell also made his famous remark to the effect that, inBanks’ words, physics describes the mathematical “skeletonof the world” without saying anything about its “intrinsiccharacter” (2014, 135):

Physics itself is exceedingly abstract and reveals only mathematicalcharacteristics of the material with which it deals. It does not tellus anything as to the intrinsic character of this material. Psychologyis preferable in this respect but it is not causally autonomous ...But by bringing physics and psychology together, we are able toinclude psychical events in the material of physics and to givephysics the greater concreteness which results from our more intimateacquaintance with the subject matter of our own experience. (1927, 10)

Today several authors, including David Chalmers (1996, 155), ThomasNagel (2002, 209) and Erik Banks (2014, 114), have shown renewedinterest in considering this general approach to the mental-physicaldistinction.

In addition to the above titles by Russell, Russell’s mostinfluential writings relating to his theories of metaphysics andepistemology includeOur Knowledge of the External World(1914a), “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” (1914c),“The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1918, 1919),“On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean” (1919b)andAn Outline of Philosophy (1927b).

6. Russell’s Atheism

Russell sums up his views about religion quite plainly: “My ownview on religion is that of Lucretius. I regard it as a disease bornof fear and as a source of untold misery to the human race”(A1957, 18). According to Russell, not only are most religious beliefsintellectually and morally pernicious, the religious point of viewitself “is a conception quite unworthy of free men”(A1957, 17). Throughout his life, Russell thus put significant effortinto opposing religious ideas and institutions of all kinds. As hereports in hisAutobiography, upon arriving at Brixton Prisonin 1918, “I was much cheered on my arrival by the warder at thegate, who had to take particulars about me. He asked my religion, andI replied ‘agnostic’. He asked how to spell it, andremarked with a sigh: ‘Well, there are many religions, but Isuppose they all worship the same God’. This remark kept mecheerful for about a week” (1968, 34).

Russell’s discussions about religion fall largely into fourcategories: his criticisms of arguments favouring the existence ofGod; his observation that religion has historically served to impedethe advancement of knowledge; his observation that religion hasregularly advanced theories of morality that are more harmful thangood; and his analysis of religion, not simply as a body of belief butas a mode of feeling.

Perhaps most importantly, Russell opened the door to thedemystification of religion, writing in plain language at a time whenpeople had been told that serious discussions about religion requireda detailed knowledge of Latin and church history. The result wastwofold: first, that many people came to understand religion as asubject about which they were entitled to develop their own beliefsand views; second, that arguments from ecclesiastical authoritysuddenly became less formidable and less influential than they hadbeen for centuries. In this respect, it is not too much to say thatRussell did as much to usher in the twentieth century’s age ofsecularism as Luther did to usher in the sixteenth century’s ageof Protestantism. As the Nobel Prize committee noted, the 1950 awardwent to Russell “in recognition of his varied and significantwritings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom ofthought” (Nobel Media 2020). Russell himself reports that hereceived the award primarily for his anti-religious book,Marriageand Morals (1969, 30).

Russell’s analysis of traditional arguments in favour of theexistence of God appears in both his popular and his philosophicalwritings. In his book on Leibniz, he discusses Leibniz’streatment of several such arguments, noting that they are “theweakest part in Leibniz’s philosophy, the part most full ofinconsistencies” (1900, sec. 106, p. 172). In his more popularwritings, he repeatedly emphasizes his views about religion, notingthat “The fact that an opinion has been widely held is noevidence whatever that it is not utterly absurd” (1929, 58). Inhis 1922 bookletFree Thought and Official Propaganda, hetells his readers that “I am myself a dissenter from all knownreligions, and I hope that every kind of religious belief will dieout” (1922a, 1). Later, in his 1941 collection of essaysLetthe People Think, he adds that “modern science gives us noindication whatever of the existence of the soul” (A1941, 113),and in the preface to his 1957 bookWhy I Am Not a Christian andOther Essays on Religion and Related Subjects, he notes that“I am as firmly convinced that religions do harm as I am thatthey are untrue” (1957, xi).

Russell’s criticism of arguments traditionally offered in favourof the existence of God includes his discussions of the

1. First Cause Argument,
2. Problem of Evil,
3. Ontological Argument,
4. Teleological Argument,
5. Argument from Pre-established Harmony,
6. Natural Law Argument,
7. Argument from Morality,
8. Remediation of Injustice Argument, and
9. Argument from Religious Experience.

Underlying these discussions is David Hume’s suggestion thatbelief needs to be proportioned to the available evidence, an ideaneatly summed up in Russell’s teapot analogy:

If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a chinateapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would beable to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that theteapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerfultelescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertioncannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part ofhuman reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talkingnonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed inancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilledinto the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in itsexistence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubterto the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of theInquisitor in an earlier time. It is customary to suppose that, if abelief is widespread, there must be something reasonable about it. Ido not think this view can be held by anyone who has studied history.(1952, 547–8)

Among Russell’s responses to specific arguments favoring theexistence of God are the following:

(i) TheFirst Cause (orCosmological)Argument is the argument that since everything has a cause,there must have been a first cause, and it is to this first cause thatwe give the name God. In response to this argument, Russell notes theobvious: If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.If everything must have a creator, then God must have a creator.Alternatively, if God can exist without a cause, then it is just aslikely that the world can exist without a cause. In fact, this is evenmore likely than the existence of an uncaused, hypothetical,supernatural creator who manufactures and then intervenes in theworld, since there “is no reason to suppose that the world had abeginning at all” (A1957, 4). To those who suggest that unlikeGod, since everypart of the world has a cause, it followsthat the world itself must have a cause, Russell notes that justbecause every man has a mother it does not follow that the human racemust have a mother (A1957, 152). Put in more formal language, althoughcausation connects each contingent stage of the world to the next, itneed not follow that there is an “extramundane” creator ofthe world as a whole (1900, sec. 109, p. 176). To those who claim thatwithout such a creator, there can never be sufficient reason for“why there are any states at all”, Russell points out thatthe traditional view of God as being uncaused because he existsnecessarily is simply inconsistent with God’s creation of acontingent universe. For Russel, no series of contingent states canhave come about by the necessity that accompanies God’s actions,since the contingency of existential propositions rests on theassertion that God acts, not from necessity but contingently (1900,sec. 110, p. 177). Thus, either the world itself has no supernaturalcause or the supernatural cause itself will act and existcontingently, and so it, too, cannot be necessary and must require acreator.

