A singular term is a term such as a proper name, a demonstrativepronoun, like ‘this [one]’ (‘hic’ inLatin), or a combination of a demonstrative pronoun and a common name,like (‘this man’), (‘hic homo’ inLatin). This is the stable list of discrete terms we find in terministtracts from the beginning of the thirteenth century on. What they havein common is that they all signify exactly one individual thing. Theseexpressions, as well as the metalinguistic expressions used todescribe them, whether individually or as a whole (‘propername’, ‘pronoun’, ‘singular/discreteterm’), were the subject of in-depth inquiries during the MiddleAges. Indeed, the problem of the signification of individuals is sorich and important that, in a way, it presents a mirror image of themore famous problem of universals in medieval philosophy.

The existence of singular terms raises various questions about howthey function within a language. Do proper names have a sense as wellas a reference? Is there a real difference between proper names andcomplex expressions such as ‘this man’? What aboutsingular terms whose referent has ceased to exist, such as‘Caesar’, or does not exist yet, such as‘Antichrist’? If they do have a sense, what is it? Is it,for proper names, the proper quality of the grammarians, some‘incommunicable quality’, the ‘Platonicity’mentioned by Boethius? How can a proper name such as‘Socrates’ be a substantial or non-accidental name if thequality it signifies is merely a bundle of accidents? How do singularterms acquire their sense? How is this sense transmitted from onespeaker to another? Is a demonstrative pronoun purely referential? Ifone believes in a language of thought, or mental language, as did manymedieval thinkers, what is the mental correlate of a singularterm?

While medieval thinkers did not produce any treatises devoted tosingular terms, their writings do contain answers to these questions,or at least, to similar questions they themselves posed in the contextof their own semantic theories. To discover medieval views of singularterms, one must consult a variety of sources from grammar, especiallyin works by Priscian (sixth century CE), where the grammar of propernames was presented in a philosophically-tinged terminology, in logic(with the medieval interpretations of singular terms inPorphyry’sIsagoge and Aristotle’sCategories,De interpretatione, andPriorAnalytics), in philosophy (especially in commentaries onAristotle’sPhysics,De anima, andMetaphysics), and theology. In the Middle Ages and still atthe beginning of the sixteenth century, singular terms were discussedin treatises devoted to types of terms in termnist logic or intreatises onsophismata.

Singular terms became a major topic of interest during the firstdecades of twelfth century, emerging from the rich dialogue that wasoccurring between the disciplines of grammar and logic. There werenumerous efforts to develop a semantics of proper names, with the ideathat proper names should have a special kind of direct reference whilestill being distinct from pronouns. The idea that logically propernames should be distinct from ordinary, grammatically proper names waspresent from the beginning. During the thirteenth century, debatesabout the semantics of proper names flourished, where the notion ofproper names as ‘temporary’ names, not unlike pronouns,became more and more problematical. After Peter Abelard’sremarkable theory of proper names (in the 1110s), the commentaries ofJohn Buridan (d. before 1361) provided the most comprehensive andcoherent medieval theory of singular terms, one which remainedinfluential into the sixteenth century. Paul of Venice’streatise is also worthy of mention here, despite the difficulty ofconstruing many of his claims. During the sixteenth century, singularconcepts continued to be a subject of discussion in commentaries onAristotle’sPhysics andDe anima, but thelogicians who came after Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) offeredonly cursory treatments of the subject. With a few exceptions, such asthe logic of Hobbes and the Port Royal logic (see Pécharman,forthcoming), we have to wait until the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies for the problems that exercised John Buridan in thefourteenth century to be fully appreciated once more.

• 1. Different Types of Singular Terms
• 2. Various Approaches to Singular Terms in Medieval Thought
  • 1.1 Proper Names and Pronouns in Grammar
  • 2.2 Synonymy, Metaphors and Equivocation
  • 2.3 Demonstrative Pronouns and Demonstrative Expressions in Logic
  • 2.4 Singular Terms in Logic
  • 2.5 Singular Terms in Theology
• 3. The Semantic of Singular Terms in Twelfth-Century Logic and Grammar
  • 3.1 New Elements
  • 3.2 Singular Terms in Peter Abelard’s Logic
• 4. The Problem of Proper Names and Proper Naming in Thirteenth-Century Logic and Philosophy
  • 4.1 Thirteenth-Century Novelties
  • 4.2 Singular Terms in Terminist Logic
  • 4.3 Sophismatic Discussions of Singular Terms
  • 4.4 The Metaphysics of Proper Names: Can Particulars Have Proper Names?
• 5. Buridan’s Theory of Singular Terms and its Influence
  • 5.1 Buridan on Singular Terms and Concepts
  • 5.2 Extended Uses of Singular Terms and Non-Connotative (Non-Rich) Singular Concepts
  • 5.3 Proper Names and Identity Through Time
• Bibliography
  • Primary Sources
  • Secondary Sources
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Different Types of Singular Terms

Obviously, expressions such as ‘Socrates’ and ‘this[one]’ existed long before they began to be thought about as‘proper names’ and ‘pronouns’ respectively,whether in technical grammars (the distinction between proper andcommon names being fixed around the first century BC), or in medievallogic, as ‘singular terms’ or ‘discreteterms’.

Medieval authors had only the term ‘nomen’available to them, whereas in English we have two expressions:‘noun’, typically used in grammars to designategrammatical function, and ‘name’, a broader expressionused in everyday life but also in logic. In order to reflect thesingle word in Latin and to capture both the linguistic and thephilosophical dimensions of the debate, we will use the term‘proper names’ in what follows, even in circumstanceswhere ‘proper nouns’ would be preferablegrammatically.

The idea of singular terms as a specific linguistic and philosophicalphenomenon was present in Aristotle’s logic, well before theadvent of technical grammar, most influentially in his definition ofsingular propositions inDe interpretatione 7 as containingterms such as ‘Socrates’, as opposed to particular orindefinite propositions with terms such as ‘man’. It wasalso present in theCategories 1, with the idea that firstsubstance signifies a ‘this something [hocaliquid]’, and in Porphyry’sIsagoge, wherethe notion of an ‘individual predicable’is introduced. Theexamples given by Porphyry are ‘the son of Sophroniscus’(provided he has only one son), ‘Socrates’, ‘thiswhite’, and ‘this one coming’ (II/15), to whichBoethius added ‘this [one]’ in his commentaries on theIsagoge. Porphyry says: “Such things are said to beindividuals, since each of them consists of properties whosecollection will never be the same in another” (Isagoge,II/15). Boethius then interprets Porphyrian properties as bundles ofaccidents (In Isagogen editio prima, p. 81, 26–82, 9),thereby providing crucial materials for the medieval theory ofindividuation by accidents (see Brumberg-Chaumont 2013a).

It should be noted that there are no expressions such as‘Socrates’ in Aristotle’sCategories, whereAristotle instead uses the term ‘a certain man’ to signifyfirst substances (Gk.ho tis anthrôpos). The Greekexpression had rather a deictic sense. Yet it was translated byBoethius as ‘aliquis homo [some man]’, that is,using the same expression that was used to indicate particularpropositions in Aristotle’s logic (as in ‘some man is ananimal’), as opposed to singular propositions (as in‘Socrates is a man’). This is probably the reason why theBoethian translation tended to be replaced by proper names incommentaries on theCategories after Porphyry, as well as bynew expressions, such as ‘this man’ (hic homo),introduced by twelfth-century commentators. Expressions such as‘Socrates’ or ‘this [one]’ began to bedescribed using the grammatical categories of proper names andpronouns by logicians beginning in the twelfth century.

Discussions of singular terms were frequently related to theaforementioned passage from Porphyry’sIsagoge (II,15), which offered medieval logicians the basis for a classificationof types of singular terms. This classification changed over time,reflecting changing paradigms in logic. For example, inBuridan’s classification (see §5 below), the ‘vagueindidvual’ is ‘this man’, while for Simon ofFaversham, the ‘vague individual’ is ‘someman’ (Commentary on theTractatus, ed. De Rijk, pp. 88and 93). In Porphyry’s passage, we find ‘the son ofSophroniscus’, that is, what we would now call an indefinitedescription, given that the stipulation that Sophroniscus has only oneson is not part of the phrase but merely background information. Thisfact is enough to ensure that the phrase refers to only oneindividual, but it does not alter its linguistic generality. There waslittle specific discussion of definite descriptions, but it seems theywould have been treated in the same way. John Buridan gives the mostdirect treatment in his analysis of the phrase, ‘the firstChristian king of France [primus rex Franciechristianus]’ (In metaphysicem VII/20). This hetook to be general, insofar as it is made up of common concepts. Inanother place (In metaphysicem VII/18), he considers thephrase, ‘the largest and brightest heavenly body [planetamaximus et lucidissimus]’, used to refer to the sun,remarking that the very same phrase could, without any new imposition,supposit for a second sun if God were to create another sun similar toor greater than the first sun in size and brightness. He could beinterpreted as saying that the very same phrase could, without beinggiven any new signification, refer to different individuals indifferent possible worlds (see Ashworth 2004a, pp. 128–129).

