Primitivist Theories of Truth

First published Thu Oct 23, 2025

When thinking about truth, it is natural to wonder whether and howtruth can be analyzed in more fundamental terms. Numerous philosophershave aimed to so analyze truth, but their theories are all plagued bywell-known problems. As a result, none has generated consensus, oreven near consensus, among philosophers. Primitivists about truthoffer a distinctive take on this situation. They suggest that thisnegative outcome shouldn’t be surprising, as there are strongreasons for thinking that truth simply cannot be analyzed in morefundamental terms. We may be able to so analyze other aspects ofreality, and some of these may even be analyzable in terms of truth.Primitivists insist, though, that when it comes to truth itself, thissort of analysis will always come up short.

This entry will start by outlining a tripartite distinction betweenthe concept of truth, the property of truth, and the terms that we usein speaking about truth. This distinction is standard within debatesabout truth, and it will inform the rest of the entry. The entry willthen provide an overview of the major varieties of primitivism abouttruth, covering historically significant developments of the view aswell as developments by contemporary philosophers. Following thisoverview, the entry will trace some nuanced connections betweenprimitivist theories and identity, deflationary, and axiomatictheories of truth. It will close with a brief discussion of theempirical significance of primitivism, focusing on how the results ofstudies on false belief attribution bear on primitivist theories ofthe concept of truth.

1. Concept, property, terms

Theories of truth can have a number of different targets. Three of themost prominent targets have been: (i) the concepttruth(we’ll denote concepts using small capsin what follows); (ii) the propertytruth (we’ll denoteproperties using italics); and (iii) thetruth terms thatspeakers use.

Philosophers have thought about the nature of the concepttruth(and concepts in general) in various ways.According to one standard way of thinking about the concepttruth,whatever else we might want to say about itsnature and possession-conditions,truth is amental entity of some sort that thinkers deploy whenever they havethoughts involving truth. For instance, if I believe that some of thethings that Laurence said about T.S. Eliot are true, then it would bestandardly held that I deploy the concepttruthin having this belief. Likewise, I woulddeploytruth if I wondered whether most of thestatements in a late-night infomercial were true or hoped that ascientist’s optimistic predictions about climate change turn outto be true. This way of thinking abouttruthwill surface in§2.1,§§3.1–3.3,§§3.5–3.7,§4.2, and§5 below. In§2.4, by contrast, we will see that one of the most famous primitivistsabouttruth, Gottlob Frege, conceived of theconcepttruth in an importantly differentway.

The propertytruth is meant to be the property that ispossessed by all and only the true truth-bearers. For instance,suppose that propositions (somehow construed) are the bearers oftruth. The proposition that Morocco is north of Liberia is true, sothis proposition possesses the propertytruth. By contrast,the proposition that Zambia is north of Chad is not true, so thisproposition fails to possess the propertytruth.

Philosophers who have developed metaphysics of truth standardly aim toidentify the nature of the propertytruth. That said, in someinstances, it may be more helpful to describe a theory of themetaphysics of truth as investigating the nature of a relation, ratherthan a property. A well-known example iscorrespondence theories of truth, which take truth to consist in some particular relation ofcorrespondence between a truth-bearer such as a belief or aproposition and portion of reality such as a fact. Another sensibleway of describing correspondence theories, however, is to take them toinvestigate the nature of the propertytruth, wheretruth is meant to be arelational property (see,e.g., the introduction to the entry onthe correspondence theory of truth and Edwards 2021). In what follows, we will set this issue to oneside and refer totruth simply as a ‘property’.(For further discussion of the concept-property distinction in work ontruth, see Alston 2002; Asay 2013c: ch. 1, 2020: §6.1, 2021a, b;Edwards 2018: ch. 2, 2021; Eklund 2021: §2; Lynch 2009: ch. 1;Nulty 2008; Scharp 2021; Wyatt 2018, 2021; and the referencestherein.)

Truth terms are, in essence, the linguistic expressions that enable usto speak about truth. In English, truth terms include the familiar‘true’ and ‘truth’. They also include‘correct’, ‘incorrect’, ‘right’,and ‘wrong’, when the latter are used in certainsentences, such as ‘Harold believes that vaccines cause autism,but his belief is wrong/incorrect, since vaccines don’t causeautism’. Other natural languages come with their own stocks oftruth terms. (For discussions of truth terms in various languages andreferences to further resources, see, e.g., Mizumoto 2022, 2024;Reuter 2024; and Wyatt & Ulatowski 2024.)

As will become apparent, this basic distinction betweentruth,truth, and truth terms proves to bevery useful when carving up the landscape of primitivist truththeories and when identifying connections between primitivist theoriesand truth theories of other kinds.

2. Early primitivist theories

2.1 Wang Chong andde facto primitivism

Primitivist theories of truth were discussed extensively during theearly years of the analytic tradition in philosophy, and we will focuson these theories in§§2.2–2.4.^[1] Prior to this period, we see primitivist ideas about truth emerge inWestern philosophy, though they appear only in an inchoate form.Descartes, for instance, wrote in a letter to Mersenne on 16 October1639 that

for my part, I have never had any doubts about truth, because it seemsa notion so transcendentally clear that nobody can be ignorant ofit…no logical definition can be given which will help anyone todiscover its nature. (1991: 139)

Similarly, Johann Heinrich Lambert proposed in 1771 that

[t]ruth is a simple concept which, as it does not have severalinternal marks, can at best be defined or elucidated only through itsrelations to other concepts. (quoted in Künne 2003: 13)

If we go back much further in the history of philosophy, we encounteran early Chinese philosopher whose body of thought about truth mayexemplify a kind of primitivism. This philosopher is Wang Chong (c.25–100 CE). Wang lived during the Han period, which AlexusMcLeod (2018b: 134) has dubbed “the period of concern with truthand method in Chinese thought”. Wang’s writings address adiverse array of topics, including astronomy, physics, ethics,metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical methodology; for athorough discussion, see McLeod (2018b).

The only extant volume of Wang’s writings is entitledLunheng (for an overview of Wang’s life and hiswritings, see McLeod 2018b: ch. 2). InDuizuo, the secondchapter ofLunheng, Wang explains that no matter the subjectthat he is addressing, his inquiry is animated by a foundationalconcern for truth (1907: 85):

In a great many books reality has no place left: falsehood andimmorality triumph over truth and virtue. Therefore, unless such liesbe censured, specious arguments cannot be suppressed, and, as long asthey spread, truth does not reign. For this reason, the [Lunheng]weighs the words, whether they be light or heavy, and holds up abalance for truth and falsehood. It does not trouble about polishingthe phrases and embellishing the style, or consider this of greatimportance.

As Wang indicates, he was troubled by the fact that falsehoods canspread more effectively than truths. One of the main reasons that thisoccurs, according to Wang, is that someone who wishes to spread afalsehood often expresses it using vivid, flowery language that ismeant to generate strong emotions among their audience. To combat thisphenomenon, Wang resolves to avoid flowery language and to insteadexpress his ideas and arguments as straightforwardly as possible.This, he contends, will enable his readers to more effectively acquiretrue beliefs and avoid false beliefs.

Given Wang’s serious concern with truth, it is important toconsider how Wang speaks about truth when articulating his views.Interestingly, Wang regularly uses three pairs of truth terms:shi/fei是非,ran/fou然否, andSHI/xu實虛. When discussingWang’s views on truth, McLeod (2018b: ch. 4) translatesshiandfeias ‘right’ and ‘wrong’,ranandfouas ‘is the case’ and ‘is not the case’, andSHI andxuas ‘true’ and‘false’. A somewhat different translation is offered byLajos Brons (2018), who translates these pairs of terms as‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘is the case’and ‘is not the case’, and‘objective/objectivity’ and ‘mere attractiveappearance’.

As always, translation is a tricky business, especially whenattempting to translate an ancient text into a contemporary languagesuch as English. Without attempting to settle upon a definitivetranslation of the truth terms that Wang uses, we can note a few keypassages fromLunheng in which these pairs of truth termsoccur, using McLeod’s translation for the sake ofconvenience:

The Lunheng uses precise language and detailed discussion, to revealand explain the doubts of this generation of common people, to bringto light through debate right and wrong principles(是非之理shi feizhi li), and to help those who come later clearly see thedifference between what is the case (然ran)and what is not the case (否fou).(Duizuo6, quoted by McLeod 2018b, 146)
Those who can determine what is the case (然ran)and what is not the case (否fou)feel an ailment in their hearts whichpain them [at the thought of truth being subverted by the“common people” and flowery scholarship] …[Mengzi’s] language was straight and to the point, accordinghigh place to the right (是shi)and suppressing the wrong (非fei).(Duizuo2, quoted by McLeod 2018b:145–146)
When the ruler does badly, instruction to change conduct is directedtoward the person on high. When the ruler’s subjects aredoltish, engaging in discussions is directed toward the people below.When the people below obtain the truth (實SHI),then instruction of the person onhigh follows. I hope to stir some of these minds, to help themdistinguish between truth (實SHI)and falsity (虛xu).Once the distinction between truth andfalsity is established, then flowery and artificial writings can beeliminated. When flowery and artificial writings are eliminated, pureand sincere transformations will grow more abundant day by day. (Duizuo2, quoted by McLeod 2018b: 148)

As these passages illustrate, Wang uses these three pairs of truthterms when developing his ideas about topics such as principles,scholarship, and social and political progress. Notably, however, Wangnever attempts todefine these truth terms or otherwiseelucidate their meanings. This fact has led Lajos Brons to proposethat Wang is best interpreted as being a primitivist about truth. Heoffers the following argument:

[t]he fact that [Wang]—in a book in which truth plays such acentral role—never even hinted at what truth is or whatshi,ran, orSHI mean strongly suggests that he(implicitly!) considered truth to be primitive. (Brons 2018: 357)

McLeod (2018b: 163) points to a significant difficulty for thisargument. He notes that while Wang doesn’t attempt to define orotherwise analyze the meanings of the truth terms that he uses, thisisn’t terribly surprising. This is because early Chinesephilosophers generally don’t aim to define the centralphilosophical terms that they use. Instead, they rely on other methodssuch as the use of case studies to illustrate what these terms meanand why the phenomena that they pick out are significant. Rather thaninferring from this that implicit primitivism was widespread amongearly Chinese philosophers, the more reasonable proposal may be thatthere are simply deep methodological differences between early Chinesephilosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy.