(ii) Related to the First Cause Argument is theProblem ofEvil. Like Epicurus, Russell holds that the creation of acontingent world could never eliminate God’s responsibility forthe existence of evil:

The world, we are told, was created by a God who is both good andomnipotent. Before He created the world He foresaw all the pain andmisery that it would contain; He is therefore responsible for all ofit. It is useless to argue that the pain in the world is due to sin.In the first place, this is not true; it is not sin that causes riversto overflow their banks or volcanoes to erupt. But even if it weretrue, it would make no difference. If I were going to beget a childknowing that the child was going to be a homicidal maniac, I should beresponsible for his crimes. If God knew in advance the sins of whichman would be guilty, He was clearly responsible for all theconsequences of those sins when He decided to create man. (A1957, 22)

(iii) In response to theOntological Argument, the argumentthat since perfection implies existence, the idea of a non-existent,perfect God is self-contradictory, Russell points out that theargument rests ultimately on the mistaken claim that existence is aproperty or, in Russell’s terminology, a predicate. Hisreasoning, like that of Immanuel Kant, is that if existence were apredicate then, like all other predicates, it would (or would not) bepart of the nature of any given substance. But upon being created,each such substance would acquire a new predicate. “Hence thespecial position of existence, as a contingent and syntheticpredicate, falls to the ground. If all substances always contain alltheir predicates, then all substances always contain or do not containthe predicate existence, and God must be as powerless over thispredicate as over any other. To add the predicate existence must bemetaphysically impossible. Thus, either creation isself-contradictory, or, if existence is not a predicate, theontological argument is unsound” (1900, sec. 115, p. 185).

(iv) In response to theTeleological Argument (orArgument from Design), the argument that the complexity andpurpose we find in the world shows that there must have been acreator, Russell points out that “since the time of Darwin weunderstand much better why living creatures are adapted to theirenvironment. It is not that their environment was made to be suitableto them, but that they grew to be suitable to it, and that is thebasis of adaption. There is no evidence of design about it”(A1957, 6). Russell also reminds his readers about the pre-Darwinobservation made famous byDavid Hume, that “it is a most astonishing thing that people can believethat this world, with all the things that are in it, with all itsdefects”, is the best that an omnipotent, omniscient creatorcould have been able to create in millions of years. (A1957, 6).

(v) In response to theArgument from Pre-established Harmony,the argument that “The world is so well constructed, we aretold, that it must have had a highly skillful Architect” or, asLeibniz preferred to say, that “the harmony of all the monadscan only have arisen from a common cause” (1900, sec. 114, p.183), Russell notes that this is simply a version of the Argument fromDesign and, humorously, that “Being more palpably inadequatethan any of the others, it has acquired a popularity which they havenever enjoyed” (1900, sec. 114, p. 183).

(vi) In response to theNatural Law Argument, the argumentthat the existence of laws of nature shows that there must have been alawgiver, Russell points out that the argument arises simply as aresult of a confusion between natural and human laws (A1957, 5). Humanlaws are commands that we choose to follow or ignore. In contrast,laws of nature are simply descriptions of how things in fact are.There is thus no need to assume a lawmaker unless the Argument fromDesign is sound, which it is not. Alternatively, if we assume theremust have been a lawmaker who brought about these laws, this raisesthe question of why the lawmaker chose to make these laws and notothers: “If you say that He did it simply from His own goodpleasure, and without any reason, you then find that there issomething which is not subject to law, and so your train of naturallaw is interrupted. If you say, as more orthodox theologians do, thatin all the laws which God issues He had a reason for giving those lawsrather than others – the reason, of course, being to create thebest universe, although you would never think it to look at it –if there was a reason for the laws which God gave, then God himselfwas subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage byintroducing God as an intermediary” (A1957, 5–6). Ineither case, there is no need to postulate a supernaturallawmaker.

(vii) In response to theArgument from Morality (or theDivine Command Theory Argument), the argument that therecould be no right or wrong unless God existed, Russell adapts thereply given by Socrates to Euthyphro 2,300 years earlier (Plato,Euthyphro, 5d–15e). Assuming there is a differencebetween right and wrong, is this difference due to God’scommands or not? If it is, then for God there must have originallybeen “no difference between right and wrong, and it is no longera significant statement to say that God is good” (A1957, 8).Alternatively, if we take a more traditional theological line andinsist that God is good, and it is for this reason that God commandssome actions and not others, then we will also have to say “thatright and wrong have some meaning which is independent of God’sfiat, because God’s fiats are good and not bad independently ofthe mere fact that He made them. If you are going to say that, youwill then have to say that it is not only through God that right andwrong came into being, but that they are in their essence logicallyanterior to God” (A1957, 8). Of course, we might then feelcompelled to suggest the existence of a superior deity, one whoordered the God who created world to act as he did, but this optionwill be of no value to the traditional theist. There is also“the line that some of the gnostics took up – a line whichI often thought was a very plausible one – that as a matter offact this world that we know was made by the devil at a moment whenGod was not looking”, but again, this is not the kind of optionthat would give comfort to the traditional theist (A1957, 8).