2. Various Approaches to Singular Terms in Medieval Thought

1.1 Proper Names and Pronouns in Grammar

The ancient Stoics made a clear distinction between names (whichbecame the proper names of technical grammar) and appellations (whichbecame appellative names) as two different parts of speech. For theStoics, names such as ‘Socrates’ did not generatedeterminate propositions, unlike articulations (‘this[one]’), that is, what we now know as ‘pronouns’;rather, they produced intermediary propositions, in the same manner aspropositions with appellations (‘man’). This is because,unlike articulations/pronouns, names do not guarantee the presence orexistence of the individual (see Brunschwig 1984). The fact that thename ‘Socrates’ could – provided it is not equivocal– identify the exact same individual as ‘this [one]’was considered irrelevant. However, the differentiating andidentifying properties of proper names became crucial in Greekgrammatical and logical theories developed during the late ancientperiod and the Middle Ages (see Brumberg-Chaumont 2013a).

During the Middle Ages, the most important ancient grammatical textwas Priscian’sInstitutiones, a treatise inspired bythe Greek grammar of Apollonius Dyscolus (second century CE), whichwas strongly influenced by philosophical concepts. According toPriscian, thenomen is the first principal part of speech. Itsignifies, as proper to this part of speech, “a substance and aquality”. Names are divided into common or appellative names andproper names. Because proper names are a species of name and hence afully-fledged part of language, they were understood to have the samesemantic properties as common names, including a sense. According toPriscian, proper names such as ‘Socrates’ signify aparticular substance and its proper quality. Indeed,‘Socrates’ signifies a substance no differently than theother names of substance, i.e., special and generic names such as‘man’ and ‘animal’, so that the quality itsignifies must be a substantial quality. Names of substances areopposed to adjectives signifying qualities, quantities, or number (forthe two (or three) senses of ‘substance’ and‘quality’, see Baratin 1989 and Brumberg-Chaumont2007/2011). Following Apollonius, Priscian says that proper names alsosignify the quality of the corresponding species. Thus, if I say‘Virgil’, the common quality of man will also beunderstood. When combined with the Porphyrian definition ofindividuality as a bundle of properties or accidents, this gave riseto theories according to which the proper quality signified by aproper name contains the essential quality of the species, associatedwith a bundle of identifying accidents (see Brumberg-Chaumont2013a).

As proper to this part of speech, pronouns signify the substance only,thanks to their deictic power. The type of pronoun we are interestedin here is what medieval grammarians called the primitive(non-derived) demonstrative pronoun, which includes personal pronounssuch as ‘I’ and demonstratives such as ‘this[one]’. Demonstration (construed as the act of pointing tosomething) can be either direct, when something is right beforeone’s eyes, or intellectual, or a mixture of the two. Settingaside intellectual demonstration, which occurs when the object isincorporeal or absent, the use of a demonstrative pronoun in normalcircumstances has the implication that the object pointed to must bepresent to the speaker. Pronouns were used only instead of propernames (not of common names) because they both signify one thing.Priscian, following Apollonius, also noticed that the deicticdemonstration performed by pronouns includes, as an incidentalcomponent, the proper quality belonging to the individual demonstrated(Institutiones XVII, 71, GL III, p. 149, 8–10).

However, against the earlier tradition, Priscian contended that properqualities will never permit us to designate one single individualunless that individual is demonstrated with a pronoun; the inabilityof proper qualities to do this is stated in principle, i.e., withouttaking into account the problem of homonymy (InstitutionsXVII, 63; GL III, p. 145, 16–146, 6; see Baratin 2006). On thecontrary, the power of proper names to designate one individual(setting aside homonymy) was crucial for his model (Apollonius), as itprecisely explained why pronouns can be used instead of proper namesonly. This somewhat puzzling aspect of Priscian’s doctrine wasignored by medieval thinkers, who maintained that proper names andpronouns have a similar (although not identical) referentialpower.

2.2 Synonymy, Metaphor, and Equivocation

Proper names sometimes exhibited the features of common names invarious respects. For instance, they could be used metaphorically ormetonymically. ‘Achilles’ can refer to strong men;likewise, ‘Nero’ was used to signify a cruel man. Moreimportantly, ‘Marcus’ and ‘Tullius’, as twonames of the Roman orator Marcus Tullius Cicero, were favoriteexamples of synonymous terms. As such, they featured in discussions ofthe problem of intentional contexts. From classical times on, propernames such as ‘Ajax’ and ‘Alexander’ providedstandard examples of equivocal terms. However, it was obvious thatthere were reasons for giving one proper name rather than another.This suggested to at least some authors that proper names need not beregarded as chance equivocals. In his commentary on theCategories, Paul of Venice claimed that some names, such as‘Aristotle’ and ‘Plato’ are purely equivocal.However, if several men are called ‘John’ because theywere born on the Feast of St. John, the name ‘John’ shouldbe regarded as a univocal term (In praedicamenta, ms.Bodleian, Canon. misc. 452, f. 81ra; see Ashworth 2003, p. 130). Heoverlooked the distinction made by his contemporary, John Dorp,between a common reason for giving the same name to two children, andthe different singular concepts which that name signified. Dorp arguedthat a common reason was not enough for univocity(Compendium, sig. 2rb). In the sixteenth century, Domingo deSoto used the newly-rediscovered commentary on theCategoriesby Philoponus (wrongly attributed to Ammonius) to introduce a new typeof deliberate equivocal, “from hope and memory”. One mightcall one’s son ‘Plato’ in the hope of his becoming aphilosopher, or ‘Nicomachus’ in memory of one’sfather, or ‘Charles’ in honor of the Emperor (for more onthe topic, see Ashworth 2003).

In Priscian, appellative names are “naturally” common tothe several things they name, whereas proper names are“naturally” the name of only one individual(Institutiones II, 24–25; GL II, pp. 58, 14–59,1). During the late Middle Ages, while almost everyone except Paul ofVenice agreed that proper names must always be equivocal when used oftwo different people, not everyone wanted to say that they wereunivocal when used of the same person. The reason had to do with thedefinition of a univocal term as involving a concept or aquality/nature in principle predicable of several individuals. Theusual solution was simply to redefine ‘univocal’ so as toinclude proper names, but theCategories commentaries byAlbert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen, and Paul of Venice containfairly extensive discussions of the issue. Both Albert(Quaestiones in Artem Veterem, p. 294, 345, 302) and Paul(In predicamenta, ms Bodleian, Canon. msc. 452, 83rb-va,unpuslished see Ashworth 2003, p. 239) agreed in opposition toMarsilius (Quaestiones in libri predicamentorum, Bodleian ms.Canon misc. 381, f. 18rb-va; see Ashworth 2003, p. 240) that a propername could be equivocal without being said to be univocal when used ofone person.

2.3 Demonstrative Pronouns and Demonstrative Expressions in Logic

The standard examples of demonstratives were ‘this [one]’or ‘this man’. The mental correlate in the second case isa common concept individuated by a demonstrative act. Because‘this [one]’ is tied to particular demonstrative acts,Buridan, like many other logicians in the fourteenth, fifteenth, andearly sixteenth centuries, believed that genuinely referring uses ofthe vocal expression ‘this man’ are equivocal . What Isignify when I say ‘this man’, pointing to Socrates, isquite different from what you signify when you say ‘thisman’, pointing to Plato, and every use of the phrase requires anew imposition (see §5.1 below). As de Soto pointed out(Summule, f. xix rb), this is quite compatible with the claimthat ‘this man’ has an unchanging general sense understoodby all speakers of Latin. It is also compatible with failures ofreference of various sorts, as Buridan and others frequently remarked.I can say ‘this man’ and point to a donkey (and theproposition will be false), or to nothing (and the proposition will beincongruent, having no truth-value). Similarly, I can utter‘this chimera’, a phrase that can never have a referentsince chimeras are impossible objects.

One might suppose that indicating or pointing is all that ademonstrative pronoun does. As we have seen, Priscian claimed thatwhereas a name signifies substance and quality (or a substance“with a quality” in the medieval formulation, i.e., areferent plus its property), the pronoun signifies the substancealone, without quality, i.e., a bare referent. However, medievalgrammarians and logicians tended to demand some identification of theobject denoted. For the use of the pronoun alone, it should beremembered that Latin grammar does not distinguish betweendemonstrative adjectives, as in ‘This man is white’, anddemonstrative pronouns, as in ‘This is a white man’. TheLatin termhic is always a pronoun, so that ‘this man[hic homo]’ was probably spontaneously/linguisticallyunderstood as something like ‘this one, a man’. InEnglish, one does not really say ‘This runs’, speaking ofa man, which is whyhic has been translated here as‘this [one]’.

