Loyalty is usually seen as a virtue, albeit a problematic one. It isconstituted centrally by perseverance in an association to which aperson has become intrinsically committed as a matter of his or heridentity. Its paradigmatic expression is found in close friendship, towhich loyalty is integral, but many other relationships andassociations seek to encourage it as an aspect of affiliation ormembership: families expect it, organizations often demand it, andcountries do what they can to foster it. May one also have loyalty toprinciples or other abstractions? Derivatively, two key issues in thediscussion of loyalty concern its status as a virtue and, if thatstatus is granted, the limits to which loyalty ought to besubject.

• 1. Introduction
  • 1.1 Background
  • 1.2 Roots
• 2. The nature of loyalty
  • 2.1 A practical disposition or only a sentiment?
• 3. The structure of loyalty
  • 3.1 Loyalty and loyalties
  • 3.2 Is loyalty inherently exclusionary?
  • 3.3 Universalism and particularism
  • 3.4 The subjects of loyalty
  • 3.5 The objects of loyalty
• 4. Loyalty as a virtue
• 5. Justifying loyalty
• 6. Limiting loyalty
  • 6.1 Whistle blowing
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Most of the detailed engagement with loyalty has come from creativewriters (Aeschylus, 2003; Galsworthy, 1922; Conrad, 1899, 1907, 1913),business and marketing scholars (Goman, 1990; Jacoby & Chestnut,1978), psychologists (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001), psychiatrists(Böszörményi-Nagy, 1973), sociologists (Connor,2007), scholars of religion (Sakenfeld, 1985; Spiegel, 1965),political economists (Hirschman, 1970, 1974),and—pre-eminently—political theorists who took aparticular interest in nationalism, patriotism and loyalty oaths(Grodzins, 1956; Schaar, 1957; Guetzkow, 1955). Because of its focuson familial relations, Confucian thought has long been interested inloyalty (Goldin, 2008; see also the section on Filiality and Care in the entry on Chinese Ethics for more on loyalty and relateddebates in Confucian and Mohist ethics). The grand Westernphilosophical exception has been Josiah Royce (1908, 1913), who,influenced by eastern philosophy (Foust, 2012b, 2015), created anethical theory centering on “loyalty to loyalty.” Roycehas generated a steady but specialized interest (see, esp. Foust,2012a, 2011, forthcoming). Since the 1980s, though, someindependent philosophical discussion has begun to emerge (Baron, 1984;Fletcher, 1993; Oldenquist, 1982; MacIntyre, 1984; Nuyen, 1999;Keller, 2007; Jollimore, 2012; Felten, 2012; Kleinig, 2014), not onlygenerally and in the context of political theory, but also in theareas of occupational and professional ethics (McChrystal, 1992, 1998;Trotter, 1997; Hajdin, 2005; Hart & Thompson, 2007; Schrag, 2001;Coleman, 2009; Foust, 2018), whistleblowing (Martin, 1992; Varelius,2009), friendship (Bennett, 2004), and virtue theory (Ewin, 1992).

1.2 Roots

Although the term “loyalty” has its immediate philologicalorigins in Old French, its older and mostly abandoned linguistic rootsare in the Latinlex (law). Nevertheless, dimensions of thephenomenon that we now recognize as loyalty are as ancient as humanassociation, albeit often manifested in its breaches (disloyalty,betrayal). The Old Testament writers were often occupied with thefickleness of human commitments, whether to God or to each other. Tocharacterize such fickleness they tended to use the language of(un)faithfulness, though nowadays we might be inclined to use the morerestricted language of (in)fidelity, which has regard to specificcommitments. In medieval to early modern uses of the term, loyaltycame to be affirmed primarily in the oath or pledge of fealty orallegiance sworn by a vassal to his lord. That had an interestingoffshoot as monarchical feudalism lost sway: loyal subjects who weredistressed by the venality of sitting sovereigns found itnecessary—as part of their effort to avoid charges oftreason—to distinguish their ongoing loyalty to the institutionof kingship from their loyalty to a particular king.

2. The nature of loyalty

As a working definition, loyalty can be characterized as a practicaldisposition to persist in an intrinsically valued (though notnecessarily valuable) associational attachment, where that involves apotentially costly commitment to secure or at least not to jeopardizethe interests or well-being of the object of loyalty. For the mostpart, an association that we come to value for its own sake is alsoone with which we come to identify (asmine orours).

2.1 A practical disposition or only a sentiment?

The nature of loyal attachment is a matter of debate. The strongfeelings and devotion often associated with loyalty have led some toassert that loyalty is only or primarily a feeling orsentiment—an affective bondedness that may express itself indeeds, the latter more as an epiphenomenon than as its core. As Ewinput it, loyalty is an “instinct to sociability” (Ewin,1990, 4; cf. Connor, 2007). But feelings of loyalty are probably notconstitutive of loyalty, even if it is unusual to find loyalties thatare affectless. Arguably, the test of loyalty is conduct rather thanintensity of feeling, primarily a certain “stickingness”or perseverance—the loyal person acts for or stays with orremains committed to the object of loyalty even when it is likely tobe disadvantageous or costly to the loyal person to remain so.