(viii) In response to theRemediation of Injustice Argument,the argument that God is needed to bring justice to the world, toensure that at the end of time the scales of justice have beenbalanced, Russell asks what evidence we have that such remediation isever going to occur. “In the part of this universe that we knowthere is great injustice, and often the good suffer, and often thewicked prosper, and one hardly knows which of those is the moreannoying; but if you are going to have justice in the universe as awhole you have to suppose a future life to redress the balance of lifehere on earth. So they say that there must be a God, and there must beheaven and hell in order that in the long run there may bejustice” (A1957, 9). Despite such wishful thinking, we have noconcrete evidence that such remediation is ever going to occur:“Supposing you got a crate of oranges that you opened, and youfound all the top layer of oranges bad, you would not argue:‘The underneath ones must be good, so as to redress thebalance’. You would say: ‘Probably the whole lot is a badconsignment’, and that is really what a scientific person wouldargue about the universe” (A1957, 9).

(ix) Finally, in response to theArgument from ReligiousExperience, the argument that people report having had directexperience of the supernatural or the divine, Russell simply notesthat we are just as likely to make mistakes when reporting suchexperiences as we are to make mistakes in other areas of our lives:“If you have jaundice you see things yellow that are not yellow.You’re making a mistake” (A1957, 161). Thus, it is ourtotal body of evidence that needs to be considered when making suchjudgments, a body of evidence that leans heavily against the existenceof anything divine or supernatural.

On the question of whether religion has impeded the advancement ofknowledge and introduced harmful theories of morality, Russell writesequally plainly: “The objections to religion are of two sorts– intellectual and moral. The intellectual objection is thatthere is no reason to suppose any religion true; the moral objectionis that religious precepts date from a time when men were more cruelthan they are, and therefore tend to perpetuate inhumanities which themoral conscience of the age would otherwise outgrow” (A1957,23). The conclusion to be drawn, says Russell, is that religious faithhas served as a shield against the advancement of knowledge, both inethics and in the sciences: “When two men of science disagree,they do not invoke the secular arm; they wait for further evidence todecide the issue, because, as men of science, they know that neitheris infallible. But when two theologians differ, since there are nocriteria to which either can appeal, there is nothing for it butmutual hatred and an open or covert appeal to force” (A1957,173). Today, no one

believes that the world was created in 4004 BC; but not so very longago skepticism on this point was thought an abominable crime …It is no credit to the orthodox that they do not now believe all theabsurdities that were believed 150 years ago. The gradual emasculationof the Christian doctrine has been effected in spite of the mostvigorous resistance, and solely as the result of the onslaughts ofFreethinkers (A1957, 28).

The tortures of the Inquisition, the condoning of slavery in the Bibleand the Koran, the burning of women and men for witchcraft, the comingtogether to pray for deliverance at times of plague (which only led tothe further spread of disease), all resulted from religious beliefsand practices. The conclusion, says Russell, is obvious: “themore intense has been the religion of any period and the more profoundhas been the dogmatic belief, the greater has been the cruelty and theworse has been the state of affairs” (A1957, 15).

In his own time, Russell was criticized severely for his view that thechurch’s attempt to keep sexual knowledge away from the youngwas “extremely dangerous to mental and physical heath”(A1957, 21). Against the practice of his time, he advocated sexeducation for the young. He also recommended temporary, childlessmarriages for those not ready to begin a family and held that“Christian ethics inevitably, through the emphasis laid uponsexual virtue, did a great deal to degrade the position ofwomen” (1929, 60–61). In support of his view that thewritings handed down by the church fathers were “full ofinvectives against Woman”, he quotes the historian, W.E.H.Lecky: “Woman was represented as the door to hell, as the motherof all human ills. She should be ashamed at the very thought that sheis a woman. She should live in continual penance, on account of thecurses she has brought upon the world” (1929, 61). Russellconcludes that “It is only in quite modern times that women haveregained the degree of freedom which they enjoyed in the RomanEmpire” (1929, 60–61).

Among Russell’s critics, it was argued that in this case andothers like it, Russell had simply got his facts wrong:

It is incredible that a philosopher of note could be so unreliable, sounfamiliar with the fact that early Christianity has exalted theconception of women in the adoration given to Mary and the saints, andthat by treating marriage as a sacrament it emancipated women of allclasses from the old traditions of the absolute authority of parentsand the seignorial power of feudal lords. It is intellectual blindnessnot to recognize the revolutionary import of early Christianity,whatever the contemporary feeling concerning the sacrament of marriagemay be, when it set itself like a wall against the tides of boundlesssensuality and impressed upon the Roman world the sanctity of humanlife. (Kayden 1930, 88)

Contrary to what was often said about his personal life, it is alsoworth noting that Russell did not practice or defend a libertineethic. He thought that sex was a natural need, like food and drink,but that it should not be trivialized by disassociating it “fromserious emotion and from feelings of affection” (1929, 127). AsAlan Wood notes, the result was that “More than anyone else, hechanged the outlook on sex morality of a whole new generation; andduring his lifetime he saw the cause of Women’s Rights, onceregarded as a crank’s crusade, end up as an established part ofthe laws and customs of the land” (Wood 1957, 166). As Wood alsonotes,

Perhaps the finest tribute to his success is that few people now evenrealize the nature of the old ideas. Russell, it must be repeated, wasfighting a cruel and indefensible state of affairs where sexualignorance was deliberately fostered, so a boy might think the changesof puberty were signs of some dreadful disease, and a girl might marrywithout knowing anything of what lay ahead of her on her bridal night;where women were taught to look on sex, not as a source of joy, but ofpainful matrimonial duty; where prudery went to the extent of coveringthe legs of pianos in draperies; where artificial mystery evokedmorbid curiosity, and where humbug went hand in hand with unhappiness… . (Wood 1957, 174)

Underlying Russell’s writings on religion was also hisobservation that religion is not simply a body of doctrine but also avehicle for the expression of emotion. This explains why argumentsagainst the existence of the supernatural, although influential amongintellectuals, are not the main driving force behind most religiousbelief (A1957, 9). Instead, religion is based largely on fear andignorance: our fear of the mysterious, our lack of knowledge ofnatural causes, our fear of death (A1957, 16).