The sense of ‘hic’ was the subject of in-depthlogical reflections. For Dorp and other later logicians, ordinarydemonstrative pronouns such as ‘this [one]’ require thepresence of an identifying concept. This raised the question of whatit is in the mind that corresponds to the pronoun, a question whichimplicates the more general issue of the mental correlate ofsyncategorematic terms, that is, terms that perform some logicalfunction (e.g., ‘not’, ‘and’,‘or’), as opposed to categorematic terms, which aretypically nouns and adjectives that fall under Aristotle’scategories. Some thinkers, such as Ockham, thought there are nopronouns in mental language (see §5 below). One could argue thatdemonstrative pronouns are disguised categorematic terms and that themental correlate of ‘This man runs’ is ‘The manSocrates runs’ (see Ashworth 2004a, p. 131–132). On themore common view, pronouns are subordinated to special demonstrativeor relational acts in the mind. If the pronoun is joined to a noun ina spoken phrase, then it represents a purely syncategorematic act inthe mind. If it appears alone in a spoken phrase, there are twopossibilities, as John Dorp argued (Compendium, sig. b 2ra).First, it could be taken to be subordinated to a mental phrasecontaining both a syncategorematic act and a name, in which case itwould be legitimate. Alternatively, it could be taken as purelysyncategorematic, but this use would be illegitimate because there isno indication of the thing pointed to and a purely syncategorematicterm cannot be the subject of a proposition. You cannot successfullyentertain the proposition ‘This [one] is running’ withoutidentifying the ‘this’ in some way. However, it seems thatthe identification need not involve a sortal concept; a singularconcept is sufficient (more on this in §5 below, in connectionwith Buridan’s theory).

2.4 Singular Terms in Logic

One important problem raised by the use of proper names in logic isthat proper names are supposed to signify a proper quality whereaccidental features are included, which would mean that they areaccidental names or “connotative” terms, following thefourteenth-century terminology. Singular terms need to correspond toqualities or concepts that would have to be singular, simple, andessential, i.e., non-connotative or “absolute” in thefourteenth-century terminology). But this seemed difficult to achieve.Another major preoccupation was the fact that in many theories, propernames seemed to have only a momentary reference or even to depend onthe existence of their bearer for their signification. Yet anotherproblem was the fact that proper names were described as not beingpredicable, following Aristotle’sCategories, or asbeing predicable of only one thing, following Porphyry’sIsagoge, whereas they could also be predicated in apredication ‘by accident’ according to thePriorAnalytics (see Ashworth 2004b).

The use of singular terms in inferences raised various issues. Tobegin with syllogistic: despite the fact that proper names never occurin Aristotle’s text as examples in valid syllogisms or even inexpository syllogisms, proper names were soon introduced bycommentators. This created new problems. Some logicians offered astandard account of the Aristotelian syllogism centered on theuniversal and particular quantification of general terms, but at thesame time included examples featuring singular terms, e.g.,‘Every man is an animal, Socrates is a man; therefore, Socratesis an animal’. One such logician was Lambert of Auxerre (orLagny), author of a widely read textbookSumma Lamberti. Moredetailed presentations of syllogistic included an account of theexpository syllogism, which is in the third figure and has a singularmiddle term, as well as of other syllogisms with singular terms. Thisseemed to go against generally granted syllogistic principles such as“One premise must always be universal” and “Nothingfollows from two particular premises”. Lambert dealt with theformer problem when addressing enthymematic inferences with a singularterm by appealing to formulations such as “Everything that isSocrates is a man (instead of ‘Socrates is a man’ as theunformulated premisse), Socrates runs, therefore a man runs”. Hethereby reduces “Socrates runs, therefore a man runs” to asyllogism (Summa Lamberti, p. 139–140, tr. Maloney p.172). Buridan prefered to reject the first principle and John Dorpexplained that the second principle did not apply unless‘particular’ was used in a narrow sense of ‘neitheruniversal nor singular’. Robert Kilwardby, who wrote aninfluential commentary on thePrior Analytics in the 1240s inParis, wanted to resist the introduction of any kind of singular termin instances of canonical valid syllogistic combinations (he usedsingular terms only for exporitory syllogisms), allowing onlyparticular propositions (see §4.4 below). In the seventeenthcentury, some logicians treated singular propositions as equivalent touniversal propositions, but, as Dorp’s remarks suggest, medievallogicians preferred to classify singular propositions as particularpropositions (see Ashworth 1970, pp. 19 ff.; Ashworth 1974, pp. 247ff.).

Singular terms were also part of the theory of suppositional descent,e.g., when one infers from ‘Every man is running’:‘Socrates is running’, ‘Plato is running’,‘Cicero is running’, etc.; or ‘this man isrunning’, and ‘that man is running’, etc. In theearlier Middle Ages, logicians did not seem to worry about the use ofproper names as opposed to demonstrative phrases, but there was somediscussion of possible problems in the later period. One problemconcerned the fact that there are different types of singular name.Men are called ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, and‘Cicero,’ but donkeys are called ‘Browny(Brunellus)’, ‘Tawny (Favellus)’,and ‘Little Grey (Grisellus)’, so what happens ifsomeone produces the inference, ‘Every man is running;therefore, Brownie is running and Tawny is running’? After all,this inference has exactly the same logical form as ‘Every manis running; therefore, Socrates is running and Plato isrunning’. Moreover, even if one has the correct type of propername, its bearer may die, rendering the conclusion false while thepremise remains true. If one adopts the preferred solution ofreplacing proper names with demonstrative phrases, a similar problemarises. If ‘this [one]’ does not succeed in pointing to aliving man, then ‘Every man is running; therefore, this man isrunning’ would be an inference with a true premise and a falseconclusion. The problem could be dealt with by adding premises toensure that the very same things referred to by the true premise(s)are also referred to by the demonstrative phrases in the conclusion.Many other approaches and solutions to this problem were discussedduring the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries (see §§ 4and 5 below).

Medieval logicians also spent a lot of time thinking about he problemof referring to deceased individuals. There were three issues. First,there was the problem that the same words are used to speak of, e.g.,a living person and of a corpse. Following Aristotle(Meteorology 389b31) and Augustine (On Dialectic),logicians were content to accept that if I point to a corpse and say‘This is a man’ or ‘This is Peter’, then‘man’ and ‘Peter’ are being used equivocally,in some different or extended sense. Second, there was the problem ofestablishing a referent for such propositions as ‘Adam was inParadise’ or ‘Adam is dead’. Here supposition theorycame into play, for it allowed reference not just to present objects,but also to past, future, and possible objects. Third, there was theproblem which was the focus of special attention in the second half ofthe thirteenth century, namely, whether the proposition ‘Caesaris a man’ is true, considering that ‘Caesar’ is usedfor an individual that has existed but no longer exists, whereas‘Socrates’ is supposed to refer to a presently-existingindividual. This question had to do in large part with theinterpretation of ‘is’. The issue here is whether propernames lose their signification when their bearer dies. If they do, itseems that any discussion of the past will be senseless. The solutionsillustrate the importance of the mind in signification. For instance,Boethius of Dacia said that ‘Socrates’ signifies the sameindividual that has existed after Socrates’s death even ifSocrates does not exist any longer because the signification of wordsdepends on intellection, which itself does not depend on the existenceof things (Boethii Daci Aliorumque Sophismata, p.127–128). An opposing view was presented by Roger Bacon, whoheld that proper names are radically equivocal because they aresubject to being reimposed on the representation when the individualnamed ceases to exist (De signis, §26). The person whocries out ‘John is dead’, intending to refer either to athing in the past or to a corpse, has given a new imposition to theword ‘John’, even if his grief prevents him from realizingit.

2.5 Singular Terms in Theology

Proper names began to be discussed by the Cappadocian Fathers inconnection with theological matters (see Kalligas 2002; Robertson2002). Problems of naming often arose in theological contexts andAquinas’s own list of reasons for bestowing proper names is partof his discussion of whether Christ was appropriately named‘Jesus’. The term ‘God’ was the focus ofparticular attention. Praepositinus of Cremona said that properlyspeaking, ‘God’ is neither a proper name nor a commonterm, whereas other early theologians suggested that it is a propername because it refers to a reality that can only be singular. Themajority view was expressed by Aquinas, who argued that the term‘God’ is similar to the term ‘sun’ insofar aswe know that both have only one referent, although in the case of God,the termcan have only one referent. Even so,‘God’ is a common term. For many later medieval logicians,the term ‘God’ appears along with ‘sun’ and‘moon’ as examples of words that are not singular terms,despite the fact that they supposit for only one thing.