In later postscript, Brons grants that we lack sufficient reasons fortaking Wang to explicitly or implicitly endorse a primitivist view oftruth. Nevertheless, Brons suggests that there is an interesting sensein which Wang’s body of thought about truth exhibits a kind ofprimitivism. Brons calls this variety of primitivism ‘defacto primitivism’ about truth. Focusing forthe sake of simplicity on the concepttruth,the idea is that a body of thought exhibitsdefacto primitivism if one can endorse that body of thought withoutbeing committed to the definability oftruth,even though the body of thought does not entail thattruthisundefinable (Brons 2018: 366).This, Brons proposes, is precisely what we find inLunheng:a set of interrelated ideasexpressed usingshi/fei是非,ran/fou然否, andSHI/xu實虛 which doesn’t entail that the conceptsexpressed by these terms are undefinable but which one cannevertheless endorse without taking these concepts to be amenable todefinition. In§4.3, we will see an additional context in which the notion ofdefacto primitivism can be put to use. (For furtherdiscussion of Wang’s views about truth, see McLeod 2016: ch. 6,2018a, 2018b, ch. 4 and Mou 2018a, 2018b: §5.3.)

2.2 G.E. Moore’s primitivism abouttruth

Having discussed Brons’ primitivist interpretation of WangChong, we can move forward many years in the history of philosophy tothe period when primitivist theories of truth first garnered sustainedinterest as such. At the advent of the analytic tradition, we findseveral of the tradition’s leading lights—G.E. Moore,Bertrand Russell, andGottlob Frege—developing distinctive primitivist theories of truth.

In his classic essay “The nature of judgment” (1899),Moore aims to show that contraF.H. Bradley, the truth or falsity of a proposition cannot depend upon theproposition’s relation to (non-propositional) reality. (Thisessay was largely extracted from Moore’s 1898 dissertation“The metaphysical basis of ethics”, for which see Moore2011.) Moore takes propositions to be composed of what he calls‘concepts’. The notion of a concept which Moore uses inthis essay is notably different from the notion that we brieflydetailed in§1, according to which concepts are mental entities of some sort. Mooreexplicitly denies that concepts, in his sense, are mental, saying that“[t]he concept is not a mental fact, nor any part of a mentalfact” (1899: 179). Instead, Moore takes concepts to beimmutable, extramental entities which are the constituents ofpropositions and are also what we mean in speaking and thinking (1899:178, 180). He also insists that we cannot explain the nature ofconcepts in terms of entities of some other kind, describing conceptsas a “genus per se, irreducible to anythingelse” (1899: 178–179). Interestingly, then, the earlyMoore favors a primitivist view of concepts as well as a primitivistview of truth. (For further discussion of Moore’s early work inmetaphysics, see Baldwin 1990: chs. 1–2.)

Moore argues (1899: 180) that if the truth of a proposition consistedin its relation to reality, then it would follow that, contrary tofact, concepts can be true or false. For instance, Moore contends thatthis view of truth entails that the conceptredis true and the conceptchimerais false, since there are real things (viz.red things) to whichred is related, thoughthere are no real things to whichchimera isrelated.

Additionally, Moore suggests that there are in fact true propositionsthat stand in no relation to reality, using the proposition that 2+2=4as an example. These considerations lead Moore to conclude that

[a] proposition is constituted by any number of concepts, togetherwith a specific relation between them; and according to the nature ofthis relation the proposition may be either true or false. What kindof relation makes a proposition true, what false, cannot be furtherdefined, but must be immediately recognised. (1899: 180)

Here, we see Moore advancing the view thattruth andfalsity are primitive properties/relations. In what follows,we will call the view thattruth is a primitive propertymetaphysical primitivism.^[2]

In lectures that were delivered in 1910–1911 and published laterasSome Main Problems of Philosophy, Moore went on to rejectmetaphysical primitivism in favor of a correspondence theory of truth(see the entry onthe correspondence theory). Here, Moore develops two concerns for metaphysical primitivism whichrespectively concern his account of the facts to which true beliefsrefer and the analysis of belief on which he takes metaphysicalprimitivism to rest (1953: 262–263). Wyatt (2022: 3) detailssome additional concerns that affect Moore’s argument formetaphysical primitivism.

2.3 Bertrand Russell’s primitivism abouttruth

During the period in which Moore endorsed and later abandonedmetaphysical primitivism, Bertrand Russell’s views on truthfollowed much the same trajectory. In Russell (1904), the third in atrio of papers prompted by the work ofAlexius Meinong, Russell’s main aim is to defend the view that all judgmentshave “transcendent” objects, which Russell calls“propositions”. This view carries a commitment to bothtrue and false propositions, and Russell worries about whether thelatter in fact exist. After wrestling with this and numerous nearbyissues, Russell ultimately forwards an arresting proposal that wouldfit perfectly in the early work of Moore:

there is no problem at all in truth and falsehood…somepropositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red andsome white…[w]hat is truth, and what falsehood, we must merelyapprehend, for both seem incapable of analysis. (1904:523–524)

In a paper that he appears to have read to the Jowett Society in 1905,Russell is mainly concerned to argue that propositions are the bearersof truth and falsity and that true propositions are facts. Along theway, he twice (1905 [1994: 493–494, 504]) maintains thattruth is undefinable, offering an argument that is strikinglysimilar to Frege’s treadmill argument (§2.4).

A pivotal juncture in Russell’s thought about truth is his1906/7 paper ‘On the nature of truth’. This paper consistsmostly of a critical discussion of the ‘monistic theory oftruth’, which Russell attributes to theBritish idealist Harold Joachim. Having thoroughly criticized the monistic theory,Russell aims in the paper’s final section to offer some positiveremarks about the nature oftruth. Here, his mind is clearlydivided between two views. The first is a primitivist theory accordingto which

the bearers oftruth are complex, non-mental entities,which Russell calls ‘propositions’;
facts are true propositions andfictions/objective falsehoods false propositions;and
“[t]ruth and falsehood…are ultimate, and no accountcan be given of what makes a proposition true or false” (Russell1906/7: 48).

The second view is a correspondence theory of truth according towhich

the bearers oftruth are beliefs;
facts are the only non-mental complexes, so that objectivefalsehoods don’t exist; and
true beliefs are those which correspond to facts.

Russell suggests (1906/7: 49) that both of these theories “seemtenable” and leaves the decision between them to futurework.

That decision comes in Russell (1907 [1910]). Here, Russell rejectsmetaphysical primitivism for three reasons. First, the metaphysicalprimitivist, as Russell conceives of them, takes the primary bearersoftruth to be propositions. In opposition to this view,Russell argues that we would do well to avoid positing propositions as“independent [entities]” and thus as the primary bearersoftruth (1907 [1910: 175]). If propositions exist asindependent entities, Russell contends, then it must be the case thatpropositions are the referents of that-clauses such as ‘thatCharles I died on the scaffold’. However, Russell is highlyskeptical of referential analyses of that-clauses, suggesting that athat-clause “has no complete meaning by itself, which wouldenable it to denote a definite object as (e.g.) the word‘Socrates’ does” (1907 [1910: 175]). Russell grantsthat this is not a knockdown argument against the view thatpropositions exist as independent entities, insisting neverthelessthat “it must be allowed a certain weight” (1907 [1910:176]).

Russell’s second concern for metaphysical primitivism, which hetakes to be “more fatal” (1907 [1910: 176]), arises fromthe fact that the metaphysical primitivist posits objectivefalsehoods. Russell finds objective falsehoods ontologicallyproblematic, given that they would exist independently of minds, yet“we feel that there could be no falsehood if there were no mindsto make mistakes” (1907 [1910: 176]). This may be a significantconcern for metaphysical primitivism. One thing that should be noted,however, is that if the concern is forceful, it would seem to castdoubt on any theory of truth which entails that there are objectivefalsehoods, irrespective of whether that theory takesfalsityto be a primitive property.

Russell’s third concern is also meant to be fatal formetaphysical primitivism, and it centers on the metaphysicalprimitivist’s contention thattruth andfalsity are primitive properties. Insofar as it entails thattruth andfalsity are primitive, Russell argues,metaphysical primitivism renders the distinction betweentruth andfalsity highly mysterious, whereas thecorrespondence theory that Russell has in mind can arguably shed agreat deal of light on this distinction (1907 [1910: 176]).Russell’s third concern continues to trouble philosophersconsidering metaphysical primitivism; for further discussion, seeWyatt (2022: §3.1).