Those who focus on loyalty as a sentiment often intend to deny thatloyalty might be rationally motivated. But even though expressions ofloyalty may not be maximizing (in cost-benefit terms), the decision tocommit oneself loyally may be rational, for one need not (indeed,ought not to) enter into associations blindly, or—even when theyare initially unavoidable (as with familial or nationalones)—accept their demands unthinkingly. Moreover, once made,such commitments may be forfeited by the objects of loyalty shouldthere be serious failure on their part, or they may be overridden inthe face of significantly greater claims. One loyalty may trumpanother; other values may trump loyalty.

Unsentimental loyalties, such as the zealous but unsentimentalprofessional loyalty of a lawyer to a client, are not unthinking, buthave their rationale in professional or associationaltele,such as that of the adversarial system (however, see McChrystal, 1992,1998). It is to this shared professional commitment that the lawyer isultimately committed, not as a matter of mere sentiment but ofdeliberative choice.

Posing the issue as one of either “practical disposition”or “sentiment” is probably too stark. Some evolutionarybiologists/psychologists see loyalty as a genetically transmittedadaptive mechanism, a felt attachment to others that has survivalvalue (Wilson, 1993, 23). Given what is often seen as theself-sacrificial character of individual loyalty, such loyalty istaken to be directed primarily to group survival (West, 1945, 218).But it is not clear what any such explanatory account shows. What“loyalty” may have begun as (defense of the group againstthreat) and what it has come to be for reflective beings need not bethe same. Nor would it impugn what loyalty has come to be that itbegan as a survival mechanism (presuming an adaptive account to becorrect).

3. The structure of loyalty

3.1 Loyalty and loyalties

Sometimes we use “loyalty” to refer to the practicaldisposition to persevere in affiliational attachments. More commonlywe speak of loyalties to specific associations. Our genericdisposition to be loyal is expressed inloyalties to certainkinds of natural or conventional associations, such as friendships,families, organizations, professions, countries, and religions. Thereis a reason for this. Associations that evoke and exact our loyaltytend to be those with which we have become deeply involved oridentified. This is implicit in the workingdefinition’s reference to “intrinsically valuedassociational attachments.” Intrinsically valued associationalattachments are usually those with which we have developed some formof social identification. We have come to value the associational bondfor its own sake (whatever may have originally motivated it). Ourloyalties are not just to any groups that may exist, or even to anygroup with which we have some association, but only to those to whichwe are sufficiently closely bound to callours. My loyaltiesare tomy friends,my family,myprofession, orour country, not yours, unless yours are alsomine. In such identifications, the fate or well-being of the objectsof loyalty become bound up with one’s own. We feel shame orpride in their doings. We will take extra risks or bear specialburdens for them.

Although our primary loyalties tend to be to associations or groupingsthat are socially valued, such that loyalty may seem to be animportant practical disposition, this need not be the case. For intheory, any association can become intrinsically important to us,whether or not it is generally valued, and it may do so even if it issocially despised. Gangs and crime families, may become objects ofloyalty no less than professional associations and siblings.

3.2 Is loyalty inherently exclusionary?

It has sometimes been suggested that “A can be loyal toB only if there is a third partyC … whostands as a potential competitor toB” (Fletcher, 1993,8). It is true that many, if not most, expressions of loyalty occuragainst the background of some challenge toB’sinterests whose protection byA will be at some cost toA. Failures of loyalty often result in betrayal (ofB, sometimestoC). Thus, defendingone’s spouse in the face of criticism may also subject oneselfto vilification (byC); refusing to leave one’suniversity for another (C) may involve a sacrifice of pay andother opportunities; and patriotic loyalty may involve volunteeringfor military service when one’s country is attacked (byC). Sometimes, however, the loyal friend will simply manifestthe loyalty by being responsive toB’s need at someinconvenience. The loyalA will get up at 2.00am to fetchB whenB’s car has broken down or will agreeto be best man atB’s wedding even though it willinvolve a long flight and great expense. No third party is involved,but there will be a cost toA. The incentive to disloyalty ismore likely to be found in the blandishments of self-interest orself-maximization than in external temptations to side with acompetitor’s interests (Kleinig, forthcoming).

Some defenders as well as critics of loyalty take the frequentpresence ofC as a reason for seeing loyalty as inherentlyunfriendly. To put it in the words of the political consultant, JamesCarville, “sticking with”B requires“sticking it to”C (Carville, 2000). No doubtsome loyalties—especially political ones—frequentlyexpress themselves in such terms. But jingoism is not necessary topatriotic loyalty (pace Tolstoy, 1894), and in most contextsthe privileging of an object of loyalty (B) does not requiretreating others (C) badly. Loyalty to one’s ownchildren need not involve the disparagement of others’children.