The Trinity caused particular problems for logicians because of theunique relation between the three persons and the one divine essencewhich is, as Ockham put it in hisSumma logicae, “oneand simple and one in number and singular to the highest degree, andyet in several things.” Inferences such as ‘This divineessence is the Father, this divine essence is the Son; therefore, theFather is the Son’ seem to have true premises asserting anidentity between singular things, yet the conclusion is unacceptable.Various solutions were found, including some that explored varioussenses of identity and different types of predication (for moreparalogisms of the Trinity, see Gelber 1974 and 2004; Boehner 1944).The Roman Catholic doctrine of transsubstantiation led to a discussionof demonstrative phrases. When the priest elevates the bread duringthe Eucharist and utters the words ‘This is my body’, thesubstance is said to change from bread into the body of Christ. What,then, is the referent of the word ‘this’? (seeRosier-Catach 2004).

3. The Semantic of Singular Terms in Twelfth-Century Logic and Grammar

3.1 New Elements

Priscian’sInstitutiones, rich with philosophicalinsights (see the contributions by Luthala, Ebbesen, and Garcea inHotltzet al. 2009), was the subject ofphilosophically-inspired commentaries since the beginning of thetwelfth century (Rosier-Catach 2011; Grondeux and Rosier-Catach 2017).The first in-depth commentaries on what was later known as thelogica vetus or ‘Old Logic’ (i.e.,Boethius’ Latin translations and commentaries onPorphyry’sIsagoge and Aristotle’sCategories andDe interpretatione, plus a few othertexts) began during the same period (Rosier-Catach and Goubier 2019).Masters from the twelfth century offered sophisticated semanticdiscussions of proper names, in which logic and grammar werefruitfully combined (Brumberg-Chaumont 2007; Brumberg-Chaumont,forthcoming-b). They employed a new distinction between nomination andsignification, identifying the grammatical ‘properquality’ with the Porphyrian ‘bundle of properties’— or accidents, as Boethius interpreted them — which wasin turn connected to Boethius ‘Platonicity’, the‘incommunicable property’. These two novelties are alreadyfound in an anonymous multi-layered commentary, theGlosulae,which is the first important commentary on Priscian’sInstitutiones, dating from the very beginning of the twelfthcentury (partial ed. in Rosier-Catach 2008). This text says that aname (whether proper or common) (i) signifies a quality (whetherproper or common), which it does not name, and (ii) names a substanceor several substances as determined by that quality: an individualsubstance in the case of proper names such as ‘Socrates’,via the proper quality, i.e., the unique bundle of accidents plus thequality of the species they signify; a plurality of substances in thecase of common names such as ‘man’, via the common qualitythey signify. Proper names were also compared to pronouns, as theywere in traditional grammar. The parallelism was reinforced because,as early as theGlosulae, proper names were endowed with thesame ability to identify strictly a “determinate person”,something that was the absolute preserve of pronouns in ancientgrammar.

The logico-grammatical context that characterized twelfth-centurydiscussions gave rise to a set of specific issues. The problem of thesubstantiality of the signification exhibited by proper names such as‘Socrates’ became a major preoccupation in logic, where‘Socrates’ had to belong to the category of substance bythe essential determination through which it signifies the subject andnot only because what it signifies is indeed a substance. But this wasthe case in grammar as well. In Priscian’s theory too, as wehave seen, proper names such as ‘Socrates’ must belong tothe category of names signifying substance, as opposed to adjectives,which signify accidents such as quality, quantity, or number. Theissue was made especially difficult because of the identification ofthe grammatical proper quality with the Porphyrian unique set ofaccidents. This identification and the prevalent doctrine ofindividuation by accidents to which it was associated were indeedharshly criticized by Abelard.

The distinction between naming and signifying became the maininstrument for the most powerful solutions put forward. This gave risefor the first time to fully-fledged semantic theories of proper names,i.e., theories ascribing a semantic structure to proper names distinctfrom that of common names, as well as from pronouns. Proper names wereconceptualized as referring expressions with a special medievalvariety of direct reference: a reference not determined by descriptivecontent (which, in this period, would inevitably have been brought tomind a unique bundle of accidents), but nonetheless able to signifyadditionally the proper quality, as well as to directly name andsignify the individual substance (as in William of Conches; seeBrumberg-Chaumont 2011) or as having the “determination”or “meaning” of the substantial special quality (as inAbelard).

3.2 Singular Terms in Peter Abelard’s Logic

In theDialectica and theLogica Ingredientibus(composed between 1116 and 1119), Abelard offered an incrediblycomplex and complete approach. He developed his theory of proper namesand pronouns in constant dialogue with grammar, especially ideas foundin theGlosulae. He explicitly referred to Priscian and tohis contemporary interpreters when he castigated any theory ofindividuation by the accidents as self-contradictory. He could notaccept that the proper name ‘Socrates’ signifies a uniquebundle of accidents, ‘Socrateity’, or worse, that‘Socrates’ would name these accidents in addition toSocrates himself, because such accidents would be constitutive ofSocrates as the individual he is (Super Porphyrium, p. 63,31–64, 6; p. 64, 26–32).

Building a robust semantics of proper names is crucial toAbelard’s logic, insofar as his rejection of realism and hisstrict ontological particularism make universal names especiallyproblematic, since nothing that is universal exists in itself or inany individual. On the contrary, proper names are the sole linguisticentities to which a real thing — the individual Socrates in thecase of ‘Socrates’ — obviously corresponds. ForAbelard, the individual and individuality are primary data that do notneed to be explained: the individual “consists simply inpersonal distinction” (Super Porphyrium, p. 64,20–24). This does not mean that Abelard can be satisfied withproper names that refer directly, without “meaning”(sensus), because the Aristotelian category to which a propername belongs is decided by the determination carried out by the name,not by the thing named itself (Glossae super Predicamenta, p.116); it is the same meaning of the predicate term and the subjectterm that decides whether a proposition is essential or not. Themeaning of ‘Socrates’ must be essential if‘Socrates’ is to be in the category of the substance andif ‘Socrates is a man’ is to be an essentialproposition.

Part of Abelard’s solution consists in saying that proper namessuch as ‘Socrates’ mean exactly the same thing as‘this man’, namely, “man in his personaldistinction”. This theory is a consequence of the new use ofexamples such as ‘this man’ as names of primary substancesin commentaries on theCategories. We see this use inAbelard’sLogica ingredientibus, but it must haveexisted in earlier anonymous texts, as he himself suggests, because hecriticizes those who differentiate ‘this man’ and‘Socrates’: “[Some people] want ‘thisman’ to be the sign [notare] of nothing other than manin his personal essence, but this name which is‘Socrates’, they say, designates the accidents”(Super Porphyrium, p. 64, 26–30). Abelard claims thetwo expressions are equivalent in logic, as opposed to grammar, wherethe signification of the accidents via the notion of a proper qualityseemed to him inevitable. This means that, in grammar, we would have anew meaning (acceptio) for the name ‘Socrates’and that this name would no longer signify the individual as asubstance (Super Porphyrium, p. 65, 5–11).

Abelard draws a clear distinction between naming and signifying in thecases of proper names and common names. He asserts: “by‘Socrates’ … a certain thing is determined andidentified … Singular names [can] not only name, but alsodetermine the underlying thing.” On the other hand,“‘man’ is rightly said to signify neither Socratesnor any other, for none [of them] is identified by virtue of the name,though it does name the singulars” (Super Porphyrium,p. 21, 36–22, 6). Abelard also contends that proper names andappellative names have different causes of invention: the“distinction of the substance” for the former, and the“quality of the substance” for the latter (Glossaesuper Predicamenta, p. 157, 29–31).