This shift in Russell’s thinking about truth away fromprimitivism and towards correspondence proved to be permanent.Russell’s endorsement of the view thattruth—ormore specifically, the truth of empirical beliefs andsentences—consists in correspondence persisted for the remainderof his life, though he articulated this view in various importantlydifferent ways (see the entry onthe correspondence theory, as well as Russell 1912: ch. XII, 1914: 54, 1919a, 1919b: §VI,1921: ch. XIII, 1927: ch. 24, 1940: chs. XVI, XVII, and XXI, 1946:849–850, 852, 853–854, 856, 1948: Part II, chs.8–11, 1959: 63–64, 132, 151, 157, 213, 220, ch. XV.)

2.4 Gottlob Frege’s primitivism abouttruth

The third early analytic philosopher to endorse primitivism wasGottlob Frege, and unlike Moore and Russell, he remained an enduringadvocate of the view. Frege develops what is perhaps the best-knownargument for primitivism, which Wolfgang Künne (2003:§3.3.2) helpfully calls thetreadmill argument. The nameof this argument references a metaphor that Frege uses in theposthumously published essay “Logic”, which was likelywritten in 1897. In this essay, he discusses the view thatpropositions are private and mental and are true just when they standin a relation to a distinct entity that is neither private nor mental.^[3] Frege (“Logic” [1979: 134]) contends that given thisview, we could not know whether a proposition is true, as

we should be in the position of a man on a treadmill who makes a stepforwards and upwards, but the step he treads on keeps giving way andhe falls back to where he was before.

Frege’s argument for this claim (“Logic” [1979:128–129]) goes by very quickly, but the argument receives afuller development in Frege’s essay “Thethought”.

The more developed argument appears in the following widely discussedpassage:

Can it not be laid down that truth exists when there is correspondencein a certain respect? But in which? For what would we then have to doto decide whether something were true? We should have to inquirewhether it were true that an idea and a reality, perhaps, correspondedin the laid-down respect. And then we should be confronted by aquestion of the same kind and the game could begin again. So theattempt to explain truth as correspondence collapses. And every otherattempt to define truth collapses too. For in a definition certaincharacteristics would have to be stated. And in application to anyparticular case the question would always arise whether it were truethat the characteristics were present. So one goes round in a circle.Consequently, it is probable that the content of the word“true” is unique and indefinable. (Frege 1918–1919[1956: 291])

At the beginning of this passage, Frege offers reasons for thinkingthat the concepttruth, i.e. the content ofthe word ‘true’, cannot be defined as involving some kindof correspondence. He then suggests that for similar reasons, everypurported definition oftruth must fail, whichshows thattruth is “unique andindefinable”. We will call the view thattruthis a primitive concept, which Frege endorseshere,conceptual primitivism.

One detail that should be flagged in connection with the treadmillargument pertains to Frege’s views about concepts. We noted in§1 that the concepttruth is often understood tobe mental in nature, and as we will see in§3, most conceptual primitivists have either adopted this understandingoftruth or else appear sympathetic towardsit. Frege, however, has a distinctive understanding of what sort ofentity the concepttruth is. As Frege uses theterm, concepts are functions from objects to truth-values (see Frege1891, 1892). For Frege, then, concepts are mathematical in nature, andthey are also non-mental. Thus, when Frege forwards the view that theconcepttruth is primitive, it is the concepttruth so conceived that he has in mind.

There has been substantial scholarly disagreement about how, exactly,the treadmill argument should be interpreted (see Asay 2013a:§§3–4, 2013c: chs. 2, 5–6, 2021a: §§1,3.3, 2021b: §4.1.1; Baldwin 1997; Johnston 2021; Heck & May2018: §5; Green 2024; Kim 2020, 2021; Künne 2008; Pardey2012; Ricketts & Levine 1996; Sluga 2002; Walker 1997: §6;and the references therein. For an interesting adaptation of thetreadmill, see Trueman 2022: §1.3.) The central issue here iswhether we should take the argument to involve an appeal to anallegedly viciousregress or allegedly viciouscircularity. Given the prominence of this debate, it isworthwhile to outline these two versions of the argument indetail.

According to the regress interpretation, the treadmill’sstructure is essentially this (cp. Künne 2003:130–131):

(1_R): Iftruth is defined in terms of somecharacteristicC, then to determine whether an entityx is true, one must first determine whetherx hasC [Premise]
(2_R): For any entityx and characteristicY: todetermine whetherx hasY, one must first determinewhether the proposition thatx hasY is true[Premise]
(3_R): Iftruth is defined in terms of somecharacteristicC, then to determine whether an entityx is true, one must first determine whetherx hasC, which requires one to previously determine whether theproposition thatx hasC is true [(1_R),(2_R)]
(4_R): Iftruth is defined in terms of somecharacteristicC, then to determine whether the propositionthatx hasC is true, one must first determinewhether the proposition thatx hasC hasC[(1_R)]
(5_R): To determine whether the proposition thatx hasC hasC, one must first determine whether theproposition that (the proposition thatx hasC hasC) is true [(2_R)]
(6_R): Iftruth is defined in terms of somecharacteristicC, then to determine whether an entityx is true, one must first determine whetherx hasC, which requires one to previously determine whether theproposition thatx hasC is true, which requires oneto previously determine whether the proposition thatx hasC hasC, which requires one to previously determinewhether the proposition that (the proposition thatx hasC hasC) is true, and so onad infinitum[(3_R)-(5_R)]

(7_R): Iftruth is defined in terms of somecharacteristicC, then to determine whether an entityx is true, one must separately determine whether an infinitenumber of propositions are true/haveC [(6_R)]
(8_R): It is not possible for any person to separately determine whetheran infinite number of propositions are true/haveC[Premise]
(9_R): It is possible for some persons to determine whether some entitiesare true [Premise]
(10_R): It is not the case thattruth is definedin terms of some characteristicC[(7_R)–(9_R)].

By contrast, according to the circularity interpretation, thetreadmill has the following structure (cp. Asay 2013c:140–141):

(1_C): Iftruth is defined in terms of somecharacteristicC, then to determine whether an entityx is true, one must first determine whetherx hasC [Premise]
(2_C): For any entityx and characteristicY: todetermine whetherx hasY, one must first determinewhether the proposition thatx hasY is true[Premise]
(3_C): If one determines whether the proposition thatx hasC is true, then in doing so, one usestruth[Premise]
(4_C): For any entityx: to determine whetherx hasC, one must usetruth[(2_C), (3_C)]
(5_C): Iftruth is defined in terms of somecharacteristicC, then for any entityx, it isimpossible to determine in an epistemically non-circular way whetherx is true [(1_C)–(4_C)]
(6_C): For some entityx: it is possible to determine in anepistemically non-circular way whetherx is true[Premise]
(7_C): It is not the case thattruth is definedin terms of some characteristicC [(5_C),(6_C)]

Selecting one of these interpretations of the treadmill is a delicatematter to be sure. Whichever way the treadmill is interpreted, though,it faces some significant concerns. To illustrate, suppose that Ioffer the following simple definition oftruth:

(Corr): For all \(x\):truth applies to \(x=_{\textrm{df}} x\) corresponds to a fact.

If I want to know whether a particular entitya is true, then(Corr) suggests that I should ask whethera corresponds to afact. Frege will claim (recall(2_R)/(2_C) above) that to determine whethera corresponds to a fact, Imustfirst determine whether the proposition thatacorresponds to a fact is true. However, this claim is certainlydebatable. To know whethera corresponds to a fact, it wouldseem that I need to know only the following things:

which entitya is;
what the correspondence relationC is;
what facts are; and
whether there exists a factf to whicha standsinC.

This isn’t to deny, of course, that the proposition thata corresponds to a fact is logically equivalent to theproposition that (the proposition thata corresponds to afact) is true. Yet even if these propositions are logicallyequivalent, that doesn’t show that the latter is epistemicallyprior to the former. If it isn’t, then the treadmill looks tofalter at(2_R)/(2_C). (For an especially nice articulation of this concern, see Asay 2013c:§5.1. For a related discussion of Frege’s conception ofjudgment and the role that it is meant to play in the treadmill, seeKim 2021.)

3. Contemporary primitivist theories

3.1 Truth, Tarski, and meaning

Debates about truth continued to be very lively throughout thetwentieth century and have maintained a great deal of momentum duringthe twenty-first century. In the twentieth century, the most visibleadvocates of primitivism were Donald Davidson (1983, 1990a, b, 1995,1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2020) and Ernest Sosa (1993a, b, 2001), whoboth defended versions of conceptual primitivism. (See also Rorty2000: 126, Savery 1955: 514, and Strawson 1992: 24, as well as Sluga1999’s discussion of Carnap’s views about truth.)

Davidson’s advocacy of primitivism was heavily informed by hisadmiration for the work ofAlfred Tarski and his sense that Tarski had proved that the concepttruthis undefinable. Davidson (1990b:285–286) observes that in developing his theory of truth, Tarskidefines various truth predicates each of which is meant to apply tosentences from a particular languageL. By contrast, Tarskidoesn’t attempt to define afully general truthpredicate which is meant to apply to sentences from any arbitrarylanguage whatsoever. The explanation for this, Davidson contends, isthat Tarski proved that no such predicate can be defined. Davidsontakes this Tarskian proof to show by extension that our concepttruth,which is meant to be fully general in theabove sense, is also undefinable.