3.3 Universalism and particularism

Loyalty is generally seen as involving particularistic, or special,obligations to the individual or groups to whom one is loyal and thusas a particularistic virtue (as contrasted with, say, the virtue ofhonesty, which is to be exercized toward all). Although Royce elevated“loyalty to loyalty” into a universalistic principle,there has been much debate concerning the relation betweenparticularistic obligations, such as those associated with loyalty andgratitude (McConnell, 1983), and universalistic, or general,obligations owed to all by virtue of their humanity. Areparticularistic obligations subsumable under universalistic ones orare they independently derived? If the latter, do they stand inpermanent tension (obligations to the poor vs. obligations toone’s children)? How, if at all, are conflicts to be resolved?The discussion has its modern roots in Enlightenment ideas of equalrespect and of what is therefore owed to all by virtue of their commonhumanity. Both consequentialism and Kantian universalism have somedifficulty in accommodating virtues such as loyalty, and on occasionhave eschewed the latter. As the consequentialist William Godwinnotoriously asked: “What magic is there in the pronoun‘my,’ that should justify us in overturning the decisionsof impartial truth?” (Godwin, 1946, vol. 1, 127).

Although most classical theorists have tended to accord moral priorityto universalistic obligations, there have been important exceptions.Andrew Oldenquist has argued for the primacy of certain communaldomains defined by our loyalties (“all morality is tribalmorality”), within which considerations of impartiality mayoperate: “our wide and narrow loyalties define moral communitiesor domains within which we are willing to universalize moraljudgments, treat equals equally, protect the common good, and in otherways adopt the familiar machinery of impersonal morality”(Oldenquist, 1982, 178, 177; cf. MacIntyre, 1984). Although Oldenquistdenies that there is a nontribal, universalist morality, thus seekingto deprive the universalist of any independent traction, he does notdo much to establish the primacy of the tribal apart, perhaps, from acertain temporal developmental priority.

Bernard Williams argued that if the claims of universalism (whether ofthe consequentialist or Kantian kind) are given pre-eminence, theywill alienate people from their “ground projects,” wherethe latter include the deep attachments associated with loyalties.Williams obviously has a point, though even he conceded that suchprojects are not impervious to universalistic challenges (Williams,1981, 17–18).

Many systematic moral theorists attempt to subsume particularisticobligations such as loyalty under larger universalistic obligations.R.M. Hare, for example, adopted a two-tiered consequentialist positionthat seeks to justify the particularistic obligations of loyaltywithin a broader consequentialist schema: we contribute moreeffectively to overall well-being if we foster particularisticobligations. Reflecting on the particularism of mother love andloyalty, he writes: “If mothers had the propensity to careequally for all the children in the world, it is unlikely thatchildren would be as well provided for even as they are. The dilutionof the responsibility would weaken it out of existence” (Hare,1981, 137). Unfortunately, simply being aware of the generalobligation may be sufficient to evacuate the particularisticobligation of much of its power—and, indeed, to call it intoquestion. Moreover, it may overlook the distinctive source of theparticularistic obligation—not in the needs of children so muchas in their beingone’s own.

Peter Railton has attempted to find a place for loyalties within abroadly consequentialist framework that avoids both alienation and theproblems confronting Hare’s two-tiered system. According toRailton, there are good consequentialist reasons for acting onparticularistic preferences, consequentialist reasons that do notundercut but honor the particularism of those preferences.Railton’s defense trades on a distinction between subjective andobjective consequentialism, the objective consequentialist (whom hesupports) being committed to the course of action available to anagent that would maximize the good (Railton, 1984, 152). That, hebelieves, does not require that the agent consciously decide tomaximize the good—indeed, it may require that the agent not makesuch calculations. Overall, then, a loyalty to friends and family, andcommitment to ground projects may maximize good, even though, were oneto make a subjective calculation, it would undermine the loyalty orcommitment. Although there is some debate about the success of thisstrategy (Wilcox, 1987; Conee, 2001), it goes some way to counteringthe common perception that universalistic (or impersonal) theories canfind no place for particularist obligations.

Another two-tiered system, but of a nonconsequentialist variety, issuggested by Alan Gewirth (1988), who accords primacy to the principlethat it is a necessary condition for human agency that all be accordedequal rights to freedom and well-being. That commitment, he believes,will also be sufficient to ground special obligations such as thosefinding expression in personal, familial, and national loyalties. Itserves as such a ground because the commitment to individual freedompermits the formation of voluntary associations, including“exclusive” ones, as long as they do not interfere withothers’ basic freedom. Such voluntary associations are formednot merely for instrumental purposes, as contributions to our freedom,but are expressive of it. A persisting problem for this accountconcerns the resolution of conflicts between obligations that ariseout of our associational commitments (say, to our families) and thosethat arise directly out of the general principle (say, to assist theworld’s needy). This is of course a general problem, and notjust one for Gewirth; but it raises a question about the success ofGewirth’s distinctive project, which was to develop a systematicalternative to the moral pluralism that he associates with IsaiahBerlin, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel.

It may be that particularistic obligations such as those of loyaltyhave to be considered as sui generis, products not simply of ourcommon humanity but of our sociality, of the self-realizingsignificance of associational bonds—most particularlyfriendships, but also various other associational connections thatcome to be constitutive of our identity and ingredients in ourflourishing. That leaves, of course, the problem of resolvingconflicts with universalistic obligations when they occur. We may,with Scheffler, wish to argue that the reasons generated byparticularistic associations are “presumptively decisive”in cases in which conflict arises (Scheffler, 1997, 196), though thatwould need to be integrated in some way with judgments about the valueto be attributed to particular associations.