Proper names are, however, clearly distinguished from pronouns, inconnection with which the traditional grammatical description ismobilized when Abelard encounters terms such as “this[on]” among the predicables in Boethius’s commentary.These terms are said to signify a “pure substance”; theyhave been “invented according to personal distinction”only; “they determine no nature or property” (SuperPorphyrium, p. 39, 16–24). Here the second part ofAbelard’s solution appears: although proper names were notinvented to determine qualities, proper names do determine qualities,i.e., “the same qualities as those contained in superior names[superiora nomina]” (Glossae superPredicamenta, p. 157, 31–32). By ‘superiornames’, he was referring to names located above individual namesin Porphyry’s tree, such as ‘animal’ and‘man’. Here we meet again the idea, inherited fromApollonius and Priscian, that proper names contain the meaning ofappellative names, but, unlike traditional grammar and what is claimedby theGlosulae, Abelard thinks proper names do notadditionally contain the signification of individual accidents. Thefact that the proper name determines the same essential properties as‘man’, without signifying them, explains how‘Socrates’ can be located in the category of substance(Super Porphyrium, p. 64, 33–65, 5) and how theproposition ‘Socrates is a man’ can be an essentialnecessary proposition. This is because the “meaning”(sensus) of the “formula” corresponding to‘man’ is included in the name ‘Socrates’(Glossae Super Predicamenta, p. 126, 37–127, 5; seealsoSuper Porphyrium, p. 72). And so essential qualitiestake part of the meaning of proper names without being part of theirsignification.

Abelard does not deny that a bundle of accidents can be unique to oneindividual and play a role in the way we identify this individual. Butthe association of ideas between a proper noun and the accidentalqualities attached to an individual is explained on ontologicalgrounds, i.e., by the fact that the individual is the substrate ofaccidents, in such a way that these accidents are indirectlyassociated with the proper name. This has nothing to do with semantics(Super Porphyrium, p. 63, 8–30). Abelard describes thiskind of association by introducing a sense of“signification” that has nothing to do with humanlanguage, but is related to the notion of a natural sign, as adog’s barking is a sign of its anger (Dialectica, pp.112 and 114).

Abelard offers a highly specific semantics of proper names based on alogical analysis that is independent of grammatical theory, as well ason a sharp distinction between semantic properties and real properties(where individual substances always exist with particular accidents),and, again, between semantic properties and subjective, psychologicalrepresentations, where individual, identifying accidents are always infact associated with the use of a proper name in everyday life.

With respect to our intellectual grasp of the singulars to which‘this man’ and ‘Socrates’ must correspond,Abelard makes clear that it is an abstractive intellective cognitionin the sense that it isolates one feature (this man) from others (thisanimal; this white) in a data complex represented by the underlyingsubject of perception (Super Porphyrium, p. 27). Here weencounter, through Boethian sources, what will later on, throughAristotelian and Avicennian sources, be described as the distinctionbetween determinate and vague individuals (see §5.1 below). Theunderlying subject is the concrete individual with all its properties,whether essential or accidental, from which the universal intellectionof man is also derived (Glossae Super Predicamenta, p. 142).The signification of the intellection guarantees the permanence of thesignification of the words even if the things referred to no longerexist (Super Peri Hermeneias, p. 309). This should also applyto ‘Socrates’ and to ‘this man’, but Abelarddoes not go further in his explanation of the function of the conceptscorresponding to demonstrative pronouns when the thing pointed to isno longer present or existing.

4. The Problem of Proper Names and Proper Naming in Thirteenth-Century Logic and Philosophy

4.1 Thirteenth-Century Innovations

We can select three genres where singular terms were addressed duringthe thirteenth century: (i) terminist tracts, where singular termsappeared as “discrete terms”; (ii)sophismataliterature, especially in thesophismata with‘Caesar’, as well as the use of ‘Socrates’ asan example of a singular term in OHNEAsophismata(‘Every man is necessarily an animal [Omnis Homo deNecessitate Est Animal)]’; and (3) commentaries on theMetaphysics, in which a new question was raised, ‘Canparticulars have a proper names?’, a question also found intoother kinds of texts.

Not every medieval text directly concerned with the signification ofsingular terms endeavored to offer in-depth philosophical discussionsof them. This was true of two very influential grammatical treatisesfrom the second half of the twelfth century, namely theSumma‘Absoluta cuiuslibet’ of a certain Peter of Spain(not to be confused with the thirteenth-century author of theSummulae logicales) and of theSumma superPriscianum of Peter Helias. It applies even more during thethirteenth century, when the prospect of a satisfying explanation ofthe signification of proper names became more and more remote thanksto a series of philosophical novelties. We can observe this trendespecially in Modistic treatises on grammar written from the 1260s on(for Modism, see Rosier-Catach 1983; Marmo 1994), by authors such asMichael of Morbais, Boethius of Dacia, John of Dacia, and Martin ofDacia, whose positions about proper names signifying an essence asexisting in the singular together with individuating materialconditions appear close to that of Thomas Aquinas, but are not furtherdeveloped (see Brumberg-Chaumont, forthcoming-b).

In addition to the issues raised during the first half of the twelfthcentury, the semantic consequences of remarks in texts by Aristotle,Avicenna, and Averroes, newly translated in the latter half of thetwelfh century and the beginning of the thirteeenth century, presenteda unique set of difficulties. First, the Aristotelian idea thatindividuals have no essence or definition of their own, together withthe theory of individuation by matter (or by form and matter) —as opposed to the twelfth-century theory of individuation by accidents— seemed to imply that individuals cannot really be named asindividuals, or that proper names signify individuals only asindividuated by material circumstances, that is, as unknowable.Second, the Avicennian theory of the three states of essence seemed toforce singular terms to signify the essence only as existing in thesensible singulars. And third, the Averroist analysis of certainsemantic aspects of theMetaphysics, which had common namessignifying first the form and secondarily the aggregate or‘suppositum’, seemed to imply that singular namessignify the aggregate directly (see Ebbesen 2000; Pinborg and Ebbesen1984; Brumberg-Chaumont 2005).

In order to understand thirteenth-century logic, one has to considerthat, unlike the view held by most later logicians, some universalpropositions were viewed by many thirteenth-century masters as lackingexistential import. As a consequence, particular propositions (we cansee here why, following modern terminology, they should not be called‘existential propositions’) and even singularpropositions, if correctly inferred from a universal proposition in alogical descent, also came to be seen as lacking existential import— unless singular propositions were simply to be expelled fromany inference involving universal propositions. The latter optionwould be bound to raise serious issues, since inferences fromuniversal to subordinated singular propositions formed the basis ofthe theories of supposition and verification by logical descent, e.g.,from ‘Every man is an animal’ to ‘Socrates (or thisman) is an animal’, ‘Plato (or that man) is ananimal’, etc.

4.2 Singular Terms in Terminist Logic

In terminist tracts, proper names are generally considered to beparadigmatic “discrete terms”, a category that includesproper names, pronouns, and expressions such as ‘thisman’. In a theory of referential variation in propositionalcontexts, singular terms are paradoxically inserted as totallyinvariant terms, since they generally have no mode of suppositionapart from discrete supposition. Some authors, such as William ofSherwood (1230s/1240s), or William Arnaud in his commentary on Peterof Spain’sTractatus (1290s) tried to argue thatsingular terms (proper names) could have simple supposition as in‘Socates is predicable of only one’, but they wereconfronted with great difficulties. Individual things have no‘form’ for which the singular term could supposit insimple supposition; the singular ‘intention’ for which thesingular term supposits in simple supposition remains unexplained (forfurther discussion, see Brumberg-Chaumont 2013b).

Masters who insist on the semantic specificity of proper nouns assertthe identity of the significate, thesuppositum, and theappellatum, i.e., the existing thing. This doctrine issupported by the best-known terminist textbook of the Middle Ages,Peter of Spain’sTractatus, dating from the 1230s/1240s(Tractatus, pp. 197–198). Peter also thought thatdiscrete terms only had discrete supposition. In hisSyncategoremata, he describes names such as‘Socrates’ as temporary, ‘as-of-now [utnunc]’ terms (Syncategoremata, pp. 296–298).But this theory led to serious difficulties and sometimes incoherentpositions. Peter did not explain what happens when an existingindividual, which is the significate,suppositum, andappellatum, disappears. In his source, a Parisian treatisecalled theSummule antiquorum, proper names appear to changetheir semantic structure depending on whether or not the individualnamed exists; in the former case, the significate and thesuppositum are identical to theappellatum; in thelatter, the significate and thesuppositum are identical, buttheappellatum is absent (see Anonymous,Summuleantiquorum, ed. L. M. de Rijk, p. 13). Furthermore, in yetanother passage of theTractatus, Peter concedes thepossibility of inferring a subordinate singular proposition from auniversal proposition (‘Every man is mortal; therefore, Socratesis mortal’ (Tractatus, p. 83), which presupposes thatthe two propositions have the same truth conditions with regard toexistential import. However, he argues in theSyncategorematathat inferences involving mixed modal absolute propositions, such as‘Man is necessarily an animal’, andut nuncpropositions, as ‘Socrates is a man’, which are true for atime, are fallacious (Syncategoremata, pp. 296–298).Consequently, the mixed modal syllogism Barbara LXL(necessary/assertoric/necessary), namely ‘Every man isnecessarily a animal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates isnecessarily an animal’, which follows an LXL combination, viewedas valid by Aristotle without restriction, should be consideredfallacious. This connects with the famous medieval sophismaticproposition, ‘Every man is necessarily an animal’, wherethis LXL syllogism systematically appeared in discussions.