In a much-cited passage, Davidson (1996 [2005: 20–21])summarizes the central lesson that he takes from Tarski’s workas follows (see also Davidson 1977 [1984: 216], 1983 [2001: 139]):

For the most part, the concepts philosophers single out for attention,like truth, knowledge, belief, action, cause, the good and the right,are the most elementary concepts we have…Why then should weexpect to be able to reduce these concepts definitionally to otherconcepts that are simpler, clearer, and more basic? We should acceptthe fact that what makes these concepts so important must alsoforeclose on the possibility of finding a foundation for them whichreaches deeper into bedrock.

We should apply this obvious observation to the concept of truth: wecannot hope to underpin it with something more transparent or easierto grasp. Truth is, as G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and Fregemaintained, and Tarski proved, an indefinable concept.

Using a primitive concepttruth, Davidson wenton to develop a program in semantics whose influence cannot beoverstated. A central idea of this program is that the meaning of alinguistic expression consists in its contribution to thetruth-conditions of the sentences in which it occurs. This idea isalso based on the work of Tarski, who explored definitions of truthbased on biconditionals such as:

(1): ‘Morocco is north of Liberia’ is true iff Morocco isnorth of Liberia.

Davidson’s approach is to treat a Tarskian theory of truth asbeing a theory of what the sentences that are used by a particularspeaker mean. If (1) is entailed by such a theory, which is attributedto a particular speakerA, then the theory also entails thatwhenA uses the sentence ‘Morocco is north ofLiberia’,A means that Morocco is north of Liberia(see, e.g., Davidson 1977, and cp. Davidson 2020).

This proposal regarding the relationship between truth and meaningillustrates a more general feature of the methodology forinvestigatingtruth that Davidson ultimatelycame to endorse. This method has it that instead of trying to analyzetruth in terms of more basic concepts, weshould instead attempt to identify significant connections betweentruth and other concepts that we use. One suchconnection is that betweentruth andmeaning,which Davidson takes his application ofTarski’s ideas to reveal. P.F. Strawson (1992: ch. 2) helpfullydescribes this approach as theconnective model of conceptualanalysis. For further discussion of Davidson’s methodology andthe ways in which he applies it, see the entry onDonald Davidson and Glanzberg (2013).

A significant concern for Davidson is that while Tarski’s workon truth undoubtedly marks a watershed moment in the history ofphilosophy, it is not at all clear that Tarski proved thattruthis a primitive concept. The theorem concerningtruth that Tarski proved concerns specific formal languages. Describedin rudimentary terms, the theorem has it that if a formal languageL has a particular degree of expressive power, then truth forthe sentences ofL cannot be defined inL. Thistheorem is about truth predicates for specific kinds of formallanguages, rather thantruth, which is meantto be a concept that is possessed by speakers of a highly diverserange of natural languages. For this reason, Tarski’sundefinability theorem doesn’t provide clear support forconceptual primitivism.^[4]

Yet even if this is so, Davidson’s understanding of the importof Tarski’s work may still point us in the right direction. Anotable view in the vicinity of Davidson’s is that while Tarskididn’t exactly prove thattruth isprimitive, Tarski’s views about truth fit more naturally withconceptual primitivism than with other theories oftruth,such as correspondence ordeflationary theories. (For a defense of this view and the above criticism ofDavidson, see Asay 2013b, 2013c: ch. 7. For further discussion ofTarski’s thought about truth, see Halbach 2011: chs. 1, 3;Horsten 2011: chs. 2–4; Patterson 2012: 144–160; and theentry onTarski’s truth definitions.)

3.2 Truth, epistemology, and external realism

Ernest Sosa (2001: 659) has sided with Davidson in holding that“[t]ruth is a primitive concept and has no illuminatingdefinition or Moorean analysis”. Sosa’s ambition in hisdiscussions of conceptual primitivism is to provide an account oftruth that (i) is compatible with atruth-centeredepistemology according to which epistemic concepts such asknowledgeandepistemicjustification must be analyzed in terms oftruthand (ii) is compatible withexternalrealism, according to which

external reality…is not dependent on human thought, and mighthave been just as it is now even in our absence, and even in theabsence of any contingent thinkers whatever. (2001: 643)

Sosa argues for conceptual primitivism by elimination, offeringvarious concerns for competing accounts of truth, includingnoncognitivist, pragmatist, and correspondence theories. Thenoncognitivist account that Sosa discusses is based in the work ofRichard Rorty, who maintained that the word ‘true’ is “merely anexpression of commendation” (Rorty 1991: 23). The correspondingaccount of the concepttruth has it that thesole function oftruth is to commend beliefs,theories, assertions, etc. with which one agrees. Against thisaccount, Sosa points out that it seems to succumb to theembedding problem that is standardly raised against noncognitivist theories. Forinstance, consider the belief that if what Barry said about Susan istrue, then Susan will come to the dinner party. In forming thisbelief, I deploytruth. However, it would seemthat in doing so, I don’t commend what Barry said, or anythingelse for that matter (see also Sosa 2001: 649, and see Schroeder 2010for further discussion of expressivism about truth).

The pragmatist account oftruth that Sosaconsiders is based in the thought ofC.S. Peirce. A proponent of this account aims to explicatetruthby proposing that

a true belief [is] one that would be accepted rationally andjustifiably by ideal inquirers in an ideal epistemic situation forthat belief and its subject matter. (Sosa 2001: 642)

This account explicatestruth using theconceptsrationality andepistemicjustification. Accordingly, Sosa pointsout that a defender of the account faces the challenge of analyzingthe latter concepts in truth-free terms, lest they be caught up invicious circularity. While this sort of project may have somepotential, undertaking it is clearly a tall order, given that it seemshighly natural to analyzerationality andepistemic justification in terms oftruth.

Thirdly, Sosa considers correspondence theories of truth according towhich “the sentences on our lips or in our brains are true whenand only when they correspond appropriately with the facts or withreality” (2001: 642). Sosa suggests (2001: 646) that the successof such correspondence theories will depend upon the development of asatisfactory theory of reference, which is likely to take reference toconsist in the obtaining of certain causal relations (see, e.g., Field1972). He also notes that despite a great deal of work in this area,we seem to lack such a theory of reference, which calls the prospectsof such correspondence theories into question.

It is worthwhile to note that the correspondence theories which Sosahas in mind here would seem to be theories of the nature of thepropertytruth, rather than theories of the concepttruth.The aim of such theories is to articulate theconditions under which a sentence is true, which can be naturallyregarded as the conditions that must be met for a sentence to possesstruth. By contrast, the correspondence theories at issuearen’t meant to be theories of how we ordinarily think abouttruth, which indicates that they aren’t meant to shed light onour concepttruth. For this reason, suchcorrespondence theories aren’t obviously competitors withSosa’s conceptual primitivism, given that one can consistentlydefend rather different theories oftruth andtruth (on this point, see, e.g., Alston 2002, as well as§3.7. For further critical discussion of Sosa’s views about truth andits role in epistemology, see McGrath & Fantl 2013).

3.3 Thick disquotationalism

Colin McGinn (2000) has put forward a primitivist account of truththat he callsthick disquotationalism. Thickdisquotationalism is primitivist at both the conceptual and themetaphysical levels (though admittedly, the concept-propertydistinction proves to be slippery when it surfaces in McGinn’sdiscussion). The signature theses of thick disquotationalism include(2000: 104–105):

(TD₁): truth is primitive in that it cannot bedecomposed into simpler concepts;
(TD₂): Truth is primitive in the sense that it lacks an“underlying empirical nature;” yet
(TD₃): Bothtruth andtruth arenon-circularly definable.

(TD₃) might seem to be inconsistent with both(TD₁) and (TD₂), but McGinn argues to thecontrary. McGinn’s arguments for the non-circular definabilityoftruth andtruth appeal to what hecalls the ‘disquotation principle’.

‘Disquotation principle’ is actually a misnomer for theprinciple that McGinn has in mind here (he acknowledges this on 2000:88 but persists in using this name for the principle). As Quine (1970[1986: 12]) famously explains, disquotation is meant to be a procedurethat applies to the quotation names ofsentences such as:

(2): ‘Morocco is north of Liberia’.

However, McGinn’s favored truth-bearers are propositions, ratherthan sentences. As a result, the principle on which he draws is infact Paul Horwich’s Equivalence Schema (for further discussionof Horwich’s views, see§4.2 and the entry ondeflationism about truth). The Equivalence Schema has it that:

(ES): The proposition thatp is true iffp.

McGinn’s argument for the non-circular definability oftruth turns on the claim thattruth can be definedas the one and onlyself-effacing property (2000: 104). Tosay thattruth is self-effacing is to say that we can statetruth’s instantiation conditions without referring totruth itself.

McGinn takes(ES) to show us thattruth is self-effacing. Consider an instanceof (ES) such as:

(3): The proposition that Zambia is north of Chad is true iff Zambia isnorth of Chad.

McGinn would suggest that (3) tells us which condition is bothnecessary and sufficient for the proposition that Zambia is north ofChad to possesstruth. This condition is just that Zambia isnorth of Chad. Notably, when we describe this condition, wedon’t need to use ‘true’, ‘truth’, orany other expression that could be reasonably taken to denote orexpresstruth. In this way, it seems that we are able to saywhat it takes for a given proposition to possesstruthwithout explicitly or implicitly mentioningtruth.McGinn’s contention is thattruth is the only propertythat behaves in this way. In light of this contention, he puts forwardthe following definition oftruth (2000: 104):^[5]

(4): The proposition thatp is true iff the proposition thatp has the self-effacing property.