3.4 The subjects of loyalty

Individual persons are typically the one’s who are loyal (i.e.,the subjects of loyalty), but being loyal is not restricted toindividual persons. Mutuality is a feature of many loyalties, and itis often a normative expectation of the loyal individual that thecollectivity to which the individual is loyal will also be loyal inreturn (Ogunyemi, 2014). Just as we personify organizations, regardingthem as in some sense responsible actors, so we can attribute loyaltyto them or—more often— bemoan their lack of loyalty tothose who have been loyal to them.

May animals be loyal? Tales of canine loyalty are legion, and evenamong wild animals, especially those that move in social groups,loyalty is often said to be shown. To the extent that loyalty is seenas an adaptive sentiment, we may think that animals are capable ofloyalty. That may be a convenient way of characterizing animalbehavior (what Aristotle refers to as a “natural” virtue),though, as Fletcher observes, the kind of loyalty shown is limitedbecause such loyalty cannot be betrayed. The dog who is distracted bythe burglar’s steak does not betray its owner; its training hassimply been inadequate. It is also limited because it is the kind ofloyalty that, if displayed by humans, would be characterized as“blind” and therefore likely to expose one to moral peril(Blamires, 1963, 24).

3.5 The objects of loyalty

As noted, the primary objects of loyalty tend to be persons, personalcollectivities (such as families), or quasi-persons such asorganizations (the company for which one works) or social groups(one’s church congregation). Some argue that it is only to suchthat we can be loyal (Ladd, 1967; Baron, 1984). But that is at oddswith the view that almost “anything to which one’s heartcan become attached or devoted” may also become an object ofloyalty—principles, causes, brands, ideas, ideals, andideologies (Konvitz, 1973, 108). Royce himself argued that loyalty isthe “willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of aperson to a cause” (Royce, 1908, 16–17). In response,those who personalize the objects of loyalty point out that we haveequally available to us the language of commitment or devotion and, inthe case of what is spoken of as “loyalty to one’sprinciples,” we have the language of integrity.

There is some reason to favor the more restrictive focus for loyalty.Our core loyalties, which also happen to be those that arepsychologically more powerful (Walzer, 1970, 5), tend to secure theviability and sometimes the integrity of our particular humanassociations. To the extent that our moral obligations encompass notonly our relations with other human beings in general but also ourrelationships with particular others—our friends, families,fellow citizens, and so on—loyalty will be partiallyconstitutive and sustaining of these particular others in contexts inwhich narrow or short-term self-interest is likely to be better servedby abandoning them. If we further argue that the core of morality isconcerned with the quality of relationships that people have with eachother, both as fellow humans and in the various associative groupsthat they form, then loyalty will constitute an important dimension ofthat relational network. Even the “cause” with which Royceassociates loyalty is ultimately articulated in terms of devotion to acommunity (Royce, 1908, 20; 1913, vol. 1, xvii).

In theory, nothing prevents the “personal” object ofloyalty being the whole human race (pace Ladd, 1967). Auniversalist particularism can be found in some environmentalcontexts, when the future of humanity is up for consideration,or—as it was nicely illustrated in Mary Shelley’sFrankenstein—when Victor Frankenstein decided not tojeopardize the human race by creating a companion for his monster(Shelley, 1831 [1957, 187]). In contexts in which the human race can itselfbe viewed as a collectivity, loyalty to it may beattributed—though that may sometimes generate charges ofspeciesism (Bernstein, 1991).

4. Loyalty as a virtue

Mark Twain (1935) and Graham Greene (“the virtue ofdisloyalty,” 1973) notwithstanding, there is greater agreementthat disloyalty is a vice than that loyalty is a virtue (Kleinig,forthcoming). Perhaps the frequency with which the demand forloyalty is used to “justify” engagement in unethicalconduct has led to cynicism about its value. There is a certainresonance to the saying that “when an organization wants you todo right, it asks for your integrity; when it wants you to do wrong,it demands your loyalty.” What might it be about loyalty thatmakes it vulnerable to such uses?

There are those who, on the basis of their particular theory ofvirtue, deny that loyalty could be a virtue. R.E. Ewin, for example,argued that because loyalty can be badly placed (as in the case of theloyal Nazi) and because, once formed, it requires us not merely tosuspend our own judgment about its object but even to set aside goodjudgment (Ewin, 1992, 403, 411), its pretensions to the status of avirtue are undermined, for the virtues are, he argued, internallylinked to some idea of good judgment. The worth of any particularloyalty is thus reducible to judgments about the worth of theassociations to which loyalty is given or the legitimacy of what isdone as a result of them and is not due to loyalty in general being avirtue.

There are two problems with this account. First, the understanding ofthe virtues may be thought too restrictive. As with loyalty,conscientiousness and sincerity can be directed to unworthy objects,but conscientiousness and sincerity do not for that reason fail asvirtues. It is arguable that had Ewin given consideration to the viewthat virtues operate, as Philippa Foot puts it, “at a point atwhich there is some temptation to be resisted or deficiency ofmotivation to be made good” (Foot, 1978, 8)—he might havebeen able to accommodate them within a catalogue of virtues.Perseverance in human associations often requires individuals to makesacrifices for the good of the individual or group with whom theindividual associates, sacrifices that self-interest naturally temptsus not to make.