4.3 Sophismatic Discussions of Singular Terms

The problem of the semantics of proper names appears in at least sixof the OHNEA ‘Every man is necessarily an animal’sophismata catalogued by Ebbesen and Goubier (see Ebbesen andGoubier 2011). Proper names are also discussed insophismatacontaining the proper name ‘Caesar’ (Brumberg-Chaumontforthcoming-a)

The aforementioned LXL syllogism was used to demonstrate that thesophismatic proposition ‘Every man is necessarily ananimal’ is false because it leads to the obviously falseproposition ‘Socrates is necessarily an animal’ in acorrect deduction in which the second premise, ‘Socrates is aman’ is obviously true – from which it follows that themajor must be false. According to one strategy, defending the truth ofthe major proposition involves exposing the argument as incorrect(ill-formed; fallacious) because of the introduction of anutnunc proposition with a proper noun conceived as a‘temporary’ (ut nunc) term, where you should haveonly an “absolute assertoric” (simpliciter deinesse) proposition in the minor position.

The defense of the truth of sophismatic proposition using this firststrategy can be found in various sophismatic texts, especially one ofthe earliest OHNEAsophisma, the Anonymus Erfordiensis, fromthe 1240s (see De Libera, 2002, p. 232). It says that the LXL argumentis not valid, so it is not the case that the major must be false. Thisis because the LXL combination is considered valid only on thecondition that the assertoric minor proposition is absolute(simpliciter), not as-of-now (ut nunc). The way thecondition is explained suggests that it is impossible to combineas-of-now propositions not only with absolute necessity propositions,but also with any absolute proposition, even assertoric ones, such as“every man is a animal”. This reason is that mixingas-of-now and absolute propositions makes the inference invalid or,according to some authors, fallacious. This saves the truth of theOHNEA proposition, but at an enormous logical cost.

Accordingly, some masters developed another strategy for defending thetruth of the sophismatic proposition. Here the aforementioned mixedmodal syllogism is taken to be valid, so that proper nouns are nolonger described as temporary, but absolute, just like the term‘man’ (see for instance the Anonymus Liberanus, ed. in DeLibera 2009, p. 221; Anonymus Alani 13, ed. in Gazziero and De Libera2008, pp. 361–362). When logically analyzed, the proper nounwith its individual dimension is eliminated, as it becomes equivalentto the name of the species to which the individual belongs; thus,‘Socrates is a man [Socrates est homo]’ becomesthe identity statement, ‘man is man [homo esthomo]’. Paradoxically, some masters viewed singularpropositions as even more necessarily true and devoid of existentialimport than universal propositions such as ‘Every man is ananimal’. This theory amounts to the logical elimination ofproper names. Similar ideas appear in the discussion of thesub-sophisma ‘Caesar is a man, Caesar being dead[Caesar est homo, Caesare mortuo]’ in the AnonymusLiberanus. The idea that individuals do not have a name or adefinition as a consequence of their having no form of their own isclearly formulated here. The truth of the proposition ‘Caesar isa man’ is not jeopardized by an empty term because thesignificate of ‘Caesar’ is the same, whether Caesar existsor not (Libera 2009, p. 230).

Discussions of the role of proper nouns in thissophisma canalso be found outside the sophismatic literature. This is the case inRobert Kilwardby’s commentary on thePrior Analytics.His aim was to exclude proper names from modal syllogistics bytreating them as ‘temporary [ut nunc]’ names.According to Kilwardby, proper names are not to be subordinated touniversal terms such as ‘man’ and therefore should beeliminated in favor of terms that enable the formation of trulysubordinate propositions, i.e., particular propositions constructedwith terms such as ‘some man’. ‘This man’ isinadmissible for the same reason (Robert Kilwardby,Notule LibriPriorum, p. 326).

4.4 The Metaphysics of Proper Names: Can Particulars have Proper Names?

A third kind of discussion is found in commentaries onMetaphysics VII. A distorted Latin translation andinterpretation of a remark at 1035b1–3 seemed to make Aristotlesay, “particulars do not have a proper name [particulariaenim non habent proprium nomen].” This reading echoedAristotle’s suggestion in the same passage that individuals lackan essence and definition of their own. And so the question arose,‘Do particulars have real/proper names?’, which is foundin at least fiveMetaphysics commentaries from the thirteenthcentury, by Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Adam of Bockenfield, RogerBacon, Geoffrey Aspall, and Richard Clive. It is also found in othertexts, such as an important anonymous pre-Modist commentary onPriscian Major (Ps-Robert Kilwardby), Roger Bacon’sDe signis, Siger of Brabant’s commentary onDeanima, Robert Kilwardby’s commentary onIsagoge,Henry of Ghent’sLectura ordinaria, and Albert theGreat’sDe intellectu et intelligibili (seeBrumberg-Chaumont 2005 and Brumberg-Chaumont forthcoming-a).

The question asked by Geoffrey Aspall in hisMetaphysicscommentary (1250s), “Do particulars have real names?”, canbe understood in three senses: ‘Do particulars havenames?’ — obviously they do; ‘Do particulars havenames of their own?’; and ‘Do particulars have names thatwould properly be names?’. Geoffrey answers: “individualsdo not properly have names. There are in fact two ways in whichanything can have a name. Either this name is imposed from a form bysignification, so that signification is not the same as appellation– this is what it means to have a proper name (i.e. to beproperly a name), and it is this name that the universal possesses– or else it is imposed by appellation, and it is this name thatthe particular possesses. In the latter case, the significate and theappellatum are the same, and so the particular does notproperly have a name” (Geoffrey Aspall,Quaestiones inMetaphysicam, ed. in Brumberg-Chaumont 2005, p. 102). Thearguments in favor of the existence of proper names for particulars,which Geoffrey accepts, mostly defend the existence of singularintellectual knowledge of individuals by reflection (via theimagination, as in the later theory of Thomas Aquinas), which meansthat the noetic argument against the existence of proper names cannotbe upheld. But the problem remains because, for Geoffrey, intellectionis not the significate of the name; rather, it is the form, followingAverroes’ interpretation of the semantic theory implied in theMetaphysics, whereby names signify the form primarily, andsecondarily the aggregate. Since there is no form for individuals, thelatter cannot properly be named. Geoffrey’s solution means thatindividuals do have ordinary proper names, but not logically propernames, i.e., names that are truly proper names for individuals andtruly names. In his commentary on theIsagoge (Notulaesuper Porphyrium, provisional edition, courtesy of AlessandroConti), Robert Kilwardby also says that the individual does have aproper name (proprium nomen), but does not properly have aname (proprie nomen), i.e., a true logical name establishedon metaphysical grounds. This distinction will also be at the heart ofthe theory proposed by John Buridan in the following century.

5. Buridan’s Theory of Singular Terms and its Influence

The fourteenth century witnessed a fresh start on the topic ofsingular terms, due to some major innovations: the birth of anominalist logic, the notion of a mental language, and the idea thatindividuals are intellectually knowable as individuals — an ideadefended by Ockham in his theory of intuitive cognition, after aninitial breakthrough provided by John Duns Scotus and his theory ofhaecceity (see SEP “Medieval Theories of Haecceity”).However, Ockham’s logic offers only a sketchy account. Spokenproper names seem to not have any corresponding singular simpleconcepts to which they could be subordinated in mental languagebecause the corresponding concept becomes universal as soon as theindividual known is no longer present to the knower. In order toaddress this, Claude Panaccio has provided a reconstruction ofOckham’s semantics where it is mental concepts that aresubordinated to oral terms in such cases (see Panaccio 2006 (2017)).As for pronouns, they are supposed to be eliminable in mental languageeven though they play a crucial role, distinct from the one played byproper names. As “direct designators”, pronouns would bemeaningless for Ockham according to Panaccio. Faced with the problemof descent from universal to demonstrative singular propositions,Ockham would say that if the subject term is empty (because noindividual man is designated), the singular proposition is not aproposition subordinated to the universal proposition (see Panaccio1980).

John Buridan offers a quite different picture, in which each type ofsingular term — ‘this man’, ‘Socrates’,and ‘this [one]’ — is thoroughly discussed. TheParisian master produced the most complete and coherent account ofsingular terms in the Middle Ages and through this exerted a greatinfluence on logic and semantics in the following centuries.