McGinn suggests that definingtruth as the one and onlyself-effacing property is compatible with the view thattruthis primitive in that it lacks an underlying empirical nature. In thisway, McGinn takestruth’s primitiveness to becompatible with its non-circular definability. For discussion of anumber of apparent counterexamples to McGinn’s contention thattruth is the only self-effacing property, see Wrenn(2004).

Turning to McGinn’s argument for the non-circular definabilityoftruth, the details are much the same.McGinn’s contention here (2000: 105–106) is thattruthis non-circularly definable insofar as itsapplication conditions can be stated without using another conceptC that is extensionally or intensionally identical totruth.This fact is again meant to be demonstratedby(ES). McGinn suggests that it is suitable to read (ES) as telling us thattruth applies to a propositionp iffp. This means that from (ES), we learn, for instance, thattruthapplies to the proposition that Zambia isnorth of Chad iff Zambia is north of Chad. In articulating theright-hand side of this biconditional, we seem to have used neithertruth nor any concept that is extensionally orintensionally identical totruth.

Takingtruth to be defined by(ES) in this way looks to be compatible with the view that it is notpossible to decomposetruth into simplerconcepts. For this reason, McGinn takestruth’sprimitiveness to also be compatiblewith its non-circular definability.

Wrenn (2004: §VII) points to a significant question that can beraised for McGinn’s argument for the non-circular definabilityoftruth. The question is whether schemas suchas(ES) can be properly regarded asdefinitions. If schemasshouldn’t be regarded as definitions, then McGinn’sargument fortruth’s non-circulardefinability seems to be seriously flawed, which calls(TD₃) into question. Notably, though, this potential flawdoesn’t put pressure on McGinn’s conceptual primitivism.This is because it doesn’t call into question the idea thattruth cannot be decomposed into simplerconcepts, i.e. (TD₁). For further discussion of relatedissues, see§4.2 and the entry ondefinitions.

3.4Truth as a monadic, non-intrinsic property

In the twenty-first century, primitivism has been endorsed, oftenbriefly, by an extensive range of philosophers. Here, we will focus onthe most detailed twenty-first century defenses of primitivism. Thesecome respectively from Trenton Merricks, Timothy Nulty, DouglasPatterson, and Jamin Asay. (For additional endorsements, see Armstrong2004: 17; Boghossian 2010: 562–3; Hinzen 2007: 10–11, 13;Khatchadourian 2011: i–ii, 2–3; MacFarlane 2005: 305, 313,321, 2014: 98, 100; McLeod 2016: x, 21, 31, 33–35, 52, 106, 175,2018b: 133; Lowe 2007: 259; Rumfitt 2022: 299; Schaffer 2008: 309;Simionato 2023; Wiggins 2022: 164–165, §12, n. 14; and B.Williams 2002: 63. See also Zalta 2014.)

Merricks (2007: ch. 8) puts forward a notable variety of metaphysicalprimitivism according to whichtruth is a monadic (i.e.non-relational), non-intrinsic property that cannot be analyzed, atleast when it is exemplified by its primary bearers. He offers tworeasons for takingtruth to be a monadic property. The firstis thattruth, according to Merricks, cannot be a relationbetween atruth-bearer, e.g., a proposition or a belief, andsome other entity or entities (note the parallel with Moore1899’s criticisms of Bradley). Merricks supports this claim bydeveloping a systematic case for the view that some truths lacktruthmakers, i.e. that some truth-bearers are true eventhough they are not true in virtue of standing in a relation to acertain entity or entities. A running example isnegativeexistential propositions, such as the proposition that hobbits donot exist, which Merricks argues cannot be made true by any existingentity or entities.

While Merricks denies thattruth is a relation, henevertheless argues (2007: §V) thattruth exists bypresenting two concerns for a deflationary view according to which itfails to exist. Combining his denial thattruth is a relationwith his affirmation oftruth’s existence, Merricksconcludes thattruth must be a monadic property. Aninteresting wrinkle is that while Merricks takestruth to bemonadic, he also insists thattruth is non-intrinsic, giventhat “whether a proposition exemplifies [truth] isoften a matter of how things are around it” (2007: 182). Forinstance, Merricks would hold that even thoughtruth is notitself a relation, the truth of the proposition that apples are solidis determined not just by the nature of that proposition but also bythe solidity of apples.

Having concluded thattruth is monadic, Merricks suggeststhat iftruth were analyzable, then it would have to beanalyzable in terms of monadic properties that are exemplified by alland only the true truth-bearers. Yet he takes the latter hypothesis tobe highly dubious, pointing briefly to a characteristic remark byRussell (e.g., 1912: 70) to the effect that the truth of a beliefcannot be plausibly taken to consist in intrinsic properties of thebelief such as its “vividness”. This leads Merricks toinfer thattruth is not analyzable and is thus a primitiveproperty.

While it is sharply formulated, Merricks’ argument formetaphysical primitivism may proceed a bit too quickly. In particular,it is worth noting that the remark by Russell which Merricks uses tomotivate metaphysical primitivism concerns beliefs’intrinsic properties, rather than their monadic properties.Since Merricks takes some monadic properties to be non-intrinsic, anappeal to this remark looks to be out of place in Merricks’argument.

Merricks’ response to this concern might very well beconcessive, given that he maintains that

[t]he monadicity of [truth] is the main point here. Itsprimitivity is not essential to the other claims about truth made inthis chapter or, indeed, in this book. (2007: 183)

These remarks show that Merricks sees metaphysical primitivism, incontrast to the view thattruth is monadic, as a highlynegotiable aspect of his overall views on truth and truthmaking. (Foran additional response to Merricks on behalf of truth pluralism, seeEdwards 2018: ch. 9. See also Griffith 2015 and Rasmussen 2014:§1.4.4, ch. 6.)

3.5 Primitive disclosive alethism

Timothy Nulty has defended a variety of conceptual primitivism that hecallsprimitive disclosive alethism. In defending primitivedisclosive alethism, Nulty offers three main reasons for takingtruthto be primitive which are based on ideas fromDavidson andMartin Heidegger.

The first reason involves the Heideggerian idea that we don’ttake true assertions to agree with things that they represent butinstead take true assertions to ‘point to’ or‘reveal’ particular parts of reality (see Heidegger 1927[1962: 260–261]). Nulty (2006: 191, 2007: 13) endorses thisidea, proposing as well that the relation of pointing to/revealingisn’t analyzable in more fundamental terms. This is meant toshow thattruth is not analyzable in morefundamental terms.

This argument doesn’t clearly provide a reason for takingtruthto be primitive. The Heideggerian proposal atissue here seems to involve analyzingtruth interms ofpointing/revealing.If the latter concepts are morefundamental thantruth, then this Heideggerianproposal actually militates against conceptual primitivism. A keyquestion to be investigated, then, is whether we should takepointing/revealingto bemore or less fundamental than (or perhaps equifundamental with)truth.This is a question that should presumably beinvestigated using the methods of cognitive science; for a discussionof related topics, see§5.

Nulty’s second reason (2006: 191, 2007: 14) for takingtruthto be primitive specifically concernspurported definitions oftruth in terms ofcorrespondence. These definitions, he suggests, will definetruthin terms of a correspondence betweentruth-bearers and certain parts of reality—e.g.,facts—that are meant to exist independently of human thought andlanguage. Nulty argues, however, that when we carve reality up intoparts such as facts, this carving is ineliminably informed by humanbiology and human social practices, including our linguistic practices(2006: 179–181, 2007: §3). For this reason, he finds theidea that there is a privileged carving of reality which is correctindependent of human thought and language to be suspect. On thisbasis, Nulty contends thattruth cannot bedefined in correspondence-theoretic terms.

One limitation of this argument is that it seems possible to offer acorrespondence-theoretic definition oftruthwhich doesn’t fit the mold that Nulty has detailed. One mightdefinetruth in terms of a correspondencebetween truth-bearers (e.g., beliefs) and facts, while also taking theexistence of facts to be somehow constrained by human thought and/orlanguage. In effect, this would amount to a combination of acorrespondence theory oftruth with a varietyof anti-realism about facts. While such a combination would beatypical, it nevertheless appears to be internally consistent. (For anobservation along the same lines, see §9.2 of the entry onthe correspondence theory of truth. Note also that McTaggart held a nearby view, which combines acorrespondence theory of truth with a form of ontological idealism;see §5 of the entry onJohn M.E. McTaggart.)

Nulty’s third reason for takingtruth tobe primitive (2006: 191, 2007: 14) is that as Davidson and Heideggeremphasized, for something to be a thinking subject, it must possesstruth. This means that one must possesstruthto possess any other concepts, which indicatesthattruth is primitive.§5 of this entry will discuss evidence from developmental andcomparative psychology that bears on this line of argument.

3.6 The conception oftruth as circular

Douglas Patterson has laid out a distinctive take on the idea thattruth is a primitive concept, according towhich theconception oftruth iscircular. As Patterson (2010: 13, 21) uses the term, theconception of the concepttruth isthe set of claims about truth that anyone who possessestruthmust be disposed to accept upon consideration.Patterson calls claims of this sortconceptually analytic forthe concepttruth.

Patterson’s conceptual primitivism has it that the conception oftruth iscircular, in that uponanalysis, all of the claims that constitutetruth’sconception turn out to involvetruth.Extending the metaphor in the passage fromDavidson quoted in§3.1, we can say that Patterson’s core contention is that theconception oftruth does not reach deeper intobedrock, insofar as its conception is shot through with instances oftruth.