The second problem has to do with the idea that loyalty requires us toset aside good judgment. No doubt something of that kind is attemptedby those who seek to exploit loyalty (and other virtues such asgenerosity and kindness). But the well-established idea of a“loyal opposition” should give pause to the suggestionthat loyalty requires complaisance or servility (see section 6,Limiting Loyalty). Further, if the setting aside of good judgment issought, there is nothing to stop a person—albeit with a heavyheart—from questioning whether the object of loyalty may haveforfeited claims to it. The trust that tends to accompany loyalty neednot encompass gullibility and credulity. In the ordinary course ofevents, the trust that accompanies loyalty has a judgment oftrustworthiness as its background.

Ewin’s challenge does, nevertheless, raise the importantquestion whether judgments about the worth of loyalty are reducible tojudgments about the worth of the associations to which loyalty isgiven or the legitimacy of what is done as a result of them. Doesloyalty have any value independent of the particular associationalobject with which it is connected or is its value bound up exclusivelywith the object of loyalty? There is disagreement on this (parallelingdisagreements about the obligatoriness of promise keeping). Some arguethat loyalty is virtuous or vicious depending on what is done out ofloyalty. Others argue that loyalty is always virtuous, albeitoverridden when associated with immoral conduct. In the case of aloyal Nazi whose loyalty expresses itself in anti-semitic forms, wecould respond in one of two ways. On the one hand, we could point tothe fact that the loyalty is likely to aggravate the harm caused. Onthe other hand, were such a Nazi to act disloyally by allowing Jewswho bribed him to escape, we could argue that he is doublydeficient—self-serving and defective in his capacity to formclose bonds. Certainly the value of particular associations is ofimportance to how we value loyalty to those associations; but it isdoubtful whether the value of loyalty is simply reducible to the valueof the association in question. A person without loyalty or incapableof forming loyalties would seem to be defective as a person.

If loyalty is a virtue, what kind of virtue is it? The virtues are amixed bag, conceptually and normatively. There are, for example, moraland intellectual virtues, Christian and pagan virtues. In the instantcase, there is a distinction between substantive and executivevirtues. The substantive virtues include compassion, fellow-feeling,kindness, and generosity, whereas the executive virtues includesincerity, courage, industriousness, and conscientiousness.Substantive virtues motivate us to act well, that is, to do good, andare critical to our moral relations with others (and, in the case ofprudence, to our own interests as well). The executive virtues, or, asthey are sometimes known, virtues of the will, are important to theimplementation of what the substantive virtues require ofus—sincerity in our compassion, courage in our kindness,conscientiousness in our generosity. They help us to surmountobstacles to our doing good. Loyalty, like sincerity, is an executivevirtue, and its worth in a particular case is especially sensitive tothe value of its object. Like other executive virtues, it can becomeattached to unworthy objects—one may be a loyal Nazi or sincereracist. But that does not make their virtuousness merely contingent oroptional. A world or person without sincerity or conscientiousness orloyalty would be a seriously deficient one. The capacity and abilityto persevere in human associations that may require sacrifices from usare important to develop and exercise, and are what the virtue ofloyalty consists in. Thus, insofar as we express loyalty in particularloyalties, we should distinguish the assessment of whether someone hasthe virtue of loyalty from assessments of the worth of particularloyalties.

The executive virtues are an important ingredient in human excellence,but, like all virtues, they should not be cultivated in isolation fromthe substantive ones. When Aristotle discussed the virtues, he arguedfor the importance ofphronesis or practical wisdom in theapplication of the virtues so that they would not be deficient,excessive, or misplaced. In the fully virtuous person, the virtueswere never meant to be possessed in isolation but as an integratedcluster—one of the things the ancients were plausibly getting atwhen they spoke of the unity of the virtues.

There is sometimes a further question about whether loyalty, even if avirtue, should be seen as a moral virtue. Loyalty may be thoughtexcellent to have—even a component of a good life—but isit essentially a moral disposition? The divisions among virtues (say,intellectual, moral, personal, and social) are, however, at bestunclear and probably overlapping. Kindness is almost always morallycommendable, but imaginativeness (often said to be an intellectualvirtue), courage (usually categorized as a personal virtue) andreliability (sometimes called a social virtue) may be shown on thesports field or by enemy soldiers as well as in contexts that renderthem morally commendable. There may be no great value in attempts todifferentiate loyalty (and other virtues) into rigid and exclusivecategories. What is almost certainly arguable is that a person who iscompletely devoid of loyalties would be deficient as a personunderstood inter alia as a moral agent.

5. Justifying loyalty

There is a great deal of contingency to the development of loyalties.The loyalties we develop to family, tribe, country, and religion oftenemerge almost naturally as we become increasingly aware of the socialrelations that have formed us. Our identifications can be very deepand are often unquestioning. For some writers, this unchosenness iswhat distinguishes loyalty from other commitments such as fidelity(Allen, 1989). But loyalty also extends to consciously acquiredrelational commitments, as we choose to associate with particularpeople, groups, and institutions. Whether those latter loyaltiesdevelop depends on the extent to which the associations we choose tobe involved in acquire some intrinsic significance for us beyond anyinstrumental value that may have first attracted us to them. Suchexplanatory accounts, however, do not justify the loyalties we form ormay be inclined to form. Yet, because loyalties privilege theirobjects, the provision of a justification is important.