5.1 Buridan on Singular Terms and Concepts

In his commentary on Aristotle’sDe anima (III/8),Buridan claims that ‘this man’, which signifies what hecalls a “vague individual”, is the most proper singularterm. Buridan’s view of vague individuals was related, as wasAvicenna’s original discussion (see Black 2011), toAristotle’s claim inPhysics I (184a22–24) thatin cognition we proceed from universals to particulars: first wecognize this body, then this animal, then this man (the vagueindividual), then Socrates (the determinate individual, with all hisparticular accidental characteristics). The vague individual is justthe perfectly individually identified individual, without taking intoaccount all his individual accidents. Indeed, Buridan says that forthe vague individual to be ‘vague’ is just “a way ofspeaking”, since it corresponds to a face-to-face (inprospectu) intellectual cognition. His account allows recognitionof both the primacy of singulars and of the move from what is more towhat is less general. It depends on Buridan’s epistemologicalclaim that general notions are always involved in apprehension. Thishas led many scholars to formulate the idea that what makes anapprehension singular is the confusion or fusing together ofcircumstances, so that being a man is not something abstracted fromwhat exists here and now in such and such a way. Singularity is nottied to the absence of generality, but rather to the presence ofconfusion or lack of discrimination. A concept can be semanticallysimple and singular but at the same time metaphysically rich (seeMiller 1985; Van der Lecq 1993; King 2001, Ashworth 2004a, Klima2009). In the case of demonstrativein prospectu concepts,i.e., those involved in the use of indexicals, Buridan often refers to“place” (situs) as the characteristic thataccompanies the intellection, making it confused and singular.

John Dorp rejected Buridan’s account, arguing that there is nosingular term corresponding to a vague individual in our language.Instead, cognizing a thing as singular involves the cognition ofparticular circumstances, and the general concept [man] cannot be partof the singular cognition. If we want to introduce vague singularsinto our language, we will have to invent some special term, such as‘a’, to signify Socrates along with a connotation of allthe individual circumstances, in which case ‘a’ will countas a vague singular (Compendium, sig. e 1, va-vb).Dorp’s view was not popular. For most later logicians, the vaguesingular was (contra Dorp) one type of singular term, but(contra Buridan’s claim in theDe anima III/8)it is less properly singular than a proper name because it involvessome generality.

While it is true that the term ‘this man’ can lackreference through improper use, if it is used properly it must pointto one singular existing present object, the very situation in whichwe form genuinely singular concepts. If it is used without anindividual being present, the expression will just not be significantbecause the pronoun ‘this [one]’ will no longer besignificant (Buridan,Quaestiones in Porphyrii, p. 161, orelse it will make the proposition false if the individual pointed tois a stone — see below). The term ‘this man’ usedseveral times for different individuals does not make it a commonterm, but each use is equivocal because a different individual isdesignated by each token of ‘this man’ (Buridan,Inmetaphysicen, VII/19, f. 53va). The fact that an individual isbeing demonstrated here and now means that ‘this man’ ismore circumscribed in its proper usage, such that it is alwaystime-bound.

Proper names are a different story. Proper names are sometimes said tobe themost proper singular terms by Buridan for this reason(Quaestiones in Porphyrii, p. 162). Buridan remarks that ifSocrates leaves the room, he is still Socrates, but he is no longerthe referent of ‘this man’ (In MetaphysicenVII/18, f. 53rb). Nevertheless, there are also strict limitations onthe use of proper names. Proper names are singular insofar as theconcept to which they correspond is itself singular. In hisQuaestiones on theMetaphysics VII/20, Buridanconsiders the names ‘Antichrist’ and‘Aristotle’, arguing that ‘Antichrist’, theexample of a name referring to a person who does not yet exist, is nota singular term because it is formed from ‘anti’ and‘Christ’ and could apply to more than one individual.There are two possiblities where ‘Aristotle’ is concerned.If I am in the presence of the individual and I dub him‘Aristotle’, then the name is a genuinely singular term.But if Aristotle is for me merely an historical figure from thedistant past, then my concept of Aristotle must be descriptive,containing general elements such asman,greatphilosopher,born in Greece, and so on. Given that therewas in fact only one such man, my concept supposits only for Aristotleand so the stability and uniqueness of my reference is guaranteed.However, since the corresponding concept is not and cannot besingular, it seems that ‘Aristotle’ cannot be a propersingular term when it is uttered by me. Every description is bound tobe universal for Buridan, even if it pragmatically permits us toidentify and re-identify a single individual (see Ashworth 2004a;Klima 2009, p. 69–89). Most of the proper names we articulatewould thus not be singular terms, but only disguised descriptions.Buridan is keen to say that proper names do not pick out theirreferents according to any descriptive content (Quaestiones superoctos libros Physicorum, p. 69). No one can bestow a singularconcept upon another person by definition or explanation. As aconsequence, the use of proper names as real singular terms also seemsquite limited.

Buridan also considers a third case concerning isolated pronouns suchas ‘this [one]’. One pending issue is then the way thepronoun combines with ‘man’ in ‘this man’. Asseen above, ‘hic’ in Latin is always ademonstrative pronoun. If the expression ‘this man’ iscomplex, then its significate would depend on the significate of twocategorematic terms, ‘this[one]’ and ‘man’,and the supposition would be their intersecting set — an ideaactually defended by Buridan in some texts (seeQuaestiones inPorphyrii, p. 160;In metaphysicen VII, 19; adopted byKlima 2009, p. 103). If, on the other hand, the expression is simple,as seems to be required by Buridan’s theory of substantialsingular terms (see Brumberg-Chaumont 2016), then the pronoun would betreated as a syncategorematic term. But this solution is inconsistentwith the fact that pronouns can be used by themselves to refer toindividuals. The latter theory was indeed not adopted by Buridan,though it was articulated by Dorp, who hypothesized the unformulatedpresence of sortals associated with pronouns used in this way (seeAshworth 2004a). Ockham also had a syncategorematic interpretation ofpronouns (see Panaccio 1980).The case of pronouns was not a side topicfor Buridan, since they are at the heart of his logic, providing thebasis for the analysis of the supposition and verification of allother terms (see Brumberg-Chaumont 2016). When used by themselves,pronouns have the same requirement regarding the presence here and nowof their referent as expressions such as ‘this man’, and,consequently, they seem to have the same very limited use.

An additional difficulty arises from the fact that singular terms suchas ‘Socrates’ need to be non-connotative terms in thecategory of substance in order to play their fundamental role insupposition and verification (seeSummulae desuppositionibus, p. 16, 23, 31; Brumberg-Chaumont 2016). Thisapplies not only to proper names such as ‘Socrates’ andexpressions such as ‘this man’, which are officiallylisted by Buridan as singular simple terms in the category ofsubstance, signifying the individual “without any extrinsicconnotation” (Quaestiones in predicamenta, p. 9;Quaestiones Libri Porphyrii, p. 169), but also to pronouns,as the basis for any chain of categorial predication. As noticed byPeter King (King 1994, p. 26), Buridan thought that pronouns signifythe substance alone, without any properties (In metaphysicenVII/19). This was in keeping with the grammatical tradition, and itsuggested that pronouns signify substances as substances, beyondsimply referring to substances. This point presents a problem,however, namely the possibility of the existence of a concept thatwould be both singular and non-connotative in the category ofsubstance (there are few absolute terms in the category of accidents;an example would be ‘whiteness’). This possibility seemsto be precluded by the standard interpretation of Buridan’stheory of intellectual cognition described above, in which a there isa necessary connection between distinction and universality on the onehand (which explains why sensory cognition cannot be universal), andconfusion and singularity on the other hand. Applied to‘Socrates’, this would mean that if the proper name wereto signify the determinate individual described in Buridan’sDe anima III/8 (as suggested by King 2001, p. 16, Reina 2002,p. 220–255), i.e., an individual substance with all itsaccidental features, then the corresponding concept would all itsindividal accidents. Applied to the demonstrativein propectucognition corresponding to ‘this [one]’ and the vagueindividual ‘this man’, this would mean that thecorresponding concepts would contain at least the aspect of place(situs), which is definitely an accidental property accordingto theCategories. Every singular term would then be aconnotative term — an idea quite disastrous from the point ofview of Buridan’s logic.

Answers to each of these difficulties can in fact be found inBuridan’s works.