Patterson provides two main reasons for takingtruth’sconception to be circular in this way.(For a third reason that he presents very briefly, see 2010: 24.) Thefirst (2010: 21, 26) is the conjecture that when asked ‘What istruth?’, ordinary speakers will not be disposed to offernon-circular responses to this question. Patterson takes this toindicate that the concepttruth which ordinaryspeakers possess has a circular conception.

Upon reflection, it should be clear that Patterson is putting forwardan empirical conjecture here that should in turn be evaluatedempirically. To date, the only extant empirical data which beardirectly on Patterson’s conjecture are the qualitative data thatwere reported by Arne Næss (1938a, b). Further work would beneeded to determine whether Næss’ data confirm ordisconfirm Patterson’s conjecture. (Other relevant data includethose of Barnard & Ulatowski 2013, 2021; Kölbel 2008;Mizumoto 2022, 2024; Reuter 2024; and Reuter & Brun 2021.)

Patterson’s second motivation for his conceptual primitivism isthat every extant theory according to whichtruthhas a non-circular conception is highlyproblematic (2010: §2). Summarizing briefly, Patterson takesdeflationary theories oftruth to beunsatisfactory insofar as they invite either theproblem ofnecessity or theproblem of paradox (2010:14–16). The problem of necessity is meant to have twoaspects: (i) that deflationary theories misidentify the set of claimsthat are conceptually analytic fortruth and(ii) that deflationary theories implausibly entail that anyone whopossessestruth must know the meaning of everyEnglish expression. The problem of paradox is meant to be that we canderive logical falsehoods from deflationary theories oftruthgiven the familiar suite of semantic paradoxessuch as theLiar paradox.

Patterson takes minimalist theories oftruthsuch as that of Horwich (1998) (which he regards as being distinctfrom deflationary theories) to be unsatisfactory as they cannotdeliver a satisfying account of what it is for a sentence or anutterance to ‘express’ a proposition (Patterson 2010: 18).He takes traditionalsubstantivist theories oftruth—e.g.,correspondence, coherence, orpragmatist theories—to be problematic because they either turnout to be circular or to misidentify the intension, and in some casesthe extension, oftruth (2010: 18–19).Finally, Patterson takes pluralist theories oftruthto be inadequate as they either inherit theproblems with deflationary theories or misidentifytruth’sintension (2010: 20–21).

Patterson’s criticisms here are all highly nuanced, and theydeserve extended consideration. An issue that should be flagged,though, is one that dovetails with the apparent shortcoming inPatterson’s first motivation for conceptual primitivism. A claimto the effect thattruth (or any concept, forthat matter) has such-and-so intension or extension, or that a giventheory misidentifiestruth’s intensionor extension, would seem to be empirical in nature. Whether a claim ofeither of these sorts is true or false hinges on whattruth’sintension or extension actually is,and that is presumably an empirical matter. Accordingly, whilearmchair reflection on a conjecture of either of these sorts may lendit some initial credibility, it must ultimately be evaluated in lightof empirical evidence regarding how ordinary thinkers (or ordinaryEnglish speakers, or whoever the target population are) think abouttruth.

3.7 Primitivist deflationism

Lastly, over an extensive body of work, Jamin Asay (2013a, b, c, 2014,2018, 2021a, b) has developed the most thorough and nuanced defense ofprimitivism to date. Primitivism is standardly viewed as a rival todeflationism, which has been one of the most popular approaches totruth (see, e.g., Burgess & Burgess 2011: 87; Künne 2003:Figs. 1.2 and 1.3, 317; Lynch, Wyatt, Kim, and Kellen 2021:506–507; and Wright 1998: 33). A core thesis of deflationarytheories of truth is that truth isinsubstantial in that (i)we can’t say anything very interesting about its nature and (ii)it lacks explanatory power (for further discussion, see§4.2 of this entry, the entry ondeflationism about truth, as well as Edwards 2013, 2018: ch. 2; Eklund 2021; Scharp 2021:§10; Wyatt 2016, 2021, 2023a; and the references therein). Withthe concept-property distinction in view (§1), it is easy to see that there are at least two levels, so to speak, atwhich one might be a deflationist: one might be a deflationist abouttruth, or one might be a deflationist abouttruth (or both).^[6]

For his part, Asay argues that we should accept a version ofdeflationism abouttruth while firmly rejecting deflationismabouttruth, opting instead for primitivismabouttruth. Asay, then, is a conceptualprimitivist and a metaphysical deflationist, so it is useful to callhis theory of truthprimitivist deflationism. (For adifferent case for combining deflationism with primitivism, seeGreimann 2000.)

Primitivist deflationism consists of four core theses:^[7]

Fundamentality:truth isfundamental—it cannot be analyzed in terms of morefundamental concepts
Explanatory Indispensability:truthisexplanatorilyindispensable—we must usetruth toexplain certain phenomena
Omnipresence:truth is astructural component of every propositional thought
Insubstantiality: The propertytruth is anon-primitive, but nevertheless insubstantial, property.

With regard to Fundamentality, the initial idea is that we can thinkof our concepts as being arranged in adependence structure.To possess a concept that is higher up in this structure, one mustpossess one or more concepts that are lower down, though not viceversa. To say thattruth is fundamental, then,is to say thattruth resides at the groundlevel of this structure—that there is no conceptC suchthat to possesstruth, one must possessC but not vice versa.

Explanatory Indispensability sets up a link between Asay’s viewsand those of Davidson. Both Asay and Davidson reject deflationismabouttruth insofar as they taketruthto have explanatory power. That is, they holdthat there are phenomena that we just can’t explain withoutusingtruth. One of these phenomena islinguistic meaning. As explained in§3.1, Davidson maintained that a declarative sentence has a certain meaningbecause it has certain truth-conditions. Asay concurs (2013c:§8.4), and infers that to explain the nature of linguisticmeaning, we cannot do withouttruth. We willsay more about the connections between primitivist and deflationarytheories in§4.2.

Omnipresence rests on a contrast between two kinds of components ofpropositional thoughts, where a propositional thought is astate of mind such as believing, regretting, or imagining that haspropositional content. According to Asay, some of the components ofpropositional thoughts areaboutness-determining, in thatthey (partially) determine what a propositional thought is about.^[8] By contrast, he takes other components of propositional thoughts tobestructural, in that they (partially) determine thestructure of a propositional thought without determining what it isabout. For example, we can regard the belief that stones are notliquid as being composed of the conceptsstone,liquid,and(propositional)negation. It is fair to say thatthis belief is about stones and liquidity, which means thatstoneandliquid areaboutness-determining components of the belief. By contrast, it seemsthat the belief isn’t about negation. Rather,negationlooks to be a structural component of thebelief.

Omnipresence is the claim thattruth issimilar tonegation, except thattruthis a structural component ofeverypropositional thought. Asay (2013a: §3, 2013c: §5.2, 2021a:§3.3) defends Omnipresence via theomnipresenceargument, which is meant to be a new-and-improved successor toFrege’s treadmill argument.

Lastly, as a metaphysical deflationist, Asay maintains that while thepropertytruth isn’t primitive, it is nevertheless amerely insubstantial property. One of Asay’s main concerns formetaphysical primitivism is that it looks to entail that facts aboutwhich truth-bearers are/aren’t true are objectionably mysterious(2013c: 75, 87–88, 2021a, 526). As we saw in§2.3, Russell also took this to be a serious problem with metaphysicalprimitivism. Asay’s central idea in connection withtruth’s insubstantiality is that whiletruthdoes exist, this property lacks the explanatory power that is enjoyedby what David Lewis (1983) called ‘sparse’ or‘natural’ properties. In this respect, Asay’s viewsabouttruth are the polar opposite of his views abouttruth.

Asay’s primitivist deflationism is a novel and provocativetheory.§5 will briefly examine its prospects in light of relevant empiricalfindings on false belief attribution. For discussion of a range ofconcerns that can be raised for the theory, see Collins (2015) andWyatt (2023b).

Table 1 provides a brief overview of the major primitivist theories oftruth. An asterisk signifies that the relevant primitivistinterpretation is controversial.

Table 1:Primitivist theories of truth
Philosopher	Conceptual primitivism	Metaphysical primitivism
Wang Chong	✓*
Early Moore		✓
Early Russell		✓
Frege	✓
Davidson	✓
Sosa	✓
McGinn	✓	✓
Merricks		✓
Nulty	✓
Patterson	✓
Asay	✓

4. Connections to other theories of truth

There are a number of multifaceted connections between primitivisttruth theories and truth theories of other kinds. This section willprovide an overview of the ways in which primitivist theories arerelated to identity theories, deflationary theories, and axiomatictheories of truth.

4.1 Primitivism and identity theories of truth

According toidentity theories of truth, a propositionp is true iffp is identical to afact. In the literature on identity theories, the following questionhas loomed large: should an identity theorist be a primitivist aboutthe propertytruth? There is a fair amount of consensus thatthe answer to this question is ‘Yes’.