For some writers, the distinction between chosen and unchosenloyalties is critical. Simon Keller, for example, considers that ourgeneral unwillingness to question unchosen loyalties exhibits the lackof integrity often referred to as bad faith. Once we have suchloyalties—he focuses on patriotic loyalties—we areresistant to their scrutiny and self-defensively discount challengesto them (Keller, 2005; 2007). There may be some truth to the view thatwe are more likely to show bad faith as far as our unchosen loyaltiesare concerned, but it may be difficult to offer that as a generalcomment on unchosen loyalties. There may be no more reason not to callour patriotism into question when we see how our country is behavingthan there is not to call a friendship into question when we see howour friend is behaving. It may be psychologically harder (and a moralhazard associated with loyalties) to challenge unchosen loyalties, butthat does not sustain a general judgment about them.

Some have treated arguments for associational loyalty as though theywere cut from the same cloth as general arguments for associationalobligations. They have, therefore, embedded claims for loyalty in“fair-play” or“natural-duty-to-support-just-institutions” arguments forassociational obligations. But whatever the merits of such argumentsas grounds for general institutional obligations, they do not providegrounds for the particularistic obligations that we connect withloyalty. They do not capture the particularity of such obligations.Even consent-based arguments are insufficiently particularistic.Leaving aside the possibility that our basic political or parental orother associational obligations may also include an obligation to beloyal, we can usually fulfill what we take those obligations to bewithout any sense of loyalty to their objects. Obligations of loyaltypresuppose an associational identification that more generalinstitutional or membership obligations do not.

Of the various instrumental justifications of loyalty, the mostcredible is probably that developed by A.O. Hirschman (1970; 1974).Hirschman assumes, along with many other institutional theorists, thatvalued social relationships and institutions have an endemic tendencyto decline. He claims, however, that social life would be seriouslyimpoverished were we self-advantageously to transfer or relinquish ourassociational affiliations whenever a particular social institutionfailed to deliver the goods associated with our connection to it, orwhenever a more successful provider of that good came along. On thisaccount, loyalty can be seen as a mechanism whereby we (at leasttemporarily) persist in our association with the institution (oraffiliation) while efforts are made (through giving voice) to bring itback on track. Loyalty commits us to securing or restoring theproductivity of socially valued institutions or affiliations. To theextent, then, that an institution or affiliation provides highlydesired or needed goods for people, they have reason to be loyal to itand, ceteris paribus, their loyalty should be given to the point atwhich it becomes clear that the institution is no longer capable ofbeing recuperated or that one’s loyal efforts will be invain.

But as valuable as loyalty may be for associational recuperation, itis not clear that we can link its justification only to itsrecuperative potential. For even within a generally consequentialistframework loyalty may play a more positive role. The loyal alumnus whodonates $100 million to an already healthy endowment fund iscontributing to institutional advancement rather than stemminginstitutional decline. In such a case the loyalty expresses a desireto further institutional interests rather than restore or evenpreserve them. The donation is seen as an expression of loyaltybecause it expresses a commitment to the institution in the face ofthe alternatives available to the donor. An outside philanthropistmight, however, choose to donate the same amount, albeit not out ofloyalty to the institution.

More critically, if loyalty is viewed simply in terms of the goodsthat the associative object is able to secure or produce, theintrinsic value that the association has come to have for the loyalperson is overlooked, along with the sense of identification that itexpresses. It is out of that sense of identification that loyaltyarises.

An alternative account is that loyalty is owed to various associationsas a debt of gratitude. Although gratitude as a ground of obligationalso stands in need of justification (McConnell, 1983), it tends to bemore widely acceptable as a justifying reason than loyalty. The factthat we are the nonvoluntary beneficiaries of some of the associativerelations to which we are said to owe some of our primaryloyalties—say, familial, ethnic, or political—has providedsome writers with a reason to think that gratitude grounds suchloyalties (cf. Walker, 1988; Jecker, 1989).

But obligations of gratitude are not ipso facto obligations ofloyalty: the brutalized Jew who was rescued by the Good Samaritan mayhave had a debt of gratitude but he had no debt of loyalty (Luke10:25–37). Loyalty, moreover, may be owed where there is noreason for gratitude: as may be the case between friends. Obligationsof gratitude are recompensive, whereas obligations of loyalty sustainassociations.

There may be a deeper reason for thinking that—in someassociative relations—loyalty ought to be fostered and shown. Itresides in the conception of ourselves as social beings. We do notdevelop into the persons we are and aspire to be in the same fashionas a tree develops from a seedling into its mature form. Our geneticsubstratum is not as determinative of our final form as atree’s. Nor do we (generally) flourish as the persons we becomeand aspire to remain in the manner of a tree. We are social creatureswho are what we are because of our embeddedness in and ongoinginvolvement with relations and groups and communities of variouskinds. Though these evolve over time, such social affiliations (or atleast some of them) become part of who we are; and, moreover, ourassociation with such individuals, groups, and communities (thoughoften instrumentally valued) becomes part of what we conceive a goodlife to be for us. Our loyal obligation to them arises out of thevalue that our association with them has for us.