With regard to the propositional content of religion, or what Russellcalls theology, Russell notes that central to the idea of Christianityare belief in God, belief in immortality and, at the very least,“belief that Christ was, if not divine, at least the best andwisest of men. If you are not going to believe that much about Christ,I do not think you have any right to call yourself a Christian”(A1957, 2). Since it is this propositional content that varies fromreligion to religion, it turns out, as a matter of logic, that at mostone religion can be true (A1957, xi).

Even so, as Jack Pitt writes, Russell is more than just a“heroic heretic hounding the sacred cows of a sterile traditionwhile spreading a new gospel of human freedom and secularenlightenment” (Pitt 1975, 152). Instead, “Russell seesreligion (as distinct from theology) as essentially a mode of feeling,perhaps as a set of attitudes which inevitably have practicalconsequences for the ethical tone and style of a person’slife” (Pitt 1975, 160). Russell confirms this when he notesthat

Religion has three main aspects. In the first place, there are aman’s serious personal beliefs, insofar as they have to do withthe nature of the world and the conduct of life. In the second placethere is theology. In the third place there is institutionalizedreligion, i.e., the churches. The first of these aspects is somewhatvague, the but word “religion” is coming more and more tobe used in this sense. … What makes my attitude towardsreligion complex is that, although I consider some form of personalreligion highly desirable, and feel many people unsatisfactory throughthe lack of it, I cannot accept the theology of any well-knownreligion, and I incline to think that most churches at most times havedone more harm than good. (Schilpp 1944, 725–6).

One suggestion about the source of this three-fold division isconnected to Russell’s love of Lady Ottoline Morrell, with whomhe exchanged some 3,500 letters. Separating religious feelings fromreligious belief would have allowed Russell to find some common groundwith Morrell’s spiritually, without having to accept anyparticular theology. (See Swanson 2019, 93–4 for a helpfuldiscussion). An alternative (and at least equally plausible) view isthat the complexity of Russell’s view was generated by the factthat even our most serious emotions and most important feelings neednot result solely from the propositional content of our beliefs. AmongRussell’s most famous suggestions about the nature of the goodlife is his observation that “The good life is one inspired bylove and guided by knowledge” (A1957, 44). For Russell, this isa view so basic that it is more like a goal than a description. As aresult, it becomes impossible to think of it as a claim purelyconnected to propositional content. As Russell explains,

Suppose, for instance, your child is ill. Love makes you wish to cureit, and science tells you how to do so. There is not an intermediatestage of ethical theory, where it is demonstrated that your child hadbetter be cured. Your act springs directly from desire for an end,together with knowledge of means. This is equally true of all acts,whether good or bad. (A1957, 48)

Just as for Hume, the result is that in many cases, emotion drivesbelief: “I cannot, therefore, prove that my view of the goodlife is right; I can only state my view, and hope that as many aspossible will agree” (A1957, 44).

These observations should not be interpreted as giving unfetteredlicence to religious belief. As Russell points out “some veryimportant virtues are more likely to be found among those who rejectreligious dogmas than among those who accept them. I think thisapplies especially to the virtue of truthfulness or intellectualintegrity. I mean by intellectual integrity the habit of decidingvexed questions in accordance with the evidence, or of leaving themundecided where the evidence is inconclusive” (A1957, 169). Inthe case of religion, it is not simply that such virtues are ignored.Instead, they are positively frustrated:

If theology is thought necessary to virtue and if candid inquirers seeno reason to think the theology true, the authorities will set to workto discourage candid inquiry. In former centuries, they did so byburning the inquirers at the stake. In Russia they still have methodswhich are little better; but in Western countries the authorities haveperfected somewhat milder forms of persuasion. Of these, schools areperhaps the most important: the young must be preserved from hearingthe arguments in favour of the opinions which the authorities dislike,and those who nevertheless persist in showing an inquiring dispositionwill incur social displeasure and, if possible, be made to feelmorally reprehensible. (A1957, 171)

Societies as well as individuals, says Russell, need to choose whetherthe good life is one that is guided by honest inquiry and the weighingof evidence, or by the familiarity of superstition and the comforts ofreligion.

Russell’s writings on religion and related topics includeChapter 15 of hisA Critical Exposition of the Philosophy ofLeibniz (1900), as well asA Free Man’s Worship(1923b),Why I Am Not a Christian (1927c), reprinted inWhy I am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and RelatedSubjects (A1957), “The Existence and Nature of God”(1939), “Is There a God?” (1952) andWhat IBelieve (A2013).

7. Russell’s Social and Political Philosophy

Russell’s significant social influence stems from three mainsources: his long-standing social activism, his many writings on thesocial and political issues of his day (as well as on more theoreticalconcerns), and his popularizations of numerous technical writings inphilosophy and the natural sciences. Although it was available to him,he only rarely took advantage of his seat in the House of Lords toattempt to advance his political views. As Kirk Willis notes, in hisnearly 40 years as a Labour peer he spoke publicly in the Lords onlysix times (2002, 97).

Among Russell’s many popularizations are his two best-sellingworks,The Problems of Philosophy (1912) andA History ofWestern Philosophy (1945). Both of these books, as well as hisnumerous books popularizing science, have done much to educate andinform generations of general readers. HisHistory is stillwidely read and did much to initiate twentieth-century research on awide range of historical figures from thePresocratics toLeibniz. HisProblems is still used as an introductory textbook overa century after it was first published. Both books can be read by thelayman with satisfaction. Other popular books, particularly thoserelating to developments in modern science such asThe ABC ofAtoms (1923a) andThe ABC of Relativity (1925), are nowof more historical interest. Even so, they continue to conveysomething of the intellectual excitement associated with advances intwentieth-century science and philosophy.