It is standardly held that in the period in which Moore and Russelltooktruth to be primitive, they also endorsed identitytheories of truth (see the entry onthe identity theory of truth and Cartwright 1987). In a similar fashion, Frege remarks near theend of ‘The thought’:

“Facts, facts, facts” cries the scientist if he wants toemphasize the necessity of a firm foundation for science. What is afact? A fact is a thought that is true. (1918–1919 [1956,307])

This remark suggests that in addition to holding thattruthis primitive, Frege may have endorsed anidentity theory of truth. Given the concept-property distinction (§1), this view appears to at least be internally consistent. (See alsoCandlish 1999: n. 22 on Meinong’s views about truth. For acritical discussion of the view that Frege and the early Moore andRussell endorsed identity theories of truth, see Asay 2013c:§3.4.2.)

Jennifer Hornsby, a leading contemporary advocate of an identitytheory of truth, claims in her highly influential paper on the topicthat her identity theory of truth “acknowledges truth’sindefinability” (1997: n. 5). Julian Dodd, another leadingidentity theorist, emphasizes likewise that what he calls‘modest’ identity theories are compatible with “theview that truth cannot be defined” (2000: 123). Additionally,Colin Johnston (2013: §2.3, §5.2, nn. 2, 4) has argued thatif an identity theory of truth is paired with a dual relation (ratherthan a multiple relation) theory of judgment, then if ajudgment’s truth condition obtains/doesn’t obtain, thefact that it obtains/doesn’t obtain is “brute”. (Seealso Engel 2001: 446’s criticism of what he calls an“identity theory of facts”, one version of which entailsthattruth is primitive, as well as Candlish &Damnjanovic 2018: 277. Working in the opposite direction, Nulty 2006:184–185, 2007: §5 argues that his primitive disclosivealethism is importantly distinct from identity theories of truth.)

More recently, Richard Gaskin (2021: chs. 6–7) has defended anidentity theory of truth which he takes to motivate the view thattruth is an undefinable property. Gaskin takes the bearers oftruth to beRussellian propositions, which are meant to becomposed of particulars such as Socrates and properties such asbeing wise (2021: 89, 101). He asks us (2021: §30) toconsider a correspondence theory of truth which takes truth to consistin correspondence between Russellian propositions and obtaining statesof affairs that are numerically distinct from those propositions.

Gaskin’s concern for such a theory is founded in the thoughtthat there is no “linguistic distance” between the ways inwhich we talk about propositions and the ways in which we talk aboutstates of affairs (2021: 179). He notes that we use that-clauses suchas ‘that Socrates is wise’ to pick out both propositionsand states of affairs. Moving a step further, he says,

[l]et us ask: why is the propositionthat Socrates is wisetrue? If I reply by saying that it is true because it corresponds toan obtaining state of affairs, namelythat Socrates is wise,I seem to have explained nothing but merely repeated the explanandum.(2021: 179)

Given that he takes sentences of the form ‘Propositionp is true’ and ‘Propositionpcorresponds to an obtaining state of affairs’ to have the samecontent, Gaskin concludes that we cannotexplain why truepropositions are true by mentioning that they correspond to obtainingstates of affairs.

Instead, Gaskin’s proposal is that true propositions areidentical to obtaining states of affairs and false propositions areidentical to non-obtaining states of affairs. This identity theory ismeant to better reflect the lack of linguistic distance between ourways of talking about propositions and states of affairs. Moreover,Gaskin argues, this theory entails thattruth is undefinable.According to the theory, the propositionp is true iff it isidentical to an obtaining state of affairs/fact. Remarking on thisgeneral statement, Gaskin urges that “it is hard to see thatmuch of substance has thereby been said about truth” (2021:180). That is, Gaskin takes this general statement about truth to fallshort of a definition oftruth, insofar as it fails toilluminatetruth’s underlying nature. His reasonappears to again be that the left- and right-hand sides of thisbiconditional have the same content (see 2021: 181, 183).

Gaskin also argues that his identity theory takestruth to bean intrinsic property, insofar as it entails that the truth of anatomic proposition does not consist in that proposition’sstanding in a relation to some distinct entityx (2021: 182;see also §5.6 of his entry onthe identity theory of truth). In this respect, Gaskin’s variety of metaphysical primitivismis notably distinct from the variety that is defended by Merricks (§3.4).

4.2 Primitivism and deflationary theories of truth

A more challenging comparison is that between primitivist anddeflationary theories of truth. Deflationists have observed that thetraditional project of attempting to uncover the essence of thepropertytruth has yielded little in the way of consensus.They take this to be a strong motivation for abandoning thistraditional project and instead regardingtruth as being atmost a merely insubstantial property. Given this attitude towardstruth, deflationists aim instead to identify the signatureroles that the concepttruth and truth termsplay in our cognition and languages.

The comparison between primitivist and deflationary theories ischallenging because at first blush, these look like very similar waysof thinking about truth. Primitivists and deflationists both stand inopposition to the traditional project of trying to analyze the natureof truth. As such, both primitivist and deflationary theories seem toentail, in effect, that there isn’t much to say about truth (cp.McGrath 2005: 308). Paul Horwich, a leading deflationist about truth,has even described ‘true’ as a primitive term (Horwich2010: 80). This raises the question of whether we should think ofdeflationary and primitivist accounts oftruth,truth, and truth terms as reallyconverging on the same set of core ideas.

While primitivist and deflationary theories do exhibit a certaindegree of convergence, the extent of this convergence shouldn’tbe overstated. Consider truth terms first, focusing in particular onHorwich’s minimalist account of ‘true’. In thepassage mentioned above, one of Horwich’s central claims is that‘true’ cannot beexplicitly defined, e.g., usinga definition of the following form (see also Horwich 1998:10–11, 20, 121, 128, §§5, 7, 38, 2010: 6, 15,22–27, 35, n. 1, 38–40, 42, 82–83, 86, 96, 104):

(Tr): For allx:x is true iff…x…

In this respect, Horwich’s views regarding truth terms convergewith a variety of primitivism that was not covered in§2–3, as it is not defended by the main proponents of primitivist theoriesof truth. This variety of primitivism concerns truth terms, ratherthan the concepttruth or the propertytruth. According to this view, which we can calltermprimitivism, the word ‘true’ (and perhaps all othertruth terms) is not analyzable in terms of more fundamental linguisticexpressions.

However, there is another key respect in which minimalism and termprimitivism diverge. Horwich’s view is that when we explain what‘true’ means, the best strategy is to identify the factabout how ‘true’ is used which explains why it means whatit does. According to Horwich, this fact is that the community ofspeakers who use ‘true’ are disposed to accept everyinstance of the Equivalence Schema in the absence of supporting evidence:^[9]

(ES): The proposition thatp is true iffp.

This leads Horwich to conclude that while ‘true’ cannot beexplicitly defined, it can beimplicitlydefined—namely, by the Equivalence Schema (Horwich 1998: 121).^[10]

It is here that minimalism parts company with term primitivism.(ES) contains the term ‘proposition’, and the minimalist takes(ES) to implicitly define ‘true’. This means that if theminimalist held that the meaning of ‘true’ is morefundamental than that of ‘proposition’, then theirimplicit definition of ‘true’ would be viciously circular.Being cognizant of this, Horwich argues that the meaning of‘proposition’ is more fundamental than that of‘true’ (Horwich 1998: 103, §§22, 32, Postscript§3; see also 2010: 50–53).

Putting the pieces together, this means that while the minimalistdenies that ‘true’ is explicitly definable, theynevertheless accept that ‘true’ is implicitly definable interms of a more fundamental expression—namely,‘proposition’. Insofar as implicitly defining a term isone (though certainly not the only) way of analyzing it, theminimalist is committed to holding that ‘true’ isanalyzable in terms of a more fundamental linguistic expression. Inthis respect, minimalism and term primitivism are fundamentally atodds. (For a similar observation, see Horwich 1998: 138–139. SeeFischer & Zicchetti 2023: 1323 and Nicolai 2021 for furtherdiscussion of deflationism and primitivism about truth terms.)

Primitivist and deflationary theories also differ in important ways atboth the conceptual and metaphysical levels. Regarding the concepttruth, these two sorts of theory convergeinsofar as they entail thattruth cannot beanalyzed in terms of concepts likecorrespondence,coherence,orverifiability. As discussed in§3.7, however, they diverge when it comes totruth’sexplanatory power. Primitivists (mostnotably Davidson and Asay) argue that truth has explanatory power,e.g., in theories of the nature of linguistic meaning or the nature ofassertion, whereas deflationists deny that it has such explanatorypower (this point is echoed by Candlish & Damnjanovic 2007:§3.8; cf. Fisher 2014: 282).

Turning totruth, deflationists, like primitivists,characteristically hold thattruth cannot be defined oranalyzed in terms of more fundamental properties or relations (see,e.g., Horwich 1998: 143, 2010: ch. 1, 13, 15–16, 38, 2013: 57,59; see also Fisher 2014: 283). However, there are at least threesignificant respects in which deflationary and primitivist theories oftruth diverge.

The first is that certain deflationists—including Ayer (1946),Brandom (2005), Grover (1992), Quine (1948, 1970, 1987), Ramsey(1927), and Strawson (1949, 1950)—have denied or else would denythattruth exists. These deflationists—we might callthempure deflationists, since they advocate an eliminativemetaphysics of truth—must clearly reject primitivism abouttruth. This is because primitivism abouttruthentails thattruth does exist. (Cp. Strollo 2023: 925.Merricks 2007: ch. 8, §V emphasizes this difference when arguingthat his primitivism is preferable to deflationism. On therelationship between Davidson’s conceptual primitivism and puredeflationism, see Salis 2019).