A broad justification such as this leaves unstated what associationsmight be constitutive of human flourishing. Perhaps there is nodefinitive list. But most would include friendships, familialrelationships, and some of the social institutions that foster,sustain, and secure the social life in which we engage as part of ourflourishing. To the extent that we accept that engagement with or in aparticular form of association or relation is constitutive of ourflourishing, to that extent we will consider loyalty to it to bejustified—even required.

The arguments that justify loyalty do not ipso facto justify unlimitedsacrifice in the name of loyalty, though they do not rule out thepossibility that, for example, a person might legitimately be willing,as an expression of loyalty, to lay down his life for another. That isoften the case in wartime and may also be true of some friendships.The strength of the claims of loyalty will depend on the importance ofthe association to the person who has the association and, of course,on the legitimacy of the association in question. Not only may someassociative relations be illegitimate, but the expectations of oneassociation may come into conflict with those of another: we may haveconflicts of loyalty. If the conflict is resolved by giving oneloyalty precedence over another, it does not necessarily follow thatloyalty to the one is disloyalty to the other. It is no disloyalty toa friend who is counting on me if instead I attend to my dyingmother’s needs. Sometimes such priorities will bestraightforward, at other times not. Prioritization may, nevertheless,call for an apology and compensation in respect of the disappointedparty. Even if we decide unwisely, our decision will not ipso factocount as disloyalty. Disloyalty is more often associated with theself-serving or hypocritical abandonment of loyalty.

6. Limiting loyalty

It has already been noted that it is not part of loyalty to becomplaisant or servile, though loyalty may be corrupted into such. Inany plausible account of loyalty as a virtue there must be openness tocorrective criticism on the part of both the subject and object ofloyalty. The “corrective” qualification is important. Notany opposition is permissible. A loyal opponent is not just anopponent, but one who remains loyal. What that entails is that theopposition stays within bounds that are compatible with the well-beingor best interests or flourishing of the object of loyalty. Generallyspeaking, a loyal opposition will not advocate (the equivalent of)rebellion or revolution for the latter would jeopardize the object ofloyalty (and perhaps lead to its replacement by an alternative objectof loyalty).

It is the commitment to opposition within (what are judged to be) theprevailing structures that has led some radical critics of loyalty(e.g., Agassi, 1974; Greene, 1973) to see it as—atbottom—a conservative virtue. Itis conservative,though in a positive sense of that word: it involves a commitment tosecuring or preserving the interests of an associational object, anobject that is, or has come to be, valued for its own sake (whateverelse it may be valued for). Nevertheless, the existence of a loyalopposition need not preclude the possibility that a more radicalopposition might and indeed should subsequently be mounted. If theloyal opposition proves incapable of “reforming” theobject of loyalty, the exit option (or something stronger) might betaken. In such cases it could be argued that the object of loyalty wasno longer worthy of loyalty or had forfeited its claim to it. It isonly if we mistakenly or misguidedly think of loyalty as making anunconditional claim on us that a derogatory charge of conservatismagainst a loyal opposition will have traction (see Kleinig, 2019).

For heuristic purposes, we can probably distinguish loyalty to atype of association (such as a state) or aparticularinstantiation of the type (such as the United States). Strictly,loyalty will be only to the latter, though it assists in understandingthe limits of loyalty if we make the distinction. If the type ofinstitution is thought to be critical to human flourishing, thenloyalty to it will be expected. But if the institution is ofrelatively minor significance, the development of instantiations ofit, along with loyalty to them, will be relatively unimportant (thoughnot necessarily to those who develop such loyalties). Whether, forexample, patriotism (that is, patriotic loyalty) is justified willdepend in part on the importance to be accorded to a state or country.If we are social contractarians, then the state (broadly conceived)offers a significant solution to some of the problems of humanassociation as well as an arena for social identification. We mightthink that both the state in general and loyalty to it are important.The state in general, however, needs to be embodied in a particularstate, andthat state may be such that the loyalty it shouldgarner is forfeited by how it acts.

Loyalty to a particular object is forfeited—that is, its claimsfor the protection and reinforcement of associative identity andcommitment run out—when the object shows itself to be no longerworthy or capable of being a source of associational satisfaction oridentity-giving significance. That is, the claims run out for theonce-loyal associate. (Others, of course, may dispute this.) Butwhether or not loyalty is thought to be justifiably forfeited, thebreakpoint may differ for different people. Consider the case ofinfidelity. For one woman, a husband’s infidelity challenges thefuture of the relationship but does not automatically destroy it. Therelationship will be considered reparable. The issues of trust thatare involved may be addressed and the relationship repaired. But foranother, such infidelity may collapse the structure in which therelationship has been housed.

Is there a right and a wrong in such cases? Does the first woman lackan appreciation of the “sanctity” of marriage/intimacy?Does the second fail to appreciate our shared frailty and thepossibilities for redemption and renewal? We should probably notacquiesce in the relativistic view that what is right for one is wrongfor the other. At the same time, however, there may be no easy answer.The two positions constitute the beginnings of a consideration of thenature of intimacy, what it reasonably demands of us, and how weshould respond to transgressions of its expectations.