Naturally enough, Russell saw a link between education in this broadsense and social progress. As he put it, “Education is the keyto the new world” (1926, 83). Partly this is due to our need tounderstand nature, but equally important is our need to understandeach other:

The thing, above all, that a teacher should endeavor to produce in hispupils, if democracy is to survive, is the kind of tolerance thatsprings from an endeavor to understand those who are different fromourselves. It is perhaps a natural human impulse to view with horrorand disgust all manners and customs different from those to which weare used. Ants and savages put strangers to death. And those who havenever traveled either physically or mentally find it difficult totolerate the queer ways and outlandish beliefs of other nations andother times, other sects and other political parties. This kind ofignorant intolerance is the antithesis of a civilized outlook, and isone of the gravest dangers to which our overcrowded world is exposed.(1950, 121)

It is in this same context that Russell became famous for suggestingthat a widespread reliance upon evidence, rather than superstition,would have enormous social consequences: “I wish to propose forthe reader’s favourable consideration”, says Russell,“a doctrine which may, I fear, appear wildly paradoxical andsubversive. The doctrine in question is this: that it is undesirableto believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever forsupposing it true” (A1928, 11).

Unlike Russell’s views about the importance of education, theprecise connection between Russell’s political activism and hismore theoretical work has been more controversial. In part, this hasbeen because Russell himself repeatedly maintained that he saw nosignificant connection between his philosophical work and hispolitical activism. Others have seen things differently. One of thebest summaries is given by Alan Wood:

Russell sometimes maintained, partly I think out of perverseness, thatthere was no connection between his philosophical and politicalopinions. … But in fact I think there are perfectly obviousconnections between Russell’s philosophical and other views.… To begin with, it is natural enough to find an analyticanti-monist philosopher like Russell upholding the individual againstthe state, whereas Hegel did the reverse … [In addition, the]whole bent of Russell’s mind in philosophy was an attempt toeliminate thea priori and to accentuate the empirical; andthere was exactly the same trend in his political thinking …Unless it is realized that Russell’s approach to politicalquestions was usually empirical and practical, based on the evidenceof the moment and not ona priori principles andpreconceptions, it is quite impossible to understand why his viewsappeared to vary so much. This was perfectly legitimate, and evenpraiseworthy, in a world which never stays the same, and wherechanging circumstances continually change the balance of arguments ondifferent sides. (Wood 1957, 73–4)

Thus, in addition to Russell’s numerous contributions to thepolitics of his day, he also contributed significantly to ourunderstanding of the social world around us. Among Russell’smore theoretical contributions were his anticipation of JohnMackie’s error theory in ethics, the view that moral judgmentsare cognitive (that is, they are either true or false), but because oftheir content they in fact are invariably false. (Mackie’s paper“The Refutation of Morals” appeared in 1946;Russell’s paper “Is There an Absolute Good?”,although not published until 1988 was first delivered publicly in1922.)

Russell also anticipated the modern theory of emotivism (as introducedbyA.J. Ayer in his 1936Language, Truth and Logic), arguing that“Primarily, we call something ‘good’ when we desireit, and ‘bad’ when we have an aversion from it”(1927b, 242), a view that “he had been flirting with since1913” (see the entry onRussell’s Moral Philosophy in this encyclopedia; see too Schilpp 1944, 719f). Even so, Russellremained less than satisfied with his views on meta-ethics for most ofhis life (CP, Vol. 11, 310).

This dissatisfaction appears not to have extended to his work inpolitical theory. There Russell focused primarily on the notion ofpower, or what he called “the production of intendedeffects” (1938, 35). As V.J. McGill writes, “The conceptof power overshadows all of Russell’s political and economicwritings” (Schilpp 1944, 581). Russell himself summarizes hispoint of view with the observation that “The laws of socialdynamics are – so I shall contend – only capable of beingstated in terms of power in its various forms” (1938, 15). As aresult, it is only by understanding power in all its humaninstantiations that we understand the social world around us.

Russell’s cataloging of the perceived evils of his age are wellknown. As Popper neatly sums up Russell’s general outlook,“we are clever, perhaps too clever, but we are also wicked; andthis mixture of cleverness and wickedness lies at the root of ourtroubles” (1956, 365). Even so, underlying Russell’scriticism of both the political left and the political right lies acommon worry: the unequal distribution of power. As McGill sums up,“Evidently he has become convinced that the thirst for Power isthe primary danger of mankind, that possessiveness is evil mainlybecause it promotes the power of man over man” (Schilpp 1944,581). The problem with this analysis and of Russell’s desire fora more equitable distribution of power is that any proposed solutionappears to lead to paradox:

Suppose certain men join a movement to disestablish Power, or todistribute it more equally among the people! If they are successful,they carry out the behest of Power, becoming themselves as powerful,in terms of Mr. Russell’s definition, as any tyrant. Even thoughthey spread the good life to millions, the more successful they are,the more usurpatious and dangerous. (Schilpp 1944, 586)

Like his writings about religion, Russell’s writings in ethicsand politics brought him to the attention of large numbers ofnon-academic readers. His most influential books on these topicsinclude hisPrinciples of Social Reconstruction (1916),On Education (1926),Marriage and Morals (1929),The Conquest of Happiness (1930),The ScientificOutlook (1931), andPower: A New Social Analysis(1938).

8. Contemporary Russell Scholarship

Since his death in 1970, Russell’s reputation as a philosopherhas continued to grow. This increase in reputation has beenaccompanied by a corresponding increase in scholarship. Olderfirst-hand accounts of Russell’s life, such as DoraRussell’sThe Tamarisk Tree (1975, 1981, 1985),Katharine Tait’sMy Father Bertrand Russell (1975) andRonald Clark’sThe Life of Bertrand Russell (1975),have been supplemented by later accounts, including CarolineMoorehead’sBertrand Russell (1992), JohnSlater’sBertrand Russell (1994), and Ray Monk’sBertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude (1996) andBertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness (2000).

This increase in scholarship has benefited greatly from the existenceof theBertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University, where the bulk of Russell’s library andliterary estate is housed, and from theBertrand Russell Research Centre, also housed at McMaster. Books such as Nicholas Griffin’sSelected Letters of Bertrand Russell (1992, 2001), GregoryLandini’sRussell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory(1998) and Bernard Linsky’sThe Evolution of PrincipiaMathematica (2011) have helped make public archival material thatin the past has been available only to specialists. Since 1983 theBertrand Russell Editorial Project, initiated by John Slater and Kenneth Blackwell, has also begun torelease authoritative, annotated editions of Russell’sCollected Papers. When complete, this collection will run to an estimated 36 volumesand will bring together all of Russell’s writings, other thanhis correspondence and previously published monographs.

