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1. Although it can be very useful to draw distinctions among variousterms, e.g., “androcentrism”, “sexism”,“male bias”, “masculism”, etc., in this essay“male bias” is a shorthand way to identify a category thatincludes the others. See Anderson (1995), E. Lloyd (1995a), andHarding (1986, 1991) for various sets of useful distinctions amongsuch categories.

2. In a book of interviews edited by Giovanna Borradori,TheAmerican Philosopher (1994), W.V. Quine acquiesces to beinglabeled post-analytic, and Hilary Putnam notes thatmid-twentieth-century analytic philosophers wouldn’t recognizewhat is called analytic philosophy today. Philosophers seem not to use“neo-analytic” to identify either themselves or others.This might result from the ongoing internal process of change inanalytic philosophy (in contrast with pragmatists/neo-pragmatists) orfrom the fact that there are more specific descriptions thatcharacterize the changes, e.g., social epistemology.

3. The author has made it a point to converse informally about suchmatters with feminist philosophers from continents other than NorthAmerica. Individual feminists outside of Anglophone countries differover the degree to which they identify as analytic feminists, giventhat to be seen as both analytic and feminist might function as twostrikes against them. Nevertheless, some feminists do what NorthAmericans call “analytic feminism” in all Anglophonecountries, much of Western Europe, Argentina, and no doubt many othercountries as well.

4. Jaggar presented this schema in a May 1972 talk at the AmericanPhilosophical Association, “Four Views of Women’sLiberation”, in which she cited socialist feminism and lesbianseparatism as “new directions”. A revised version waslater published as “Political Philosophies of Women’sLiberation” in Vetterling-Braggin, Elliston, & English 1977.She develops her views fully in her bookFeminist Politics andHuman Nature (1983)

5. Louise Antony (1993, 2003) and Harriet Baber (1993) are among thosewho reject various inferences between liberalism and their method andtheory preferences as analytic philosophers. See also Vogler (1995)for a discussion of liberalism, humanism and philosophical feminism.Concerning empiricism, it is likely that those who want to callthemselves empiricists are not all using the term in the same way.

6. Of course, comparable bridge building takes place by feminists inother philosophical traditions as well. Feminist pragmatists andfeminist phenomenologists build bridges both with feminists outsidetheir methodological traditions and with nonfeminist pragmatists orphenomenologists. Although many participants in such“bridge-building” conversations may lack background intheir feminist colleagues’ traditions, they neverthelessprogress in their understanding of each other.

7. See the Symposium “Intra-Feminist Criticism and the‘Rules of Engagement’” in Garry, ed.,APANewsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, Spring 2001, especiallythe essays by Frye, Garry, Nussbaum, and Scheman.

8. Marilyn Frye (1983) Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990), Patricia HillCollins (1990), and Charles Mills (1997), among others, alldeserve credit as forerunners of the blossoming discourse aroundepistemic ignorance/injustice/oppression. Note also that there is workon “ontic injustice” (e.g., Jenkins 2020) and“discursive injustice” (e.g., Kukla 2014).

9. Scheman cites a passage from Wittgenstein,

The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of lifeof human beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophicalproblems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and oflife, not through a medicine invented by an individual. (1956 [1967:57])

10. Something like my wider sense of “naturalized” goes byvarious terms, e.g., Kornblith’s “weaker” version ofnaturalized epistemology (Kornblith 1994: 3). But given that Kornblithand many other nonfeminist naturalizing philosophers often focus onthe “individual” not the “social” sciences, myuse of “naturalized” is even wider than Kornblith’s.We will discuss feminist criticisms of naturalized epistemology inSection 8. See, for example, Code (1996), Campbell (1998), and Rooney(2003) among others. For more detail on feminist social epistemologysee Heidi Grasswick’s entry onfeminist social epistemology.

Although I and many others categorize social epistemology as a type ofnaturalized epistemology, not everyone agrees. Maureen Linkeradvocates social epistemology that is not a form of naturalizedepistemology, but a “revised rationalized approach to knowledgethat takes into account social responsibility” (2003: 167).Linker believes that her view better defends against relativism thancan naturalized epistemologies based on Quine, for example, that ofLynn Hankinson Nelson.

11. Richmond Campbell has interesting criticisms of Antony’sarguments. He also presents his own version of feminist naturalizedepistemology that incorporates moral as well as empirical knowledge.See Campbell 1998, 2001.

12. Responses to Nussbaum and others are discussed briefly in Section 7.Nussbaum discusses her approach to criticizing other feminists inNussbaum, 2001. See also note 7 above.

13. An earlier,archived version of the present entry (Summer 2012: Section 8) contains brief updatesin some other areas of feminist scholarship through 2012 in areas notlisted below, e.g., Wittgenstein and Logic.