5.2 Extended Uses of Singular Terms and Non-Connotative (Non-Rich) Singular Concepts

A first element is the fact that thein propectu cognition isa richer notion than the knowledge of something as presentlydemonstrated here and now, as implied by the special case of deicticexpressions (Quaestiones in Porphyrii, p. 160–161).Contrary to Ockham’s intuitive cognition, Buridan’sinprospectu concepts admit situations where individuals are notphysically present, but seen in dreams (where they can even befictitious) or remembered by the knower (In metaphysicenVII/20). Once you have had anin prospectu cognition of theindividual named, you can use the proper name, whether the individualis present to you or not. With regard to thein prospectuknowledge attached to the use of proper names, Buridan often speaks ofin propectu knowledge “according to the modeof existing in front of the knower” (see for instanceDeanima III/8; see Miller 1985, Van der Lecq 1993, Reina 2002, pp.198 ff., King 1994, King 2001, Klima 2009, pp.74–86;Mora-Márquez 2019). A further extension of the use of propernames is possible. As shown by Jennifer Ashworth (Ashworth 2004a),Buridan admits the possibility of using proper names in connectionwith the impositor’s singular cognition — rather thanone’s own cognition. Buridan remarks that I can treat‘Aristotle’ as a singular term because I believe that thename was imposed or given its signification by someone who did havethe appropriate singular concept (In metaphysicen VII/20). IfI have never been acquainted with Aristotle but I am speaking withsomeone who is, we can both be taken to be using a proper name when weutter the word ‘Aristotle’. Buridan’s remarks can beanalyzed in at least two closely related ways. On the one hand, givenhis references to an original baptism or name-giving ceremony, we canregard Buridan as offering an early hint of the historical chaintheory of proper names developed by Kripke. On the other hand, givenhis apparent recognition that the speaker’s intention to referto the person so named is related to a body of information which,whether accurate or not, is causally connected with the personbaptized as ‘Aristotle’, perhaps Buridan’s view iscloser to the causal account given by Gareth Evans. As Gyula Klimaputs it, the appeal to the “second user” is“parasitic” on the “primary user” (Klima 2011,p. 68). Buridan’s hints were picked up, though not developed, bylater authors. For instance, Dorp remarked that we treat‘Aristotle’ as singular because it was singular for theoriginal impositor.

The importance of some sort of causal link between the originalproducer of the name and the named individual as well as its relationto the representative nature of singular concepts was brought out byBuridan and Dorp in their discussion of two cases. In the first case,Plato and Socrates are exactly similar but, without my knowing it, onereplaces the other in my field of vision. Buridan (Quaestionessuper octos libros Physicorum I/7,In metaphysicenVII/17) and Dorp (Compendium, sig. e 2rb) argue that while myfirst-formed singular concept is equally similar to both individuals,i.e., Plato and Socrates, it is not a concept of Socrates (the secondindividual) because it is caused by a different individual. Thecriterion of distinction is not the fit between concept and object butthe causal relation. The second case was discussed by Dorp alone(Compendium, sig. e 2rb). If identical twins are born andboth are called ‘Socrates’, it may seem that‘Socrates’ will thereby function as a common name becausethe two concepts will be exactly alike. But here too the causalrelation is what is important, and so for Dorp this is an example oftwo singular terms, each with its own signification (see Asthworth2004a, p. 138).

An extended use can also be envisaged for pronouns, whether occurringalone or in expressions such as ‘this man’. A passage fromthe commentary on theMetaphysics (In metaphysicenVII/19) shows that Buridan accepts and indeed, for the sake of thecoherence of his logical theory, encourages the idea that pronounscould be used by someone to refer to something thatcould bedesignated by pointing. This de-indexicalized use of pronouns ismobilized by Buridan in specific philosophical contexts, such as whenAristotle says that primary substances signify ‘thissomething’ (hoc aliquid). The point is very important,because Buridan believes that if taken “in the propersense” (de vitute sermonis), any inference from auniversal proposition to a subordinate proposition with a singularterm such as ‘this man’ is invalid, because the antecedentcan be true and the consequent false, such as when I point to a stone(In metaphysicen VII/19, f. 53vb). Logical and philosophicaluses of language are contexts in which you should admitde-indexicalized uses of pronouns, that is, uses connected to thepotential designation of a thing by someone (whether bymyself or another speaker), “as if [something] were to be shownby someone [about which] she could truly say, ‘this thing is athis something’ (si ab aliquo esset demonstrata ipse possetdicere vere ‘hec res est hoc aliquid’)” (forfurther discussion, see Brumberg-Chaumont 2016).

What about the connotative nature of singular terms and concepts? Itshould be said here that proper names are probably not to be generallydescribed as signifying “determinate individuals”, assuggested by the reading ofDe anima III/8. This idea, whichis simply incompatible with Buridan’s rejection of descriptivecontent in the standard analysis of the semantics of proper names, isavoided by Gyula Klima’s interpretation (Klima 2009, pp. 111ff.) . In addition, the arguments derived by the standardinterpretation against the existence of a concept that would be bothsingular and non-connotative (not rich) can be overcome by lookingmore closely at another passage from Buridan’s commentary on theMetaphysics (In metaphysicen VII/17). Here Buridansays that a single substantive feature inside the complex of datacontained in an intellection based onin propectu knowledgecan be isolated from accidents, including place. Buridan’ssolution for “substantial terms in the category ofsubstance” (termini substantiales de predicamentosubstantie), whether singular or universal, is the following:“Because the intellect can detach (absolvere) theconcept of the subject from the concept of an accident, when we impose[a term], we can have the intention to detach it, so that the termdoes not connote the accidents.” This applies to singularsubstantial terms in the category of substance: “A purelysingular concept needs the thing to appear in front of (inprospectu) the one who knows. In this way, someone who knowsforms an individual concept of the substance [on the one hand] and ofthe accidents [on the other], and can impose a singular name [on each]in an independent way” (In metaphysicen VII/17, f.50ra-rb). This solution explains how one can consider the individualsubstance on its own without the cognition being turned into auniversal concept. As a substantial name in the category of substance,a proper name can be imposed only according to this isolated feature,i.e., ‘Socrates’ can be imposed on Socrates as asubstance, irrespective of the other features he presents to theintellect. The concept and the corresponding term can both be singularand substantial. The isolation being appealed to here does not meanthat we end up with an abstract concept, detached from theinprospectu cognition (otherwise it would not be singular anymore),but rather, it is isolatedwithin thein prospectucognition (for further discussion, see Brumberg-Chaumont 2016). Veryinteresting discussions on the same topic are found in Marsilius ofInghen and Thuo of Vitborg (Bos 1999). The same kind of solution canand indeed must go for demonstrative concepts corresponding to‘this man’ and ‘this[one]’. This would explainwhy Buridan says that pronouns do not signify substance withaccidents, despite the fact that substances always appear withaccidents in demonstrativein prospectu cognitions (if onlywith the accident of place). If proper names can sometimes beassociated with individualizing accidents attached to a singleindividual (as suggested byDe anima III/8), this does notmean that the proper namesignifies such accidents. The namecan be imposed on individual substances only as designated by‘this [one]’ (as in, “let this one be named‘Socrates”), the demonstrative term being a substantialsingular term based on a substantive singular concept in which evenplace has been removed from consideration.

5.3 Proper Names and Identity Through Time

In the last redaction of his commentary on Aristotle’sPhysics (I,10), Buridan asks the question “Is Socratesthe same today that he was yesterday?”, with importantconsequences for proper names. In his answer, Buridan carefullydistinguishes between three kinds of numerical identity through time,a strictest sense (God), a strict sense (for individuals unified by arational soul such as Socrates) and a less strict sense (for bodiesand other realites like rivers). A consequence of Buridan’saccount is that names such as ‘Socrates’ and‘Aristotle’ on the one hand, and the river‘Seine’ and ‘Browny’ the donkey on the other,have a different status. The former are more properly singular termsthan the latter, even for those acquainted with these individualsthrough time. Domingo de Soto was strongly opposed to thisconsequence. He appeals to Aristotle in order to argue that continuityof soul is not the only criterion for identity of the second type, andthat horses, trees, and even rivers could possess this strongeridentity by virtue of the continuity of their forms and functions,which is the basis on which a singular concept is applied to them overtime. Another consequence of Buridan’s account is found in someearly sixteenth-century logicians who adopted an even more restrictiveaccount of proper names (see Astworth 2004a, pp. 139–140). Theselogicians argued that a sequence of different concepts of Socrateswill be formed over time, even by one acquainted with him, and hencethe name ‘Socrates’ is no more a proper singular term thanthe name ‘Seine’. Names are radically equivocal, since atevery moment they are subordinated to different concepts. Nor is thisincompatible with the intention of the person who originally gaveSocrates his name. Strictly speaking, only the baby was called‘Socrates’, but the name was imposed equivalently or as aconsequence to signify every successor to the boy by means ofdifferent concepts. Once more, Domingo de Soto (Summule ff.18vb-19rb) was strongly opposed. He said that to regard the name‘Socrates’ as an equivocal term referring to a successionof individuals is a rejection of common speech and the common sense ofthe wise men who originally gave such terms their signification.Identity of the second type is sufficiently strong to be the basis fora singular concept to be predicated non-ambiguously over time.

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