Recent scholarship has also helped remind readers of the influenceRussell’s students had on Russell’s philosophy.Ludwig Wittgenstein and Frank Ramsey especially presented Russell with helpful criticismsof his work, as well as with new problems to solve. Both men pushedRussell to develop new theories in logic and epistemology. Despite thefact that Wittgenstein was less than satisfied with Russell’sIntroduction to hisTractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921),Michael Potter’sWittgenstein’s Notes on Logic(2009) and the introductory materials published in Russell’sTheory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript (CP, Vol. 7) showthe extent and fruitfulness of the interaction between teacher andstudent (Landini 2007).

Since Russell’s death, debate has also taken place over theultimate importance of Russell’s contributions, not just tophilosophy but to other disciplines as well. Advocates ofRussell’s inclusion in the canon remind readers that few havedone more to advance both formal logic and analytic philosophy. As thetwentieth-century philosopher P.F. Strawson concludes, Russell’sinfluence “on the philosophy of his and our time has perhapsbeen greater than that of any other single individual” (Strawson1984, 104).

Critics of Russell’s inclusion in the canon, or at least of hiscanonization, remind readers of Russell’s early enthusiasm forBritish imperialism (1967, 134) and of his controversial commentsabout eugenics and race (1929, 259, 266). Others have noted hisapparent early antisemitism and his advocacy of a pre-emptive nuclearwar against the Soviet Union following World War II (Hook 1976, Stone1981, Perkins 1994, Blitz 2002). On the issue of a pre-emptive war,Russell himself later denied he had ever advocated such a course ofaction. However, after carefully reviewing the historical record,biographer Ronald Clark comes to a different conclusion. Clark is alsounequivocal about Russell’s lack of sincerity on the issue:“If the suggestion that he deliberately tried to conceal hisearlier views is repugnant, the record does not really allow any otherconclusion to be drawn” (Clark 1975, 530). Perhaps as a resultof such observations, some readers remain undecided when attempting toevaluate Russell’s overall contribution to the intellectual lifeof the twentieth century.

Monk’s two volumes are a significant case in point. In additionto his ground-breaking biographical work, Monk relatesWittgenstein’s humorous suggestion that all of Russell’sbooks should be bound in two colours, “those dealing withmathematical logic in red – and all students of philosophyshould read them; those dealing with ethics and politics in blue– and no one should be allowed to read them” (Monk 2000,278). Others, such as Peter Stone, have argued that such caricaturesare based on “a misunderstanding of the nature of Russell as apolitical figure” (2003, 89) and that “Whatever one thinksof Russell’s politics, he was one of the few public figures inthe west to stand against capitalism without succumbing to illusionsabout Stalinist Russia. If for no other reason than this, Russelldeserves some credit for his political instincts” (2003, 85).(See, for example, Russell 1920 and 1922c, and Russell et al.1951.)

How is the ordinary reader to decide between such conflictingevaluations? Unlike Russell’s work in logic and related areas,in politics he is still usually understood to be more of an advocatethan a theoretician. As a result, his reputation as a politicalthinker has not been as high as in logic and analytic philosophy morebroadly.

Even so, in addition to his numerous disciplinary contributions,Russell’s lasting reputation has benefited enormously from hiscontinued willingness to abandon unsupported theories and beliefswhenever new and better evidence presented itself. A short anecdoterecounted in Russell’sAutobiography is typical. As ayoung man, he says, he spent part of each day for many weeks

reading Georg Cantor, and copying out the gist of him into a notebook.At that time I falsely supposed all his arguments to be fallacious,but I nevertheless went through them all in the minutest detail. Thisstood me in good stead when later on I discovered that all thefallacies were mine. (1967, 127)

As a result, “Against my will, in the course of my travels, thebelief that everything worth knowing was known at Cambridge graduallywore off. In this respect”, says Russell, “my travels werevery useful to me” (1967, 133).

This change in outlook resulted in Russell’s frank and repeatedadmission that not all questions admit of easy answers. It is onlythrough patient, fallible, scientific and logical investigation– “by which I mean the habit of basing our beliefs uponobservations and inferences as impersonal, and as much divested oflocal and temperamental bias, as is possible for human beings”– that knowledge ultimately is able to advance (1946, 864).

Bibliography

Primary Literature

• Major Books and Articles by Russell
• Major Anthologies of Russell’s Writings
• The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell

Major Books and Articles by Russell

• 1896,German Social Democracy, London: Longmans,Green.
• 1897,An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, Cambridge:At the University Press.
• 1900,A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz,Cambridge: At the University Press.
• 1901, “Recent Work on the Principles of Mathematics”,International Monthly, 4: 83–101; reprinted as“Mathematics and the Metaphysicians”, in Bertrand Russell,Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, New York, London:Longmans, Green & Co., 1918, 74–96; also appearing inCollected Papers, Volume 3.
• 1903,The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: At theUniversity Press.
• 1905, “On Denoting”,Mind, 14: 479–493;reprinted in Bertrand Russell,Essays in Analysis, London:Allen and Unwin, 1973, 103–119; and in Bertrand Russell,Logic and Knowledge, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956,41–56; also appearing inCollected Papers, Volume4.
• 1907, “The Regressive Method of Discovering the Premises ofMathematics”, in Bertrand Russell,Essays in Analysis,London: Allen and Unwin, 1973, 272–283; also appearing inCollected Papers, Volume 5.
• 1908, “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory ofTypes”,American Journal of Mathematics, 30:222–262; reprinted in Bertrand Russell,Logic andKnowledge, London: Allen and Unwin, 1956, 59–102; alsoappearing inCollected Papers, Volume 5.
• 1910, 1912, 1913 (with Alfred North Whitehead),PrincipiaMathematica, 3 volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;2nd edn, 1925 (Volumes 1), 1927 (Volumes 2, 3); abridged asPrincipia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1962.
• 1911, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge byDescription”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,11: 108–128; reprinted in Bertrand Russell,Mysticism andLogic and Other Essays, New York, London: Longmans, Green &Co., 1918, 209–232; also appearing inCollected Papers,Volume 6.
• 1912a,The Problems of Philosophy, London: Williams andNorgate; New York: Henry Holt and Company.
• 1912b, “On the Relations of Universals andParticulars”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,12: 1–24; reprinted in Bertrand Russell,Logic andKnowledge, London: Allen and Unwin, 1956, 105–124; alsoappearing inCollected Papers, Volume 6.
• 1914a,Our Knowledge of the External World, Chicago andLondon: The Open Court Publishing Company.
• 1914b, “On the Nature of Acquaintance”,Monist, 24: 1–16, 161–187, 435–453;reprinted inLogic and Knowledge, London: George Allen andUnwin, 1956, 127–174; also appearing inCollectedPapers, Volume 7.
• 1914c, “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”,Scientia, 16: 1–27; reprinted inMysticism andLogic and Other Essays, New York, London: Longmans, Green &Co., 1918, 145–179; also appearing inCollected Papers,Volume 8.
• 1916,Principles of Social Reconstruction, London: GeorgeAllen and Unwin; reprinted asWhy Men Fight, New York: TheCentury Company, 1917.
• 1917,Political Ideals, New York: The CenturyCompany.
• 1918, 1919, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”,Monist, 28: 495–527; 29: 32–63, 190–222,345–380; reprinted in Bertrand Russell,Logic andKnowledge, London: Allen and Unwin, 1956, 177–281; alsoappearing inCollected Papers, Volume 8.
• 1919a,Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, London:George Allen and Unwin; New York: The Macmillan Company.
• 1919b, “On Propositions: What They Are and How TheyMean”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,Supplementary Volume 2: 1–43; also appearing inCollectedPapers, Volume 8.
• 1920,The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, London:George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
• 1921,The Analysis of Mind, London: George Allen andUnwin; New York: The Macmillan Company.
• 1922a,Free Thought and Official Propaganda, London:Watts & Co. and George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
• 1922b, “Is There an Absolute Good?”, inCollectedPapers, Volume 9.
• 1922c,The Problem of China, London: George Allen andUnwin Ltd.
• 1923a,The ABC of Atoms, London: Kegan Paul, Trench,Trubner & Co., Ltd.
• 1923b,A Free Man’s Worship, Portland, Maine:Thomas Bird Mosher; reprinted asWhat Can A Free Man Worship?Girard, Kansas: Haldeman-Julius Publications, 1927.
• 1924, “Logical Atomism”, in J.H. Muirhead (ed.),Contemporary British Philosophers, London: Allen and Unwin,1924, 356–383; reprinted in Bertrand Russell,Logic andKnowledge, London: Allen and Unwin, 1956, 323–343; alsoappearing inCollected Papers, Volume 9.
• 1925,The ABC of Relativity, London: Kegan Paul, Trench,Trubner & Co., Ltd.
• 1926,On Education, Especially in Early Childhood,London: George Allen and Unwin; reprinted asEducation and theGood Life, New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926; abridged asEducation of Character, New York: Philosophical Library,1961.
• 1927a,The Analysis of Matter, London: Kegan Paul,Trench, Trubner; New York: Harcourt, Brace.
• 1927b,An Outline of Philosophy, London: George Allen andUnwin; reprinted asPhilosophy, New York: W.W. Norton,1927.
• 1927c,Why I Am Not a Christian, London: Watts; New York:The Truth Seeker Company.
• 1929,Marriage and Morals, London: George Allen andUnwin; New York: Horace Liveright.
• 1930,The Conquest of Happiness, London: George Allen andUnwin; New York: Horace Liveright.
• 1931,The Scientific Outlook, London: George Allen andUnwin; New York: W.W. Norton.
• 1938,Power: A New Social Analysis, London: George Allenand Unwin; New York: W.W. Norton.
• 1939, “The Existence and Nature of God”, in John G.Slater (ed.),A Fresh Look at Empiricism, 1927–42(The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell: Volume 10), Londonand New York: Routledge, 1996, 253–68.
• 1940,An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, London: GeorgeAllen and Unwin; New York: W.W. Norton.
• 1945,A History of Western Philosophy, New York: Simonand Schuster; London: George Allen and Unwin, 1946; rev. edn,1961.
• 1948,Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, London:George Allen and Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster.
• 1949a,Authority and the Individual, London: George Allenand Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster.
• 1949b,The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Minneapolis,Minnesota: Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota;reprinted asRussell’s Logical Atomism, D.F. Pears(ed.), Oxford: Fontana/Collins, 1972.
• 1951 (with L.B. Schapiro, C.D. Darlington, Francis Watson, W.N.Ewer and Victor Feather),Why Communism Must Fail, London:The Batchworth Press.
• 1952, “Is There a God?” in John G. Slater (ed.),Last Philosophical Testament, 1943–68 (TheCollected Papers of Bertrand Russell: Volume 11), London and NewYork: Routledge, 1997, 542–548.
• 1954,Human Society in Ethics and Politics, London:George Allen and Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster.
• 1959,My Philosophical Development, London: George Allenand Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster.
• 1961,Has Man a Future?, London: Allen and Unwin.
• 1963,Unarmed Victory, London: Allen and Unwin; New York:Simon and Schuster.
• 1967, 1968, 1969,The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell,3 volumes, London: George Allen and Unwin; Boston: Little Brown andCompany (Volumes 1 and 2), New York: Simon and Schuster (Volume3).
• 1967a,War Crimes in Vietnam, London: Allen and Unwin;New York: Monthly Review Press.