A second detail to mention is that deflationists who do taketruth to exist—we can call themmoderatedeflationists—characteristically hold thattruthlacks explanatory power (see, e.g., Dodd 2000: 133, 149–155;Horwich 1998: Postscript §7; and M. Williams 2002: §5; forfurther discussion, see Wyatt 2016: §III.3). It is open to aprimitivist abouttruth to deny this claim, much as Davidsonand Asay do with regard to the concepttruth.This means that when itcomes to the choice between primitivism and deflationism abouttruth, a central consideration is again whethertruth has or lacks explanatory power (cp. Edwards 2013: 9;Fisher 2014: 286–287; Strollo 2023: 925–926, §7; andWyatt 2016: 380–381).

A third key difference is that primitivists and moderate deflationistsoffer differentreasons for thinking thattruthcannot be defined or analyzed in terms of more fundamental propertiesor relations (see Dodd 2000: ch. 5, n. 14, and cp. Fisher 2014:285–286). The distinctive deflationary reason, due to Horwich(1998: 2–5), is that we can apparently explain the cognitive andlinguistic behavior oftruth and‘true’ by supposing that they are mereexpressivedevices. The specific deflationary claims here are that:

to possesstruth/understand the meaning of‘true’, one must be disposed to accept every instance of(ES) in the absence of supporting evidence and
the primary function oftruth and‘true’ is to enable us to have thoughts and makeutterances that we couldn’t otherwise have or make, due to ourcognitive and linguistic limitations.

If these claims are correct, Horwich argues (1998: 2), then

[“true”] is not used to attribute to certain entities(i.e. statements, beliefs, etc.) an ordinary sort of property—acharacteristic whose underlying nature will account for its relationsto other ingredients of reality.

By contrast, the motivations for primitivist theories oftruth are quite different. A review of§2.2,§2.3,§3.3, and§3.4 of this entry will make this very apparent. (For more on thedifferences between primitivist and deflationary theories, see McGrath1997: 84–85, 2000 [2013: 40] and Sosa 1993a: §D, 2001:§5.)

4.3 Primitivism and axiomatic theories of truth

A final connection to explore is that between primitivist andaxiomatic theories of truth. (For discussion of the motivations for and details of variousaxiomatic theories of truth, see Fujimoto & Halbach 2018; Halbach2011; and Horsten 2011.) Axiomatic theories of truth concern truthpredicates that are meant to apply to sentences of particular formallanguages. Unlike traditional theories of truth such ascorrespondence, coherence, or pragmatic theories, axiomatic theoriesaren’t founded on the presupposition that these truth predicatesare definable. Advocates of axiomatic theories wish to avoid thispresupposition in light of Tarski’s theorem concerning theundefinability of truth for certain formal languages (§3.1).

Rather than attempting to define the truth predicates with which theyare concerned, advocates of axiomatic theories propose axioms thatgovern the behavior of these predicates. For instance, suppose that weare interested in offering a theory of truth for an object languageL which does not contain any semantic vocabulary. Usingcorner quotes as a naming device, a particularly straightforward axiomfor a truth predicateT that applies only toL-sentences would be (for discussion of axiomatictheories of truth which follow along these basic lines, see Fujimoto& Halbach 2018: §27.4.1; Halbach 2011: ch. 7; and Horsten2011: ch. 4):

(Dis): For allL-sentences \(\phi\):\(T(\ulcorner\phi\urcorner)\) iff \(\phi\).

In this way, axiomatic theories treat their target truth predicates asprimitive predicates. However, it is also important to note thatendorsing a particular axiomatic theory of truth doesn’t commitone to holding that the truth predicate that it concerns isundefinable. Kentaro Fujimoto and Volker Halbach (2018: 719)bring this point out particularly well (see also Halbach 2011:3–4, 7–8):

Axiomatic approaches to truth, knowledge, or other notions do not ruleout the possibility of a definition for the notion in question: anotion that is taken as primitive can turn out to be definable afterall. On an axiomatic approach, one just does not presuppose that thenotion is definable. Once it has been set out what is expected fromthe notion, one can investigate whether a notion satisfying theseconditions is definable or eliminable in some sense.

This fact about axiomatic theories of truth sheds some light on thesense in which they are primitivist theories of truth. Here, it isuseful to recall Brons’ contention that Wang Chong was adefacto primitivist (§2.1). The idea is that although Wang never explicitly claims that theconcepttruth is primitive, this conceptnevertheless operates as an undefined concept within his body ofthought. Iftruth so operates, one can endorseall of Wang’s views without committing oneself to thedefinability oftruth. However, that Wang is ade facto primitivist doesn’t entail thatanyone who endorses Wang’s views is committed to theundefinability oftruth.

The motivations for and details of axiomatic theories of truth are ofcourse very different from Wang’s motivations and the details ofhis writings. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that axiomatic theoriesof truth arede facto primitivist theories. In anaxiomatic theory of truth, the truth predicates that the theoryaxiomatizes operate as primitive predicates, but the theorydoesn’t entail that these predicates are undefinable.Accordingly, as Fujimoto and Halbach underscore, someone who endorsesan axiomatic theory isn’t committed to the definability of thetruth predicates that the theory axiomatizes, nor are they arecommitted to these predicates’ undefinability.

5. Empirical significance: primitivism and false belief attribution

A final issue to consider is the empirical significance of primitivisttheories of truth. Conceptual primitivism is particularly relevanthere, as it may find support from the extensive body of research onfalse-belief tasks. (For further discussion, see Nulty 2008and Ulatowski & Wyatt 2023. On this and other relevant sources ofempirical evidence concerning truth, see Asay 2021b: S627–S628,§5, 2024, 2025; Brons 2016: §1; Burge 2018: 425–427;Hinzen 2013; Ulatowski 2017; von Heiseler 2020; Wyatt 2018; and Wyatt& Ulatowski 2024.) False-belief tasks are employed bypsychologists to studytheory of mind, which is our cognitivecapacity to attribute mental states in attempting to make sense of thebehavior of agents (cp. Spaulding 2020: 1). In particular, a largenumber of psychologists have used false-belief tasks to determine whenhumans, as well as other primates such as great apes, attribute falsebeliefs (see Ulatowski & Wyatt 2023). In their landmark study,Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner describe a familiar type of false-belieftask as follows (1983: 106):

In order to test subjects’ comprehension of the otherperson’s wrong belief, stories like the following wereconstructed: A story character, Maxi, puts chocolate into a cupboardx. In his absence his mother displaces the chocolate fromx into cupboardy. Subjects have to indicate the boxwhere Maxi will look for the chocolate when he returns. Only when theyare able to represent Maxi’s wrong belief (‘Chocolate isinx’) apart from what they themselves know to be thecase (‘Chocolate is iny’) will they be able topoint correctly to boxx. This procedure tests whethersubjects have an explicit and definite representation of theother’s wrong belief. Yet, there is neither a problem in framingthe test question by using mental verbs (e.g., ‘What does Maxibelieve?’) nor are subjects required to verbalize theirknowledge about other’s beliefs since a mere pointing gesturesuffices.

The body of evidence from the false-belief task literature seems tobear directly on at least some varieties of conceptual primitivism.Consider, for instance, Asay’s Fundamentality thesis (§3.7).truth is a fundamental concept inAsay’s sense ifftruth is either innateor among the initial set of concepts that we acquire in the course ofcognitive development. Asay (2020: 106) puts this point crisply whenhe remarks that

truth is among our most basic and fundamental concepts, a conceptwithout which, as Davidson aptly claims, “we would have noconcepts at all” (1996 [2005: 20]).

Thus, if the body of evidence on false-belief tasks strongly supportseither of the hypotheses at issue here, then it supports theFundamentality thesis in turn and to that extent, supports conceptualprimitivism.

Our current data should be at least somewhat encouraging to advocatesof Fundamentality. Baillargeon, Buttelmann, and Southgate (2018: 112)point out that

[t]here are now over 30 published reports, spanning 11 differentmethods, providing convergent evidence for false-belief understandingin children ages 6–36 months.

If these studies are on the right track, then it looks as though veryyoung children are able to attribute false beliefs. Since they canattribute false beliefs, it would seem that these children mustpossess the conceptfalsity. Moreover, it ishighly probable that if they possessfalsity,then they also possesstruth. So absentcompelling counterevidence that children acquiretruthin virtue of possessing more fundamentalconcepts, it can be reasonably inferred that the body of false-belieftask evidence supports Fundamentality.

This line of argument seems promising, though properly evaluating itwill require attention to a number of issues. One is whether we shouldfollow researchers such as Baillargeon, Buttelmann, and Southgate inoffering amentalistic interpretation of the false-belieftask data, according to which they indicate that young children areable to attribute mental states like belief. Tyler Burge (2018) hasrecently proposed an alternative, non-mentalistic interpretation ofthe data, and the jury is out on which of these (and a number ofother) interpretations is the best (for criticism of Burge’sinterpretation, see Carruthers 2020 and Jacob 2020).

Another relevant issue is whether, as Peter Carruthers (2020: §4)has argued, infants can represent beliefs while lacking anexplicit—detachable, symbolicallyrepresented—concepttruth (as well as,presumably, an explicit conceptfalsity).Carruthers’ proposal suggests that passing some false-belieftasks, e.g., the active helping task used by Buttelmann, Carpenter,and Tomasello (2009), may require possession oftruth,whereas passing others, e.g., thechange-of-location task of Wimmer and Perner (1983), may not.Accordingly, it may be that only some of the false-belief task datalend support to Fundamentality.

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