The same may be true of other loyalties. Our approach may be assistedby utilizing the earlier heuristic distinction between the generalform of an association and its particular instantiation. We may beable to reach some general consensus on what a state might reasonablyexpect of us. However, in any actual association with a particularstate the content of the bond may be individualized.

6.1 Whistle blowing

The issue of loyalty’s limits is usefully illustrated by thephenomenon of what is sometimes distinguished as external“whistle blowing.” Although there is some debate about itsscope, whistle blowing can be helpfully (if not fully) characterizedas the activity of an employee within an organization—public orprivate—who alerts a wider group to setbacks to their interestsas a result of waste, corruption, fraud, or profit-seeking (Westin,1981; Bowman, 1990; Miethe, 1999). Because such employees aregenerally considered disloyal, it has been common to characterize themas traitors, snitches, weasels, squealers, or rats. “Whistleblower” offers a more neutral way of referring to such people,and permits an inquiry into the proper limits of employee loyalty.

The normative background to whistle blowing is a belief that employeesowe loyalty to their employing organizations. Such loyalty willinclude an expectation that employees not jeopardize theirorganization’s interests by revealing certain kinds ofinformation to people outside it. If employees have grievances, theyshould be dealt with within the organization (“we wash our ownlaundry”). The case for whistle blowing, then, is driven by therecognition, first of all, that internal mechanisms often fail to dealadequately with an organization’s failures, and second, thatbecause the interests jeopardized by those failures often includethose outside the organization, a wider group has a prima facie rightto know of the costs that it faces or that have been imposed onit.

Blowing the whistle frequently creates significant disruption withinan organization—it may lose control of its affairs as it issubjected to external inquiries and constraints; it may find itselfcrippled by costs or other restrictions; and many within it who arelittle more than innocent bystanders may suffer from the repercussionsof an externally mounted investigation. Because whistle blowingjeopardizes the organization’s interests (at least as they areunderstood within the organization), whistle blowing is therefore seenas a significant act of disloyalty. Whistle blowers themselves willoften argue that owed loyalty has been forfeited (or at leastoverridden), so that no (condemnable) disloyalty has been perpetrated.Occasionally they will argue that whistle blowing can be an act ofloyalty.

A resolution to such conflicting assessments must address the issue ofloyalty’s limits and, in the case of whistle blowing, it musttake cognizance of several considerations: (i) Because of thedisruption it threatens, the whistle should be blown only as a matteroflast resort. (ii) For the same reason the organizationalwrongdoing should be sufficientlyserious. (iii) The publiccomplaint should bewell-grounded—the reasons thatsupport it should be strong enough to be publicly defensible. (iv) Apotential whistleblower should consider whether he or she has aspecialrole-related obligation to take some action. Althoughany member of an organization might have some responsibility for whatis done in its name, some members will be better placed to makeappropriate assessments of seriousness and may be more responsible forthe way in which the organization conducts its activities. (v) Becausethe purpose of blowing the whistle is to bring about change, thepotential for the whistle blowing to beeffective ought to beconsidered. (vi) It is sometimes argued that the act of whistleblowing needs to beappropriately motivated—it must atleast be done out of concern for those whose interests are beingjeopardized. This last consideration, however, may have more to dowith the whistle blower’s praiseworthiness than with thejustifiability of blowing the whistle. A morally compromisedwhistleblower, however, may find his or her credibility undermined andthe exposé rendered ineffective.

Even if the foregoing considerations are satisfactorily addressed,there remains a question whether blowing the whistle is obligatory ormerely permissible. As omissions, failures to blow the whistle mustengage with debates about the moral obligatoriness of our acting toprevent harm. Even if it is morally obligatory, though, there may bereasons for not making whistle blowing legally mandatory. In addition,the potential costs to a whistleblower may excuse even legallymandated reporting of organizational wrongdoing (Glazer & Glazer,1989; Martin, 1992). Although legal protections for whistle blowershave been instituted in some jurisdictions, they have often provedinadequate (Glazer & Glazer, 1989).

Anonymous whistle blowing represents a possible solution; it opens thedoor, however, to disruptive whistles being blown for the wrongreasons or after careless investigation (cf. Elliston, 1982; Coulson,1982).

In sum, the case of whistle blowing illustrates not only theimportance of loyalty to many organizations but also the care thatneeds to be exercised when it is claimed that obligations of loyaltyare justifiably overridden or forfeited.

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Other Internet Resources

• Josiah Royce,The Philosophy of Loyalty, New York: Macmillan, 1908.
• Whistleblowing—International Bibliography, a substantial, though not complete, web-based bibliography on whistleblowing compiled by William De Maria, of the University of Queensland(Australia)

Related Entries

ethics: virtue |friendship |legal obligation and authority |obligations: special |patriotism |Royce, Josiah

Acknowledgments

I thank Julia Driver and Thomas Pogge for their comments on theoriginal draft of this essay and Cheshire Calhoun for comments on the2022 draft.