Major Anthologies of Russell’s Writings

• A1910,Philosophical Essays, London: Longmans,Green.
• A1918,Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, New York,London: Longmans, Green & Co.; reprinted asA Free Man’sWorship and Other Essays, London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1976.
• A1928,Sceptical Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin;New York: W.W. Norton.
• A1935,In Praise of Idleness and Other Essays, London:George Allen and Unwin; New York: W.W. Norton.
• A1941,Let the People Think, London: Watts & Co.
• A1950,Unpopular Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin;New York: Simon and Schuster.
• A1956a,Logic and Knowledge: Essays, 1901–1950,Robert Charles Marsh (ed.), London: George Allen and Unwin; New York:The Macmillan Company.
• A1956b,Portraits From Memory and Other Essays, London:George Allen and Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster.
• A1957,Why I am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religionand Related Subjects, London: George Allen and Unwin; New York:Simon and Schuster.
• A1961a,The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell,1903–1959, Robert E. Egner and Lester E Denonn (eds.),London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster.
• A1961b,Fact and Fiction, London: Allen and Unwin; NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1962.
• A1968,The Art of Philosophizing and Other Essays, NewYork: Philosophical Library.
• A1969,Dear Bertrand Russell, Barry Feinberg and RonaldKasrils (eds.), London: George Allen and Unwin; Boston: HoughtonMifflin.
• A1973,Essays in Analysis, Douglas Lackey (ed.), London:George Allen and Unwin.
• A1992,The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Volume1, Nicholas Griffin (ed.), London: Allen Lane, and New York:Houghton Mifflin.
• A1999a,Russell on Ethics, Charles R. Pigden (ed.),London: Routledge.
• A1999b,Russell on Religion, Louis I. Greenspan andStefan Anderson (eds.), London: Routledge.
• A2001,The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Volume2, Nicholas Griffin (ed.), London: Routledge.
• A2003,Russell on Metaphysics, Stephen Mumford (ed.),London: Routledge.
• A2013,What I Believe, London: Routledge.

The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell

In Print

• CP, Vol. 1,Cambridge Essays, 1888–99, KennethBlackwell, Andrew Brink, Nicholas Griffin, Richard A. Rempel and JohnG. Slater (eds.), London, Boston, Sydney: George Allen and Unwin,1983.
• CP, Vol. 2,Philosophical Papers, 1896–99, NicholasGriffin and Albert C. Lewis (eds.), London and New York: Routledge,1990.
• CP, Vol. 3,Toward the Principles of Mathematics,1900–02, Gregory H. Moore (ed.), London and New York:Routledge, 1993.
• CP, Vol. 4,Foundations of Logic, 1903–05, AlasdairUrquhart (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 1994.
• CP, Vol. 5,Toward Principia Mathematica,1905–08, Gregory H. Moore (ed.), London and New York:Routledge, 2014.
• CP, Vol. 6,Logical and Philosophical Papers,1909–13, John G. Slater (ed.), London and New York:Routledge, 1992.
• CP, Vol. 7,Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript,Elizabeth Ramsden Eames (ed.), London, Boston, Sydney: George Allenand Unwin, 1984; paperbound, 1992.
• CP, Vol. 8,The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and OtherEssays, 1914–19, John G. Slater (ed.), London: George Allenand Unwin, 1986.
• CP, Vol. 9,Essays on Language, Mind and Matter,1919–26, John G. Slater (ed.), London: Unwin Hyman,1988.
• CP, Vol. 10,A Fresh Look at Empiricism, 1927–42,John G. Slater (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 1996.
• CP, Vol. 11,Last Philosophical Testament, 1943–68,John G. Slater (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 1997.
• CP, Vol. 12,Contemplation and Action, 1902–14,Richard A. Rempel, Andrew Brink and Margaret Moran (eds.), London,Boston, Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1985.
• CP, Vol. 13,Prophecy and Dissent, 1914–16, RichardA. Rempel (ed.), London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
• CP, Vol. 14,Pacifism and Revolution, 1916–18,Richard A. Rempel, Louis Greenspan, Beryl Haslam, Albert C. Lewis andMark Lippincott (eds.), London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
• CP, Vol. 15,Uncertain Paths to Freedom: Russia and China,1919–22, Richard A. Rempel and Beryl Haslam (eds.), Londonand New York: Routledge, 2000.
• CP, Vol. 21,How to Keep the Peace: The Pacifist Dilemma,1935–38, Andrew G. Bone and Michael D. Stevenson (eds.),London and New York: Routledge, 2008.
• CP, Vol. 26,Cold War Fears and Hopes, 1950–52,Andrew G. Bone (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 2020.
• CP, Vol. 28,Man’s Peril, 1954–55, Andrew G.Bone (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
• CP, Vol. 29,Détente or Destruction,1955–57, Andrew G. Bone (ed.), London and New York:Routledge, 2005.

Planned

• Vol. 16,Labour and Internationalism, 1922–25.
• Vol. 17,Authority versus Enlightenment,1925–27.
• Vol. 18,Behaviourism and Education, 1927–31.
• Vol. 19,Science and Civilization, 1931–33.
• Vol. 20,Fascism and Other Depression Legacies,1933–34.
• Vol. 22,The CCNY Case, 1938–40.
• Vol. 23,The Problems of Democracy, 1941–44.
• Vol. 24,Civilization and the Bomb, 1944–47.
• Vol. 25,Defense of the West, 1948–50.
• Vol. 27,Culture and the Cold War, 1952–53.
• Vol. 30,Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,1957–59.
• Vol. 31,The Committee of 100, 1960–62.
• Vol. 32,A New Plan for Peace and Other Essays,1963–64.
• Vol. 33,The Vietnam Campaign, 1965–66.
• Vol. 34,International War Crimes Tribunal,1967–70.
• Vol. 35,Newly Discovered Papers.
• Vol. 36,Indexes.

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Acknowledgments

Thanks are due to Jimmy Altham, Erik Banks, Kenneth Blackwell,Francisco Rodríguez-Consuegra, Fred Kroon, Mark Mercer, JimRobinson, Russell Wahl, John Woods and several anonymous referees fortheir helpful comments on earlier versions of this material.